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attack submarines, half nu-
m f and half diesel. ...” The submarine
cWr
ls an excellent antisubmarine
;rce levels
hew
th,
atants
consider the following three ations.
ttt-e World War II, how much of a
Pbj
►
role
ha-
^ctical ASW; Let’s Fight Fire w'th Fire”
(See A \r
' an Saun, pp. 99-101, December
p„ j W- Estes- PP- 80-82, March 1977 “breedings)
lj *eriant Commander H. S. Stoddard, yan ^avy —Lieutenant Commander oUraun argues that the submarine is that “1°St effective ASW system and Co ~ - in lieu of producing ASW-
sh 1.^Urec^ surface ships . . we
°v®t 200U'ld 3 ' ‘ f°rCe °f Wdl
than*16 platform, but a more
C ,dout>ling of current submarine would essentially eliminate construction of surface com- if you realistically examine h0esPr°ieCted shipbuilding budget, lavor ^0rnrnander Van Saun really g the resulting unbalanced Navy? faCe0re virtually eliminating our sur- shoui^0rnbatahts from the fleet, he
'serv.
tty0 ~"Ve submarines played in the trtajor conflicts, Korea and Viet- tj0tls’ aricl in the numerous crisis situa- Lq ’. Such as the Mayaguez, Lebanon, ^rab'l''Can ^ePuhlic, Cuba, and the Pare<j rSrae^ wars? We must be pre- 'v>th °f C^e possibility of a major war the Soviet Union and its sub-
The forum
^ the p°me brief comments on material published (°piCs *°cee<hngs and also brief discussion items on Kibj naVa ’ maritime, or military interest for ^UrPose ^U^^cat*on on these pages. A primary Here j, tbc Proceedings is to provide a place c*chaeas °f Importance to the Sea Services can be J|)thor of ^nsr'mtc pays an honorarium to the hh--rj ° cach comment or discussion item pub- V___ *n tEe Proceedings.
marine force, but we also must be prepared for other crises, which occur with a much higher degree of regularity, and in which surface combatants have a major role.
y The submarine is highly effective in ASW, antisurface warfare (ASUW), and various covert missions, but how effective is it in providing gunfire support, in area antiair warfare (AAW) defense, in control of air intercept and ASW aircraft, in boarding, search, and seizure operations, in PIRAZ (positive identification radar advisory zone) duties, in plane guard and search and rescue missions, and in combating high-speed surface craft? y The surface combatant is undergoing revolutionary changes in capability. In ASW, surface ships are gaining a long-range passive (as well as active) detection capability which rivals the submarine’s, and embarked LAMPS helicopters provide a rapid means to effectively prosecute these long-range contacts. In ASUW, the imminent fleet delivery of the Harpoon missile will provide an excellent stand-off capability against surface targets. Finally, the fleet introduction of the Aegis system and the Mk 71 major caliber lightweight gun will provide major improvements in capability for the surface combatant in the AAW and gunfire support roles.
Commander Van Saun’s arguments for offensive ASW, for use of submarines in direct support of convoys and naval task groups, and for construction of a new class of diesel submarine are very worthy; the submarine is a very valuable asset. I would recommend, however, that he surface long enough to recognize that there is a need for a balanced Navy in which the air, surface, and sub-surface communities complement each other in ASW, as well as in other warfare areas. The surface combatant, which operates at the air-ocean interface, is an important player in this tripartite effort.
“The Future of the Navy”
(See B. M. Blechman, pp. 27-34, January
1977 Proceedings)
Commander T.M. Hale, U.S. Nary—It was particularly timely for the Proceedings to publish Barry Blechman’s article, since Dr. Blechman was a key member of President Carter’s transition team. For this reason the article should be taken as an indication of the direction in which our civilian leadership in government may guide the Navy in the future.
While Dr. Blechman offers some convincing rationale in support of his call to increase the effectiveness of the Navy, it was particularly distressing to note his reliance on the European central front "short war” scenario, which is so popular among some groups in Washington today. He would reduce or rechannel Navy expenditures associated with protecting the North Atlantic sea lines of communications in exchange for the prepositioning of war materials in Europe and improving airlift capabilities for a quick low-scale resupply effort. This no doubt would improve NATO’s capability to defend against the initial Warsaw Pact attacks, but it also would effectively preclude NATO’s capability to conduct a sustained war.
It is a poor strategy indeed that limits one’s options to this extent. Not only would untold billions of dollars have to be spent to preposition the 90-, 120-, or 150-day war stock, but additional billions would have to be allocated in the future to replenish the stock as it deteriorates or becomes obsolete. And, even without a Soviet onslaught, scarce dollars are consumed.
The short conventional war strategy has other shortcomings. y It presumes that a strong initial conventional defense in Europe will deter war.
Comment and Discussion 83
e worst case scenario is not a
So
h subordinates the primacy of the £Uclear deterrence.
It ignores the tremendous industrial ^pability of the United States to sus- ^ain a protracted worldwide conven- ^10nal war with the Soviet Union.
tvith *S ma*n^ a war ibught on land *t little play at sea where, in most
instances, t^le Uuited States and its al-
les can win.
Th •
War 6 rna’n Proklem with the short do Strategy’ however, is that it is jt0rnecI to failure from the beginning, ^makes no difference whether prepoOr *?ned stocks are established for 120 j H days, or longer, for all smart tQan and his Warsaw Pact allies have lo ° *S I^an rhcit war to last one day "fCr than the prepositioned supplies sj !ast and the West’s airlift can be ained, and they win the war.
Uhc
e C attack on the central front in t; I56- It is a worldwide confronta- “ the Soviet Union. This
of i We^ initiated in any number th ^ aCeS *n t^le world. For this reason an country needs a strong and bal- "’ith ^e^ense f°rce able to respond a variety of military options tive^ere *n r^e world with the objec- reri^ terniinating war, should deter. Ce foil, far from the shores of the n,ted States.
C o
(&nander L D Chirillo, U.S. Navy a tlred)—If “the structure and man- jn^ent of the American shipbuilding fia UStry Include the many naval or- atid'2at'°nS whlch impose procedures hu Part*cipate in day-to-day ship- Bl l"*® decisions, then Dr. $h- , otan is probably correct: “Naval of Riding is one of the few sectors e*pe 6 ^merIcan economy which has in rienced a decline in productivity AmeCent years- ” But If applied to the E*r eRCan shlpbuilding industry per se, Wron *echman’s opinion is grievously
etstecent years American shipbuild- du aVe slsnlflcantly improved pro- "u Vlty- Many improvements are tjva tuatter of intangible, subjec- qujt lodgments but are instead real, Eor 6 V*s*^Ie> and easy to understand, example, huge new cranes, including one having a 1,200-ton lifting capacity, are landmarks in the cities of Bath, Quincy, and Newport News. These are more than indicators of increased capacity. They exist primarily to permit large sections to be built in or near shops where special jigs, controlled climates, and better access facilitate productivity. Moreover, large units minimize the number of welds and, thus, time required for final assembly. More hulls, assembled per year in a capital-intensive building dock, yield greater productivity!
There are new facilities in American shipyards for building components and even entire hulls in flow lines. Complete hulls, 26,000 displacement tons each in a recent series, are transferred bodily into floating dry docks for launching. Productivity improvements are inherent in flow lines, but, in addition, these dry docks are used between launchings for the maintenance and repair of ships in service.
On their own initiative a few American shipbuilders applied computers to lofting and adopted numerical control for cutting steel. Acting in concert with the Maritime Administration and each other, through the National Shipbuilding Research Program, all remaining major shipbuilders were encouraged to adopt the process. They quickly developed this technology to a stage where it is equal to, perhaps even better than, any in the world.
The National Shipbuilding Research Program consists of almost a hundred such projects, too many to describe here. Most of them involve development of ship production technology, and a good number are in implementation. Now, in response to the industry’s expressed need, efforts are being applied to produce performance standards and regulation changes which will achieve more productivity
ith
her VTOLs and helicopters, reptcse^
\d
an adversary one cannot take lightly ot
however, considerable resistance providing catapults and arresting S'
to
eaf
long
V/SS°l
aircraft. The reasoning follows a
ting
the
cover solely under their own P° will be much heavier than aircraft
ait'
d hf
----- > ****■'- r
the pound, there is a trade-off betw .
i
through the use of new materials.
Dr. Blechman’s suggestion to go abroad for ships is not the answer to the U.S. Navy’s shipbuilding dilemma. The Navy needs American shipbuilders because their experiences and facilities are indispensable elements of U.S. seapower! And, the Navy is needed because it could provide stability to the American shipbuilding industry. The solutions lie in Dr. Blechman’s ideas to “require better, and yet less intrusive oversight procedures on the part of the Navy” and to motivate Congress to "take the politically difficult steps needed to deal with the problem.”
Jeffrey R. Thomson—In contrast to people who labor to prove that the attack aircraft carrier represents the modern-day battleship—meaning that the carrier is obsolete—Dr. Blechman seems a little unsure on the carrier issue. He recognizes that the Navy must have a power projection capability, and in this sense the attack aircraft carrier offers the inherent flexibility of a "floating” air base without the political and economic problems that are usually associated with fixed- land-based air forces.
Dr. Blechman, along with others, recommends that smaller carriers, of some 25,000-35,000 tons displacement, be developed. This would indeed be a good capability to have included into the fleet. However, this proposed ship is neither a reasonable replacement nor a substitute for the Nimitz-class attack aircraft carrier.
Granted there is no such thing as an invulnerable weapon system in the nuclear age; and this certainly includes the attack aircraft carrier. Nonetheless, in relative terms, the Nimitz-class attack aircraft carrier remains as sur- vivable as any single weapon system may be (and more survivable than many other platforms that have much less capability), in the event of general war, where the national survival of one primary belligerent is put in jeopardy. In just about any conceivable lesser conflict, the basic scenario that has involved the United States over the past 30 years, the Nimitz-class attack aircraft carrier may in fact be relatively ///vulnerable.
As demonstrated in Okean-75, the Soviets continue to place a high priority on attacking U.S. carrier task forces. I do not think that it would be a good idea for the United States to unilaterally solve this considerable strategic problem for the U.S.S.R. by failing to maintain at least a 12-carrier force on an indefinite basis.
Dr. Blechman laments that a Nimitz-class attack aircraft carrier would check in at $2.0 billion a copy—a considerable price to be sure. Dr. Blechman fails to point out, however, that these costs, including non- amortized R&D, are spread out over a time period of perhaps ten years. It is not a case of the Navy Department’s requesting $2.0 billion in a single fiscal-year budget for one ship.
Dr. Blechman also finds it hard to believe that Congress will support larger defense budgets. While this was the case in 1977, in the face of the ongoing, across-the-board, nuclear and non-nuclear, frenetic Soviet military buildup, the time may soon be at hand when there will be no feasible alternative.
“The Soviet Naval Air Force”
t$ee N. Polmar, pp. 96-101, March 1977
Proceedings)
Commander Tyrone G. Martin, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Constitution—Mr. Polmar quotes from a 1976 CNO study which states, in part, ". . . the Soviet Union will develop still larger carriers. . . .” From this statement, it is apparent that we still are unable to view another nation’s developments by any means other than a mirror. In the decades since World War II, we have seen the Russians create a naval force that is uniquely theirs. They placed early emphasis on a variety of missiles (including submarine-launched ballistic missiles [SLBMs]), made wide use of gas turbines, and now are working with vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) aircraft. They have taken their chances with these programs, sometimes suffering loss and embarrassment (not to mention the short-tern1 diminution of capabilities), in order t0 bring a new system on the line. An ' have done so because only throng quantum advances could they achie^e some measure of parity with the U- j Navy in a relatively short time, an because they were certain that the>f potential adversaries would not >nl tiate combat.
Bigger does not necessarily equate with improvement, however. Even °u^ Navy seems to be having secon thoughts about its big carriers, in that something called a CVV (V/ST° carrier)—in response to the Russia11 initiative?—is being bruited aboo^ Pick as one might, the Kiev’s SSM, and AAW missiles, together W’1
view from but one aspect. We won do well to be as innovative.
“Which Five-Year Shipbuild*11^ Program?”
(See D.H. Rumsfeld, pp. 18-25, February 1977 Proceedings)
Burton R. Laub, Jr., aerospaC engineer—Mr. Rumsfeld describes c conceptual V/STOL (vertical/sh°r takeoff and landing) ship as be*n^ equipped with catapults. There
to ships intended to operate
these lines: catapults and arres1 gear would add significantly to , cost of the ships, and V/STOL aitcra j being designed to take off from land in small spaces, won’t need 3 sistance anyway. _
Aircraft designed to launch and ^
designed to perform the same rnilita^-
mission with the assistance catapults and arresting gear. Since craft, like potatoes, can be price1
;v<
the cost of the aircraft and the cost
the catapults and arresting gear- j systems analysis should be perfott0^ to determine the most econotH* course of action for the planned V/S force level.
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1977
de
of the
d,
opment. Actually if the chain command within the brigade were
up as it would be in the operation Navy, the midshipman chain w°u^ end with the company officer; which point it would conti° ^ through the officer structure. *1°^ ever, as a leadership develop01 tool, the midshipman organiza11 ^ continues beyond the company leV^ to the brigade level. It affords 1 midshipmen an opportunity develop and display leadership s as well as have an input to the p01 decisions made at higher levels. ^ The supervisory and administta roles of the company and battali°° ^
shipman’s duties and responsibilk1 are great enough without ao
.era'
an
‘Let the Naval Academy J°*° the Navy”
(See J. D. Oliver, pp. 90-91, January Proceedings)
Lieutenant Paul H. Scberf, Jr->
Navy, U.S. Naval Academy ‘nstruCu tor—Midshipman Oliver has ma1 several points in his criticism system at the Naval Academy, a° having once been a midshipman, 1 ca° easily understand his frustration’ However, now that I am on the other side of the fence I can view the sim9 tion a little more objectively would like to take issue with a fe"’ his points.
The Naval Academy’s mission *s prepare midshipmen to become Pr° fessional officers. The U.S. mission, to put it simply, is nati°n ^ defense. These missions are diffef0c and for that reason I do not think 1 ^ it is possible or feasible to run Naval Academy in the same mannef the Navy is run. Legally a mids*11^ man is a member of the Navy, hut a practical sense he is not. His duty not as a front-line fighter but is so e^ to obtain an academic and profess*00 education in preparation for comf°lS sioning when he really joins the Na^y The dual chain of command wit ^ the brigade exists for leadership d° ^
set ial fleers are certainly necessary. A 011
addi^
further administrative duties, duties are not to administer the op tion of the brigade but to obtain ^ education. The supervisory r°*e^c these officers is no different from
Comment and Discussion 89
^ i°h will be encountered in the eet, for there is always a supervisor r°rn whom policies will emanate. The COrnpany officer can be viewed as a di- j1S*°n officer, the battalion officer as a
epartment head, and the dar
Th
ha<
comman-
nt as the commanding officer, 'us, if Midshipman Oliver advocates ,Vlng a chain of command similar to ^ at is in the fleet, it would be neces- ary to eliminate the midshipman or- ^a^*2at*on beyond the company level.
idshipman Oliver also makes the P°lr>t that there is no incentive for 8°°d performance at the Naval aderny. I must strongly disagree this premise. A midshipman’s ijf ormance is assigned a grade fol- Wlng each academic semester and TOrner program. These grades are (T?n Stored into his total multiple, a j tuultiple is made up of 70% c a ,ern'cs> 20% performance and tit)1 UCt’ an<^ f°t physical educa-
0tJ and professional exams.) This tel determ‘nes the midshipman’s ta ative class standing. The impor- Ce class standing first becomes his arent when the midshipman makes Se|eserv'ce selection since choice of hina|tl0n depends on relative standing, tank' C^3SS standm8 also determines lng on the lineal list upon com- tolStSh10ning. This may mean nothing •n h neWly cornrn*ssioned ensign but , e future it may determine when Ask eC°mes ehgible for promotion. Ac ,any member of the U.S. Naval tam ern^ f-lass of 1967 how impor- f0rr. c^ass standing is. When selection th 1?Utenant commander came up for i0tieC ass> only the top half fell in the an6, The bottom half had to wait thi 61 year f°r selection. A similar The^ ^appened to the Class of 1968. midsh' *S *ncent've’ although many •pmen may not be aware of it. the * S^'pman Oliver suggests that Scrac°nduct system should be similPed and that a system which is t0 non_)udicial punishment Syste instituted. In fact the present 111 operates in such a manner. pu . offense for which the maximum revj'S rnent is 30 demerits or less is pane^ed and disposed of by the com- view |^0rnrnancler with automatic recUsed ^ t^le comPany officer. The ac- tnidshipman is afforded the opportunity to make a statement, and, if so warranted, an investigation is conducted by the company conduct officer. Offenses with heavier punishments are reviewed and disposed of at higher levels. This system is identical, except for the punishments and automatic review, to the NJP system.
The feature within the conduct system for issuing demerits for minor offenses should not be eliminated. Upperclassmen should be encouraged to exercise leadership in dealing with the minor offenses of underclassmen, but the conduct system must be available for use when needed. Warnings can be used when deemed necessary by the upperclassmen involved rather than automatically writing up a report chit or issuing demerits. I must agree that there is nothing positive accomplished in making an individual march off demerits. Something more productive needs to be instituted to overcome this problem. The actual conduct system is a good system and does not need to be changed; only the manner of administering that portion dealing with very minor offenses may need changing.
“Erosion of an Ethic”
(See R. P. Dunwell, pp. 56-62, March 1977 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Jack D. McNamara, U. S. Marine Corps—"The Marine Corps is a competitive society.”
This phrase was dropped as one of a numbing litany of organizational assumptions during a lecture concerning one of the more pointless management fads au courant, "Management By Objectives,” at Marine Corps Command and Staff College.
There was not a murmur of dissent. I’m sure that most students were thankful that the instructor, a good one, was getting on in compressing several hours of pap into a half hour.
Colonel Dunwell’s article refreshes my memory and forces me to ask: Is the Marine Corps a competitive society?”
Was silence consent? Have we come to accept the values of the corporate jungle so implicitly that I was the only one among 144 students to feel mild irritation at such an odious premise? I hope not.
Make no mistake about it. When we make such an assumption within a context of “organization theory” and other social science management bilge to which we have become overly accustomed, we are not talking about the battalion beer bust and first versus second class physical fitness test scores. We are talking about very hard ball indeed. Many of us have been drawn into that game and are well aware of the difference.
We have been similarly well- schooled in the secondary functions of foreign affairs, bureaucracy, industrial management, etc. Such skills are almost irrelevant to arms. The necessary expertise is a civil one, not transferra- ble, thank God, to a battalion. Those who do take their Machiavellian bag of tricks with them are precisely the Mr. Hydes of whom Colonel Dunwell speaks.
“We only reflect society” was a recurring phrase during the transition to the all volunteer force. Well, we never did. Only about 7% of the eligible population ever so much as considered joining the Marine Corps. George Wilson in The Washington Post tells me this percentage still holds true. “We only reflect society” is a universal assumption which permits us to scapegoat failures. Society has failures, so we have failures. Society has successes, so we have successes. Society has competition, so the Marine Corps is a competitive society. Graduate schools are attended; political patrons are secured; and tickets are punched. Who has time for military matters?
We reflect society only very imperfectly. Assumedly, we want to be Marines, and very few civilians have similar longings, though most respect our desires. And, certainly, some of us must go to Washington. But the Washington corps could be smaller if Congress, the Defense Department, and the other 1,999 agencies, commissions, and clamoring interests will reduce their insatiable demands.
We must restore an ethic whose definition and example we have lost, perhaps temporarily. Sounding the trumpet for “professionalism” won’t do it. Inadvertently, the word has
definitely positive and represents best friend the working engineer
than 50-50? Are over half our
iding
al
come to connote “careerism” and that is not what I mean. But most importantly, we must exorcise this self- aggrandizing, corporate, sleazy one- upsmanship. For if we do not, then we are not an armed service; we are a civil service, and we surely deserve whatever that may bring.
“Publisher’s Note”
(See p. 77, January 1977 Proceedings)
Captain Frank C. Gilmore, U.S. Navy (Retired)—The decision to print the “High-Low” article was a very sound move. The idea that it might sell books doesn’t “grab me” all that favorably, but if that helped to get the article in print then okay. The condensation itself was most interesting and thought-provoking. The comment generated and published in Comment and Discussion has been even more interesting and provoking. Much of the material raised for discussion by the distinguished writers has been of a level far beyond that found in print or available at my coffee locker discussion level. It has been most enlightening. The Comment and Discussion result seems to justify the article. To my mind "High-Low” and Bob Smith's 1971 essay winner, “A United States Navy for the Future,” stand as the two most professionally stimulating articles I can recall.
I would hate to have missed the condensation and the comment; thank you for making the right decision.
“Is Military Unionization An Idea Whose Time Has Come?”
CSee J. E. Kane, G. C. Reynolds, A. R. Thorgerson, and J. Gordon, pp. 36-44, November 1976, and pp. 24-28, December 1976; E. J. Ohlert, p. 75, and C. E. Burns, pp. 82-83, March 1977; R. S. Mathews, R. W. Noland, and S. H. Edwards, pp. 76-79, April 1977 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander W. S. Hoffman, U.S. Navy—The authors may have been hasty in concluding that unions will have a detrimental effect on productivity and ship design. In fact, increased productivity and more capable ships, as well as a significant advance in women’s rights, may be among the
benefits of military unionization.
We should have no doubts that unions will negotiate military working hours and conditions. The immediate effect may very well be a decrease in output (defined as work accomplished) when the Navy is suddenly constrained from the indiscriminate use of labor (the “putting in whatever time is necessary to complete the task” the authors naively ascribe to “can do” spirit but which is far too often the fear of disciplinary action or loss of privileges). However, this should force Navy management to eliminate nonessential tasks and find better ways of doing the necessary ones, including automating or civilianizing many jobs. This, in turn, should increase productivity (defined as output per manhour). The Navy would also be forced to recognize and promote the talented and efficient performer, not the one who just works harder or longer. After an initial period of adjustment, increases in productivity, which must be attained with the cooperation and assistance of the union, could lead to a net increase in total output.
The authors argue that a union would demand improved shipboard accommodations, and that the resulting diversion of space and weight from weapon systems allocations would reduce the ships’ combat capabilities. A more likely union strategy would be to recognize the requirements of warship design and urge members to accept austere shipboard accommodations, but to seek compensation, such as sea pay, "two-for-one” sea tours, compensatory leave, etc. This type of arrangement would increase direct or indirect personnel costs, but naval architects could, with the full consent of the intended beneficiaries, scrap the current misguided habitability standards and return to the business of designing more effective combatants.
If women press their demands through the union organization, unions could be instrumental in winning for them the right to serve in combatant ships at sea. This should be an important objective even of the non-unionized Navy, both because it represents true equality and because it will avert the imbalances in sea to shore rotations that are inevitable ' the number of women in the Navy continues to increase under the current restrictions.
“Engineering Readiness Shot 0 The Arm: The Propulsion Examining Board”
(See R. L. Madouse, pp. 108- 111. January 1977 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander G. N. Eisc,en' U.S. Navy—Near the conclusion 0 Commander Madouse’s self-serving sales pitch for the Propulsion Exarnin ing Board (PEB), he states: “The efett of the program on the deck plateS^£
has
seen in many years.” Nonsense. This is a typical example of the PEBS Pf0 pensity to read their own press re views.
I don’t know which “working en
L/iC
gineers” Commander Madouse been talking to, but I doubt if c e are the officers and fleet sailors of °u operating ships.
In light of the fact that the PEB ^ been in existence over four years no" > let me just pose a few questions:
^ Why is the retention rate °f ® (boilermen) and MMs (machinist mates), first termers and careerists> declining, while the overall sur ac force retention statistics are sho"'nS slow but steady improvement?
^ Why is it necessary for almost eve^ ship, on either coast, to augment Engineering Department 30-60 7
prior to an LOE (light-off examinat'0 ^ or OPPE (operational propulsion Pa ^ examination) with “tiger teams ^ non-engineering personnel in order have a 50-50 chance of passing?
► Why are the odds of achieving
“satisfactory” on an LOE or OPPE .
y ship5
mismanaged? Or, is the PEB grino ^ an axe with capricious and unreaii standards? . .
^ Why is it necessary for our sem engineering watchstanders, wh° justly earned advancement and * confidence of their immed* . superiors, to undergo a semiannn inquisition at the hands of the PEB-
“q
ernian Remotely Piloted
a°mbs”
f&r C H d
](w. ' Bogart, pp. 62-68, November 6 Proceedings)
(Ret^ ^^omas Schreiber, U. S. Army Readers of Charles Bogart’s in afrnative article might be interested • j*er successful attack carried out PonoJ 6Se weaP°ns which is not men-
staff and attached to the 63rd er Wing for the purpose of
sde:
rer
ctin
the ^ operational. Consequently, in 4ja ^ginning of October, I flew to
and reported to the 63 rd
“The Board of Control”
(See E. B. Meyer, pp. 86, December 1976 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral John T. Hayward, U.S. Navy (Retired)—It is clear General Meyer misconstrued my criticism. I do not believe the members of the
tyL- y we frequently find ships rn-*C bave met all deployment com- neftrnen,tS 'n a sa^e an<f excellent man- ftesh nt^°r reCent|y bave undergone re- be' 61 tra'nmg and received kudos ** deemed grossly deficient by the
den^° SUr^ace warfare specialist will Was^ t^at *n years P3^ engineering Sj0na neglected facet of our profes- to •• ^°wever> in an apparent effort We ft0ne ^or tf‘e sins of our fathers” gone fVS Create<^ an agency that has j^aj6 ,ar ^ey°nd the intent of its origan ejC arter- The PEB has evolved into its *tlSt coter'e more concerned with ^jejCjnt*nue<J existence and power to cteate ^ hammer than it is to gjjj e a realistic effort to improve en- svereerin8 readiness. If PEB members they rea^ concerned with the latter,
> would be well on their way to lng themselves out of a job.
^ith
in the article.
ber September and early Octo-
eVar , > while German forces were
j>ent atlng Corsica, French contin-
^lacc Were be’n8 continually landed at
ernj 10 by submarines, destroyers,
Pir»i!erS’ and one LST. The U.S. 63rd
ta- Wlng, a unit of the Mediter-
^^ied Coastal Air Force
asSjp headquartered at Algiers, was
<rthe mission of establishing
Sar(jtlVe air defense of Corsica and
tirnen|a ^ q^ckly as possible. At the
^Aca Was a radar officer on the p. wap stat- P sites for the ground radar s which were to be set up on • ands, and expediting their be- 'ghter vyi- *
Wbicji Wing advance headquarters bad just opened there.
Upon arrival it was reported to me that the first radar, an SCR-270 belonging to a platoon of the 560th Signal Aircraft Warning Battalion, had arrived a day or two earlier on an LST, but, before it could be unloaded, the LST was hit and sunk at the dock by a “flying bomb” launched from a German aircraft. While the damage inflicted by this attack was relatively minor, the attack did delay attainment of an effective air defense capability over western Corsica.
To amplify a bit on Bogart’s account of the sinking of the Roma, this is the only instance in history where a modern battleship under way at sea was sunk solely by an aircraft bombing attack. Thirteen other dreadnoughts were sunk during World War II solely by air attack, but in all these instances either torpedo hits were the primary cause of sinking, or else the ships were in port when attacked. Bogart’s article implies, as do some other accounts of the sinking, that the Roma was hit by only one bomb. Evidently, it was hit by two bombs, as stated by Giorgerini and Nani in Le Navi di Linea Italiane (Rome, 1962). The hit near the forward magazine which caused it to explode was undoubtedly, however, alone responsible for the loss of the ship.
Board of Control have their orders from the CNO, or that CNO is the censor of what they approve in the way of articles. I do say it is such an obvious conflict of interest that it is clearly apparent to many people outside of the Navy. The CNO is part of the Executive Branch of our government. He is required to support the President, his Commander in Chief. If there is a raging controversy between the Congress and the Executive, he is obliged to back the Executive. Do you believe that this would permit the Institute to publish an article highly critical of the Executive? It is an obvious conflict of interest. In this day and age when there is little enough faith in our government decisions, one certainly can see why people would say the Institute cannot be overly objective where its case is beholden to the Executive.
Now I am not saying this has happened or that any CNO has slanted anything. I am saying, however, that the Board of Control does know the policy, and so little that is really controversial in Navy or Marine affairs will see the light of day in the publication.
I realize I cannot change the U.S. Naval Institute, nor will it be changed. The inertia of the establishment is such that I know we can’t really fight “city hall.” I give up, but at least I have said something that had to be said, and I hope gives members of the Institute an understanding of how that great big world outside may view the Proceedings. I appreciated General Meyer’s letter and will still look forward to my monthly Proceedings and read it with interest.
of
“Duty-Honor-Country”
Steven M. Cohen—Five years ago, as a second classman in the class of ’73, I was dismissed from the Naval Academy for misconduct; specifically for failing to attend eight classes during a rather complex change in majors that had been authorized by the Academic Dean. During a lawsuit seeking readmission to the Academy, I was offered and accepted another alternative: namely an honorable discharge with no further obligated service.
I entered Brown University, graduated after four semesters as class marshall (one of ten outstanding graduates), a Rhodes Scholar finalist, and was the first student to sit with the Board of Trustees.
But despite my apparent success (or good fortune), I was beginning to see myself as Edward Everett Hale’s pitiable “Man Without a Country,” who was kept at sea and never allowed to land. As a bilged midshipman, I had been heaved out on the land and would never be allowed to go to sea, or more importantly, welcomed back to the Naval Academy.
Today, like a pardoned Philip Nolan, I am being permitted, if not invited, back to the Maryland Avenue gate to add my comments to Midshipman Oliver’s January article. As the former Chairman of the Plebe Professional Program, I was part of the now defunct “shadow command” to which Midn. Oliver refers.
Because I became an Ivy League graduate, it does not mean that I dismiss the Naval Academy as a third- rate institution. I value my Annapolis experience, and look back on it with little bitterness or regret. Indeed, I look forward to renewing a relationship with an institution I respect.
That the nation’s Federal Service Academies in varying degrees are in serious trouble is generally accepted in some quarters. Cheating scandals, attrition rates exceeding 35%, and resignation and criticism from some of their most promising young officer- instructors have afflicted one or more of them during the past few years.
They have been investigated by the U.S. Senate, the General Accounting Office, assorted academic accrediting bodies, and perhaps even by the American people as well. The conclusions have not been complimentary. The Academies have been branded by some as expensive, as third-rate academic schools, and as unlikely to change despite need or pressure. They are also accepted as a national resource.
If the Academies were merely in the business of producing military officers, they would probably have been closed long ago. ROTC (Reserve Officer Training Course), OCS (Officer Candidate School), and other programs train officers competently and inexpensively. The difference is that West Point, Annapolis and Colorado Springs exist to prepare young men, and now women, for leadership positions in the military, government, and industry. Just in numbers of top decision-making positions held, only Academy graduates rival the Ivy League’s record.
In the case of Annapolis, the Naval Academy’s mission is no longer to prepare young people ”... in mind and character to assume the highest responsibilities of command, citizenship, and government.” Instead, a policy change in the Academy’s mission was effected in the early 1970s to simply prepare young men "for careers in the Naval service.”
The current importance of the graduates reflects the Academies’ glory of 20 and 30 years ago. Still a glory rooted in a different academic and professional program. Feelings toward the military were less critical, and the disparity between civilian colleges and the Academies less severe. The problem, in short, is that the Academies are suffering from an identity crisis. Sustained by the achievements of the past and plagued by the crises of the present, the Academies are ill prepared for the challenges of the future.
It must be recognized that the Academies are trying to prepare leaders, not merely fliers, tank drivers, or ship drivers. They are intended to provide both a high quality undergraduate education and officer training. But, in addition, and perhaps
more important, the values so apt Y expressed in the West Point motto — Duty, Honor, Country must be imbued.
To expect an 18-year-old, directly out of high school to enter a service Academy with the express purpose committing himself to a career is sitn ply unrealistic. To focus an Academy program toward a goal as narrow as maximizing retention rates subverts and cheapens the long and proud tra dition of the Academies. The primary goal of the Academies must be to or e a first-rate opportunity to develop a young person’s mind and character- Consequently, education, not tram ing, is necessary to develop these at titudes towards excellence and publ>c service.
To achieve the Academies’ g°a s and traditional missions is a diff|CU task. Too often the Academies are forced into situations where educa tional quality is sacrificed or intefleC tual curiosity is discouraged to at commodate conflicting military ^ mands within a limited amount time. To compensate, and at the sam<- time give the appearance of rigor, Academies create unrealistic and olt> mately counterproductive program5 For example, the typical Ivy LeagL1 program—whether engineering or 5^ cial science—requires four courses P ^
semester. This translates into
i • The
credits upon graduation. ^
Academies, however, typically mand five or six courses each serrie ., and 145 credits for graduation, though this additional academic Pre^ sure is viewed by some as an assist ^ weeding out individuals who rmg later cave in under severe pressure, when this additional academic Pre j sure is coupled with the additi°n^
military and athletic requirements
the Academies, the result is °ot qualitatively more demanding Pr^ gram, but a busier and more super cial one. ^
A second manifestation of this Pr^ lem results in a personal tension is perhaps most responsible for the frequent lapses of judgment that g erate honor code violations. ^
Cadets/midshipmen faced with c conflicting demands of heavy acade assignments and so-called “mint'1
Comment and Discussion 97
. uty-Honor-Country. Those three hallowed words reverently dictate at you ought to be, what you can be, and what you will be. They are °u.r allying points: to build courage when courage seems to fail; to re- U’A*2 when there seems to he little cause for faith; to create hope
fe1 hope becomes forlorn. . . .
he code which those words perpetuate embraces the highest moral laws th U stand the test of any ethics or philosophies ever promulgated for a °f mankind. Its requirements are for the things that are right,
tts restraints are from the things that are wrong. . . . ou now face a new world—a world of change. . . . r through all this welter of change and development, your mission *™ains fixed, determined, inviolable—it is to win our wars. Everything All ln y°ur professional career is but a corollary to this vital dedication.
other public purposes, all other public projects, all other public needs, r^at or small, will find others for their accomplishment; but you are the Uies u'ho are trained to fight; yours is the profession of arms—the will to t^>e SUre knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory . . . y , jhers will debate the controversial issues, national and international, tirj> ^*v*de men’s minds; but serene, calm, aloof, you stand as the na- tio S,Uar guardian, as its lifeguard from the waging tides of intema- vo?a confl‘ct> us its gladiator in the arena of battle. . . . Let civilian ou^5 ar8ue *be merits or demerits of our processes of government; whether fed Strfngth is being sapped by deficit financing, indulged in too long, by ralpaternalism grown too mighty, by power groups grown too arro-
politics grown too corrupt, by crime grown too rampant, by morals i(pU t? to° low, by taxes grown too high, by extremists grown too violent;
^e et,T °Ur Personal liberties are as thorough and complete as they should tj0 "ese great national problems are not for your professional participate m Hit ary solution. Your guidepost stands out like a .. . beacon in
e nlght—Duty-Honor-Country. . . .
- er*eral Douglas MacArthur’s last major address, delivered without tes on 12 May 1962 to the Corps of Cadets at West Point.
Utter
0rizing trivia, usually opt for the
ster “professional” perform-
atice
Jati0n
in which survival at the
^ade
fiuirernents of spit shining shoes . erT>ori?inr, -
f simply because the punishments
°r lacklur " " ' - - ^ are more severe anci more im-
fectlate- This has the unfortunate ef-
and SuU°rclinating academic quality
tti'ri f°rc'ng too many cadets/
nipmen into a situation where
acc(;-, at c^e Academy can only be
0tJe ^Poshed through shortcuts, i.e.,
°f which can be “cheating.”
thi IIT1^y Put> it should be the goal of
ton nCW ^ministration *n Washing-
t° reform the Academies such that
sir ’ a° not force young people into a *cUa*‘‘
Hj0 trues is more important and Ch ■ reaUdy accepted than honor. Causat'n8 should be a scandal, not be- k0jllf ls a flagrant violation of the is f code or concept, but because it affront to education. As a secondary objective, the trend in high attrition and low officer retention rates should be reversed.
Given the Academies’ history of excessive inertia and opposition to change, it is ironic and lucky that the new President of the United States is an Annapolis graduate. Jimmy Carter has not only the ability to turn around the futures of these proud institutions, but he has something perhaps more important. He has the credibility of an Academy ring.
To restore the Academies to their traditional leadership role. President Carter could take the following steps. ► Upgrade the academic standards. This means that the Academies must relinquish their reliance upon rote learning and short answer quiz methods, and adopt the more substantive and flexible approaches of the Ivy League.
y Direct that the faculties be civil- ianized and be staffed by teachers, not well meaning but inexperienced officer instructor!. Purely military courses would, of, course, be taught by military professionals.
y Extend the Zumwalt era Z-gram reforms to the Academies. This would help rebalance the military and academic dimensions of the Academy experience to adjust not only for higher academic standards, but for a serious lack of realism in the military-professionalism position of the program as well. y Appoint a civilian superintendent to head each Academy, an individual whose stature and career pattern might logically include the presidency of a major university. This would help ensure the implementation of the essential reforms, and underscore civilian control of the military. y Reconstruct the Academies’ Boards of Visitors to serve as governing bodies and not merely figurehead groups.
y Require that all cadets and midshipmen spend a year away from the Academy, and not in the military. This could perhaps occur between the sophomore and junior terms. A year off would afford a better perspective from which to make the important decisions about one’s career. It would make young people less likely to drop out of the Academies simply because of uncertainty or unwillingness to commit oneself to a nine-year minimum service obligation. Additionally, it would have an important and very necessary effect on maturing individuals, and give them much desired exposure to the “outside world.” y Relocate the nation’s senior war colleges at the Academies. This would give young people exposure to successful, career military officers, and acquaint them with current strategic and tactical thinking. It would also allow these senior officers to better understand the problems, concerns, and ideas of younger officers.
The question is not whether America needs the Service Academies; they are a part of the American tradition. Rather, we must ask how do we make them institutions worthy of their proud heritage.