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Donald Rumsfeld is likely to have an impact on the future fleet that will far outlast his recently concluded, 14-month tenure as Secretary of Defense. The judgments that he and others have contributed are fundamentally important to the future of the nation.
During the 14 months I served as Secretary of Defense, a good deal of time and attention was devoted to studying the circumstances our country will face in the maritime area in the two decades ahead, our maritime strategy, and the requirements of the fleet through the 1980s and 1990s. It has been an area of particular interest to me as a one-time naval officer, as a student of history, and as a member of the National Security Council. It is an area of vital importance to the nation.
Throughout its history, the United States has been dependent on freedom of the seas. To ensure that freedom over the years, we have maintained a Navy second to none and have deployed our fleet well forward, year in and year out. The presence of capable U. S. naval forces has contributed significantly to peace and stability in a dangerous and untidy world.
Tackling the Problem: When I assumed office on 20 November 1975, the Department of Defense was in the final stages of preparing both the fiscal year 1977 budget and the annual Defense Report to the U. S. Congress. It was clear to me that our country’s maritime strategy and long-term needs would require more work than what had been done specifically for the 1977 budget. For the first time, the Congress had called for submission of a five-year shipbuilding program with the budget. After the President and I consulted, the budget presented in January 1976 contained the proviso that it might prove necessary, at a later point in the year, to request additional appropriations for naval shipbuilding, once the National Security Council had completed its review of "the requirements and composition of the Navy in the 1980s and 1990s.”
It is instructive to start with where we are. Today, we have an active fleet of some 485 ships, in categories shown in Figure 1. Changes to this total occur almost
Figure 2
Ships Authorized hut not Delivered
5 | Ballistic Missile Submarines |
2 | Nuclear Powered Aircraft Carriers |
3 | Cruisers |
25 | Destroyers |
18 | Guided Missile Frigates |
30 | Attack Submarines |
6 | Patrol Combatants |
4 | Amphibious Ships |
13 | Auxiliaries |
The question | before us is, "Which ships should |
Figure 1
1977 Active Fleet
Ballistic Missile Submarines 41
Aircraft Carriers 13
Cruisers 27
Guided Missile Destroyers 39
Destroyers 35
Guided Missile Frigates 7
Frigates 57
Attack Submarines 77
Patrol Combatants 7
Amphibious Lift Ships 62
Mine Warfare Ships 3
Auxiliaries 117
485
daily as new ships are delivered and older ones are retired. The average age of the fleet is less than 15 years, so most of what we have in commission today will still be in service as we enter the 1990s.
Over the past five years or so, the Congress has authorized construction of 106 ships which have yet to be delivered. Thus, the most significant potential changes to today’s inventory are those in Figure 2.
make up the next five-year shipbuilding program?” While the National Security Council study of the subject was under way, shipbuilding proposals already in the budget were addressed by the responsible congressional committees- in the course of the annual budget review. Actions by the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee, in particular, differed in many respects. The House committee strongly favored modernizing the fleet with nuclear-powered ships and submarines; the one in the Senate expressed concern for the numbers of ships which could be added to the fleet if so much of the shipbuilding budget continued to be devoted to the most expensive ships. There was fundamental agree
ment, however, that our nation needed an increased level of construction if the Navy is to retain the capability to fulfill its assigned missions in the 25 years ahead.
In May 1976, the administration presented an amended shipbuilding budget for fiscal year 1977— based on preliminary results of the interagency National Security Council study—which would have provided for 21 new ships at a total cost of $7.3 billion (which included $1.7 billion for claims and cost growth associated with ships authorized in fiscal year 1976 and before). In addition, $200 million was requested to accelerate research and development in certain naval warfare areas, particularly V/STOL (vertical/short takeoff and landing) concepts. In concluding its work on the fiscal year 1977 budget, the Congress, in effect, did not address that proposed amendment. Rather, it authorized the construction of 15 new ships at a total cost of $6.2 billion, as shown in Figure 3:
Figure 3
Fiscal Year 1977 Authorization
1 Trident ballistic missile submarine Long lead funding for a Nimitz-class (CVN-68) aircraft carrier
Long lead funding for conversion of USS Long Beach (CGN-9) to Aegis capability
3 Los Angeles-class (SSN-688) attack submarines 8 Oliver Hazard Perry-class (FFG-7) guided-missile frigates
3 Auxiliaries
This action perpetuated a trend which has developed over the past decade, as indicated on this chart:
HISTORY OF NAVY SHIPBUILDING
It is obvious from the chart that there was a steady decline in real terms (i.e., constant fiscal year 1977 dollars) over a 15-year period before fiscal year 1976 in funds applied to purchase of new ships for the Navy. Even though real growth was budgeted for fiscal years 1976 and 1977, the numbers of ships authorized year after year have been far below the numbers required for needed growth in the size and capability of the fleet. One reason is that the funds have been inadequate. Another is that the emphasis has been on construction of relatively small numbers of the most expensive, most capable ships. Barring unprecedented real growth in the shipbuilding account, a continuation of this trend of past years will lead inevitably to a smaller Navy— too small a Navy to assure freedom of the seas. That predictable outcome, which I consider unacceptable, must be weighed against the requirements of national strategy.
Naval force requirements comprise a complex subject. The costs involved in shipbuilding are substantial, and lead times are long. Decisions made today will affect our country’s maritime posture from 1985 to 2000. Ships approved today will not enter the fleet for five or six years. They will remain in service 25 or 30 years. Given the long period involved, our judgments must be accurate. Mistakes made today may take years or decades to correct, assuming they are correctable. We must proceed on the basis of a realistic estimate of the geostrategic environment of the 1980s and 1990s and at least attempt to anticipate our national objectives over that period. It is, admittedly, not an easy task.
Our Geostrategic World Through the 20th Century: Although change is inevitable in our world, it is reasonable to proceed on the assumption that the major systems of alliances in which we participate are not likely to change much more in the next two decades than they have in the last 30 years.
It is probable that the Soviet Union—a nation which believes neither in freedom nor in self-determination for others—will continue as the only country which can physically endanger the safety and, indeed, the survival of the United States. The Soviet Union is behaving in a manner which suggests it will continue its military expansion and force modernization in order to achieve greater world influence, if not overall military superiority.
Some lesser nations, or combination of nations— with or without Soviet backing—could pose serious threats to U. S. regional interests. Still, the present military balance, on both the strategic and conventional levels, should be maintained, primarily because the American people are not likely to knowingly allow the United States to slide to a position of military inferiority. Crises in the future, as in the- past, are likely to occur as the Soviets attempt to expand their geopolitical influence, either directly or by proxy, particularly where they anticipate no firm resistance.
Changes in Sino-Soviet and Sino-American relations, and events in the Middle East and in the developing world will no doubt affect our policies and security. However, they are unlikely to alter the most basic threat we face throughout this century. Nations which, like the United States, believe in freedom and selfdetermination will continue to see this danger. Hence, it is most probable that the alliance systems now in effect will continue in their general form. Outside of our own hemisphere, Western Europe, the Middle East, Korea, and Japan will remain the most vital areas to us.
Our relationships with our allies should become closer as the world becomes even more economically interdependent. This is suggested by the fact that our foreign trade has been soaring, increasing sixfold in the past 30 years and doubling in the past decade alone. Some 99% of that trade moves by sea. It seems clear that freedom of the seas will become increasingly important to the United States and to our allies. Exploration of resources in and under the oceans will undoubtedly increase, giving emphasis to national efforts to control adjacent waters, including possible control of some straits now considered international waters. Technological growth by the United States and the Soviet Union is expected to be rapid. A number of lesser powers will also participate in technological advances, which will enhance their potential for considerable harassment, possibly against our interests on occasion.
Against this background, America’s fundamental national security goals and objectives are likely to remain—in the decades ahead—much as they are today. Our primary goal remains, of course, to provide for the physical security and political independence of the United States. To accomplish this goal, we must be able to:
► Deter the use, or threat of use, of nuclear forces against the United States and our deployed forces, our allies, and other nations important to our security.
► Deter the use, or threat of use, of conventional forces against our forces, our allies, and other nations important to our security.
► Terminate any conflict, should deterrence fail, on terms favorable to the United States and its allies.
For the deterrent to be credible and effective, the United States must both have a genuine war-fighting capability and demonstrate its commitment. Thus, the United States must maintain overseas deployment of capable forces—which, in coordination with the efforts of our allies, results in powerful leverage on prospective adversaries—in the foreseeable future.
U. S. Maritime Requirements: This need for forward deployment, along with the increasing interdependence in the. world, demands that we uphold our traditional policy of freedom of the seas. Bounded by oceans on the east and west, our nation uses the seas both as barriers for defense and avenues of commerce and influence. One of our states, several territories, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the vast majority of our allies—41 of the 43 nations with whom we have security treaties or agreements—lie overseas. Since the United States does not have enemies on its borders, our major strategic interests—and more general political and economic interests—are dependent upon our access to and free use of the seas.
To attain its basic national security goals and objectives, the United States must have unmistakable military strength and a force structure which reflects its maritime orientation. While today’s world is often said to be marked by peaceful negotiations and diplomatic attempts to resolve crucial international issues, today as in the past, military might and resolve remain basic instruments on the international scene. The primary responsibilities of our naval forces follow logically:
► We and our allies, as our primary maritime task, must be able to control vital sea areas in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Mediterranean, and project power overland from selected sea areas wherever and whenever necessary.
► We must be able to protect maritime commerce from intimidation or harassment.
► We must routinely deploy overseas forces to establish a U. S. presence and enable us to bring military power to bear rapidly in a crisis.
In times of relative peace, the routine forward deployment of U. S. naval forces helps achieve our foreign policy objectives. It helps provide on-the-spot deterrent strength, reassure our allies, and protect American interests and lives. It also establishes a U. S. presence when and where necessary, and a measured degree of military capability in areas distant from bases available to us. Since I960 alone, U. S. naval forces have been called upon to help in more than 40 specific incidents: the Cuban Missile Crisis, three Cyprus crises, two wars in the Middle East, the evacuation of Saigon, the release of the Mayaguez and, most recently, the evacuation of U. S. citizens from Lebanon, to name a few.
In my view, the use of naval forces in times of tension, short of all-out conflict, is likely to increase, given the fact that some lesser, but still radical, powers appear to be becoming militarily more capable, belligerent, and adventuresome.
While we do not anticipate substantial resistance on the high seas in such crises, we must prepare to safeguard selected sea areas for use during such times. This is the essence of sea control—the ability to control the air, the surface of the sea, and the subsurface of maritime areas of interest to us. Sea control is not something we must exercise at all times and in all places, but we must be able to do so wherever and whenever needed. This objective is achieved by neutralizing hostile air systems, surface ships, and submarines which threaten our own or allied forces in selected areas of operation.
To ensure sea control in the varied and demanding circumstances we are likely to face ahead, I am convinced that the United States must develop and maintain a margin of maritime superiority over any other nation. Only then can we expect to assure our own security, preserve freedom of the seas, and contribute in an effective manner to peace and stability in the world.
Soviet Maritime Goals and Capabilities: In large part, the course we must take to develop maritime superiority is driven by advances in Soviet maritime strength. As stated, only that nation—the only other superpower—threatens us in a fundamental way in the period ahead. Thus, U. S. force requirements must be sensitive to the capabilities and ambitions of the Soviet Union.
The traditional importance of sea power to the United States contrasts sharply with the geostrategic setting of the Soviet Union. As the dominant nation on the Eurasian land mass, the Soviet Union has historically stressed defense of its land areas against continental enemies. It shares a landmass with all of its important allies and also with a majority of its potential adversaries—NATO nations and China. Until the 1960s, the Soviet Union concentrated almost entirely on development of its land forces and, except for its large submarine forces, relegated its limited Navy to coastal defense.
However, the Soviet Union has been making steady, determined efforts to achieve superiority and international dominance across the spectrum of military capabilities. Expansion in the maritime area has been part of this steady effort. Certainly, the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated the utility of naval superiority in a crisis. Such maritime expansion clearly is a central element in the Soviets’ effort to develop the capability to project power worldwide, to increase both their military capabilities and their political reach in areas far from their shores. This has been evident in incidents such as the minesweeping operations in the Suez Canal, the harbor clearing efforts in Bangladesh, the naval presence in Guinea, and increased Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean.
The Soviets have built a navy with a greater number of somewhat less capable platforms than the United
States. This is generally true, even though there are exceptions such as the Kara-class cruiser. They coordinate the operations of their large fleet through an extensive command and control system, the sophistication of which was demonstrated in 1970 and 1975 worldwide Okean naval exercises which included global coordination of air, surface, and submarine activities.
To supplement their naval fleet, the Soviets have a substantial merchant fleet, fifth largest in the world in number of ships, which helps resupply the Soviet Navy, a worldwide hydrographic research effort with over 200 ships helping in naval intelligence, and the largest nuclear submarine construction capacity in the world.
This Soviet Navy, along with its supporting fleet, appears to be expanding toward a capability to threaten extensive American and allied use of the oceans for commerce, communications, and defense. Clearly, it is a force configured for denying control of the sea to an enemy, a task which is easier than the U. S. maritime tasks of sea control and projection of power. Basically, this means that the Soviets could thwart us in our more difficult task with a smaller number of less specialized forces. This in turn demands that our Navy achieve and maintain a definite margin of superiority to meet its responsibility and perform its missions.
Technological Developments: As indicated, decisions made today will directly affect the shape and capabilities of our Navy in the 1980s and 1990s. As a result, anticipated technological developments will prove important, if not crucial, to decisions on the shape and use of our future fleet.
The margin of U. S. technological superiority—an important factor in our past and present overall military strength—may now be diminishing. The U.S.S.R. has devoted more resources to military research and development over the past few years than the United States, and it continues to expand such efforts substantially. If we da not increase our efforts in turn, we may well see a number of Soviet technological "surprises” which could greatly enhance their capabilities and endanger our forces. At present, however, we still enjoy a technological edge.
Looking to the future, we can anticipate a number of technological developments possible for the superpowers, and some lesser powers as well, which could be crucial in the overall maritime balance. Among them is the cruise missile, a pilotless jet aircraft which can be used in small, flexible, highly accurate systems launched from a variety of platforms. Such missiles could be used to augment systems in strategic and theater nuclear arsenals. They already have entered the inventory of antiship weapons. The prospective availability of cruise missile technology should make the roles of land-based and sea-based air defense systems more significant than ever before in naval warfare.
Some other important potential technological advances include:
► Developments in space systems which could dramatically improve detection, identification, tracking, and long-range targeting of ships at sea
► Advancements in electronics, miniaturization, and guidance which would improve longer-range weapons
► Increased capabilities for long-range ordnance delivery, including tactical and theater ballistic missiles, air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles, and land- based air such as the Backfire bomber
► Antisubmarine warfare improvements, such as towed arrays, non-acoustic detection systems, signal processing, maritime patrol aircraft systems, helicopter capabilities, and the possible use of space vehicle monitored stationary arrays
► Helicopter and V/STOL technology to improve the aviation capability of major U. S. surface combatants
Such technological developments, particularly those involving sensor and weapon systems, may increase the spectrum of threats facing surface ships. This will affect the naval forces of both the United States and the Soviet Union, given the trend toward Soviet acquisition of larger surface ships. It should also encourage us to disperse offensive naval power over a variety of platforms, to complicate an opponent’s targeting problems. For this reason, our research and development efforts for smaller, still highly capable, surface platforms—and improvement in sensors and weapon systems which broaden their coverage—should continue.
Designing Our Naval Forces: Our future shipbuilding program must enable the Navy to meet its missions in light of the geostrategic situation and technological developments we anticipate. In addition, there are other considerations we should weigh, such as:
► The role and contribution of other elements of U. S. military capabilities, and Naval Reserve and merchant marine forces in helping to achieve our national maritime requirements
► The maritime contributions of our allies, particularly those in NATO, to be sure they augment and strengthen, rather than duplicate
► Soviet vulnerabilities and ways to thwart their missions through measures to diversify our forces, saturate their command and control network, emphasize mobility and covertness of our forces, and capitalize on the fact that they have few outlets to the oceans
► Retaining maximum flexibility for the future, given the long lead times of ships and geostrategic and technological uncertainties
► Ways to assure maximum effectiveness of our forces to achieve the greatest capabilities for the defense dollar ^ The possibility of future naval arms control measures, even though they seem unlikely at this point, and would pose complex problems
Further, U. S. naval forces should be designed to handle the most probable contingencies. For routine forward deployment, forces must establish an American presence with solid military power and a capability to stay and fight if necessary. The aircraft carrier certainly symbolizes American naval might around the world. While it meets the criteria for efficiency in naval power and presence, the cost of the large carriers, their aircraft, and support ships continues to grow, as it does with most weapon systems. Consequently, we have deployed other surface ships to constitute an American presence and capability for force projection in certain instances.
For localized crises—where the superpowers are not in direct confrontation—we must assure accurate surveillance of opposing force movements and composition. This is essential for the diplomatic handling of the crises and to head off unwanted concentrations of opposing forces.
To deter or, should deterrence fail, to win a worldwide conventional conflict with the Soviet Union, the United States would need a strong war-fighting capability and sufficient numbers of ships to secure vital sea-lanes around the world. This is, of course, the most demanding contingency we face, and one which requires that we design our forces on the basis of both present and anticipated Soviet capabilities. The next decade will likely see a continuation of determined Soviet efforts in the maritime area, with improvements and modernization of its Navy’s firepower, endurance, and survivability in conventional war. We can expect greater numbers of forces like the Kiev (the first Soviet carrier, a surface ship with three-dimensional war-fighting capability) the Kara cruisers, and a large force of increasingly capable nuclear attack submarines.
To deter or, should deterrence fail, to win a nuclear war with the Soviets at sea, we must possess adequate strength in our retaliatory force. As much as some might wish to dismiss this contingency, and as unlikely as it may be, still we must recognize the still growing Soviet capabilities to wage nuclear warfare. Their training, exercises, and tactics demonstrate that, from their standpoint, this is not outside the realm of possibility.
To meet these contingencies and others we cannot foresee at present, our naval force structure must include ballistic missile submarines, amphibious forces, antisubmarine and ocean surveillance forces, and multi-purpose task forces. Moreover, as we are likely to have to operate in oceans far from our shores, the mobility and sustainability of our fleet must be enhanced by modern underway replenishment ships and a variety of special auxiliary and repair ships.
The five-year shipbuilding plan submitted with the Defense Department’s fiscal year 1977 budget provided a benchmark against which our goals, missions, and expected capabilities could be measured. Basically, this program consisted of 12 carrier task groups, with a 13th carrier for which a reserve air wing is programmed. It also included the basic area antisubmarine warfare and ocean surveillance capabilities we require, and amphibious lift for the assault echelons of about one-and-a-third Marine amphibious forces.
Some Recommendations: Those involved with the National Security Council study of naval requirements, along with those involved with various congressional studies, agreed that the existing five-year program had to be substantially modified and augmented. In light of our continuing maritime requirements and responsibilities, the steady expansion of the Soviet Navy and of even some lesser powers, and the future geostrategic environment and technological developments, it became clear that the U. S. should alter the nature of its naval shipbuilding program and substantially quicken its pace. The number of new ships authorized for the fleet had dwindled to an average of 15 for the past five years. There was wide agreement that that rate should be doubled, at the very least, over the next five years.
Numbers of ships, of course, are not the only objective. The ships in the U. S. fleet must be effective units, representing the balance of capabilities required to meet a wide range of maritime contingencies. But numbers do serve, in part, as a proxy for the scope of the capabilities of the fleet in a geographic sense, and there is general agreement that the size of the U. S. Navy should be closer to 600 than to the present 485 ships by the mid-1990s.
A steady, sustained real growth of approximately 6% each year in overall ship construction funds probably could produce such a fleet, with the balance of capabilities we require. Some of the specifics of the five-year program presented with the fiscal year 1978 defense budget are these:
► Continue our present building program for Trident ballistic missile submarines at the pace of two-one- two-one-two (the numbers included in successive years of the five-year request) to ensure the needed modernization of this leg of the strategic Triad
► Maintain a force of 12 deployable large-deck carriers as long as possible by a careful program of service life extension. Construction of another large Nimitz-sized carrier (CVN-71) should not begin as planned in the earlier five-year program.
► Proceed as rapidly as possible with the design and construction of new 40,000-50,000 ton V/STOL carriers, equipped with catapults, as an alternative to additional large-deck carriers in the 1990s and beyond.
► Continue modernizing the attack submarine force with ships of the SSN-688 class, but not further increasing the backlog of units authorized but not under construction, with a program phased at one-one-one- two-two.
► Bring the Aegis air-control capability into the fleet in a mixed program consisting of two nuclear-powered strike cruisers and ten Aegis destroyers in the five-year period and defer conversion of the USS Long Beach (CGN-9) into an Aegis strike cruiser configuration until the ship’s anticipated recoring in 1983.
► Continue to buy guided-missile frigates (FFG-7s) at the maximum feasible rate.
► Substantially modernize the mine countermeasures forces and amphibious lift capability.
► Procure modern auxiliary vessels in the necessary and increasing numbers to enhance the Navy’s capability to support sustained overseas deployments and operations.
In sum, the proposed program would authorize 158 new ships—more than doubling the 1971-77 building rate—over the next five fiscal years. Figure 4 summarizes the proposals.
Figure 4
Fiscal Year 1978-82 Ship Construction
8 Trident Submarines
2 V/STOL Carriers of New Design
2 Nuclear Powered Strike Cruisers
10 Aegis Guided Missile Destroyers
58 Guided Missile Frigates
8 Nuclear Powered Attack Submarines
19 Mine Countermeasures Ships
6 Amphibious Ships
16 Mobile Logistics Ships
29 Auxiliary/Repair Ships
158
The most significant difference between this program and the one tentatively presented to the Congress last May—which was based on preliminary results of the interagency study of maritime strategy and requirements—is, I believe, the decision to move ahead as rapidly as possible with a smaller aircraft carrier design.
This is proposed with a full appreciation of the power, teamwork, and flexibility represented by a task force built around one of our largest aircraft carriers. Yet, when one looks at the geopolitical facts of the world in which we live—and that in which we are likely to live for the next two or three decades or more—one must conclude that the United States has to begin dispersing, somewhat, its aviation capability at sea. It was tempting to go for one more large nuclear carrier, with its $2.2 billion cost. But the broad thrust of the National Security Council study so recently completed drives one down another path—to a somewhat larger number of aircraft carriers, some of which are not quite so individually capable, and not so costly; in short, toward the ships needed to meet U. S. maritime requirements as we move into the 21st century.
There is no dearth of arguments and data on options for aircraft carrier design. To my knowledge, the subject has been worked over at two- or three-year intervals over the past 15-20 years, within and without the Department of Defense. The Navy’s study completed in the fall of 1975—which took the Nimitz design as a kind of upper boundary and worked downward through several smaller alternatives (the so-called "midi” and "mini” concepts)—became the nucleus for discussion of the subject in the interagency National Security Council study. Earlier Navy analyses of the sea control ship (SCS) and V/STOL support ship (VSS) concepts, and preliminary thinking about the kind of carrier which would follow CVN-71 in the early 1980s, helped fill in the spectrum which appears to be those in Figure 5.
Figure 5
Aircraft Carrier Alternatives
Design | Nominal Standard Displacement | Operating Aircraft Complement | Aircraft Capabilities |
Nimitz | 82,000 tons | 85 | Standard carrier air wing |
Large CV (like John F. Kennedy) | 68,000 tons | 80 | Standard carrier air wing |
Medium CVNX | 55,000 tons | 60 | Standard carrier air wing |
Medium CV | 50,000 tons | 60 | Standard carrier air wing |
Conceptual V/STOL Ship (CVV) | 40,000-50,000 tons | 50-60 | V/STOL, helo only |
VSS | 22,500 tons | 30 | V/STOL, helo only |
SCS | 14,500 tons | 17 | V/STOL, helo only |
If we are serious about building a new class of smaller aircraft carriers—the CVV indicated above—then V/STOL technology will have to be accelerated so that
the new ship can be provided with the range of capabilities inherent in a standard carrier air wing, albeit on a slightly reduced scale. The air defense capability represented by F-14 and F-i8 aircraft would be the deficiency of concern. Anticipation of that problem was the thrust of the research and development increment proposed in May 1976, as part of the amendment which changed our shipbuilding request.
There are those who argue that V/STOL technology cannot yield the requisite fleet air capabilities in time to equip a new V/STOL carrier delivered in 1984. Personally, I believe that, given a determination to move toward a new era of naval aviation, American industry can provide the tools needed to enable the U. S. Navy to perform its mission, in light of changing circumstances. In fact, our current AV-8 Harrier programs will provide the CVV with a useful suite of aircraft in the interim if such optimism turns out to be misplaced. Introduction of the Aegis fleet air defense capability, planned for the early 1980s in any event, provides an additional hedge against any present uncertainty in V/STOL developments.
Admittedly, it is a matter of judgment as to whether this is the time to push ahead with the new aircraft carrier concept. It is my conviction that, 10 or 15 years down the road, the nation will be better served by having a force level larger by two or three aircraft carriers of new design than the present force of 12 big carriers that would continue to be available if we were simply to build one more Nimitz-class ship next year. Because U. S. national security interests are global in nature, we will almost certainly want to have more ships and dispersed aviation capability over the longer haul.
The shipbuilding program which has been recommended to Congress is one which most nearly conforms to this nation’s maritime strategy and the naval force requirements which derive from the strategy. It is clear that a sustained effort, over a period of years, will be necessary to bring U. S. maritime capabilities from where they are today to where they must be a decade or more ahead.
Mr. Rumsfeld graduated from Princeton University in 1954 and was commissioned an ensign the same year. After initial indoctrination with Composite Squadron Three (VC-3), he reported for training in PBM seaplanes. He was designated a naval aviator in 1956 and subsequently served as an aviation instructor at Saufley and Corry Fields in Florida. After three years and five months of active duty, he was released as a lieutenant (junior grade) and continued to perform a variety of Naval Reserve duties thereafter. He was promoted to the rank of captain in 1975. Mr. Rumsfeld was elected a U. S. Congressman from Illinois in 1962 and has subsequently served as Assistant to the President, Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, Counselor to the President, Director of the Cost of Living Council, U. S. Ambassador to NATO, and Coordinator of the White House Staff. From November 1975 to January 1977, he was Secretary of Defense.