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The concept of a unionized Navy is not new. The main difference between past and present attempts to unionize the military is that past attempts centered on the formation of new unions, while present efforts focus on the integration of the military into existing unions.
The current intense interest in unionization stems from three sources: first, the career Navyman’s dissatisfaction with his lot and, more importantly, his perception of an inability to influence the collective destiny of which he is a part. Secondly, union leaders have recognized the discontent and have come forward in an attempt to fill this need for representation. Lastly, staunch opposition has been raised against the military unionization movement by both naval and governmental leaders who fear unionization will compromise military discipline and preparedness.
Federal Labor Unions: The beginning of the organized American labor movement can be traced as far back as the late 1800s, a period in which unions endeavored to protect worker interests from management dominance. With the passage of the Wagner Act of 1935 and the assembling of an increasing constituency, unions took a more aggressive position and "effected a sweeping redistribution of the power that was once held exclusively by management.” Lately, however, they are striving to preserve their established power and have become "advocates of the status quo: They are now finding it to their advantage to attempt to control change or even to prevent it.”[1]
Labor unions in the federal government had their beginnings in the 1800s when trade unions were introduced into the Boston Navy Yard. By the 1940s, the
Navy had generally recognized and accepted trade unions representing civilian employees on military installations. It was not until January 1962, when President John F. Kennedy signed Executive Order 10988, that federal labor unions achieved full status in the government. Executive Order 11491, which superseded 1098^ in October 1969, covers the administration of labor- management relations in the federal government, recognition of units, negotiation of contracts, rights anti conduct of management, labor unions, and employees- It prohibits striking or bargaining for wages by federal unions or employees. It also prohibits unionizing national security organizations, specifically the Federa Bureau of Investigation and Central Intelligence Agency - The three main unions representing civilian empl°y' ees of the Navy are the American Federation Government Employees (AFGE), National Federation of Federal Employees (NFFE), and National Association of Government Employees (NAGE). These unions have undergone essentially the same historical growth phases as those in the private sector. The largest of these federal sector unions, the AFGE, is now exploring a potential candidate for unionization—the U. S. naih tary. One source of inspiration for the AFGE is the process of unionization of the European armed forces- European Military Unions: The demand for unions of other bodies representing the military officer, non commissioned officer, and draftee has been part of the evolving social climate in Western Europe over the paSt ten years. In most cases, the drive to establish effecttve systems to air grievances and to protect interests has been organized by draftees or conscripts of variouS Western European armed forces. They are permitted to belong to political parties and participate in polittca activities when outside the barracks and off duty an out of uniform. Discipline, however, largely remain5 subject to military control. The Swedish Armed Force5 Union, the Association of Draftees (V.V.D.M.) of the Netherlands, and the mixed military association/labo1 union personnel system of the Federal Republic 0 Germany have all had an impact on military person
I'his whimsical drawing suggests one far-fetched consequence had there heen military unions in John Paul Jones’ day. It is to be hoped that if unions do come, they would never lead to this sort of refusal to fight.
But almost certainly there will be situations in which some presently accepted military duties will be curtailed or at least questioned.
officials. The "Central Committee on The Institution' Consultation of the Military,” as it is termed, is chaite personally by the Minister of Defense.6 .
In 1969, the viability of the V.V.D.M. was enhance by the fact that dues subscriptions were thereafter de ducted automatically from military pay, and officef5 were given the right to devote regular duty time to the union. Since then, the V.V.D.M. has made progressin spite of adversity created by agitators in the early Sev enties who joined the armed forces in order to under mine the consultation process.7 The following lS 3 summary of the main changes brought about by fbe institutionalized consultation process:
nel decisions in their respective countries. French and Italian military forces have attempted to form military unions, met with resistance, and succeeded only in causing unrest within the military.
The Armed Forces of Sweden: Collective Bargaining. The union-like system of the Swedish armed forces evolved during the spring of 1965 as a result of that country’s enactment of the "State Officials Act.” This act "extended the private sector’s collective bargaining rights over salaries and working conditions to nearly all national civil servants, including armed forces members. . . . Any Armed Forces member of any rank may legally join a labor union with civilian affiliation.”2 Unions of officers, noncommissioned officers, warrant officers, and draftees now exist, and they engage in coordinated bargaining with civilian public employee unions to obtain improved pay and benefits. The officer’s union consists of approximately 5,000 active duty members ranking through general and is the smallest main organization. Further, several hundred officers are members of a separate professional workers’ union. Noncommissioned officers have formed a 9,000-member union as part of the largest white collar union federation. This federation has organized public employees on all levels of government and it has also signed up their counterparts in private industry. The 5,800-member union of warrant officers is also a part of the large white collar federation. Figures concerning membership in the draftee union are unavailable; however, this union has an impact comparable to the officers’ unions. Most draftees are not only in the draftee union but also maintain civilian union affiliation as well. These military unions may not strike or negotiate matters of selection, tenure, and retirement. Flowever, the civil service may strike, and as a result has won improvements which concomitantly benefit the military. This benefit occurs since military members and civilian workers are on the same salary scale, and unity between the civilian and military halves of the public service has been fostered. Overall, the Swedish system has resulted in improvements in military efficiency, discipline, and morale. Among the accomplishments of the union are:
► Increases in pay for lower ranked officers, as high as 8% per annum
► Establishment of a 31-grade uniform salary scale for all Swedish national public employees, military and civilian3
► Marked increases in soldier morale4
The Armed Forces of the Netherlands: Institutionalized Consultation Without Collective Bargaining:
"'Institutionalized Consultation’ is defined as organized discussion between representatives and Armed
Forces personnel on matters of mutual concern pn°r to any governmental decision implementation in the military personnel field.”5
The consultation concept described above has pr0' vided an organized forum for effecting qualitative and quantitative changes within the armed forces of the Netherlands. In July 1966, the V.V.D.M. ("the soldiers union”) was organized at the Army post at Ede & Holland as a result of the suggestions and efforts o draftees striving to protect their own interests. Through the cooperation and support largely of the Dutch pe0' pie, press, politicians, and a number of high-ranking officers, the Dutch armed forces now have the most powerful conscript union in Western Europe. Out o 45,000 conscripts, about 22,000 are members of the union which has an annual income of about $360,006 received as dues. Its headquarters are in an Army bat' racks, and the union is run by seven draftees under the supervision of a 27-year-old private. The Netherlands personnel system does not provide for negotiation b) unions of pay and military working conditions with the Ministries of Interior and Parliament. Instead, office* and enlisted personnel serving in the Army, Navy, an Air Force are members of dues-collecting associations which send elected representatives to a monthly eon1 mittee meeting with the appropriate Defense Ministb
► Flabit ability:
Establishment of new billeting standards Modernization of mess halls, cafeterias, and mainte nance facilities
Modernization of all barracks and Army posts
► Working Conditions:
Reduction of the number of formations to two eac day
Abolishment of so-called military trains which ^er£ mandatory for off-duty travel previously
Allowance of wearing of civilian clothes after dub hours
► Discipline:
Reduction of the number of inspections and rhe
Is Military Unionization an Idea Whose Time Has Come? 39
Crnphasis on personal responsibility Abolishment of close detention Abolishment of the penalty of reduction in rank Abolishment of standards on beards and the length °f hair
^ Personal Freedom:
Introduction of the "free” reveille. It is not mandatory to rise immediately after a reveille. However, each person should have washed, shaved, dressed, and cleaned his or her room before the morning formation.
Introduction of the right of married draftees to pass [he night outside the barracks ► Pay:
An increase in pay to the level of the mandatory Minimum youth wages for a person of 20
In appearance and working conditions, the difference etween a young man in or outside the Dutch armed 0fces has almost disappeared. Soldiers of other armies are especially annoyed with the slovenly appearance of fhe Dutch soldier. But under working conditions and Maneuvers, he is able to convince his European counterpart of his competence and dedication. At present, the Minister of Defense feels that the 22,000-member ass°ciation lacks objectivity; however, he does not intend to hamper the association in any way in expressing ‘ts opinions publicly. On the other hand, the minister rmly rejects the demand for the right to strike.8
Phe Federal Republic of Germany: A Combination of ^sociational Consultation and Collective Bargaining: lnce military unions are not permitted in West Ger- ^ai*y, the German Armed Forces Association (DBVB) Utictions as a quasi-union. The DBVB is the principal soldiers’ organization in West Germany. It behaves ^uch like a professional association and is comprised of ^embers from the lowest enlisted ranks to general °fficers. Within this system, members elect representa- ;^s who lobby within the Defense Ministry and the est German legislature for favorable legislation con- ^rning allowance, retirement benefits, and the like. The bvb also offers members low-cost insurance as well.
. c West German system is a mixed military associa- tl0r>/labor union in that the military members may join
Ur>ion and have dues collected from their pay, al- °ugh the DBVB does not actually negotiate personnel Matters. "The mixed military/labor relationship within e Federal Republic of Germany represents a com- Prornise between the Netherlands’ institutionalized c°nsultation and Sweden’s genuine collective bargaining Ostein. . . ,”9
Over 1,800 noncommissioned officers have joined Public Service and the Transport and Traffic Trade n’°n (OTV) since 1967. The OTV is made up primarily public employees and negotiates a collective bargain's agreement annually with the Federal Minister of the
th,
TOBY MARQUEZ
Shoutder-to-shoulder, U. S., Dutch, and West German sailors swabbed the bore of a 5-inch gun during the mixed-manning demonstration in 1964-1965 on board the USS Claude V. Ricketts (DDG-5). The modern Dutch sailor probably is a dues-paying union member, the German sailor can join a quasi-union, and a great many U. S. career enlisted men are saying they would support a union that woidd speak for them to Congress.
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, right, seen being briefed on the progress of Trident submarine construction by Electric Boat officials, sees military unionization as "incompatible with the mission of the United States armed forces. ”
Interior. Since civilian and military salaries are derived from the same schedule, the OTV has complemented the efforts of the DBVB in garnering favorable action for armed forces personnel concerning allowances, pay increments, overtime, retirement formulas, and other changes. The Federal Republic’s mixed military asso- ciation/labor union works well and compromises neither discipline nor preparedness.10
France: The 330,000 soldiers of the French Army, of which 75% are conscripts, are forbidden by law to participate in political or union activity while on active duty. Moreover, various draftees who have attempted to form unions in their units have been met with strong governmental resistance. Attempts so far to create military unions or similar committees have been viewed by the French Government as subversive undertakings to demoralize the French Army and have not been tolerated.
Italy: The agitation in the 460,000-member armed forces of Italy by approximately 2,000 radical draftees has been viewed with concern by Italian Government officials. These radical draftees have illegally paraded in uniform, demanding the right to form unions and to undertake political activity in the barracks. Additional demands have concerned more pay, better food, more comfortable accommodations, and the opportunity to serve closer to home. Thus far, the drive to unionize the Italian Army has been small and led by only a few draftees. But government officials fear that the movement may grow and develop dangerous consequences.
Very little information about the actual quality of the unionized fighting forces of Western Europe is available since they have engaged in no conflicts. Also, there is a major difference in the mission of U. S. forces and those of Western Europe in that the ones serving this nation must be capable of projecting offensive power on a global scale. Most European forces are designed primarily for national defense and generally maintain an offensive role only through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is less difficult to motivate a soldier to defend the motherland than to fight for an unclear national interest on foreign soil as the Vietnam conflict demonstrated. This aspect further complicates the issue of U. S. Navy unionization.
Pressures for Unionization: The possibility of a unionized Navy is the result of the peacetime situation and the present economic situation, which together have produced a trend toward elimination of benefit pr0' grams and pay increases. In wartime, Navy personne make sacrifices and live and work under less than desif' able conditions; however, the peacetime attitude is very different. The high inflation rate of the late Sixties an early Seventies has produced Navy-wide discontent m the area of personnel compensation. Navymen receive annual pay increases of approximately 5% while negoc1' ations for other professions are publicly settled f°f greatly increased pay and benefit programs. For example, a settlement with the Teamsters Union earlier tms year allowed approximately 28% pay increases over the next three years, unlimited cost-of-living adjustment’ increased health benefits and improved working conditions. This package will place Teamster truck drived (labor) on a pay and benefits level which is exceeded m the Navy only by its highest ranking officers (manage' ment).
The discontented Navyman has two options: to g£t out as soon as possible or to stay in until retirement-
► Those who resign or who choose not to reenlN deprive the service or quality and experience it cannot afford to lose.
► Those who continue on become embittered and trated as they encounter further inequities in pay an reductions in benefit programs.
The career personnel in the last category feel helples* in their situation and are searching for alternatives 0 action of which unionization is one.
The concept of a unionized Navy is not new. Tb£ main difference between past and present attempts t° unionize the military is that past attempts centered on (he formation of new unions, while present efforts focus °n the integration of the military into existing unions.
the past the need to "be heard” was perceived as unnecessary by the constitutionally apolitical Navyman ecause he was aptly represented by his Commander- *n-Chief and was viewed favorably and treated respon- si% by Congress. The current trends in this area are evidenced by recent quotes of Department of Defense and Congressional leaders:
Restrain the growth in compensation levels;
Reduce . . . positions by consolidating headquarters and other base facilities;
Phase out subsidies for the operating costs of military commissaries over a three year period;
Reduce temporary duty and permanent change of Nation travel;
"Hold new construction below 1976 levels;
Reduce the paid drill strength of the Naval Reserve f ^0,000 (emphasis added);
Allocate a larger part of pay increases to quarter . °wances [rather than basic pay (thus reducing re- tlrement pay increases which are computed as percent- a§es of basic pay)];
Reduce or even eliminate Champus [health benefit H°gram] payments for various types of counselling;
■ • • modernize the nondisability retirement system
130 years service instead of 20 with benefits starting at age 55J ”11
F°ur unions have gone on record as exploring the Possibility of representing the armed forces. They are the oierican Federation of Government Employees . FgE), the National Maritime Union, the Associa- tj°n of Civil Technicians, and the Teamsters Union. Of ,ese unions the most serious consideration has been 8lven by the AFGE, a federal employees union of over ^0.000 members, of which approximately half are epartment of Defense employees.
The AGFE’s logic in trying to bring the military into .e union is based upon the link between government Clv*lian employee pay and military pay. In 1967 the pay lr,Creases for military personnel were coupled to white c°llar Civil Service employees, and since 1974, military arH Civil Service pay have had the same effective date.
^ Presidential order issued in 1969 gives unions '-’presenting federal civilian employees (including De- rtment of Defense employees) the right to negotiate 0r>tracts and process grievances. This order does not tj^ Clfically exclude armed forces personnel and, under
Constitution’s First Amendment rights on freedom
assembly and association, armed forces unions could c*ist.
attempted to defer civilian and military pay raises, a situation which, according to AFGE officials, would have saved the Treasury Department several hundred million dollars (depending on the amount of the raise and the length of the deferment). Union court cases and congressional votes have reversed the deferments. In 1974, the most recent time the President considered deferment, the AFGE decided to involve the military. Handbills were sent to military personnel urging them to write their Senators and Representatives since it would be in the serviceman’s own self-interest to receive the pay raise as scheduled. The Congress prevented the deferment, and the AGFE stated that the military effort was a strong influence on the resultant vote. The mutual concern between the AFGE and the armed forces was apparent at that time and consideration of offering AFGE membership to armed forces members was discussed at the 1975 and 1976 AFGE conventions.
Clyde Webber, president of the AFGE until his death in June of this year, made the point that his organization was still only examining the feasibility of unionizing the military. Webber contended, however, that since military personnel came to him for help, ". . . all you can assume is that if they thought the [associations] could help them, they wouldn’t be turning to us.”12 At present, strikes are unlawful in government unions, but as Mr. Webber stated before his death, ". . . if you treat people shabbily and give them no way to see hope in the future, they are going to do what they are going to do. . . ,”13 He discounted the idea that the existence of a union organization could
. . Unionism in the sense that there would be collective bargaining to determine whether or not certain operations would be undertaken is 'unthinkable’ in a military sense.”
Si
trice 1970, a President has on five different occasions
Admiral James L. Holloway III
could flourish.”19 The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James L. Holloway III, believes that unionize tion in the sense that there would be collective barga>n ing "to determine whether or not certain operations would be undertaken is 'unthinkable’ in a mihtarf sense.”20 Vice Admiral Robert Baldwin, now CQl11 mander Seventh Fleet, said a "military organizatm9
exists for the exigencies of battle where we must
ThoSe
who oppose unionization generally do so because ^ feel that the present command structure would
Career enlisted personnel are split on the issue.
provide the focal point for a strike. He also argued that there would be no divided loyalty between the union and the unit.14 Mr. Webber’s successor may have different views.
Analysis of personnel compensation and benefits (in millions of dollars) for military and civilian employees shows the following comparison:15
1974 1975 1976
(estimated)
Total, civilian
personnel costs 31,945 35,590 39,060
Total, military
personnel costs 22,472 23,210 23,960
This comparison is interesting in view of further discussion in Special Analysis H which shows the number of military personnel on active duty (1976 estimate) as 2,137,800 compared to 2,801,800 civilian employment (including Postal Service). Military personnel constitute 43.27% of all federal employees and consume only 38.01% of the personnel compensation and benefits budget. Further, the civilian pay budget has increased 18.21% since 1974, whereas the military portion has increased only 6.21%. The total change in personnel since 1974 has been an increase of 0.28% for civilians and a decrease of 2.7% for military.
To further emphasize the drastic trend under way in the budget, it should be noted that, "Ten years ago, 43% of the Federal budget went to Defense and 32% to 'benefit payments to individuals and grants to states and localities.’ The [fiscal year 1977] budget projects only 26% ($101.1 billion) for Defense and a whopping 55% ($217 billion) for benefits and grants.” Outlays for social and benefit programs have increased 164.3% from 1969 to 1975. Defense spending has increased 8% over the same period.16
The AFGH stands to gain much more than leverage for pay increases for its membership. Organizing the military would mean more members, more money, and, therefore, more power for the union. Projections forecast at least a trebling of AFGE’s present $9.7 million budget with the incorporation of the armed forces.
Pressures Against Unionization: The opposition to a unionized Navy comes from many individuals and groups. As previously discussed, some Navy personnel favor unionization. However, many officer and enlisted personnel have gone on record as being opposed to a unionized Navy. Many Navymen have become accustomed to the traditional concepts and cannot visualize an effective military under a union.
Most senior military and civilian personnel associated with the Department of Defense oppose unionization for a variety of reasons. Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld has termed the idea of unionization as " in‘ compatible’ with the mission of the U. S. arme forces.”17 General George Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has said that "Military personne cannot live up to the oath of service and still wor under a union contract.”18 Department of Defense officials have acknowledged the effect of restraining military pay and benefits. According to Navy Ttffi^i "Deputy Defense Secretary William P. Clements, Jr- has acknowledged that the Defense Department, b) restraining military pay and benefits, is creating a situation in which unionization of the armed forceS be
assured of immediate and absolute response to orders . . . unionization is not necessary or workable in batt or preparing for battle.”21 Retired Vice Admira Emmett Tidd, former Pacific Fleet Naval Surface Force Commander, feels there is no place in the armed force- for a union. "Collective bargaining would erode mi tary command authority, good order and discipline an have a negative impact on national security.”22 ^lCC Admiral Samuel Gravely, now Commander Third Flee° pointed out that direction of the armed forces is veste carefully in constitutional and public law through • clearly prescribed national command authority. "I ‘-f' see great international danger in the perception ■ other world powers of the effectiveness of the America11 defense establishment were it to be immobilize ' collective bargaining.”23
No support could be found among senior Na^ officials for unionization. Within the laws and regu^ tions of the Navy, a commanding officer’s judgm and subsequent actions are absolute. Lawful mm ; orders must be obeyed immediately by subordm ^ personnel. The establishment of a union could begin ‘ erosion of this absolute power and, therefore, sen Navy officials vehemently oppose unionization. j|
Junior and middle grade officer opinion is not documented, nor would it be publicly expressed due ^ the precarious nature of their position on involve111 in this issue. Although the officer-enlisted relations ^ under unionization is open to speculation, it is 10 ^ probable that these officers would bear the brunt day-to-day union problems.
affected. These personnel put the overall effectiveness of the Navy ahead of their individual desires, pay raises, and benefit increases. Career personnel who favor un- 10ruzadon are those with longevity investment in the hlavy. They seek wage increases comparable to the private sector and an end to the erosion of benefits.
Junior enlisted personnel stand to gain from unioni- Zat’°n; however, as evidenced by low career reenlist- tttent rates for first termers, most junior personnel do n°t plan on a military career and are apathetic about the Union issue.
Many legislators are opposed to unionization. Most n°teworthy among them is Senator Strom Thurmond ^ho, in addition to 24 other senators, has sponsored a _ (S.3079) which would make any form of military ^Mon or active solicitation to join a military union legal. Senator Thurmond noted that "some freedoms ^hich are well-recognized in the civilian sector must be enied to the military” in order to maintain the "disci- Phue, command authority, patriotism and quick re- sP°nsiveness” necessary.24 Senator John Stennis, chair- tlaan of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has stated "there is no need for a military union if officers Provide 'leadership, encouragement, and patriotic inspiration’ to their men.”25 Congressman Bob Wilson, 'Mj10 represents the large Navy community of San lego, said, "If we want to hire mercenaries and have a Uriion, then the whole idea of service to one’s country is the window. I oppose it very strongly.”26 Research as produced no legislators who have gone on record in SuPport of military unionization.27
One person who has not spoken on the issue but ^ho could have a powerful voice in determining the °utcorne is AFL-CIO President George Meany. He has c°nsistently supported a strong military and is a tradi- tlonalist in this matter. (The AFGE is an affiliate of the Afl-CIO.)
. One of the most active groups to oppose unioniza- t’°n of the Navy is the Fleet Reserve Association ^A), a 128,000-member group of Navy, Marine 0rps, and Coast Guard enlisted personnel, most of ^hom are retired. The FRA guards its members’ interim and employs three lobbyists in its efforts to favora- y affect political issues. The organization has scored Several notable successes over its 50-year history.
the FRA convention of 1975, it was resolved to oppose unionization of the Navy, and $112,000 was edicated to this effort. This, however, is a small sum c°rnpared to available union funds. The FRA has under- ta^tn a membership drive that if successful will achieve t'v° goals. First, increased membership would mean tTl0re money and authority. Active duty personnel of all Pay grades, not just career people, are being solicited for P°ssible membership. Secondly, an increased membership will document increased opposition to unionism. The continued existence of the FRA depends upon the failure of unionization in the Navy. If unionization does occur, its normal recruitment of members would diminish, and the ability to represent members could be reduced, if not eliminated.28
The FRA National President, Joseph D. Morin, feels that unions could divide the Navy between the young sailors and the career people. He acknowledges that working conditions are not optimal, but he feels these sacrifices must be made to maintain the prescribed level of readiness, and that unions would face difficulty improving these working conditions also. Morin feels his best selling point is that the FRA is experienced in handling a Navyman’s problems, that it can provide Congress with the necessary information on how Navy people feel about relevant issues, and that this can all be done without disrupting discipline and the chain of command. However, Morin admits that the FRA has insufficient funds to organize an effective publicity campaign.29
Morin has endeavored to document the Navyman’s opinion. Most of his efforts have been personal visits to various units where he has found that the prevailing attitude among all Navy personnel is that a unionized Navy could not defend the country as effectively as the present force. Additionally, young Navymen would rather follow a respected leader than become involved in a union-like arrangement. He was surprised to find the large number of career enlisted who would support a union movement if a union would improve their voice in Congress.30
"... a situation in which unionization of the armed forces could flourish [is being created J. ”
Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements, Jr.
Military associations could present a viable alternative to unionization. There are many groups with an impressive membership size, but they are not organized, and their membership comprises mostly retired personnel. Active duty personnel are not well represented by these groups due to their paucity of membership.
In next month’s concluding installment, the authors examine the present "non-union” Navy system and the effects unionization could have in the U. S. Navy. Finally, they put forth their own recommended solution of the unionization question.
SH Lieutenant Kane graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy ■J in 1968 and was designated a naval aviator the following I year. He served as a flight instructor in the advanced I training command and made several Western Pacific I deployments while attached to Patrol Squadron Six. Lieu- ^ tenant Kane is currently serving aboard the Navy Manpower and Material Analysis Center, Pacific as a management engineering analyst.
Lieutenant Reynolds was designated a naval flight officer in 1971. He has served in the Western Pacific on several carrier cruises while attached to fleet Reconnaissance Squadron One. He graduated from West Virginia University with a degree in industrial management and has completed graduate work at the University of Southern California. He is presently serving as a management engineering analyst at the Navy Manpower and Material Analysis Center, Pacific, advising naval commands on the optimum allocation and utilization of
Lieutenant Thorgerson was commissioned ensign and designated as a naval flight officer in 1970. He has served tours of duty with Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron Three and the Navy Manpower and Material Analysis Center, Pacific. He is presently assigned to Air Anti-Submarine Squadron 38, Naval Air Station, North Island, San Diego. He holds a psychology degree from Washington
t Lieutenant Commander Gordon was an NROTC student at the Georgia Institute of Technology, from which he graduated with a B.S. degree in industrial management in 1965 and was commissioned an ensign. He has served as resident assistant Navy exchange officer at Naval Air Station, Agana, Guam; supply officer of the USS Vesuvius (AE-15) and USS Joseph Strauss (DDG-16), and receiving officer at Naval Supply Center, Norfolk. Currently, he is serving as assistant officer in charge of the Navy commissary store region, San Diego.
JSaul W. Gellerman, Motivation and Productivity (New York: American Management Association, Inc., 1963), p. 270.
2 Clyde M. Webber, Testimony Before The Defense Manpower Commission: Or ganizing The Military Services Into a Union (Washington, D.C., 18 AuguSt 1975), Appendix II, p. 6.
3Ibid., p. 8.
Albid., pp. 2-10.
5Ibid., p. 3.
6Washington, D.C. Royal Netherlands Embassy. Military Attache T. L. )■ Brouwer letter to David Fisher, The Unionization in the Netherlands Arm)-
7 November 1975, Article 3, p. 2.
7Ibid., Article 1, p. 1.
8 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
9Webber, op. cit., Appendix II, p. 2.
10/bid., p. 10.
11 Fred Lardner, "DOD’s Views on Economizing”, Shipmate (U. S. Nava Academy Alumni Association), April 1976, p. 34.
12 R. C. Barnard "Unionizing the Services,” The Times Magazine, 24 Septeiri ber 1975, p. 22.
13Ibid., p. 24. l*lbid., p. 43.
15Webber, op. cit., Appendix IV.
16Fred Lardner, "Think About This”, Shipmate, April 1976, p. 34; Lardn^ "Human Resources vs. The Military,” Shipmate, April 1976, p. 32.
17"Rumsfeld, Brown Knock Unionization,” Navy Times, 23 February p. 30.
lsIbid.
19"DoD Concern Over Morale, Unionization Threat Is Hinted.” ^ Times, 23 February 1976, p. 4.
-°James L. Holloway III, Testimony Before The House Armed Sets'**- Committee, 2 February 1975, Naval Affairs, March 1976, p. 1.
21 "Serviceman Union Drive Adds Steam.” The San Diego Union, 24 JanuaO 1976, Sec. A, p. 6.
22 Ibid.
23Ibid.
24"Bill Would Ban Unions In Military.” Navy Times, 15 March 1976, P- 1
25"Stennis Says Military Officers Hold The Key To Unionization.” Times, 16 February 1976, p. 25.
26Serviceman Union Drive Adds Steam.” The San Diego Union, 24 JaniiaD 1976, Sec. A, p. 1.
£■
27San Diego, California. Congressman Bob Wilson letter to J0*10 Kane, 19 March 1976.
-8Joseph D. Morin, Fleet Reserve Association, San Diego, California lfl terview with Arne Thorgerson, 12 March 1976.
29Ibid.
30lbid.