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Preceding pages: Men of the world’s third largest navy race aboard a pair of the North Sea Fleet’s Romeo class submarines moored in at Lushun. The People’s Republic of China has some 60 submarines, many more than any country save the Soviet Union and the United States. The submarines appear to be operated timidly, in a fashion guaranteed to give little value for the resources committed. But, then,
China’s navy marches to a drum beat very different from that headed by European and North American navies.
All military laws and military theories which are in the nature of principles are the experience of past wars summed up by people in former days or in our own times. We should seriously study these lessons, paid for in blood, which are a heritage of past wars. That is one point. But there is another. We should put these conclusions to the test of our own experience, assimilating what is useful, rejecting what is useless, and adding what is specifically our own . . .
Mao Tse-tung—December, 1936 "Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War”
A
J. Xny student of the modern Chinese military scene would agree that Mao has been a keen observer of Chinese military history. His works are laced with allusions to ancient battles and he has often written with fond reverence for Sun Tzu, the military philosopher who set forth the Art of War nearly 2,500 years ago. Most Chinese, in fact, take an acute interest in their history and despite the introduction of Marxist- Leninist ideology, there is a pervasive "sameness” with the past in the structure and content of many of their modern political, social, and economic institutions. As is clearly evident in Mao’s quote, the military is not excluded from tradition but, in fact, directed to "assimilate” those useful lessons learned from the past. Thus, no look at the Navy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would be meaningful without reference to the naval tradition. Only in this way can one determine whether the world’s third largest navy is a product of history whose basic strategy, tactics, and organization remain essentially unchanged from the traditional system; or whether the Chinese Communists, as claimed,
Just as in all other contributions to the Proceedings and Naval Review, the opinions and assertions in this essay are those of the author. They are not to be construed as official.
are creating something specifically their own—"a revolutionary force which writes a new chapter in naval history.”
The case of China is an enigma—a country with a vast coastline totaling over 7,000 miles and more than
3,500 offshore islands, yet rating only a lengthy footnote in the histories of seapower. Most China scholars believe that this aversion toward naval and maritime development is rooted in the very core of Chinese culture—the Sino-centrist ethic, a recurring theme in Chinese history which has had impact on every majof political, economic, and military change since the third century B.C. Conceived in the Confucian era this national characteristic promoted a belief in the political centrality, cultural superiority, and economic selfsufficiency of China. Sustained through the centuries by a decentralized autocracy whose government was bureaucratic and authoritarian, these beliefs stood counter to a desire for intercourse with "barbarian” nations and were manifested through the "Great Wall” strategy.
In Imperial China the sea, in fact, was the original wall and the grand 2,000-mile-long brick and mortar edifice was built inland as an extension of the natural sea barrier. Until the West began its penetration of China in the nineteenth century, Imperial China’s only threats from the sea were pirates; the real challenge to China’s security came from its interior frontiers, especially the northern nomadic tribes, whose frequent depredations were to be countered by the Great Wall- Thus, early on, navies were created which adhered to the principles used successfully by the armies, and » naval strategy of "Haifang” or maritime defense evolved- An important element of the "Haifang” system was the regional defense concept which resulted in a decentralized naval organization managed by loyal provincial officials appointed by the emperor. Thus, coastal fleets were funded and administered by provincial civil leaders who, more often than not, looked to their more powerful army commanders for advice on naval matters. Without an Admiralty at the capital, the coastal navies, concerned only with pirates or rebels, frequently operated in a semi-autonomous fashion. Little though1 was given by the conservative regional leaders to creating "blue-water” fleets.
This is not to say that China consistently rejected naval or maritime expansion as an instrument of foreign policy—there are several significant examples if her history to refute this. The great Ming expeditions to Africa described by Captain Dewenter in Naif Review 1975 are a case in point, and so are several anti-pirate operations as distant as Japan, Vietnam, and the Strait of Malacca. The Ming expeditions were sponsored by the emperor himself, and the admirals and seamen were his own men. However, during those
periods of naval expansion, there was a clash of interests between the conservative elements who represented the traditional "brick and mortar” school and those who advocated construction of fleets capable of operating at sea beyond the protection of coastal fortifications.
As an illustration, during the disastrous Opium Wars with Britain from 1839 to 1842, a small group of southern Chinese officials developed an acute apprecia- tton for sea power and there were serious attempts made at the local level to catch up with Western technology. The Manchu emperor, too, underwent a change of attitude, and when the situation became esperate he proclaimed: "In my opinion, what the rebellious barbarians rely upon is the fact that Chinese V/ar)unks are incapable of going out to sea to fight them • ■ • If Fukien, Chekiang and Kwangtung (provinces) each can build large-sized warships with many more SUfis on board, they will be able to fight the rebellious arbarians on the sea. Above all, these ships will destroy discredited tribe, or at least will be able to pursue ^emY ships. The governors of Fukien, Chekiang and Wang rung are hereby instructed to plan carefully and t0 carry it out secretly.”
There ensued a brief flurry of activity as provincial experiments were carried out to build steamships and guns. However, most provincial officials opposed this c°urse of action, contending that the barbarians could easily be defeated by blocking rivers with rocks and air*ed timbers. Even if these barriers were breached, guns from the forts would "reduce the foreign ships to ashes.” In tpe encp Q,inese attempts to adopt modern naval technology were thwarted by these conservatives Wh° insisted that any imitation of the barbarians would Underrnine the Imperial system of government.
Later in the nineteenth century China finally began t0 emerge from her naval hiatus and "purchased” a triodern steam navy that was quite respectable by West- C*rn standards. Chinese naval academies were created in coastal provinces and officers received training in ntain and France. In some instances, Chinese crews ^a'led their new cruisers and battleships to China from urope Despite the presence of these modern ironclads ln Chinese waters, conservative officials still argued for j*Slng these ships as floating fortresses to augment the ®rts ashore. Others contended that further exposure to estern ideas and technology would ruin Imperial ^thority and naval training in Europe should cease.
n the eve of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, many fr°vincial leaders were busily engaged in preparing old arbor-blocking devices such as sunken junks and fire ts- One Viceroy, in Shanghai, effectively sealed off e city by filling the Woosung channel with rocks. Clearly, China remained a fortified nation uncertain t0 how to employ her modern weapons. Some enlightened officials were keenly aware of the impact of modern ships and guns upon strategy, but despite their pleas no attempt was made to contest Japan for control of the approaches to the Yellow Sea. Instead, Imperial orders to the largest and best Chinese force, the Peiyang or Northern Squadron, directed that the fleet not advance beyond a line from the Yalu River to the tip of the Shantung Promontory, that is, not far beyond the Gulf of Po Hai. As a demonstration of how centuries of decentralized naval command and control handicapped the Chinese, when ships from the Kwangtung Squadron, sent north to support the Peiyang Squadron, made contact with Japanese warships rounding Korea, they indicated to the Japanese flagship that the imminent battle was not their concern and promptly reversed course for Canton. A few days later, the Peiyang Squadron was beaten, damaging China’s naval potential to such an extent that it took nearly eight decades to reemerge under the hand of the Communist admiral- generals.
As stated earlier, China now ranks third among naval powers in terms of manpower and units, and she is rumored to be quietly at work constructing nuclear submarines. Despite her present status as a ranking naval power, China is still lightly regarded by many naval experts, being invariably described as a weak naval power wholly devoted to coastal defense.
The most important question, however, is how do the Chinese view their increased naval capability? Are they now determined to embark upon a naval expansionist program, and if so, is there a clash of policy between "modernizers” and "traditionalists”? The following sections clearly show that there is disagreement in Peking and, while often cloaked in Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, the modern arguments between the "revisionists” and "revolutionaries” bear strong similarity with past periods of Chinese history.
The Expansionist/Revisionist Line
As early as 1949, Mao Tse-tung is noted proclaiming that "to oppose imperialist aggression, we must build a powerful navy.” To many Chinese leaders Mao’s statement was intended as an indictment of China’s past naval weakness, thereby signalling a shift in policy. Hence, less than two years later, when China was receiving significant assistance from the Soviet Union, the deputy-commander of the still weak PRC Navy, Wang Hung-k’un, is quoted as saying: "The Soviet Navy is an example for the Navy of the Chinese people and is the direction of construction of the Chinese People’s
Navy.” By 1955, China’s intent, in theory at least, to commit its small Soviet-equipped Navy to something other than coastal defense could be found in the classroom. At the Chinese equivalent of Newport, the Nanking Naval War College, a translated version of Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power Upon History had become standard reading fare among senior naval officers.
At the same time "Regulations on the Service of Officers” were adopted in February 1955, and ranks and privileges were approved which were essentially the same as those used by the Soviet Navy. Then, in September 1955 naval titles and honors were conferred on military leaders. At the ceremony, thirteen ex-army leaders received the rank of rear admiral or above and the Chinese Navy officially began to take on the look of a modern professional force. The old informal revolutionary military structure, founded on egalitarian and "democratic” principles, was considerably changed.
During the next four years more army officers were selected for Navy flag rank, and a rating structure for enlisted petty officers and seaman also was taking shape.
By 1961 over 90 different enlisted ratings were identified, and the terms of enlistment were set at five years. Basic pay was augmented with special stipends for those serving in submarines, and a sea-duty allowance was also listed for surface sailors. Provisions were also adde< to the "Regulations” which detailed the selection o' personnel for officer training, with emphasis on technical abilities. In both the officer and enlisted ranks promotions were heavily weighted toward professions competence, and time limits were established for advancement.
By 1959 the roots of a more aggressive naval policy could be discerned in statements by important military leaders. General Lo Jui-ching, who would shortly become the powerful Chief-of-Staff of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), was noted advocating a new naval strategy. Lo considered the Maoist "land war of annihilation” outmoded and advanced the line that, "not'' conditions are different and the only method to be used is that of blocking the seas. With new technical equipment any invading enemy can be annihilated on the sea. in the air, or at the base from which it launches its
attack.” Meanwhile, Marshall Peng Teh-huai, the MiO' ister of Defense, was maintaining that the Navy w*5 highly technical and openly attacked Mao’s military writings by declaring "as there are no forests, mountain ravines, 'green curtain’ of sorghum fields and no masse5 at sea, people’s war and such stuff are outdated.” Subsequently, the 1960s reflected even harder evidence of China’s naval expansion. Under Lin Piao’5 leadership, submarines and other surface combatant5 went into serial production. Figure 1 depicts the sip nificant naval modernization program either begun °!
_ ___ Ship Type | No. Commissioned Vessels | Year Under Construction |
SUBMARINES | ||
G’ Class Ballistic Missile Diesel | 1 | 1964 |
R” Class Patrol Diesel | 36 (note # 1) | 1963-Present |
W” Class Patrol Diesel | 9 (note #2) | 1960-1964 |
Ming Class Patrol Diesel | 1 | 1971-Present? |
Han Class SSN/SSBN? | 1 (note #3) Total 48 | 1971-Present? |
guided MISSILE DESTROYERS | ||
Cuta Class | 5 + | 1969-Present? |
guided MISSILE FRIGATES | ||
Kiangtung Class | 1 + | 1971-Present? |
Agates | ||
Kiangnan Class | 5 | 1965-1969 |
CORVETTES | ||
Hainan Class | 14 (note #4) | 1963-Present? |
FAST ATTACK CRAFT-MISSILE | ||
Hola Class | 20 | 1965-1969 |
Hoku Class | 17 | 1965-1968 |
Hrna Class | _J_+ (note #5) Total 38 | 1974 |
fast attack craft-gun | ||
Shanghai Class #/, II, III, IV | 375 | 1959-Present |
Whampoa Modified Class | 50 + | I960-? |
Shantung Class | ^+ Total 430 | 1972 |
fast attack craft-torpedo | ||
Huchwan Class-Hydrofoil | 70 | 1965-Present? |
P-4 ■ | 70 | 1966 |
P-6 | 80 Total 220 | 1966 |
c°astal minesweepers | ||
Woosung Class | 4 + | 1970-1971 |
Ending ships (lsmS) | ||
Puling Class | 3 + | 1971 |
SUBMARINE SUPPORT SHIP |
| / |
Class Unknown | 1 | 1965 |
SURVEY and research ships | ||
Pan Hung Class | 1 | 1965 |
RAKjGE INSTRUMENTATION SHIPS | ||
Class Unknown | 4 + | 1971-1972 |
... | Total all units 11A |
|
°" #1: Total calculated from various Foreign Broadcast Information Service Reports which reference "R” Class hull numbers between 136 to 172. | ||
°tc #2: These 9 units were assembled and completed | at Chinese Shipyards after Sino-Soviet split. Twelve others remain operational but were constructed prior |
to I960.
^0te #3: According to Combat Fleets of the World. 1976, this ship is an SSN and she has a sister under construction.
^°te #4: Similar to Soviet SOI subchaser, however no special ASW weapons system is apparent.
°tc #3: Chinese Nationalist Sources in 1973 list this vessel as 94 feet long, 22 feet wide and equipped with two surface to surface missiles. She is a modification
of Hoku Class.
vwuna
L r v^f > |
|
1 if | \\f I r’Tr'l- 1/ |
NVIM3JO,
vhoonow
NVMJVi
dud:
Sw: to both
lng the Gulf of Po Hai. The latter serves from
atow to the Vietnamese border, and includes service Hainan and the Paracels. Regular service is provided
entire cargo in 19 hours.
Pro
at best "correct” terms. But the populated l,r>ces and military regions (the latter outlined in gray)
are all
Interestingly, the Chinese have been an exporter of small warships. During the past seven years the following countries have received such naval assistance:
Albania | 30 hydrofoil torpedo boats of the Huchwan class |
North Korea | 15 to 20 gunboats of the Shanghai class and probably other larger warships, such as "R” Class submarines. This aid was provided under a Sino-Korean military aid agreement signed on 7 September 1971. Taking part in these talks were Admiral Li Tso-peng, Political Commissar of the PRC Navy and Major General Choe Changhwan, Commander of the North Korean Navy. |
North Vietnam | 8 to 10 Shanghai gunboats and 18 to 20 Swatow class gunboats |
Pakistan | Before and after the Indo-Pakistani War some naval training has been provided to the Pakistan Navy. So far as known, no warships have been transferred, however. |
Sri Lanka | 6 Shanghai gunboats |
Tanzania | 14 Shanghai gunboats |
continued under Lin Piao’s reign. What cannot be displayed so graphically is the significant sophistication achieved in engineering and weapon technology in order to outfit these new vessels.
During this period, PRC merchant shipping also showed rapid gains. By 1970, China claimed that she ^tended to fully develop her commercial shipbuilding y vigorously forming a railway on the sea.” Hong °ng sources reported that as of April 1974 the PRC Was rhe largest charterer on the London market and its international maritime fleet was estimated at nearly 4
ntdlion tons, with 270 vessels of all kinds and sizes. Th
ney carry about one-third of China’s total foreign it^de to 140 ports in 70 countries. From 1972 to 1974 e PRC reportedly purchased an estimated 150 vessels a r°ad, including 3,200-ton fish-processing trawlers, redges, tugs, and refrigerator ships. Many of the ships, °wever, were cargo vessels in the 10,000 to 20,000 ton ran§e> with East and West Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Yugoslavia as the principal builders. Apart r°m the essential need for cargo vessels to move her growing volume of exports and imports, China is also uying medium-sized and large passenger vessels, ifia'nly to transport men and materials to the black ncan nations receiving Chinese economic and mili- y a*d. Commercial ships are also built in Chinese yards- including at least one 24,000-ton tanker. Tk^ere *s a^so a sizable amount of coastal shipping.
cre are two coastal shipping regions, northern and ^nrhern. The former provides service north from lngpo (which is south of Shanghai) to Dairen, in- on short routes, such as between Dairen and ef°o or Swatow and Canton, and on long routes, SUch as Shanghai to Dairen. Some of the newer ships in °astal service are the Chiangtung, a 1,390-ton passen- St-t-cargo ship able to transport 1,300 tons of cargo and passengers at 14.5 knots; and the Chienshe, a tanker cbree or four thousand tons reported capable of ^Ustained steaming for eleven days and of discharging
(?*• ,
to ,>>a ' seacoast ts enormous—7,000 miles from North Korea North Vietnam, counting all the ins and outs. Nonetheless, Cfj ■>“rec^ to *be land frontiers, the seacoast is short. Hence, nltla s army traditionally has been more important than the ^ d- Just as China, most of the countries with which she ares boundaries are totalitarian leftist states, and with most he « bad ,
near the sea.
Another recent example of China’s naval expansionist tendencies occurred in January 1974 when an efficient PRC Navy force quickly occupied the Paracel Islands. According to South Vietnamese survivors, the Chinese force consisted of about 11 warships carrying 605 amphibious assault troops. Also, Mig fighters from Hainan, about 130 miles to the northwest, provided air cover. One interesting facet was the warning given to Saigon by Peking some six days before the naval action began. On 11 January 1974, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the People’s Republic of China had indisputable sovereignty over the, Paracels and added that the "sea areas around them also belong to China.” Finally, the PRC spokesman stated that the Chinese government would "never tolerate any infringement on China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty by the Saigon authorities.”
According to the Peking version, which agrees reasonably well with that of Saigon, the trouble began about 15 January when South Vietnamese ships attempted to displace Chinese fishermen from the islands. On 17 January, Chinese patrol vessels arrived and were followed a day later by ten other warships. These ships were backed by Mig-21 and Mig-23 jets. The South Vietnamese had a former U. S. Coast Guard cutter armed with a 5-inch gun and four DEs each armed with two 3-inch guns. They had no air support. (There were some U. S. reports that the South Vietnamese naval commander asked for air support from Da Nang but was turned down.)
Within a day the islands were in Chinese hands. The South Vietnamese lost one of the DEs. The New York Times for 21 January, 1974, reports that the DE was hit by a missile launched from a Komar, though the Chinese deny any such craft were present. Interestingly, the Chinese reports emphasized the part played by militiamen rather than that of the navy. The brief action vividly demonstrated that China will employ her fleet beyond the coasts to protect what she perceives as territorial and national security interests.
The Traditionalist / Idealogue Line
But these events do not seem to square with the known activities of the PRC Navy. Other than the Paracels incident, no Chinese warships have been noted operating at any distance from the mainland, and public statements of the PRC Navy’s mission have consistently referred to defending the territorial seas through interception of enemy infiltration and providing escorts for coastal shipping and fishing fleets. This traditional line is best exemplified by a 1970 People’s Daily article which referred to the PRC Navy and maritime building program as one which would turn China’s coastline "into an iron wall.” This is rather more like the work of a coast guard than of a navy. Indeed, in the last hundred years or so various advisors—British, French, German, American, and Soviet—have all proposed to their clients that a coast guard type of navy be built.
The apparent disagreement over naval strategy goes deeper, however. It is one which revolves around control—civilian Party control over the PLA which represents the world’s largest land army, the third largest air force, and now the world’s third largest navy. Most people are familiar with Mao’s frequently quoted maxim "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun,” however, when Mao wrote this he also added that "our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party.” During the arduous years of revolutionary warfare, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) did control the gun, but when the military professionalization campaign commenced in the 1950s the expanding power of the PLA threatened the principle of civil Party control. In a word, the old informal, egalitarian, and "democratic” rules under which the PLA operated during the Long March era were, as Peng Teh-huai stated, "outmoded.” At this juncture, it is appropriate to analyze how this conflict has affected the PRC Navy.
One of the first indications that some thought
Navy-building should be carried out along more traditional lines occurred at a conference of PRC Navy Activists in February 1957. It was the first occasion that Admiral Su Chen-hua, the newly appointed Political Commissar of the Navy, addressed his party sailors. In his remarks, Su laid great stress on opposing doctrin- airism and formalism in the Navy—that is, Maoist strategy and tactics were still the principles to be followed in building a modern navy. The People’s Daily quickly followed with an editorial summarizing the conference. It never mentioned Soviet assistance, but concentrated on glamorizing the Navy’s role in agricultural production, economy in operations, and inventions or recommendations by sailors that had resulted in savings to the government (obviously the Chinese version of the Beneficial Suggestion Program).
About one year later, Vice Admiral Chou Hsi-han, the new Chief-of-Staff of the PRC Navy, wrote an article that reflected growing party pressure. While he paid lip-service to Soviet assistance and Marshal Peng Teh- huai’s "correct” appraisal of the modernization of the armed forces, Chou clearly struck at the central issue if1 his concluding remarks: "First of all, the Party’s absolute leadership of the Navy must be strengthened. This leadership is the soul of the people’s armed forces. They will be lifeless as soon as they are deprived of this leadership. The rightists, always on the look out fof trouble, understand this quite well, for they have been trying to remove the Party’s leadership from the armed forces . . . The highly class-conscious members of the Navy full realize that the Party’s leadership of the people’s armed forces is absolutely necessary and that if it had not been for the Party there would have been n° people’s armed forces . . . Had it not been for the leadership of the Communist Party, no such result would have been possible, and there would have beef no such People’s Navy as the one we have now.”
Concurrent with these remarks, the Party served notice that the Navy was to be reoriented to one of the more basic aspects of revolutionary Army building—tlN of supporting the masses. Training was reduced to ft# sailors to engage in auxiliary production projects. I*1 1957, Tsingtao-based sailors were congratulated on having raised a total of 551 head of pigs, sheep, and catch and cultivating 1,069 acres of land that produce^ 150,000 pounds of grain and 200,000 pounds of vegetables. Additionally, sailors devoted more than 11,000 working days to fishing co-ops and, during the peak 0 the wheat harvest, 5,000 officers and men were mobilized and contributed 28,000 working days to the hat- vest.
Two years later Peng Teh-huai was purged and L° Jui-ching followed five years later. Their accusers blam^ them for stressing technology over politics and advO'
*de;
sub;
a to Peng Teh-huai during a visit to Moscow, as a
canng building the Navy on the Soviet model. Peng Was quoted as saying that "in battle the Navy relied uP°n the tonnage of its vessels, the calibre of its guns a*ad the slide rule.” Both Peng’s and Lo’s gravest error, °ugh, was the abolition of political instructors at the Scluadron level.
One of the key factors in downgrading Peng’s and 0 s naval professionalization policies centered on the growing Sino-Soviet dispute. In fact, one of the major lasues in the late 1950s concerned a Soviet proposal for e establishment of a joint Far Eastern Sino-Soviet naval command. The details of the proposal are still not ea.rly known, but the idea was apparently generated by Krushchev who, while not wanting to become in- I'oK'ed in a face-to-face nuclear confrontation with the nited States over Matsu and Quemoy in 1958, was, nevertheless, strongly desirous of creating a nuclear- ^luipped submarine fleet that could operate from Port . ur (Lushun), Shanghai, and Yulin at the southern yP Hainan in opposition to the U. S. Seventh Fleet.
u ln has a large, well protected harbor with a convoking depth of 30 feet or more, apparently in April 1959, Khrushchev proposed this
statute for giving China nuclear weapons. Peng
gree<l to the idea, but in July, when Khrushchev and
k .Vovski, the Soviet Defense Minister, visited Pe-
Hao rejected the idea as a Soviet plot to control
th *na trough the military. In 1964, some details of
ls scheme were discussed with visiting Japanese who
Suoted the Chinese position as follows: "In 1958 the
a°Vlet Union brought up the subject of the forming of
c°mbined fleet of China and the Soviets along the
^?ast of China and proposed the erection of Loran
Uectric wave bases jointly by China and the Soviets on r^u* > j j _
c-mnese national territory. This proposal was their
to get control into their hands. China rejected s- U defended its independence.”'
■^t'other interesting sidelight to the Peng and Lo
controversy occurred in 1958 when Party cadres at the Nanking Naval War College issued a document entitled "Absolutely Do Not Eat Prepared Food.” The document stressed China’s ability to build a Navy along revolutionary lines and cautioned against imitating foreign shipbuilding designs, i.e., "prepared food.” In many ways the article reflected the same conservative ideas that prevailed in the 1840s when naval modernization was stalled by intransigent provincial leaders.
Later the Chinese accused Peng Teh-huai and Lo Jui-ching of leading a conspiracy to sell out Chinese independence to the Soviet Union. These accusations of Peng and Lo, however, came out years later, long after they were relieved by Lin Piao. From a naval standpoint Lin’s tenure as Minister of Defense is interesting because he was able to manipulate the two antagonists, the "red” and the "expert,” so that little damage was done to the naval construction program. Fleet level political commissars were exhorted to "learn from the PLA” and sharpen their technical skills in order to gain the confidence of the Navy rank and file.
By the early 1960s, the influence that political commissars had in naval affairs had grown to one of great importance and, to this day, they wield considerable command authority aboard ships. The Soviet "one ship, one commander” theory which made the commissar subordinate to professional Soviet Navy officers, was to be avoided by the Chinese. One explanation for this is that Chinese political commissars historically were competent battlefield commanders and served in that capacity numerous times during the Japanese and Civil wars. Another factor is that most of the officers and senior petty officers of the Navy are Party members and, as such, are the Party’s specialists in naval affairs.
Chinese policy for political work in the armed services had been outlined by Mao, in 1948, as an effort "to arouse the rank and file, the commanders and all working personnel in order to achieve three major objectives . . . namely, a high degree of political unity, better living conditions and better military techniques and tactics.” In this, the political commissar aboard ship has status equal to the commanding officer and shares responsibility for all naval activities. The division of effort and command authority seems to be clear: the commanding officer is responsible for "military matters” such as combat operations, logistics support, and military training; the commissar is responsible for "political matters” such as political security (this includes communications security and intelligence gathering), ideological training (leadership, discipline, and human goals for example), personnel control (background investigations, ideological training, and general record keeping such as personal jackets), cultural activity (physical fitness and advancement programs), and economic activities (the people-to-people program—where sailors are required to participate in manual labor, construction projects, and farm work). He can make recommendations regarding combat. The last function allows the commissar to participate in the planning, mobilization, education, and inspection of ships preparing for combat and to countersign orders relating to these functions. If there is a dispute on any matter, both the commanding officer and commissar are required to submit reports to higher level political committees ashore for decision or inspection. However, during combat, the commanding officer will make the final decision on tactics to be employed.
A specific example of how the commissar functions aboard ships is reflected in a 1961 article dealing with engineering. The political commissar formulated "four carefulnesses” for the Engineering Department aboard a warship to implement: 1. Be careful to test the temperature of the bearings; 2. Be careful to listen to the sound of different sections; 3. Look carefully at the reading indicated in instruments; and 4. Carefully take note of the odor of the machines.
While this example is obviously a pragmatic course of action followed aboard ships in most navies, some startling things do occur which indicate a lack of professionalism. In 1963, the training of "barefoot” torpedo boat commanders was established which was extolled by the Party as an excellent example of "revolutionary” practices. Apparently, the increased construction of torpedo boats created an acute shortage of officer personnel and the regular naval academies could not keep up with the demand. The Party’s solution involved the creation of "Thatched Hut” naval schools. From 1963 to at least 1969 one of these schools, constructed of bamboo and grass and located in the mountains, provided training for many torpedo boat commanders destined for duty with the PRC South Sea Fleet.
The Cultural Revolution was a key turning point in the history of Party-PLA relations, for it resulted in 2 power struggle for control over the CCP and the Chinese state. Moreover it projected the conflict between revolutionaries and the so-called "revisionists” into sharp focus during what turned out to be a premature succession struggle. Initially, Mao sought to reinstill hi* revolutionary principles among a new generation of Chinese, and he chose Lin Piao as his instrument fof carrying out the plan. While most Party leaders welcomed this revitalization program they did not foresee that the subsequent unleashing of non-Party Red Guards and Revolutionary Rebels would nearly destroy the Party apparatus. In the early stages the PLA remained very much in the background. One exception was that military ranks again were abolished in 1965’ and remain so to this day. The effect of this did no[ noticably alter command authority, and it is misleading to believe that officers today operate strictly under the old informal and egalitarian rules. Nor did it reduce the requirement for technically proficient enlisted personnel—with the new conscription laws in 1974 the Chi' ■ nese laid stress on arbitrary enlistment extensions as ^ j method necessary to retain technically qualified person- j nel.
The real change engendered by the Cultural Revolt; tion was the transfer of power to the military—an even1 not considered in Mao’s or the Party’s master plan. I” 1 1966 China was in chaos, and to restore order an^f discipline in the country Mao was forced to call the PL41 into the struggle. Within months military personn^ E took over the running of the nation and their respofl' R sibilities ranged from management of the economy t0 E the educational and legal systems. More importantly’* the PLA assumed most of the Party functions of supef'R vision, public security, and ideological indoctrination-1 There was a certain amount of risk, however, for th£B regime still retained enough power to purge sotn£E senior military officers as being anti-Maoist, but it cou^
Fshed
a ringing denunciation of emphasizing electron-
n°t challenge the entire PLA establishment.
After martial law was declared in 1967, the disarrayed party organization attempted to reestablish an orderly government in the provinces by creating revolutionary committees. This provided Lin Piao and the PLA with an opportunity to assume near total control. By September 1968, 19 of 29 revolutionary committee chairmen and 20 of 29 vice-chairmen were PLA general officers. The gun now controlled the Party.
The struggle was far from over, however. In an arna2ing show of resiliency, the Party, led by Chou Emlai and powerful regional military officers who op- - posed Lin Piao, formed a coalition with Madame Mao and her left-wing Cultural Revolution group. Together j. ousted Lin Piao and his "Joint-Chiefs-of-Staff” r°m power in September 1971. Among those purged Was the First Political Commissar of the Navy, Vice Admiral Li Tso-peng, a long time associate of Lin’s. espite the presence of Hsiao Ching-kuang, the aging avy Commander-in-Chief, Li had gradually assumed complete control over the Navy during the 1960s. Li Probably was responsible for convincing Lin Piao to embark upon the large and expensive building program r at occurred during this period.
In many respects Lin’s downfall, which had all of the C ements of a James Bond thriller, was presaged by tee major policy decisions which had naval implica- ^°ns- First, there were rivalries among the services. The avys and Air Force’s new technology increased their are of the defense budget and significantly cut into e Army’s traditionally larger apportionment. One of e urst indications of this occurred several weeks prior ,t0 Lin’s death. In August 1971, the People’s Daily pub- lcs (missiles and other modern weapons) over that oh
agriculture and the iron and steel industry (guns). The article stated in part: "Electronic technology is a new technology used in developing the national economy and national defense industry. Together with atomic technology and jet engine technology it is generally regarded as a criterion used to measure the development level of a country’s industry. However, advanced and special technology is one thing, while the foundation and center are another. The two cannot be mixed together . . . the various branches of industry in China, including the electronics industry, must be developed proportionately and in a planned way. However, only the iron and steel industry should assume a leading role.”
The second policy problem was the increased "extra-curricular” responsibilities encountered by the PLA in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. Many officers believed that training was suffering at the expense of carrying out non-military tasks. For example, in July 1968, basic submarine training for enlisted men was cut in half, approximately from a year to six months, and basic torpedo firing exercise time was reduced by two-thirds. One submarine was reported as going on local patrol duty with 80 percent of the crew newly assigned. Such a situation was considered intolerable in the face of the massive Soviet buildup on China’s northern borders.
The third element revolved around foreign policy and China’s decision to reach detente with the United States, the lesser threat according to Mao and Chou En-lai. This extreme shift in policy obviously led to great disagreement in Peking. Later denunciations of Lin Piao indicate that, ideologically, he preferred reestablishing relations with the Soviet Union and that "capitalist” America remained the real enemy. From a military view, at least, this would have made sense, and it certainly would have assisted China’s naval plans considerably.
Following the fall of Lin Piao and many other senior officers of the central headquarters, Party authority was partially restored. Real power, however, remained in the hands of regional military leaders, but there are signs that the Party is reestablishing its authority. In early 1974, there was a dramatic shift of Military Region commanders, and in July 1974, Party cadres on East Sea
A rare view of Chu Teh, the former Commander in Chief of the People’s Liberation Army, in a naval uniform. The uniforms have since been abolished and Chu Teh, now very old, is employed mainly in ceremonial duties. The tall man at the left in peasant dress is the "CNO, ” Hsiao Ching-kuang.
Fleet warships were carrying out a series of meetings reemphasizing Mao’s Party-Gun principle. Frequent study-discussion sessions were conducted where officers and enlisted men reported to the embarked Party branch to strengthen their Party concept and "correct any erroneous ideas.”
Again in the spring of 1975, the old strains of the
1958 debate on adopting foreign shipbuilding technology were being reemphasized at the Shanghai Hutung Shipyard. Workers were being reminded "to struggle fearlessly against the revisionist line of worshipping things foreign.” The Party committee recalled in 1958» clash between workers who believed that foreign blueprints and patent rights were needed to build
2,000-horsepower diesel engines, but the true Marxb1 Leninists persevered and came up with a pure Chine* design. .
Finally, further signs that Lin Piao’s aggressive na^ , building program has been halted at least temporal ; was provided in the following exclusive interview , tween Captain John E. Moore, Royal Navy, Edit^' j Janes Fighting Ships, and Shih Hsin-jen, the PRC Defen J { Attache in London in April, 1975:
Shih Hsin-jen:
Captain Moore: Shih Hsin-jen:
Captain Moore:
Hsin-jen: Captain Moore:
Shlh Hsin-jen: Captain Moore:
Shih Hsin-jen: Captain Moore:
Captain Moore: Shih Hsin-jen:
Cavy Command and Control Structure
p Mr. Shih’s remarks in mind there is a need to (j S? an<^ reflect upon the contradictions thus far intro- ty,e ' H China’s Navy an emerging professional elite : cll> aggressively led, will make its presence known
°ther
ocean areas? Or is it a creature of tradition—
^ the bureaucratic and authoritarian Party appara-
Where does Lin Piao fit into this?
He was a devoted friend of Russia. Had he succeeded to power he would have established a personal dictatorship and China would eventually have become a Russian province. That is why our government is conducting an anti-Lin Piao campaign—to rid people’s minds of his evil influence.
If Lin Piao was aiming at personal dictatorship allied with Russia, is it possible that, as Minister of Defense, he had oriented his naval building program towards an expansionist policy?
Yes. He had great power.
Is it also possible that, following the exposure of his aims and his death, this policy was seen for what it was and slowed down or cancelled in-part?
That is very possible.
Would you give me some idea of the aims of the Chinese Navy?
Purely defensive. We may have cause to help our friends but we have no thoughts of territorial expansion.
Does that apply to areas which might be classified as required for defense such as the Spratley Islands?
Yes. We have no intention of occupying any soil that is not ours by right. At the same time we shall not yield an inch of our land to any invader. Do you consider the Russians as potential invaders?
Yes. They have plans for world-wide imperialist expansion.
itl
Mi,
tus u -
nesears strong similarities with past periods of Chico 6 historY when the Navy was consigned to a purely ijp a defense role? To answer these questions it is 0t!> rt3nt to Mok at China’s traditional coastal defense Nation and compare it with the PRC’s current
command and control system.
The best example is that of the early Ming period (1368-1403 A.D.), for this period, in many ways, resembles conditions now faced by the PRC. A period of internecine warfare had occurred which led to the overthrow of the Mongols. The new Ming emperor and his followers were not yet safe however, for the Mongols were regrouping to the West. They still had several hundred thousand cavalrymen under arms along the modern Sinkiang and Mongolian border region poised to strike at Peking, much like the 45 to 50 modern Soviet Army divisions are now arrayed. On the coast, Korean, Japanese, Vietnamese, and Chinese pirates were wreaking havoc against islands and mainland coastal cities. Some of these raids were so severe that coastal inhabitants were moved inland. The early raids carried out by Chiang K’ai-shek’s U. S.-backed Nationalist Navy in the early 1950s created a condition similar to that faced by the Ming.
The Ming emperor, Hung-wu, took several actions. First, he ruled that China would never attempt to conquer countries beyond the sea that were causing no trouble. Secondly, in 1374 because of problems with pirates and Mongols, he forbade any Chinese ships to sail beyond the immediate coastal regions. Mariners who violated this decree would be executed as pirates. Thirdly, he undertook strong measures to build up his defenses. Ashore, he created a large, powerful army that functioned under a military guard system known as Wei. Along the coast he subordinated his navies to the Wei. Through this system, the Ming officials were able to manage the country in peacetime as well as war.
The Wei guards were under provincial civil control and positioned at strategic points along the coast. Each Wei commander and his principal assistants were selected on a hereditary basis so that the military officers represented a self-perpetuating elite. The soldiers also were drafted locally by selecting one out of every three taxable males to serve in the guard service. As an example of how this system worked at the provincial level, in 1387 A.D., the Chekiang Province coastal defense force constructed fifty-nine forts and more than 58,000 troops were conscripted to man these forts. In many respects the guards represented a coastal militia since seventy per cent were posted on farmlands and were employed primarily as farmers. The remainder were used to construct and maintain ships. They did not man them.
Each Wei unit was divided into local garrisons called Chien-hu-so, or "So” garrisons, and these were further broken down into smaller units. For use against pirates the Wei guard units had some fifty warships. Smaller units reporting to the Wei controlled two warships each, and in the early Ming period when at full strength
*
these units in the six coastal provinces had more than three thousand warships. To assist the Wei, fishing fleets frequently were formed into a maritime militia and although not armed, the fishermen performed "early warning” functions by providing intelligence on pirate fleet activities.
The Ming coastal defense leaders displayed a clear appreciation for "forward base areas” in that they extended their control over the larger offshore islands where they constructed naval support facilities or Chai. The Chai provided logistic support and also maintained contact with the Wei and So garrisons by means of dispatch boats and beacon fires. Some of these offshore "communications and observation posts” were garrisoned by as many as five thousand men. By 1562 A.D. more than 1,000 of these posts lined the coast from Canton to modern day Dairen.
As a means of maintaining command and control over the provincial fleets, the Ming and its successor dynasty, the Ch’ing, followed the aforementioned traditional decentralized scheme where provincial viceroys managed military and naval affairs in their respective provinces. This resulted in the creation of provincial navies which, theoretically subordinate to the army, were administered by, and took their orders from, a civil bureaucracy.
During periods of strong government, the fleets acted together and were directed to conduct annual interfleet exercises. In the thirty-six year period between 1373-1409 A.D., the Ming coast guard armadas successfully hounded pirate fleets to the shores of Korea and the Liu-ch’iu Islands (modern Okinawa) and were victorious over the ferocious Annamese pirates who inhabited the Tonkin Gulf.
The coastal defense system begun by the Ming was perpetuated through the centuries until the late nineteenth century when China began to modernize her navies. An Admiralty was finally established in 1885, but corruption and intrigue over naval funds led to its dissolution shortly before the disastrous war of 1894-95. It was reinstituted in 1910, and four years later the Admiralty divided the Navy into three squadrons which operated in as many naval districts or regions, the Northern, Central, and Southern naval districts. These districts encompassed the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea respectively.
One significant change that took place in the Ch’ing period (1644-1910) was the development in the midnineteenth century of semi-private militia armies and navies. Created by the central government to combat the Taiping rebels from 1850 to 1866, these regional forces changed the balance of power between the Throne and the provinces. Regional leaders who emerged during this period maintained their positions .
of authority through a vast network of personal reh tionships insuring that their troops were paid promptly and that strict rules of discipline were enforced. Sud1 relationships were based on three traditional devices1 the time-honored family system, regional identification and the teacher-student relationship. Each of these fit' tors essentially bound the subordinate to his superior so that each served and supported the interests of the other. This personal loyalty system finally degenerate^ into the warlord system a few short decades latch destroying the old Chinese tradition of civil superiority in the process.
The PRC Fleet System
In 1945 Mao Tse-tung, commenting upon the vif' tues of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), set forth the blueprint which would eventually determine thc shape and direction of the PRC Navy. At that time hc stated: "This army is powerful because [of] its divisio” into two parts, the main forces and the regional for with the former available for operations in any regio(1 whenever necessary and the latter concentrating on fending their own localities and attacking the eneif) there in cooperation with the local militia . . .”*
In this brief passage, Mao was of course addressing himself to the PLA, but its application to an alrea^) emerging Communist Navy was soon evident in ri*£ years that followed. As already seen, Mao’s outline fofJ navy required strict adherence to successful principle used in developing the Army. Initially, in fact, Navy was never considered to be a separate agency bn1 rather it was to operate under Army control as a servC arm and be molded in the image of the PLA. M°sl evident in Mao’s statement, however, is the triparrit£ division of forces which reflected close similarity to $ Imperial military and naval organization.
The "Main Force Navy”
Early evidence of the establishment of a Main F Navy came a year after the "liberation” of the ma1(1 land. In the fall of 1950, a Chinese Naval Headquart£p was established in Peking subordinate to the PLA Ge<] eral Headquarters to provide centralized control for operational, technical, professional, and political ne° of the Navy.
With a great deal of Soviet assistance, the NT Force fleet organization began to take shape by 1954- ^ was reported that during the early 1950s as many J
2,500 Russian naval advisors were assigned to all kvC
* Those who served in Vietnam will recognize this system. The Republ1 Vietnam had, besides the regular army, the Regional Forces and the P°PU Forces.
^ ° at age 74, still functions as the PRC "CNO.” As a biya Maoist, Admiral Hsiao’s credentials are impecca- j_jC' ^siao comes from a military family in Changsha, lie nan ^rov'nce> Mao’s home province, and their fami- s tttay have known each other. We know that Hsiao attended the same school (circa 1918) that Mao had ered several years earlier. At that time Changsha was tiJCnter for revolutionary thought, and upon gradua- in 1920 Hsiao was chosen along with several others go to Shanghai to study Russian at a school spon- y>rc by Mao. Thereafter, Hsiao joined the Socialist iri°Uth League and, later the CCP, when it was founded ^922. He studied in Moscow from 1921 to 1924 ^turning to the Whampoa Military Academy in 1924, the*1 COmrnan^e<f by Chiang K’ai-shek. He took part in the Ku°mintang’s (KMT) Northern Expedition against in Warb)r<fs> but when the CCP and KMT split occurred *927, Hsiao returned to Russia where he spent three je years studying at the Red Army Academy.
^ Msiao established his loyalty to Mao, who
ling r^en °ut favor> by refusing to follow the Party as C attacking cities—a tactic then criticized by Mao En 1 Wastebal adventure. Hsiao was arrested by Chou lead^’ W^° WaS 2t t^lat bme fhe Party’s senior military tCr’ an<^ charged with dereliction of duty and moral pitude. When Mao returned to power Hsiao was Hair ; tC> ^avor’ ar,h he held a number of important clud’ ' P0sts during the Japanese and Civil wars, in- fcln§ command of the Shensi-Ninghsia-Kansu deha Sj ^orces protecting Yenan. He is one of only a and 1,U^ PR<“ ^eaders wh° spent many years in Russia sei .1S fluency in the language probably aided in his ection as "CNO” in 1950.
v; ,^sPhe Hsiao’s close association with things "Soho ' naval organization evolved along more tradi- 0ra Chinese lines. By the mid-1950s he elected to d; .12e his Main Force Fleets into the same three No 'mpNmented in 1914. These fleets were: the tjle bea Fleet whose district covered the area from b00rean border to the Shantung-Kiangsu provincial n aty; the East China Fleet, from the Shantung-
Kiangsu boundary to Kwangtung Province; and the South Sea Fleet, whose area extended from Kwangtung to the Vietnamese border, including Hainan Island. Theste Main Force fleet areas have remained constant since then. Writing in Marine Rundschau for May 1974, Siegfried Breyer reports that the North Sea Fleet has 225 units (no breakdown by type given), the East Sea Fleet 680, and the South Sea Fleet 285. Six or seven years ago Indian sources noted "R” class submarines under construction at Canton and assigned to the South Sea Fleet. There may be five or ten such submarines now in that fleet, operating out of various ports including Yulin. There is little interchange among the fleets. The large number of units in the East Sea Fleet probably is a result of a very large number of PTs and PTFs assigned that fleet.
As the fleets expanded in size, a "naval schools command” was set up which is probably administered and controlled by the Peking Naval Headquarters (see Figure 2). Initially these schools supplied officers and enlisted personnel for the Main Force fleets within their geographic region, however, by 1958 as naval units increased, personnel trained in one fleet school were noted being transferred to other fleets upon graduation. This represented a change from the old Imperial and Republican provincial naval school system that fostered naval cliques and may have been a deliberate change in policy by the Communists to avoid such a problem. In
°ver specific military regions after 1954. For exam- m the East Sea Fleet, Admiral Tao Yung com- ^ nbed that fleet for more than 10 years until purged ^r'ng the Cultural Revolution. Tao had been a senior my officer of the 3rd Field Army whose units were l954arilY reassigned to the Nanking Military Region in ' Id is relief, Kao Chih-jung, is also an ex-army man Sea*11 ^ ■I7IeIcd Army. Senior officers of the South
ea Fleet were former members of the 4th Field Army w^o k j 1 . . . J
^ nad been assigned to the Kwangtung Military
du
Ar:
act, most instructors in the 1950s were ex-Nationalist officers who had defected with their ships in 1949- hose Nationalist officers and senior petty officers had received considerable training in Britain and the United States, including service in submarines, but their loyalty 'Vas questionable and they never were permitted by the °mmunists to serve at sea.
As far as selection of naval personnel is concerned, is known about the ratio of coastal peoples to °se raised in agricultural areas. The interrogation of c ree captured PRC torpedo boat sailors in 1958 did reveal, however, that they, together with fellow crew- 111 en’ did come primarily from coastal provinces. Interesting^ while all received basic training in North Sea P eet area schools, they were transferred to the East Sea eet upon graduation.
It may not be purely coincidental that such interfleet 'banning takes place, for there is evidence that senior baval fleet officer personnel may not be entirely free °rn the traditional personal loyalty system. Concurrent ^'th the establishment of the three fleet areas, the old army system was being reorganized into military e8>ons. The Military Region Commanders (MRC) con- tlnue to be powerful figures, and those that have coastal )Urisdiction do have naval liaison staff elements. In ^artime, control of main naval forces would be held by e MR.Cs that had jurisdiction over the coastal area ^ ships homeported in their regions.
“is probably explains why the respective fleet combers have for years been ex-PLA army men who had
a with the main force field armies that took control
pie,
Th
the China Sea where, for the first time in centuries,
p0t^°°r^ recet‘tly saw the aggressive use of Chinese naval for r ^ey°nd that country’s coast. In January, 1974, Chinese p routed a South Vietnamese naval squadron near the ty0lv,s‘ands and ejected a South Vietnamese garrison. ^Pratl^‘na Seems interested in acquiring control of the Phip ^ I5^a,,ds to which Vietnam, Taiwan, and the Ppines also lay claim.
The dramatic shift of MRCs in 1974 does reflect a strengthening of central control, but it did not result in the emergence of new, younger military leaders. Within the Navy there is still no sign that younger officers are being placed in key positions. The table shows that 12 of 17 key naval leaders are ex-army men who fought in the 1930-40s period. Of the five who cannot be identified, it is possible that they, too, are old army veterans.
The relationship of the MRCs to the three fleets can be subjected to long debate and is worthy of further study, but one factor must be kept in mind—at least until 1974, when 8 of 11 MRCs were shifted, these army men wielded great power in their respective regions, and their influence among decision-makers at Peking is considerable, much more so than that of the Naval Headquarters and the three Main Force fleet commands. In one respect, this may explain why, until recently, Main Force naval units rarely conducted inter-fleet maneuvers as well as the lack of movement of ships between or even within fleets. Three of the most powerful MRCs, Chen Hsi-lien, Yang Teh-chih, and Hsii Shih-yu, had held power in the Shenyang, Tsinan, and Nanking military regions for 15, 16, and 20 years respectively, and their claims on all Main Force military elements within their domains were near absolute. Such an arrangement bears strong similarity to other periods of Chinese history in which fleets and squadrons were controlled by provincial or regional strongmen.
Provincial Navies
Until the Cultural Revolution, provincial navies did exist, but they functioned as a "water police” or coast guard force under the control of the Public Security Force (PSF), which is another arm of the PLA. The formal establishment of these provincial navies occurred in 1955 when the conscription laws stated that officers of the "seaborne public security units” could hold ranks equivalent to the Navy, i.e., ensign through vice admiral. These fleets were entrusted with "watch-dog” responsibilities over the numerous provincial fishing fleets, but their activities also included coastal defense—a function which took them to sea at a far greater distance than the Main Force fleets. How far at sea did this apply?
The answer to this can be found in a series of Sino-Japanese fishing agreements concluded between 1955 and 1965. China had claimed a 12-mile territorial limit in 1958 and in 1965, following several interim agreements with Japan, China had concurred in six fishing zones which specified the season and maximum numbers of vessels each country could allow in the zones. The inshore limit of the zones averaged 50 to 60 nautical miles from China’s coast. These zones had first been fixed by agreement in 1955.
BASIC OFFICER TRAINING (OCS)
Tsingtao
Shanghai
NAVAL ACADEMY Dairen
POSTGRADUATE/WAR COLLEGE Nanking
NAVAL AVIATION SCHOOL
Shanghai
Tsingtao
COASTAL ARTILLERY SCHOOL Shanghai
LOGISTICS/SUPPLY SCHOOL Shanghai
NAVAL RADAR SCHOOL Shanghai
NAVAL ARCHITECTURE
Shanghai Shipbuilding School (4 year curriculum) Harbin Military Engineering School
ENLISTED BASIC TRAINING MAJOR SCHOOLS
Tsingtao Fifth Naval Training School Shanghai Fleet Training Center
MINOR SCHOOLS Weihaiwei Nanking Anch’ing Foochow Choushan Hangchow
ENLISTED ADVANCED TRAINING
Tsingtao
—Maintenance and Operation of Torpedoes and Mines —Electricians —Electronics Technicians —Submarine Operations
Shanghai Fleet Training Center —Signalmen —Radiomen
—Electronics Technicians
Nanking
—Quartermasters —Enginemen —Gunnery
Dairen
—Minelaying
Lushun
—Submarine Operations Yulin
—Submarine Operations
In 1956, the first indication that Public Security Force units were actively involved in coastal defense came in the form of an admonishment by Lo Jui-chingi the PSF Minister. Lo noted that Japanese fisherm#1 legally fishing in the zones of agreement were still being harrassed by his seaborne units and he informed them that "coastal defense units of the PLA should rigidly adhere to our country’s foreign policy of peace ful co-existence in intercourse with our neighboring nations, and should also resolutely oppose 'big nation chauvinism’, respect the people of other nations, and adopt a friendly attitude toward them.”
It is not known whether these provincial PSF se>' borne units continue to operate well out to sea or if,111 fact, complete responsibility for fishing escort duty ha[1] now been turned over to the Main Force Navy. Tha1 the Navy does perform these duties is well documented but whether it shares them with the PSF is unknown During the Cultural Revolution the PLA, through i(* naval arm, assumed most PSF coastal defense function*! and it has only been recently that many of the old cadres have reappeared. If the Navy has taken over tin* responsibility full time, it represents a large drain men and assets that certainly restricts any expansion!*' program.
A well-organized system of regular army troops lt provincial coastal defense garrisons exists. Subordina*' to the MRCs, these forces closely resemble the trad1' tional Wei organization. Beginning in 1950, hundred of coastal fortifications and modern communication* and observation posts were erected; however, radar an® radio have now replaced beacon fires.
Early on, the Chinese Communists openly publish^ the accomplishments and vital roles played by the*( outposts. As late as 1971, Chinese press and rad'1 reports described the ten-year hardships endured by 1 garrison company of a PLA Tsinan Unit. This compa®' had been assigned to an island in the Yellow Sea 11 1961 to erect an advanced coastal defense site, and 'F efforts were "warmly hailed by the people as a brilliad company which defends the sea frontier.” These p°sC do work in conjunction with the Navy for, dufi« periods of naval action with the Nationalists, leaders have commended them for providing timely a*11 accurate information about enemy movements.
The Maritime Militia
During the testimony at the Court of Inquiry, c°f vened by the U. S. Navy in January, 1969, to determ1’!’ the circumstances relating to the loss of the USS Pu$ (AGER-2), several comments were made by witne[2]” which briefly described an unusual incident involv1’1' the USS Banner (AGER-i). The Banner was intercept by Chinese fishing vessels while operating off Shang^
back
Co the early Communist period, when the PRC
Na'
ln December, 1967, one month before the seizure of the Pueblo. Her commanding officer, Commander Charles R. Clark, USN, in response to questions by the Court relating to what action he would have taken in the event of an actual boarding attempt, stated: "Well, this w°uld have depended on what attacked me. I feel I c°uld have defended myself against a small fishing boat fhat had small arms very well. The Chinese, on one occasion, did have some small fishing boats that encircled me, and at one point I felt that they were trying to take us under tow, or something on that order. They S°r as close as five yards. Two of the fishing boats had arger guns than we did, but I felt that, while our guns Were smaller, we could have possibly fought them off w'th what we had.”
The testimony surfaces several interesting questions. n *ke the Pueblo incident where North Korean naval Units challenged and boarded the U. S. ship, why was it at the Banner was harrassed by a group of armed crawlers? More importantly, was this Chinese reaction Part of a well-organized maritime defense system where carmen are responsible for actively prosecuting SUsPicious foreign ships?
To answer these questions, it is necessary to look vy was virtually non-existent and Mao’s military strategists were faced with a challenge of protecting a vast coastline. For guidance in this matter, the Chinese strategists looked to Maoist military teachings—convert weaknesses into strengths; base military decisions on the reality of the situation; and rely on the peasants (in this case the coastal fishermen). They also looked to history where fishing fleets had been formed into a sea-going militia. This time, however, the fleets were to be armed.
But there were many problems in getting the coastal fishermen under control. During the years when Mao was creating an effective militia far inland to fight the Japanese and Nationalists, the coastal fishermen, who for the most part lived in occupied areas, had little or no exposure to the Communist militia concept. Furthermore, many of these people had a centuries-old association with pirates and, being historically independent and mobile, they remained skeptical of any ideology.
An example reflecting the magnitude of the problem in organizing the fishermen was exemplified by a New China News Agency release of 23 July 1951. It indicated that of 510,000 junks and crews in the Canton area only
47,500 had been successfully organized into fishing collectives. The article stressed four "needs” that still required attention. The first three were concerned with
Figure 3 PRC Natal Leaders
Title
Name
Age
Ex-Army Veteran of Japanese/Civil Wars
CMC)”
1ST POLITICAL COMMISSAR POLITICAL COMMISSAR PPUTY CDRS (NAVOPS)
?IIEF OF STAFF
n?UTY c/s
EPUTy c/s
^’Orth sea fleet cinc ST SEA FLEET CINC SEA FLEET CINC
*s„,
Hsiao Ching-kuang Su Chen-hua*
Wang Hung-k’un Chao Chi-min Chou Hsi-han Chou Jen-chieh Kao Chen-chia Kung Chao-nien Liu Tao-sheng Wang Wan-lin Wu Jui-lin P’an Yen Hu Peng-fei Lai Kuang-tsu
Ma Chung-ch’uanf Kao Chih-jung Kuei Shao-pin**
74
65 68 61 70 p ? p
66 ?
59
p
p
p
57
59
59
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
p
p
Yes
?
Yes (Also fought in Korea) ? (Also fought in Korea)
p
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Was
tMa
purged during the Cultural Revolution but reappeared in 1971. He wields considerable power and could replace Hsiao as "CNO” at any time.
*Kuei
rCccntly reported as being deputy chief of operations, naval headquarters.
Was South Sea Fleet Cinc from at least 1957 to 1966. It is possible that he has since been relieved.
combating feudal attitudes, improving wages, and increasing "catch.” The last need, however, laid stress on "strengthening of measures for education of the fishing folk in patriotism, the extension and consolidation of their organization, and their mobilization for assistance to national defense works.”
By 1959, it was apparent that the Chinese had accomplished what few governments before then had been able to do. Operating within an intricate network of effective controls reaching down to the individual level, China’s vast fishing fleets had undergone a complete metamorphosis. In terms of production the statistics were impressive. China had increased the annual catch 13 times over that of 1949, from 450,000 tons to more than 5.8 million tons in I960, which placed the PRC second, only behind Japan, in world fishing production. With improved gear and the steady replacement of wind-driven junks by modern trawlers during the 1960s, PRC fishermen are now without doubt still among the top fish producers in the world' Nowadays, the majority of long-range fishing (that is, more than 20 miles from the coast) is done by diesel- driven boats.
Of equal importance, however, is that China’s maritime defense posture has been immeasurably strengthened. Present statistics are unavailable, but 19^1 Japanese estimates of manpower and vessels reflected China as having more than 750,000 persons actively engaged in fishing, and more than two million persons were incorporated into fishing communes ashore. They operated an estimated 138,000 sailing boats, 700 powered sailing boats, and 563 motor vessels with engines up to 450 horsepower.
■■■■■■■
,»• 'W* XWI
The maritime militia’s relationship with the PRC Navy has been consistently close. In the 1950s, fishing fleets hid torpedo boats which subsequently dashed
Ch:
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rorn cover to sink Nationalist warships operating aix>und Matsu and Quemoy. In 1961, in the aftermath 0 rhe Soviet exodus, the Chinese Main Force Navy ^xperienced a great many material and training prob- ms- To overcome the training problem, Marshal Yeh ymg, a prominent member of the powerful ary Affairs Committee, recommended that navy en be assigned to mechanized junks during fishing expeditions "so as to toughen those who are prone to easickness and to have more experience in navigation.” June 1975, New China News Agency domestic ^rvice carried yet another article about the PRC ^'T^Maritime Militia relationship. It stated: "Since e beginning of the fishing season this year (an East ea Fleet organization) has made some 300 trips in Warships and patrol craft on missions to protect and eScort fishing vessels, logging more than 24,000 n.m. at ^ *n the process . . . While protecting and escorting e fishing vessels . . . the navigational security depart- Ir'ent would thoroughly inspect lighted markers and £ t houses along sea routes in an effort to insure safety r aH fishing vessels. During the busy fishing seasons, ^eteorological units of the PLA and local authorities a^d ' cooperate with each other in providing prompt accurate weather forecasts for fishing vessels at sea.” here is little doubt that the maritime militia still ys an active role in reconnaissance and surveillance p 1Vlties in support of the PRC Navy. During the aracels incident PRC militiamen engaged South Viet- j^o> Cse commandos during one phase of the fighting at aft Crt ^ancb an<J Saigon naval photographs released o,er *be incident shows heavy machine guns aboard ‘nese fishing trawlers.
Cxi ^arace^s incident should be proof enough of the er*ce and importance of the maritime militia, and it tefiri ^ ^abaci°us t0 dismiss its wartime capability in s of an active or passive role (e.g., mine warfare, pPiy lift, or reconnaissance). Moreover, there is no
doubt that the Chinese have "exported” the maritime militia concept to other countries, particularly North Vietnam.
The Current Estimate
Based on the foregoing account, the PRC Navy in its short quarter century existence has been the center of much controversy in Peking, and it would be safe to say that its current posture remains essentially a coastal defense one. In the wake of the Lin Piao affair and the importance attached to ideology, anyone who now proposes naval expansion is voicing a "counter-revolutionary” opinion that can only be raised at personal peril.
There is another important factor which supports this conclusion—recent reports on the Chinese economy published by the Joint Economic Committee of Congress reflect a 25 per cent reduction in defense spending. One of the reasons given for this curtailment was the Lin conspiracy where the military incurred much distrust among the Party cadres. Other conclusions reached by scholars and government analysts reflect Chinese reemphasis on consumer goods, as well as on meeting continued agricultural and industrial demands. If these conclusions are accurate, the PRC Navy construction program has likely been slowed down, and nuclear submarine and guided missile frigate construction could be halted entirely.
Ideology versus naval expansion also acts as an important theme in the Sino-Soviet dispute. China, for some time, has viewed itself as Asia’s principal regional power, and it has also assumed the mantle of leadership among "Third World” nations. In this process, the PRC has engaged in a vitriolic campaign against Soviet naval expansion which the Chinese have looked upon as another example of Soviet "revisionism.”
After the Ussuri incident in 1969, China intensified its attack on Soviet naval activities through newspaper and radio propaganda, with Soviet naval ventures in the Indian Ocean being a particular sore point. In fact, Soviet naval activities in that region have received much more bad publicity from the Chinese than that accorded to the United States and its build-up of Diego Garcia.
The Chinese leveled broadsides at Admiral Sergei Gorshkov following publication of his articles on the Soviet Navy’s fast growing world ocean capabilities. On 9 May 1974, the Peking Daily took Gorshkov to task for "shamelessly praising the old czars’ naval expansion as symbolizing the fine tradition of the fatherland’s navy in surveying the world’s oceans.” Branding Gorshkov as a Mahanian pretender, the article stated that "the Soviet revisionist renegade clique will soon come to no good end other than lifting a rock only to drop it on its own feet.”
Following the fall of South Vietnam, the Chinese once again took the Soviet Union to task for wanting to "fill the vacuum” in Southeast Asia. Quoting from Thai and Philippine newspapers, the Chinese contended that the Soviet Union is trying to take the place of the United States in dominating Asia. Regarding the United States, when Ferdinand Marcos returned to Manila from Peking he was noted using the nineteenth century term of "extraterritoriality” in descriptions of U. S. bases in the Philippines—a word probably bandied about during discussions with PRC leaders.
Ideology notwithstanding, China’s naval organization and command and control system remains anachronistic, and changes to this structure do not seem immediately in the offing. Inter-fleet maneuvers am rare; and emphasis on developing anything other than a local amphibious capability is non-existent.
corps exists as a separate professional elite—it is mof£ likely that they are "naval infantry” selected on a*1 kj ad hoc basis from the army or provided and outfitted b)'. the MRCs. This is odd, because historically the Chined w have been adept at amphibious operations and f°f ^ centuries possessed a marine corps that fought in a style similar to modern marines.
As early as 500 B.C. the military staffs of the varioifi Chinese riverine states were augmented with experts of such matters. Rivers, lakes, and marshes were obstacle that had to be surmounted if one state was to conqud
It is doubtful that the estimated 28,000-man marine
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an°ther. This meant the construction of vessels to carry ^valry and infantry. In the T’ang dynasty (618-906 marines were chosen from among the best and bravest in the army.
Perhaps the- best remembered episodes in Chinese a,Tlphibious history were the two disastrous Mongol ^editions against Japan late in the thirteenth century. e first took place in 1274. Some 40,000 troops and °usands of horses were to be moved across the Korea rait. Before reaching the other side they were de- str°yed by a typhoon. Kublai Khan ordered a second expedition. In 1283 more than 4,000 ships carried an arrny °f 150,000 men to Japan. After many of the °°ps had landed on the shore of Kyushu, this expedi- n a^so was hit and destroyed by a typhoon. Without j Slstic support those troops who had been landed were eated by the defending Japanese.
,^n cfie ensuing centuries marines often were used to a pirate-held islands or were employed during such
periods as the Ming to sail to distant lands as naval infantry.
Early in the twentieth century a marine corps still existed, and amphibious maneuvers which received praise from foreign observers were carried out in 1903. Marines remained a distinct element of the Chinese military establishment until 1949 and, indeed, remain a fighting elite to this day within the Nationalist armed forces on Taiwan.
The Chinese naval air organization is also a question mark. Established in 1957 from a battle-tested air regiment that fought in Korea, it has grown to about a 30,000-man air arm. Equipped with about 450 obsolete aircraft including 100 IL28S configured to carry torpedos and substantial numbers of Mig 15 and Mig 17 interceptors, it possesses little ASW capability. French sources report that it is organized by fleet area and used in a purely coastal defense role.
The Future Estimate
There are several "impellents” which will influence China’s future naval development, that is, whether she becomes a world naval power or remains essentially coastal defense oriented. Heading the list of those fac-
One heavy machine gun is encircled and the arrow points to another on this trawler-like small ship used by the Chinese during their seizure of the Paracel Islands in 1974. Chinese publicity emphasized the role of the militia in this event, and played down that of the main force navy.
tors which will enable her to challenge the United States and the Soviet Union is oil.
Less than fifteen years ago China was classified as an oil-poor country whose total oil production amounted to about 3.7 million tons annually. Current estimates now credit Chinese production as 50 million tons, and much of this increase is due to the discovery of offshore oil deposits in the Po Hai Gulf and Yellow Sea, known collectively as the Takang oilfield. These promising fields, whose oil is extremely low in impurities, lie beneath shallow waters whose sedimentary stratus makes drilling an easy and inexpensive process.
Offshore oil rigs have already been observed at the mouth of the Yellow River and in the Tientsin region, and news releases indicate that China has acquired a number of underwater drilling rigs from France, Denmark, and Japan. In 1969, for example, China ordered the Pailung, a seabed drilling ship, from Japan. Following that delivery possibly one more such ship was purchased from the Japanese, the Fuji. Japanese observers in China also noted the existence of the Hapin # 1 and Hapin #2, both apparently indigenously designed drilling vessels. Then, in December 1973, the Hong Kong based South China Morning Post reported that China had placed an order with Denmark for eight sophisticated oil rig support vessels. The first vessel was to be delivered in late 1974.
Recent reports from American oil-equipment-companies indicate serious negotiations are in progress which will permit the PRC to purchase advanced drilling equipment. James P. Sterba, writing in The New York Times on 28 November 1975, named eight firms that had been approached by the Chinese. Mr. Sterba also stated that the rush by American companies has even taken the form of translating equipment advertisements and technical articles into Chinese.
The consequence of all this activity likely portends a quantum leap forward in Chinese oil exports. The New York Times quoted one highly placed Japanese source, Rytaro Hasegawa, Chairman of the Japan-China Import Council, as predicting Chinese oil output to be eight million barrels daily by 1980. This would place China in the class of Saudi Arabia and Iran and make it a prime candidate for membership in the important OPEC oil cartel.
David K. E. Bruce, the former American envoy to Peking, noting China’s vast oil potential, was quoted as saying, "If [the Chinese] pursue their current policies, they are going to be rich long before anyone expected them to be.”
It would seem, at the very least, that if Chinese oil production continues to increase at its present rate of 20 to 25 per cent annually, a short-range but definitely blue-water naval capability will result, if for no other reason chan to protect the vast shallow offshore oil resources. Destroyers and frigates will be necessary’ Moreover, revenues from oil hungry nations woul^ certainly aid in upgrading Chinese technology and pay for expensive new naval weapons systems which migb1 be needed to insure the safety, prosperity, and prestige of the Chinese people. The thought of Chinese helicopter carriers, cruise missile-equipped cruisers, and nuclei submarines operating throughout the world by 2000 A.D, is not an unreasonable one.
Another "impellent” which is related to oil is the law of the sea question. China leaves no doubt as to her views on this vital issue, and her position, which heavily favors the Third World, is summarized as follows:
1. Supports the idea of the 200-nautical-mile economic zone.
2. Denies the internationalization of straits; i.e., the principle of free transit.
3. Condemns fishing powers who destroy the fishing potential of poorer coastal states by carrying oUc intensive catches.
4. Supports the position that coastal states have the right to exercise jurisdiction and control marine pollution over areas within given limits which ate adjacent to their territorial seas.
5. Upholds the use of the seabed for peaceful purpose and opposes its use for arms expansion and waf preparation.
From a naval standpoint the Chinese advocacy of the 200-nautical-mile economic zone makes it imperative for Chinese naval ships to extend their operations fur- foer to sea. A glance at any chart of China’s coast shows foe continental shelf limit as extending unusually long distances beyond the territorial waters, reaching nearly t0 Okinawa in the East China Sea. If the Spratley Islands were settled by the Chinese, and there is no reason to doubt such an attempt in the future, the Chinese continental ocean area would reach nearly to Malacca. This, of course, could hurt Chinese relations wuh the Philippines and Vietnam.
According to recent newspaper accounts, the Sprat- p's are claimed not only by the PRC but also by the huippines, Vietnam, and the Nationalist Chinese gov- err»ment on Taiwan. The same reports indicate that, Wlfo the exception of the PRC, small groups of soldiers and fishermen from each of these countries inhabit au*16 r^e ‘sIancIs- The largest island of the group, Itu a> is 1,300 yards long and 450 yards wide, which means it would not be satisfactory at all as the site of a let airfield. Its height above sea level is a mere eight eet- The island is garrisoned by Taiwan.
One other major element which enters into China’s uture naval plans is whether Japan decides to rearm. If Japan does so and, furthermore, elects to "go nuclear,” Sl*ch events would have staggering implications for all ° foe prc’s defense establishment. Both possibilities ec|uently are topics of discussion in Peking propaganda literature. Whether such actions would foment a Is debatable, but they would certainly stir the lnese into changing their naval strategy from one of c°astal defense to something more offensively oriented. Kim II Sung also must rate in Chinese naval plans. enewed fighting between North and South Korea "'Quid risk Chinese and U. S. involvement, but condi- tlQns in the Yellow Sea and East China Sea are obvi- °Usly different from 1950. Decision makers in the nited States know the country would be faced with considerably more opposition from the sea should foa enter such a conflict.
n foe long term Taiwan cannot be ignored by PRC aval planners. One Chinese fear which has received p e attention is a possible Soviet detente with Taiwan. k°r years there have been rumors that Chiang Ching- 0 has made unpublicized trips to Moscow and it is Pj secret that Chiang was educated in the Soviet n*°n. Recently, the Nationalists have been quick to e the prc fears through articles such as one which e °ut in Hong Kong in February 1973. An un- ePttified Nationalist official of the Taiwan Ministry of On enSC Was cluotcc^ as saying that should the U. S. pull * °^aiwan. the Nationalist government would have 0 °hjection to permitting the Soviets to establish a
naval base on their offshore islands, such as the Pescadores.
Russia and Taiwan are not likely to establish such a relationship in the near future; however, the Taiwan government, if pressed by its current uncertain future could, together with a clumsy Soviet Cuba-like adventure, produce a dangerous Pacific confrontation.
Perhaps the real key to Chinese naval expansion is who will be the leader of the People’s Republic after Mao passes from the scene. The recent death of Chou En-lai has already resulted in a major surprise with Hua Kuo-feng, a relatively unknown official, replacing Teng Hsiao-ping as acting Prime Minister. Moreover, Teng’s rapid demise as a power-holder was prompted by yet another clash between the "revolutionaries” and the "revisionists”. Big wall posters recalled Teng’s previous sins for which he fell from prominence during the Cultural Revolution. In recent months he has been labeled an "unrepentant capitalist roader” who opposes class struggle and overemphasizes stability and economic growth. Clearly, the maneuvering for power has begun.
It is noteworthy that the current 1st Political Commissar of the Navy, Admiral Su Chen-hua, was also purged during the Cultural Revolution and was out of power for about six years. His return to naval leadership coincided with Teng’s reemergence in 1972-73, and some Nationalist sources speculated that Su was the de facto "CNO.” Should the radicals expand their attacks beyond Teng, Su’s disgrace during the Cultural Revolution could become an important factor resulting in another premature retirement from naval affairs.
Just as intriguing is the reappearance of General Lo Jui-ching in August 1975. As a leading advocate of naval expansion until purged in 1965, Lo’s possible reassumption of power within the PLA comes at a time when the military will play a key role in resolving China’s leadership crisis.
Whatever the issues and personalities, the transition of power will not likely be a smooth one. Whoever emerges as the ultimate leader will hold the key as to whether a coastal defense or a blue water strategy will prevail. China’s naval potential is unlimited and new, comparatively youthful naval leaders are ready for appointment to positions of importance within the naval hierarchy. Given their country’s long and often sad experience with sea power, the new Chinese naval leaders cannot help but appreciate the value of a navy which can serve their country’s perceived needs.
[1]This list is by no means exhaustive. Data was gathered from Foreign
Broadcast Information Reports and declassified government documents.