For the officer of the Revenue Cutter Service, attempting to assist a ship in dire distress in the 1870s, left, a career was not nearly so complex as it is for today's "generalist" officer who must be equally adept at performing military, regulatory, or search and rescue duties. But what alarms today's generalist is the shrinking number of seagoing billets and the proliferation of "desk jobs" ashore.
One way to judge the organizational personality of an institution is to measure the changes in its roles and missions and then to assess the impact of those changes. The ability to accurately identify and adapt to environmental changes determines the vitality of an organization. For the U. S. Coast Guard, missions seem to change constantly, thus modifying the role and identity of the service as it adjusts to change. As Professor Samuel P. Huntington has noted:
"Usually an organization is created to perform one particular function. When that function is no longer needed, the organization faces a major crisis: it either finds a new function or reconciles itself to a lingering death. An organization that has adapted itself to changes in its environment and has survived one or more changes in its principal functions is more highly institutionalized than one that has not."1
These varied roles and missions have been accumulated gradually by the Coast Guard and its predecessors in a history which goes back to 1790. By examining the historic mission orientation of the Coast Guard, it is possible to highlight the major evolutionary changes in the service's culture and personality.
The earliest forerunner of the Coast Guard was designed in 1790 by Alexander Hamilton to enforce revenue and customs laws of the new United States and to prevent acts of piracy on the high seas. Inasmuch as the primary function involved tariff collection, the new Revenue Marine Service was placed in Hamilton’s Treasury Department. Since armed cutters had been provided for law enforcement duties, it was natural that Congress would direct the service to cooperate with the Navy in the undeclared war with France in 1799. This predecessor of the Coast Guard was integral to naval defense in wartime and has continued in that function since then. It was formally recognized by Congress as an armed force in 1949.
From its origins, the Coast Guard has thus had a dual orientation—military and nonmilitary—which provides the basis for one of the major divisions in the officer corps today. Is the military mission of the Coast Guard the paramount function, or are the assigned civilian roles the key ingredients to the self-image of the service? The rank structure of the Coast Guard is identical with that of the Navy, and for many years the uniforms of the two services were also quite similar, distinguished only by small and often mistaken insignia. For many officers, the similarities to the Navy symbolize the most important aspect of the Coast Guard—its status as an armed service of the United States. In a book which Coast Guard Academy cadets must virtually memorize, the service is described as "an armed force with a specialized peacetime mission.”2 This serves as an indication of a military-dominant concept, a concept that has remained ingrained in the officer corps in spite of an increasing civilian role in the Transportation Department. In literature, used both internally and for public information, the theme is the same. The book Coast Guard History is divided roughly in half, with the first section being devoted to the Coast Guard in wartime.3 The emphasis is placed on the accolades won in wartime—from the undeclared war with France in 1798 to the recent Vietnam conflict. In the Coast Guardsman’s Manual, a book of general information for Coast Guard recruits, there is a ten-page section devoted to a brief history; nearly half of those pages recount the Coast Guard’s role in wartime.4 One noteworthy exception to this norm is the Bulletin of Information: 1975-1976, published as an Academy recruiting pamphlet. Only one paragraph is devoted to telling the story of the Coast Guard in war. This is a shift from a similar bulletin of the early 1960s; it mentioned the military role continuously. The new version appears to be a concession made to the unpopularity of the military in the late Vietnam War period and not an indication of the institutional view of the naval role.5
While the Coast Guard has far fewer personnel than the Navy, there is, nonetheless, an intense pride in the service’s war record and its potential role should war develop in the future. The Coast Guard uses standard naval warfare doctrine, sends ships at periodic intervals to various naval training commands, has officer exchange programs, and has one class of vessels (the USCGC Hamilton [WHEC-715-726] cutters) primarily designed to provide surface antisubmarine defense in conjunction with naval forces.
While the Coast Guard does seek the association with the Navy, former Coast Guard Commandant Chester R. Bender prescribed a distinctive new uniform in an effort to establish a separate Coast Guard identity that will not be confused with the Navy. The uniform, while still military-looking, is lighter in color from the traditional Navy blue. The response from the officer corps has been vocal, and mostly negative:
"For myself I have no identity problem. I identify with professional naval officers and want to keep it that way. Take away my dark blue uniform and you have denuded me of my status and prestige”6
"Far better to be mistaken for another seagoing service, such as the U. S. Navy or Royal Navy rather than the Air Force or the local bus drivers, as the present trend would indicate.”7
Only a few officers supported the 1974 uniform change and viewed it as a potential for greater organizational change. In my opinion, the new uniform will tend to weaken the military image of the Coast Guard, for the officer will no longer be mistaken for his Navy counterpart. This is likely to cause a new identity to emerge, one that reflects upon one or more of the assigned civilian missions of the service.
One more possible reason for maintaining the perception of the service as a military force is the constant requirement for the nation’s defense. This avoids the danger of bureaucratic elimination if one or more of the Coast Guard's civilian functions becomes non-essential, and it helps to insure that the service will not be fractionalized by federal reorganizations.
Throughout the history of its growth, the Coast Guard has maintained the initially legislated law enforcement function. Added to the original duties has been a multitude of other enforcement responsibilities, including oversight for loading of dangerous cargoes (1871), enforcement of neutrality laws (1917), regulation of motorboats (1940), protection of certain species of fish, and the enforcement of the 1961 Oil Pollution Acts.8
In 1831, the cutter Gallatin was ordered by the Secretary of the Treasury to cruise the coast to provide assistance to distressed mariners. These duties were expanded by Congress in 1837 to provide that Revenue Marine vessels cruising the coast in law enforcement work were to offer every possible assistance to any vessels they encountered in distress.9
The U. S. Life-Saving Service was established in 1871 to build and maintain a network of coastal lifeboat stations to provide rescue assistance from the shore. In 1915, the two organizations, the Revenue Marine, with its law enforcement heritage, and the U. S. Life-Saving, Service, with its 300 rescue stations, were amalgamated and named the U. S. Coast Guard. Since that time, lifesaving and rescue duties have grown within the service so that by the early 1960s, 47% of the Coast Guard's operational hours were dedicated to search and rescue.10 As duties involving the collection of revenues diminished in importance and rescue duties increased, many within the organization maintained the view that the Coast Guard was primarily a search and rescue agency. This has caused differences within the organization as to the self-image of the Coast Guard as it reinforced the seagoing assignments as premier and essential to the traditions of the service.
In 1939, the Coast Guard acquired the responsibility for maintaining aids to navigation in the United States. This occurred when the Lighthouse Service was transferred from the Commerce Department to the Treasurer. Department for consolidation with the Coast Guard. The change involved a system of 30,000 aids to navigation, more than 5,000 personnel, and 64 buoy-tending vessels. For a number of years, the former members of the Lighthouse Service maintained an identity within the Coast Guard, but as they retired, only the functional identity remained. This role in the navigational field provided the Coast Guard with a major regulatory function and further affected the organizational identity by again stressing administrative oversight.
The regulatory nature of the Coast Guard was enhanced significantly in 1942 when another organization, the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation, was added temporarily. The transfer of the bureau from the Department of Commerce to the Coast Guard was completed in 1946.11 A factor in the shift was the disastrous burning of the Morro Castle, a passenger liner devastated by fire in 1934. The investigation highlighted many weaknesses in the laws of maritime safety and brought about pressure to move the bureau to the Coast Guard. Within the Coast Guard, the inspection function includes both the regulation of vessels and the licensing of marine personnel. This has reinforced the view that the Coast Guard is a regulatory agency—at least as perceived by the operators of the American merchant fleet. These regulatory duties increase the number of shoreside administrative assignments for Coast Guard officers.
So that officers may be moved freely from regulatory assignments to those involving military preparedness or search and rescue, the Coast Guard has attempted to use all officers as "generalists." A question that is surely raised by the ever-increasing diversity of legislated duties concerns the means of insuring divergent proficiency while maintaining organizational cohesiveness. The "generalists" feel that the varied and numerous functions of the Coast Guard require officers who can perform a multitude of duties. This, they feel, is an essential ingredient for the preservation of the service. They believe that every officer must be qualified to go to sea and, in fact, that if one is to succeed in the Coast Guard, he should have several tours of duty at sea. Thus, the "generalists" believe the prime concern of the Coast Guard to be military readiness and professional seamanship, for these aspects constitute the organizational personality of the Coast Guard. The "generalist" is greatly alarmed by the recently decreasing percentage of officer billets at sea and the commensurate increase in "desk jobs” ashore.
In contrast to this philosophy is the concept of specialization that requires an officer to devote his entire career to an area of expertise and not to interrupt those assignments by intermittent sea duty or unrelated areas of responsibility. The "specialists” feel that general experience just will not do as the complexity of assigned Coast Guard responsibilities increases. New missions legislated by Congress require technical abilities and political skills that involve intricate knowledge of the problem areas and the governmental process. The "generalists” feel these specialty groups could fractionalize the Coast Guard and make it vulnerable to division by executive reorganization. Additionally, they feel the specific skills will make the Coast Guard too rigid in present functions, causing an inability to adapt to new functions as old ones become obsolete.
While this internal conflict is far from resolved, it should be noted that one distinctive characteristic of the service is the predominance of engineers in the Coast Guard. All Academy graduates receive a bachelor of science degree, and the overwhelming majority of the graduates have concentrated in engineering studies. A survey conducted by the Commandant in 1971 showed that of the 877 officers whose undergraduate degrees came from schools other than the Academy, 382 were engineering- or science-oriented.12 This gives an overall ratio of approximately 4:1 engineering to nontechnical degrees. Such a breakdown tends to give the Coast Guard a cautious mindset that is somewhat resistant to change but is potentially adaptable to new technical functions and missions. It also tends to establish a service in which individuals usually seek quantitative solutions to problems, often using very simplistic "black/white” thinking with a view toward pragmatic problem solving. There is thus a strange dichotomy- many of the newly assigned functions do require a high degree of technical skills but involve sensitive interrelations with the public and industry. Implementation of new boating safety legislation is one example, for it requires a different skill that is far more politically directed. Thus, the generalists and the specialists are continually sparring while Congress and changing conditions continue to reshape the Coast Guard.
In addition to undergoing mission changes that have placed pressure on the "generalist,” the Coast Guard has also experienced an environmental change which brought new missions and increased the need for specialization. In 1966, President Lyndon Johnson introduced plans for a new Department of Transportation that called for incorporating the Coast Guard as the maritime agency with responsibility for marine transportation affairs. The idea was to create a central agency to oversee transportation policy that previously involved 30 autonomous or semiautonomous agencies such as the Federal Aviation Administration, Maritime Administration, Army Corps of Engineers, Interstate Commerce Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, and the Coast Guard. For the Coast Guard, this meant possible opposition from the Treasury Department because it would lose the assets of the service, from the cognizant committees in Congress likely to lose jurisdictional power, and from the service itself since it would have to adjust to a new departmental culture that might involve loss of military status. Thus, the reorganization was a significant milestone in the bureaucratic personality of the Coast Guard. As far as the Treasury Department was concerned, the secretary was required to advocate retention of the Coast Guard for the record, regardless of his personal views, in order to preserve his future relationships with the Coast Guard.13 Secretary Henry (Joe) Fowler resisted the move and the commensurate budget loss, but Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara’s logic that the national security would be enhanced by the move, combined with President Johnson’s insistence upon the creation of the new department, won the day. In fact, Secretary Fowler probably did not mind the move a great deal, for "When they came to the budget item on the Coast Guard, the President quipped: 'Old Joe doesn't want to lose the Coast Guard and all those, airplanes and ships with big flags he can ride in.' Everyone present joined in the laughter, including Fowler, and he did not again bring up the subject of the Coast Guard."14
The congressional committees required more than a reassuring joke to allay fears that committee jurisdictional scope would not be lost. This was particularly true of the two authorizing committees: the House
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee which insisted upon the retention of the Coast Guard within its jurisdiction as a precondition for endorsing the transfer from the Treasury Department, and the Senate Commerce Committee.15 This fear was registered clearly by the committee's chairman, Senator Warren Magnuson of Washington, as he testified before the Government, Operations Committee that investigated the proposed reorganization. The Chairman of the Government Operations Committee was later prompted to remark to Coast Guard officials:
"Now that authorization legislation comes before the Commerce Committee, of which Senator Magnuson is Chairman, he wants to make certain you would still have to come there to get your expenditure authorization."16
Reservations were also expressed on the appropriations side, but these were of a different nature. Representative Tom Steed of Oklahoma, whose subcommittee handled the Coast Guard budget, felt that the Coast Guard would get swept up and overlooked in the new Transportation Department and, therefore, was better off under the cognizance of his Treasury and Post Office Subcommittee.17 Congressman Steed, possibly because of an affinity for the Coast Guard, obtained a seat on the new Transportation Subcommittee.18
The Coast Guard survived the move intact and was again organizationally independent except for oversight by the Secretary of Transportation. Additionally, at the insistence of the Bureau of the Budget, it remained as a military service for possible transfer to the Navy Department in time of war.19 It appeared at first, however, as if the Coast Guard would occupy the same peripheral position within Transportation that it had in the Treasury Department. No one at the policy level in the new Transportation Department had marine or maritime experience.20
While in the Treasury Department, the Coast Guard had traditionally tried to maintain an apolitical character that stressed obedience to assigned orders rather than active political intervention in departmental affairs. This was evidenced by the absence of Coast Guard officials within the department hierarchy and by the physical separation of several blocks between Coast Guard Headquarters and the Treasury building. The Coast Guard appears to have abandoned its previous stance of remaining aloof from departmental affairs; it has taken a more active role in the Transportation Department hierarchy. The increasing number of politically sensitive regulatory missions that have fallen to the Coast Guard insure that apolitical isolation is a practical impossibility for the future Coast Guard.
Whether or not this expansion into the various aspects of departmental affairs will continue is uncertain. Now that the Coast Guard is physically located in the new Nassif building with the rest of the department, a closer interrelationship may result. How dramatically this will change the nature of the service is also uncertain. There have been a number of changes to date as newly assigned functions have become more important. The Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971, governmental oversight responsibility for obstructive bridge construction, and duties involving marine oil pollution have all moved the Coast Guard farther in the direction of regulation. The overall concept of water transportation safety and environmental protection is creating a bureaucratic rearrangement within the Coast Guard in order to reflect the regulatory emphasis. While search and rescue is still a vital aspect of the service, the implementation of regulatory safeguards to prevent accidents on U. S. waterways and the safeguarding against abuse of natural resources are emerging as the most important Coast Guard functions.
Three years after the creation of the Transportation Department, a reorganization plan recommended by the Stratton Commission would have placed the Coast Guard in the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA) as the parent organization. The plan met with severe opposition. North Carolina Representative Alton Lennon, of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, remarked after discussing the intended move with the Commandant of the Coast Guard and other top officials: "Their apprehension of the Coast Guard being brought into NOAA was that it might be headed by some person interested primarily in science and the marine science in oceanography as such. They were interested in their daily roles of search and rescue.”21 This sentiment was not unanimous as the bureaucratic future of the Coast Guard was discussed, but it gives evidence that the conflicting self-image of regulation and sea rescue was still unresolved within the service. Representative Charles Mosher of Ohio indicated that the Coast Guard felt privately that it could operate in either environment and that the real pressure came from the Transportation Department.22 The Stratton Commission studying the problem felt that most Coast Guard officers have an affinity for marine activities and would find a more comfortable home in NOAA.23 Although the move never took place, it is my belief that the Coast Guard was reluctant to move since this meant another severe interruption of identity and placed the organization in jeopardy of losing its military status. The military identity has survived one move, but the NOAA proposals created the possibility of a uniformed yet civilianized service similar to the Forest Service or Coast and Geodetic Survey. This would have dealt a near deathblow to the Coast Guard’s self-perception of being integral to any naval defense. To allay these apprehensions, Commandant Bender continued to stress the sanctity of this function:
"As I travel about the Coast Guard and take the opportunity of talking with groups of Coast Guardsmen from time to time, one question is most frequently voiced. That question is, 'Where does the Coast Guard stand now and in the future with regard to its military posture?’ ... I emphasized then my keen desire for the continued military status of the Coast Guard and both the Secretary and under Secretary fully concurred in my position ... in the President’s proposal to reorganize . . . the Coast Guard is again specifically maintained as an intact and military service . . . You have my positive assurance that I am dedicated to this concept and, in my opinion, the Coast Guard is not in danger of losing its military status.”24
Because of newly assigned environmental missions, another change is occurring within the Coast Guard that is tending to reduce the seagoing and military nature. This is the expansion of the officer corps—a reflection of the changing missions. The enlisted to officer ratio in the Coast Guard has gone from 9:1 in 1962 to 6.8:1 in 1973. This prompted the House Appropriations Committee to note:
"While the testimony indicates that the increase in technology employed by the Coast Guard required a higher percentage of commissioned officers, the committee feels that efforts should be made to level off this trend”25
The decreasing number of vessels, and the increasing number of officers are transforming the Coast Guard into what C. Northcote Parkinson described as a "magnificent navy on land”26 This strikes at the heart of the seafaring self-image of the service and reinforces the regulatory view of the Coast Guard: serving as administrative watchdogs with "desk jobs” ashore. With the added environmental duties, the gradual increase (both relative and absolute) in the number of Coast Guard officers within the Transportation Department, and the number and diversity clientele groups, the Coast Guard has been forced to increase its political activities an abandon its traditional apolitical military stance.
A certain political maturity seems to be developing’ perhaps lending support to Richard Fenno’s argument that:
"... a bureau will possess its own independent base of support to which it may appeal. In fact, an this is the point, it must do so in order to get the power to operate. . . . Every governmental bureau has one vested interest, one constant preoccupation" survival. And in the interests of survival, it must cultivate sympathetic attitudes and support on the part of those who can do it harm, which most often means the legislature. In the interest of control, the legislation unit whose relations with the agency are most frequent will encourage and attempt to enforce responsibility to it. This mutuality of interest may create a concentration of power which can under mine the authority of the Secretary over his department.”27
As Fenno's statement indicates, the clientele associations of an agency are of prime importance. One problem associated with a "closed system" that tends to shun politics is the absence of a strong centralized civilian hierarchy to lobby in the Coast Guard's behalf. The Coast Guard does, however, have some strong civilian alliances, which are predominantly industry-oriented. In a policy overview statement, designed to inform service officers of the direction of the Coast Guard over the next five years, former Commandant Bender stated with relation to client groups that:
"Accelerating change is evidenced in size, distribution and nature of client groups who receive Coast Guard services . . . A broad spectrum of society is affected—commercial vessel builders, owners, and operators; recreational boaters; port and terminal operators, fishermen, etc. . . . New legislation, such as the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, Federal Boat Safety Act and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, directly affect the nature of our clientele."28
Not only is the nature of the clientele shifting, but the Coast Guard itself is changing to accommodate the client groups. Admiral Bender's case may be overstated somewhat because of the diversity of the groups and the different nature of relationships with each. The problem is that the Coast Guard is viewed as a regulatory agency by commercial builders and operators, as a rescue agency by the recreational operators, a whipping boy on pollution disasters by the Congress, and a military service by the officers corps. To the fishermen, the service is many things. The Coast Guard inspects fishing boats for safety and seaworthiness, provides assistance in case of distress, and has recently been tasked with protection against infringement of territorial waters by foreign fishing vessels. There is a strange perception, then, that has the Coast Guard in the position of a policeman and fireman at the same time. The Coast Guard clearly prefers the roles which are benevolent, but as transportation-related duties receive more attention, the regulatory missions will become more pronounced as the lifeblood of the service. This will cause a reduction in the traditional search and rescue and military preparedness roles. In their place will grow a new identification and personality that will provide the organizational cohesion needed for vitality in the Coast Guard.
Lieutenant Commander Russell graduated from the U. S. Coast Guard Academy in 1964 with a B.S. in general engineering. He has earned two master’s degrees: one in history/government from Wesleyan University in 1969 and one in political science from the University of Connecticut in 1974. His first commissioned service was as a deck officer on board the USCGC Duane (WHEC-33). Next he was executive officer of the USCGC Alert (WMEC-127), commanding officer of the Iwo Jima LORAN station, and subsequently served as an assistant professor of history at the Coast Guard Academy before retiring from the service in 1973. He is now Dean of Students at the State University of New York Maritime College at Fort Schuyler.
1 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), P. 15.
2 Running Light, 1972-1973 (New London: U.S. Coast Guard Academy, 1972), p. 131.
3 U. S. Coast Guard Public Information Division, Coast Guard History: CG-213 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972).
4 Captain W. C. Hogan, USCG, U.S. Coast Guardsman's Manual, Fifth Edition by Commander L. A. White, USCG (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1967), pp. 3-27.
5 Bulletin of Information (New London: U.S. Coast Guard Academy, 1962-1963 and 1975-1976), p. 60 in later edition. It should also be noted that in spite of the naval self-image, the Academy dropped ordnance and gunnery from the curriculum in 1972.
6 Captain W. L. Webster, USCG, "More on Uniform," Alumni Bulletin (U.S. Coast Guard Academy Alumni Association), May-June 1973, p. 6.
7 Commander R. L Brown, USCG, et. al, "More on Uniforms," Alumni Bulletin, January-February 1973, pp. 2-3.
8 U. S. Treasury Department, Study of Roles and Missions of the United States Coast Guard, Vol. I, A report to the Secretary, 1962, pp. B-2, B-3.
9 Ibid., C-2.
10 Ibid., p. C-65.
11 Ibid., p. F-2.
12 Admiral Chester R. Bender, USCG, Commandant's Bulletin, No. 33-72, 18 August 1972, Amendment No. 2, p. 3.
13 Harold Seidman, Politics, Position, and Power, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 84.
14 Patrick Anderson, The Presidents' Men (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1968), pp. 431-432.
15 Seidman, personal notes on the transfer of the Coast Guard to the Trans. Department, 1967.
16 U. S. Congress, Senate, Establish a Department of Transportation, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Government Operations Committee, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, 1966, p. 265.
17 U. S. Congress, House, Treasury-Post Office Departments and Executive Office Appropriates for 1967, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, 1966, pp. 488-489.
18 Congressman Steed’s district in Oklahoma became the site of the Coast Guard Institute, the service’s correspondence school, in an FAA vacated building. This sentiment of loyalty affected other members of the Congress, for as another member of the Transportation Subcommittee, Representative Silvio Conte of Massachusetts, remarked during the 1971 appropriations hearing:
"I want the record to show that I had a difficult decision to make. I became senior Republican on the Treasury and Post Office and Transportation Subcommittee and I had the choice of one or the other. Because of my love for the Coast Guard and the Chairman, I chose this Committee.”
U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1971, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, 1970, p. 268.
19 Thomas D. Combs, "All Ashore that’s Going Ashore”, unpublished paper, 1973.
20 U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Establishment of NOAA, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the Commerce Committee, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, 1969-1970, pp. 461-471.
21 U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1970, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Government Reorganization, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, 1970, p. 31.
22 Ibid., p. 35.
23 U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, op. cit., p. 95.
24 Admiral Chester R. Bender, USCG, Commandant’s Bulletin, No. 42-71, 15 October 1971, pp. 1-2.
25 Quoted in Art Jaeger, "House Passes CGd Appropriations Bill,” Navy Times, 4 July 1973, p. 2.
26 C. Northcote Parkinson, Parkinson’s Law (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1957), p. 7.
27 Richard F. Fenno, Jr. "The President’s Cabinet” in R. Rourke, Bureaucratic Power, p. 122.
28 Admiral Chester R. Bender, USCG, Commandant’s Bulletin, No. 25-73, 22 June 1973, p. 3.