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i f the Department of Defense had offered each of the armed services the opportunity to prepare an exhibit for a world’s fair commemorating the American Revolution Bicentennial, the Department of the Navy would probably have welcomed the chance, especially if Congress had allocated $178 million for the exhibit of each service. Although such a sum represents only about one-half of 1 % of the total Navy budget for fiscal year 1976, it is an enormous sum for public relations in the armed forces. With that money, and the incentive of being able to publicize the Navy’s mission to millions of visitors, DoD would probably have given the project top priority and arranged for a first-class display.
A century ago, Congress gave the Navy a comparable amount of money (an extra $100,000, which represented about 0.5% of the fiscal year 1876 budget of $19 million) to create an exhibit for the International Centennial Exposition in Philadelphia from 10 May to 10 November 1876. However, the department reacted coolly to the opportunity and presented only a modest display. In the executive order that outlined the participation of the federal government in the exposition, President Ulysses S. Grant stated that the purpose of the display was to:
• • illustrate the functions and administrative faculties of the Government in time of peace and its resources as a war power, and thereby serve to demonstrate the nature of our institutions and their adaptation to the wants of the people.”
The Navy exhibit achieved President Grant’s goal by accurately illustrating the material condition of the service in 1876.
Obsolete cannons, unarmored and underpowered steam-and-sail ships, and relics and paintings of the glorious heroes of past wars formed the motif of the display. The discerning visitor saw that this situation was the result of congressional policy. With barely enough funds to perform its basic missions of coastal defense and foreign cruising, the Navy had failed to make much significant technical improvement between 1865 and 1876. Congress had withheld money from the Navy to spend it on more pressing concerns. Initially, first priority went to the task of rebuilding a divided nation after a devastating war and the necessity of economic retrenchment to reduce the huge national war debt. Later, attention focused on the reconstruction of the South, industrialization, and westward expansion.
Devaluation of the currency and inflation during the war prevented Congress from returning the Navy to its prewar level of funding, $12.5 million in 1861. The legislators scrutinized the Navy’s budget requests thoroughly and cut many in half. Nevertheless, expenditures for the Navy and Marine Corps averaged about
$25 million from 1866 to 1876. Congressional advocate5 of building a fleet to rival European navies found little support. The House and Senate refused to adopt 5 foreign standard to judge the strength of the U. Navy. George M. Robeson, Grant’s Secretary of thf Navy from 1869 to 1877, and Gideon Welles h*5 predecessor, had repeatedly assured Congress that the Navy was adequate for coastal defense and foreign cruising.
Protection of the American merchant marine wasi traditional argument for maintaining a strong navy- h* 1876, however, foreign ships carried most of the U- exports and imports. During the Civil War, high insurance rates and attacks by Confederate cruise55 forced many domestic shipowners to fly foreign flag5, and federal statutes prevented their return to U- $■ registry. Congress refused to change the laws to all0"' them back and rejected attempts to subsidize the merchant marine and shipbuilding industry. In & 1870s, American tonnage in foreign trade continued its intermittent decline; by 1876, it was only 62% °* the prewar level. Higher labor and material costs afld the smaller scale of production in the United State5 produced ships that were 25-30% more expensive tha® British-built ships. Aided by subsidies, lower labflt costs, and cheaper ships, the British merchant marine had regained its predominant position in world con1' merce. Faced with such tough competition in the foreign trade, American shipowners and shipbuilder shifted their attention to the coastal trade or the f^ subsidized lines where only U. S.-flag registry vessel could trade. In 1874, the value of exports exceeded imports for the first time in the nation’s history. As the United States continued its growth into an industrh1 giant during the last quarter of the 19th century1 commercial expansion into overseas markets would ah0 continue. However, foreign bottoms would carry tha1 commerce as the American merchant marine continue^ to decline.
The geographic separation of 3,000 miles of oceai> from the ferment of European politics permitted the United States to maintain its traditional foreign poM of isolationism, non-intervention, and commercial expansionism. The nation, Congress was convinced- had sufficient naval power to defend the coast and t° protect American citizens and property abroad.
Naval officers and big-Navy advocates in CongfesS could not successfully counter the logic in that arg11' ment. Moreover, disagreement over several key issue5 reduced the meager strength of the navalists in the House and Senate and the effectiveness of the expeft advice from the naval professionals.
In that era of graft and political patronage, the Navy and navy yards were ripe pawns. Since many of the Avalists represented districts containing navy yards, they argued over the division of the appropriations for 'v°rk at each location. The debates in Congress about the Navy did not focus on its mission and strength but 0fl the details of each item in the budget requests.
Most of the equipment collected and displayed by retired Rear Admiral Thornton A. Jenkins and his staff c°rnprised surplus items from the Civil War or existing stock from navy yards. The War Department exhibit, across the aisle from the Navy in the Government building, was much more elaborate and dramatic. For Sample, the Army imaginatively erected operational Cartridge-making machinery and gave each visitor a sand-fllled sample made on the spot as a memento of ’•he exposition. The Army proudly published a voluminous catalog of its display, describing each item and deluding an appendix that mentioned all of the civilian exhibits of military significance at the exposition. The Navy, on the other hand, printed only a brief bilingual listing of the items in the display. The Navy could have done much more because it failed to use ^0% of its original appropriation of $100,000. All of ’he other departments requested and received supplemental funds.
The Navy and Marine Corps lived in the shadow of the Army in 1876. The War Department had more than twice the budget and manpower of the Navy department. With a dynamic and exciting role in Westward expansion and campaigns against the hostile Indians, the Army attracted more public attention. One °f the most sensational events of 1876 was the defeat °f General George A. Custer at the Little Big Horn. The overriding reason for the maintenance of the large
The Russian exhibit in the Machinery Hall featured a number of naval ordnance pieces.
Army during the decade after the Civil War was to ensure Congress that it had the means to control the “reconstruction” of the South.
The self-effacing approach of the small group of officers who collected and arranged the Navy exhibit at the Centennial Exposition typified the sentiments of many officers and men in the service who were extremely dissatisfied with the state of the fleet in 1876. They were frustrated and disillusioned by the indifference of the American public to naval affairs and the lack of congressional appropriations since the end of the Civil War for new construction and experimentation on weapons, ship design, and propulsion. Career professionals—committed materially and intellectually to the welfare of the naval organization—the naval officers were not self-seeking in advocating a larger navy. Rather they genuinely foresaw a war just around the corner and wanted to be prepared for it. Unfortunately for them, Congress and the American public did not share their anxiety, and appropriations remained low.
All of the senior officers in 1876 were distressed that the U. S. Navy, the strongest in the world in 1865, had slipped to the status of a sixth- or seventh-rate power. Most officers were quite aware of the latest developments in naval technology. The cruising of naval ships and several extensive fact-finding trips abroad by ordnance and engineering experts compensated for the lack of naval attaches and a centralized intelligence office. Foreign navies opened their facilities to Americans whom they did not regard as a threat. Communication was frequent and regular among the small officer corps (in 1876—796 line, 550 staff, and 249 warrants). They freely visited other naval ships in foreign ports and read widely.
Comparison with Great Britain was inevitable because it was the traditional enemy and commercial rival of the United States. However, Italy, Russia, France, and Spain had ships that outclassed the best American capital ships. Italy, Spain, Britain, and France refrained from exhibiting military hardware at the Centennial Exposition, but Russia proudly displayed rifled naval ordnance that excelled the modified Dahlgren cannons in the U. S. Navy exhibit.
Although the naval professionals agreed that the Navy was in bad shape, they could not reach a consensus about the type of Navy that the nation needed or the possible strategic implications of recent advances in naval technology. The employment and importance of the torpedo, improved armor plate, “monster” rifled guns, compound engines, the underwater ram, and greater speed were not clearly evident during this transitional period. Some officers believed that the United States should not adopt any of these innovations until the Europeans had found the best combination of armament, armor, and propulsion. Other men suggested that the nation depend solely upon the torpedo and marine ram. Still others wanted to construct capital ships on the current European model. The U. S. Naval Institute, founded in 1873, offered a forum for the objective discussion of these strategic and technical issues. The small number of members in 1876 had begun to grope toward a consensus during the short existence of the organization, but they were still far from their goal.
The officer corps was also divided on issues of selfinterest—pay, promotion, and status. Low pay and stagnation in promotion produced profound discontent. The department never satisfactorily resolved the dilemma of whether to make promotions strictly by seniority or by relative merit. The “hump” of Civil War veterans, who could not be voluntarily dismissed except for serious crimes, created severe problems f°f the younger officers. For example, the top dozen men in the Naval Academy class of 1868 were lieutenants fof 21 years.
The acrimonious and long-lasting argument between the line and staff officers also created dissension. The naval (steam) engineers, surgeons, and paymasters sought more status and rank equal to line officers. The staff s excellent service under fire during the war had weakened the line’s argument that the staff did not face the same hazards of combat. The war also caused a dramatic shift of the fleet to steam and elevated the status of the engineers. Despite the temporary victory of the line officers in 1869 and 1870 over their most f°r' midable challengers, the naval engineers, the controversy continued to cause discontent.
The line’s attack upon the bureau organization of the Department of the Navy was associated with its struggle against the staff. They charged, with some justification, that it prevented coordination because each bureau chief tended to concentrate only on his special field and neglect the others. The line officers, led by Admiral David D. Porter, advocated replacing the eight bureaus, half of which were controlled by staff officers, with a system modeled after the British Board of the Admiralty. In it, line officers would oversee and coordinate the operations, and material functions of the fleet. The implicit goal, of course, was to end the strong influence of staff officers on the Secretary of the Navy- Congress rejected such attempts on the grounds that the new system would usurp the authority of the secretary and concentrate too much power in the hands of the professional military men.
An additional unsettling influence on morale in 187^ was the lengthy House of Representatives investigation of charges of possible fraud and misadministration in the Department of the Navy. In 1874, the Democrats had won control of the House for the first time since I860. In January 1876, they initiated extensive investigations of all the executive departments in an effort to discredit the Republican Party in a pivotal presidential election year. After six months of hearings and the testimony of several hundred witnesses, the House Naval Affairs Committee sent its majority report to the floor on 25 July 1876. The report blamed Secretary Robeson for the terrible material condition of the NavyCharging him with the fraud and misuse of govern-
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j iient funds, committee members called for the Judic- \ 'ary Committee to initiate impeachment proceedings j against him.
. The Republicans countered well with a minority report that accurately pointed out that low congres- „ sional appropriations, the system of purchasing, and the . °rganization of the department were to blame for the , Poor state of the Navy and the fiscal errors. They r c^arged the Democrats on the committee with using report for political expediency. Robeson s culp- r ability is unclear because political considerations were Uppermost at the time, and the validity of the evidence ' a distant second. The report did tarnish Robeson s
record as secretary, but the Judiciary Committee never | °Pened an impeachment investigation.
Congress passed only one major construction bill be- ^een 1865 and 1876. The result of that 1873 appropriation was three iron and four wood gunboats and the Benton, a large 3,900-ton frigate. Launched in January 1876 and commissioned the following year, this Wooden vessel was the most formidable cruising ship in the Navy and the only one that was comparable to foreign warships of the time. The 1873 bill also intruded money for repairs at the Washington Navy Yard t0 the Nipsic, a fourth-rate steam sloop. Since the gunboat was not finished in 1876, her engines formed part °f the Navy display at the Centennial Exposition.
With so little new construction, the Navy Department had to repair the existing ships in an effort to
meet operational requirements. Hasty construction with inferior materials during the Civil War had resulted in warships that quickly rotted. Insufficient storage facilities after the war caused the deterioration of more good ships and machinery.
The loss of most of the wartime tonnage forced the department to rely heavily on the small screw-steamers built before the Civil War. However, age was also catching up on them. For example, two famous vessels—the Hartford, Admiral Farragut’s flagship at the battle of Mobile Bay, and the Kearsarge, victor over the Confederate raider Alabama—had undergone extensive repairs since the end of the war.
A 51-foot scale model of the USS Antietam, the centerpiece of the Navy’s exhibit at Philadelphia, accurately illustrated the type of ship that the Navy used for foreign cruising in 1876. It depicted a bark-rigged 2,500-ton steam sloop of war that mounted 18 9-inch Dahlgren cannons and two 100-pound pivot guns. The U.S. Naval Acadamy staff used the model for seamanship instruction of the cadet-midshipmen. Ironically, the actual Antietam epitomized the Navy’s problems with the wartime construction because she never saw sea service. Laid down in 1864 and launched in late 1875, she was too deteriorated for cruising and served as the storeship at the Philadelphia Navy Yard.
A total ot 16 wooden warships similar to the Antietam represented the United States in 1876 on the five foreign stations—European, South Atlantic, Asiatic, and North and South Pacific. Usually scattered over thousands of miles of coast, the ships rarely operated together as a squadron. These steam sloops-of- war were v '1 equipped for the cruising duty. Wind provided their principal propulsion on the long cruises and allowed them to be free from bases and the need to purchase expensive coal. Since the semi-civilized nations seldom possessed modern weapons, the obsolete muzzle-loading Dahlgren cannons were adequate for emergencies.
In regard to possible attacks upon the Eastern seaboard of the United States, Secretary Robeson assured President Grant in late 1876 that the Navy was well equipped to handle foreign threats:
“Thus, our monitor system supported by the marine ram, commanded by enterprising officers, and re-enforced by the deadly torpedo in skillful and scientific hands, will, I think supply all that is absolutely necessary for the naval share of our coast defense, and will be found efficient, for our purposes against any foreign iron-clads which can reach our coasts or enter our harbors.’’
Robeson’s plan depended upon a strange combination of slow, single-turret Civil War monitors armed with obsolete cannons and two unproven weapons: the torpedo and marine ram. Eleven of these “smooth- water” monitors, completely rebuilt during Robesons administration, formed the mainstay of the North Atlantic, or home, Squadron. At the Centennial Exposition, the Navy built a full-sized wooden replica ofa monitor turret with standard 15-inch, cast-iron Dahlgren guns inside.
In an effort to obtain oceangoing armored warship5' Secretary Robeson resorted to an old, but quasi-lega' expedient. He arranged for the construction of ne"' ironclads at private shipyards under the guise of “[C' building” five rotten monitors. Usually the namesake vessel was not even near the construction site of the ne'v ship. In June 1874, Congress permitted Robeson to initiate this scheme by transferring $900,000 frorn another project to make “repairs” on these ship5; Later, the legislators learned that the “repairs consisted of substitution of iron for wood in the hulls of the four Miantonomah-Hiss monitors and the conversion of the Puritan from one turret to two. When Congress refused to give Robeson more money, he dre^ upon the general repair funds of the Bureaus of Steam Engineering and Construction and Repair until Congress stymied him by greatly decreasing the appr°' priations. A particularly incensing aspect to Robeson 5 arrangement with the private shipyards was his decision to pay them by surrendering 11 old monitors and machinery from several other ships, in addition to the five original ships, for their scrap value. The builders ceased work on the five vessels in 1876 because of lack of funds.
The reluctance of Congress to join Great Britain- France, Italy, and the others in a naval arms race saved millions of dollars by avoiding costly experimentation and development of weapons and armor plate that would soon become obsolete. The Army and AW journal commented approvingly in late 1876 that Secretary of the Navy Robeson:
“...does not believe in following the lead of the European, with heavy-armored and unwieldly ironclads, or in their attempts to provide “the monstet cannon to penetrate them.” As the grapes hang high we have always thought ourselves that they do look sour: and we may console ourselves with the present spectacle of England, tearing its hair and wringing its hands, at the sight of Italy’s 100 ton guns letting daylight through the armor, it has been spending so many millions to perfect.”
The transitional nature of naval technology in 1876 caused some officers to advocate waiting until the Europeans had discovered the best combination o( armament, armor, and propulsion. This approach had
s°me merit because designs were constantly changing. Eor example, the British completed the first mastless Seagoing turret ship, the Devastation, in April 1873. Only a year later, they discarded this design, which later proved to be prototype of the modern capital ship. The 25% increase in displacement and 100% increase in the 'Veight of the guns in the Inflexible forced the naval instructors to abandon the turret concept in favor of sails and a protected citadel in the center of the ship, ^aval technology changed so rapidly that each capital ship was almost one of a kind.
In any case, the United States did not have the industrial capability and technical expertise to manufacture che type of armor plate and steel gun forgings that the Europeans used in their capital ships. John Roach, whose shipbuilding firm near Philadelphia was repairing” the monitor Puritan, proudly displayed an arrnor plate for the ship at the Centennial Exposition. The 12 3/4-inch iron plate was a great technological advance in American ironmaking at the time but quite 'uferior to the 24 inches of “compound” armor on the ^flexible.
The American situation was just as bad in ordnance, ^he United States had clearly lost its prewar status ^ a leader in cannon innovation and manufacture. Eifteen-inch, muzzle-loading Dahlgren guns in a fake Monitor turret adjacent to the Government Building at the Exposition were the best guns the Navy had Ir> service. Constructed according to outmoded prin- c‘ples two decades old, these cast-iron relics were fitting mates to the Army’s 20-inch Rodman coastal defense guns displayed nearby. All were laughable antiques in comparison with the Krupp rifled, breechfading gun on display in the Machinery Hall. This cast-steel, hooped 14-inch “monster” cannon was Probably the most powerful gun in the world but would s°on be surpassed by the 17.7-inch “monsters” built W a British armaments firm for the Italians in 1876. No company in the United States would have the capability of successfully casting or forging such large pieces of steel until the late 1880s. The Midvale Steel Company displayed a steel tube at the Centennial Exposition that had an outside diameter of only 12 inches.
The Navy had managed to stay more contemporary in one of the most important innovations of the time— the “auto-mobile” or “fish” torpedo. The first trials of this new offensive form of underwater attack took place in 1866. When other governments purchased the patent rights to this Lupis-Whitehead model in 1869, the United States refused. Instead, officers at the Newport Torpedo Station, founded that year, attempted to develop a domestic version that copied the Whitehead plan. They were not successful. The 12-foot-long “fish” torpedo in the Navy’s exhibit was the 1871 model that had failed to meet operational requirements Since then, officers had concentrated on other work because of difficulties with the lack of speed over long distances.
The controllable Lay and Ericsson torpedoes and the towed Harvey model were other forms of offensive tor-
pedoes that officers considered promising at the time. They were prominently displayed at the Centennial Exposition and are interesting despite the fact that they later proved unfeasible.
Carbonic acid gas powered the 25-foot Lay torpedo that contained 300 pounds of gunpowder or 75 pounds of dynamite in its contact warhead. The operator on the shore or ship controlled the path of the weapon by signals transmitted through two miles of electric cable. Since this surface torpedo ran almost completely submerged, two guide poles on top permitted the operator to determine its location. In tests during 1876, control was adequate, but the torpedo could reach only half its projected speed of 12 miles per hour.
John Ericsson, of Monitor fame, submitted a weapon driven by compressed air that came to the torpedo through a rubber hose from the shore. It had a very limited range—only 800 feet. The Harvey torpedo resembled a small paravane used in modern minesweeping operations. It offered the advantage of hitting the enemy ship below the warerline. However, towing the weapon into the target proved to be difficult and
subjected the towing ship to prolonged attackSecretary Robeson had obviously overrated the potential value of the torpedo in coastal defense in his 187^ report to President Grant.
The only bright spot at the Navy’s exhibit at the Philadelphia Centennial Exposition was the progress in the peacetime activities of astronomy, hydrography, and exploration. Naval officers had made significant contributions to science in their work at the Naval Observatory, Hydrographic Office, and Coast and Geodetic Survey, and expeditions in Central America and the seas between North America and Greenland. The Bureau of Navigation oversaw the work of several independent offices that carried on the services established by Lieutenants Matthew F. Maury, Charles H. Davis, and James M. Gilliss before the Civil War. The traditional justification for this work was the promotion of American commerce through better navigation and safety at sea.
The Naval Observatory had established its preeminence in positional astronomy in the United States by the 1870s. Through telegraphic links, it provided
time standard for the federal government and much the country. The sextants, chronometers, and other lristruments in its display at the Centennial Exposition showed that the United States was no longer dependent uPon European manufacturers for first-class scientific ! arid astronomical hardware. In 1873, Alvan Clark & I S°ns of Cambridgeport, Massachusetts, built and I Called in the observatory the largest refractory tetacope in the world.
In three small houses adjacent to the Government aiding, the Navy displayed the equipment used for observation of the transit of Venus on 9 Decem- er 1874. This rare occurrence offered astronomers ar* opportunity to check the distance between the Jjarth and the sun, the fundamental unit in astronomy.1 equipment in the display was one of eight sets that Naval Observatory provided and Navy ships transported to scattered and isolated locations around the acific Ocean. Secretary Robeson reported proudly to ffsident Grant in 1876 that the Navy’s expeditions for solar eclipse of 22 December 1870 and the transit Venus in 1874 had brought:
• • . most gratifying success. The highest commendations of the eclipse observations were received from astronomers at home and abroad, and the work °f reducing the transit of Venus observations has progressed sufficiently to prove that the labor and expense attendant on the expedition was well bestowed.”
The preparation and publication by the Navy of the high-quality American Ephemeris and Nautical Almanac each year provided another source of pride. Lieutenant Charles Henry Davis established the Nautical Almanac Office in 1842 at Harvard University, the leading center for astronomy at the time. After subsequent naval duties and a distinguished combat record during the first year of the Civil War, he became the head of the Bureau of Navigation, the Navy’s principal scientific organization, from 1862 to 1865. A close friend and colleague of many of the most eminent American scientists, he was instrumental in the incorporation of the National Academy of Sciences in 1863- After the war, Rear Admiral Davis commanded a squadron and the Norfolk Navy Yard before becoming Superintendent of the Naval Observatory in 1874.
The deep-sea sounding equipment in the Navy’s display illustrated the important contributions that naval officers were making to hydrography at the time. The Navy had long been involved in the study of the sea. Lieutenant Matthew F. Maury had won international stature through his studies in the 1840s and 1850s of what he called the “physical geography of the sea. ’ ’ His wind and current charts and tables saved sailing masters time and money. Officers on board the USS Dolphin made the first deep-sea soundings in the Atlantic
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Ocean and discovered a route for an underwater telegraph cable. They used a sounding lead invented by LieutenantJ. M. Brooke that significantly improved the measurement of the depth of the water and was a standard tool for years.
After the Civil War, hydrographic surveys were a routine duty for all Navy ships as they cruised on foreign stations. Several ships made special surveys. In 1873, the uss Tuscarora made the first soundings in the North Pacific Ocean in search of a telegraph route between Japan and the United States. The demonstration on this cruise of the feasibility of using wire instead of rope for soundings “revolutionized” the art, reported Lieutenant Commander T. F. Jewell in the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings. The saving in labor, the shorter time for the cast, and the accuracy of the result soon convinced other nations to copy the
American method. This “deep-sea sounding machine and a special specimen cylinder for bringing up botton1 samples invented by Captain George E. Belknap 'vefC part of the display at Philadelphia.
Fifty officers on Navy pay performed the hydr0 graphic work of the U. S. Coast Survey. In 1876, example, they assisted in the accurate determination 0 the latitude and longitude of many key ports borderifl? the Caribbean Sea. In another commerce and safeO related duty, George Dewey and 13 other commanders worked as lighthouse inspectors in 1876’
From 1870 to 1875, naval officers commanded 1 series of surveys in Central America to determine thc best route for an interoceanic canal. Aware of potential commercial and strategic significance of the*1 work, they made extremely accurate surveys that wefe the basis for later decisions about the canal route.
Arctic exploration had captured the attention of 6|C Navy and the American public for more than three decades. Although the federal government had fl0t underwritten the principal expenses of any of the maj°f expeditions, the Navy and naval officers were deepl) involved in this exciting adventure. At the Centeno111 Exposition, the Bureau of Navigation presented aI1 extensive collection of relics and artifacts from four principal American efforts.
Lieutenant Edwin J. De Haven commanded expedition in 1850-51 in search of the noted Brit'5 explorer Sir John Franklin and his men. This utl successful attempt to locate Franklin initiated America11 exploration of the Arctic and gave Assistant Surge0(1 Elisha K. Kane valuable experience.
Kane’s own expedition, the second funded by Henf' Grinnell to search for Franklin, explored a differe(lt area than DeHaven, who had looked in Lancastd Sound north of Baffin Island. Ice trapped Kane a°'
Eis small ship, the Advance, in Kane Basin between Ellesmere Island and Greenland in 1853 and 1854. One °f the three boats that Kane and his party used to make their escape in the spring of 1855 was part of the Navy exhibit, outside next to the monitor turret. Kane’s Party made some valuable scientific observations in Meteorology and natural history in one of the most ternote and interesting regions of the world. Kane’s Narrative of this ordeal became a best-seller when it was Published in 1856.
Dr. Isaac I. Hayes, a member of Kane’s company, Eegan his own expedition after five years of effort rising money. In 1860-61, he retraced Kane’s route looking for Franklin and searching for the open polar Sea that Kane believed existed. Ice stopped him short of goal and forced Hayes to return to the United States during the first summer of the Civil War. The war
Precluded further fund raising.
, The Navy Department and Coast Survey had an ‘Mportant role in outfitting the next large American expedition on the ill-fated Polaris from 1871-73. They Provided Charles F. Hall with most of his instruments aod his ship the Polaris, a former seagoing naval tug drat had been especially fitted for Arctic duty. On two Previous journeys to the north during the 1860, Hall Ead learned that no survivors of Franklin’s party were living among the Eskimos. More importantly, he Proved the feasibility of adapting to the severe climate Ey living as an Eskimo. Although the search for Eranklin was again the principal objective of this eXpedition, science was an important secondary Mission. The National Academy of Sciences specified scientific program of astronomy, meteorology, natural history, and glacier study.
On 30 August 1871, the ship reached a new “highest n°rth’’ of 82° North latitude in the Hall Basin between Ellesmere Island and Greenland. After, going into winter quarters alongside a grounded iceberg, Hall died Ur>der rather mysterious circumstances. Discipline went to pieces. After the ship was freed from the ice, the Darty started south. During confusion when the sinking °f the ship appeared imminent, two groups got out on lce floes and were stranded. Fortunately, they had applies and quickly got together. On the ice for 196 days, they drifted about 2,000 miles before being rescued by the sealer Tigress. Meanwhile, the party on (be ship beached her and spent a difficult winter. They Eishioned two scows from the remains of the Polaris and Sa*led south until encountering the Ravenscraig. Most °E the scientific materials were lost with the ship, but lbe centennial exhibit contained one of the scows fashioned from the timbers of the Polaris.
The books, maps, rocks, pictures, instruments, Nothing, and other memorabilia from the four
intrepid expeditions filled two glass cases. Guidebooks to the Centennial Exposition usually sketched a brief history of the exploits of this adventurous American in glowing terms. The Public Ledger stated what was probably the reaction of many visitors:
“Every relic here told a story of its own. It was not only suggestive of patience, hardship, endurance, bordering on rashness, and life nobly sacrificed in the search for truth, but the geographer, or he who loves travel or to read of travel, found a strange fascination in these relics.”
The Centennial Exposition of 1876 was a celebration of the sophistication and genius of American industry. Merchants and manufacturers proudly showed the Europeans the vitality and versatility of inventors and craftsmen in the United States. Exhibits in the Machinery Hall and many separate company buildings indicated that his country was rapidly growing into an industrial giant that could rival Great Britain, France, and Germany.
In contrast to this progressive and dynamic spirit in most of the exposition, the antiquated equipment in the U. S. Navy’s exhibit came from a past era. Congress, in reverting to traditional naval policy after the end of the Civil War, and halted the development of American naval technology. During the decade from 1866 to 1867, when foreign navies competed in an armaments race, the United States used old ships that required constant repair. They were, however, quite adequate to perform the dual missions of the Navy: coastal defense and overseas protection of commerce. Until the development of a strong expansionist impulse in the 1880s, there was little stimulus for building the expensive armored steel ships with big guns that could compete with the Europeans and project American power overseas.
A graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy in 1967, Lieutenant Glasow holds a master of arts degree in history from San Jose State University. He served in the weapons department in the USS Robison (DDG-12) and as an instructor at the NROTC Unit, Stanford University. Since disability retirement in 1972, he has studied the history of technology and science at the University of Delaware on a Hagley Fellowship. At present, he is a predoctoral fellow at the Smithsonian Institution while writing his dissertation on the role of naval officers in ordnance innovation in the "New Navy” of the 1880s and 1890s.