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l he ability of a crew of a ship or an aircraft to bring life and spin to cold hardware and make it function hi our nation's defense can be the difference between victory and defeat. So we must improve the quality of the people we attract to the services, making certain that the person matches the requirements of the job, that our men and women are determined to excel, that they understand the policies of our nation, and that they are trained to win.
W hen members of the Senate debated the Department of Defense (DoD) budget for fiscal year 1974, they became uneasy with the growing cost of manpower. Even by inadequate accounting methods which did not include a calculation of future retirement costs and veterans benefits for those then serving in the armed forces, personnel expenditures had absorbed more than half of the dollars to be appropriated. How would these growing costs for people affect U. S. military allocations for new weapon systems (our only means of maintaining comparability with forces which have more manpower and/or weapons) and for research and development that are essential to technical superiority? Senators wondered about the all-volunteer force. Was its modest success at the time a temporary blessing, subject to the vicissitudes of the economy?
During the discussion, Senators Howard Baker and Lloyd Bentsen asked that an independent commission be appointed to inquire into these subjects and all other related manpower issues. Other voices quickly agreed, for they had questions of their own. What is the impact of socioeconomic changes on the capability of our defense forces? What will be our needs for numbers of people within the next decade? How well are people utilized? Are they paid adequately and equitably? Can the services fulfill their missions? The Senate agreed to form a commission and the House of Representatives, in conference, concurred.
The Defense Manpower Commission, beginning work on 19 April 1974, had the broadest charter ever devised for a group investigating this subject. It was directed to consider the problems related to the entire life cycle of manpower and personnel matters, during the next decade, for active and reserve forces, civilians working for DoD, and private contractor personnel. The members of the commission (four appointed by Congress, three by the President) took numerous trips to visit the armed forces, held public meetings and hearings, employed a professional staff" averaging about 20, and submitted a final report on 19 April 1976.[1] From this experience the commissioners concluded that defense manpower, a complex of interrelated systems, can be studied logically only as a total system. Particular inquiries, even though competent or sometimes brilliant, have harmed the total manpower system because the effects of one change cannot be isolated as they influence other parts of the system as well.
Readers of the Proceedings may wish to know the major recommendations of the commission, particularly those that relate specifically to the U. S. Navy. These are related here under headings similar to the substantive chapters of the commission’s report.
Requirements: Those who visit the fleet today can_ begin to comprehend how heavily the Navy spent itsei in Southeast Asia. Ships and aircraft remained on sta tion there long after combat troops had come home- The American public, looking at only DoD dolfo expenditures in the late 1960s and early 1970s, does not realize how much money went into expendable items and how little into the maintenance of existing capm equipment and the acquisition of new weapon systems- Thus, weapons and people now compete for the Nav)s limited resources, with some evidence that the forces available do not match requirements.
The much-publicized total force policy is not yet a reality because the National Guard and reserve units 0 the various services could not be ready for deploymef[2] overseas within one to three months; four to si* months would be a more realistic goal. Nevertheless the differences we found in reserve units of each of t^e services were profound. The Air National Guard, the Air Force Reserve, and Naval Air Reserve, all of w‘llC receive costly support, have achieved remarkable leve of readiness. By contrast, Army units have not done s° well, and the Navy has neglected its surface reserve-
Fundamental to the total force concept is the fleXl bility that should be available to the services in order t° maximize their effectiveness by employing an econom1 cal variety of manpower resources. But this cannot done without some awareness of real costs. While the commission found that civilians usually cost less tfon military personnel and reservists less than civiflanS’ much more accurate costs are required. For example, often hear that reserve forces cost a small fraction 0 active units. Commissioners found that a reserve info11 try battalion (a manpower intensive unit) costs abou^ 15% of an active one, but an Air National Guard d squadron (an equipment intensive unit) costs 65% active one. If accurate costs were available, DoD con develop an orderly transition for the next decade obtain a better mix of active, reserve, and civfl*afl personnel which would provide maximum capability least cost. . .
On force structure, the commission concurred W the Army’s 16-division force, in addition to eight hi* tional Guard divisions. It also recommended that tfo three separate brigades in Europe either be organfo into a division or attached permanently to existin£ U. S. divisions assigned to NATO. Likewise, the cof1 mission found justification for the 26-tactical Air Force.
active-
reserve mix experiments, realizing that the future -j^Pansion °f the Navy may depend upon the results. e affiliation concept and the possibility of offering re training at ports, where active force personnel can
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assi;
The decline of U. S. naval strength from 976 ships in rhe active fleet in 1968 to 480 in fiscal year 1976 ^derlines the necessity to augment and modernize the avy- The commission believes this is particularly important for the antisubmarine forces, owing to our nation’s dependence upon raw materials from abroad atld the likelihood that a national emergency would re'luire us to deploy overseas.
Commissioners recognized the character of naval Warfare: manpower and weapons are constrained by the Sl2e and configuration of the ship in which they operate- Because of the natural desire to increase the opera- tl0r>al effectiveness of a ship, men at sea are destined to ^0rk long hours under cramped conditions. The loneness of long deployments adds to the burdens of a ^fior’s life. Consequently, rotation between sea and 0re assignments must continue if quality people, able faster the Navy’s sophisticated technology, are to be recruited and retained. This fundamental point must be Uriderstood, or well-intentioned lay people will argue a8ainst the use of military personnel on shore assignments. Finally, the Navy depends upon a large shore J^kBshment of yards and stations that boosts the ratio Clvilians to military personnel to 60% compared to ^ for the Army and 46% for the Air Force.
^he commission reviewed a Naval Reserve study, t.0rnpleted in late 1975 by the Chief of Naval Opera- efj.ns’ and was impressed with the thoroughness of the °tt. The Navy is restructuring its reserve into task- ented units with specific capabilities, a vast improve- "nt over the heavy emphasis upon individual aug- Nation. Accordingly, the commission did not Pport the President’s recommendation to reduce the ected Naval Reserve to 52,000, preferring instead a ^rt'ngth of 102,000. The Congress later approved a .mgth of 96,500. Commissioners were intrigued by
^ st in realistic instruction, could greatly improve the ectiveness of reserve units.
The Marine Corps, with a structure fixed by law, is now studying the size and equipping of its units. Commissioners found a supportive relationship between active and reserve units of the Corps. Apparently there are some difficulties in reaching desired reserve manning levels. The reserve air wing has a disproportionately large number of enlisted personnel in higher grades. The commission recommended an expanded reserve for skilled aviation personnel who cannot now be accommodated in units.
The commission found opportunities for savings in base operating support by consolidating activities on fewer bases, employing civilians to a greater extent, taking advantage of more capital equipment to save direct labor, and utilizing contractors for services. Without question, closing facilities would save considerable amounts of money, but politically it will continue to be difficult to do so without concurrence by the leaders of both houses of Congress on a long-term program that provides sufficient warning to the personnel involved, time for communities to make economic adjustments, and federal assistance to communities during the transition away from dependence upon the base, yard, or station.
To estimate the forces required by the nation during the next decade, the commission accepted the plans and policies of the National Security Council (electing not to stretch our already broad charter to cover this com-
ided
or moderate economic growth. If the economy g1
rows
and
National Guard will have a difficult task, even unc
der
seeks to meet its commitments. Certainly the susta* ability of the all-volunteer force is linked to making 11 services attractive and insuring that military compenS:1
ing DoD estimates of individual Reservists, discover
re-
in the 1980s. The Department of Defense is now
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plicated area) and then examined manpower numbers to carry out those plans and policies. Assuming no deterioration in the present international situation, no major hostilities, and no decrease in U. S. capabilities, the commission estimates that active military forces for the next decade will remain at 2.1 million, civilians will decline by 70,000, or so, to one million (based upon better utilization of people, more contracting for base operating support, and the closure of facilities). The selected reserve will remain at 890,000 if the Navy’s surface reserve remains approximately at its present level, and the number of personnal employed by private contractors probably will increase.
Recruitment and the Future of the All-Volunteer Force: Commissioners found that no issue within the services or among the informed public generates emotions quite so quickly as a discussion of the all-volunteer force. Few seem to be uncommitted to a firm view.
Without question, the services have made an heroic adjustment to volunteerism. All services have had difficult conditions to overcome in the transition. The pressure to attract sufficient numbers of people to replace departing draftees who served short terms caused recruiting officers to accept some who could not meet the requirements of the armed forces. The Marines, particularly, experienced these problems and did not react quickly with early discharges, as they now are doing. Most of those transitional burdens in each of the services have been eased.
The commission found that active force quality has been improved over that of the draft years, measured either by mental category or educational level. But the reserve components have experienced a decline, partly because they no longer attract bright young men who previously enlisted to avoid being drafted. Although commanders prefer recruits who want service in a reserve unit rather than those who accept service to avoid something even more distasteful to them, nevertheless recruits must be capable of mastering the tasks that the unit undertakes. The total force implications of this matter bear careful and continuing scrutiny.
Both active and reserve forces attract more blacks and women than they used to. The services seem to draw their recruits from the middle classes, as previously they had done. Commissioners detected no evidence that the present composition of the services in any way detracts from unit capability, and they had before them an extensive survey of unit leaders’ opinions that corroborated this conclusion.
The commissioners recommended that the Army and Air Force combine active and reserve recruiting as do the Navy and Marine Corps; that recruiting and recruit training be directed by the same command, as the Air
Force does and the Marine Corps is moving to do; that the services be given flexibility in the use of recruiting incentives (thus to match the incentive given with the immediate need to employ it); that the Secretary 0 Defense monitor service recruiting costs and establ's standard budgeting procedures; that recruiter effective ness be measured on the basis of recruit success aftef entry into the service; and that selection tests predict success on the job rather than in training.
The giant question is how long the all-volunte£r force can be sustained. To provide a careful answer, commission staff people estimated the size of the p° from which recruits must come during each year of the next decade (aware that during this time the l8-)'e‘ir old male population group will shrink). Then the) tried to determine recruiting success in slow, moderate, and rapidly growing economies. They concluded that the active forces will be able to maintain their present size and quality with existing inducements (prov: these remain relatively competitive) in periods of s'0" rapidly, then inducements must increase, more wotnef must be used, lower quality must be accepted, or th services must resort to a combination of these. Incide11 tally, this analysis did not take into account the p°sSI bility of a massive job program for this popular'011 group, a development that would certainly make rn°re difficult the recruitment of needed personnel for c armed services.
This same analysis concluded that the reserve
moderate growth, attracting the numbers they requ"e' while a rapidly-growing economy will force rna) changes. This conclusion must be weighed carefully 1 appraising the total force policy by which the naU°r
tion and other benefits are competitive.
One other factor must be considered in a discuss'°n
of the future of the all-volunteer force: what must 1
nation do in a mobilization? No student of the sub]1'
. ■ the
has suggested that volunteerism would sustain needs of our services during total mobilization. 1 commissioners found inadequate planning for com loss replacements in a major war. Staff members, stu i
overly optimistic estimates of the size of available P(
evaluating its estimates. Under existing planning. Army must find its infantry loss replacements n these pools. . _
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M
At the same time, the administration has discontl0^ ued the annual registration of young men who rea
total for ROTC. That restriction should be lifted, for two-year program offers considerable flexibility to services for producing qualified officers at relatively cost. The Platoon Leaders Course, vital to the
Pro
'grams should be continued.
aSe 18 and has virtually terminated the Selective Service System on the logic that new machinery could be created quickly enough in an emergency to satisfy the needs of the nation at war. The commission recommended that the Selective Service System be restored, lhat annual registrations be continued, and that women assurne the same reserve obligation as men.
development and Utilization: This major portion of commission study surveyed all education and train- lng undertaken by the services and DoD and the utili- 2ati°n made of persons following that training. The C°mmission staff estimated that individual training and ecWation cost the nation $7 billion each year, and unit lining adds significantly to this amount.
The commission suggested that the armed forces rec°nsider the wisdom of assigning service academy Smduates to basic training courses upon graduation.
ms questions the Navy surface warfare schools recently established. The Army and Air Force are advised to consider carefully the Naval Academy mix of civil- lans and naval officers on its faculty as a better alternate than a faculty composed almost entirely of military °fficers. At present, two-year reserve officer training tfPs scholarships can constitute no more than 20% of
the the low
Ratine Corps, should be established permanently and traced under the management of the Secretary of the avy- Other services should explore the possibility of ^s'ng the Platoons Leaders Course approach, since this ^°uld open the possibility of commissioning to stu- er>ts enrolled in colleges and universities where ROTC ^grants are not available. The enlisted commissioning
The commissioners believe that undergraduate heli- Pter training should be consolidated at a single location, leaving advanced training to the individual services. The commission favored the Navy concept of separate "tracks” for helicopter, jet, and propeller aircraft training instead of the Air Force practice of training all pilots in jet aircraft. Simulators could be utilized even more than at present and should be considered for teaching basic flying skills in undergraduate flight training. Lateral movement from civilian occupations to the services would allow some recruits to bypass portions of the skill training.
The commissioners concluded that the professional education of military personnel is a necessity meriting strong support, but it must not be considered an end in itself. Except for special areas, a bachelor’s degree should be sufficient formal education to prepare an officer for flag or general rank.
The report recommends that professional military education be linked with professional advancement. The extensive educational programs at the Naval War College at Newport, and elsewhere, can only be justified if they are prerequisites to promotion. Likewise, reserve officers need access to professional military education, and special programs should be available to them. Petty officers and noncommissioned officers have a requirement for professional education, and the services should adopt programs with adequate resources for them.
Graduate degrees can become status symbols. Truly educated professionals can and do learn by themselves and through experience. Thus, the acquiring of degrees or course hours does not necessarily mean that the individual is better educated or more capable. To control graduate-level programs, the commission advised that a share of similar billets be held by advanced degree holders, when it seemed to the service’s interest to do so, rather than to use the current validated billet approach. The services should continue to support voluntary programs related to the individual’s occupational duties. Similarly, the services should encourage civilian professional growth.
The commission found evidence that both military and civilian managers need a better understanding of Civil Service rules and procedures. Much closer coordination is necessary between civilian and military personnel managers.
The services probably have worked harder to improve equal opportunity and race relations than any other institution in American society. But problems requiring continuing effort still persist. The commission, after hearing testimony from officers and men in each service, including minority members, and also from a group of minority scholars, decided that a representational policy should not be adopted. Rather, commissioners concluded that the services should continue to recruit and assign personnel without regard to representation.
Women should be encouraged to enter nontraditional roles in the services, even though commissioners recognized that the public would not now support combat duty for women. Commissioners sensed some lack of acceptance of women in the services, hampering effective utilization of them. As is true in the military, so too equal opportunity is lacking for civilian women; a program to utilize more fully civilian women requires top-level encouragement.
The future military career force: One of the report’s major recommendations proposes a new concept for shaping the career force, an approach that will improve the stability and quality of the force while it reduces retirement and other personnel costs. This new program is based upon requirements for a career force rather than personnel management considerations, although, of course, it must be tempered by these. The career force under this concept would be defined as the officers, petty officers, and noncommissioned officers with ten or more years of service. Entry into the career force would be controlled to insure that the size of the career force met the requirement. Officers of the career force need not be promoted to be retained, and thus the failure- orientation of the present program, that is both wasteful and demoralizing, would be eliminated. Promotions would be based on a range of years of service and time in grade; current pressures on the efficiency/fitness reporting systems would be eased.
Career officers would be grouped and managed by broad categories, such as combat, technical, administrative, and professional. A normal career would be 30 years, but combat careers (such as arduous sea duty) could be shorter. Enlisted personnel and reserve officers should have similar career programs.
Linked with this concept of shaping the career force would be a retirement system to support it. An immediate annuity after 20 years of service would be phased out and replaced by an immediate annuity after a normal career of 30 years. In the event of combat service, the immediate annuity might be available as soon as 20 years, with intermediate rates for earning retirement assigned to jobs according to mission and the degree of combat orientation. Voluntary separatees would receive a deferred annuity at age 65, while involuntary separatees would have the choice of readjustment pay plus a deferred annuity or double readjustment pay.
Compensation: No element of the commission’s study proved to be more complicated or confusing than that of compensation. A comprehensive study of military pay cannot be made without a corresponding inquiry into civilian pay as well. The commissioners found that the present systems for adjusting rates of pay for both military and civilian personnel are not working well, the principle of comparability has become greatly distorted.
The commission believes that compensation shoul be competitive—adequate to attract and retain the desired quantity and quality of personnel over both the short and long term to carry out the missions of the services. In this context, the commission would accept the use of comparability only as a guide.
Commissioners believe that the only way to insure equitable rates of pay for civilian and military personnel in the defense establishment is to establish an independent, permanent Federal Compensation Board with jurisdiction over the uniformed military (including active, National Guard, and reserve personnel), and a federal civilian personnel including those of the Genera Schedule and the Federal Wage System. A board coul not confine itself to military pay without considering civilian pay as well. Likewise, it could not consider the pay of civilians working for DoD without having the authority to consider all federal civilian salaries. DoD employs all of the military, 45% of the civilians under the General Schedule pay program, and more than 80/® of the Federal Wage System employees for blue collar workers. Yet, the Secretary of Defense has neither con trol of nor a major voice in the mechanism adjusting compensation. He would not have a direct voice in the Federal Compensation Board, but the board worn recommend to Congress and the President appropriate pay for all federal employees of the major pay plans, an thus it would necessarily consider compensation 0 military and civilians together.
Considering force profiles, the commission recog' nized that each service has its own specialized needs- The more technological services, the Navy and the A*r Force, desire a more mature enlisted force than do the ground combat-oriented services, the Marine Corps an the Army.
The commission concluded that military compensa* tion, dealing with such a range of work and working conditions, will necessarily appear complex. A uniforrn pay table supplemented with bonuses and special pa) ments to meet specific problems will support best the needs of each service. Regular Military Compensation’ not including benefits, should be converted into a tui t taxable salary in order to establish equity between all o those having the same service responsibility. Institn tional benefits greatly affect morale, and thus attacks of them often do great harm, out of proportion to the modest savings that would be possible through the*r cancellation. No explicit payment to all service men1 bers should be made as compensation for the X-fact0 ’
chat balance of noncompensation elements of military service compared to civilian employment. Rather, the X-factor should be acknowledged in other ways. LookIng at the military estate program, the commission staff •ttade the most comprehensive examination yet undertaken. To cause the services to reflect the cost of retirement when they develop personnel programs, the commission recommended that currently accruing retired pay liabilities be funded in the service budgets.
Managing Defense Manpower: The commission stud- led the management of defense manpower, not only at lower levels but at the seat of government as well. From this inquiry, the commissioners concluded that manpower and personnel functions are not clearly defined and manpower is not managed as an entity. Management authority is dispersed, it is not adequately professionalized, and key managers often stay at their posts a discouragingly short time. It appeared that three feyers of manpower management in Washington could
replaced more efficiently by two.
The service secretariat layer of manpower management should be eliminated, provided that the same c°uld be done for other major functions such as reSearch and development and installations and logistics, fe seems possible that directions from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) could go directly to the service chief and his staff, without passing through the feyer of the service secretariat, provided that OSD made Certain to include the service secretary in its communiCations channel.
Manpower managers should have responsibility for a^ elements of the total force and for all life cycle fenctions. Moreover, all life cycle functions should be managed on a total force basis with no separate management systems for the reserve forces or civilian em- Pfeyees. The commission found the Planning, Pro- Staming, and Budgeting System to be cumbersome and Clme consuming, requiring major revision. Manpower requirements and associated costs are not portrayed adequately and consistently.
dollar Savings: Although the commission sought tst to improve manpower practices and effectiveness, Pmbably the adoption of all the recommendations ^ould save considerable funds in the long run. Commission staff members estimate that total annual net ^avings by the early 1980s could amount to $3 to f billion in constant 1975 dollars, and that by the fte 1980s this could increase by an additional billion dollars.
leadership and Human Relations: Within the services, ne commissioners found strong leadership. There are
gaps in the middle-grade petty officers and noncommissioned officers. Each of the services needs to attract and retain more minority officers, women officers, and female enlisted personnel. The Navy leadership has approached many difficult and persistent problems in admirable fashion.
Morale generally is good. But the commissioners often found dismay and disillusionment among service personnel who believe that their government has broken faith with them. National leadership must fill an apparent credibility and communications gap between Washington and the field in order to restore the faith of service men and women in their government.
With many people in the forces in this frame of mind, unionization cannot be overlooked as a possibility. The commission argued strongly that unionization would be incompatible with military command authority, introducing a division of loyalty that would run counter to the requirements of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The commissioners believe that this is a critical issue that must be faced now by the Congress and the executive branch.
The commission report terms manpower as the keystone of national security. Given adequate weapon systems and nearly comparable numbers, the determination, the courage, the commitment of people will decide battles in the future, just as they always have done in the past.
During World War II, Dr. Tarr served as an enlisted man in the U. S. Army. He received his B.A.-in economics from Stanford University in 1948, his M.B.A. in business administration from Harvard University in 1950, and his Ph.D., in American history from Stanford in 1962. Dr. Tarr was a research assistant and instructor at the Harvard Graduate School of Business from 1950-1952, and was vice president of the Sierra Tractor and Equipment Company, Chico, California, from 1952 to 1958. During 1954-55, he was a staff member on the Second Hoover Commission. From 1961 to 1963, he was associated with Stanford University. Dr. Tarr became the Director of Selective Service on 20 March 1970. Prior to that appointment, he served as Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), and as President of Lawrence University in Appleton, Wisconsin. Dr. Tarr left Selective Service in 1972 when he became Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance and remained in that position until November 1974. He is now vice president of Deere and Company, Moline, Illinois.
Captain Keenan graduated from the Naval Academy in 1947 and received a master’s degree in personnel management from Stanford in I960. His naval career consisted of extensive experience in line management and command within the submarine force. He commanded the USS Springer (SS-414), USS Bonefish (SS-562), and Submarine Division 101. Captain Keenan held a number of positions in the manpower area, including Director, Personnel and Training, Antisubmarine Programs, OpNav; Director, Compensation Studies, Office of SecDef; and Director of Personnel Development Division, BuPers. He is now assistant Director for Planning and Management of the Commission on Federal Paperwork.
[1]The members of the Defense Manpower Commission were Dr. Curtis W. Tarr, chairman; Mr. Karl R. Bendetsen, vice chairman; Dr. Martin Anderson;
Mr. Britton L. Gordon; Mr. Arthur E. Haley; Rear Admiral Lester E. Hubbell, U. S. Navy (Retired); and Dr. Norma M. Loesser (served until January 1976). The executive director of the commission staff was General Bruce Palmer, Jr., U. S. Army (Retired), and the deputy executive director was Captain Paul C. Keenan, Jr., U. S. Navy (Retired).