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Lieutenant (j.g.) Bruce A. Castleman, U. S. Navy, Surface Warfare Officer
Retirement Eligibility
Could it be that the manpower moguls in the Department of Defense finally realized that in all too many instances, a military career is not really a career at all? It is, too often, too short. The armed services do not get enough mileage out of their highly-trained leaders, managers, and technicians.
We need more 30-year men, and this is true especially in view of the huge cost of paying the 20-year retirees of the largest and longest lasting standing armed force in the history of the United States.
I propose a program, which would produce a number of beneficial side effects in addition to lengthening the average military career. First, establish a point system to determine retirement eligibility. Second, establish retirement eligibility at 360 points (30 years x 12 months/yearx 1 point/month = 360 points). Third, establish a retirement point credit policy which favors duty afloat and duty in combat units, such as in the following schedule:
Retirement
points
Type of duty per month
Afloat in combat zone 2.0
Combat unit in combat zone 2.0
POW/MIA status 2.0
Afloat, not in combat zone 1.5
Combat unit, not in combat zone 1.5 Non-combat unit, in combat zone 1.5 Isolated, unaccompanied tours 1.5 All other types of duty 1.0
Retirement pay would continue to be figured in the current manner, based on calendar years of service, with the reservation that a serviceman who earned 360 retirement points prior to the completion of 20 years service would be immediately eligible for retirement and would be paid as though he had actually completed 20 calendar years of service.
(It would be possible to achieve retirement eligibility in less than 20 years with a combination of actual combat duty and duty in combat units.) The reverse side of the coin should be clearly visible—the storekeeper in the supply center and the journalist in the public affairs office would not receive the same credit for service as would the machinist’s mate in a destroyer or the paratrooper in an airborne infantry division.
An obvious problem becomes the identification of what is a combat unit and what is not. Accordingly, the following combat duty list is proposed:
Navy
► All duty afloat (not including staffs which are really ashore)
► Duty in a Seabee unit
► Duty in an EOD billet, or in UDT/SEAL units
► Duty in an aircraft squadron
Army and Marine Corps
► Duty in a combat division or combat aviation unit (including organic support units)
► Duty in an EOD billet
► Duty in a field medical unit
Air Force
► Duty in aircraft squadrons (bomber, fighter, air refueling, reconnaissance, air rescue, or airlift units)
► Duty in an ICBM squadron
► Duty in an EOD billet
Given the typical career pattern, this program would tend to lengthen the average military career. The desirability of service at sea and in combat units would be enhanced greatly. The average line officer would first be eligible to retire after approximately 25 years, and the average staff officer would first be eligible after approximately 27 years. There would be a more noticeable disparity among enlisted specialties, but I consider it equitable in view of the arduous service required of some men as compared to the soft niche accorded others.
While increased career lengths might cause promotion slowdowns among officers, pay scales could easily be adjusted in accordance with the new promotion points to offset a large part of any dissatisfaction arising from such a slowdown. It might also become necessary to promote staff officers more slowly than their warfare-oriented counterparts, but how is that unfair in view of the lessened degree of personal hardship inherent to their jobs?
We’ve all poured our heart out to our boss, spouse, chaplain, or kid and asked, "Right?” only to be told, "I’m sorry, I wasn’t listening.” Nobody listens any more. But a few do read. If nobody seems to care what you think about anything, perhaps you ought to contribute to "Nobody asked me, but . .
Maybe what you have been saying isn’t worth listening to. But, if it is, we may print it and pay you $50.00. If it isn’t, you’ll feel better for having got it off your chest.
Finally there will be a stronger inclination to complete full, 30-year careers since the longer minimum career lengths would leave most with only three to five more years to serve. Longer careers inevitably would result in a substantial increase in the quality of our manpower assets and our national defense posture.