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"Seafaring has always been a hard and dangerous trade.”
On the preceding pages we see men of an American tanker’s deck department bring aboard stores for the next voyage. As crews get smaller, men (and women?) of all departments may have to work at whatever task is most pressing at the moment, be it on deck, in the fire room, or in the pantry. To an extent, it will be a return to the classical nature of seafaring, vestiges of which still remain in the Navy.
T
-L he merchant marine, with its longshore auxiliary, has been the most strife-prone of our unionized industries since modern trade unionism began in the United States. It has had a bitter history of exploitation, infighting, and political shenanigans attributable to all the involved parties, the companies, the unions, and the federal government.
Compared to many shoreside occupations, seafaring has its hardships, but compared to the beginning of this century, it is greatly changed. It has also fallen on hard times. The roles of the parties have changed. At the beginning the companies had the upper hand and exploited the seamen. With government aid, the unions have since gained the upper hand and exploited the companies and the government. Now the industry is entering a time of government enforced neutrality or equality while the other two parties simply try to save each other.
Seafaring has always been a hard and dangerous trade; and it has attracted more than its share of hard, ruthless characters, both as officers and as seamen. In addition to the natural dangers of the sea, seamen endured poor food and quarters and harsh treatment by officers and people ashore. In the last half of the nineteenth century, society cast out seamen and left them to be preyed upon by various waterfront crooks. At sea the laws governing a seaman made him subject to every whim of his officers. The laws made a seaman subject to prosecution for desertion if he went on strike; once under articles, a seaman was practically a slave. It was a time of harsh conditions and harsher men. In the United States during this period, shippers faced with competitive pressures from more modern foreign fleets and rising wages ashore reduced their crews and drove the remaining seamen harder than ever. Many of the tales and traditions of harsh treatment come from this period. Against this background the first U. S. seamen’s unions arose in the 1880s and 1890s- These survived until the early 1920s, when the companies broke most of them during the postwar shipping depression.
The first significant union victory was the Seaman’s Act of 1915 won by Andrew Furuseth’s lobbying and publicity campaign. It abolished imprisonment for desertion and set standards for the crew’s quarters and food and established crew qualifications. Thus the triangle was begun, for the Act was the governments first set of regulations governing shipboard conditions. Previously, the government implicitly backed the companies in their treatment of seamen. Today the Coast Guard and Public Health Service have detailed regulations concerning ship construction, safety, quarters, food, and sanitation. The Coast Guard also sets ere# standards and issues licenses for the higher-rated billets- In addition to the government’s regulations, modern union contracts have detailed clauses covering crew’s quarters, recreation facilities, food, ship’s stores, and other amenities and conditions.
During the shipping depression of the 1920s and 1930s, when they had broken or weakened the unions, the shipping companies had an opportunity to solve some of their labor problems and to restructure the industry in order to attract better employees. Instead, they chose to continue the abuses of the past. This led to the rise of the very militant seamen’s unions during the 1930s. Because the intermittent nature of a seaman’s employment discouraged responsible workers from choosing the occupation, the most important change the companies could have attempted was to devise a system for continuous employment- Had the shipping companies followed the lead of their counterparts ashore who were concerning themselves with improving the treatment of their employees, they would probably not have the union problems they have today.
The most important victory of the new and reemerging maritime unions was exclusive hiring of seamen through union hiring halls. This gave the unions a monopoly on the labor supply and enabled them to dictate contract terms to the companies. Following the West Coast strike in 1934, a government arbitrator awarded the unions preferential hiring through union halls. During the ensuing year the unions engaged in a record number of job actions (planned wildcat strikes) and won exclusive hiring rights with all contracted companies. During World War II the government further reinforced the monopoly position of the union halls by sending all the seamen it trained
t rough the union halls. The unions fought for their °wn hiring halls because of the industry-wide corrup- tlon ‘n hiring practices, both in the companies and the government hiring halls. Seamen were expected to nbe the employment agents if they wanted a job, e*ther directly, or indirectly by patronizing establishments owned by the agents. While the union halls have e iminated the old corrupt practices, it is difficult for a nonunion seaman or a union member in poor stand- lng to obtain a berth. Internal union politics leave much to be desired.
As the unions gained power, they sought revenge ar*d treated the companies in the same manner as the c°mpanies treated the seamen. Shipping companies Were forced to accept restrictive and cumbersome work rules and manning practices. With little control over om they hired, the companies had to accept poor seamen and poor job performance. They responded Wlth minimal cooperation and understanding, leading t0 the complete breakdown of employer-employee communication. In addition, the companies found C emselves frequently in the middle of disputes between the various unions representing different segments of a ship’s crew. The political and power ambi- tl0ns °f maritime union leaders did much to damage e industry. This became particularly evident after world War II as the unions fought over shares of a steadily decreasing pie. In 1959, 65,000 unlicensed sea- naen were employed in the industry; in September 1974 t e number was 20,000. (Of the latter more than a ^enth were employed, one way or another, by the avy-) Job boundary disputes and pure "one-up- tTlanship” concerning contract terms were frequent Cause for strife. For many years the unions maintained an open contest over who could extract the most from e shipping lines. Contracts had no common expira- tl0n date, and ship owners were faced with successive sthkes as each shipboard union’s contract expired, and lts members hit the bricks to outdo the previous contract. If the unions which settled last received significantly more than the first to settle, a wildcat by the rst was in order. This "rolling barrage” principle also ex tended to greater benefits awarded by other companies.
The continuous company versus union and union Versus union warfare drove many shipping companies °ut of business and others to operations under foreign nags. The unions priced most of the industry out of e market, and the federal government’s bureaucracy stifled any innovative thinking in what remained of e industry. Many shippers preferred to send their §°ods in foreign ships because they offered more dependable service. In the main, the surviving shipping nes are the dozen or so subsidized lines and some
unsubsidized companies which got by using old ships to carry government preference cargo.
Because of mutual distrust and hatred, no one truly attempted to change things; thus the industry settled into its dependency upon the government to solve its disputes and to pay its excessive costs. In the name of national defense and economic policy the government accepted the burden. Rightfully too, for much of the union power comes from "permitted” abuse of the laws and from favorable government attitudes toward organized labor. "Unions thus have insured themselves the right to make the companies answer complaints of union members, and they have ensured themselves the right to charge members a fee for their representative services, but they have refused to warrant anything to the industry.”1
All of the blame cannot be laid on the unions’ shoulders. Management blunders and the actions (more often the inactions) of the government have been significant. Government inaction stalled reform of the 1936 Merchant Marine Act several years. The study used as a basis for the 1970 Maritime Act was compiled in the middle 1960s. With few exceptions management failed to see the rapidity with which containers would invade and dominate the industry; hence, some fast subsidized breakbulk freighters completed toward the end of the 1960s had to be sent to the yards only two years later for conversion to container ships. These were American President Lines’ President Fillmore class of five ships. Similar stories can be told of other lines and other ships.
The government’s errors are usually in the interpretation and administration of its own rules. The following case may not be typical, but it illustrates the effects of bureaucratic action. The American President Lines was operating the passenger ship President Roosevelt with subsidy. The subsidy was stopped by law when the vessel reached the age of 25 years. The ship was sold to a foreign operator who refurbished her, and she is now back in service under foreign flag sailing from the same port in the same trade. True, management and the unions also had a part in the outcome of this event, but a different government reaction may have provided the stimulus for both to come up with a solution that would have kept the ship in the U. S. fleet.
As the abuses practiced by the shipping companies caught up with them, so the abuses of the unions return now to haunt them. A large portion of their members are either out of work, on pension, or working ashore; and their actions to raise wages and main-
lMThe Merchant Marine—Awash in Manpower Problems,” Walter McNab Miller, III, U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1972, p. 66.
tain uneconomically large crews forced the government to clamp down on them; i.e., the Subsidy Board, rather than the unions, now dictates crew size. Financial mistakes, high operating costs, and recent rate wars left many companies on the verge of bankruptcy.
Under such conditions the unions recently have shouldered their responsibility by cooperating with the companies to help reduce costs and ensure continuous service. The unions are honoring the no-strike and arbitration clauses in their contracts. With the possible exception of the International Organization of Masters, Mates, and Pilots they are no longer striking over any trivial issue. In 1971 the Masters and Mates struck Prudential-Grace Lines over the number of mates in that company’s new lash ships and their job jurisdictions, and in November, 1972, the West Coast was struck over the same issue. A recent strike by the mates’ union was reported to have occurred because a line located the captain’s and the chief engineer’s cabins ofl the same deck despite a tradition that the captain’s quarters be located higher than the level of the engi' neer’s quarters. With this exception, the position of the unions is summed up by the following quote:
We recognize in the labor movement that v/t haven’t always done right by the American shipper We understand it, and we regret it, and we’re trying to correct it. Where there have been tie-ups of American-flag ships, cargoes have been tied up. We understand now as a result of the deterioration of the industry that . . . the labor movement has been wrong, that we have in many instances . . . acted irresponsibly. We understand that now, and we are trying to correct it, . . ?
There are four principal unions representing seamen today: the Seafarers’ International Union of North America (siu), the National Maritime Union of America (nmu), the International Organization of Masters, Mates, and Pilots (iommp), and the National Marine Engineers’ Beneficial Association (meba). Once there were some small unions representing various specialties and geographic areas, but these have been absorbed by the main unions with the exception of the marine radio
2"Secretary’s Notes: Shipping and the Union,” U. S. Naval Institut1 Proceedings, February 1973, p. 3. Quotes from an address by Paul Hall- President, Seafarers’ International Union, before a meeting of the National Maritime Council in Seattle, Washington.
operators’ union. All maritime unions belong to the AFL-CIO.
The Seafarers’ International Union primarily represents the unlicensed seamen sailing in unsubsidized ■ S.-flag ships. The membership numbers about 85,000 0 which about one-half are deep-sea or Great Lakes seamen. The remainder are inland boatmen, fishermen, and workers in other marine-related industries. The union was formed in 1938 from the Sailors’ Union of [he Pacific and the remnants of the International Seamen s Union (isu), which had been shattered by an •nternal revolt.
The National Maritime Union was formed by the other faction of that revolt, and much of the rivalry etween the two unions can be traced back to this storrny beginning. The Siu has been hurt by the industry s troubles; but with stricter rules for its pensions and other benefits and the fact that the unsubsidized Part of the industry is healthier than the subsidized Part, the siu is better off than the nmu.
The National Maritime Union primarily represents Uulicensed seamen on ships of the subsidized complies. Like the Siu, it represents inland boatmen and rcat Lakes sailors and has branched out into other jUarine-related industries. The nmu has a reputation for eirig the most militant and corrupt of the unions, but 1C ls changing its ways. The union was founded by -|°seph Curran, its recently retired president, in the late 30s, when he led a revolt against the leadership of e old isu, taking most of the isu’s members. Political a economic events have softened the nmu’s militancy, and it is cooperating on manning reductions and practice changes without the blood-baths that aracterized earlier attempts to deal with these issues, fo C NMU s cLieL problem is funding its pension plan, r over 30 per cent of its deep-sea members are on Pension.
The Marine Engineer’s Beneficial Association repreSents all engineers in U. S. merchant ships. It also has ^rned to shoreside industry for growth, but, unlike e Nmu and siu, it is willing to organize any group professional workers; in 1970 it absorbed the air c°ntrollers’ association, it represents naval architects and tTlar*ne engineers at Gibbs and Cox, Inc., in New York, and it tried to organize several groups of aerospace porkers on the West Coast. Membership is around >000, of which approximately 10,000 are marine en- S'neers. While meba has had to look shoreside for new ^embers, the industry’s troubles have not hurt it badly. c ability of marine engineers to find high-paying jobs 0re or in foreign-flag vessels, combined with the ah output of the training facilities, keeps the labor supply to a reasonable size.
The International Organization of Masters, Mates, and Pilots represents deck officers (mates) and captains. It appears to be a hybrid entity, playing the roles of both a union and a professional society. The parent organization was founded in 1887 as an association of pilots. Until the 1950s it conducted itself mainly as a professional society, lobbying for various legislative proposals, advising panels and committees on marine affairs, and helping set qualifications and professional standards for its members. It has since become a militant trade union as shown by its recent rivalry with meba and its affiliation with Teddy Gleason’s International Longshoremen’s Association (ila). In 1971 the government "honored” the Masters and Mates Union by challenging its officer elections, a distinction previously reserved for the nmu and the siu. The iommp still tries to maintain its professional society image and calls its retraining facility a graduate school. However, its primary motivation is best learned from the following statement of Gleason’s: "When we are all together, you will not have any trouble maintaining five or six mates on these new ships. You wouldn’t have a bit of trouble. The other guys are going in now and wanting to make deals for three mates. Some are already making deals for three mates. And this is what you can look for in the future, unless we get ourselves together.”3
Since I960 the engineers and mates have been engaged in a union whipsawing battle over relative wages. Traditionally, the pay of the captains and deck officers is higher than that of the engineers, but the latter closed that gap in the 1960s. The chief engineer, in some cases, can be paid more than the captain when overtime is counted. The last round so far in this battle occurred in 1969 when the masters and mates stayed out on strike after the other unions settled, demanding that the "traditional balance” between deck and engineering salaries be restored. This issue also caused labor troubles in the nuclear ship Savannah when she was operating some years ago. The operating company sent the engineers through a reactor operator training school and gave them a pay increase commensurate with the additional knowledge and responsibility required of them. The deck officers then struck the Savannah demanding that they be paid more, though their duties were the same as they would be in a conventional ship.
The basic issue in the fight is how much long hours and physical effort, combined with technical knowledge, are worth compared to the traditional responsibility of the deck officers. However, the technological changes in ships and the increasing concern about pollution are giving the engineers more responsibility.
3"Gleason Speaks Out,” Master, Mate, & Pilot, IOMMP, August 1971, p. 29.
This would be particularly true if nuclear-powered merchant ships become economically feasible and enter the fleet. The pay battle has shifted to the background since 1969, to be replaced by a jurisdictional fight which led to the West Coast strike by masters and mates in November 1972.
With the exception of the officers, the shipping companies do not choose the seamen who man their ships. Unlicensed crew members are dispatched to a ship by their union hiring halls; though the companies may, for good reason, refuse a seaman sent to one of their ships, they do not choose the men. The companies may choose their captains and chief engineers, provided the men chosen are members in good standing of their respective union. Other engineers and mates can maintain continuous employment with a company, and the companies can choose their officers from among them. However, the maintenance of continuous employment is subject to union approval; and any vacancies that cannot be filled from a company’s continuous employment list must be filled through the union hiring halls.
Unlicensed seamen can be rejected or discharged subject to contract provisions (in the past the effectiveness of these provisions was subject to the union’s willingness to wildcat), but when discharging a seaman, a company must pay his way back to the port where he joined the ship. The unions include in their constitutions and shipping rules offenses for which they may refuse to register a seaman or deregister one, and some of these are enforced. But, though there are no provisions for poor work performance, there are penalties for union disloyalty. In rejecting a seaman or in discharging him, a company risks the wrath of the union and does not solve the problem since the man can easily be routed to another ship. Though contracts provide for arbitration of disputes over employee qualifications, the unions have a history of honoring those clauses only when it suits them; but currently, the unions are improving the policing of their membership. Since the companies are freer to choose their officers and because the Coast Guard licenses ships’ officers, the companies do not have the attitude and performance problems with officers that they have with the unlicensed seamen.
For most people, pensions, seniority, and fringe benefits are attached to a particular company; in the marine industry such benefits are dispensed by the unions. With almost all of the training facilities under their control, the unions also control a seaman’s promotions. With the exception of captains, chief engineers, and some other officers, a merchant mariner is in effect a union employee—not a company employee. The system is similar to that of a business supplying temporary help to other businesses. The only company controls over the pensions and other fringe benefits art their representatives on the governing boards of the various funds set up to pay for and administer the benefits. Also, in contrast to shoreside industry, the maritime unions have a three-group seniority system rather than one based on time of service. Entry to each group is by time served, but within a group the oldest and newest member of that group have equal seniority’
To ship out, a seaman registers with his local union hall and receives a registration card valid for a specific time period with the date and time registered, his rating (highest job qualification), and his seniority group marked on the card. Job openings are sent to the hall by the contracted shipping companies in the area, posted on the notice boards, and called at set intervals. When a job is called, any qualified seaman can bid for the opening; i.e., submit his registration card to the dispatcher calling the position. The seaman with the oldest registration card in the highest seniority group among those cards submitted is dispatched to the job.
When a seaman joins a ship, he signs the Ship’s Articles, thereby becoming temporarily an employee o( that shipping line. At the end of a voyage he signs off and is paid, thereby terminating his employment with the line. This traditional system is the reason the unions developed their temporary help agency patterns. The system is written into our admiralty laws; laws governing the obligations and discipline of seamen are effective only when a seaman is under Ship’s Articles- It is a carryover from the days of multi-year sea voyages and multi-month port stays when, because of the abuse of seamen and their particular social status, they came to be classed as wards of the admiralty courts. A seaman can, if he wishes, sign on for the next voyage at the end of the preceding one, but neither the unions not
Ottce, a man learned his trade by shipping out as an unskilled ordinary seaman; but the increasing technical sophistication of ships is requiring a more highly Stained crew; improved design in such ways as better y°ut in messing space, and the increasing use of trtaterials requiring little maintenance are reducing the Unskilled entry positions on board a ship. In response, e unions established technical schools, both for initial tra|ning and for upgrading older members. Initial raming of deck officers is provided by the federal and ^tate merchant marine academies, and initial training engineers is provided by these academies and the ^ EBa school. Both the mates’ and the engineers’ unions Ve graduate” programs for their members. The new- ^ >s the mates’ recently opened Marine Institute of echnology and Graduate Studies, a name in keeping their professional society image. In recognition the labor pool unlicensed seamen are drawn from, p.e SIU’s Harry Lundeberg School of Seamanship at mey Point, Maryland, offers coaching for the high school equivalency test, and the Siu is trying to see at all of its members have a high school education its equivalent. The schools perform their jobs satis- ctonly; in my research I did not find any dissatisfac- tlQn with the training seamen receive.
1 e companies encourage this practice. The system guarantees that employment will be temporary and is a considerable factor in the work performance and attitude problems in the unlicensed seafaring labor force.
There are conditions to the right of a seaman to continue employment with a company. The nmu and e mates’ and engineers’ unions require members to a e their vacations at specified intervals, though they 0 make provision for returning to the same company 0r position after the vacation. The mates and engineers require their members to take vacation time after two years job time is accumulated, and the nmu requires Vacations be taken after accumulating 210 days on a )° • The siu does not require members to take vaca- U°ns> but only members with group I seniority are a owed to hold a position as long as they and the company wish. Members in group III must leave a job ter 60 days, and group II members must leave after 180 days. The purpose of such regulations is to increase an mdividual’s opportunity for some employment.
^ual seniority systems are maintained by the mates and engineers; they have the three-group system used y the unlicensed men’s unions and also provide for semority with a company where continuous employment is maintained. The mates’ union has taken an Unusual approach to the industry job shortage by limit- |ng membership to 1.5 members per contracted job in
lts constitution.
Though the union schools are financed primarily by the shipping lines, they are run entirely by the union. In the nmu and Siu hiring halls, preference is given to graduates of their schools, both new seamen and retrained old salts. The establishment of these schools in 1966-67, when the unions consolidated and restructured their training programs as a result of losing the old battle over automation in the summer of 1965, has created what can be called a "union heaven.” As we have seen, hiring, firing, wages, and promotion are controlled primarily (in some cases, entirely) by the unions. If the basis for the survival of unions in the United States is the principle of getting more for the members, then the maritime unions in the future may have some problems over what their purpose is. There will be nothing more for them to demand. It is ironic that, after having won their impressive list of powers and rights, the industry is too weak to allow them to exercise them.
Because a ship is a self-contained world from which there is no escape once at sea, living and working conditions are much more a union concern than they are to a shoreside union, living conditions in particular. From their formation, the unions have fought as hard for better quarters and food as they have for better wages. The first union victory was, in part, the enactment of government regulations over a seaman’s food and quarters. Today the contracts contain extensive sections governing quarters and food which go beyond the minimum standards of the Coast Guard and Public Health Service regulations.
In a modern U. S. freighter, the men have single
rooms, semi-private baths, and air conditioning. Linen service, laundry facilities, and recreation rooms are also provided by the contracts. Food is served in generous quantity, and the contract sections governing meals sometimes specify meal hours, type of food, amounts, and where food may be purchased. Interestingly, these standards are not up to the practices in some of the more advanced ships in foreign merchant fleets.
The combined factors of decreased port time, increasing automation, and shortage of seamen in advanced maritime nations have brought significant changes in shipboard living conditions since the 1950s. The companies have to compete with living conditions ashore in an effort to retain the qualified men they need to man increasingly sophisticated ships. This is not a factor in the United States yet, but some of our shipping lines do make an effort to retain the better seamen sent to them. In the United States, improvements tend to follow the lead of Norway and Japan. A few recent innovations in shipboard living conditions are: gyms and saunas in Scandinavian ships, swimming pools for the crew, a rock garden and bowling alley in one Japanese ship, and closed-circuit, video-tape television in some British ships. Some companies permit officers’ " wives to accompany them on voyages, and this is being considered for unlicensed seamen. The employment of both a man and his wife is also being considered. Changes predicted for the near future are: individual climate control in the crew’s staterooms, carpeting, private toilets, elevators, and bars. The new Sea-Land SL-7 class containerships already have crew’s quarters with private toilets, carpeting, and several channels of piped-in music.
While the new ships and some of the rebuilt vessels in the U. S. fleet are quite comfortable, many of the older vessels have poor conditions which the companies’ attitudes toward their crews frequently make worse. Many companies provide poor ship’s stores and mail service. Modern and proper tools are not supplied, and repairs are often inadequately done, particularly on the old ships.
Wages afloat are high for the skill levels required. Requirements for unlicensed seamen range from unskilled for steward department utilitymen to highly skilled for some of the engine department ratings such as electrician or machinist. For seven months’ work in 1974, an electrician made about $13,500 and a utility- man, about $6,800 in base wages, overtime, and vacation pay. In addition to the wages, each would receive over $1,200 in fringe benefits (pension, medical, and welfare benefits) plus his room and board while in the ship, which is not considered part of his earnings. For the chief engineer, base wages, overtime, and vacation amount to $27,268.78 for seven months’ employment.
This coming June contracts will expire. The economic and social forces which will influence the shape of the new contracts are, collectively, too complex to permit an accurate forecast.
Despite high wages, the industry has trouble retaining many of the officers it trains. A ship’s officer must be an engineer, foreman, manager, lawyer, and diplomat. Anyone with those qualifications can easily find comfortable employment ashore. Also, many officers find they do not want to endure shipboard conditions, poor company attitudes, or the men they have to deal with. Over half of the United States Merchant Marine Academy graduates leave the industry within five years- Retention of those officers that rise through the ranks is much better, but that likely is because they have a considerable investment in the industry. The labor, government, and economic problems of the industry are a significant factor in encouraging many to leave, but the attitudes of the companies play a part equal to the others. "Companies have dropped virtually all pretense of cooperating with their employees, except with the captains and chief engineers, the only two men not supplied by union hiring halls.”4 Because union power has thwarted all attempts at disciplining and weeding out bad seamen, many companies ignore problems of boredom, crew morale, crew amenities, and vessel maintenance and work load. The better unlicensed seamen find themselves carrying the workload of loafers who are paid the same, and the officers are stuck with the ensuing problems. Though there is no effective provision for differentiating good and bad workers, a seaman may be disciplined for union disloyalty if he protests the status quo.
The federal government has the power to constrain the unions in the exercise of their power over the industry as it has significantly constrained the sub-
4 Miller, op cit, p. 65.
sidized shipping lines. It has not wanted to assume eadership of the industry, but the unions and companies have forced leadership upon it. Nor, presumably or political reasons, has the government tried to regu- ate the unions so that there is a balance of power etween the companies and the unions. The situation 's kest described by the following:
With such disparity in economic power and risks °f the parties involved, so-called collective bargain- lng becomes a farce, no matter what lip-service is paid to it by spokesmen for the unions and the industry. A more descriptive term for what occurs ln the maritime industry would be "collective capitulation,” either at the bargaining table or with the assistance of Federal Mediators after a brief strike.5
ne unions are restrained at the moment by the adverse ec°nomic conditions in the industry and changes in government attitudes. The government spoke and the uni°ns obeyed—restrain yourselves or we will let the lndustry collapse. The change shows signs of becoming Permanent, and a new era may be starting in the industry- A light shines on the horizon.
The union hiring halls are keystones in maintaining e power of the seafaring unions. As we have seen (except with tanker companies which if unionized are 1 ely to have company unions), no seaman can obtain a position without going through the halls, even that Very rare specimen, a non-union seaman. Thus the UrUons have a monopoly over the labor supply and with lc fhe means of forcing their way upon the companies, specially new companies, and enforcing union loyalty uP°n their members. Hiring through the halls was enforced by strikes, violence where "necessary,” and the a*d of the afl and CIO. Today a shipping line attempt- lng to by-pass the seamen’s unions would face boycotts °r Worse from the other unions it dealt with such as e Longshoremen or Teamsters, in addition to the Pr°blem of finding enough seamen to meet Coast uard manning regulations.
After four decades of dealing with the maritime Uru°ns and living on federal aid, the shipping companies are in weak financial condition. The fault is both e unions’ and the companies’—the unions’ for their °rtsightedness which led them to write some of the ^orst pages in our modern labor relations history, and e companies’ for their marketing and planning mis- ^akes. However, the blame must be shared by all three lnv°lved parties, the unions, the companies, and the government, the last for its subsidy program politics arid associated peripheral policy politics and blunders.
Joseph H. Ball, The Government Subsidized Union Monopoly, Labor Policy Ss°ciation, Washington, D.C., 1966, p. 11.
As to which of the individual parties is most to blame, I leave that to the reader’s viewpoint.
Federal intervention in maritime strikes is the rule (it is news if the government doesn’t intervene, and lets the parties cut everyone’s throat), and many times this intervention aids the unions in forcing the companies to capitulate. The maritime unions hold a very long lever; many vocal segments of our society depend upon a flow of imports and exports, and the government is sensitive to damage to the merchant fleet it subsidizes and to possible effects on our foreign relations and trade. Therefore, when the federal mediation service enters negotiations in the maritime industry, its primary objective is a fast settlement. Given the militancy and the political and economic power of the unions, it is easier to pressure the shipping lines to give in than to do the reverse. "No mediator would dream of asking a union to give up something already in its contract, except in a rare instance where featherbedding practices might be limited in return for a substantial quid pro quo.”6 Thus, in the face of a strike the shipping lines have neither the financial ability to outlast the unions nor the ability to continue operations without them. The companies must have at least one of these if there is to be true collective bargaining in the industry.
Another factor contributing to the bargaining problem of the companies is the disunity in the industry. Today the members of the industry are working together more closely, but it took not only adverse conditions but also government initiative and pressure to bring them together. There are wide variations in the goals, operations, and strengths in the shipping industry. Some of the largest U. S. shipping companies are foreign-flag operators, and there is even an organization to promote the foreign registry of U. S.-owned shipping. Subsidized companies have different outlooks and objectives than unsubsidized companies. Different shipping lines serve different markets and provide different services, and the economic and technological changes in these markets tend to be independent of each other. Until recently the industry was not able to get together to promote itself or to resist the pressure exerted upon it by the unions and the government.
Under these conditions a frequent union tactic is to divide and conquer. Bargaining is usually conducted between the unions and associations of the shipping lines, which commonly are formed along geographic boundaries, and there is a wide variation in the ability or willingness of different companies to take a firm stand during a strike. One association may yield or hold out in contrast to the others, and many times a single
&Ibid., p. 6.
company will break with its association and settle independently, setting a pattern for later settlements. During a maritime strike, cargo is diverted to foreign shipping lines or to Canadian ports. Every time this happens a portion of that cargo does not return to the U. S. ships. Many times small lines, when faced with the high cost of vessel layup and the permanent loss of cargo, are willing to pay almost any price to keep operating. The subsidized lines enter negotiations with the knowledge that, under the 1936 Maritime Act and the policies of the subsidy board, any cost increases will be paid for by the federal government. These lines, in fact, have been described as a pipeline for money from the government to the maritime unions.
The results of any negotiations are dependent upon the wiles of the various shipping markets, and the positions taken by the Maritime Administration and its willingness to back those positions at the time of negotiations. To illustrate, I hypothesize negotiations where the chief issue is the monetary increase. Under the 1936 Maritime Act, the subsidized lines have little incentive to resist union demands. However, if the subsidy board threatens to cut subsidies because it thinks the settlement unreasonable (as it did in 1965 when the board actually cut subsidies), the subsidized lines might hold out longer than anyone else. In recent years the Maritime Administration has been taking firmer stands on issues, particularly crew sizes and costs, and there is little the unions or companies can do to resist.
The nature of operations in the industry gives the unions yet another advantage. When a strike is threatened, the companies sail as many ships as possible. Since the crews will not walk off until the ship returns to a U. S. port, it could be a month before a large number of seamen are financially hurt. The unions pay strike benefits and operate medical clinics, and in addition, seamen are eligible for free medical care at Public Health Service hospitals. Also, in the states where many of the major ports are located, the strikers are eligible for welfare benefits. If the shipping lines try to hold out against the unions, the government intervenes before the move is effective, sends in the mediation service, and obtains an injunction.
The current dire condition of the industry is forcing the unions and companies to join efforts to correct the industry’s problems. They are cooperating on issues of maintaining service and manning reductions where companies are hurt by competition. The Nmu, Siu, and meba have accepted shipboard automation.
The current conditions and future prospects have brought the changes in the attitudes and actions of the members of the industry. No one knows whether the cooperation will last through better times; the old battle-scarred union leaders from the 1930s are retiring and being replaced by more moderate and businesslike j leaders. With the exception of the strike by the mates union, which is still pursuing its old course, the 1972 contract negotiations were peaceful.
On the inland waterways, where the unions lack 3 monopoly on the labor supply and the companies are strong, a reasonable labor relations situation exists, without the abuses of the deep-sea shipping industry. The nmu and the Siu are running strong organizing campaigns among the crewmen on riverboats, and they have been successful so far. However, except for the pilot, little in the way of papers, licenses, or special training are required; and there is a good supply of labor, both union and non-union. In riverboats the crew works six-hour watches; i.e., six hours on and six hours off, in contrast to the traditional four-hour watch system (four hours on and eight hours off). Non-watch standing seamen in merchant ships work a regular eight-hour day, five days a week. Riverboats work a seven-day week, but they have two crews who work 30 days on the boat and have 30 paid days off.
River craft compete with rails and trucks on shore, and there are no political, defense, or diplomatic reasons for the government to regulate the industry or to maintain it at all costs, as the government maintains our deep-sea merchant marine. Many of the river transportation lines are subsidiaries of large corporations, who are willing to abandon the industry if the unions force conditions to that point. In the river craft there have been no industry-wide strikes, and there is little featherbedding. To illustrate, in 1972 United States Steel gave the nmu a "take-it-or-leave-it” proposal fot a 50 per cent crew reduction in its towboats, take it or U. S. Steel would leave the industry. The offer was submitted to the employees for a vote. Such an action is unheard of in the deep-sea negotiations.
Events have shown that the greatest weakness of the seafaring unions is their strength. The irresponsible use of their power has helped weaken the industry to the point where the unions themselves are hurt, and the government has essentially put them on trial. What the government gives, it can also take away, depending upon the politics of the moment. Much of the union power comes from favorable government attitudes, decisions, and regulations, particularly the fact that anti-trust laws do not apply to labor unions. The exclusive use of union hiring halls was essentially given to the unions by a government arbitration award. But there is a limit to what even the greatest of friends can stand.
The nmu and siu have problems because of the decline in the number of jobs for unlicensed seamen, and the nmu, as has been mentioned, has funding prob-
ems with its pension plan. Both unions completed t e'r 1972-1975 contract negotiations before the expiation date of the old contract and without a strike threat. The siu does not have as much a problem as e Nmu because shifts in the shipping market and government actions have had a healthier effect on the ^subsidized companies where most of the siu’s mem- ers are employed. The current reduction and reorganisation of many of the old subsidized shipping lines as hurt the nmu; the number of ships has been re- uced and the crew sizes on those ships remaining have een ctit. However, most of their problem stems from rhe ending of service by the U. S.-flag passenger ships their large crews and the liberal regulations on c e pension plan. The nmu plan provided for retire- rr'ent on full pension after twenty years of service with n° age limit. In 1972 the nmu found that the industry c°uld not afford the plan, and an age limit of 55 was "^posed as part of the 1972 contract negotiations.
here are 14,000 nmu members on pension, and the ^lon has admitted that funding the plan has hurt it. n ^ct, the nmu probably cannot now afford to go °n strike; payments to the fund must not be stopped.
The situation with the officers is different. Excellent H oreside job opportunities and membership control ave softened the effects of the industry decline. While k ere are some job shortages, the problem is small; and oth officers’ unions went out on strike in 1972, stages a classic maritime union show in the process.
The engineers completed contract negotiations with- °|lt a strike, although after the expiration date of the ° d contract. The mates continued negotiations until ctober 25, then struck the Pacific Maritime Associa- d°n, the bargaining association for the major West °ast shipping lines. The engineers then struck the East arid Gulf Coast lines supposedly in support of the rnates- After a week the engineers strike was declared atl illegal secondary boycott and ended by a court ^junction, but the mates’ strike continued until De-
cember 4. The latter’s strike issues were pensions and job assignments, but more was involved. The principal issue was a jurisdictional dispute between the mates and the engineers over who manned bridge-mounted engine controls. Section 38(b) of the 1972-1975 meba-pma contract between the engineers and the West Coast shippers apparently gives engineers jurisdiction over the controls:
It is agreed that such jurisdiction shall include the operation, maintenance and repair of all computer equipment and related servo-mechanisms which are concerned with the propulsion and internal machinery equipment of the vessel and the maintenance and repair of all computer and related servo-mechanisms and equipment which are not concerned with the propulsion of the vessel but excluding navigational equipment and external communication devices which is not part of the above equipment unless otherwise specifically provided for in any agreement between the company and the Union.
The Union will have jurisdiction, regardless of where located, over the equipment as defined above, engine department controls and all read out equipment
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"The federal government . . . endures the headaches the industry gives it for two reasons: national defense and trade protection. ” Seamen of the tanker SS Erna Elizabeth refueling a naval vessel during an experiment in 1972. To a growing extent naval and merchant mariners will have to work together if each is to succeed in his own work.
which is related to any equipment, functions and duties under the jurisdiction of the meba.
The Pacific Maritime Association attributed the strike to rivalry between the unions, and in light of that, the engineers’ East Coast strike appears to be a retaliation against the mates. This got the Maritime Administration’s reform movement off to a bad start and hurt the industry’s new promotion campaign and the credibility of future union pledges. The strike is a perfect example of the role the unions played in reducing the marine industry to its present state.
The moves toward cooperation among the segments of the industry brought renewed interest among the unions in the possibility of solving some of their problems by merging rather than by feuding. Because of the labor problems generated by union rivalries, for many years the government proposed that the unions either coordinate their activities or merge into one or two unions. The mates and the longshoremen took a step in that direction in 1971, when the former affiliated with the latter. One advantage from union coordination or merger would be the elimination of much of the trouble that occurs between contract negotiations, giving improved continuity of service. Another would possibly be changes in the cumbersome work rules each union has in its contract to protect its jurisdictions, with fewer bloody disputes over changes in shipboard practices.
In March 1972 the unions made an effort to coordinate their activities in the upcoming contract negotiations and gave the industry the following pledge:
1. An agreement for no strikes while contract negotiations continue in progress.
2. A three to five year contract, which would provide shippers with assurance of continuity of operation for U. S.-flag ships.
3. Uniform expiration dates for all contracts, including longshore labor.
4. A provision for annual automatic wage adjustments.
5. Establishment of a procedure or mechanism for resolving inter-union disputes without work stoppage.
It was a significant improvement, but the mates and the engineers failed to follow all the points.
A
In its efforts to get the industry to solve some of its problems, the Maritime Administration organized and backs the National Maritime Council. Basically, the Council promotes the use of U. S.-flag shipping and provides a forum for discussing the industry’s internal problems. An example of its work is the effort to get the unions to allow U. S.-flag ships to finish unloading
when a strike is called and, for those arriving home aher a strike is called, to be unloaded before being laid UP for the duration of the strike. Many customers have een lost when their cargo was delayed or damaged ecause it languished in a ship’s hold during a strike. Unity” dinners are part of the Council’s promotion Program for U. S. shipping. They bring together industry representatives (labor, shipping lines, shipbuilding, and Maritime Administration) with representatives of c°mpanies using ocean shipping to try to convince the shiPpers that the American marine industry has changed its ways for the better. The presentations are 1 interesting and well done, but so far most shippers seem [° ke taking a wait-and-see attitude. The officers’ strike 1Ult badly, coming as it did just as the program was rea|ly starting. All the unions except the mates are act've in the Council and work on the various programs; though the mates’ union is not a member, the Ongshoremen’s is. The potential of the nmc is great, ut who knows whether the members will continue t0Work together if conditions in the industry improve?
While the moves toward cooperation or merger among the maritime unions will solve some major Problems, they can also easily create new ones. By coordinating their actions with the longshoremen, the seafarers’ unions would remove one check against ern—the diversion of cargo when they tie up U. S. mips, jf they st-j-jpg with the longshoremen, every- °dy~foreign and U. S.—is tied up; but they would run a much greater risk of government intervention, and some cargo can be diverted to Canadian ports. They HH'ght even consider strikes against foreign-flag ship- Plng only. While such a strike would be illegal and ave detrimental effects on our trade, the history of t e maritime unions indicates that that may not stop them. The unions would not now exhibit such irre- SP°nsible behavior, but how responsible will future Un*on leaders be? If the unions merged and chose to act irresponsibly, the only constraint on their power Would be how much the government and public were Willing to tolerate.
The shipping lines are hampered in dealing with the uhions by their attitude toward the seamen they employ and by a lack of leadership and initiative in much of e industry. If there is to be any change the companies must cultivate some respect from their seamen. In this area, the 1972 contract with the mates is a step back- Wa,d. It provides for rotational employment of second a°d third mates like unlicensed seamen, where previ- °Usly mates were mostly employed by the same company. The companies missed an opportunity in the UUOs to improve employer-employee relations, but hey have another today. While the mates would prob- D1y prove recalcitrant, the other unions now seem willing to work with the shipping lines on automation, living conditions, and work rules providing an opportunity for significant changes, although a line might have to work hard to convince the union that a proposed change was beneficial to its members in the long run.
Both the companies and the government are responsible for the lack of initiative in the industry. The subsidized companies grew soft on their subsidy, and the government bureaucracy uses rules left over from 1936 which stifle initiative and improvement. While there were abuses the rules were supposed to correct in 1936, the conditions and practices of the industry have changed greatly. The Maritime Administration needs to decide whether it wants a very active merchant marine or simply some U. S. participation in our foreign trade. Some of the rules seem designed to en- couarge the latter, such as those governing how much a subsidized ship can engage in foreign-to-foreign trade even though no subsidy is paid for those voyages.
We show a similar failing in our approach to new technology, and the unions are a major influence in this. We developed many of the innovations in ship design, cargo handling, and ship automation, but we left it to foreign shipping lines and our foreign-flag operators to implement them. The most recent example is with the lash barge-carrying ships. We conceived and designed the system, but the first ship of this type was built in Japan for operation under the Norwegian flag. The industry seems to take a "let someone else try it” attitude toward innovation. Here, the U. S. Coast Guard and the American Bureau of Shipping, the U. S. insurance classification society, must share some of the blame for the conservatism. These attitudes carry over to non-technical areas as well. For example, Exxon Oil Company developed a new system for manning its vessels in which the same mariner will work in both deck and engineering departments, depending on the need of the moment. It is experimenting with it in Great Britain, however, a highly unionized country, rather than in its U. S.-flag ships.
The strongest party in the maritime labor relations triangle is the federal government; both the big transoceanic shipping lines and the union owe their existence to it. The government has provided the unions with much of their power, and the subsidy and cargo preference programs are the only reason for the existence of much of the U. S. merchant marine. All the same, the government’s actions have created or prolonged many of the industry’s problems, particularly where the administrative bureaucracy does not keep up with changes in the technology and operating methods in the industry. The 1936 Maritime Act accomplished what it was designed to do. It created a modern, conventional cargo liner fleet; but by I960 that was not the appropriate objective, given the changes occurring in maritime industries worldwide and in the foreign trade of the United States.
The government’s refusal or inability to act as an effective referee in seafaring labor-management relations adds to the chaos. The government is supposed to see that the antagonists fight fairly and that third parties do not suffer unduly from the actions of antagonists. However, the political power of the unions and the government’s position as a ship operator and chief financial backer of the industry casts it on one side or the other of any issue. Also, frequently one part of the government will back one side and another part the other. Because the State Department commonly has taken the position that the lowest cost carrier offering reasonable service should get the trade, the unions look upon that department as a mortal enemy which tries to sell the industry down the river, principally by allocating federal cargo to foreign-flag shipping. When the situation in the government is combined with the militant irresponsibility toward one another and the community at large, shown by both maritime labor and management until recently, conditions were created that tried men’s souls. In 1967, while trying to devise a new maritime policy, Transportation Secretary Boyd said, "To come up with a reasonable and fully acceptable program takes the patience of Job, the wisdom of Solomon, the strength of Sampson, and the talent of Jezebel.” The statement easily applies today to the problems of effectively implementing the 1970 Maritime Act. The statement by the Seamen’s International Union’s president, Paul Hall, "Maritime is the craziest business in the world,” is an apt summary.
The goals of the shipping lines are, of course, to survive and to make a profit. The order these are given depends upon the individual company and the prevailing economic conditions. Until the formation of the National Maritime Council, there were no industry programs to work on labor problems nor the other troubles plaguing the industry. Individual companies did make efforts, at times going as far as to attempt to bribe union leaders for peace. The only goals the industry banded together to support were occasional Maritime Administration proposals.
Since the formation of the National Maritime Council, the unions and companies have been trying to educate each other on their respective problems, and both are working together to try to regain some of the business they have lost over the years. The shipping lines’ goals still are survival and profit, but they are now working together on these. They added the goals of trying to improve the regulations they deal with, particularly in the matters of rates and the paperwork
necessary for shipping cargo. A number of industrial and governmental statesmen have united the unharmonious members of a mad industry to work for common goals.
The primary union goal is protection, first for the unions themselves and, second, for the maritime industry as a whole. The union leaders look first to the maintenance of their power in the unions, then to the maintenance of their labor supply monopoly. Union leaders also guard the jurisdictions carved out by their unions. The unions learned much from their Com- / munist Party supporters in the 1930s about controlling organizations; the common rule in union politics is the ends justify the means. The elections of the NMh and Siu are almost routinely challenged either by a member or by the government. As we have seen, the government even challenged the last election in the IOMMP, supposedly a prestigious professional union. D the area of industry protection, the seafaring unions mount large lobbying campaigns, usually for classic protectionist trade regulations. If the industry could be protected from competition, the unions would be free to try to force higher wages and larger crews upon the industry.
The union lobbying campaign is aimed at increasing preference cargo for the U. S. fleet and at changing the laws governing the U. S.-owned foreign-flag fleet (called "Runaways” by the unions). Present cargo preference law guarantees 50 per cent of government-sponsored cargo and 100 per cent of military cargo to U. S.-flag ships, if available. The unions are pushing for a guarantee of 100 per cent of government cargo and last year backed a bill, eventually vetoed by President Ford, requiring 30 per cent of our oil and gas imports be carried in U. S.-flag ships. They have a long-range goal of getting a portion of all U. S- foreign trade reserved for U. S. ships. The industry and the government are divided over these issues, but the Maritime Administration is considering blanket cargo guarantee proposals. The justification given for cargo guarantees is that many other nations enacted various cargo preference regulations and laws; therefore, we should protect ourselves by doing likewise.
An object of great union enmity is the "Runaway” fleet. If a U. S. ship operator is not receiving subsidy, he is free to buy ships anywhere and register them where he wishes. The unions would like to end this. Tax advantage aside, the reasons companies register ships under foreign flags are vessel regulations, crew regulations, the high cost of owning and operating U. S.-flag ships, and to get away from the U. S. maritime unions. The proof the unions give for their claims of damage to the industry is repeatedly to quote a number of jobs as having been "exported,” then
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s«eaming that it is unfair to our God-fearing, law- a iding American seamen.
The federal government maintains our merchant Marine and endures the headaches the industry gives 1C ^0r two reasons: national defense and trade protec- tl0r>. The merchant marine is considered a naval auxil- available for emergency use and, as such, it must e maintained at a minimum strength for the same ,r,easons we maintain our Navy. While some of the unaway” fleet is counted as available in emergencies, m°st of the U. S.-owned merchant fleet must be U. S. ^grstered and crewed for political and security reasons.
ls also allows the Navy to require special features lr* government-subsidized ships not normally found on Vessels built purely with commercial considerations, SUch as heavy-lift booms, large evaporators, and duplicate controls. Now that tankers are eligible for subsidy, j. e Navy requires of those ships equipment suitable r underway refueling. The several cases where foreign ^ews on chartered vessels refused to sail ships to letnam with military cargoes proved the validity of e claim that we cannot depend entirely upon foreign
Similar arguments can be extended to the commer- protection of our trade. The maritime world has a ng history of preferential rate conferences, graft, corruption, and other tactics not considered in classical economic theory. Because of these practices, it is necesSary to maintain a U. S. merchant fleet to protect ourSelves against the possibility that the international ship- Plng conferences will set artificially high rates on our Cfade routes or charge more to carry U. S. exports than °r exports originating in the ship owners’ countries. • S.-owned foreign-flag ships theoretically could serve this protective purpose, but the new laws that would be necessary and the fact that most of these ships are bulkers, rather than cargo liners which carry our manufactured goods, make this impractical; equally important, such practice would not provide the trained U. S. seamen that might be necessary in emergencies.
The labor problems over the first LASH ships were due to union attempts to increase employment. The first U. S. lash ship the Lasb Italia, was delivered to Prudential-Grace Lines in January 1971, and for the next four weeks she was subject to intermittent strikes by the mates over the number of deck officers carried and their workload. Simultaneously, there were strikes by the longshoremen over stevedoring gang size, and the nmu chose this time to propose rotating crews of such fast turnaround vessels as the lash ships and containerships. The NMU’s proposal was an effort to spread a vessel’s payroll around, but it was dropped when the nmu decided the industry could not afford it now. The other disputes were settled on the unions’ terms.
Prior to the labor troubles over the LASH ships, there was a dispute over crew size which involved the subsidy board. It was this that broke the nmu’s resistance
to automation. The original negotiations over the lash crew size established a crew of 40 for the five Prudential-Grace ships and 43 for the six Pacific Far East Lines ships. (The Coast Guard established a minimum crew of 32 for the ships.) The 1970 Maritime Act changed the previous subsidy policy of simply paying the difference between foreign and U. S. operating costs and gave the subsidy board the discretion to decide whether an operator’s costs and crew size were reasonable. The board decided it would pay subsidy for only 38 seamen on the Prudential-Grace and Pacific Far East ships and for only 32 seamen in later lash ships. The crew size in the lash ships has since been reduced accordingly, and the nmu has taken a position of living with crew reductions. It is interesting to note that the first lash ship operating under the Norwegian flag has a crew of 29. The significance of the lash decision is that a precedent was established for the subsidy board and the Coast Guard to set crew sizes for U. S. merchant ships where traditionally that decision was reserved for negotiations between the ship operator and the seamen’s unions.
There is merit in the NMU’s proposal for rotating crews in fast turnaround vessels. Old-style cargo ships spend several days in each port unloading and loading cargo, which gives the crew plenty of time ashore. Containerships, barge-carrying ships (lash or Seabee), and tankers can load and unload their cargo in two days or less, and the tankers and barge ships do not even have to secure to a pier. If such a ship is operated efficiently, the only significant shore time a seaman might get is his vacation. The crews of inland waterway towboats have the same problem since a towboat does not have to wait to load and unload cargo; she leaves the barges she is delivering and picks up others. There are even facilities for midstream refueling and reprovisioning. In response to these conditions, the inland waterway shipping industry has developed the practice of having two crews for each towboat who spend 30 days on and 30 days off. However, towboats have crews of eight or a dozen who work six hours on and six hours off, in contrast to the crews of 30 or more on cargo ships which have an eight-hour, five-day week for non-watch-standing seamen and for watch standers, four-hour watches in three sections.
Studies have been made of using the river watch system in oceangoing ships, but at present the Coast Guard is unwilling to allow six-hour watches. They do not know if there would be any fatigue and safety problems stemming from the longer watches. Moreover, a ship at sea can be far from the nearest help. If disaster strikes and the number of men available is too few to cope with it, an otherwise salvagable situation might become hopeless, with the total loss of the ship and perhaps of her people. There is also the consideration of aiding some other ship in distress. If the rescue ship has too few people to help effectively, once again an otherwise salvagable situation might deteriorate into one of total loss.
Rotating crews with the traditional four-hour watch system would be uneconomical without drastic crev' reductions. The cost of a 32-man crew under present manning practices and a 24-man crew under a rotating system with six-hour watches in two sections are approximately the same. However, a ship with a 32-man crew under conventional manning practices would provide employment for approximately 40 seamen, and 3 ship with a 24-man crew under a rotating crew system would provide employment for 48. Assuming safety considerations were met, if a company and the unions could work out an agreement for, say, a 22-man rotating crew, both parties would benefit. Even if no cost reduction were to occur, the company would gain from the intangible benefits of better relations with the unions and, perhaps, attracting better seamen.
The battle over manning reductions was bitterly fought, and in the end it took government intervention to settle it. The unions accepted increases in the productivity of ships of 400 to 2,000 per cent over ships existing at the end of World War II with few, if any> protests, but fought every manning reduction due to automation, work practice changes, and low-maintenance materials and equipment. The unions based their opposition to crew reductions or even claims for crev' increases on statistics. In fact, the automation battles have been matters of statistics as much as they have been of picket lines and court injunctions. If we had no foreign maritime competition, the present situation would be hailed as a fine example of the American Way. Both labor and management shared the gains of increased productivity. However, our ships cost much more than equivalent foreign-built ships and our seamen are paid more than twice as much as foreign seamen. We can compete by shifting to capitalintensive operations, and the U. S. merchant marine is moving in that direction, given that an individual company can find the necessary capital. Even then, subsidy is necessary to maintain the shipyards. The irony is that much of the foreign shipping we are competing against has already shifted to such capitalintensive operations, and it is we, who developed the automatic equipment, the materials, and the new sys- terns which made fast turnaround vessels and reduced crews possible, who are in the rear.
The economic hardship of the industry offers an opportunity to upgrade the caliber of unlicensed seamen in general. The union schools are performing well their job of training new seamen and retraining older
Our Merchant Mariners and Their Unions 83
0nes bor °ur more complex ships; and now is a good Irne for retiring or forcing out those seamen whose or and attitudes are decidely inferior, and for the ornpanies to upgrade their treatment of their seamen u out union interference. The new contracts give the otT>panies the option of refusing to accept a seaman Sent by a union hall, though in the past the unions ^0U|1^. Str^e a shipping line chose to use that th'^ 1 ^0day the nmu cannot afford to strike, and
e siu possibly would be unwilling to make a case °ut of a rejection for good reason (usually spelled out y rhe contract). Until recently the unions’ position as that, since the Coast Guard issues licenses and ^‘amen s papers, that service should police the labor t^rce’ but rhe issue over the lash crew size has shown and Um0ns where government intervention may lead, lem encouraSes an in-house solution to the prob- m- Along with this weeding out, it is the companies’
, ■ ?ns‘bility to improve the small items that make u.P, oarh life tolerable or intolerable: mail service, the and S St°re’ hbraries, and other amenities. A workable fair system of rotating crews on fast turnaround k C s would improve a seaman’s life greatly and attract faTfter Pe°ple' Present solution to the problem of still t,Urnaroun<^ vessels, increased pay and vacation time, eaves a seaman with extended periods at sea. The life’,°S^nf? view is that a "seaman’s life is a seaman’s 7an island of tradition away from our modern is rl ^at sbou^ be preserved. But our modern world ependent upon our ocean commerce—the two shotdd be integrated.
e rridustry is uncertain about what will happen l972^Car Wben contracts are up for renegotiation. The negotiations were unusually peaceful; the govern- nt did not have to settle any issues at "gunpoint”
as it did with the automation issue in 1965 when the government threatened to impose its own solution. Nevertheless, given the iommp’s infatuation with strikes, Teddy Gleason’s remarks quoted earlier, and an intuitive feel gleaned from various rumors, it appears that the government will have to settle the dispute over who mans bridge-mounted engine controls.
The unions will ask for wages that at least cover predicted inflation plus a productivity allowance. The nmu probably will try for more vacation time or port time for fast turnaround vessels, and if the Public Health Service hospitals are closed, the Siu will try for more medical benefits to make up for the loss of free care. Both unions consider the present situation too unstable to make any definite plans. Rotating crews will come up again, and there is the possibility of some work rule and jurisdiction changes. Any issues over crew size will again be settled by the Coast Guard and the subsidy board.
The shipping companies’ desires are to hold costs at present levels or to lower them, and to change the craft boundaries and their associated work rules. The unions have pledged uninterrupted service with no surprises between contract negotiations, and the maintenance of this is a major goal of the companies. Otherwise, most of the companies are too preoccupied with mere survival to make major plans for future contract negotiations.
The work rules carried in the union contracts are a major block to the effective use of automation. Over half of the text of the nmu and Siu contracts are devoted to work rules spelling out exact working hours, the duties of each rating in each department, exact meal hours, and penalties for deviations. These rules require that a larger crew be carried than would be necessary if seamen were allowed to work in different departments, depending upon the need of the moment. The shipboard trend is toward less maintenance by the crew, leaving them housekeeping, watch standing, and emergency repairs; these require a seaman who can be a deck hand, an engine mechanic, and a steward.
As we have seen, some companies in cooperation with the British Seamen’s Union are already experimenting with general purpose crews or general crewing. In the experiment, craft boundaries were eliminated
The future of the American merchant marine now lies in men such as these. If the American flag is to continue to fly from private ships at sea, these men, their unions, their employers, and their politicians will have to do better than those who have gone before them.
among the unlicensed seamen who were trained to work in all three operating departments in a ship, deck, engine, and steward, and the traditional hiring system was eliminated; the seamen became full-time company employees with full fringe benefits and increased pay. The advantages to the companies are reduced crew size and the opportunity to attract and develop more responsible crews for their ships. The program also increased the social status of the participating seamen since they were no longer itinerant workers, but employees with full-time, steady jobs.
Three items are needed for the success of a general crewing system: capital investment, training for the crew, and the good will of the unions. The system is ideal for the U. S. merchant marine since it is moving toward a small fleet of fast, automated ships and, though union controlled, facilities capable of properly training the crews exist. The good will of the unions is lacking, and I doubt that it could easily be won because the system, as it was tried in Britain, could weaken their power. In the United States a seaman’s first and almost only obligation is to his union, and that is a large factor in the union’s power. General crewing requires that loyalty to the union be weakened, and the unions obviously are reluctant to allow that, even though it would improve the conditions and image of the seafaring profession.
Had it not been vetoed by President Ford, the bill requiring 30 per cent of our oil and gas imports to be carried in U. S.-flag ships might have boosted the concept of general crewing. Most U. S. oil companies operate their fleets under foreign flag, except for those ships required for coastal shipping. If they had been forced to start or increase U. S.-flag operations, they might have pushed for the system, possibly tying it to rotating crews. The negotiations would have been interesting, with the unions trying to maintain their control over the seamen and the oil companies trying to make them company employees, with the aim of exercising control over them. The oil companies are strong enough, both financially and politically, to withstand a prolonged strike. The issue may come up anyway. In the event of a bloodbath, the final outcome would be a government dictated one, since it would be caught in the middle of a political cross-fire and forced to take action. The unknown is how much the unions or companies would be willing to fight out the issue, though I do know the unions would be most reluctant to strike over it considering the condition they and most of the industry are in.
The shipping lines and the unions are studying various changes in work practices in the industry which could be issues at future contract negotiations. Temporary maintenance crews to do work beyond the ability of the small regular ship’s company have been pt°' posed. The maintenance men would stay with the ship needing their services for a voyage or two and then go to another ship. Another idea, being considered by the siu, is to have relief and maintenance crews to take over vessels when they are in port. The nmu is considering replacing ordinary seamen and oilers and wipers, entry level ratings in the deck and engine departments respectively, with a new rating, Ships’ Utili- tyman, who would be qualified and allowed to work either in the engine or deck department depending upon the workload in each. The nmu is willing to look at crew reductions in the steward’s department in conjunction with modernization of galley equipment, new practices such as pre-prepared foods, and improvement of galley layout. Better maintenance procedures and the use of modern tools and equipment are yet other areas for changes. It would be possible to go as far as an unmanned ship, but nobody wants that now. (An interesting possibility stems from the development in Germany of an automatic sail-handling system. This could lead to a two-tiered merchant marine with large unmanned powered ships on the major routes and smaller manned sailing vessels elsewhere.)
An area open to company initiative for improvement of shipboard life is to allow wives and/or women seamen on their ships. It is common practice in Europe for shipping lines to allow officers’ wives to accompany them on voyages, and the Norwegian and Russian merchant fleets employ women sailors. Our shipping lines are starting to allow officers’ wives on voyages, and the industry is discussing allowing unlicensed seamen’s wives on voyages. The new Sea-Land SL-7 class containerships have crew’s quarters designed with that practice in mind. Most of our cargo ships have facilities for up to 12 passengers; these spaces could be used by wives, thereby avoiding the cost of modifying the crew’s quarters in older ships if this practice were to be initiated before they are replaced. The next step is to employ women sailors, possibly husband and wife teams. There is a precedent for this in the river towboats where women do work as cooks. The equal rights legislation has eliminated previous legal barriers to the hiring of women. Living conditions and shipboard work were the reasons for barring women, but the amount of hard physical work done in a ship is decreasing, and with single room accomodations becoming the rule, the employment of women seamen should present no unusual problems. They would probably be hired for the steward’s department, but they could easily handle positions in the other departments. Also, there are no reasons not to have women officers, other than industry prejudice; the IOMMP already has a woman captain. The job requires intelligence, diplo-
union policy change that would help the industry, n°t weaken union power, is to give the companies meC assurance of the ability and integrity of the sea- ^en they supply; i.e., the policing of their membership, in f?USt done eventually, as the changes being made sibl C ‘ndustry require better-trained and more respon- the'C Seamen’ "Ehe unions have a choice of working out r own system or having one imposed by the gov- ent. In 1972 a bill was submitted to Congress Posing that longshoremen be certified as to pos- ng good moral character. Given their recent experi- j CS’ ^ doubt the unions would want a government , P°sed solution, even though their past position was c the government should do the job.
macy, ancj for deck officers, only moderate physical or- Engineering officers, however, do maintenance w°rk on the machinery; the physical strength requirements might bar women from these positions and ers in the engine department. The major obstacle, °ugh, is the attitude of the industry; it is an industry ere tradition in and of itself is considered sufficient to justify a practice.
ne stated attitudes of the nmu and siu on women Searnen differ. The nmu has women members with seamen s papers who once were employed in the U. S. passenger ships (now mostly laid up), and the union s willing to allow them to ship out if they wish to ure the living conditions. The Siu’s answer to my *nquiry was, seaman’s life is a seaman’s life.” They t-^not CXPeCt women to be employed in ships any e soon, nor do they expect seamen’s wives to be °Wc'd to accompany them in the foreseeable future. th°Wever> Siu supplies the unlicensed crewmen for e Sea-Land SL-7 containerships, where the crew’s Quarters were designed to accommodate the seamen’s
^F°r the foreseeable future, the labor relations concern die maritime industry will be union responsibility »s absence). The last two years have exhibited great provement over the industry’s history, though the ls ictional battle between the mates and the engi- I C^s threatens to mar the new relations. The five-point Siu ^ ^*Ven the industry and the fact that the NMU, f ’ and Meba lived up to it indicate a much better to UrC <iuestion *s whether the unions will revert e*r former ways when economic conditions im- ^0^' "i iaey are backing protectionistic trade legisla- in pi an<^ ^ave a Program °f picketing foreign-flag ships p.. ports. For example, the P & O passenger liner,
p rit of London, was picketed in January 1973 in San b ancisco hy the Marine Cooks and Stewards Union --sc it was "a foreign-built, foreign-owned, foreign- Qp atcd> and foreign-crewed ship.” The implications ^uch actions leave one wondering.
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The position of the maritime unions is interesting. They have created a "heaven” where they have monopolistic control over the labor supply and control hiring, firing, and promotion; but the industry is too weak to allow them to enjoy this power. In order to discharge their responsibility of helping provide employment and other services for their members, they must restrain their power.
The basic union desires are protection by the government from foreign competition, and for the government to leave their power base undisturbed. To these ends the unions are cleaning their houses, lobbying for trade protection, picketing foreign-flag ships, and joining the companies and the government in promoting the U. S. merchant marine. Where necessary, the unions are accommodating requests by the companies that they lower costs to enable them to survive.
The shipping lines’ desires are that costs remain the same and that service continue uninterrupted. The lines are also working with the government and the unions to promote our merchant marine, but much of their energy goes to trying to survive. The costs of fleet replacement, new cargo handling systems and equipment, and competition have left many U. S. shipping lines barely hanging on.
The federal government has managed to bring the companies and unions together with other members of the maritime industry in the National Maritime Council. It is a major accomplishment. When brought together, the shipping lines and the seafaring unions decided to cooperate and try to educate each other to their respective problems, perhaps solving some of them in the process. The industry is now showing signs of improving. The parties have an opportunity to correct many of their abuses and to restructure themselves to face a hopefully better future. It is regretted that the industry had to decline as far as it did before action was taken, and that government pressure and initiative was needed to turn it around. One may hope that the industry does not repeat its mistakes and continue its stormy traditions. The federal government may not find it worth saving again.