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avy medicine and does bring into
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The Survival of Navy Medicine”
(See D. L. Custis, pp. 35-45, August 1974;
• W. Fordham and R. Gerber, pp. 81-82, Member 1974; D. L. Custis and J. H. Cook, PP- 84-85, February 1975 Proceedings)
tenant Commander Thomas G. Cahill, edical Corps, U. S. Naval Reserve— Urgeon General Custis accurately de- ^hbes many of the problems facing °CUs some of the changes we must Implement in order to maintain the j 4uahty of health care in the Navy, strongly disagree, however, with his °jection that incentives of increased y> education subsidies, and a vigorous ^obstruction program will be sufficient mduce the non-draft-oriented physi- Clan to enter and remain within the ^6-197g time frame, th * believe it unrealistic to assume rat Congress by 1976 will approve pay Ses of sufficient magnitude to come with the civilian medical commu- /• Even assuming that the most en tly passed legislation provided the Ca]1Xlmum bonus of $13,500 to all medi- officers (which it does not) the aver- ^/^dical corps lieutenant commander stjj. 0ver eight years longevity would Co^ e earning 20% less than his civilian e- nterPart- Requests for bonuses to ? (be $48,310 salary of the average lshed civilian physician would ex- f’ay of*6 ^m'tS ^or max'mum allowable lltj 0 rn'litary officers and create a legis- e nightmare. It took more than six
hundreds of military physicians desiring pay commensurate with their training observed the annual failure of Congress to pass such legislation. With almost two years of anticipating the end of the physician draft, Congress was unable to pass appropriate legislation until approximately 90 days prior to the expiration of the draft—too late to retain those physicians due to be released 90 days later. Even this "emergency legislation” was not implemented until almost six months after passage.
Second, current medical school graduates observe that civilian residencies now successfully compete financially with military residencies and additionally do not require an obligatory one- year term of service after completion. Financial incentive, one of the major factors in the retention of military physicians (in order to enter and complete military residencies) and in the recruitment of civilian physicians for military residencies has been lost. Although educational subsidies will indeed provide a much-needed input into the military medical system, it takes five years for a student to complete medical school and internship. If a student elects specialty training (as do approximately 90% of the current medical school graduates) this may delay his availability to the non-hospital based health care system for an additional two-five years. Thus, although the earliest of the scholarship recipients will be available for primary patient care in 1975, the vast majority will not complete training until approximately 1978 or later. Graduates of the Uniformed Services University of the
Health Sciences will not complete initial training until approximately 1980-1982. Again however, postgraduate specialty training will delay the availability of the majority of these physicians until 19831985, at the earliest.
Third, an active construction program is indeed imperative for the future, but because of the long lead times necessary to obtain approval and execution of military construction projects, even the most vigorous legislative commitment, immediately authorized and funded, would take the Navy several years to provide the tangible benefits available to civilian physicians today.
Thus it may be well into the 1980s before the above factors are able to have significant impact on the rapidly declining number of military physicians.
What is desperately needed by military medicine is a program now which would alter significantly the retention rates of physicians currently on active duty, induce current medical school graduates and those physicians completing residency training to enter the military, and induce physicians who have previously served with the armed forces
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication in these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged. The U. S. Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion published in the Proceedings.
of
to reconsider the military as a career. Without such a transition program the Navy medical system may not survive until the 1980s when the Surgeon General’s programs take effect.
To attain these objectives, I propose the following:
► Implement immediate expansion of the present bonus legislation to give the current $13,500 maximum annual bonus to all physicians who would temporarily forego residency training in order to enter primary care areas immediately after internship. This bonus should be paid without contractural obligation for additional years of service and regardless of prior years of service or lack thereof (including prior or initial obligatory service). Though this would not match civilian earnings it would provide some financial incentive for younger physicians not in the service to try the military if they are undecided about future specialty training. It would also encourage unspecialized physicians currently on active duty in primary care areas to consider remaining in the military rather than leaving for the "greener pastures” in the civilian sector upon the completion of their enlistments.
► Provide physicians in active patient care billets with adequate paramedical and especially with clerical help. This has been repeatedly shown to be a significant factor in the retention or loss of medical officers.
► For all physicians in active patient care billets, institute mandatory continuing education requirements for promotion and career development, guarantee funds, transportation, and time to attend meetings and conferences dealing with the physician’s specific areas of interest. Such a program would amply demonstrate to all physicians the Navy’s active and continuing commitment to excellence in patient care and would keep the Navy in the forefront of progressive medicine.
► Guarantee physicians who desire it a minimum tour of five years in one geographical area.
► Allow qualified physicians—including generalists—attached to outpatient care facilities, the privilege of caring for their patients in nearby military hospitals (including those of other services). This would eliminate much of the frustration of "clinic-based” physicians and provide more personalized and less fragmented care for patients.
► Within reason, attempt to structure the military physician’s practice in accordance with the physician’s interest and training. Specifically, this would mean encouraging increased university affiliations where available.
Even if commensurate salary, better facilities, and educational subsidies are fully implemented, job satisfaction is now, and always will be, the deciding factor for the retention of military physicians beyond their minimum obligatory period. All of the above recommendations except the first are directly related to the job satisfaction and the self-esteem of physicians in the service or physicians contemplating entering the military. All require moderate changes in administrative policies but most would demand comparatively small financial outlays. Navy medicine is indeed capable of a "remarkable” recovery from the current grim prognosis but its tremendous recuperative powers may be of no avail in 1980 if we fail to treat its ills promptly and adequately in 1975. -
Commander Earle R. Callahan, U. S. Navy, Naval War College—\ do not believe that enough has been said publicly about the restrictions placed upon the U. S. mill' tary forces by our European allies during the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict and U. S. military force alert. It did appear as a news item for a short time during that period but has not been publicized since.
One point that is quite apparent is that a Mediterranean or Middle East conflict that involves American armed forces will most likely not be supported by U. S. allies and friends in Europe, the periphery of the Mediterranean, or MidEast areas. The probable consequence is that U. S. naval forces could not use forward bases for fueling, general support, repair, or air support operations. The Army and Air Force would also be shut out as before. In the 1973 svar, U. S. air forces were even denied overflight rights, and support flights had to be funneled through the Gibraltar Strait.
The Southeast Asia experience could be used as an example of the type of forward base support that is required during a limited conflict. Subic Bay naval facilities were used for ship and air support and repair, and as depots for fuel and ammunition. Okinawa supported Air Force and Marine operations, and Navy facilities in Japan supported and repaired both ships and aircraft. A similar support situation existed 111 Japan during the Korean conflict as well.
Recently, the U. S. military forces were denied operations from these typeS
of facilities in the Europe-Mediterranean
area. This brings up a very simply state question—can the U. S. Navy supp°rt
a conflict in the Mediterranean-Middle
East area without forward bases? if 11 conflict were initiated, I believe °ur naval forces would be impotent in a very short time.
Does this mean that U. S. threats limited intervention can never be carrie out? Not exactly, but serious restrff tions can be expected. One way to dc termine the answers to these and otf>ef questions would be to war-game a scC nario similar to the 1973 Arab-Israe conflict and get the U. S. forces involved ln shooting operations.” The war game facilities at the Naval War College could be used to provide some valuable answers for future planning.
I am sure that Congress and the pubic, as well as the military, would be vitally interested in the outcome. Shortcomings should be used to press for increased defense expenditures for combatants and support forces to meet the challenges of those who would threaten
S. vital interests. The Russians are doubtless well aware of our weaknesses, so no secrets would be exposed. Are Americans equally aware?
Polynesian Navigation:
They Made it, but How?
(&? R. H. Gulmon, pp. 106-109, October 1974 Proceedings')
^utenant Commander Fernando H. Ca- n?/ Teles, Brazilian Navy, SC— Captain ulmon’s Professional Note exposed Several methods of crude celestial navigation which surely must have been
applied by the early Polynesians.
We mustn’t, however, underrate the creative powers of a people who have 2,000 years of seafaring experience. No wonder, then, that Polynesians not only invented the most efficient hull designs— multiple hulls—but also a unique navigational method, based upon completely different principles than those familiar to us.
Waves, upon striking reefs or steeply sloped rocky shorelines, set up hyperbolic patterns of stationary waves. A highly-trained observer can detect those fine fleeting lines a dozen or more miles from their sources. A keen eye can also detect the differences in color of cold or warm currents, the presence of traces of flora and fauna typical of certain places, and the changing colors imparted by bottom sand to shallow waters. This whole system of position recognition amounts to a kind of natural navigation system and was recorded by Polynesians in maps made with twigs and strings. A straight, thin twig when bent by a string attached near its ends may approach a hyperbolical contour and reasonably described nodal lines on those maps.
I read about this in the late Fifties in a book called Song of the Sky (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1954) written by Guy Murchie, an aviator. I’m sure about the consistency of these data, for I was deeply impressed then and have since regretted that so many learned people wave off the only true "flower people” as just another primitive culture. This is why, though living quite far from the Pacific—and never having personally met any Polynesians or visited Polynesia—I’m now trying to have them a little more recognized as thinking human beings.
The Indian Key Massacre”
(See D. A. Dye, pp. 74-78, November 1974 Proceedings)
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Walt Jajfee—While Mr. Dye’s account of the massacre at Indian Key is historically correct, the cause of it is misrepresented. Captain Jacob Housman was the most accomplished of all the Florida
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The isthmus, jugular of the Western Hemisphere, as it looked in January 1842
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shipwreckers. Indian Key was an empire he created when he became dissatisfied with local salvage awards. By 1833 his store was doing $30,000 a year in trade with the Indians. Using credit from his store, he cultivated fishermen, beachcombers, and bums into an extensive spy system that located wrecks for him almost before they occurred. When a court was established in Key West to supervise matters of wreckage and salvage, Housman got into trouble. Witnesses were bought. To avoid collusion charges he once towed a vessel to Charleston for settlement of his claim. On one occasion a ship master "committed suicide” during salvage operations.
When possible, Housman convened his own boards of arbitration, providing his own "disinterested” captains to sit in judgment. Charged at Key West with stealing goods from a wreck, his wrecker’s license was revoked. Traveling to Tallahassee, he had enough political clout to cause Monroe County to be divided in two. Key West became the seat of Monroe, while Indian Key became the seat of newly-formed Dade County on 4 February 1836. Housman built a courthouse, appointed a judge, and installed a lobbyist in Washington. The 15 eligible voters in the county were on his payroll. Finally he began to overreach. First he put seamen, then Indians in stocks for their crimes. He then offered to catch or kill every Indian in the state of Florida for the sum of $200 a head. No one took him up on it, but the Indians heard of it. It was then that they attacked and burned Indian Key. The plunder was incidental. It was the humiliation of Housman’s stockades and the bounty on their heads that caused the massacre.
"Lieutenant Strain’s Ordeal”
(See L. C. Allin, pp. 83-86, February 1974
Proceedings)
Captain Warren Taylor, U. S. Navy {Retired)—The article by Mr. Allin brings to mind an old map I have had for a number of years. It is dated 15 January 1842, shortly before Lieutenant Strain’s ordeal took place and shows potential canal routes in some detail. It does not refer to the route explored by the fhmxhabe I.
shortest line for unitinp the Atlantic and the Pacific bv means of the or western branch of the river Chore ra.
d
Darien Expedition but correctly locates the general area of the present Panama Canal. The map indicates that a canal linking the oceans actually existed in 1783 (see area marked "r”). The marginal note points out that this waterway, the Canal of Raspadura, was created by a monk of Novita and permitted passage from the Caribbean to the Pacific through the country of Granada (now Colombia) via the Atrato and San Juan Rivers during the rainy season.
Another route—Atrato to the
Naipi, thence west to the Cupica River and the Bay of Cupica—was projected as a good sea-level possibility and still is a feasible selection, but it would take a lot of dredging. Interestingly, the cost of construction of this route would be considerably offset by the gold, platinum, and other metals which would be recovered by the dredging of these particular rivers.
Rear Admiral Milton E. (Mary) Miles explored this passage in 1954, accompanied by the Chief of the U. S. Naval Mission to Colombia, Captain E. L. Robertson, Jr., the admiral’s aide (then Lieutenant [junior grade] Jack Galenor, now movie star John Gavin), and a number of Colombian officers and civilians. As pilot of the mission plane during this era, I picked up the group at a small field on the Atrato—near the largest gold dredging operation of the
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time—and flew them on to Bogota. They were thoroughly worn out, but after some Colombian hospitality, Admiral Miles was ready to go on again. This time we headed east to the llanos country, with stops at Leticia, Puerto Carreno, Arauca, and Tres Esquinas. Turning south, we visited Leguizamo on the Putumayo River and Leticia on the Amazon. We were three and a half hours by air from the nearest gas pump, and no radio aids were available.
These river bases were primitive compared with other Colombian and U. S. naval bases. Admiral Miles insisted, however, that Mrs. Miles, Mrs. Robertson, and Mrs. Taylor join us on the excursion for goodwill purposes, and were they welcomed. Women were a real rarity at Colombian river bases in these remote areas in the 1950s. I suppose it5 all changed by now; nonetheless, I’d like someday to refly that route and remember those fun days with Billie and "Mary” Miles and all the others.
"Latitude by Observations at Lower Transit”
{See W. Norvillc, pp. 111—113, August 1974 Proceedings)
Earl Ranter, M.D.—In the third pafS'
graph of Mr. Norville’s Profession Note, he refers to the fact that in trop[1]' cal locations when the declination of the
In a passage to the Yucatan last year, observed a change of only 8° in the Sun’s azimuth during the entire morn- ln8- This is considerably less than the ^•nimum angle of 20° taken as a must y most navigators. Only when the 0cal hour angle (LHA) approaches zero ^11 the azimuth change enough to give ao adequate angle of cross in the lines * position. But when the LHA is near *er°, the sun will be near the meridian. 0 I did indeed mean azimuth, but I 3 s° see why Dr. Kanter asked this cIUestion.
sun and the observer’s DR latitude are nearly equal, the azimuth of the sun will remain at or near 90°. Does he mean azimuth or altitude?
Warren Norville—To answer Dr. Kanter’s question, the altitude of the sun at local apparent noon (LAN) will be very near 90 when the declination of the sun is nearly equal to the DR latitude of the observer. But the azimuth of the sun will equal 90° or nearly so during the morning until very near LAN, and then che azimuth will change rapidly, within a few minutes, until it reaches 180° or at LAN. From a few minutes after jneridian passage the azimuth will then be near 270° the entire afternoon.
In my article I said "the azimuth of the sun will be 90° or nearly so, the entire naorning . . By "nearly so” I meant che azimuth would not change suffi- Clently to give enough angle of "cross” 0 the lines of position, by a running x °n the sun, to give the navigator a ^liable indication of latitude.
Co
inlander Raymond P. Eyman, Coast ana tai0c^^c ^urvey (Retired)—There are cera *n discrepancies and omissions in this ^lc e that, unfortunately, tend some- 0j. at to discredit professional treatment the example presented. nn m°st navigation problems it is ^ to start with an assumed DR gi^tlon- In this case no DR latitude is u - n> but the solution produces an tkely position for either marine or pr13 navigation (a site over land ap- |Ca°X'rnatoly 25 miles west of New Or- ns)- Values taken from the Nautical
Almanac for the date given (3 February 1969) are all erroneous, as follows: SHA of Kochab: 137° 17.2' instead of the actual 137° 18.0'; Declination of
Kochab: N 74° 19.2' instead of N 74° 16.5'; GHA of Aries at 0011 00“ on 4 February 1969: 133° 10.3' instead of 133° 58.8'. The total result of these discrepancies, while not monumental, requires the observation to be made at a time differing from that given by at least several minutes and hence affects the derived latitude.
The article should be labeled an approximate method. [2] I
agree with this statement at all. The blunders made by me in this one specific case do not make the method itself approximate or any less valid. The blunders reflect solely on me. As I said in my article, lower transit observations are just as valid and just as accurate as any other type of meridian altitude observations.
"Disciplining the All-Volunteer Force”
(See J. Webster, pp. 33-39, November 1974, Proceedings)
Commander Daniel G. Powell, U. S. Navy, Commander Mine Squadron Ten—To my mind, Lieutenant Webster has presented an accurate and vitally important analysis of some of the discipline problems confronting our modern Navy. His discussion of the American goal-oriented society, the lack of a viable goal (other than "preparedness”) for the military, and the early adulthood of the enlisted man in the all-volunteer force (AVF) is superb. He has adequately explained that the enlisted man is ". . . also capable of analyzing the reasons . . . and thus with increasing frequency . . . can be expected to ask, 'Why?,’ and to expect some form of explanation.”
It appears, however, that Lieutenant Webster has been too preoccupied with the "inferiors” and has not correctly gauged the temperament and reaction from the "superiors.” He states:
". . . at least for the present, it looks as if there is not going to be any further 'official’ discussion, for practical-minded people appear to have determined that not to adopt an Answer the Why’ approach is to run the risk that there will never be a Standing Army in which to form a backbone. For that reason, among others, the decision has been made to join the recruit, and not vice versa.”
Lieutenant Webster has either widely missed the mark, or we have many persons in responsible positions in the Navy who are not "practical-minded people.” In the post-Zumwalt era the pendulum has swung rapidly. There is great pressure now to return, not just to the pre-Zumwalt days, but to the real "rocks and shoals” Navy. With increasing fre-
area. The employment of aircraft sU
tin?
ch
quency—one hears senior naval officers, including those of flag rank, calling for this about-face. If these views prevail—and it now seems likely that they will—the "Answer the Why” approach is due for a swift demise, with one foot already in the grave.
Finally, Lieutenant Webster suggests that a shift in disciplinary (directory) policy may be "a realistic attempt to mirror the society that produces our military men.” He adds the further subtle, if tacit, suggestion that such is an honorable and desirable course of action. However, hand-in-glove with the currently prevalent negative attitude concerning the "Answer the Why” approach is the complementary attitude that the Navy must take the lead in molding a coherent civilian society rather than merely reflecting that society.
However confused and confusing it may be, our Navy should be an interesting place for the next few years.
Commander Paul William Garber, U. S. Naval Reserve—Lieutenant Webster’s otherwise fine article gives feudalism an undeserved knock. Feudalism was not "absolute authority originating from a few with responsibility for dutiful performance resting on the many,” but a bilateral relationship in which the holder of the fief rendered counsel and support (consilium et auxilium) for his lord’s protection and maintenance (pro- tectio, defensio, et warantia). The bonds could be broken by voluntary renunciation {diffidatio). or by a breach of faith or duty. The idea of the felony comes from the failure to fulfill a feudal obligation, as does the notion that an order incompatible with one’s dignity as a free man need not be obeyed.
Feudalism did not "step aside” because it could not accommodate basic egalitarian principles of democratic theory; its utility was reduced because of technological changes in waging warfare, the increasing expenses of war, the rise of commercial activity in a money economy, and the ability of central administrations to play off one class or estate against another. Thus, for example, in England under the Plantagenets, feudal relationships were restricted but simultaneously amalgamated into royal administration. Egalitarianism had minimal, if any effect on this process.
I suggest that the authoritarianism Lieutenant Webster discusses arises much more from notions of Frederick the Great and Napoleon—the former for his treatment of men as machines, the latter for the creation of the mass army. The Enlightenment may be a greater villain than the Middle Ages ever were.
I agree that discipline in its broad definition must be considered anew when dealing with people who must have a relatively high degree of education and training to deal with what now passes for military hardware. In studying and restudying the force structure of the Navy for the future, it would be plain folly to disregard what technology has forced upon us.
arise. Our recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff were thus precise and timely. There was then broad policy guidance from Washington, but the execution was delegated to and was expected to be performed by the unified commander. Washington policy pre' vailed and everyone fully recognized that this was right. In certain instances critical tactical decisions were also provided from Washington, but the role of the on-scene commander-in-chief was vital, and it was demonstrated unmistakably to me—and to Washington—that his role continues.
"The Coast Guard Approaching the Century’s End”
(See S. B. How, pp. 90-107, May 1974 Proceedings; D. R. Wiesnet, pp. 99-100, September 1974)
Captain Norman C. Venzke, U. S. Guard, Prospective Commanding 0jfu:er’ USCGC Polar Star (WAGB-io)—Lieutenant Commander Wiesnet’s comments concerning the impact of ice reconnaissance
by satellite are well taken. In order to further highlight that relatively new technique I would like to add a comments from the vantage point or tn icebreaker commanding officer.
The problem of determining the 1° cation and concentration of sea ice haS always been the major indeterminate >n polar ship operations. In the early yearS' the mariner could rely only upon his torical information, if available, when he planned his penetration into the paC • That was an imprecise procedure for iC least two reasons. First, one cannot nec essarily expect ice conditions to be Pre cisely the same during successive se^ sons. Varying weather conditions su as temperature and wind do produce vastly different ice conditions in a g[3][4]'re° area. Second, there was a lack of cofrl prehensive data over wide areas t>ecaU of the few data-reporting units and t total inaccessibility of many areas. T ^ it was impossible to obtain a comp1 historical picture of ice conditio throughout the polar regions. ^
Although the icebreaker coroi®an^ ing officer is vitally interested m forecasts, he is more concerned wi actual ice conditions in his opera
Can _ ei l teS°'ve concentrations when three-
CredK °r more a S‘ven area is cov- thr ■ *CC' Concentrations of less than hre , e'8hths are trivial as far as ice- c,/ ‘)*rs or ice-reinforced ships are con- ^ ^ Che icebreaker may receive the Ce- 7 two means. She normally res lce information from the Navy’s ftQet leather Service which uses data aA sources, including satellites. Or,
Book Review—A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power
(See R. W. Daly, p. 108, November 1974 Proceedings)
Dr. Donald W. Mitchell, Chairman, Political Science Department, Northeast Missouri State University—Dr. Daly’s review of my new book demands a reply. His 30 years of research in the field of Russian and Soviet naval history eminently qualify him to review my book. Unfortunately, the fact that he is also a competitor with an unpublished book of his own in this area appears in this case to have deprived
as the Navy P2V, P3V and C-121 types td much to provide the desired information. They continue to obtain long- range ice information in selected areas which is invaluable for penetration and 'mck planning purposes. Of course, the S *pb°ard helicopters obtain the detailed s °rt-range ice reconnaissance informa- tlon needed in transiting the pack ice. Unfortunately, the aircraft have not Ways been available for ice reconnaisSance where needed. Although used ex- mnsively in the Baffin Bay area, the estern Arctic and in the Western Ross a> there are many areas where it is r*.e,ther economically feasible nor opera- l0nally possible to launch reconnais- pance Sights, particularly in Antarctica. °r exatnple, icebreakers are ordered to Penetrate areas such as the Weddell and tnundsen Seas which are beyond the °Verage of Navy C-130 aircraft based at flliams Field near McMurdo Station. eUs> w‘th the exception of other mod- *<Ws such as the helicopter, the aj° ern icebreaker skipper might not cJVays be better off than his early prede- ,L0r in regard to ice information, ga satefl‘te bas more than filled the 0£ ‘ not only possesses the capability recording ice data over vast areas but
U. S. COAST GUARD
she may receive pictures from the satellites directly, utilizing specialized shipboard equipment. I might add that good satellite performance is contingent upon lack of cloud cover and, therefore has not completely replaced the fixed wing aircraft. This is based upon my experience in Antarctica during 1970-73 when cloud cover frequently degraded satellite performance.
The satellite is capable of providing a comprehensive ice picture which aids both the mariner and the ice forecaster. The former obtains an almost-real-time, long-range view of the ice. The latter is provided with a prodigious amount of data which can be analyzed by automatic data processing equipment and used to refine forecasting effectiveness. The impact of the satellite on icebreaking operations is great. It cannot be fully appreciated unless one has had to work his way through the pack without any ice information at all.
him of objectivity. In his review, he makes only one major point—that my book contains a number of factual inaccuracies. He lists seven cases in the book which he describes as either inadequate or incorrect.
Dr. Daly is correct in some instances. In other instances his point is definitely arguable. But on this particular matter the reviewer is, it seems to me, beating a dead horse. Because the contents of Russian naval archives have not been released since 1801, anyone writing on this subject is obliged to base his history for the last 174 years on sources which are at times inaccurate, inadequate, and in a few cases, wholly missing. A definitive work is therefore not possible at the present time, and I stated specifically in my book that I made no claim to having written one. If Dr. Daly’s historical manuscript in this field attains a significantly greater accuracy than does mine— without sacrifice of other qualities which make a good history—I shall be the first to congratulate him following its publication.
Unfortunately, the reviewer’s singleminded concentration on minor factual errors appears to have blinded him to other services normally rendered by a reviewer. He has nowhere indicated the size or scope of the work, the methodology used, or the conclusions reached. The 17-page bibliography, illustrations, maps, and tables pass unnoticed. There are no observations concerning interest or quality of writing. The contents draw no observations other than his seven specific criticisms. There is no comment on Russian and Soviet war records, naval innovations, contributions to science and exploration, the achievements of genuine naval heroes, extensive Russian and Soviet borrowings from the U. S. Navy, naval philosophy and doctrine. Even the final chapters dealing with the achievement of sea power and the combat capabilities in differing areas and conditions are not of apparent interest.
This history covers a time span of more than 11 centuries and is based on research in English, Russian, German, French and, to a much lesser extent, Swedish and Finnish sources. As of the present time, this is not only the first treatment of this subject by an American writer but the first complete and up-to-date account in any language.
A Return to Shipboard Leadership
Lieutenant Richard A. Olsen, U. S. Navy—The lack of good leadership is evidenced at every echelon of shipboard activity. Replacing leadership are externally directed programs to affect safety, morale, performance, reliability, and human relations. Each of them not only tells "what” but "how” and thus removes the onus of decisive action from the chain of command. There should be no need for these programs or the special assistants and councils created by them. A strong chain of command with strong leadership at the top can and should handle all shipboard personnel problems. Why, then, are such programs necessary?
Fleet and force Commanders have long recognized that far too many, if not most, of their units have fallen below acceptable standards of material and operational readiness. Additionally, problems of drug abuse, dress, and human relations demonstrate that morale and discipline have broken down.
The cause of this malaise has been ascribed by some to the heavy tempo of operations required by the recent Vietnam conflict and to the radically new social values and behavior of contemporary society. The real reason for the present state of affairs is lack of leadership on the local level. Commanding officers and their subordinates are not asserting themselves as positive, consistent personalities. The myriad directives and programs issued by higher command comprise an attempt to make up for this deficiency.
One fleet commander found it necessary to develop a readiness improvement program for ships between deployments. It is embarrassing that a fleet level monitoring device was required in order to insure that routine tests, maintenance, and inspections—traditionally the responsibility of the commanding officer— were, in fact, being carried out.
On a long-term and broader basis, specific programs are being undertaken by various command levels to shore up weakened areas. Some of these, however well intentioned, may even prove themselves to be a greater detriment. Installation of closed circuit television on board ships is being touted as a way to improve morale. Is its cost justified in terms of the additional material, money, and men required to install, manage, and operate it? The problem here is communication, and a better way lS provided by the commanding officer who tours his ship often and makes effective use of upper management intervention.
Billets for special, full-time counselors for most ships have been created to better human relations and enhance retention. If division officers and leading petty officers da function effectively, re ceiving motivation and support from their department heads, they can provide career guidance, solve the conflicts ° discrimination and drugs, and instill a sense of belonging and of job-imp°r tance in each member within their organization.
1971. 137 pages. Illustrated. List price: $11.00 Member's price: $8.80
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The museum of the United States Naval Academy houses one of the finest collections of ship models in the world. There are more than a hundred models on display, spanning four centuries and most of the major seafaring nations. Most of the models are from the "great age of sail", and they reflect the intricate detail and meticulous craftsmanship of that era.
There is unquestionably no better way for the modern shiplover to investigate and understand the construction, rigging, and design of these great sailing ships than to examine these models, many of which were originally made to guide the shipwrights before plan drawings and blueprints were in use. Today, the models are often the only extant sources for information about developments and refinements of the shipbuilder's craft over the centuries.
This edition has been designed to do justice to the Henry Huddleston Rogers Collection of Ship Models, not only as a chronological record of naval architecture since the seventeenth century, but as a pictorial record of the modelmaker's art in its most sophisticated ind authentic form.
Henry Huddleston Rogers Collection of Ship Models
The elaborate personnel qualification standard (PQS) system has been implemented to insure adequate training in operational areas. Essentially an enot-
mous elaboration of the practical factors sheet which every enlisted man had to complete prior to advancement in rate, lc is vulnerable to the same shortcom- lngs of gundecking and personal interpretation. Of real value would be the upgrading of the practical factors sheet and a determined effort by the leading Petty officer and his supervisor to make it work.
The first effect and the most significant complaint against all of these programs is the increased paper work in- v°lved in a need to report to higher authority the status and progress of activities which should be the function
local command. Sadly, those at the °ttom who would like to lead and train their men as professionals are so overpowered by the enormous administrative burdens placed on them, that often too little productive effort filters out.
Commanding officers, agreeing that there are too many directives from higher authority, and feeling the need t° defend their own ineffectiveness, are eagcr to point to the recent CNO policies and methods as usurping their com- ruand prerogatives. The Z-gram approach, however, was a dynamic attempt t° cut down cobwebs of indifference and Useless bureaucratic entanglements by Personally reaching and motivating each Uavyman with positive programs which could be felt immediately. Both the Programs themselves and their method j truplementation have been criticized.
uaost cases, however, active and Aggressive local commands could have 'uitiated these or similar programs of . eir own accord, and some did. Direct Implementation was used in lieu of slow tration through the chain of com- Utand because the many previous CNO P°licies had received so much lip service I personal interpretation, at each eg that little positive effect was ever e c by the fleet sailor. The shotgun Approach of the Z-grams has left little °orn for deviation or procrastination.
nfortunately, too few aspirants view ururnand at sea as an opportunity to rose dynamic leadership, but rather sel °baPenge only ro credit them- c es with this tough qualification for rther promotion. With these com- .^riding officers, the hope is that noth- 8 Untoward will happen during that
period in command.
The personality and efficiency of the ship take their shape and color directly from the example and policy of the commanding officer. The captain, therefore, must see it as his duty to initiate imaginative and positive programs. Because the fruits of these programs are a function of the expertise and productivity of his officers, the captain must also use his greater experience to hone the professional qualities of his subordinates.
The executive officer and department heads have significant and distinct roles in the leadership chain, but the real producers are the chief petty officer and the division officer. They have the closest daily contact with the sailor. Living in today’s peer-oriented atmosphere where group acceptance is paramount, the young chief petty officer and the division officer are often too concerned with rejection by their men and with damaging their "nice-guy” image. What is required here is the experience of the chief and the enthusiasm of the young officer combining to form an aggressive team that is not afraid to step forward of the group and lead.
When all levels of shipboard management function as described, & positive, well-organized, and meaningful image of the ship and of the Navy is transmitted to the lower-rated sailors. These men then will feel themselves part of a professional team—each individual a vital contributor, accepted and needed. These junior members are then quick to imitate the good leadership of their superiors.
It remains only to find sufficient numbers of people who have the courage to lead.
"Navies in War and in Peace”
(See S. G. Gorshkov, pp. 26-39, February 1974; B. V. Drashpil, pp. 89-90, August 1974 Proceedings)
'Boris V. Drashpil, Miramar, Florida— In order to amplify my comment in the August Proceedings, I submit a letter sent to me by the substitute chief editor of the monthly Sudostroenye, published in Leningrad. I had written to him for either confirmation or refutation of my belief that Peter the Great’s original
"botik”—not just a replica—is in the Naval Museum at Leningrad.
"In reply to your inquiry, we are sending the following information on hand about Peter the First’s 'botik.’
"The boat was found by 16-year- old Peter in 1688 at the village of Izmailovo, near Moscow. It was brought to Moscow in 1701 and placed in a shed in the Kremlin, where it remained through 1722. It had been transported to Petersburg in 1723 and placed in the Admiralty Yard and then—in the same year— was transferred to Peter and Paul Fortress. It has repeatedly taken part in the festivities during celebration of the signing of the peace treaty of Nishtadt, and in 1872 the 'botik’ was brought to a polytechnical exposition at Moscow. It was taken to Peterhof in 1928 and in 1940 entered the Central Naval Museum where it is at the present time.
"Besides the original 'botik’ there is in the museum its model built in the museum’s model shop in 1872 to l/lO scale. This information was obtained from the article in the January 1972 issue of the Journal entitled 'Botik of Peter the First’ and it has been approved by the Central Naval Museum.”
"A New Look at Tidal Dynamics”
(See V. R. Gardy, pp. 111-113, September 1973 Proceedings; C. H. Blair, pp. 97-99, November 1974)
Lieutenant Commander Martin J. Finerty, Jr., U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, Oceanographic Unit Five—The technical content of the commentary by Captain Blair is excellent and does correctly identify the forces causing tidal conditions on the earth. The lack of identification of "centrifugal force” and the slightly misrepresented forces associated with gravitational attractions and centripetal accelerations by Mr. Gardy are consistent throughout his article, and are the source of difference between the two. The reference to the "equilibrium tide ’ by Captain Blair is valid and represents a good starting point in a discussion of tides. As indicated by both gentlemen, tides are caused by the fact that gravitational attractions of the sun and moon vary from place to place on and in the earth. Atmosphere, solid earth, and ocean all experience these forces, but only the ocean tides can be perceived as evidence of these forces.
Captain Blair suggests in his Figure 1 that the average gravitational attraction per unit mass must equal the average centripetal acceleration, or the earth orbit will change. But from point to point in and on the earth, the two will not be equal. The centripetal acceleration is constant; the gravitational attraction varies with position. This local difference causes the tide-producing force. The forces depicted in Blair’s Figure 2 clearly indicate that the gravitational attraction of the sun causes the earth to follow a curved path orbit. Every particle of mass on or in the earth moves in orbit identical to the one traced by the center of the earth. Flence, the earth moves around the sun like a gyroscope on a pivot. This point is not evident in the paper by Mr. Gardy.
Neither gentleman clearly states that the centripetal acceleration is proportional to the average gravitational acceleration (attraction per unit mass) and is directed toward the sun and moon. For the moon this is expressed mathematically as:
Centripetal Acceleration = Average
G Mm
Gravitational Acceleration =-------- 5—
r*
where
G = universal constant of gravitation
Mm = mass of the moon
r = distance between the centers of the earth and the moon.
For a point directly under the moon
GMm
Grav Acc =----------------------- -5-
(r - aY
where
a = radius of the earth
The difference between the average and local gravitational acceleration is the tide-producing force.
The comment by Mr. Gardy concern-
ing mathematical models and the prediction of observed behavior is also misleading. Tides are predicted by empirical relationships which are a form of mathematical model.
Notebook Item—"Syria Beefs up Airpower”
(See p. 124, September 1974 Proceedings)
Over 700 photographs, with explanatory text, show how to tie every kind of knot, from a simple overhand to the most complicated Turk’s head. This classic guide features step-by-step illustrations, clear definition of terms and a full discussion of tools used in rope work. The third edition, which has been brought thoroughly up-to-date by including material on synthetic line, is for every sailor, yachtsman, scout, and woodsman.
1970. 225 pages. 7.19 Illustrations. Bibliography. Glossary, hides List Price: $12.50 Member’s Pricer^SlO.OO ^
Lieutenant Commander Franklin A. Curcto, U. S. Naval Resene—The article re' printed from The Christian Science Monitor gives the speed of the Russian MiG-23 as nearly 2,000 miles per hour. According to Jane’s All the World’s Ait- craft, the MiG-23 Flogger variable-geometry (swing-wing) fighter-bomber has a maximum speed of Mach 2.3, which would be in the vicinity of 1,400 knots or about 1,600 miles per hour. An explanation of this discrepancy in speeds is that the faster and higher flying MiG-25 Foxbat was formerly identify as the MiG-23 when the Russian desig' nation of the Flogger was still un-
uneasy Middle East peace, the Israelis j^nght be reluctant to increase tensions y downing an unarmed Syrian plane °Ver an Arab state or in international
known. The MiG-25 Foxbat can attain speeds in level flight near Mach 3.2 which would be about 2,000 miles per hour.
The Christian Science Monitor is probably correct in its estimate that a squad- r°n of MiG-23 Floggers would not tip che balance of air power in favor of Syria. But according to Aviation Week and Space Technology the U.S.S.R. has sent both the MiG-23 and MiG-25 aircraft to Syria. A squadron of Foxbats could yield significant advantages to the Syrians. The MiG-25 flies so high (probably in excess of 80,000 feet) and so fast that once it has attained its cruise altitude it is virtually invulnerable to the Israeli air defense system. In a role as a fighter aircraft in open hostilities, the 1>vhG-25 could engage Israeli planes with lrnpunity from its vantage of altitude atld speed. But perhaps the greatest advantage of the Foxbat’s high performance could be realized by the Syrians through the employment of the reconnaissance version of the aircraft in peacetime”.
In such a role, the Foxbat could conduct valuable intelligence collection nttssions over Israel and be unopposed. Since it would be susceptible to attack °nly during its climb and descent, it w°uld, of course, climb and descend °ver Arab territory or in international attspace over the Mediterranean. In an a'tspace. In such a situation the Syrians c°uld have the valuable advantages of r°utine reconnaissance, and pre-strike reconnaissance before an attack.
20th Century Mahan”
(SW E. R. Zumwalt, pp. 70-73, November 924 Proceedings)
^tenant Commander Cloyde I. Brown, ^ Navy (Retired)—Surely historians doddering if they happened to read Oiiral Zumwalt’s words placing Rus- Admiral Gorshkov among them, p ltb a proper number of impressive J0otn°tes, even American historians can ^nd credible when they are not, but exander Solzhenitsyn recently ^ed up the writings of many high- placed Russian officials by saying that such men were deluding themselves.
Admiral Zumwalt has lauded Gorshkov as a superior strategist and historian without much foundation if he did so on the basis of the Gorshkov Proceedings series. Zumwalt has also mistakenly assumed that these writings, at face value, are of historical importance. Where chauvinism guides the pen, as in Gorshkov’s case, the accuracy necessary to history must fall by the wayside. Nevertheless, the articles by Gorshkov are of great importance, and I, like other naval officers, have eagerly awaited each issue to see how he developed his case.
What Admiral Zumwalt believes to be history and strategy revealed by the Russian author might better be labeled polemic. It is always dangerous to speculate on the purpose and motivation of an author, but such speculation may reveal where the real value lies in this literature.
We may ask ourselves whether Gorshkov believes his own distortions of fact. To return to recent pronouncements of Solzhenitsyn (Time), many high-level Russians, after many years, may very well believe their own propaganda. Gorshkov undoubtedly believes America is as imperialistic as he has often stated; there is considerable historical evidence to support him in this regard. However, this and other matters are not examined at length, but only "substantiated” by referring to other Russian authors bent on glorifying their land—at times through noting deficiencies in the strategies of other navies. Let us conclude that Gorshkov believes in his information to some unknown extent and uses additional material which he doesn’t believe because it serves his purpose.
Admiral Zumwalt is correct in giving Gorshkov great credit for advancing the cause of the Soviet Navy. In doing so, there is evidence of Gorshkov’s study of the histories of the U. S. Navy and those of other nations. This supports the view that Gorshkov has not been led astray by Communist-oriented historians but chooses to use them to espouse his cause. In fact, Gorshkov supports most skillfully the direction of development of the Soviet Navy through references to that navy’s history, a historical area where there is less than ample fact to support his premises. He also notes significant deficiencies, such as antisubmarine warfare, in the American and other allied navies during World War II to substantiate his conclusions.
This method is very much in contrast to that of Alfred T. Mahan whose writings drew much from the history of foreign navies such as the Spanish Armada and the Royal Navy to develop his thesis on the importance of sea power. Gorshkov’s method is to point to the failings of other "foreign” powers in their naval developments, and to explain the trends in the Soviet Navy as dependent upon, and influenced by, its own history. No exemplary models are found in either the American or British Navies of the past. Gorshkov seems to learn from their failures only, caused in part, no doubt, by imperialistic designs, and he does all this convincingly and skillfully.
What are the goals of Gorshkov? Young Soviet naval officers have probably read this series of articles as avidly as their American counterparts. They cannot help but be convinced by footnotes that they are reading an apparently scholarly and interesting collection of articles explaining the "big picture.” They cannot help but feel some pride. To those Soviet citizens and officials outside the Navy circles, the articles are convincing about the importance of the Navy—and here again Admiral Zumwalt can rightfully draw a parallel with Mahan and his influence.
Many will read the articles to find out where the Soviet Navy is going. They will find out. As to why, I don’t think the reasoning behind the direction of naval development can be depended upon. No great philosophies either in strategy or sea power are to be found, nor are the writings of general historical importance. Perhaps they are of limited historical importance because of the author s position, but the articles are certainly of considerable interest to those in the Free World dedicated to maintaining it against a Communist enemy.
[1] can say in defense is that I used an abstract example. Perhaps the article would be enhanced by the use of a position at sea, but the use of an abstract example does not detract from the validity of the technique.
The errors in the SHA and declination of Kochab are another matter. Commander Eyman is absolutely correct here, and I have searched all the earlier drafts of this article in an attempt to find where I derived these figures. My best guess is that I must have inadvertently picked up the Nautical Almanac for the wrong year. Yet I must admit I cannot find any year and date where the values I used are tabulated together. Except for the important fact these errors would cause a reader to have difficulty in following the steps in the article, if this reader went to the effort to find and consult a 1969 Nautical Almanac, their total effect on the problem of determining latitude by the method described should be considered. My blunder in extracting the SHA as 137° 17.2' instead of the correct 137° 18.0' would make no significant difference whatsoever in the time a navigator should look for the body, Kochab, on the meridian. Unfortunately the error in declination could have a more serious effect. The latitude determined would be off 2.7 miles because of the error.
In the next paragraph Commander Eyman says, "The article should be labeled an approximate method.” I do not
Warren Norville—As for Commander Eyman’s statement that the position in the solution is "an unlikely position for either marine or aerial navigation,” all
"Command and Control: Changeless—Yet Changing
(See D. T. Poe, pp. 22-31, October 1974 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Donald T. Poe, U. S. Navy—In June 1974, just before the Cyprus crisis, I reported to my current duty as the Director, Communi- cations-Electronics on the staff of the U. S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe, the unified commander for this theater. During this crisis, I was thus a very busy staff officer, supporting the commander- in-chief in a full-fledged and relatively high-order contingency operation.
[4] was also an interested observer of the role of the commander-in-chief as it was played. Obviously, my academic interest centered on comparing the role and its play with one of the premises of my Proceedings article—that the role in today’s world should be modified. I believe my article and its proposals remain valid. However, during the Cyprus situation, this unified command played a vital role in insuring unity of effort among the players provided by the Army, Navy, and Air Force component commanders.
The unified commander was able to stay ahead of the situation because he had the systems and orientation to perceive the developments and to determine what requirements were apt to