Comment and Discussion

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, ^ 'S'ROTc

supporters at the hands of

°ud.

tjj_e Nevertheless, I must agree that tide ^ ^sh°uld have found a way to _Ca °^ut the storm and remain on those ^stfe u^SCS ^ ^mtght have involved some (J_err]. ^lnS of the rules, requiring aca- ttin'^{C reco}S^nit‘on for NROTC staff or kt^lrnUrn ^es for graduating classes, j^^{lt w}°uld have been worth it. th_at ^3r|' military people failed to realize ^{CSe ma}i°r universities are not

b,

supporting one philosophy

were negotiable but NROTC bodv^ ^^Cave the campus over his dead

^JHd ,^^ncentration of wealth, power, ^ard chargers” at the eight ^Slties involved. Currently, 122

^fficers for the 1980s:

^A Challenge for NROTC”

n                 Soper, pp. 40-47, February 1975

hidings)

riDwight L. Gertz, U. S. Naval ^-Captain Soper has taken what _t; ^Uridoubtedly be an unpopular posi- l_0$t^{As a} student at a university that the *k ^{[1] [2]}'^IRotc program, I can remember W \ ^{USe w}h*ch was patiently endured 'rtsistent, and often irrational able ^atthg^r°unds where every conceiv for j^VlewP°int has to stand up and fight s_Up ^tSelf- Nrotc personnel and their ’■t'hile^{rtCfS t0}° °h^en stood meekly by sh_0u opposing elements paraded and School ^reh^e£i ^on the protection of Only ^ ^ministrations which were really sti_rri^^eutraI at best. It would have been na_Vai ®“ ^an embattled professor of 'hat ,^Science had stood up to announce

V_0ui_d ^tai S ^were neonrinhle but NROTC ¹

think that a dedicated effort to W_etl ^tllese NROTC units would have O^rthwhile because of the tremen- members of Congress hold degrees from these institutions. The concentration of young men and women from these universities who quickly enter the na­tion’s elite circles is impressive. The value of having the military insistently poke its nose into these institutions might not be in the numbers of officers recruited, but in the "lobbying” done. Sympathetic viewpoints toward the military could hopefully be generated if future leaders of civilian institutions find at least a small number of their friends engaged in military training and willing to answer the critics of our defense posture.

education, admissions standards, and the quality of students admitted to NROTC seems to have Captain Soper foundering in water too deep even for a deep-draft skipper. I am confident that his faculty colleagues at the University of Pennsyl­vania will assure him that it has not been true "throughout most of our history” that academic policies were made by "duly appointed adminis­trators.” I believe that the records would show that in almost all cases NROTC course offerings were faculty approved. Credit is not granted by administrators without faculty approval. I will certainly acknowledge that many faculties had not paid enough attention to the con­tent and quality of ROTC offerings, but let there be no misunderstanding about their general authority to do so.

A Navy captain and professor of naval science who can make the un­qualified and unsubstantiated charge that "the quality of the undergraduate education in the new ROTC schools is not equal to that of the schools lost” is really in deep water—as is the editor who would let the statement ride. Hav­ing served as a member of the teaching faculty and an administrator in both a prestigious university and a small liberal

ENTER THE FORUM

Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publi­cation in these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged. The U. S. Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion published in the Proceedings.

tta^£

the loss of a few units at the

Referring again to the alleged quality of the eight recently est;

inr

ablis'

ih^ CO Uⁿ'

Academy and the State University.^ New York Maritime College. ^'^urn^_j(j

ships, these superships, operating

officers of a caliber as high as th^^ Furthermore, the merchant °®^cer^ _t[ic

:11^st

m^ofC

meeting this challenge. There ^[3] . _}i

iiiuuvauuu lur uic aca - u t potential at these specialized sen .

arts college, I must admit that I have some serious questions how one meas­ures the quality of undergraduate educa­tion. It certainly is not appropriate to measure the quality of the process and results by the measured quality (SAT/ACT scores) of the raw material. The "qualifications” of the faculty may be considered, but then one must look at the actual instructors of the courses in which the average undergraduate is enrolled—an experienced teacher, or a first year graduate student. (Having been one of the latter, I know that I received better instruction in a small undergraduate college than I produced during my first two or three years as a teaching graduate student in a pres­tigious university with ROTC affilia­tions.) Unfortunately, there are no easy ways to measure outcome. The Navy must do that in a continuing process of honest evaluation of those who enter the system through not just the new NROTC schools, but through each and every producing unit.

Let there be no doubt but that some institutions are able to attract generally better qualified students to the under­graduate programs. There is equally no doubt but that almost any accredited four-year institution has some students as well qualified as those at the more prestigious institutions. That there can be a measurement of quality by geo­graphic location is fallacious and an inappropriate comment.

Lastly, I am confident that Captain Soper, more than most naval officers, would be aware of the extensive study, now in its final stages, of NROTC. I, for one, would have hoped that he might have waited for the results of that study and its probable recommendations be­fore letting his obvious and proper con­cern for the qualifications of the naval officer of the future get ahead of his own good sense.

list of our NROTC colleges. Nevertheless, in my opinion, Captain Soper places en­tirely too much emphasis on the impor­tance of these institutions with their high college-board score students. He also disturbs me by implying that the NROTC units dropped from the so-called high quality institutions have been re­placed by units of significantly lower quality or second-rate colleges.

I certainly concur that the well-being of our Navy is largely dependent upon the quality of the officer corps and, hence, the Navy has a huge stake in enticing adequate numbers of smart and highly motivated leaders to become career naval officers. At the entry stage we can sel­dom measure motivation or leadership potential, so we grasp for brains hoping the other desired qualities will surface later. Still, both my experience and read­ing indicate that there is not a substan­tial, valid correlation between the col­lege-board scores/high school marks and success in the Navy measured by any standard. I suspect that a study would show that the preponderance of those naval officers judged successful are from the B student category.

Looking toward the future, it’s true that advancing technology will demand smarter people, but the equipment to be operated in the fleet, for the most part, must be serviced by enlisted ratings with specialized training, many of whom do not have a college-board score on record. Hence, I question the em­phasis on Ivy League college NROTC units, unless we’re prepared to strengthen the remaining links in the chain in a similar manner.

The Navy can control the academic standards of NROTC scholarship awards and for practical considerations it is nec­essary that units be maintained at a variety of colleges that offer a range of

choices to both the student and ¹ Navy. Even in the selection of col program students, and the subset selection of a number of this ^citcf_n(. of students for a scholarship ^aPP° .

1 nVvi

ment, the Navy has full control enrollees. I submit that the real ^c lenge to the Navy is to interest of our nation’s youth in the ^ through the NROTC program and ^r

• is ^u

tionally prestigious institutions minor relative significance.

NROTC units, I feel compelled to ter that allegation with a claim th^at^ Navy actually gained ground in m^e£ future challenges by the establish**¹,^ of NROTC units at Maine M#¹⁰ t these fully accredited colleges ha'^e j and continue to have, noteworth) ^ successful careers in the merchant rine, Navy, and Coast Guard.

Because technology has create . equally challenging demand for ^8 skilled merchant marine officers ^t0 ate and maintain our modern met

-

a total crew of less than 30,           ⁴ by the Navy for its incoming

be practically trained to mai^nta)1\_ji)y ship and its equipment, duties performed by petty officers in the The maritime academies are sucee^sS than adequate brain power, as ujp motivation for the sea and lea _{0

-                                                -                                   ActO^

justify ranking the maritime aca

at the high end of a scale of best

for the location of NROTC units-

wthermore, there is a considerable *^Vln§ to the Navy by having the ^c units at our maritime academies.

the

first place, since all students at talc ^rnant'^me academies are required to ^ ^{e [}he naval science programs, the _0n^avY Personnel for the units are already stV^ ^CamP^uses- Also, since these are . ^e schools, the tuition costs are much

lOtypr fL

^cnan at the private colleges they sch^aCe^ Penally, included in these _v | ^{0 s} programs are opportunities for _c , ^{6 sea tf}aining on board the acad- sav' ^tra*ⁿ‘ⁿg ships, which is another ^a8 for the Navy.

our

Lieutenant Lester R. LaBrecque, U. S. Navy—The weakening of the NROTC program during the past decade has not diminished our responsibility to provide top quality people for the officer pro­grams. Not every motivated individual can attend the Naval Academy or obtain a NROTC scholarship, but in view of the problem areas that Captain Soper men­tions, Officer Candidate School (OCS) can provide an alternative that may be­come increasingly attractive "in house”

For the individual considering a naval career, the OCS route might be looked upon as the "least painful” means to earn a commission. Even though the officer candidate does not receive four years of military training or a free edu­cation, OCS provides an intensive pro­gram designed to equip the individual with the tools to be an effective division officer. If performance, and not source of commission, is to be the gauge for promotion, then the OCS graduate who

^hile

I cannot speak for the other

(^1° ^tfi^e eight newer NROTC units, I I, confident that each in its own way of k ⁶ P^otential to meet certain needs the ^{6 Kav}y- ^ Navy fails to attract ties' ⁿ^^rn^^)er °f high quality students ^ ^w'^rhin the present spectrum of

tveli ,^C P^rograms, then we could very _r “ have

problems ahead, but in my \^0t~~ °P*ⁿ'on the recent changes in ^c units will not contribute signifi

^Urnbl_e

i

if at all, to creating such prob-

^canth

^lems for the

Navy.

0,$ \?^an Second Class R. J. Norton, ^Ot ^UVa^ ^^esene’ Tulane University te_rrn ^C The author states that the a_dve‘^nation of the military draft has Sup^fSe y effected the NROTC program.

the Navy has lost the pres­sed ^many males who formerly joined A_rm^remair>ed in the program to avoid i_ncr/^service.

leer Candidate School—possible answer to NROTC problems

case i

makes the Navy a career is on an equal footing with his contemporaries. OCS should not be looked upon as a replace­ment for the NROTC program but, rather, as a means to augment it.

as well as to the prospective naval officer. Those elements that should make OCS attractive to the present naval commu­nity include:

►                   The potential to expand or contract as the needs of the Navy dictate.

►                   Graduating classes joining the officer corps at six-week intervals, as opposed to the annual "ensign deluge” from NROTC and the Naval Academy.

►                   Officer candidates that have all com­pleted bachelor programs and, in some cases, master programs—a savings of both time and money during a career pattern.

►                   An officer input from those top universities that may not have NROTC units.

►                   Naval control over programs of in­struction, periodic updating, and in­structor staffs.

►                   Limited retention-until-commissioning problems.

►                   An economic savings—training an individual at OCS is substantially less than the cost of a NROTC scholarship.

Captain Soper points to :

voluntary disenrollments and f^{nS t}^^le ^^{act c}h^{at [}h^e only incen- th_Cf ^{0r enr}olling in NROTC today are tunj.^0Ur'ye^ar scholarship and the oppor- officer ^{t0 Serve as 3 nava}l ^or marine q_Ua)i^ ^ⁿd as a result, less of the "best ^ ^aPply for the scholarships and ttien ₀f ^C^^asses contain more midship- Us^jj j rnferior qualifications. An un- Us_ecj .°8^IC system appears to have been sta_tj ^ln deriving this conclusion. No that k P^roof is offered to demonstrate qUan ^ere has been a decline in the

that u °f applicants. It would also seem tho

ritloa

in

^arsbip_s °^{se st}udents who find the schol- ^an^ the opportunities to serve ^s in the Navy or Marine Corps

'it..''¹'' wicencives of NROTC display a

N_t0

motivation than avoid the draft.

those who

Lieutenant Dan Caldwell, U. S. Naval Reserve—As a graduate of one of the NROTC programs to which Captain Soper refers, 1 am sympathetic with many of the points that he raises. In particular, I agree that a newly struc­tured program for those students who are qualified to attend the prestigious schools (Harvard, Yale, Stanford, Tufts, Brown, etc.) is needed. There are two existing programs that have the potential for allowing midshipmen to attend universities without NROTC units.

The "Platoon Leader’s Class” (PLC) of the Marine Corps and the Reserve Officer Candidate (ROC) program of the Navy involve a student commitment of

two summer training camps. In return, the student receives a commission upon graduation. A newly structured NROTC program could be built upon the foun­dations of these two existing programs.

The questions of academic credit, professorial ranking of NROTC instruc­tors, and the "privileged position” of the military on campus, objections that played such an important role in the ROTC debates of the late Sixties, would have little applicability to the new PLC/ROC program. Such a program would be a simple, inexpensive means of allowing some of the brightest mid­shipmen to attend colleges and universities that do not have NROTC programs. There are several advantages of this program. First, the Navy will benefit by having its future officers edu­cated at some of the best colleges in the country while improving its represen­tation to the civilian community through student midshipmen. Second, the stu­dent midshipmen will certainly benefit from their education and exposure to the society that they are commissioned with protecting. Finally, universities will benefit from financial payments made to them for the tuition of mid­shipmen and by the diversity that mid­shipmen in the student body provide. In short, this program would accom­plish many of the goals discussed by Captain Soper.

Navy is alive and kicking at the Naval Academy.

deemphasis of purely naval subjects.

Of the 144 semester hours comprising the Naval Academy curriculum, the non-engineering major will devote 38% of his class-time to naval subjects, while an engineering major will devote at least 22% of his class-time to naval subjects. I do not feel that these figures justify an interpretation of deemphasis in naval subjects at the Naval Academy; quite the contrary, Navy is alive and kicking at USNA.

wha^[

the

Captain Soper points out NROTC lacks, and what it needs to

Commander P. L. Godefroy, U. S. Navy, Chairman of the Professional Education Committee, U. S. Naval Academy— Captain Soper should be complimented for a very perceptive and thought- provoking article. I sincerely hope that it achieves the intended effect of bring­ing about needed changes to the NROTC program.

I am, however, concerned that some readers may gain an incorrect impression of the Naval Academy curriculum rela­tive to naval subjects. Captain Soper states, "the deemphasis of purely naval subjects and improved academic reputa­tion have raised the academic quality of the student body (at USNA) signifi­cantly.” I concur that the academic quality of the student body has increased significantly. However, I do not concur that it has been at the expense of a

John Tuttle—Captain Soper brings to light some major problems with the NROTC, along with his possible reme­dies. Unfortunately, he never develops the problem associated with complex modern technology which threatens to continue to cause training programs difficulty in providing capable officers.

With the technological advancements increasing every year, it should be obvi­ous that the days of the accomplished generalist are numbered. The operation and maintenance of ships’ systems will become even more sophisticated than at present. This will call for more officers with technical backgrounds.

Perhaps we could learn a lesson from the Europeans or our own merchant marine. By training officers to operate in a given speciality for their careers, they will become more adapt in their chosen field. How many fresh NROTC or Academy graduates could take charge of an underway watch? It is common for 3rd mates or engineers fresh from a maritime school to handle such a task. Businesses learned long ago that speciali­zation improves an organization’s per­formance.

ir over

tract quality officer candidates. By

g

cers of the future may find it imp°^{sS 1}    - nafl^£C

looking what is fast becoming

problem for the Navy, the young

iblt

to achieve the levels of perfotn¹^ required to meet the Navy’s e⁰¹¹¹ ments.

Lieutenant Commander Bernard V-

•xt$

U. S. Navy, Prospective Auburn U»^!t: ,_{

NROTC Instructor—Captain Soper ^ ₀, is a welcome end to a long droug

discussion of officer commiss*⁰^

i of

sources, particularly in the area o- ^ Academy versus NROTC graduate^

elude ¹

hopes a future article will m cussion and comparison of ^oCS

commissioning source.

ion⁵

Despite some broad g^enera^^z3|j₀iiS and a few questionable assumP ^ Captain Soper’s perceptive and g⁶⁰ _£|. excellent article contained a well ,

oped and complete discussion officer retention problem. In sugg

of*

•estn

that it "is the active duty that is demotivating” to the newly

J

missioned officer, the author strik

the heart of the problem. The not attract and retain a highly officer corps through monetary ^ alone, or by establishing NROT^c

1#

tie⁵-

at Barron’s "top twenty”

What is required is a meaningful ^

in operating units. While this *^rtl ’ ,o doubt, will be of immediate       ₍jjC

those directly concerned with

NROTC program, it is more

imp¹

i₀r^t3

,li«*

that it be carefully read, and the imP ^ tions of Captain Soper’s argum^en considered by career naval offi^celS

Spirit vs. Morale in the Modern Navy

^mmander Robert E. May, U. S. Navy Wired)-Spirit is positive; morale is ^negative; spirit motivates. Morale is im­portant ^t0 people who lead purposeless ^es’ ^ln the negative sense that lack of ^m°rale is a deadener. Where spirit pre­^Vails *ⁿ the individual feelings of pur- P°^se and achievement, there is little ^need to worry about morale.

Spirit and morale are as different as ^|ght and day. Spirit should be thought ^as a motivator, spurring a person to ^lngs of achievement, responsibility, ^^rsonal growth, and love of the Navy. _to^0r^ on the other hand, boils down correction of dissatisfiers: better lib- f 7 hours, more bunk and locker space, ^ler>dliness, pay and fringe benefits. If th°^rale factors are not properly handled, ^can lead to dissatisfaction, but only ,_ac,^crc there is lack of spirit or a gross °f concern for morale factors, u often said that morale is auto- a_re *^C *ⁿ °®^cer corps because officers ₀g. ^Se“-rnotivated. This is very true; an ^cer comes out of midshipman school

steeped in Navy customs and traditions, motivated by the history of great Navy men and deeds. Once at sea or other duty the new officer is frequently ex­posed to demotivators in the form of seemingly purposeless duties and ad­ministrations. Those who received lower levels of Navy motivation at schools are first to give up and leave. A naval officer education which emphasizes motivation as well as technical knowledge is the base for a strong officer corps.

The thesis of my essay is not the competition between spirit and morale, but rather their complementary natures. Both are important in the modern Navy. Disregard of either is invitation to failure. The naval establishment needs to look after morale factors, and also to build spirit by making people believe in Navy purpose, achievement, and success. If every man believes he serves in the best damned Navy in the world, on the best damned ship in the Navy, in the best damned division on the ship, and that he is doing the best damned job there is, then there will be much more room for poor morale factors, but not limitless. Both sides are important and if they complement each other well, the sky is the limit.

Spirit flows from the challenge of the job through such factors as achieve­ment, responsibility, growth, advance­ment, work itself, and earned recogni­tion. Morale, on the other hand, tends to result from factors peripheral to the job; the environment or working condi­tions or fringe benefits. It is possible to quantify and budget the cost of morale factors. Not so with illusive spirit which comes so inexpensively to the gifted leader.

Dictionary of , Scientific and Technical Terms

The reader who opens this unique dictionary to any page, looks up the definition of any scientific or technical term in any field, compares the volume's scope with that of any other dictionary he or she is using, will quickly agree that it is the world's most comprehensive single-volume reference for scientists, engineers, technicians, managers, and writers working in any of the 100 separate scientific and technological areas encompassed by the work.

The definitions are wide in scope, meticulously accurate, and current. This is the first dictionary of its kind to provide instantly each definition within the context of the field wherein it has its prime use. The field is identified and the definition follows—clear, simple, succinct—usually in no more than three lines, as it is used in the field. Throughout, synonyms, acronyms, and abbrevia­tions are shown and cross-referenced. When more than one definition is given for a term in a field, each definition is numbered.

The illustrations and diagrams are carefully selected and amplify the definitions. Beautifully photographed or drawn, they are clear, detailed, and apt. Especially useful is the information included in the appendix. There are conversion tables from U. S. Customary to International System for measurement units used in science and technology; symbols used in architecture, biology, business, chemis­try, communications, computers, crystal structure, and meteorology; symbols in circuit diagrams, abbreviations for scientific and technical organizations; and a list of chemical elements.

Covering every major field of science, engineering, industry, and commerce, the Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms will reduce research time for everyone dealing with scientific or technological material. This volume is bound to become the classic reference in its field.

1974. 1,634 pages. Almost 100,000 definitions. 2,800 illustrations. Appendix. List price: $39.00. Member’s price: $27.30.

It would be incorrect to state that spirit and morale are so complementary in nature that there is no cross-over between them. Consider the motivators; achievement and recognition. Their op­posites are failure and unfairness, which would rightly be considered demoraliz­ing factors. Clear separation of these opposites can only be accepted if the concept of spirit is limited to its positive sense, and that of morale to its negative sense. Such a concept would be unfair to the positive nature of morale. My thesis is that morale is good and neces­sary, and since the Navy is at present

signed to it. Each ASRT is capai

controlling radar-guided bombing ^ sions performed by aircraft fly*ⁿS _£ altitudes well outside the BGW enve °P

United States Naval Institute Annapolis, Maryland 21402

1975

weapons (BGW) environment: (1) zation of a smart aircraft such 2^s A-7E to deliver ordnance from ^oUtSl^ the BGW envelope and (2) employ¹¹^ of guided ordnance to provide an ^ ceptable standoff range. Both opt* are expensive.                    .

Another option, which Mr. «¹ ^ did not mention, is the Air S^UPP -_t Radar Team (ASRT). Each Marine ^ Support Squadron has three ASR^ts

dar

in)

drops, and positioning attack (guided) weapons delivery. The -_s

overly morale conscious, it is time to recognize and reemphasize the impor­tance of building spirit. At least in our search for better morale we should be careful to avoid those morale builders which are also demotivators and tend to break down spirit. Not all of our recent innovations will pass this vital test.

One way to gauge a man would be to weigh his concern for motivation against his concern for environment. It is not hard to recognize a highly mo­tivated individual. He thinks and talks clearly in respect to goals and objectives, and what is important. The morale- oriented individual can also be recog­nized through his preoccupation with liberty hours, pay, fringe benefits, work­ing conditions, status, policy, adminis­tration, and the qualities of his fellow shipmates. He is very little concerned with how well he is doing his job, or how important his ship is to the Navy; what interests him is the quality of his next beer. Once the man is so gauged, it is difficult to change the balance be­tween spirit and morale. However, place a morale-oriented man in an environ­ment of achievement, responsibility, growth, and earned recognition, and he will tend to behave like the others and become a spirited individual. On the other hand, if you place a spirited man in a demotivational environment, he will tend to become preoccupied with morale factors. Such is human nature.

The first task towards building spirit

MAIL TO:

is to identify what is to be achieved, not just for the man but also for his divi­sion, his ship, his fleet, his Navy, and his country. What the individual is to achieve is of course most basic to the desired results, and most difficult to identify. The work itself must become important to the individual, regardless of how menial it may appear to be. The best identification of what is to be achieved must be both believable and challenging to the individual involved. It is at this point that the average leader gives up and works instead on the mo­rale problem.

One unfortunate truth about devel­oping spirit is that motivational factors must be passed down the line. Each man looks to his immediate superior for guidance, and if that influence is nega­tive it will offset or destroy the good of higher level leadership. It is, there­fore, important to look at all links in the Navy chain of command. Perhaps the weakest link in the chain lies with senior enlisted personnel. These men are promoted in the Navy under the most difficult environmental conditions with frequently very low motivational factors. They have been taught for years to square their hat and fall in line. They often don’t know why they are doing something, but they know that they have to do it. "Ours not to reason why, ours but to do and die”; "There’s no reason for it; it’s just our policy.” Many platitudes have told them over the years that spirit and inner motivation ^itC unnecessary. Yet these are the very me" who must accept and understand ^[^^c concepts of achievement, responsibibff personal growth, and love of Navy ⁵⁰ that they can pass them on to the ®^cn who report to them. This can be ³ difficult task for a man who perh^aP^s believes he has reached his limit of sonal growth and has been most e posed to demotivational factors.

I find most perplexing is that if ^ thesis and the situation just descrin are even just generally true, the recen* change in enlisted men’s uniforms ten to tug even harder at the weak link ^1,1 the chain of Navy spirit. Have all '^e'^ej of the Navy forgotten about spirit an motivation in their search for mora ■

"Battlefield Guided Weapon* The Big Equalizer”

(See P. A. Wilson, pp. 18-25, February

Proceedings)

Second Lieutenant James E. Pons, ^ Marine Corps, Air Support Control OJjV Marine Air Support Squadron Two" Wilson gives the air support common^ two options in a battlefield g^ul ,j.

the ide ,e»^l

,ble

im⁵'

The ASRT employs the AN/TPQ-^{10 ra}^

(the TPQ-27 will be operational ^s°°

and can control any type aircraft

ing any type of the less expensive ^

falling ordnance. In addition ro

primary mission of radar bombing’ ^

ASRT can be utilized for helicopter P^

tioning, controlling paradrops and ³

• -jtt ■*

—r->         r------------ e “          ₍ pgci

the optimum pushover point tor ^sr

is extremely accurate, flexible, an¹ combat proven.

^Caonot

imagine a better combination of

Vrs!

^miral ult

Potv,

fail ^KinS- Of course, he had his ^ts> but think of his intellectual ,^{er an}d the manner in which it was ¹ important matters!

Vs

^'ⁿg of the Oceans”

H. Sanders, pp. 52-59, August 1974;

' • Tate, G. C. Dyer, and E. B. Potter,

P- 75-77_j April 1975; G. Van Deurs, p. 82, ^Une 1975, Proceedings')

Admiral Marc Mitscher:

Naval Aviator”

^A' Burke, pp. 53-63, April 1975

Admiral Henry E. Eccles, U. S. Navy — A_{t a} time when political- ^tary matters are so confused in the ^lc mind and concepts of manage- ^t rather than concepts of command j. to be prominent in the military the King and Mitscher arti- _t ..P^rovid^e a unique perspective on the ties of command in times of overt "Vy conflict.

kn ^lt" ^t^^{le exce}ption of one man, I of k' ^{and at one r}'^me served with all ^{1 e} rnembers of King’s 1941 staff. I , tupetent professionals, nor better ^ship than was provided them by

\ji_t            I never knew Admiral

trunk' ’ ^tf‘^erc is ^no doubt that the , ^mati°n of Mitscher and Arleigh aiu ^C’ ^{and t}f^|e f^nai development of djj ,.^{a res}pect and affection again ex- c_0[f^{1 es} professional leadership and l_ericf^tence- While technological excel- p_rof ^{ls nec}essary, the development of ^essi°nal competence, leadership, and i ^al trust in command always must Vinant.

^e Big Ten: Our Trident ^lssile Submarine Class”

&e ft .

Mat; *^^aP ^an> P 75, January 1974; T. ^tln, p. 99_> j_une ^974 Proceedings)

^ennis m

^/Va- Greene—As a 20-year re- lj <, ^er °f the origins and histories of l^_a k^al vessels’ names, I read Mr. gc_St- ^{n s an}d Commander Martin’s sug- ^t'atn°^nS ^°^{r r}^^e Trident class submarine ^Wlth great interest. Although th_ese^Cr mentioned it, I believe both 'Ben implied that personal and city have been grossly overused in

recent decades and that a new and dis­tinct category is in order. I agree.

Mr. Kaplan and Commander Martin certainly suggested interesting names, however I would like to propose that only previously used names be consid­ered—this applies to 15 of their 20 rec­ommendations. If a specific era of naval names should be desired for per­petuation, then the World War I lists contain some courageous and challeng­ing names. There were tugs and mine- sweeps named Challenge, Dreadnaught, Fearless, Nonpareil, Peerless, Protector, Reso­lute, and Undaunted. There were motor patrol boats named Alert, Commander, Guard, Nemesis, Qui Vive, Sentinel, Vence- dor, and Volunteer. Although not endless, a much longer listing could be com­piled from which ten appropriate names could be selected. Mr. Kaplan and Com­mander Martin raised the issue, now let’s hope for action.

"Admiral Lord Cochrane: A Hero for Today’s Professionals”

(See F. C. Lynch, pp. 63-73, February 1975 Proceedings)

Commodore Marcos G. Simpsas, Hellenic Navy (Retired), Naval Historian—I have been truly impressed with Captain Lynch’s interesting biography of Admi­ral Cochrane. As far as the relations between Admiral Cochrane and Greece are concerned (page 73, first column), I do think that a few more facts should be added in order to enable us to come closer to the historical truth.

The Hellenic National Assembly in­vited Admiral Cochrane to Greece in 1827 and agreed to pay him £ 57,000, of which he was given a prepayment of £ 37,000. Cochrane arrived in Greece on 29 March 1827, and was accorded the greatest possible honors. He assumed the command of the Hellenic Fleet, which until then had enjoyed numerous naval victories. This fleet however was guided by him from one failure to another—his attack against Alexandria in June 1827, his operations at Misso- loghi in September of the same year, and at the island of Chios. Admiral Coch­rane was not able to perceive the peculi­arity of the battles and to govern them accordingly. On 29 December, he re­turned to England where he remained under various pretenses for eight months, only to return to Greece to collect the remainder of his fee.

French Admiral Jurien de la Graviere says in his book, The Struggle of the Greek Independence, that "Greece had Miaulis, Kanaris, Sachturis, sailors such as only few centuries have produced and they were expecting the salvation from the coming of Cochrane . . .” All for­eign and Greek historians agree on Cochrane’s failure in commanding the Hellenic Fleet. Greece has never placed Admiral Cochrane among it’s heroes, as it greatfully did with a great deal of others—Americans, British, Italians, and French. Nowhere in the Hellenic rec-

when introducing a relatively new of main propulsion. However, it

0°“

Co*⁵'

ords can be found an order or some mention, which will show that a full pension was given to Cochrane by the Hellenic Government. This by the way is natural, because he already had had his full fee, which was more than too much!

Captain Noman C. Venzke, U. S. Coast Guard, Commanding Officer, USCGC Polar Star (WAGB-io) Precommissioning Detail— Captain Goldman is to be complimented on his article. The marine gas turbine is certainly a most versatile power plant which we will see employed increasingly in the future. The Coast Guard has been intimately involved in gas turbine tech­nology for some years. The most recent development in this area is the new icebreaker Polar Star (WAGB-io) which will have a combined diesel or gas tur­bine (CODOG) main propulsion plant. Her three controllable pitch propellers will be driven by either a diesel AC/DC plant, which develops 18,000 shaft horsepower, or a gas turbine plant capa­ble of developing 60,000 shaft horse­power continuously with an inter­mittent boost capability of up to 75,000 shaft horsepower.

Polar Star is the fourth class of Coast Guard cutters to be involved in the realm of gas turbines. The Coast Guard’s first experience with this mode of propulsion dates to 1961 when USCGC Point Thatcher (WPB-82314), an 82-foot patrol boat, became operational. She was powered by two 1,000 horsepower gas turbines. The next evolution in gas turbine propulsion involved the 210-foot medium endurance cutter USCGC Reli­ance (WMEC-615) which was the first U. S. ship to be powered by a combined diesel and gas turbine (CODAG) installa­tion. Each of her two controllable pitch propellers were driven by a 1,500 horse­power diesel engine and/or a 1,000 horsepower gas turbine. (Commander, now Captain, Tighe’s article provides a detailed description of the Reliance.)

In 1965, the most successful Hamilton class arrived on the scene. In his infor­mative article, Captain Oliver aptly re­ferred to USCGC Hamilton (WHEC-715) as the "Coast Guard Ship of the Future.” The Hamilton class is powered by two 3,500 horsepower diesel engines and two gas turbines, constituting a CODOG plant which is geared to two control­lable pitch propellers. The combination provides "long-legged” cruising at speeds up to 20 knots under diesel power with a 29-knot sprint capability under gas turbine power. Since the Hamilton’s commissioning, she alone has accumulated more than eight years of operational experience with the CODOG plant. Her class has participated in a wide range of activities including com­bat duty off Vietnam, joint Navy-Coast Guard exercises, as well as traditional Coast Guard duties. The record of this class of high endurance cutter is impres­sive.

As Captain Goldman noted, one must expect considerable problems

appear logical to assume that the Guard’s extensive experience with '5 turbines is transferrable despite 0^aC ery differences.

"Television and the War: The Small Picture”

(See Lieutenant Commander K. C. pp. 54-60, March 1975; Colonel B. ^1S pp. 82-83, June 1975 Proceedings)

Victor IV. Paredes—Commander J^a j sen’s piece was a very narrow ^V1 ^ a real and frightening problen^jje unrestrained power of the media- ₅

the commander made some good P° ^

about the limitations of tclevisio^^ the technical sense, he did not ^ that area completely. The P^r0^^C^ of Vietnam reporting was the ^attltU^_ffnS the reporters and news gathering

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As

^an Army company commander U967-197Q) I witnessed first-hand the ported coverage that the American ^m*litary received in Vietnam.

* think those of us in the military ^ttst realize that the self image of the tt'porter has changed; he no longer tries ⁰ 'nform, he educates. Using the power ^e|ectronic journalism he consciously ^{Sets 0u}t to use his job to change society i° reflect his political and philosophical , ^ets- As long as we refuse to recognize ^at fact we will continue to be his ^Vl«ims.

has been said that the last refuge ^a rnili_tary man is to wrap himself in e flag * When criticized, the media ^^e°ple have a different recourse. They ^raP themselves in the First Amend- I^his tactic is weak and must no ^ger be permitted. We must not only tnand integrity from ourselves, but ^So from the journalists.

^’^r Warfare’s Adolescent Years ¹⁹ⁱ4-1918”

p * W. Emmott, pp. 61-69, March 1975

P. P D-

^ ' ‘f’ggar—Royal Flying Corps (RFC) jy113 tons 34 and 52 shared the Bray ^^unes field with Royal Naval Air _t0ri (RNAS) Sopwith "Pup” Squad- 1- , °- 51. We tactical men learned to . ^t0 the "Pups” for help when _to We flew R.E. 8s, which tended ^Se their wings at about 105 mph.

su^^tUrn> ^we kept a watchful eye for ''keb ^at*^nes °ff Westende Bains, near _t^^ugg^e, though just how one identi-

din ^t^^c many things our instructors ⁿ°r know.

^ Johnson wrote in 1775 "Patriotism is thi *ge of a scoundrel.”

Walter C. Hadley—\ enjoyed Mr. Emmott’s story about the World War I aircraft and agree entirely that they did a good deal of growing up in a very short time, and, of course, they flew a good deal better than they looked.

One point he did not mention, though, was the fact that they were built in incredible numbers. (Well over

100.0          aircraft were built for all the combatants during World War I.) Over

4.0                of the R.E. 8s, nearly 8,500 of the various models of the Avro 504, over

2.0           of the BE 2Cs, and close to 2,000 of the Voisin 10s were delivered. In addition, the Handley-Page shown on

page 66 looks like the Model 400 which could not only carry a 1,600 pound bomb, but also had folding wings. I don’t know how many of the Model 400s were built, but there were several versions of the Nieuport and their numbers must have run well into the thousands. There were even 100 of the F. 2As, but not many of the big Handley Page V-1500S.

"An Act of Faith and Hope”

(See D. Bess, pp. 43-49, March 1975 Proceedings)

Captain Albert T. Church, Jr., U. S. Navy (Retired), American Institute of Merchant Shipping—I would not in any way re­fute from a factual point of view Dr. Bess’ excellent analysis of the Merchant Marine Act of 1970 and its promises. However, one less informed than Dr. Bess could draw inaccurate conclusions from the article. For example, Dr. Bess states that ". . . in spite of the 1936 Act . . . the long-run downward trend in the U. S. merchant fleet continued,” however, this applies to the overall fleet, cargo liner and bulk carrier. Dr. Bess points out elsewhere that the 1936 Act was a liner act and that the 1970 Act extends benefits to the bulk carriers. Actually, the results of the 1936 Act have given the United States the fastest, most modern and efficient liner fleet in the world. In addition to the U. S. inno­vation of the container evolution (some call it revolution), including Sealand’s 33-knot SL-7S (foreign built), Prudential, Delta, and Pacific Far East Lines operate other modern new LASH barge ships, and Lykes "Sea-bee” barge ships are per­haps the most productive ships in the world for their service. Other U. S. flag subsidized operators also operate modern ships designed for their particular routes and services. This has not been a "downward” trend. This is by far the most elite liner fleet in the world!

Unfortunately, as Dr. Bess points out, the liner fleet carries a lower per­centage of U. S. export-imports cargo by tonnage and by value, than might be desired. This, however, is not due to any deficiency in the 1936 Act. The situation stems back to the Merchant Marine Act of 1916. At that time the United States, with virtually no cargo liner fleet and anxious to have U. S. cargo carried at any price, wrote into law the sweetest and loveliest "white hat” rule about "open conferences” that exceeded the fondest dreams of our maritime competi­tors. No other nation followed suit then, and none has since. The result has been that all steamship conferences in the world, except those serving the United States, are "closed conferences.” When the closed conferences become over-tonnaged, they throw their excess tonnage into the U. S. trade, sometimes at cut-rates. In 1974, at the United Na­tions Committee for Trade and Devel­opment Convention on a Code of Con­duct for Liner Conferences, a U. S. proposal that liner conferences be "open” was supported by only one of the one hundred or so nations present at the convention—Switzerland.

So, thanks to the 1936 Act, and de­spite the 1916 Act, the U. S. liner fleet is the finest in the world. Perhaps the 1970 Act will satisfy Dr. Bess’ "hope” for the bulk carrier. Meanwhile, both bulk and liner trades would be helped by amending the Act of 1916!

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tion, and this writer believes that must, then merchant shipping also be escorted similarly. Otherwise

"The Nuclear Submarine: Riding High”

(See W. J. Ruhc, pp. 55-62, February 1975

Proceedings)

Captain R. A. Bowling, U. S. Navy (Re­tired)—Since Captain Ruhe quoted me, I feel compelled to comment.

Captain Ruhe’s main thesis is that two long-range submarine weapons, the wire-guided torpedo and the antiship missile, have made traditional ASW tac­tics for the protection of shipping inef­ficient and uneconomical, citing Mahan as an authority. There is no argument with the contention that there is a vital need for appreciable improvements in overall naval tactics to bring them out of the Neanderthal past and the Viet­nam War tactical development dol­drums. However, care must be taken, in the process of revising old and develop­ing new tactics, not to discard or ignore fundamental principles of war. Ruhe’s article commits that error by confusing the principle of convoy with tactics employed while convoying. As Mahan was particular to note, there is a defini­tive and significant difference between the principles of war and tactics:

"The battles of the past succeeded or failed according as they were fought in conformity with the principles of war; and the seaman who carefully studies the causes of success or failure will not only detect and gradually assimilate these principles, but will also acquire increased aptitude in applying them to the tactical use of the ships and weapons of his own day.”

The article implies that convoy is a tactic which is limited in its application to the weapon systems in use at any particular time—modern submarine weapons making it obsolete. On the contrary, convoy is a method or type of naval warfare based upon a cardinal principle of warfare: concentration of force at the decisive point. That is, in order for submarines to succeed in their antishipping mission against a convoy they must face a concentration of ASW forces. Thus, the principle of convoy is not solely dependent upon the weapons in use. However, the tactics used in the application of the principle definitely are influenced by weapons and technology. Therefore, convoy tactics must change with the ships and weapons of the times, but the principle of concentration of effort remains the same. As a result, the argument that convoy is no longer economical is invalid; for, given the choice between a basic principle of war and economics there can be no choice if violation of the former as an expedient favoring the latter would result in disas­ter or defeat.

And it is disaster that the article courts by suggesting as an alternative to the principle of convoy a tactic: acoustic deception. Aside from the fact that to substitute a tactic for a principle violates the science of naval warfare, to base a tactical scheme exclu­sively or primarily upon deception vio­lates the caveat of cover and deception (C&D) doctrine itself which warns that C&D should be used only as adjuncts to other plans, not as the primary basis for plans.

Ruhe speaks of the threat to the protection of shipping, but says nothing of the threat to naval units. However the threat is the same. Does this mean also that the answer is the same: reduced speed and dispersal for major fleet units? If so, the probable consequences could be more permanent than bankruptcy: suicide. Nevertheless, there is strong advocacy in some quarters to adopt just such a tactic proposed in the article for naval high-value targets. Appreciable time at sea has been spent on the con­cept of an aircraft carrier "tip-toeing” around at about eight knots, completely sans escorts, as a defense against sub­marines. Great claims have been made for the number of hours the CVS went without detection; little emphasis has been directed to the absolutely indefensi­ble position of the carrier when sub­marines did gain contact. Hopefully, the dire consequences of eventual retribu­tion contained in such tactics will ^c°ⁿ vince people to never expose a ®*r fleet unit having as its primary or s° defense acoustic silence or deception a combat environment. Thus, if 1°1>^|C prevails, naval forces will continue sail in compact formations escorted 1 adequate AAW and ASW screening ^unlt* And what is best for high-value n³' units must apply to merchant shipP*ⁿ^ for, Mahan’s conclusion that cornm^ercC raiding is but a secondary naval tion has been seriously challenged by ^ nearly decisive results achieved by ‘ submarine version of the guerre de in both World War I and II. The th>^ time around, commerce destruct might very well be the decisive fa^cl0t Therefore, if it is determined that m^aJ

naval units still should be escortei the best means of AAW and ASW p^fl must, then merchant shipping also ru^

• A by

almost fatal strategic error commute

the Allies in World War I and II ⁿ°_£

affording merchant shipping the s ^

degree and priority of submarine p^r0 ^

tion as main fleet units will be repeal

he **

only next time there might not v second chance to reconsider and even ally revert to the "ancient practice convoy.”

William R. Walsh—\ read Captain ^ Ruhe’s article with interest, but wi sense of detachment. The article svas ^ informative discussion of a situati°ⁿ

, All

widespread, prolonged attacks by clear submarines upon our, or otn maritime trade—that seems unlikely^ occur. The Soviet submarine fleet f°^r ^ present is the only one we need to $ ^ against on a world-wide basis ^an^_t certainly our only likely nuclear . opponent. Use of this enormous,

^ern fleet against our or anyone else’s Jwde would indeed pose tremendous tfensive problems. However, such problems would be insignificant com­pared to the rest of the holocaust such ^an offensive commitment of the Soviet ^Underseas fleet would imply.

One can pose a situation in which ^ne Soviet submarines might be em­ployed in an announced blockade, leav­es the U. S. and others to take the first ^sreps in escalation toward a nuclear ex- ^ange. The obvious reply, if the situa- ^tl0n warranted, would be to escort the Merchantmen concerned with the clear Earning that any attacks would result ^ln certainly local and, perhaps, wider Retaliation. The next move would then . ^tbe Soviets. In any event the situa- ^tl0n would not lead to a prolonged ^c°ⁿfrontation on the sea lanes requiring j ^{e ste}ps considered by Captain Ruhe.

Would either be resolved relatively Slickly or would probably get out of ^ar>d. The risks would be enormous for ^both sides.

An even less likely scenario would be ^e covert use of Soviet submarines

against trade lanes. It is hard to imagine what objective could be attained by such means before the submarines would be identified. The appropriate response to such "piratical” attacks would again be escorting and setting a few traps by one’s own attack submarines. After pos­itive identification is made, one is back, I should think, to the first situation.

In the event a smaller naval power attempted to interrupt or attack our trade we would most likely be dealing with a more circumscribed theater of operations and the opponent would be known, or soon identified. Counter­measures would be escorts, attack sub­marines, and strikes upon and/or min­ing of the enemy’s shore bases. It seems unlikely that a smaller power, not at war, would deliberately and continually attack our trade, or that of any other power on the high seas. We have seen enough "volunteer forces” to have to consider the case of a larger nation’s submarine force being used as a surro­gate. Again, it is unlikely that accurate identification could long be postponed, particularly if one considers the use of nuclear submarines and sophisticated weapons systems which smaller powers do not have and would be unable to operate themselves.

After identification the risks of more general escalation are again encountered. This type of action would probably be geographically localized and the pressing threat would be attacks upon escorts or other naval forces standing by to protect the threatened trade, rather than the merchantmen themselves. In cases deal­ing with a smaller power, suitable naval vessels in lawful operations could pro­tect the merchantmen against all threats except for nuclear submarine attacks. The employment of nuclear submarines would likely constitute a trigger mecha­nism for a more serious conflict.

The problem of defending surface vessels against the nuclear attack sub­marine remains a daunting one. Never­theless, it is better to concentrate atten­tion on defending against the likely form such attack could take under cur­rently foreseeable circumstances, than to dissipate resources in trying to counter unlikely threats.