U. S. Naval Ship Design: Platforms vs. Payloads

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Soviet warships has inevitably generated concern ^ cause they appear to have more weapon launchers p ship than U. S. vessels have. It should be noted, h°^ ever, that the Soviet ships were designed to carry j missions different from our own. They appear to

Contemplating the severe constraints imposed by the new naval ship construction budget, the man who was in charge of the design of the Spruance, facing page, and is now responsible for the design of all U. S. Navy surface ships and submarines, knows which he will select in any choice between platform and payload, and he knows, too, that of the many sides to the modular payload question, the Spruance represents "one-sided tnodularity.”

Within the last seven years, U. S. Fleet units ha^vC been reduced by 49%. In June 1968, the U. S. had 976 ships in the active fleet, 484 of them warship^5. Today, the fleet totals 502 ships, and only 309 ^itC warships. Of these, 193 are surface combatants (inclu ing aircraft carriers). The latter figure will slowly ^lfl crease during the next few years as the number of ^nC ships joining the fleet exceeds the old ones retired.

By the mid-1980s (according to current plans)> nearly 75% of the surface warship fleet will comp^rlS<j five new classes. With the exception of the FF-i°⁵' (ex-DE-1052) designed in 1962, all of them will ha'^e been designed between 1969 and 1975: DD-963, (ex-PF-109), CGN-38 (ex-DLGN-38), and CSGN. Each ¹⁵ equipped with the latest helicopters, sonars, guns, ¹¹¹¹⁵ sile launchers, and radars. Since each of these clas^se5 is designed for a different mission, their individu capabilities and costs differ markedly.     ^

During the last few years (since the appearance ^ Soviet surface combatants such as the "Kresta,” "Kara- "Moskva,” and "Krivak”), many have criticized the ne* U. S. warship classes which will constitute the ba^c bone of the American Fleet for the remainder of d¹’⁵ century. This criticism results primarily from what visible or the knowledge of relatively well-known cha^f acteristics. Thus, most criticisms are leveled aga‘ⁿ^ "platform” characteristics (including the number weapon launchers per ship), rather than payload chi^[iC teristics. This author questions whether those char³^ teristics being criticized are really significant, const ing the expected missions for which these conventt°ⁿ surface ships were designed. The appearance of the n

well equipped for their purposes, just as U. S. ships are both well designed and well equipped for their an­ticipated missions.

The criticism of our emerging surface fleet for the 1980s and beyond is based on outdated evaluation criteria which are inappropriate for the remaining quar­ter of this century. The issues are complex since they involve the interaction of new technology, budgetary constraints, and political factors. Thus, the basic prob­lem facing Navy planners is to get the best ships for the money in order to meet a variety of postulated scenarios. This article offers an explanation of the forces responsible for the characteristics of our new surface warships and presents two concepts which, if adopted, should enhance the Navy’s ability to obtain an im­proved distribution of its ship acquisition dollars—the major determinant of fleet capabilities.

The characteristics of modern combatants indicate that the trend is back to the ancient role of warships as transport vehicles. Rather than transporting troops, however, they are carrying sophisticated collections °> weapon systems. To understand modern surface nav^ warfare, one needs to appreciate the development of multiship surface warfare since the introduction NTDS (Navy Tactical Data System) in I960. Tactical data link communications now permit rapid, long' range, and error-free exchange of tactical data, un'^r status information, and engagement orders. Tactic^ computer systems enable the handling of these data iⁿ real time. Thus, the strength of one ship has beco®^c an integral part of total force-strength, which is tod*) the weapon system. Also integral to this force-strength of course, are the extended range and altitude/depd¹ capabilities of modern weapons.

Faced with the limitations of current technology *ⁿ with constraints in both acquisition and research an development budgets, we have still done well in nearly every category of the ship combat system. Table 1 l*^stS

Table 1 New U. S. Naval Surface Ship

Missiles

Harpoon—radar-guided, long-range antiship cruise missile for air-to-surface or surface-to-surface use

NATO Sea Sparrow—advanced surface-launched missile for shipboard defense systems

Launchers

Mk 26 multipurpose guided-missile launching system; provides stowage and launching capability for Standard missile, Harpoon, and ASROC

Deck-mounted cannisters for Harpoon and other cruise missiles

Guns

8-inch/55 caliber lightweight gun—fully automatic major-caliber gun with all-weather capability and a high degree of operational flexibility

76-millimeter Oto Melara—lightweight gun primarily for self-defense

Vulcan/Phalanx close-in weapon system—automatic radar-controlled gun for close-range defense against antishipping missiles

Aircraft

S-3A Viking—high-performance carrier-based antisubmarine search and attack aircraft

F-14 Tomcat—high-performance tactical fighter for air escort, air superiority, and fleet air defense

LAMPS III—antisubmarine helicopter

Fire Control Systems

Mk 86 GFCS—first major class I all-digital gun fire control system; also has a missile-control channel

Combat System Hardware 1974-1978

Mk 92 GFCS—all-digital gun and missile fire control systems with three-dimensional search radar

Mk 116 UFCS—all-digital underwater fire control system for controlling torpedoes (both ship and air launched) and ASROC; replaces the analog Mk 114 system

Computers

UYK-7—third generation general-purpose digital comp^utef UYK-20—new standard Navy minicomputer

Sensors

SPY-i(Aegis)—air and surface search radar with phased array electronic scanning and advanced signal processing techniques; tracks targets and communicates midcourse guidance commands to missiles

SPS-48C—significantly upgraded descendent of the basic SPS-48 3D radar with complete auto-track capability

SPS-49—new two-dimensional air-search radar with increased capacity

SPS-58—pulsed doppler radar for low-altitude target detection for point defense system

SQS-53—long-range active/passive sonar with all-digital signal-processing interface

ETASS—passive towed sonar array for escort ships

Countermeasures

A variety of ACMs (acoustic countermeasures) and EC>^1S (electronic countermeasures)

RBOC—rapid bloom offboard chaff dispenser, successor to CHAFFROC

their

Protection philosophy (with the exception of very spe- °he areas) has improved, and we have reduced the Number of single-purpose, yet highly visible, weapon ^launchers per ship since World War II.

. An important question that emerges from all this ^{ls r}he degree to which improvements in ship platform Performance influence the overall performance of the . “P as a weapon. Some clues may be found in an exam- ^ltlation of the modern fighter aircraft, which (as ships °^ncc were) is still intended for one-on-one combat.

In order to be an effective one-on-one weapon sys- > the fighter aircraft requires a large variety of char­^aCteristics which clearly originate in the platform. These nrfude: maneuverability, speed, range, and handling

Quality. The combat effectiveness of a naval ship, how­ever, -

so_rs,

basic •tiodi

Obsolescence is more likely to limit the useful oper- hfe of many products than wear and tear in

^ati0n_al

^fhes_e

flexibility.

1970

1960

^new weapons and sensors which have or will become °perational between 1974 and 1978. Within the same period, however, our ships have become slower. Neither

maneuvering characteristics nor our overall ship

results predominantly from her weapons and sen- with the platform contributing little more than mobility and basic support services. Moreover, in ^ern naval surface warfare, as discussed earlier, com- pe £^e^^ectI^veness ts determined through the integrated ^ orrnance of several ships, rather than simply as the j rhe individual ships’ performances.

Par^{C S}^°^U^’ rherefore, not be surprising when a com­ets ^S°^{n recent} pl^atf^orm performance trends for fight- ^and destroyers (Figure 1) shows a distinctly different p_e^^ern- The F-i4 "platform” constitutes a significant f °^rrnance improvement over the F-4, whereas per- _c ^{arice c}hanges in the DD-963 vis-a-vis the DDG-2 are Po ^nec* primarily to improved weaponry. The distinc- ^ between payload and platform in the case of naval / *^s meaningful, since the life-span of the platform (ab"^r°^Xamate^ y^ears) ^^{ar exc}e^ecIs that of the payload f/^mately 7 to 10 years). This trend of plat- ^load life disparity has necessitated periodic ^mizations and conversions of naval combatants.

_Ceri ^tlmes of rapidly expanding technology. Obsoles- _Syst^{Ce ls} even more detrimental in the case of weapon i_rr ,^Crris> where performance in absolute terms becomes n_e ^evant if the adversary has better weapons which will t_e^^ate existing defensive measures. Thus, weapon sys- a_rt ’ ^ln general, will tend to "push” the state of the t₀’ ^Wbereas platform-related advances are less crucial ^ilitary effectiveness.

d_tsi ^e problem facing Navy planners and warship s^rs, therefore, is how to allocate these weapons, it! °^rs’ ^and integrating systems into which platforms ti_0r^[^a* ^amides in order to provide maximum opera-

RANGE X PAYLOAD RATE OF CLIMB THRUST

J____________________ L

YEAR

The success of modern multiship missions is much more dependent upon the successful integration of surveillance, communications, and the targeting of car­rier and shore-based aircraft, surface and submarine forces than on the number of guns or missile launchers placed on any single ship. An individual ship is still quite capable of operating alone, but it must be prop­erly matched to the threat level. During the design phase we allocate weapon systems for maximum flex­ibility. We can usually assign two ships to one mission, but we can never halve a ship to fulfill two lesser threat missions in separate areas. How, then, do we accomplish this allocation process?

The derivation of ship requirements is not a simple process concisely documented by instructions and pro­cedures. The process seeks to provide the Navy with the number of ships it needs, with ships providing operational flexibility, and with the requisite ship char­acteristics to fulfill identified naval missions in the most cost-effective way.

search and development efforts, can either neutralize A& new threat, or, hopefully, create a new threat for the enemy which results in expenditure of his resources But another very important, poorly-understood fu^nC' tion of new technology is to provide possible trade-o® in order to improve performance or to reduce cos¹ while keeping performance constant.

From the ship designer’s viewpoint, the requirement* derivation process is primarily one of engineering trade-offs. The designer develops alternative config^ur3‘ tions at the ship system level which reflect varying operational requirements and which are translated in^t0 comparable ship acquisition cost estimates. These al^tet natives, each satisfying a unique set of operation² requirements with an associated cost, are then trade off until the decision-maker selects an alternative v/njC offers the desired balance between operational require ments and cost. This process usually takes as much ^aS one year for a major warship and assures that m°^st feasible solutions have been examined and the he*¹ possible choice made.

Faced with severe constraints imposed on the nfy naval ship construction budget, i.e., level funding ¹⁽¹ spite of spiraling inflation, the Navy had to devd°P a policy which would yield warships in adequate nud¹ bers while still satisfying military requirements.

This

ito-

La­

th²'

of

Planning guidelines based on National Security Council directives are provided to the military agencies in the Defense Policy and Planning Guidance (DPPG) memoranda. This guidance presents cases in the form of possible wartime scenarios which are intended pri­marily to guide the services in programming their resources into a particular force structure. They are not directly related to planning for the use of existing forces in various contingencies. This high-level pro­gramming guidance is intended to have a strong and direct influence on the derivation of ship requirements. The Chief of Naval Operations also develops the so- called CNO Programming Planning Guidance (CPPG) which describes Navy roles and missions and furnishes broad Navy planning guidance. Another document called the CNO Program Analysis Memorandum (CPAM) treats mission and support areas in terms of cost and capabilities and furnishes the basis for consid­eration of broad program options. These various guid­ance documents also reflect intelligence data, antici­pated scenarios, the results of other studies, and anticipated fiscal constraints.

As part of the studies, the Navy conducts force level analyses in an attempt to determine the numbers of ships needed to carry out its assigned missions. This analysis is not an independent work, but one which is strongly interrelated with other factors in the deci­sion process, particularly to so-called "force mix analy­sis.” The force mix analysis is a determination of the different types of ships with unique capabilities which the Navy needs to carry out its missions. For example, the submarine threat demands ships with ASW capabili­ties, while aircraft and antiship missile threats dictate the need for a viable AAW capability.

The ship’s minimum essential performance require­ments (later characteristics) are derived from the identi­fied mission requirements. Further characteristics defini­tion is the result of cost-capability trade-offs during early ship design phases. Ship programs are developed on the basis of replacements required for aging ships and the fiscal constraints of the shipbuilding program appropriation. The latter constraint creates further cost- capability trade-offs before settling on the final charac­teristics of an individual ship class.

Elements of a ship’s design may also result from pressures from outside the Department of Defense, particularly Congress. A very good example is House Bill No. 14592, which became law in August 1974. It specifies that new major combatants for the Navy’s strike forces shall be nuclear powered.

The existence of new technology has one of the most significant impacts on ship requirements. First of all, a potential enemy’s new technology usually creates a new threat. Our new technology, resulting from re­

policy has evolved into one in which the Navy P duces a small, but hopefully sufficient, number of sh'P with the highest capabilities so they can function the areas of highest threat. These are complement by a larger number of less complex ships. This P° has come to be known as the "high-low mix balance of forces concept. Developing the right ch'i^!iC teristic, especially for the less capable ships, is no) easy task. We have to insure that they have suffice, capability to carry out their missions effectively, ^an at the same time, can still be of minimum cost so - ^ we can procure the requisite numbers. The key, course, is to obtain maximum force effectiveness ^wl the dollars available, and the individual ships <n reflect a feasible solution to this problem.                            ^

In order to be able to effectively implement policy and satisfy the requirements of modern ^naV surface warfare, we need to:

► Invest a larger proportion of our research and

opment dollars in platform system alternatives—⁰⁰^ improve platform performance, but to squeeze ^ more acquisition dollars from each new design reinvest them in the payload.                                     j,

►  Use more modular payloads so we can minimize ^ the length of the necessary periodic "out of com , sion” time of ships while they are being modern and the associated cost of the modernization.

In deti

ermining how best to allocate our resources,

^must realize that the platform soon reaches the

^achi₍

T°nsideri

t^ment °f dramatic performance improvements in ^val_u^t the platform characteristics is of questionable

fror

^e*Pe_nsi

R,

En,

* Electric space heating Electric-powered steam generator for laundry system

Three 2,500-kw, medium-speed, 60-Hz diesels

Four 250-kw, 400-Hz static converters and two 63-kw, 400-Hz static converters

Assuming that future research and development ^dgets are likely to be smaller than we would like, ^e crucial decision is how best to allocate these limited ^Unds for naval ships.¹

Obviously, the area of greatest opportunity for cost ^savings resides in the higher cost portion of the prod­^Uct- The platform portion costs more than the combat ^sy^stem portion of a ship. This is true even when ^u°itions and a transportable payload, such as aircraft, ^are included as part of the combat-system-related costs.

in contrast to acquisition cost proportions, however, ^re^^earch and development allocations are far greater, £ atively speaking, for the combat system payload than ^r the platform. As discussed earlier, there is much S^reater potential for increasing combat effectiveness in f ^ern surface warfare through combat system per- _fo^r^nce improvements than through platform per- tniance gains. Therefore, it is understandable that ^°te has been spent for research and development in ^Se areas of greater potential for increased perform- b_e^Ce .^^0wever, in light of earlier discussion, it would tvise to reexamine this position.

We

Point where added performance capability will do little _sjr^ⁿ^^ance the ship-system performance effectiveness, fai ^^1C P°i^nt of performance irrelevance is reached in u ^quickI>' the other hand, performance increases tffe ^C P^afI°^acI ^wiP continue to improve ship system ^veness. Here, too, the point of diminishing re­_as .^{s w}iil eventually be reached, but not so quickly ^tke case of the platform. The reason for this _tj₀^^rence stems from the fact that platform contribu­te^ ^t0 °^Vera^ ^skip performance are less dramatic than tiar ' ^r°^V^^e<^ ^ ^{an im}P^rovecI combat system, and the 8^Jnal cost of an increment of contribution is very

Attractive.

ng the advances of modern weaponry, the

luj -“tn a tactical standpoint. Moreover, even if °^vernents are achieved, they are likely to be so sH '“^lve that they could double the total cost of the tact' °^{r exam}pl^e> very high speed, while having some for '^Ca' ^VaI^ue> is extremely costly beyond a certain level spc-_Cd°^nVCnti0nal displacement vessels. Beyond certain Wj_tj^^{S 11} requires hydrofoils and surface effect ships d_llra^^tkeir high cost/weight ratios. Likewise, long en- but ,^Ce time, if obtainable, does have tactical value, ^e nuclear power it requires makes the ship far

°f ka_VjJ^{1Ven leo}P°td> Otto P. Jons, and John T. D re wry, "Design-to-Cost Mi_rj ^hips,” a paper published by the Society of Naval Architects and ‘gmeers, in SNAME Transactions, 1974.

more expensive than a ship powered by fossil fuel. Similarly, maneuverability, which today has low tactical value as compared, for example, with electronic coun­termeasure effectiveness, would require significant out­lays in order to achieve a significant improvement over current standards. The same holds true for blast resist­ance. To exceed some modest capability is very costly, while the contribution to total ship naval surface war­fare performance is relatively small. On the other hand, improvements in combat systems such as the Aegis radar compared with a conventional rotating array radar or the addition of LAMPS (light airborne multi-purpose system) helicopters on a destroyer result in a significant increase in overall performance.

Generally, one may take advantage of improved technology in two ways: improved performance at the same or higher cost (this has generally been the trend in the past) or constant or only slightly improved performance at less cost.

Experience has shown us that the greatest advantage from advancements in platform design results from significantly reducing the cost of the platform, while keeping performance constant. This should be the pre­ferred path. By having saved a substantial amount in platform acquisition cost, either the combat system acquisition cost budget can be increased to obtain even more performance out of the ship system, or a larger number of ships with the same performance can be procured for the same ship program acquisition budget.

The following example demonstrates these princi­ples. A ship now being designed has a baseline electric power generation and conversion plant consisting of the major components shown in Table 2. The alterna­tive configuration shown in the table offers a potential saving of $750,000 per ship, a figure representing over 1%% of the total platform cost. This amounts to a

Table 2 Major Components of the Electric Power Generation and Conversion Configurations for a Current Naval Ship Design

Baseline Configuration* Alternative Configuration[1]

Four 100-kw, high-speed, 60-Hz diesels

Three 380-kw, 400-Hz gas turbine generators

Two 200-kw, 60-Hz 400 static frequency converters

Two auxiliary steam generators (boiler)

USS Parsons (DD-949 to DDG-33). Such improvem^ in major weapons configuration have normally °^ccurf_t|₁ only twice during the lifetimes of ships. However, '^V1 the rapid pace of technological advances, the freq^ut’^nC' of modernization can only increase.

Given appropriate consideration at the time

of t^h£

original design of the ship, a certain amount

of dis^cl;

n°

substantial saving, especially when considering the ac­quisition of, say, 20 ships. Yet the feasibility of the ultimate solution rests on the availability of two quali­fied components such as the 1,000-kilowatt high-speed, lightweight diesel and the 380-kilowatt direct-driven 400-cycle gas turbine. In this particular case, the re­search and development investment is aimed at quali­fying this equipment for naval ship use. This entails testing, evaluation, and the possibility of minor re­design to enable the equipment to withstand the naval environment. Saving $750,000 on the platform would allow investment of that sum in the combat system, thus contributing to total ship combat effectiveness.

Therefore, it would be beneficial to invest more research dollars in the platform in order to provide alternative hardware trade-offs. The acquisition costs saved on the platform could be invested in the combat system where more performance can be achieved per dollar invested in a specific naval ship.

To keep pace with the changing technology of the "payload,” the periodic modernizations of a ship re­quire one to one-and-a-half years in normal cases. How­ever, there have been programs in which the ship was unavailable as long as 31 months in the case of the

pline during payload component developments, appropriate policies relating to modularity, there is reason why modernization turn-around time sho^u exceed six months.                      ^

Rather than reshaping the ship periodically ^t0^

modernization items, the modernization must be ^c

-

figured to fit the ship. This, of course, puts the bu^f ^ on both ship and component designers. It can be ^ complished through modularity, the prepackage¹? a collection of equipment (systems or components) ease of installation and removal.      ^

Although numerous reasons have been advance the inevitability of modernization, only four are f^u(1 mental:²

►                                                                                                                                            Our weapon technology advances      j,

►                  Response to a potential enemy’s technologic²

vances

►                  Inability to forecast the threat accurately

►                  The correction at times of inevitable erroneous sions at the conceptual stage of ship design

Changes to a naval ship with a 25-30-year

ieO-

lifeti^

9                                                                      . . .        . o_cturⁿ ,

²John T. Drewry and Otto Jons, "Modularity: Maximizing the 0

the Navy’s Investment,” ASNE Journal, April 1975, pp. 193—214. J-

and G. D. Kerr, "Designing for Change: Present and Future, ^             ^

Institute Proceedings, July 1974, pp. 30-38. J. Spero, W. Hicks, and V-

"A Philosophy of Naval Ship Construction,” NavShips Technic

December 1973, pp. 2-9.

^{e a} virtual certainty. Therefore, designing for this ^ H^Ull'ernent is extremely important. Since the need is ^¹⁰us, where do the problems lie?

^lt;bout some mechanism which acts as a clearing- ₍.^^Se ^^or interfaces among sensors, weapons, and vari- _ajj ^lntcgrating devices, we are virtually assured that attempts to achieve modularity are in vain. This ,_Vt ^anism has not existed in ship design. However, ave generally been successful in executing plat- _this 'Payload integration in the case of aircraft, and

_A                                                                                                                                                               1                                 ------------------------- 7       -- ---- J ----

t_Cfl ^a P ^used as front-line equipment for only about

&^nci

jp . ^Ve a significant impact on the design of the ^and normally results in some penalties in .’ ^v°ffirne, and capacity of services installed. Such ^are well worth the advantages gained, in ^ ^uiarity concepts have been applied to naval ships cifi_Caii P^ast- A case in point is the Spruance class. Spe- this includes the modular installation of the ^ro_cl_Ce.               5-inch/54 gun, the ASROC (antisubmarine

> launcher, palletized installation of the BPDMS

^may be attributed to two factors. Aircraft require ^tlrne from inception to production, and they are

^rr>o/^CarS' ^ ^ac^^ll:'^on> aircraft designers evidently have ^e control over component packages and systems ” ^do ship designers.

^aval^Seton<^ difficulty in implementing modularity for st_afi. ^S.^P^S stems from concern about technological a_t(jj^nat.*^on resulting from the side effects of stand- is _t£ ^tl0n' Sl^ncc a certain amount of standardization s_hJ^red for the implementation of modularity in ^od               ^suc^ ^concern is understandable. However,

a_SSQ . ^arity can be implemented without the problems a_rc]j^Clate^ ^with standardization. All that need be stand- te_rj . ^are certain physical and functional charac- anj ? ^SUck ^as weight, certain dimensions, pipe, duct Perf ^{C conne}ctions. Modularity does not standardize ,_hi_c^^ance characteristics which are normally those jyj eause the need to modernize in the first place. tiiQj ^ularity concepts reach their full potential only if th_{e s}^^{es are} interchangeable without modifications to do_Cs ^structure or other systems. Thus, modularity

shi ""

(basic point defense missile system) firing panel to­gether with its display consoles in CIC, and the AN/SPS-40A radar. The intent is to replace:

► BPDMS with the IBPDMS (improved basic point defense missile system)

► ASROC/launcher group with the Mk 26/Mod 0 launcher

► 5-inch/54 gun with an 8-inch/55 gun

A later conversion will replace the IBPDMS with the Mk 26/Mod 1 launcher.

Even so, the Spruance represents one-sided modular­ity. The ship was designed to accommodate known and anticipated modernization using designed and, for the most part, prototyped equipment. The ship design, however, had no influence on these equipments. With­out this second feature, modularity is only a small step in the right direction.

Let me conclude by saying that I hope this article contributes to an understanding of why we are design­ing our new surface warships as we are. We mustn’t fall victim to the shallow criticisms of recent U. S. warship designs because they are based on a lack of understanding of modern surface warfare. In the years to come, even more than in the past, ship platform characteristics will not be so important as those such as surveillance, communications, targeting, and coun­termeasures. Thus it is that the U. S. Navy has focused its attention on developing an impressive array of ship­board weapon systems.

Basing its warship designs on the "high-low mix” or balanced force concept, the Navy is seeking to pro­duce maximum operational flexibility. But in order to implement this concept effectively, we must invest a larger proportion of our research and development dollars in platform system alternatives, and we must develop payloads which employ modularity to the greatest extent possible.

Mr. Leopold is technical director for ship design at the Naval Ship Engineering Center. In this senior civilian position, he is responsible for the design of all surface ships and submarines for the U. S. Navy. Before beginning work for the Navy, he had a ten-year career in private industry. His last such position was director of ship engineering for Litton Industries. In this role he was in charge of the designs of the Spruance-class (DD-963) destroyer and the Tarawa-class (LHA-1) amphibious assault ship. Mr. Leopold holds three degrees from M.I.T. He is also a candidate for a Ph.D. from M.I.T. and an M.B.A. from George Washington University. He has published numerous technical articles for journals in the United States and abroad and is the editor and a principal author of a forthcoming book titled Naval Surface Ship Design, to be published in 1977. He holds patents for 'Trisec,” a new hull form for displacement-type ships. This article has been adapted from a paper Mr. Leopold presented to a symposium organized by the Fletcher School of Tufts University in September 1974.