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Nuclear Navy: 1946-1962
Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1974. 475 pp. Illus. $12.50 (Member’s price: $10.00).
Reviewed by Norman Polmar
(My. Polmar is an author, historian, and analyst. He has written two hooks on nuclear submarines, Atomic Submarines [1963] and Death of the Thresher [1964], and has participated in several studies related to nuclear ship and submarine operations and requirements. For the past several years he has been an executive with an analytical research firm and the editor of the U. S. sections of Jane’s Fighting Ships.)
The authors, historians of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), wrote this book in response to a suggestion by Admiral H. G. Rickover that his organization may have "devised some especially effective approach to reactor development which others had not found. If Rickover had such a 'magic formula,’ would it not be sensible to find out what it was so that others could use it?”
Authors Hewlett and Duncan admirably describe the development and management of nuclear power in the U. S. Navy. It is up to the reader, however, to determine if Rickover indeed had a "magic formula.” Perhaps more significant, could such techniques be applied by others or to other projects? The authors note the unique Navy-AEC structure which gave the United States useful nuclear power and state, "the structure of responsibility would be largely Rick- over’s work. He had created this strange alliance, and he alone could make it function.”
Almost from his initial association with nuclear power, Rickover saw the immediate goal of a nuclear-powered ship. In contrast, the scientific community in the immediate post-World War II period generally sought research and engineering goals. The schedule of development of nuclear power was extremely significant. Largely as a result of Rickover’s official and unofficial prodding during 1948, the Navy created the organization that would make it possible to build a nuclear submarine. The AEC laboratories attained an interest in developing the reactor plant, the nuclear submarine was given a reasonably high priority, and Rickover himself was placed in charge of both the Navy and AEC ship reactor efforts.
Despite this progress, the authors remind us, it was not yet possible even to describe the tasks necessary to develop a submarine reactor. Indeed, no official in either the Navy or AEC had ever designed a nuclear reactor of any kind! The physicists and engineers at one AEC laboratory estimated that after almost a decade of development it would be possible "with some confidence” to build a submarine reactor. Less than a decade later, five nuclear submarines were in commission, several land reactor prototypes were operational, and several nuclear submarines as well as surface ships were on the building ways.
The organization that carried out this schedule probably is unique in U. S. governmental history. It was the result of two years of bargaining, cajoling, prodding, threatening, and promising. The "Rickover organization” was spawned of two independent federal agencies, the Navy Department and then newly-established Atomic Energy Commission. Rickover’s single-mindedness enabled him to establish himself firmly in both the Navy and the AEC as head of nuclear ship propulsion.
Equally fascinating is the description of how American industry and the naval and commercial shipyards were "organized” for nuclear power. Indeed, organization is the forte of the authors in fulfilling their goal of describing Rickover’s "magic formula.” Within that context, Rickover’s techniques are described—how he dealt with government and industry, superiors and subordinates, problems and successes. The descriptions appear candid, although some readers will undoubtedly dispute them.
How applicable is his management approach to other technology areas? The nuclear propulsion program was initially a vertical organization, going from reactor design to operation of the plants at sea. At each level there was some horizontal spread—to AEC and industry laboratories, shipyards, personnel selection and training, to maintenance and overhaul. In comparison, the Polaris program—under the Navy’s Special Projects Office—was more a horizontal organization, embracing all aspects of the submarine platform: hull, weapons, navigation, personnel, tenders, etc.
How many similar organizations could a Navy have? Periodic attempts to establish "czars”—such as one for ASW in the early 1960s—have failed miserably against practical problems and
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The vision and the reality: Captain H. G. Rickover with a schematic model of the proposed nuclear submarine in 1952. That same year the keel was laid for the USS Nautilus (SSN-571), and the submarine herself (inset) was commissioned in 1954.
TURBINE
CONDENSER-i the "establishment.” Perhaps nuclear power and the Polaris succeeded because they involved new technologies and programs with high levels of funding.
Nuclear Navy: 1946-1962 is the story of success. In that period the U. S. Navy became the leader in nuclear power, with Rickover even directing development of the nation’s first commercial power reactor. By the end of 1962, the Navy had completed 27 nuclear submarines as well as a nuclear supercarrier, cruiser, and frigate, with several more submarines under construction.
Authors Hewlett and Duncan explain that 1962 was the cutoff date because "reliable historical analysis simply is not possible for the years after 1962.” Agreed. But 1963 was the year of the Thresher loss, and the nagging question, never answered to the public, of a possible reactor shutdown as the submarine was approaching test depth. About 1963 the Soviet Navy began construction of the Yankee, Charlie, and Victor classes of nuclear undersea craft—programs that have given them the lead in submarine numbers, the fastest submarines in service, advanced-technology submarine weapons, and possibly other areas of leadership related to nuclear navies. In 1963, the U. S. Navy launched Polaris submarines at an average of one per month, the cause of severe problems in
NUCLEAR REACTOR
gRUMP^’’^ STEAM GENERATOR
the procurement of submarine officers and sailors. Moreover, about this time Admiral Rickover was strongly opposing the development of gas-turbine surface ships in the U. S. Navy, a potential competitor of nuclear power as an advanced propulsion system. These and other factors make 1962 a frustrating cutoff date for the Nuclear Navy.
The story that Hewlett and Duncan have set forth is well told. They had complete and unrestricted access to pertinent records; they were free to determine the scope, content, and approach of the book; and review was limited to security classification and factual accuracy. This would seem to be more than enough tools to do a good job; however, unless one knows what specific documents to request, many just- do not come to light. Also, because many of the documents used are denied to historians outside of AEC, the interpretations of Hewlett and Duncan must be accepted—period. Similarly, direct access to Rickover and many other key personalities is denied to the "outside” historian or writer.
Within this context the authors have produced an interesting and well-written text. Their apparent lack of basic Navy background surfaces in several areas. Moreover, the authors tend to discuss nuclear submarines and surface ships in a vacuum. During the nuclear submarine discussions of the late 1940s, the Navy was to an extent fighting for survival against the concept of air power as the only military force necessary for the future. Rarely is there any discussion of other naval requirements such as the desire in the late 1940s to build large numbers of small, specialized hunter- killer submarines as a counter to predicted Soviet submarine forces. Although this SSK concept was not successful in the end, neither were certain nuclear programs. The giant, two- reactor submarine Triton was no longer needed from an operational viewpoint before she was launched, and the Navy has yet to develop a "destroyer-size” nuclear power plant although it was proposed as early as 1946 and has long been a formal Navy requirement.
Finally, the authors raise too many questions. For example, if operating single-screw Polaris submarines under the Arctic ice was considered so dangerous, why have we periodically operated single-screw attack submarines at the top of the world? If Rickover so often took the initiative in proposing new reactor designs in the early 1950s, why have 98 of the 100 nuclear submarines completed between 1959 and 1975 all had the same S5W plant (with the resultant loss in performance as submarines became increasingly larger)? And, what was the cost in overall Navy and civilian morale from the Rickover management techniques? How many outstanding people were lost to various nuclear and non-nuclear programs because of Rickover’s "magic formula” of management, his personal control of nuclear personnel, his lack of interest in non-nuclear details which he left to others whose jobs and lives he made more difficult? The authors’ discussion of Rear Admiral William E. Raborn’s management of Polaris provides an interesting contrast in management approach.
Within the context of a reasonable amount of space (391 pages of text) the authors have fulfilled their intent. The reader will find considerable insight, detail, and candor on Rickover’s "magic formula.” Hewlett and Duncan have ably helped the reader by providing highly useful, simplified charts and tables, adequate (and well captioned)
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photographs, notes, citations, and appendixes. They have treated well with the pre-Rickover history of the nuclear Navy (Ross Gunn and Philip Abelson, the former having initiated nuclear propulsion studies for the U. S. Navy in 1939).
Many questions remain about the nuclear Navy of 1946-1962, but at last we have a meaningful discussion about that period.
Command of the Sea:
The History and Strategy of Maritime Empires
Clark G. Reynolds. New York: William Morrow and Co., 1974. 642 pp. Ulus. $15.00.
Reviewed by Dr. Thomas H. Etzold, Naval War College
(Professor Etzold received his Ph D. in American diplomatic history from Yale University. He has since written and reviewed widely in diplomatic history, foreign policy, and military affairs. He is now Associate Professor of Strategy at the U. S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.)
The author—a former Naval Academy history professor, now at the University of Maine—surveys in this book the use of navies throughout history. His aim is to synthesize the strategic constants which have made naval activity a continuous—not merely disjunctive or periodic—influence on the rise and fall of empires.
In his long perspective, from the navies of ancient Egypt and Crete through a hypothetical World War III, Dr. Reynolds argues that certain strategic realities have remained timeless. Command of the sea has always been necessary to protect trade, conduct amphibious warfare, and defend against invasion. States destined for regional or global power have always found in the sea their most important source of wealth, power, and influence.
States on the way to greatness have taken advantage of geographic position (especially an extensive coastline) to develop merchant shipping. The need for secure merchant shipping has led to the construction of ships capable of defending seaports, protecting sea lanes, and attacking enemy shipping.
Then, "shifting from the defensive to the offensive, the maritime nation acquired overseas colonies or trading stations . . . built and maintained a permanent superior navy ... it achieved the ability to command the sea through a maritime strategy . . . Finally, the vitality and affluence at work during this long process culminated in a golden age of enlightened government, human rights, high culture, and artistic achievement.” And so Reynolds analyzes the history of the world, the rise and fall of empires, in terms of this ever-repeating historical process.
Throughout these cycles of history, he notes, there have been debates between two schools of strategic thinkers, "material strategists” who emphasize the influence of contemporary technology on sea power, and "historical strategists” who perceive and realize the continuities of naval power and principles as distinct from tools or weapons of maritime predominance. For the latter, the historical strategists, Reynolds holds a clear preference. "Men—as always—and not machines,” he writes, "have remained the final arbiters in harnessing the seas for peaceful advantage or defensive purpose.”
Indeed, that will no more change than the importance of the life-giving sea. When the holocaust of World War III has come and gone, Reynolds says, the age-old cycle will begin again because whatever civilization survives nuclear devastation will have to produce food and then fashion vessels for trade,
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and so on into and through the cycle.
In so ambitious an undertaking there are almost certain to be flaws. Reynolds probably could not prevent the sketchy treatment of some subjects and periods, making at least the early portions of his book seem more a compilation than a synthesis or analysis. And surely it was difficult, though perhaps not impossible, to balance narrative and fact with themes.
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In the matter of sources, Reynolds relies on secondary works since, as he says, this is a book of synthesis. But how can one write an analysis of all the navies of the world throughout history almost entirely from English language sources? There are gaps in the impressively long chapter bibliographies. The discussion of the post-Civil War decline of the American merchant marine, for example, fails to cite or to profit from the work of the one scholar who has written definitively on that subject, Charles Dalzell. In using periodicals, Reynolds has concentrated on the Proceedings and on the Naval War College Review. Other periodicals containing important articles receive mention, but one senses that there is an element of chance about their inclusion. Earl Ravenal’s article on the Nixon Doctrine in Foreign Affairs for January 1971 appears, but Reynolds has missed the same author’s article, perhaps even more important, in the Summer 1971 issue of Foreign Policy. The list of omissions of articles—and even books—could be much longer.
Further and regrettably, the pace of change has made the book already out of date in discussion of Soviet naval weapons, doctrine, and developments.
This book will nonetheless have a considerable usefulness. It is almost certain to become a part of the curriculum at the Naval Academy. Perhaps Command of the Sea should also become part of the curriculum at the Naval War College, to remind older generations of officers of the historical perspective and experience from which they draw in their studies of sea power. For the instincts which led Reynolds to attempt this project were sound. Not since the days of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian S. Corbett has anyone contributed fundamentally either through synthesis or research to understanding of sea power in ages past and of its possibilities in ages to come. This book perhaps does not entitle Reynolds to stand with those historical strategists of the turn of the century. But it is useful, and in coming years it will surely contribute to the education of American naval officers.
TV and National Defense:
An Analysis of CBS News, 1972-1973
Ernest W. Lefever. Boston, Va.: Institute for American Strategy Press, 1974. 209 pp. $3.95 (paper).
Reviewed by Lieutenant Charles R. D’Amato, U. S. Naval Reserve
(Lieutenant D’Amato served in destroyers on both coasts and was a basketball coach and instructor in the political science department at the Naval Academy during six years of active duty. He contributed a section on the press and national security to a recent book Civil-Military Relations. He is a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution and legislative aide to Congressman James Jeffords of Vermont.)
Walter Cronkite claims to tell it "the way it is” on his nightly CBS-TV news program. "Not so!” challenges this meticulously researched and damaging study of how the show handled national defense issues in 1972-73. Dr. Ernest W. Lefever, a respected scholar and senior fellow at the Brookings Institution asks: "Does network TV provide an adequate and balanced coverage of facts, events, developments, and perspectives so the citizen-viewer can form responsible opinions on the national security issues facing the United States? Are all major options and viewpoints on external threats and alternative ways to meet them fairly presented?” He finds CBS gave us a "significantly lopsided picture,” underplaying the Soviet threat, presenting the U. S. military in an "unfavorable light most of the time,” and treating detente, the Vietnam War, U. S. military developments and U. S.-China relations in a way that was "neither fair nor comprehensive.” He says the "essential facts” on these issues and a "balanced picture” of alternative responses were missing. He concludes that, over time, such partial reporting affects the attitudes of millions of viewers, and thereby influences national policy.
This is an important book, because of the charges it levels and the possible repercussions on CBS and the future direction of television news. It has received wide attention in the print media and summarizes the evidence in what could well be the most serious complaint against a news show ever brought before the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). If the charges are sustained, CBS’ wholly-owned and affiliated stations could lose or have their broadcast licenses suspended, or the FCC could order the airing of compensatory programming.
Lefever uses several content analysis methods on the raw video data and transcript summaries. The methodology, some newly developed during the research, appears generally sound and thorough. A sample of the findings: during two years and 521 shows, only one minute of broadcasting was concerned with the comparative ' military strength of the United States and U.S.S.R., while about two minutes were devoted to the disappearance of silverware from Pentagon cafeterias. Of the 142 minutes on problems of the U. S. military, less than six present the armed services favorably. On U. S.-U.S.S.R. detente, there were 91 pro-detente references, compared to only four suggesting detente may have dangers.
Most persuasive and interesting of all was a section on stories CBS "did not report,” but which were covered by major newspapers, primarily The New York Times (several times on page 1). The list includes successful testing of a Soviet submarine-fired missile with a range over 4,500 miles and of an antisatellite satellite system, development of new iCBMs capable of destroying hardened Minuteman sites, production of the Backfire bomber, new nuclear ballistic missile submarines, the launching of the first Soviet aircraft carrier, and large Soviet expenditures on military research and development.
In another instance, data were classified into three "viewpoints:” (A) the United States should increase national security efforts; (B) Current efforts are adequate; (C) Efforts should be decreased. The ratio of C to A views, even excluding Vietnam topics, was 3:1. The author concludes CBS failed to seek out and present the A viewpoint, which he feels is widely held in the U. S., citing a 1973 professional poll showing 71% of Americans favor "military superiority over Russia.” Thus, he says, CBS advocated a particular policy position, not just reported news.
All of this, if true, violates the Fairness Doctrine of the FCC, an agency tasked to parcel out the scarce frequency spectrum. Stations licensed to use this public resource agree to operate in the "public interest.” While the FCC and the courts have allowed stations wide discretion in news judgment—based on the right to free speech—the public has an even greater right to be informed. To achieve the doctrine’s goal, stations must devote "substantial” time in their overall programming to important con-
troversial issues and must present "responsible conflicting views” on these issues. Indeed, the book is purposely structured to show that CBS is in violation of this doctrine.
Lefever calls for compensatory programming to make up for the omissions and says CBS should "enrich the philosophical diversity of its staff.” CBS’ initial reaction to the study, a four-page memorandum from president Arthur Taylor, argues that the Institute for American Strategy, which sponsored the book, is conservative and biased. The memo also argues that other CBS programming, such as the morning news, "Face the Nation,” and "60 Minutes,” carried stories which balance out the picture. But CBS has not yet provided enough documentation to answer the challenge satisfactorily. Let us hope there will be as much light as there is heat when the FCC hears the case.
Admiral of the New Empire: The Life and Career of George Dewey
Ronald Spector. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974. 220 pp.
Illus. $10.00.
Reviewed by Dr. Roger Dingman, University of Southern California
(Professor Dingman teaches history and international relations at the University of Southern California. He has lectured at the Naval War College and is the author of a forthcoming book on the origins of naval arms limitation.)
Ronald Spector’s new biography offers a lively account of Admiral George Dewey’s career. Because the admiral was so very average in comparison with his naval contemporaries, the story of his life provides us with a deeper understanding of the late 19th and early 20th century Navy.
The book’s first chapter spans Dewey’s years of obscurity, from his 1854 entry into the Naval Academy to his 1897 selection (while still a commodore) as commander of the U. S. Asiatic Squadron. While Spector presents an interesting account of Dewey’s Civil War service, he passes over— perhaps by choice, perhaps because of the paucity of source material—the next
30 years of Dewey’s career. He shows that the future admiral was "average” at the time in not associating himself with naval reformers and intellectual leaders and in internalizing service values. The latter—devotion to the Navy, concern for personal and professional honor, and loyalty—critically influenced his later career.
The author excels in explaining how so ordinary a man was able to achieve such a spectacular second career from 1898 to 1900. He details how Dewey’s reputation as a fighter, his friendship with Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, and intervention by Vermont’s Senator Redfield Proctor got him command of the ships that brought victory over the Spanish at Manila Bay. More than anything, the public adulation and subsequent Navy promotions came as a result of his being in the right place—Manila Bay—at the right time.
Using previously unavailable diaries of the second Mrs. Dewey and the admiral’s letters to his son, Spector shows that Dewey was no imperialist. His account of events in Manila after the battle reveals a man who misunderstood rather than disliked the Filipinos and forced others to make political decisions rather than assuming the responsibility himself.
Spector finds much to tarnish the admiral’s reputation in his third career as national hero and political symbol for the Navy. Dewey wobbled in dealing with intraservice reformers and defenders of tradition. He made no effort to reconcile contradictions between Atlantic and Pacific war plans, and he fueled interservice conflict over bases in the Philippines.
In this last section of the book, Spec- tor is perhaps least persuasive. Too much material from his doctoral study of the Naval War College intrudes and obscures Dewey. More importantly, Spec- tor disregards the fact that the admiral’s style of leadership apparently suited the political climate. Behind his external blandness lurked determination that could be effective. When he threatened to resign in 1906 unless Roosevelt fired Secretary of the Navy Charles J. Bonaparte, the President did so. Dewey as symbol was important to congressional approval of the naval expansion programs of both Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Finally, Spector prematurely dismisses Dewey’s values— professional pride, candor, and unwillingness to resort to subterfuge to gain service objectives—as obsolete. Dewey’s mind may have been narrow. His lifestyle and understanding of international affairs may have been outdated. But his sense of morality and recognition of the need to maintain bureaucratic political balance most certainly were not. This eminently readable book offers today’s naval officer much food for thought.
Admiral George Dewey
U. S. NAVY
FOXBAT & PHANTOM
Tactical Aerial Combat in the 1970’s
FOXBAT & PHANTOM simulates the completely unique type of aerial encounter now occuring at the edge of space. It is a fast playing, easily balanced game that pits three “intruder” aircraft against three “Interceptors.” Players may choose from any of fourteen supersonic jet fighters including the F-4 Phantom, the French Mirage II, Soviet Mig 23 "Foxbat,” and the British Lightning. These aircraft may be flown in either Radar Intercept or Point Defense missions.
Aircraft counters are maneuvered on the 22" x 34" hexagonally gridded mapsheet. The counter-mix contains eight, twenty-eight piece sets of aircraft markers, each representing a single jet aircraft. Each type of plane has an individual Aircraft Control Chart which involves the use of cannon, heat-seeking missiles, radar-homing missiles, and electronic counter-measures. A separate Combat Results Table is used to resolve the fire from each individual fighter-type. FOXBAT & PHANTOM, simulating present-day air combat at supersonic speeds is designed for play by one, two, or up to eight players. A typical game can be played in under one hour ... an hour filled with high speed, high-action, simulated aerial combat.
• Fourteen different supersonic jets
• Air-to-air missile combat
• Electronic countermeasures
• Packaged in a high-utility, plastic container specially designed to hold the playing pieces
List price: $8.00 Member's price: $6.40
"CA”
Tactical Naval Warfare in the Pacific, 1941-45
The last great surface battles between warships took place in the Pacific Theater in World War II. The gun-armed battleship and heavy cruiser (“CA") attained their final expression in the navies of Imperial Japan and the United States. "CA” enables you to re-create seven famous naval battles (plus three hypothetical ones) using counters representing individual battleships, battle cruisers, heavy cruisers, light cruisers, and destroyers. Counter characteristics include the ship’s gunnery strength, range, torpedo strength, and defense strength. Ships are identified by naval abbreviation and a class-name code. Players maneuver their task forces on a 22" x 34" hex-grid map which can be used to represent various parts of the ocean (and in some scenarios, the islands of Guadalcanal and Savo). 400 counters enable the players to display the speed heading and damage status of each of their ships. Rules cover momentum, spotting, night action, maneuverability and effects of damage. Play is fast-moving and rich in action.
• Ship-to-ship combat
• Night action rules
• 10 scenarios plus complete Pacific OB
• Packaged in a high-utility, plastic container specially designed to hold the playing pieces
List price: $8.00 Member’s price: $6.40
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NAVAL AFFAIRS Submarine Batfish
Hughston E. Lowder. Baltimore, Md.: Silent Service Books, 1974. 32 pp. Illus. $3.00 (paper).
A former crew member presents an outline operational history of the World War II fleet boat USS Batfish (SS-310). In service less than two years during the war, she won the Presidential Unit Citation for sinking 15 ships, damaging several others, and rescuing three U. S. Army pilots. Illustrated with maps, diagrams, and photos.
"The World’s Greatest Ship:” The Story of the Leviathan
Frank O. Braynatd. New York: South Street Seaport Museum, 1974. 380 pp. Illus. $25.00.
In this, the second of five planned volumes, an author with a lifelong interest in the ship traces the liner Leviathan’s history from 1919 through 1923. Following decommissioning as a World War I Navy troopship, the Leviathan lay idle for three years before being reconditioned at Newport News under the supervision of naval architect William Francis Gibbs. This large-format volume,
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which contains more than 70 pages of photos, recounts the ship’s story through her maiden voyage as a civilian passenger ship.
MARITIME AFFAIRS Abandon Ship!
Hal Butler. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1974. 235 pp. $7.95.
Writing in you-are-there style, Butler describes ship disasters which range in time from the sinking of the brig Negociator in 1809 to the last voyage of the Lakonia in 1963. Others include the Medusa (1816), the Birkenhead (1852), the Eastland (1915), the Flying Enterprise (1952), and the Carl D. Bradley (1958). In a number of cases, the author traces the fate of the ship’s survivors.
B The American Heritage History of Seafaring America
Alexander Laing. New York: American Heritage Publishing Co., 1974. 352 pp. Illus. $25.00 Deluxe edition (with slipcover) $30.00 ($19.95).
This is a large-page (8%" x 11") collection of some 50 short articles on American use of the seas and coastal waters from colonial times to the present. It contains numerous illustrations—prints, paintings, drawings, and photos—which put it nearly into the picture album category. One feature is a selected guide to U. S. maritime museums.
The Control of the Sea-Bed:
A New International Issue
Evan Luard. New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., 1974. 309 pp. $14.95.
Growing worldwide demand for scarce raw materials has given a sense of increasing urgency to the question of licensing the sea’s exploration and the development of its resources. Luard summarizes the information that is known and not known about the unexplored areas and their economic and military potential. He offers the latest statistics on the availability of various resources. Included are a review of international laws on the subject and a history of U.N. efforts to regulate offshore explorations. Luard also includes suggested solutions for the real and potential problems to be resolved in developing the sea-bed.
The Discovery of the Sea
J. H. Parry. New York: Dial, 1974. 302 pp.
Illus. $20.00.
With an emphasis on the reasons for the spurt of voyaging into uncharted waters, this is an illustrated history of the ships and men who challenged the unknown in the 15th and 16th centuries.
Marine Environmental Engineering Handbook
Frank L. Cross, Jr., Editor. Westport, Conn.: Technomic Publishing Co., 1974. 186 pp. Illus. $35.00 (paper).
Ten authorities in the field contributed to this guide and reference book which deals with the following problems in oceans, harbors, channels, rivers, and large lakes: air pollution control, oil and hazardous materials spills, sewage treatment, industrial wastewater, storm water runoff, dredging and dredge spoil, bilge, ballast, and tank washings, solid waste, legal considerations, occupational safety and health, environmental impact statements for marine operations and installations, and future trends.
Nuclear Merchant Ships
Marine Transportation Research Board. Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1974. 125 pp. $6.75 (paper).
Despite recent oil price increases, nuclear power is not economically competitive for commercial ships, according to this report made by a panel whose purpose was to examine desirable U. S. aims in the field. The panel advocates nuclear power in particularly promising applications, such as icebreakers, and urges the Maritime Administration to fund research in order to develop more efficient marine technologies, nuclear or otherwise.
Prince Henry Sinclair: His Expedition to the New World in 1398
Frederick J. Pohl. New York: Clarkson N.
Potter, Inc., 1974. 230 pp. Ulus. $8.95.
In 1398, Henry Sinclair, Prince and Earl of Orkney, made an expedition to Newfoundland. Along on the round-trip voyage from Britain was Nicolo Zeno who wrote descriptive accounts. Long thought to be contrived, the Zeno papers have been established as genuine by Pohl’s research. Their value is that they deal with the only pre-Columbian crossings for which records written by a participant still exist.
MILITARY AFFAIRS
The Battle for Berlin
John Strawson. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1974. 182 pp. Illus. $7.95.
The successful culmination of the Allies’ war against Germany was the capture of Berlin after American and British thrusts from the west and Russian from the east. As part of the story, the author describes the battles of January 1945, the summit meeting at Yalta, the crossing of the Rhine and Oder, and the plight of the Berliners. All ended, of course, with the city’s collapse and Hitler’s final days in a bunker.
Battle for a Continent: Quebec 1759
Gordon Donaldson. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1973. 241 pp. Illus. $8.95.
Writing popular history, including real—or imagined—dialogue on the part of the participants, Canadian journalist-TV commentator Donaldson recreates the important battle in which the British captured the French stronghold of Quebec. The book is illustrated with contemporary drawings and paintings, a few in color.
Chief of Staff: The Diaries of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall
Brian Bond, Editor. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1974. 205 pp. Illus. $14.50.
The first volume of Pownall’s diaries covered the years 1933-40. This second volume deals with the final years of his career in the British Army, up to his retirement in 1944. It is mainly concerned with his service as chief of staff to Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander in Southeast Asia. Pownall used his diary, which he never intended for publication, to unburden himself of the emotions and frustrations of daily life. Thus, his comments are outspoken and shed new light on the relationships between senior officers in Mountbatten’s command.
To Conquer a Peace: The War Between the United States and Mexico
John Edward Weems. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1974. 500 pp. $12.50.
Rather than being an encyclopedic catalogue of names, dates, and statistics of the Mexican War, this history describes the conflict by focusing on ten principal characters: Sam French, U. S. Grant, E. K. Smith, Santa Anna, President James Knox Polk, E. A. Hitchcock, John C. Fremont, John T. Hughes, Robert E. Lee, and Joseph W. Revere.
Decisive Day: The Battle for Bunker Hill
Richard M. Ketchum. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1974. 282 pp. Illus. $10.00.
Originally published in 1962 and titled then The Battle for Bunker Hill, this new edition has been revised by the addition of a new introduction and many more illustrations. Although Americans thought for some time they had suffered a humiliating defeat in the 1775 battle at Boston, it actually forced Britain to commit herself to war, and relations were never again the same between the mother country and colonies.
No Surrender: My Thirty-Year War
Hiroo Onoda. New York: Kodansha International/USA, 1975. 219 pp. Illus. $7.95.
The author was a World War II Japanese Army lieutenant who successfully hid in the Philippine jungle for 30 years until marching out in 1974 to receive his surrender order from the commanding officer who had sent him there 30 years earlier. Believing that Japan was still at war with the United States, he carried on one-man guerrilla activities for nearly three decades. Onoda’s first-person account also describes his early life and training as an intelligence officer before being assigned to the Philippines.
Now That You Mention It
Maj. General Melvin L. Krulewitch, U. S.
Marine Corps (Ret.) New York: Quadrangle, 1973. 257 pp. Illus. $6.95.
In this memoir the author recounts his experiences ranging from lawyer, Marine in four wars, politician, painter, and author to chairman of the New York State Athletic Commission. He describes events from the turn of the century to date and in localities ranging from Morocco to Hawaii, France to
Saipan, Korea to Kwajalein, I wo Jima to the state of Israel during her 1948 war.
Political-Military Systems: Comparative Perspectives
Catherine McArdle Kelleher, Editor. Beverly Hills, Calif.: SAGE Publications, Inc., 1974.
299 pp. $12.50 ($7.50 for paper).
This is a collection of papers from the 1973 conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. The papers generally deal with military organization, its significance for social and political roles, and its responsiveness to broader societal cleavages such as ethnic conflicts. Geographically, the papers deal with Latin America, China, and Eastern Europe.
Seaford House Papers: 1973-
Royal College of Defence Studies. London: Ministry of Defence, 1974. 131 pp. Free on request.
This fourth annual collection includes a dozen papers by students at one of Britain’s war colleges. The authors, who include a U. S. Navy captain, deal with such topics as guerrilla warfare, unification of Canadian armed forces, European neutrals, the Persian Gulf, the southeast flank of NATO, and the aggressive instinct in man.
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Agreement on Berlin
Dennis L. Bark. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1974, 131 pp. $3.00 (paper).
The author chronicles the public statements and private compromises that were part of the diplomatic negotiations leading to the four-party agreements on Berlin’s status signed in June 1972. Bark examines the reasons why Berlin has been a focus of attention for so long and emphasizes that the agreement has substantially diminished the tensions which Berliners have experienced since 1945.
Convergence of Communism and Capitalism
Leon Goure, Foy D. Kohler, Richard Soli, and Annette Stiefbold. Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1973. 168 pp. $4.95 (paper).
The theory that Communism and capitalism would at some time in the future resemble each other more than differ has been around a long time, and to some extent Soviet policy has taken advantage of this belief as it exists in the West. In this study the Soviet views on convergence are analyzed, and supporting documentation from Soviet sources is presented.
The Emergence of Bangladesh
Wayne Wilcox. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973. 79 pp. $3-50 (paper).
The creation of this new state is seen as an opportunity for a new American foreign policy in South Asia based on a greater appreciation of local views, institutions, and aspirations.
The French Against the French
Milton Dank. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1974.
365 pp. Illus. $12.50.
The French have not found it easy to live with the knowledge that theirs was the only occupied European country in which collaboration with the Nazis was officially proclaimed by the legal government and supported by a great number of its citizens. This documented account reveals a portrait of a nation torn by intrigue and personal antagonisms, betrayal, and torture that were part of the French Resistance’s struggle against Vichy’s authority—culminating in a civil war and a post-liberation purge of collaborators.
The Future of the China Market
Edward Neilan and Charles R. Smith. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1974.
94 pp. *3.00 (paper).
Despite many diplomatic and political obstacles, the authors foresee a growing U. S. trade with China—exceeding present U. S- Japanese trade figures and a real force in the world market—should China choose to become involved.
How American Foreign Policy Is Made
John Spanier and Eric M. Uslaner. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974. 180 pp. *8.50.
The structure and process of foreign policymaking by the President are seen as part of the dilemma that arises from a chief executive who is constitutionally limited by domestic requirements in order to preserve a democratic society but also has to be able to move quickly in the international sphere.
The Imperial Republic: The United States and the World, 1945-1973
Raymond Aron. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974. 339 pp. $10.00.
The original French edition of Professor Aron’s essay on U. S. foreign policy was awarded the 1973 Prix des Critiques. He has added a new preface to this American edition, listing the two key events which illuminated his analysis of the dualism of U. S. action. These were the 1971 announcement of President Nixon’s visit to Communist China and the devaluation of the dollar that same year. They form the basis for the two principal parts of the book, the study of the United States in the inter-state system and the examination of this country in the world market.
The Latin American Military as a Socio-political Force
Charles D. Corbett. Washington, D.C.: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1972.
143 pp. $4.95 (paper).
Case studies of the military establishments in Argentina and Bolivia are provided along with a general overview of the situations in other countries.
The Logic of World Power
Franz Schurmann. New York: Pantheon Books, 1974. 593 pp. $15.00.
Applying analytical techniques to the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the People’s Republic of China, the author explores the history of world politics since 1945. He shows the pivotal role a nuclear-armed America played in the creation of the order governing the postwar world, how relations between China and Russia were fundamentally influenced by Washington, and how decisions in one capital triggered decisions in the other two.
Malaysia: A Study in Successful Economic Development
Wolfgang Kasper. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research, 1974.
130 pp. $3.00 (paper).
The above-average economic growth of a third-world nation, without inflation, is seen as the result of laissez-faire capitalism.
Micronesia and U. S. Pacific Strategy:
A Blueprint for the 1980s
James H. Webb,.Jr., New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974. 109 pp. Illus. $12.50.
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The author is a 1968 Naval Academy graduate and former Marine officer who spent the summer of 1974 working as a consultant to the government of Guam. He is now a student at Georgetown University Law Center. In this book he suggests that in 10-20 years the entire U. S. presence in the Pacific may be centered in the Marianas because of military withdrawals from other bases in Pacific Asia. In order to achieve such a consolidation, it will be necessary to estab-
lish harmonious relations with the Micro- nesians themselves; the author suggests an approach for achieving that objective.
A Nation Observed: Perspectives on America’s World Role
Donald R. Lesh, Editor. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Associates, 1974. 150 pp. $3.95 (paper).
Writers from Canada, Japan, Argentina, France, Germany, and Russia who specialize in watching America bring contrasting backgrounds to this collection of essays. Their aim is to provide opinions on where the United States appears to be today, where is seems to be going, and where it ought to be going. To provide contrast to the foreign views, the book includes a poll of American attitudes on the nation’s position vis-a-vis other countries.
Soviet Strategy for the Seventies Foy D. Kohler, Mose L. Harvey, Leon Goure, and Richard Soil. Washington, D.C.: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1973. 241 pp. $4.95 (paper).
In this study the Communist use of peaceful coexistence is seen as concerning only formal state-to-state relations with the primary purpose of neutralizing policies and actions by capitalist states which would involve the use of force or which might lead to nuclear war.
The Use of Force in International Relations
F. S. Northedge, Editor. New York: The Free Press, 1974. 258 pp. $12.95.
Nine essays survey the threat to use military force and the actual use of it as means of achieving national security and international stability. The contributors look at the legal, moral, political, and technological aspects. Because of the general disapproval of nuclear conflict and public opinion such as that against the Vietnam War, the uses of force today are often devious. The book does not offer solutions but examines how and why nations resort to arms.
GENERAL
Aftermath: Martin Bormann and the Fourth Reich
Ladislas Farago. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974. 479 pp. Illus. $10.95.
Farago chronicles the story of his hunt for Martin Bormann, the former Nazi Reichs- lauter now allegedly living in exile in South America. Challenging the claims that his quarry was killed in Germany at the end of World War II, the author describes the documents, discoveries, and revelations leading to his personal confrontation with the man he believes to be Bormann. Farago also indicates the presence of a conspiracy that he says still protects Nazi fugitives in South America.
H America Explored: A Cartographical Study of the Exploration of North America
Adrian Johnson. New York: Viking Press,
1974. 252 pp. Illus. $25.00 ($20.00).
This large-format volume (10" x 13") contains more than 350 illustrations, many of which are full-color facsimiles of early maps. The story progresses from the first Viking voyages through numerous explorers such as Columbus, Verrazzano, and Marquette to the 19th century journeys of Fremont and Lewis and Clark. Detailed ornamental maps show our ancestors’ growing awareness of the new continent and increasing skill as cartographers.
A History of Polar Exploration
David Mountfield. New York: Dial, 1974.
208 pp. Illus. $17.50.
The Battle of Midway
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This magnificent painting by the distinguished artist, R. G. Smith, depicted in full color on the cover of this month's issue of Proceedings, is the latest addition to the Naval Institute's Color Print Gallery. Widely regarded as naval aviation's highest point of achievement, the Battle of Midway was one of the most significant naval actions of World War II.
Presented here for the first time, this print captures the total drama and heavy action of the battle. This superb example of naval historical art was specially chosen to provide fitting accompaniment to this month's dedication of the Naval Aviation Museum. Navymen, aviators, historians, professional buffs, and fine art enthusiasts will welcome this long-awaited visual documentary of a great moment. The overall size is 19" x 16".
This history starts with the earliest accounts of polar exploration and chronologically covers expeditions to the top and the bottom of the world. The book is large format,
illustrated with more than 200 photographs and drawings.
Hitler
Joachim C. Fest. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1973. 844 pp. Illus. $15.00.
Written by one of Germany’s leading journalists, this bulky biography of the German Fiihrer describes and analyzes the rise of a man and nation to a brief period of absolute power. Fest discusses Hitler’s initial success in peace and war and shows the effects of his policies to this day. He sees Hitler as having had a constantly destructive personality, a man who aimed at and achieved destruction on an unprecedented scale.
Hitler’s Letters and Notes
Werner Maser. New York: Harper & Row,
1974. 390 pp. Illus. $12.50.
The book is divided into two parts. The first contains letters and postcards written between 1906 and 1945 and ends with Hitler’s personal will. The second part consists of notes to clarify his thoughts or to prepare speeches, writings, and plans for action. The book concludes with his political will written just prior to his suicide. All of these pieces are tied together by a commentary which claims that all other biographers have misinterpreted these writings with consequent misinterpretation of Hitler’s real personality.
Joseph Stalin: Man and Legend
Ronald Hingley. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1974. 482 pp. Illus. $15.00.
Hingley’s biography of the Russian dictator falls outside the categories of the best-known pre-1973 studies of Stalin. It is neither popular history nor Marxist. Instead, he tries to separate the man from the legend, a task made difficult because Stalin eliminated both those who aided his rise to power and his contemporary Soviet biographers. Hingley describes Stalin as an intelligent politician, one who institutionalized the power seized by Lenin. The author believes that Stalin’s intelligence made him all the more harmful.
The Politics of Nonviolent Action
Gene Sharp. Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973.
902 pp. $24.95.
Dr. Sharp’s massive study is based on the idea that alternatives to violence are needed in meeting tyranny, aggression, injustice, and oppression. The theory of power underlying nonviolent action is that governments depend on people and the consent of the governed. Sharp explores the roots of political power and the nature of government and discusses why and how political power can be controlled at its sources. In discussing specific nonviolent tactics, he explores protest and persuasion, and methods of political, economic, and social noncooperation.
What Price Defense?
Edmund S. Muskie and Bill Brock.
Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1974.
73 pp. $2.50 (paper).
This booklet is the published version of a televised debate between the two U. S. Senators in 1974. It features statements from each of the senators on his defense budget philosophies and includes questions from media, government, and academic representatives in the audience. Muskie argues that $5 or $6 billion could be cut from the defense budget without hurting the overall defense effort. Brock contends that the defense capability would be reduced by Muskie’s proposed cuts because of inflation.
The Wound Within: America in the Vietnam Years, 1945-1974
Alexander Kendrick. Boston: Little, Brown,
1974. 432 pp. $12.95.
A longtime CBS correspondent views the Vietnam War experience and its effects on the United States in the larger context of American postwar policy and in light of internal and social turmoil since 1945. The book aims to show how the nation moved from the security and stability following World War II to the disunity, radicalism, and riots of the Sixties.
To Join with the Eagles
Murray Rubenstein and Richard M. Goldman. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1974.
230 pp. Illus. $15.00.
An illustrated history of Curtiss-Wright aircraft from 1903 to 1965.
’Twas a Famous Victory: Deception and Propaganda in the War with Germany
Benjamin Colby. New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1974. 221 pp. $8.95.
The propaganda that was necessary within the United States before and during World War II to build a hatred of Nazi Germany and a trust of Communist Russia is seen more as a long-term Communist plot to seduce the American people rather than as a manipulation of the political realities as seen by this country’s leadership in order to save Europe from a Nazi conquest.
Knot Possible
In 1970, I had command of the USS Mispillion (AO-105), a beautiful "jumboized” oiler that had all of the outward appearances of our new breed of 22-knot support ships. However, the oiler’s engineering plant had not been altered during the conversion and her top speed was 16 knots.
One afternoon in the Gulf of Tonkin, I saw a cruiser coming over the horizon at high speed for a rendezvous. As the cruiser drew near and began a wide, sweeping turn for an approach to our starboard side, she suddenly broke off and slowed drastically. The reason for her change in plan became apparent when we received a flashing light message which read: CAN YOU MAKE APPROACH ON ME? ENGINEERING CASUALTY LIMITS ME TO 15 KTS FOR NEXT TWO HOURS.
My immediate reply was: AFFIRMATIVE, IF YOU SLOW DOWN. I AM LIMITED TO 16 KTS FOREVER.
Rear Admiral W. D. Toole, Jr. USN
(The Naval Institute will pay $23.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)