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8 ,/55 Major Caliber Lightweight Gun:
Big Punch for Small Ships 91
By Commander Herbert M. Effron, U. S. Navy
Another Problem in Resource Allocation—
The Radio Frequency Spectrum Shortage 94
By Vice Admiral Jon L. Boyes, U. S. Navy and Mr. Frank L. Frisbie
Missions and Concept of the Federal German Navy 96
By Commander Karl-Heinz Reichert, Federal German Navy and Commander Franz-Dieter Braun, Federal German Navy
8"/5 5 Major Caliber Lightweight Gun: Big Punch for Small Ships
By Commander Herbert M. Effron, U. S. Navy, Major Caliber Lightweight Gun Weapon System Acquisition Manager, Naval Sea Systems Command
At 162315ZAPR75 an 8-inch projectile was fired from a destroyer for the first time in history. The place was an open ocean area about 80 miles south of San Clemente Island off the Southern California coast, the weapon was the Major Caliber Lightweight Gun (MCLWG) — the 8-in./5 5 caliber Gun Mount Mk 71 Mod 0—and the ship was the USS Hull (DD-945).
The U. S. Navy’s MCLWG is unique in concept and design and has the employment potential to open new horizons in surface weapon capabilities. A single operator, manning the system’s control console below decks, can fire the big gun against ship and land targets, delivering 260-pound projectiles without interruption at rates up to ten to 12 rounds per minute. While the prototype has a 75-round automatic ready service magazine, larger, automatic ready service magazines can be designed and built to match selected ship classes and their missions.
Firing can be single shot salvo with step or fully automatic loading, or the system can be employed in rapid, continuous fire with fully automatic loading and firing. The operator can select and fire up to six different types of ammunition without interruption or delay in system response or rate of fire. Any misfire can be cleared automatically from the console without the need to send personnel into the gun house.
Between missions or individual targets its continued readiness can be fully tested, without firing, by the operator exercising a step or totally automatic mode without moving ammunition through the system. The MCLWG can make the transition from the exercise to the ready to fire mode in less than one second; at any time it can be ready to load and fire in less than five seconds from a cold start.
The gun’s range is over 15 miles when firing conventional ballistic ammunition weighing 260 pounds. Much greater ranges can be achieved with subcaliber, rocket assisted, or low drag finned projectiles. Yet, with the distinct versatility and capabilities of this system, it can be controlled by existing fire control systems such as the Mk 68 (analog) gunfire control system or the Mk 86 (digital) fire control system which is gun and missile capable and going on board new construction combatants.
On a comparative basis, the MCLWG is a revolutionary step beyond the triple, 8-inch gun turrets of World War II-type heavy cruisers. It offers a marked improvement in offensive firepower for destroyer-size ships. The MCLWG system, at a weight of 172,000 pounds (in the prototype configuration), is only about 17% the weight of an 8-inch three-gun turret, and only 20% heavier than the automatic 5-inch Mk 42 gun it replaced in the Hull, a 3,950-ton destroyer.
The highly valued feature of a one- man requirement for full operation is 2% of the 44 men needed to deliver the same payload at the same rate of fire for just one gun of the old 8-inch turrets.
Impressive comparisons can also be made with the 18-man requirement for the 5-in./54 caliber Mk 42 gun or even the eight-man requirement for the Navy’s new lightweight 5-in./54 caliber Mk 45 gun and the MCLWG’s one-man operation.
The concept of a major caliber gun capability in a destroyer existed long before the 1961 Bureau of Naval Weapons document which proposed its development. Curiously, this document proposed three systems: the MCLWG, the 5-in./54 caliber Mk 45 lightweight gun, and the Mk 86 fire control system. Yet, the current history of the MCLWG must start in 1965 at which time the CNO formally established a requirement for a major caliber gun capability in destroyer-size ships.
When the formal requirement was issued the plan was to build a 175-mm. system to take advantage of commonality in ammunition under development by the Army. However, the Army subsequently terminated its 175-mm. ammunition development program, and the Navy decided to convert the then- completed prototype system to 8-in./55 caliber in order to use existing 8-inch ammunition. Conversion was made on site, at the Naval Surface Weapons Center (formerly Naval Weapons Laboratory) at Dahlgren, Virginia, by contractor and Navy civilian technical personnel. The system that emerged from the conversion was the MCLWG, officially designated the 8-in./55 caliber Gun Mount Mk 71 Mod 0. Although the system had been delivered to Dahlgren for testing in 1969 after successfully passing a 50,000-cycle test at the manufacturer’s plant, it took two years for it to undergo the conversion and subsequent testing as an 8-inch weapon. Its land base technical and operational tests and evaluations were conducted in late 1971 and early 1972. During this phase, 913 firings were conducted. (202 firings were made while it was a 175-mm. system.) The operational portion of the tests were conducted by Commander Operational Test and Evaluation Force (OpTEvFor) who recommended that the system undergo at-sea tests. The CNO directed that the MCLWG be installed in a Forrest Sherman (DD 931-951)- class destroyer. The subsequent selection of the Hull as the test ship was made for a number of reasons including the fact that her regular overhaul would occur when the MCLWG would be ready for installation.
After the decision was made to send the MCLWG to sea, it was disassembled. Some components were shipped to the Northern Ordnance Division of FMC Corporation, the designer and manufacturer of the system for the Navy, and others were sent to the Long Beach Naval Shipyard for installation in the Hull. Detailed examination of the disassembled system was conducted to the part level by company design engineers and Navy civilian technical personnel. They found surprisingly little wear or deterioration after the 1,115 firings. A technically satisfying example of the MCLWG’s operational stamina was an 0-ring which was discovered to have cracked into a number of pieces, yet it had retained its functional integrity during system firings without any indication of its failure.
During refurbishment, a number of minor changes were made which had evolved from the land base tests to further the system’s safety, reliability, and maintainability. These changes ranged from providing a crew’s maintenance platform to an electronic logic change that would cause the system to stop in a fail-safe mode if a round became partially chambered because of a bent or oversize powder case. The most important change, however, was the introduction of a new and significantly potent operational capability: the electronic logic that would permit the MCLWG to load and fire the Navy’s 8-inch guided projectile automatically. The 8-inch guided projectile, currently undergoing land base tests which recently included the destruction of a target tank with a direct hit by one warhead shot, could be ready for its first shipboard test firings from the Hull’s MCLWG as early as 1976.
At the same time that the MCLWG was being readied to go to sea, a four- man gun crew was selected and began training at the Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Illinois. Crew training consisted of 15 weeks of formal schooling in operation and maintenance of the 5-in./54 caliber Mk 45 lightweight gun (similar in design to the MCLWG), complemented by a one-week course at the Northern Ordnance plant to familiarize the crew with the disassembled MCLWG. The off-site training was followed by classroom and hands-on training at Long Beach Naval Shipyard and on board the Hull to teach the differences between the 5-in./54 caliber Mk 45 and the MCLWG.
During the summer and fall of 1974, structural modifications were made to the Hull to rearrange her previous 5-inch gun spaces into new spaces for the MCLWG, and a specially modified Mk 155 ballistic computer was added to her Mk 68 gunfire control system to provide 8-inch ballistics.
Since the MCLWG requires no men in the gun house, provisions had been made previously for an electronic check-sight observer. This device was especially designed and manufactured to be a line-of-fire monitor unit which compares the differences in fire control orders generated by the Mk 68 gun fire control system and the response of the MCLWG to the fire control orders. If the difference is greater than two minutes in train or elevation, the firing circuit cannot be completed. A simple red- light/green-light display in main battery plot provides visual confirmation of the system’s readiness to fire.
On 14 February 1975, the installation and checkout of the MCLWG in the Hull was completed. From the time the system’s automated ready service loader was lifted from the pier until the total system had been physically installed, hooked up, and system checkout completed, a total of 209 working hours had elapsed. The Hull’s regular overhaul work was completed in the next few weeks and structural test firings were scheduled. The MCLWG’s structural test firings were to be on the final two days of a three-day test period during which the Hull’s new 5-in./54 caliber Mk 42 Mod 10 guns would be fired first. These firings were designed to conclusively demonstrate whether a destroyer could withstand the blast and shock of a major caliber gun.
While Navy civilian technicians and inspectors stood ready to measure the effects of firing 71 8-inch rounds, there was no shortage of theories on what the effects would be. Some joked that the bow would be blown off. Others seriously questioned whether the keel could withstand the dynamic loads from the
firings. Even the self-styled seeress Jeanne Dixon prophesied that the U. S. Navy would lose a ship with a big gun on it, and some members of the Hull's crew thought she meant their ship.
The impact of firing an 8-inch gun from a destroyer was not totally predictable, although blast measurements taken during land base tests indicated that it was feasible. A set of readings from the Hull's 5-inch gun firings were taken prior to her regular overhaul to establish a baseline against which the 8-inch firings impact could be assessed. During the structural test firings of the MCLWG blast overpressure, strain, and acceleration on various ship structures would be measured and recorded from over 40 instrumented sites on board the ship.
The planning and buildup for the structural test firings had been deliberate, perhaps to a degree of overcautiousness. A detailed scenario and script had been prepared. Every procedural action, every order, every instrumented site had been judiciously decided upon, then reviewed and re-reviewed to precisely detail every aspect of the test. Any damage to the ship, however slight, had to be found and assessed. Any instrument reading which indicated that damage could occur on the next round had to be assessed before the firing of the next round would be authorized.
After loading ammunition and a brief non-weapon related repair, the Hull got underway for the firing area the night of 15 April; the ship’s routine was devoted to preparing for the structural test firings of her 5-inch guns which would begin the next morning.
Firings of the 5-inch guns began on schedule and proceeded well until a stoppage occurred which was expected to delay resumption of firings for about two hours. The decision was made to start the MCLWG firings a day early.
The Hull went to general quarters, and all stations reported ready as the order was given to elevate the MCLWG’s 36-foot-long barrel directly over the bow to 45°. The ship’s weapons officer reported all was ready, and the commanding officer issued the standard order: "batteries released.” The boatswain’s mate of the watch held the microphone to the ship’s announcing system, ready to echo the countdown as the weapons officer ordered "load one round to the ram position.” At the response, "one round at the ram position,” the commanding officer directed that the countdown proceed.
At the instant of transition from the nearly rote countdown of numbers to the crispness of the order to "fire,” the bridge was totally silent. Then the muffled boom and a nearly incredible and almost disappointing lack of the expected punch in the pit of the stomach punctuated a point in naval history— not a lightbulb was broken.
These firings and subsequent tests have ranged from single shots to five and ten round rapid, continuous firings to a continuous 42-round burst. The firings have conclusively demonstrated that a major caliber gun can be fired, safely and continuously, from a destroyer.
The MCLWG system will continue to undergo at-sea technical and operational tests and evaluations. By the end of 1975, a total of 1,000 8-inch rounds will have been fired against land and sea targets. The future and significance of this system will be determined by Navy planners. But, the exhilaration of the first firing of a major caliber gun from a destroyer—a U. S. Navy destroyer— can never be duplicated.
Another Problem in Resource Allocation— The Radio Frequency Spectrum Shortage
By Vice Admiral Jon L. Boyes, U. S.
Navy, Director Command and Control and Communications (C3) Programs, and Mr. Frank L. Frisbie, Special Assistant for Electromagnetic Spectrum Matters
The U. S. Navy, like any large corporation, is constantly faced with resource allocation decisions. This means budget and personnel adjustments which are as much a part of the everyday business of the modern defense establishment as is the allocation of such things as gasoline, copper, and even denim. Yet, there is another limited natural resource which must be judiciously allocated and managed if the Navy and indeed the U. S. Government are going to be able to continue to conduct business as usual. This resource is the radio frequency spectrum.
The radio frequency spectrum has been called the invisible resource, and perhaps it is this lack of substance that makes consideration of a shortage difficult. The general public and even the communications/electronics (C-E) manufacturers and operators do not seem to be able to grasp the gravity of the situation.
The symptoms of an impending problem are manifold. They range from difficulties within the high councils of U.N. organizations to the difficulties encountered in using a walkie-talkie because of the multitude of equipment in the citizen’s band. In the national government arena, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) of necessity now requires that suitable frequencies be identified before it will allocate funds for a radiating communications/electronics system, and manufacturers are now strapped with more stringent electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) requirements.
On the world front, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), a 140-nation U. N. organization established to set international telecommunication regulations and to allocate radio
frequencies, held a conference in Malaga-Torremolinos, Spain in late 1973. The proceedings convened in an atmosphere charged with tension between the technologically emerging nations and the technologically developed nations as politics and alienation were the orders of the day. Immediately, things began to happen that threatened to undermine the foundations of the ITU, which could in turn jeopardize the present cooperative collective use of the spectrum by all nations. Some countries and political jurisdictions were stripped of their right to participate in the union because of "political sins,” irrespective of the fact that their use of the radio spectrum dictated the necessity of their participation. At the same time, it was decided that "liberation groups” could participate in the union even though they had no legal radio operations and few of the illegal variety.
In the spring of 1974, political interference at the World Administrative Radio Conference, a specialized and presumably more technically-oriented meeting of the ITU Maritime Mobile Telecommunication interests,, was evident even at the sub-working group level where the detailed task of fashioning new rules is accomplished. The conference decided to abolish, for high frequency (HF) radiotelephone, the seniority date system which heretofore had accorded the first registered user of a frequency the right of freedom from interference caused by later registrants.
This system had served as the final arbiter of disputes regarding interference and had protected existing operations. Some countries, however, viewed the system as another form of colonialism. These countries felt that the structure of the radio regulations was a restraint on the new nations, and that it was constructed to serve those old established countries whose resources and technology had developed early in the century.
Under the banner of equal rights f°r all, a bloc of 40 countries devised a system of allotments for the HF Maritime Radiotelephone Service whereby old and new countries alike would have equal rights. They would have these rights irrespective of whether or not they had a demonstrated need, a merchant fleet, or even the transmitting equipment with which to establish a service.
As a result of these actions, the entire HF radiotelephone plan was revised without benefit of any technical criteria. While chaos is the prognosis for the HF radiotelephone service, even more importantly, the precedent for extending this irrationality to other frequency bands and services has been established.
The recent turn of events prompted FCC Commissioner Robert E. Lee, head of the U. S. delegation to the latter conference, to say that "we should begin to look for an alternative forum to resolve the kind of issues that the ITU was once attuned to handle.” Unfortunately, more recent evidence strongly suggests that this trend toward the substitution of politically-motivated action for the soundly-based technical regulation which has been the ITU hallmark in the past will continue.
While "equal rights for all” is a noble sentiment, it is, in this case, the misguided cry of those who want to tear down laws to achieve some transitory and illusory political principle. The approach of the emerging nations should be restrained to ensure that the utility of the spectrum resource is preserved for them, as well as for today’s users. No nation or bloc of nations should seek t0 politically dominate the regulation of the radio frequency spectrum.
At this time, the complexity of radio systems, their number, and their importance are reaching an all-time high. As a result, radio regulations are now particularly important. Those who view this resource as a negotiable commodity to be bartered for political advantage must be made to realize that their own development is dependent upon good communications, and radio, not wire- hne, is the way to establish these links Quickly and efficiently.
In addition to international telecommunications problems, the United States faces a related problem: a shortage of frequency managers. Who is going to sound the alarm?
The shortage of frequency managers in this country has reached crisis proportions. As an example, of the 40 technocrats who represented the United States at the last General World Administrative Radio Conference in 1959 (the last conference which treated the totality of the radio regulations), only one will he available to serve as a delegate at the next one, scheduled to be held in 1979- The accelerated attrition resulting from the departure of the World War II crop of technical experts has hit the spectrum management community hard. This attrition is also evident at the senior government frequency management forum tv here there will be a very rapid turnover of senior advisors in the next few years.
One reason for this generation gap is that there have been very few frequency managers all along. In all too many cases, replacements were not developed because staff limitations precluded establishing a line of succession. The effects of this situation on the military spectrum management officer over the past few years are shown in the table below.
The situation has been recognized by Table t
Spectrum Management Staff
| 1967 | 1973 |
Army | 50 | 27 |
Air Force | 36 | 24 |
Navy | 58 | 25 |
the Office of Telecommunications Policy in the Executive Office of the President, which has commissioned a group to look into ways to try to alleviate the problem. This is a most difficult assignment, for even the most inventive solutions give little promise of being able to solve the problem in the short term because radio frequency management is done by experts who meld years of experience with a curious blend of electronics, politics, and not a little bit of larceny. They justify requirements, horse-trade, coerce, bluff, and gamble with an intuition that cannot be taught other than by long experience. So, for the next five to ten years, the United States will be doing business with considerably less consolidated expertise than it has had for the last three decades.
Over the past 20 years, the communications industry and the sale of electronic goods have increased in excess of five times. However, if we now fail to face reality regarding our dependence upon the radio frequency spectrum and our dependence upon its good management, we will bring on disastrous results for a broad cross section of the nation’s users—disaster relief agencies, defense, air traffic control, entertainment, and NASA, to mention a few. Also, what will happen to an economy which now reaps $32 billion annually from the spectrum- dependent portion of the communi- cations/electronics industry? Could we tolerate a "regulatory” system wherein a Western Hemisphere nation with which the United States shares the equatorial satellite orbit has decided to use frequencies from satellites which interfere with critical terrestrial U. S. communications and had ITU sanction?
We must recognize that there will never be a time when the United States will achieve spectrum self-sufficiency. Therefore, we had better set about doing the things which will decrease our vulnerability to the external influences and simultaneously nurture and preserve our internal mechanisms so that we can apply a unified approach to the pressures of a changing world.
Currently there are about 80 people engaged in frequency management in the Washington DoD community. The 80 can be divided into approximately two equal groups: professionals (i.e., professional frequency managers); and nonprofessionals (i.e., record clerks, ADP operators, and other administrative support personnel). The former group must be augmented now because attrition threatens them; these are the individuals who must provide the guidance in the development of spectrum-dependent equipments and ensure mutual compatibility among the multitude of commu- nications/electronics systems of the DoD, the United States, and our allies.
In addition, a partial remedy may be found through the further application of technology which has permitted the upper boundary of the usable frequency spectrum to be raised significantly since the end of World War II. Modulation techniques, antenna development, and satellite options offer us dramatic opportunities to circumvent the spectrum crisis if we are willing to get started now. We must be willing to scrap outdated, and as a result inhibiting, com- munications/electronics systems and invest in the future.
Finally, we must excercise and encourage self-restraint. All users of the radio waves must recognize that this resource should be conserved for only critical uses.
There is a requirement for men, money, technology and self-restraint, but more importantly there is an urgent requirement for a significant increase in national awareness of this crisis. For its part, the Navy, which has historically been a leader in the field, is becoming reawakened to this subject. As the planning for the 1979 General World Administrative Radio Conference begins to gather momentum, the Navy gives evidence of making the sacrifices necessary to insure that any further loss of ITU potency does not come as a result of poor performance on the U. S. side. For example, the Navy is using higher frequency bands and more complex modulation forms to reduce susceptibility to interference, cooperating with major user nations, and decreasing its reliance on transducer/receiver sites located on foreign soil. Simultaneously, the Navy recognizes the possibility that the rules of the game may be changed, like it or not, and efforts are being accelerated to minimize the impact of that development.
Missions and Concept of the Federal German Navy
By Commander Karl-Heinz Reichert, Federal German Navy, Instructor on the Armed Forces Staff and Commander Franz-Dieter Braun, Federal German Navy, Commanding Officer of the FGS Schleswig-Holstein (DD-182)
Ten years after World War II, the Parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany decided that armed forces should be formed and that the Federal Republic should join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In 1956, the first officers and enlisted men of the new Federal German Navy took up their duties.
Since joining NATO, one of the governing factors in the German security policy and, hence, in the concept of the German Navy has been, and continues to be, the Federal Republic’s dependence on, and dedication to, the common
defense of the Atlantic Alliance. The execution of the German Navy’s missions and its force requirements can only be regarded as a contribution to, and in the context of, the common defense effort and must therefore be governed by the following factors:
► In the context of the defense of NATO as a whole, it is obvious that the strategic essence of the German Navy’s wartime mission is to deny the Soviet Navy the use of the sea lines of communication between the Baltic and the Atlantic. This mission is defensive in nature because it is the Soviet Navy’s strategic aim and capabilities in the Baltic Approaches area which dictate the German Navy’s response. Since the Soviets regard this area as an entity and, since their military options include a simultaneous surprise attack against the Baltic Approaches from the Baltic and North Sea, the German Navy is well advised to regard this area as a single entity and is prepared for a flexible and balanced concept of operations.
NORTH ‘Sea
NORWAY
THE
SKAW
THE\ \ KATTEGAT1
DENMARK
Liibeck
ivemunde
SWEDEN
Helsinki i*
Leningrad
Stockholm
GOTLAND
Tallinn
SKANE Kar'skrona^ PENINSULA
BORNHOLM
Pillau (Baltiisk)
* • Konigsberg (Kaliningrad)
POLAND
'Stettin (Szczecin)
NETHERLANDS WEST GERMANY
L EAST GERMANY /
Swinemunde (Swinoujscie)
► In the light of the inferiority of NATO land forces permanently stationed in the Baltic Approaches and in South Norway against the forces which the Warsaw
■ PiT.r,T.H /
• LX--
Missile-equipped fast patrol boats play an important role in the German Navy’s plans and missions. Pictured here are the 200-foot Type 143 (top) and the 134-foot Type 148 missile patrol boats.
JJ ' Thl
Pact would be capable of concentrating there, the Alliance’s ability to reinforce these defense positions becomes of paramount importance. NATO’s ability to defend this area is, during war, a prerequisite for the cohesion of the Central and Northern Regions in the European theater as well as for its deterrent credibility in Northern Europe in general. In this context the credibility of NATO’s deterrent strength is twofold: (1) the Soviets must be convinced that an armed attack would include severe risks and would not necessarily be successful; and (2) every single NATO ally must be convinced that its national security is best assured by the united strength and unity of purpose of the Atlantic Alliance. Thus NATO’s ability to reinforce and resupply the Baltic Approaches and South Norway plays a vital part in the common defense concept, and this ability depends upon the capability to maintain control of the North Sea. The necessity of maintaining this capability is further influenced by the growing strategic and economic significance of the North Sea as it becomes a source of oil and gas. Although primarily committed to the Baltic Approaches area, the German naval contribution should allow for the possibility that other North Sea littoral states may, to an increasing extent, be forced to concentrate naval assets against the threat outside the North Sea.
^ These factors notwithstanding, a mere look at the map demonstrates that the main naval threat in the Baltic Approaches area is directed against German and Danish territory. The primary concern of the German and Royal Danish Navies must, therefore, be to develop and maintain a credible capability to repel seaborne attacks against their countries’ coasts and to maintain control of the Danish Straits and Western Baltic, and, if such control is lost, to prevent Warsaw Pact control of these areas.
► Since the surprise attack is a Warsaw Pact option in the Baltic Approaches area, it follows that the size of these two navies must be such that they are able to survive such strikes and repel assaults during the early stages of war without outside assistance.
► Finally it is considered to be a prerequisite for the success of NATO’s strategy that there be no gap in deterrence and defense. There should be no Warsaw Pact potential threat which NATO is not prepared to deter and defend against. The deterrent strength is posed by the total potential of NATO. However, only the German and the Royal Danish navies are continuously present in the Baltic Approaches area.
The missions of the Federal German Navy clearly define the Baltic and North Sea as the navy’s primary operating area. As a result, German naval assets must be designed specially to meet their tasks and to operate in this area.
In the Western and Central Baltic, the Danish Straits, and the Kattegat, the German Navy must be prepared to repel attacks against these coasts and prevent the Soviet Baltic Fleet’s passage through the Danish Straits and Kattegat to the North Sea and Atlantic. This area is characterized by shallow water, many islands with narrow passages and bights, and very short distances to home and enemy coasts and bases. This environment requires extremely short reaction times for command and control, a high survivability of forces, and the ability to concentrate effective forces on short notice. The optimum equipment for operations in this confined area are
MARINEAMT
t
MARINEAMT
attack aircraft, a combination of surface- to-surface missile (SSM)-equipped fast patrol boats, air-to-surface missile (ASM)- equipped helicopters, and mines with an associated mine-laying capability.
Warsaw Pact forces can utilize the Eastern and Northern Baltic to assemble and resupply amphibious forces for assaults against NATO territory in the Western Baltic and North Germany. Therefore, one of the tasks in the German Navy’s mission is to impede the Warsaw Pact’s free use of that area and contain part of its forces there. The area itself is less confined than the Western Baltic; nevertheless, the Warsaw Pact maintains complete surveillance of the area and has the capability to concentrate superior combat power in any position within one hour. However, NATO’s lack of secure lines of communication to its bases suggests that NATO surface forces will not normally be operated there. To achieve its tasks in the area, and given the water depths and hydrographic conditions, the German Navy favors the use of coastal submarines with long- range torpedoes. Attack aircraft, flying at low altitudes, can also be operated within acceptable risk levels against priority targets.
In the North Sea, including the
Skagerrak, the German Navy’s tasks are to repel attacks against NATO coasts, to ensure use of this area for German purposes, and to prevent the Soviet Baltic Fleet’s further access to the Atlantic in case it should have gained access to the North Sea. The North Sea and Skagerrak are, compared to the Baltic, characterized by far heavier weather and sea states (e.g. patrol boat-type units cannot be operated for about 25% of the year), greater water depths in the northern reaches, far greater distances in general (greatest distances: North to South about 550 nm. East to West about 350 nm., approximately the size of the Gulf of Tonkin), and by the fact that they are exclusively bordered by NATO countries. To threaten NATO’s control of this area in war, Warsaw Pact forces could operate submarines in the deeper northern and central areas, lay mines in the shallower southeastern sections with submarines and aircraft, and attack NATO forces and shipping with aircraft. It is also within their capabilities to deploy surface and amphibious forces to the North Sea before any outbreak of hostilities in order to facilitate the seizure of the Baltic Approaches from both sides. To counter this threat destroyer- type units with missiles and helicopters are required for the backbone of defense, supported by maritime patrol aircraft, fighter-bombers, and submarines. In addition, an efficient mine countermeasure (MCM) capability is required.
In summary, for the German Navy to achieve its role in defense of the Baltic and North Sea, her fleet should contain the following types of naval units: missile-equipped fast patrol boats and helicopters, attack aircraft, minelayers, submarines, destroyer types with missiles and helicopters, maritime patrol aircraft, mine countermeasure forces, and auxiliaries for afloat logistic support of combat units.
Mission threat, environmental factors, and current NATO strategy determine the theoretical composition of the German Fleet in terms of types of units. Domestic budgetarial realities determine the fleet’s size in numbers. All factors considered, full implementation of what would be necessary will not be possible. The German Fleet of the early Seventies was only able to fulfill its tasks to a very limited extent because it lacked a sufficient number of ships and sophisticated equipment, and what ships and weapon systems that were available suffered from obsolescence. Since the main naval threat to the Baltic Approaches is considered to be directed against NATO territory in the Baltic, the German naval modernization program’s first stage called for improvement of the defense capabilities in the Baltic. This initial stage is currently in progress and will be completed in 1978. It involves:
► Replacement of the fast patrol boats by a new generation of units equipped with Exocet missiles and wire-guided long-range torpedoes
► Acquisition of 18 additional coastal submarines
^ Acquisition of a stand-off asms for attack aircraft
^ Development of computer-assisted command and control systems
The second stage of the German ftiodernization program, scheduled to be completed about 1985, will further improve the Baltic component because it calls for the F-104 attack aircraft to be replaced (probably by the European MRCA). This stage also provides for the modernization of the North Sea component to be commenced and includes replacement of the Fletcher, Koln, and Thetis-class units by a new type frigate with surface-to-surface missiles and helicopters. Included also are replacement of the Breguet-Atlantic maritime patrol aircraft by a new type, possibly the S-3A Viking, and conversion of some coastal minesweepers to minehunters and modernization of the remaining MCM units.
In yet another stage, the remainder of today’s fleet will have to be replaced— mainly the Hamburg-class destroyers and the MCM units—and a further increase of combat effectiveness in the Baltic is planned in the form of missile-carrying helicopters and new mine-layers.
The implementation of these plans will result—with the exception of the Liitjms-chss DDGs—in an entirely new German Fleet, slightly reduced in numbers but with a considerably increased combat power. Its improved capabilities will give it a better chance to fulfill its missions and, thus, contribute to the preservation of peace by deterrence.
Table 1 General German Fleet Development 1975-1985
Type | Class |
| Humber | in Service | Remarks |
|
| 1975 | 1978 | 1985 |
|
| Liitjens | 3 | 3 | 3 | Modernization follows refit of U. S. Charles F. Adams-class DDGs |
destroyers/ | Hamburg | 4 | 4 | 4 | Exocet SSMs to be fitted until 1978; replacement after 1985 |
frigates | Koln | 6 | 6 | — |
|
| Fletcher | 4 | 4 | — | First ships to be replaced |
| Thetis | 5 | 5 | — |
|
| New Project | — | — | (8) | Final number not yet decided upon |
| 142 (Zobel) | 10 | — | — | Converted Zobel class |
| 148 | 20 | 20 | 20 | French-built Combattante II class |
fast PATROL | 143 | — | 10 | 10 | German built; computer assisted |
BOATS | New Project |
| 10 | 10 | combat information system Probably hydrofoil—presently under |
|
|
|
| (increasing) | development in the United States |
| 205 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
|
SUBMARINES | 206 | 18 | 18 | 18 |
|
| Various (MSC, MSI) | 55 | 39 | (decreasing | Schutze, Frauenlob. and A nadne-classes |
|
|
| number) | also have capable of minelaying | |
MINE COUNTERMEASURE | Flensburg | 2 | 12 | 12 | Converted Lindau class |
VESSELS | New Project | — | 6 | 6 | Guidance vessel for three remotely |
|
|
|
| (increasing) | controlled MCM-vehicles; converted Lindau class |
AMPHIBIOUS VESSELS | Butt | 22 | 22 | 22 |
|
ATTACK | F-104G | 4 | 4 | — | After 1976 will be fitted with ASMS |
AIRCRAFT SQUADRONS | MRCA | — | — | 4 |
|
MARITIME | Brequet-Atlantic | 10 | 20 | — |
|
PATROL AIRCRAFT | New Project | — | — | 15 | Probably S-3A Viking after 1980 |
TENDERS, | Various | 37 | 37 | 37 |
|
AUXILIARIES