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We continue to perpetuate the myth that our mine countermeasures forces are capable of clearing an enemy minefield in a timely manner. They are not. Even at full strength they were not. And the ??iiners will remain several steps ahead of the mined as long as we continue to be oriented toward fooling the mine into detonating on a phony signal.
;canS
yet
the
developed the first magnetic influence mines. They not used extensively, though, until 1939 when^ Germans began planting their new "secret weapon ^ British waters. The straight-tail or diverted-jig naag110 , sweeps we use today are essentially the same design those developed in World War II to counter the man mine threat. Various acoustic minesweeping
devi^
mind'
Pressure mines were introduced late in the war by
deveW
a suitable pressure sweep—often producing fl Goldberg devices in the process—there still retnam^ effective way to sweep pressure combination
f0lti!
imperative that we develop rapidly a reliable ^
them. Although many attempts were made to
magnetic signatures actuate a sensitive
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tor. And though the helicopter is not particu
larly
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In developing new mine countermeasures systems to replace those now being phased out, the U. S. Navy must come up with systems able to counter current enemy mining threats effectively and designed so that future mining innovations will not soon render them obsolete. To accomplish this goal, the Navy will have to de-emphasize its traditional method of detonating mines by simulating target ships. It must concede the inadequacies of present minehunting/neutralization systems and develop reliable new ones through increased technology, funding, and priorities.
Fleet cutbacks have hit the mine force particularly hard. Nearly all of the ocean minesweepers (MSOs) capable of immediate response to a mine threat are now in the Naval Reserve Force. The last coastal minesweepers (MSCs) recently went out of service. The Navy’s few remaining mine warfare "experts” would argue that such cutbacks constitute a "monumental folly.”* But the cuts are not surprising at a time when funds are short and the Navy’s top officials lack mine warfare experience.
The Navy is run by destroyermen, aviators, and submariners. It is inconceivable that they would impose additional sacrifices on their own resources in order to maintain a force of slow, wooden ships for contingency purposes only. Because of their slowness, lack of firepower, and the continual training required to keep fantail crews sharp, wooden minesweepers are suited for little else besides a limited capability to sweep mines. The RH-53 minesweeping helicopters are even less capable, although they do have the advantage of being able to sweep into shallow water, and they risk fewer crew members.
The RH-53 played a dominant role during the North Vietnam sweep because that operation was conducted against the very sensitive Mk 36 destructor in areas where the water was almost always less than 30 feet deep. It would have been suicidal for surface minesweepers to have attempted to sweep such inshore areas. The Mk 103 helicopter gear for sweeping moored mines (none of which was used in North Vietnam) is only capable of cutting the cables of moored mines which have the explosive mine case relatively close to the surface. When the Mk 103 was being used extensively in exercises off Charleston in 1971-1972, approximately one set of sweep gear was lost for every moored mine swept—not a very cost-effective method.
Against sweepable minefields, helicopters do complement the surface sweepers by cleaning up the shallow water areas where surface ships would be exposed to increased threat from sensitive mines or where maneuvering restrictions would make surface sweep111? virtually impossible.
Current mine countermeasures are not really vC(J modern. They are, for the most part, merely refinerr.entS of equipment and techniques developed several #sis ago. Mine countermeasures have usually evolved as result of innovations in mining itself. Thus, the mi11111? experts have always managed to stay at least one steP ahead of the mine countermeasures people.
The earliest mines in use on a large scale were c0[1 tact mines, usually moored in fixed positions and & quiring a target ship to make physical or electrlC^ contact with the mine. The countermeasure develops was the mechanical sweep consisting of wire, cuttC^’ diverters, and floats to support the wire—basically 1 same moored minesweeping gear we have today- ^ut ing World War I, the Germans, British, and Amcr1' were developed to counter German acoustic - ^
Germany and the United States, but they were sparingly since both nations feared having to
Primarily for this reason, as well as others that a de-emphasis of detonating mines is called f°r- . ,
a reliable [2]
detection and neutralization system.
• of1
The current concept of minesweeping consists helicopter or surface ship dragging at a safe d*st3 ( astern a "sweep” designed to simulate the passag 1 a target ship. Theoretically the towing vehicle 15 1 visible to the mine because of its extremely small ' netic and acoustic signatures. Modern mines, h0^ ^ are extremely sensitive and have made the towing cle very visible indeed. Even the helicopter is vU ^ ble. Helicopter rotor noise can easily actuate aC°Uset mines of certain frequencies. In some cases, it can off sensitive magnetic mines.
During the North Vietnam operation, pil°ts ^ cautioned against flying below a certain height leSt Mk 36 « nerable to the damaging shock wave from a }$ mine detonation, in relatively shallow water (sU
hnce,
various "progressive” sweeping tactics can be
to minimize the risk. These tactics, however,
are
Raters require the mine to be satisfied that it has deta tarSet ship pass several times before it will de0nate on the last count. Delayed arming times ren- rnines unreceptive to influences until the arming
U>lSWi and
qj*tru, of
ct features, and if they had contained batteries
^countered in most minable harbors) a bottom mine Ration can produce a water plume several times ^ C^an C^e towlng altitude of the helicopter. lng these sweeper risks into consideration, as most eneld planners know, a few "antisweeper” mines sj\ ikied in with those designed to detonate on other
Ps can create heavy losses to mine countermeasures Chicles.
n cases where sweeper safety is of primary impor-
^ployed
even more time-consuming. Minesweeping can also time-consuming because of other devices. Ship
ays have expired. The mines would therefore be cepable while unarmed and could become armed ^ poised” after minesweeping efforts had ceased. jt$avigational errors, coupled with the imprecise lim- uj ^ Sweep influences, force us to use statistical tQ °hs to determine how many passes are required dj WeeP ah the mines in an area. This statistical process actnal 1 S f^at many more passes be made than are great] y required. The probability of detonating mines decreases on the final passes, but unless these suj^ 'n^y fruitless passes are made, there will not be hig^"lent confidence to warrant risking the transit of Value ships through the area.
^°tth^e aPProximately 11,000 U. S. mines planted in dc<.. Vietnam had not had sterilization and self- opern ehnite active life, then the completion of that |jjTtl0n would have been measured in years rather *0u,dmonths- Hundreds of passes over each minefield caju , ^ave been required. Equipment and personnel Sttles probably would have been high. are _atjsrical techniques for evaluating sweeping success only as g°°d as rhe assumptions upon which ^ased. Against known mine types of known tate h, ^ sett*ngs, rfiese evaluations can be fairly accu- are ’ Ut aSa>nst the unknown enemy mine threat they Styee^^y ec^ucated guesses. Following exhaustive and ae^0rts> an area could easily be evaluated as "safe” ually still contain many mines posing a consid-
t^. m‘nesu’eeping has made some advances, such as ft 's helicopter to tow a Mk 105 magnetic sweep
fater ^ay< North Vietnam, mining has progressed even
to be planted in coastal areas in order to impede 0
- i , ntc[
beaches would be subjected to undertows and co
encountered in harbor entrances. Since these
mines would have been planted some time in
'scour” into the bottom eventually. It is also cone
fliK*
Even if we are so fortunate as to detect and
effici^ ilc'c
method for rendering it harmless other than coi^P
d[3]'
nique consists of vectoring a "zeebird” (a rubhef
with a nonmagnetic outboard motor) to a p°inC
42 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1975
The late Rear Admiral Charles W. Cummings, shown here inspecting mine components at Souda Bay, Crete, advocated the use of modern technology in minehunting and minesweeping.
crable threat. The mines’ logic circuits would have discriminated against the phony sweep influences and would have remained poised to detonate on real targets generating the proper rate buildup, amplitude, signal decay, and combination of influences.
We still persist, however, in conducting exercises against U. S. drill mines of known sensitivity settings and gloat over any success which we may achieve. (Even End Sweep was not a true test; all the mines had self-destructed or sterilized by the time the operation was over.) We continue to perpetuate the myth that our mine countermeasures forces are capable of clearing an enemy minefield in a timely manner. They are not. Even at full strength, they were not capable. It will remain that way as long as we continue to be oriented toward fooling the mine into detonating on a phony signal.
The alternative is to search for individual mines in a ship’s path, detect them at a safe range, and neutralize them so that the ship’s progress is relatively unimpeded. It would then make no difference whether a mine is armed or unarmed, on ship count 1 or 30, or an unsweepable pressure combination type. All mines could be cleared quickly without having to depend on a reaction by the mine mechanism. In addition, to be truly versatile, this detection and neutralization system must be capable against both bottom and moored mines, including one of the most recent and effective products of the mine development program, the Captor ASW mine. Captor consists of a Mk 46 antisubmarine torpedo housed in a capsule. Because of the mobility of the torpedo, Captor has a damage radius several times greater than any conventional mine.
Current minehunting equipment is hopelessly inadequate. The presently endorsed neutralization technique, were it not so dangerous, would be farcical. The MSCs are fitted with the AN/UQS-i minehunting sonar, the MSOs with the AN/SQQ-14 possessing better classification capabilities. But the concept of both detection systems is an outgrowth of the Navy’s attempts to locate submarines by using sound wave reflections to portray objects which are prominent within their acoustic backgrounds. Though the AN/SQQ-14 ("squeeky 14”) has at times performed exceedingly well, these times have been during ideal conditions. When a mine is lying unburied atop a smooth, unthe object being prominent on the bottom, minen ^ ing sonars are virtually worthless against mines bu" beneath mud or sand or hidden in a crevice. *
performance of many mines, particularly magnetic ^ We can expect that bottom mines will be plants the world these harbors are characterized by nan1 silty bottoms and/or currents which produce consta11^
Minehunting with conventional sonar in such an ^ would have been fruitless. We might also expect ^ the-beach amphibious assaults. In many areas currents, producing the same shifting sand cond*^ minefields would be primarily defensive in nature^ and even the slightest current would cause the*11
ble that an enemy could intentionally bury his . « in the bottom sand, thereby capitalizing on °ur bility to detect them. _ ^fjj a bottom object as minelike, we have no avoidance of the area. Our present neutralization ^
o'"
a sonar target. The boat carries explosive or disposal people carrying a suspended sonar reflcc ^ charge is lowered to the bottom and detonated c
°ut, "The technology exists.”
and efficient detection and neutralization system. tep , SUch a system is developed—and if it is truly St ]. e~~rhen it does not necessarily have to be in- c°Un °n a ^c^*cate^ "minesweeper.” This new "mine ■ termeasures weapon system” could be installed in
0
sy then the number of ships requiring such
- Crn would be greatly reduced. It is time for the
■S,
^Pposedly—to the mine. In extreme cases, a diver goes It)Wn t0 investlSate t^ae Poss^'e methods of disposal. any case, it is an unreliable, time-consuming, and , exceedingly dangerous method. After the first error j 1 e ^tempting to neutralize a 2,000-pound weapon, ^ls unlikely that many other divers will want to go areSUC^ a ^oat r^e' So-called improved techniques ln the mill, but they are merely refinements of the anae ludicrous "zeebird” method.
etter methods for hunting and neutralizing enemy Th ^ arC Poss‘^e by employing modern technology. |L? ^ate Rear Admiral Charles W. Cummings, upon E* cbarge of the Mine Force in the summer of ’ expressed surprise and dismay at the vast amount pli eC^n0l°gy wbh possible mine countermeasures ap- Varftl0nS C^at was eRber unnoticed or ignored by mine Qr are "traditionalists.” For example, lasers might be tajjSe *n both detecting and destroying mines. Infrared Lj atl0n niay be used in detecting mines, and electro- tCn^net'c radiation could possibly "zap” circuitry and pQ^er mines inoperative. As Admiral Cummings ^at' ^ nOC yet cx*st arc rbe priorities, organ- ab) °n’ an<^ funding necessary to achieve a truly reli-
nee
s,jPi r°yers, amphibious assault type vessels, or even of^ines. Each of these ships would then be capable f0j ln8 her own way through mined areas. Channels b]ttT’ercbant ships would be cleared by the least valua- c0n .'Ps having the system. If the system were self- asthe'nec^ enough to be installed in helicopters such
vat' ^avy to cease "reacting” to new mining inno- tirtlens by continuing to refine old techniques. It is Cqut0 determine exactly what is required of a mine Thrums system and then go out and build it. Wins t0P Navy officials may pay lip service to 0r future mine countermeasures capabilities, it
is doubtful that a vigorous program to develop such a system is now being seriously contemplated. Mine countermeasures are just not that important. Not yet anyway. The United States is today more vulnerable to a mining campaign than at any time in the nation’s history. With many of our resource needs being transported by sea and with our fleet concentrated at a relatively small number of bases, even a relatively crude mining operation could alter the balance of power. In 1972, the United States amply demonstrated in North Vietnam that mines could be planted by one nation against another in a situation other than total war. The enemy may not be as considerate as we were to plant sweepable mines. They may not contemplate having to clean them up afterwards.
Admittedly, no concrete design has been presented here for a detection and neutralization system to replace our present mine countermeasures systems. That is better left for physicists and technicians to develop under practical fleet guidance. The intent, rather, is to perpetuate Admiral Cummings’ idea that the mine force is technologically lagging and has probably lost its importance as a result of this lag. It is time for mine warfare "traditionalists” to regroup and approach the problem of mine countermeasures with fresh ideas, unemeumbered by the variety of devices with which we have stocked our minesweepers and the "nice tries” we have piled up in our laboratories. We don’t need a new device which can sweep only one type of mine. We don’t need a new sonar that can locate a mine under only a few conditions. We need a reliable, versatile mine countermeasures weapon system, and we need it now.
Lieutenant McCoy graduated from the University of Texas and was commissioned through the NROTC program in 1969. After serving as mine countermeasures officer in the USS Firm (MSO-444), he was ordered to the six-month Mine Warfare Staff Officers Course. Upon completion, he served as mine warfare officer for Commander Mobile Mine Countermeasures Command. During Operation End Sweep, Lieutenant McCoy formulated all detailed minesweeping instructions for both surface and airborne units and was the primary technical advisor at negotiations ashore with the North Vietnamese. Until recently, he was officer-in-charge of the USS Vim) (MSC-205).
_____________________________________________ Lady at the Helm
Approaching my third period English class in Sampson Hall at the Naval Academy, I saw a stream of water pouring from the head next to my classroom. I was assured that the matter was being taken care of, so I waded into my room and began the class as usual. A few minutes passed as the water made its way into the room. As the carpeting became increasingly inundated,
[1]See R. L. Schrcadley, "The Mine Force—Where the Fleet’s Going, It’s
Been,” September 1974 Proceedings, pp. 26-31.
[3] paused for a moment wondering whether we should move to another classroom. In that moment of silence, a midshipman generously observed: "Your first command at sea, Ma’am”.
Lieutenant (junior grade) Marlene A. Angus, U. S. Naval Reserve