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Preceding pages: One of the most powerful instruments of war ever serving an American government, Tom Paine’s Common Sense converted many otherwise indifferent colonists to the cause of revolution. An idea, once accepted by the people of a country, cannot be eradicated by an army.
In the wake of the Vietnam conflict, it should be recognized, but ofttimes is not, that the object of war is determined by policy; that the policy itself is determined by statesmen and politicians; and that they are influenced strongly by the opinions of the body politic. For this reason, public opinion gives to strategy not only its initial direction but also its continuing sustenance. It can be and it has been a decisive influence in the outcome of war.
Some, both within and without the U. S. military services, have said that the war in Vietnam did not receive public support and, following the losses of the Tet offensive, the people turned hostile to American involvement. That view, in major degree, is not accurate. It is but another of the myths which surround public opinion and mislead an evaluation of its effect upon our national security policy.
Beginning with the American Revolution and continuing unbroken to this day, there has been a strong, constant current of American opinion which has promoted the concept of raising and using the amount of force necessary to insure our freedom of action. That is, an abiding concern for our national security has been a main current in the thought of the American citizenry since our nation began. It continues, unabated, today.
Naysayers to this thesis well may point to the dismantling of the Continental forces following the Revolution and to the subsequent retrenchment policies of Jefferson as the first fallacy. It isn’t so, however, for developing our mercantile interests and opening the American frontiers were the main preoccupation of the emergent Americans. It was the frustration of their goals: the depredations of the Barbary Corsairs which
brought to being the first Federal Navy in 1794 an the continuing competition with England which ul°' mately precipitated the War of 1812. The lesson to ^ drawn is that American public opinion prefers that th|S country pursue a course of peaceful cooperation competition as it gets along with other countries 111 the world, but that challenges to our freedom of actio11 and our goals can be and will be met by force if be the necessary course.
It is the perception of the need to use force an the assessment on the part of the public of the util1? of that use in gaining our desired goals which h*'‘ been the keys to American public opinion as appl‘eLj to national security policy. We can better understan why this is so by taking a new look at public opini011 in operation. Perhaps it will assist us in evaluating 01,1 current condition and give us, as well, an insight in11 the future.
Opinion isn’t attitude, though a quick trip to aa from the dictionary doesn’t serve us well in maW the distinction.
Each one of us comes equipped with a unique sCl of attitudes: our own predispositions to look at part10 ular things in certain ways. Attitudes are learned an they are continually modified throughout our liveslC a constant process of refinement.
Public Opinion _ x
Opinions, on the other hand, can change quic^). An interesting thing about them is that, for most 0 us, they are polarized into negatives and positives. ^ important example of such polarization of opinion s° can be seen in most Americans’ view of the Far £a\ and the changes in that view which have occurs within our lifetimes. In the opinion of most Am°rl cans during the 1930s, Japan was a ruthless aggress0', against the Chinese who were putting up a heroic a0 patriotic resistance. As the United States entered ^
r c \\i
war, these views became accentuated by visions of 1 suicidal fanaticism of the Japanese kamikaze. Through out that period, the Chinese were viewed as patio1' long-suffering, oppressed people worthy of our suppott Following the end of the war, China’s "fall” to co?1 munism saw the collateral development of Japan inf0 a prosperous, friendly, democratic, and peaceful nati°^ The time was right for an opinion shift. The Japan0'1 now became the industrious models of our admirartl,|! while the Chinese assumed the role of the inscrutable fanatical zealots.
President Nixon’s visit to Peking, however, set stage for the newest twist. Suddenly, once again $ Americans began to see the Chinese as idealistic, haf
The Effect of Public Opinion Upon National Security Policy 121
set of
new°Wn m*n^s makes it easier for each of us to accept w information, categorize it, and file it under plus 0r minus. 6 F
^escribing how Americans look or have looked
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abo
an opinion can be absolute, carrying both in
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should have led U. S. citizens to hold opinions
Wor 'ng people who have carried forward a major aruJCm■ 'an<^ re^orm> have cleaned up their country,
ehminated hunger and disease. In the place of ‘ration for Japanese industry came a suspicion of norruc grasping and images of a teeming, polluted Untry. While neither the negative nor the positive
0r minus De
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^P°n the Far East is assuming not only something ??C °P*n‘on but something rather specific about lc opinion. Public opinion is a valid term for , . things, and it is appropriate to establish just
rime ^ ^ubbc °P‘nron you are considering at any given Qr^e' Attaching the word public to opinion may yield e °f three meanings: (1) that the opinions are ex- Puhr Poblicly, or (2) that the opinions are about 1C a^a‘rs, or (3) that the opinion is held by the P hr public ratber than by a small group or a specific affai *C ^°me issues of great magnitude, the Watergate erair b)r instance, encompass all these meanings. Oth- > covert dissent in China for instance, would not c .Dllc opinion under the first meaning, would most k Inv be under the second, and probably would not
Public opinion under the third. jn be public opinion exists as a cultural universal its • C ?ense tbat beliefs are held by most of a people, Pin l®n’^cance as a factor in government had its begin** 0nly as recently as the American and French acce[Utlons- Its evolution as a political force has been Pol' Crate<^ bY mass media and modern techniques of jbcai organization.
run” tbe United States, the range of public opinion thr ^rorn the subjects of concern at town meetings ^ national domestic policy, and on to foreign |n before we can delve into how this force operates fill C politico-military affairs, it will be help-
affeexamine the functions of public opinion as they an(jCt individual American, his group organization, ls affiliations.
Opinion and the Individual Man of ■ b‘ng opinions helps all of us process new bits late • °rmation which we receive. Newspaper articles to *n concerning the Franco-American contest
fit>hCe Wb*cb would supply the new NATO lightweight
enter j i_ > i T r • • i . i • •
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the rrencb and their arms industry, the Germans and
j °tber allies who would share in the production, develop some concept of NATO and its relation e United States. They should also have an opin- of the forces possessed by the Warsaw Pact. Opinions on those subjects, among others, assist us in our view of the aircraft competition with France.
This concept of public opinion functioning as a shorthand method for looking out on the world around us was identified by Walter Lippmann in 1922. Since that time there have been a number of major studies which have supported that thesis.
The concept of how people think, in terms of the function of their opinions, is different from classical democratic theory in which each member of the society studies objectively each issue and then votes according to his concept of what will best serve the public good. People in real life and with personal opinions do not operate that way. There are other factors which cause them to behave differently.
The Character of Opinions
Not all of anyone’s opinions have the same meaning or importance to that person; they are not all equally central to his concerns.
Information about a subject and the organization of that information are the aspects of an opinion known as differentiation. One man’s view of Russia, for instance, may be a highly simplistic, subjective opinion while another may hold a larger opinion comprised of many aspects: Russia as an imperialistic nation; Russia composed of many peoples and many states; Russia as a country capable of producing great literature, art, and music. The latter opinion is a highly differentiated view of Russia.
The organization of that opinion of Russia is highly important. The highest stratum within the differentiated view may be the perception of Russia as a political system with an absence of personal liberty, with the other aspects of the opinion subordinated to that. Recent readers of Alexander Solzhenitsyn may have organized differentiated opinions of Russia in that manner.
Another characteristic of an opinion is its time perspective. One’s view of this nation’s progress in preserving our ecology can cast an opinion of imminent peril or of steadfast and logical improvement, depending upon one’s perspective of time.
Another characteristic of an opinion, akin to differentiation, is the sum of information available on the subject of any opinion, the total of the knowledge which was used to construct that opinion. In the example of a differentiated view of Russia, the many parts, such as Russia as an imperialistic nation, were subjective summaries and were based upon many things other than purely available information, chief among them the selectivity shown in seeking or assimilating certain information.
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lar product and the people who used that product.
result saw some cigarette companies advertising ",1: a theme evocative of the outdoors while others pic*^
time events have led to a less attractive picture of students as being, if not violent in the cause of ’peace, ” at least lazy, unkempt, and ill-disciplined. The influence of such opinion on the support people give to education has been catastrophic to many colleges and universities.
In the orientation of an opinion we arrive at the characteristic which will demonstrate the tendency of that opinion toward action. In the abstract, there are four possible action tendencies: approach, indifference, avoidance, and hostility, with indifference a tendency to non-action. In the action aspects, the orientation of opinions concerning school busing in certain parts of the country translate quite readily from the abstract.
The final characteristic of an opinion is its policy stand, its indication of a preference for a defined P° icy. Most of the work being done in public opir>‘ol! polling attempts to discover the policy stands of pies of the population chosen by scientific mejn Opinion polling is highly accurate in many of findings, especially in polls designed to indicate ^ choices or policy preferences of respondents. In arriw at opinion sampling on emotionally held issues, h0<l ever, pollsters have found that what people say oftt; is not what they mean. Despite tests for internal c°f sistency in polling, it is not unusual for a commit*1111 thought to have liberal views concerning school >nIf gration to be blown apart when the action acttf*® comes.
Identification by Opinion
Many opinions which people hold are held b that opinion serves to identify the individual wit^ group to which he belongs, or wishes to belong- is, in short, a social identification. A tremend011 amount of research has been done in this field in 1 investigation of political party organization. AH1 with this research has been another perhaps more in[f! esting, if less scientifically sound, area called mot>v> tional research. Initially this research was pointed 11 an examination, for advertising and marketing Pu' poses, of the images which people held of any par**1-' themes suggesting that distinguished and sophistic:*1 people smoked their products.
Similar kinds of motivations enter into choices . foods, hair sprays, automobiles, after-shave lotions, $ even furniture. Whatever may be one’s feelings ab°, the results of this motivational research, it will be l*;lt to deny its success, at least in the consumable prod**1' area. Who, five years ago, would have believed d1’ men would be dressing in pink suits, would wear
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s- unless, of course, his identification with that
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bis membership in another group which may hold v*ew that such an installation is a strategic impera-
w “5 an<^ ^lue P^atf°rm shoes with high heels and thoU US*n& ^air sPray? There are such men now, °ugh we may wonder just who is trying to identify Wlt« what.
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r°up Membership and Common Opinion a very group has its own set of identifying symbols: aCr?c'^x> a hardhat, a flag, brown khakis and a swastika and, long hair and dirty blue denims, or whatever. pac^e ^mbols set that group apart from other groups. Od' ■ rouP bas, as well, an identifying set of common t|^ lons t0 which its membership subscribes just as of>% as to the visible symbols. For a member at group to hold views different from those es- S(m by the group will be more shocking to the e|$e ership than if those views were held by someone jjarorn another group whose views were more in jtrm°ny with the differing view. In such a condition, Fo;°u* be normal to ostracize the dissenting member. Wh' reason> most people avoid holding opinions ^ are inconsistent with the opinions held com- that ^ wbhin their group. It is not likely, therefore, a Sa 3 mernber °f a group in Wisconsin which opposes ******* installation on ecological grounds will be Ru it0 a presentation of acceptable ecological safe gtou S,< Un^ess’ course> bis identification with that tha^ S ec°logical stand is of lesser importance to him the tive.
^C0Pe °f Opinion
att- Cb °f us comes equipped with a unique set of °Ur wb*cb are both a part of and supportive of °Ur ?ersonabty. Our upbringing, our mental capacity, °the 0rma^ education as well as the sum of all of our prc^r experience are factors which go to make up our wa s1SP0sati°n to look at certain subjects in certain
In a real sense, however, our opinions are limited; bounded by our experience and by the information we are able to digest. Given limited opportunity to experience first hand, most of us are dependent upon communication systems for the information of the world around us. It is really the scope of the communication system which determines the bounds of public concern. A good case can be made, in turn, for social, political, and economic bounds upon that communication system. Whatever may have been our attitudes toward the Greco-Turkish problem on Cyprus, barring first-hand experience with the events of last summer and fall, our opinions concerning that situation were formed by combinations of our social values, our political system which identified the issues in our own political and strategic terms, our economic system which set forth some measure of values at stake and, most importantly, the communication system from which we received information which had been tuned to our social, economic, and political frequencies.
Information and Our Communication Systems
In traditional societies, the passing of information in the village was done from person to person. For certain kinds of communications, that same interpersonal, face-to-face communication system works today. Working in a complementary fashion, but with probably different effect, is a highly sophisticated system of mass communications.
Huge changes have occurred in the transformation of what once was a traditional society into our modern urbanized society. Technology has given us the means of public communications as well: high speed printing presses, rapid and efficient distribution systems for the printed word, and electronic broadcasting. At no time in our past has so much information been available to so many.
In the earlier days of communications research, these tools of mass communication were viewed with some alarm as having potentially devastating effects upon a large and innocent audience. It was a view of an allpowerful system able to impress its ideas and messages upon a population; widely scattered, disconnected one from the other, and defenseless. Evidence of the manipulative power of the public communications industry supposedly was drawn from such events as the role of the newspapers in arousing public support for the Spanish-American War, the apparent power of the Nazi propaganda machine in influencing German citizens in World War II, and a fear of Madison Avenue techniques and influence on our behavior as consumers and voters. This notion of a hypodermic needle effect, the
direct injection of attitudes or opinions, and the influence by instruments of public communications upon men’s minds, largely has been discarded, although vestiges of that view pop up from time to time.
The idea which supplanted the hypodermic theory is that an intervening variable operates between the instrument of communication and the individual in the audience—an opinion leader. This idea sets forth a new model of communications, the two-step flow. The theory suggests that information messages from newspapers, magazines, or television flow to persons in the mass audience who are especially interested in them and, in turn, flow from those interested people, the opinion leaders, to less active persons, those who are their followers. It is an interesting concept because it realizes a limit to the influence of mass communications and recognizes that people play a thinking role in the communications process. No longer are individuals disconnected from one another and hooked directly to the vehicle of mass communication, but, rather, people are gathering information, forming viewpoints and interacting with each other. Recent research tells us that, while useful in the evolution of communication theory, the two-step flow model of modern communications hasn’t got the process precisely right.
How We Communicate
Actually, communication is a combination of the hypodermic needle in a certain limited sense and a refinement of the two-step flow into a multi-step flow. If we watch a television commentator who seems to be an authority on a particular subject, it is likely that we will be influenced directly by his thoughts if they fit our own—a direct injection. If we disagree, or for some reason doubt his authority on that subject, we are likely to seek other views if we’re active communicators ourselves, or, at least, to listen to one or more others whose knowledge or opinions we regard more highly. While some individuals will receive a message directly from some source of mass communications, others may be several times removed from the message’s origin. The number of strata in the removal seems to be dictated by the nature of the message, the ready
What a powerful symbol the cross is. To some it means the love of God and a life everlasting. To others it means ignorance, hate, and repression. It is through such symbols as this that we signify to others our beliefs and it is to these symbols—the shorthand of commitment—that others respond. Religious symbols evoke mixed responses. Others, such as the swastika, speak to us of unmixed evil.
availability of the instrument carrying it, the extent o the audience exposure, and the salience of the message to the particular audience.
This recognition that certain members of a ma5S audience are very influential in shaping the opinio11* and decisions of their peers bears definite limits, ho#' ever, for opinion leaders seem to operate in specific an restricted fields, following along a pattern of logic3 authority.
There is a series of studies which has sought t0 identify the characteristics of the opinion leader. ^ analysis of leaders and their followers shows that >3 comparison to their followers the leaders are charac terized by more formal education, higher social statu* and wealth, greater innovativeness in the adoption 0 new ideas, more exposure to instruments of mass con1 munications, greater empathy with others holding same views, more participation in social activities, an they are more cosmopolitan. Usually, these difkf ences are small, and a collateral series of studies sho#s the influence of the leader greatest among follo#e(i of education, background, and social status similart0 his own. They also show that opinion leaders are eas'|) accessible to their followers, more competent than the1’ followers (but not too much more so) and, in gene13 conform to the norms of their particular system.
To be more innovative and yet to conform to non11*
The Effect of Public Opinion Upon National Security Policy 125
^hich
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:dge. But it is interpersonal communication ls tnore likely to be effective in bringing about
Security
w°uld seem to be difficult, but that is not necessarily j50- When a system’s norms favor change, opinion ers are more innovative. However, when the norms are more traditional these leaders are only slightly m°re innovative than their followers. Moreover, inno- Va.tors ‘n a traditional system often are looked upon suspicion and disrespect by their peers. One can- ot escape reflections upon the status of an innovator Wlthin a military service, a labor union, or a large Corporation.
^We communicate today both through instruments mass communications and directly, one person to pother or to a small group. These channels of com- nications have different, but complementary roles . can be expected to have different effects. The mass rument probably is most effective at the job of creasing both the scope and depth of our individual
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f dnSe m attitudes within the general public or in cusing public opinion upon public issues.
^lass. Communications, Public Opinion, and National " ■ F
Th
e term National Security is comparatively new to ti C ^mer'can lexicon of defense. It dates roughly to t^rea^2ations which grew out of the war with Spain s3t American interests outside our borders did require ests C matter f°rce sufficient to protect those inter- ,S' Conceptually, however, the American attitude j C l proclaimed the right to mastery of our own stiny dates to colonial times. The proclamation of ^ ngnts by the newspapers and the surge of opinion ] . Precipitated and supported the American Revo- n cast a character upon national security affairs h|ch continues today.
pj e reasons for the American Revolution were com- 0f X' ^°st of us can agree it was not a simple matter f a freedom-loving people struggling to gain their ce6 0rn from a tyrannical British king. The self- tjj rcc interest of British policies, inept leadership in tyi. ^°i°nies, overemphasis of a mercantile system 0p^ exploited the colonies, restriction in the devel- tL nt °f the American frontier—all were factors in CaUs *Sf>Ute’ f*ut none °f them necessarily gave sufficient Co-f°r rnaking that dispute into a war. Other British abl niCS tfie t‘me similar grievances and were . to find peaceful solutions.
nat combination of conditions, then, brought no°Ut rfie resort to arms in 1775? Some historians, fatin'^ ehe subsequent revolutions in France and in n America, say that the American experience was
the forerunner of a struggle that was as much a class conflict as it was an attempt to achieve political separation from England. Within this meaning, the emergence of class leaders—termed recently by the National Geographic magazine as the "firebrands of the Revolution”—takes on new significance. Some reflections upon the American Revolution in terms of these agitators, the newspapers and the methods they used, and the force of opinion which rallied to their cry is necessary to understand the imprint of public opinion upon today’s national security policies.
Opponents and Proponents of Revolution
It is significant that the Stamp Act of 1765 alienated two very influential groups in America—the lawyers and the journalists. The new law levied a heavy tax upon all legal documents and a duty, as well, upon the paper used in publishing newspapers. (It is an interesting sidelight to history that the large format used today by newspapers was developed primarily to circumvent the effect of the tax by placing more information and advertising on larger sheets, the tax being levied on the number of sheets rather than upon the amount of paper.) Opposition to this and other British policies began a consistent thread of dissent and active opposition, and it was in the press of the time that passions and arguments of the revolutionaries found expression.
Today, we are likely to remember the American Tory as a traitor to the American cause because he refused to take up arms against the king. We do so because it was the Tory who lost, but the objectives of the Tories, basically, were to retain the structure of colonial society, to continue governing by right of property, heredity, position, and tradition. One of the strongest proponents of this view was James Rivington, proprietor of the first chain of book stores in America, with branches in New York, Boston, and Philadelphia. In 1773, he founded Rivington’s New York Gazetteer or the Connecticut, New Jersey, Hudson’s River and Quebec Weekly Advertiser, a publication skillfully edited and initially objective in its views.
The objectivity did not last long, however, because power was slipping from the hands of the British authorities and into those of the colonial assemblies. In the eyes of the colonists, criticism of the king was no longer seditious libel, but criticism of the assemblies was another matter. An organized campaign of threats beset Tory printers, and economic coercion was reinforced at times by mob action which demolished Tory printing plants.
Rivington, for his part, abandoned the objectivity
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of his publication after Lexington and Concord and began partisan publication to rival that of the most radical patriots. His renamed Royal Gazette was laden with unfounded charges against American leaders and all manner of vicious rumors which he thought might harm the rebels. It should be noted, however, that his most malicious attacks were penned while the British general, Lord Howe, who hoped to turn the colonists from their course and avert the resort to arms, was breathing down the editor’s neck.
The views of the Tories did not go unopposed, for other journalists, such as John Dickinson, were on hand to articulate the case to those people of the colonies who found themselves in the middle of the road, between the loyalists on the one hand and the revolutionaries on the other. As a result of a series of articles he wrote, entitled "Letters From a Farmer in Pennsylvania,” Dickinson has been ranked with the great journalists of the period. The letters not only discussed American policy, they actually were the policies of the American colonists and were reprinted and quoted widely up and down the eastern seaboard. He, more than any other writer with the possible exception of Sam Adams, prepared public opinion for the Revolution.
Where the Tories’ interest lay in loyalty to the Crown and perpetuation of the status quo and the Whigs, for whom Dickinson was the principal spokesman, concentrated upon economic issues, the Radicals were the only ones concerned with social change, and they might have been overcome had it not been for the actions of some very effective leaders, Samuel Adams chief among them.
As a propagandist, Adams was without peer, but he was more than just a writer. He was an organizer and expert news gatherer as well. The Committees of Correspondence which he organized in 1772 kept him alert to every event and sentiment throughout the colonies. Members of the Committees understood well that, in
In 1927 American and British warships, in order to protect citizens of their countries in Nanking, China, from attack by Communist troops, fired on those troops. Some of the Chinese saw the event differently and one of them drew this poster whose legend reads: "British and American cannon attacked Nanking for two hours, reducing crowded streets of the city to scorched dust: of the crowds of people over two thousand lost their lives. Brothers of every class, arise as one and oppose this barbarous and inhuman cruelty!” Such was one result of the defense by our armed forces of endangered fellow citizens.
order to win the conflict they regarded as inevitable they must achieve five major objectives: they mus1 justify the course they advocated; they must advert^ the advantages of victory; they must arouse wide!j scattered and disparate segments of the American sot1' • ety; they must neutralize any logical or reasonable arguments advanced by the opposition; and, lastly, the) must pose all issues in black and white so that tho# issues could be internalized and the cause advocate by common men throughout the colonies. Adam5 "reporters” attended each event of importance an forwarded information as capably as do our moderi> wire services. His central committee processed the m' formation and placed it where it would do the most good. He was a prolific writer. Work done under ^ least 24 pen names have subsequently been recognize11 as having been written in Adams’ hand. The Boston Gazette, recognized as the mouthpiece of the "patriots, was Adams’ major market, and it was followed witb avid interest along the length of colonial A merit3' His appeal to the public sentiment in promoting tl,c cause for independence marks him as one of the chm architects of the Revolution.
To yet another writer, Tom Paine, belongs much the credit for crystallizing colonial opinion in supp°ft of the rebellion. Arriving from his native England 0<[ the eve of the Revolution, penniless and witho33' any special prospects or notable interests, Paine ^ infused with the American spirit. His pamphlet ComM0<l Sense, the pronouncement of his revolutionary fire, written in January 1776, little more than a year afte his arrival. It was copied by many of the colon!1 newspapers and brought large numbers of lukewah1' and fence-straddling patriots to the activist cause, b5
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^°pularity was instantaneous. More than 130,000 copies ae so^ in the first three months of publication. In ^fnatter of weeks after it was published, Paine’s views ere known to virtually every literate American. Six into thS wrote ’L bis doctrine was incorporated
° c^e Declaration of Independence, off °rt^ a^ter %bting bt°ke out, Paine himself but ^ t0 serve what amounted to a foreign legion, triad W^en C^at Un*C WaS ^e^eatec^ by the British, he e bis way to Washington’s headquarters at Fort Lee, ^ w Jersey, where the Americans were in the process Withdrawal. The bedraggled forces and tattered com- Cs were in disarray and were at the point of break- in this setting, Paine wrote his first Crisis paper. •Her • CSe 2re t*ie fbat trY men’s souls. The sum- sh 1 and rhe sunshine patriot will, in this crisis,
stand ^r°m Cbe service °b his country; but he that and S lt deserves the love and thanks of man
yetWornan. Tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered; the WC ^aVC t^*s consolation with us, that the harder ob C°nb*ct the more glorious the triumph. What we 0r.fain t0° cheap, we esteem too lightly—Tis dearness tQ b rbat gives everything its value. Heaven knows how be ^Ut a proper price upon its goods; and it would sl stlange indeed if so celestial an article as FREEDOM °u d not be highly rated.”
anj ^76, the ideology of the conflict still was vague eel ^*S ^rst Crisis provided the clarion call; it was at W *n newsPaPers throughout the colonies. Crisis, ashington’s order, was read to the troops at Valley
Public weariness of the long, dreary wars in Korea (above) and Vietnam (left) was a major influence in the American decisions to terminate the former and extricate ourselves from the latter. There are those who argue that Ho Chi Mink beat the Americans in Vietnam, and that he did it mainly by influencing the opinion of the American people at home.
Forge and within a week those forces had crossed the Delaware and had defeated the British at Trenton- buoyed by that indefinable element of military force- morale. Little wonder that a contemporary of Paine’s later wrote that, ". . . the great American cause owed as much to the pen of Paine as to the sword of Washington.”
The Revolutionary writers and publishers used every possible avenue to appeal to the American public and win that public’s support to the cause of Independence. These gentlemen were sensitive, too, to the public in England where a sizeable number of people sympathized with the colonial cause. Following the opening battles of Lexington and Concord, General Gage completed a report placing the blame for the shooting squarely upon the Minutemen, and he dispatched that report to London by the fastest sloop at his command. Within four days, however, the patriots also prepared a report defending their position and laying the blame on Gage. They placed it into the hands of the Salem skipper, Captain John Darby, to race to the motherland. Crowding his sail, Darby beat Gage’s sloop by eleven days, more than enough time for Ben Franklin to circulate the patriots’ version throughout England.
Only 20 of the 35 American newspapers which were being published at the war’s beginning survived to the war’s end. Some were casualties to the British occupation, others moved several times to avoid British capture, and some were simply economic failures in diffi-
cult times. Thirty-five new papers began publication during the war and enough of these survived to bring the total up to the original 35. These papers, though their combined circulation amounted to only about 40,000, were the primary sources of information throughout the colonies, each issue being read by many readers. Objectivity, the first casualty of the war, was not a characteristic of any of them. Each was highly partisan and each had a highly partisan readership. Of their influence upon the crystallization of American public opinion, both leading up to and during the war, too much cannot be said. Both the writers and the publishers were primary actors in the American Revolution, and the examples they set then are the traditions of the modern press in the United States.
Other Opinions In Other Times
It is not well recognized by many contemporary critics who fancy themselves liberal that there has been a continuing and consistent opinion concerning our national security as a main current in American thought since the Revolution. Public support for an active policy in national security affairs, including foreign commitments, is both strong and stable over time. It is a main current, shifting with public attention, high in times of tension and regressing when attentions are directed elsewhere, but always there, always strong and always consistent.
The war with Spain in 1898 gave the United States Navy a startling demonstration of the effects of an aroused public opinion upon strategy.
Naval command of the Caribbean was the strategic key to the war in the Western Hemisphere. To counter the challenge of the Spanish squadron under Admiral Cervera, Admiral William T. Sampson, fleet commander in the Caribbean, proposed two strategically sound plans: either to take Havana before the arrival of Spanish reinforcements or to seize San Juan and subsequently locate and destroy the Spanish fleet upon its arrival in the West Indies.
Sampson was given neither option. Public clamor fired by news reports, and Congressional and group pressures compelled the Navy Department to direct Sampson, instead, to confine his operations to blockade and cautious bombardments. The Navy Department further witheld some of the best ships of Sampson’s fleet and organized them into a "Flying Squadron” which was held at Hampton Roads against the unlikely possibility of naval raids by the Spanish on the eastern seaboard of the United States. The approach of war built an increasing alarm, and the Navy Department created a second defense force of several cruisers, organized it into a Northern Patrol Force, an distributed it along the coast from Maine to Virginia-
The news that Cervera had sailed from the Cap1’ Verde Islands on a westward course brought pan|C bordering hysteria along the Atlantic Coast. As the day* passed without further intelligence, Congress directs the Navy Department to mobilize the naval militia 0 the states. The militia manned a "fleet” of long-id^ Civil War monitors and armed yachts and tugs, an took up defense stations from Maine to the Gulf. Th^ nearly total disorder caused the naval historians Harol and Margaret Sprout later to comment,
"Only with the greatest difficulty did the Na') Department prevent the unreasoning and preposterous panic from forcing a complete disruption of the figh1 ing fleet, and the scattering of its units, to guard t"'° thousand miles of coastline against the wholly 110 probable, if not utterly impossible, raids by Cervera > decrepit cruisers.”
The role of the press in the Spanish-American was both important and unusual. By this time, ^ American newspaper had grown from a party org30 to a major industry. No longer were newspapers d£ pendent upon party allegiance. They were independent and each publisher sought to build his own center0 strength and influence among readers. Circulations10 the hundreds of thousands were commonplace, an worldwide coverage was provided by the growth of ^ press associations which had divided up the world news cartels: the Reuters Agency in England, the Ha''3' Agency in France, and the Wolff Agency in German) The American agency, Associated Press, had bee0 affiliated with Reuters by 1887.
There is little question that William Randolp1 Hearst promoted the war with relentless propaganda Just before the war, Hearst had sent the famous weste30 illustrator, Frederick Remington, to Cuba. Remingt00 cabled: "Everything is quiet. There is no trouble her<:. There will be no war. Wish to return.” Hearst repl^ tersely, "Please remain. You furnish the pictures an I’ll furnish the war.” ,
With the coming of war, the cooperation afford correspondents by most military and naval command# was nearly limitless. There were reporters with DewC. dozens embarked in ships on blockade stations 0 Cuba, and a fleet of them in dispatch boats darti^ about Sampson’s ships, then flying off to Key to file their stories. The German Kaiser was report to have been highly amused at the thought of ^ American fleet, accompanied by an entourage of prcS’ boats, awaiting an engagement with the Spanish. Th#‘ is little wonder why the war with Spain also ^ known as "The Correspondents’ War” and that publp opinion ran high and had great effect upon naval str3c
The Effect of Public Opinion Upon National Security Policy 129
^gy- What is more to the point, however, was that mencans were demonstrating an active interest in the World outside their borders.
At the Turn of the Century
^ With his succession to the Presidency, Theodore ^oosevelt brought to that office a personal interest in le Navy, in the United States’ entrance onto world CCne as an international power, and in enterprise over- ^S' "^he cruise of the Great White Fleet in 1907-1909, lrected by Roosevelt over considerable Congressional opposition, was, in itself, part of a drive to popularize ^ Navy and to promote an active building program. AnT ^r*Ve succeecied briefly, but in a year or two korJnca s attention was turned once again inside its
1,"* £he succession of William Howard Taft in ^ > a continued program for ship construction was anced by the administration. It did not, however, to 1VC P°Pu^ar support of the Congress. In an effort ^ gain legislative support, the recommendations of the ancl^ ^Cnera^ ®oar<^ for four battleships in both 1910 1911 were pared by the President to two. ee*°ng to take his cause directly to the people, Taft j^ge<a dramatic fleet reviews in both San Diego and ew York which provided the platforms for public ^Ppearances by the President himself and his Secretary e Navy, George von Lengerke Meyer. The reviews in ^ tlrne<^ ^or November 1911, just prior to the open- ng sessions of Congress. The efforts appeared for tee ^ C’ ^0wever> f°r die House Naval Affairs Commit- ereP°rted an appropriation bill without provision for
titled "Patriotic Reasons for the Navy League of the United States,” it was intended for release to newspaper editors and opinion leaders. Initial distribution was made in July to 5,000 carefully chosen individuals. Before year’s end, an additional 20,000 were distributed, as well as 40,000 other pamphlets of a similar nature.
In 1910, League action was directed to offsetting directly many of the activities of several prominent "peace groups” which were advocating disarmament. In the upcoming debates on the naval appropriations bill of 1910-1911, the League foresaw a major test. Two weeks before the vote was taken, the League sent letters to members in thirty-three states with a listing of Congressmen known to be opposed to or not favoring the increased budget. The letters urged members to put pressure on their Congressmen and to agitate in their local press. The bill passed the House, the narrowness of the margin and the intensity of the debate standing
even
Several years before, in 1902, the Navy League of .. s Unite ' ‘ heved "
°ne battleship.
e United States had been formed by men who be- C(j > • • • The American people would have to be
po^ed to appreciate the connection between sea er and America’s new international responsibilities. greUS edncated, they would exert pressure upon Con- a . t0 provide with generosity and promptness for Peacct*me Navy.” Activities of the League but Cen ec^'Psed by the leadership of Teddy Roosevelt, feu LeaSue st*rred to new life and began support a continued building program in 1909.
Jn Feb
tress Moi
ruary, following the convention held at For- Cfuis nr°C t0 we^come home the fleet from its world pjat^.e’ League released a resume of its convention five °rrTls to che press of the nation. By March, ninety- An ■|lrtlC^es had appeared in fifty-eight newspapers. In out' ' Hague’s new secretary, Henry H. Ward, set
’ Wlfh approval of the Board of Directors and the p i rrria* endorsement of the Secretary of the Navy, to *sh for tjle grst tjme a comprehensive booklet erating the planks of the League’s platform. En
*nfo
in testimony to the necessity of the League’s action.
By the time the bill had gone to the Senate in May 1910, the League had held its annual convention and made wide distribution of yet another pamphlet urging increased appropriations for ship construction. The Senate version passed, increasing the number of ships which the House had authorized. At the end of the fiscal year on 30 March 1911, League officials could look back with considerable gratification at their efforts to refocus national attention upon what they believed to be an imperative national need.
Naval Aspects of Wilsonian Policy
Following the election of Woodrow Wilson in 1912, those interested in military and naval preparedness had expected the President to follow in Taft’s footsteps in advocating an active building program for the Navy. Those expectations were based upon the Democratic party’s platform and upon Wilson’s published philosophy concerning the use of strong naval power in the protection of neutral rights. The expectations were doomed to disappointment.
In his 1913 message to Congress, President Wilson made no mention of naval policy, but simply endorsed the annual reports of the executive departments. For his part, the Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, had recommended a scaling down of the proposal of the General Board: from four battleships and a large number of smaller warships and auxiliaries to two battleships and some smaller ships.
The action was more surprising for its apparent lack of perception of the great increase in armaments in Europe and the implication of that for U. S. foreign and naval policy. While the Anglo-German rivalry and the influence of distance promised territorial security for the Western Hemisphere, the interests of the European powers in China, the effective American limitation of Japanese expansion in the Far East, and the vulnerability of our position in the Philippines bespoke grave strategic liabilities. For the Navy, the implications pointed to the necessity of increased fleet strength and readiness.
Secretary Daniels, in the meantime, turned his major attention to the limitation of armaments, to the expansion of the domestic shore establishment, and to welfare measures for naval personnel. In no forum did he address the strategic implications confronting the Navy. But in 1914, for the first time, the General Board was allowed to place its recommendations on the public record in the form of an appendix to the Secretary’s annual report, and it was permitted to have a representative testify before the naval committees of Congress. A part of the General Board’s report was in direct recognition of the importance of public opinion in the determination of a sound naval strategy:
". . . In the opinion of the General Board, any rational and natural development of the Navy looking to the continuance of peace and the maintenance of our national policies demands the adoption of, and the consistent adherence to, a governmental naval policy founded on our needs and aims. To give life to such a policy requires the support of the people and the Congress; and this support can only be obtained by giving the widest publicity to the policy itself and to the reasons and arguments in its support, and taking the people and the Congress into the full confidence of the Government, inviting intelligent criticism ^ well as support. The General Board believes that only a lack of understanding ... by the people at large prevents the adoption of a consistent naval policy; an^ recommends to the department a system of extended publicity in all matters relating to naval policy, acting through patriotic organizations, the press, or by whatever means a knowledge of the naval needs of the Nation may be brought home to the people of this country.”
The naval appropriations bill, after spirited debate in both House and Senate, was signed into law essentially as the administration had recommended it—ju5t two days after the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand on June 28, 1914. Contributing to >tS passage had been the newly found voice of the professional Navy speaking in recognition of the effects 0 public opinion upon national and naval policy. Capta*11 Alfred T. Mahan had voiced the principle several yeafS before, . . public opinion, in operation, constitute national policy. . .
The examples of yesterday in our history bear nod' ble and striking resemblances to many conditions find in the country today. Perhaps we can benefit fr01” their instruction.
Vietnam ,
There are many who hold that the experiences 0 Vietnam are too recent and too emotionally held c° offer an objective perspective. Perhaps that is true, b should not be too early, however, to make some obser' vations concerning the operation of public opinion i<[ the Vietnam conflict and to examine some of the conventional wisdom surrounding the effect of tba opinion upon our recent national policies.
Within the last generation the United States Vs fought in two lengthy and costly wars in the Far Ea5 ’ in Korea, and in Vietnam. Both wars have been mb1' tarily limited in their objective, complex in their natufe and, to many Americans, obscure in their purpose. Leil we tend to view Vietnam as an isolated case, reed1' studies indicate that support for both wars on the paft
tr j C ^mer*can public followed strikingly similar g S’ t^lat the experience of Vietnam was not unique, poi] 7 r^e beginning of the Korean War, public opinion lng in the United States had become scientifically h' ^tUre<a and h was conducted on a regular basis by o y reputable organizations. As a matter of fact, poll tions designed to reveal a consensus of general and °rt ^°r war Were Pr°bably more widespread tbat data more complete for the period of the Y°rean War than they were for the period of the cifjCtnarn ^ar when policy questions were more spe-
was
at Pusan and the American initiative showed
, ermg momentum with the landings at Inchon. It Probable that this high level was maintained by the
expect: 14
fhat
^ Support for President Truman’s reaction to the i Korean invasion of the South was overwhelm- Juf ^ ^avorable at the beginning of the war. Early in A the Gallup Poll found 77 per cent approving the Sl)Clsion to send U. S. military aid to South Korea. That i Pport remained high throughout the summer and stall ^ as North Korean push
§athe
ation that the war would be a short one. Only PCr cent of Americans polled believed, at that time, ‘t the war would last more than a year. per^ e entry of the Chinese into the war altered that 0 ?ftl0n an^, Wrb it, a sharp drop in war support e part of the American public occurred. Popular
support had dropped fully 25 percentage points. After that initial drop, support for our involvement in Korea showed no further decline for the remaining two and a half years of conflict, and this despite some rather spectacular events. Notions about the shifting moods of the American public and mercurial opinion shifts tied to dramatic events do not seem to fit these findings well at all.
Unlike the war in Korea, American involvement in Vietnam had no clear-cut or dramatic beginning. From the standpoint of public opinion, Vietnam did not become significant until the summer of 1965 when large numbers of American troops had been committed and the United States was heavily engaged in air raids over the North. Support for American actions rose to
more than 64 per cent by December. By the summer of 1966, support for the war had declined to levels more consistent with those of the Korean era, approximately 50 per cent. In the years following, support for the war suffered a slow and somewhat ambiguous decline to levels of approximately 40 per cent support. A distinct difference, however, was in the rate of increase of the opposition—those who actively opposed the American involvement. Fifty-eight per cent opposed the war by the spring of 1970, five years later.
As with Korea, the major events of the war—the Tet offensive, the replacement of General Westmoreland, President Johnson’s decision not to run again, and his partial bombing halt—all seemed to have but a limited and gradual effect until the prospect of peace talks came closer to reality in 1970.
The legislative history generally supports the view of the American public at large. After the enactment of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which passed both houses by overwhelming majorities on 7 August 1964, there was continued support for not only increasing military manpower and equipment but for foreign and military aid as well. Significant opposition did not develop until the summer of 1970 when it became clear that peace talks had become our primary objective. The resolution was not repealed, however, until 2 January 1971.
Many current political analysts have declared that Vietnam was the most unpopular war in this Nation’s history, yet poll evidence suggests that the Korean War was its rival for this unhappy distinction. One reason for that label might be that Vietnam engendered more vocal opposition, more demonstrations, more petitions, and more organized political campaigns than did Korea. One might be drawn to the conclusion that this activity was symptomatic of a deeper discontent. Available data suggests, however, that opposition to the war was more vocal, but it was not more extensive than the opposition to Korea. Support for American military action, however, was initially strong and continued at a substantial level until a change in our objectives became clear.
The High Cost of Vietnam
There is no realistic way to put a dollar cost upon the Vietnam war: neither the human cost, nor the political cost, either domestically or internationally can be translated into dollar terms. Nor does the impact of the Vietnam war upon our current national security posture lend itself readily to a handy assessment.
Those concerned with national security must be like Janus, with one face fixed upon the international vista where American interests are advanced or threatened and the other turned inward toward the source of determination to promote or defend those interests.
The older concepts of the foundations of national power are going. How important is a nation’s popuh' tion if all, or a major part of it, is held hostage to a nuclear strike? If economic vitality transcends national power considerations, what value do you place upon the economic force of Japan just prior to and the" immediately following the Middle East oil embargo What significance has an industrial base which is energy limited? Of what utility is a squadron of fighter plane* against a campaign of political terrorism?
Collaterally, what has been the effect of our curref>( perception of American interests upon our system collective security? These cover such matters as ho"' much our citizens feel that we have contributed t0 the progress and development of other western sod eties at the expense of our own domestic interest* and the degree to which we have developed compel tors rather than partners. Other matters are whethd Western Europe really is as central to the long-ted1 American interest as is the third world and how mat1) millions of barrels of oil we are prepared to contP' bute to the defense of Berlin, or of Israel, or ho" many millions of tons of wheat we are prepared to <1° without to arrest famine in Africa.
Some, not all, of these questions had their roots in or were surfaced by the Vietnam conflict. And thetC are other, more directly related issues emanating fro11' that war which bear upon the security of the Unite" States: the All-Volunteer Force, the limitation of ^ President’s war powers, increasing restrictions on f°r’ eign and military aid and treaty limitations which nV involve overseas basing and support forces. Potential each of these has a profound effect upon our securP) posture. Each of these has, as well, a body of publ"- opinion which will seek to support, to modify, or t0 challenge the policy which attends the subject. ThatS how issues are made.
Subordinate the Issues ,
Were one to lead an organization which was cd1 vinced that American security policy was totally lfl error, then he could set out methodically to destrd that policy, not by rational debate of the issues, but by undermining the public confidence in and supp°rl for those policies. He could, for instance:
► Support all major pay increases for both military af^ civilian personnel. A handy way to limit total numb£f! is to increase the unit cost.
► Support the most technologically difficult, most phisticated and most costly weapons programs. PushiP#
The Effect of Public Opinion Upon Nutlonal Security Policy 133
ne it he was able to erode the support of the ^dcan public.
still °St '^rner*cans believe, however, that the world is ^ a difficult place to live in, that the goals which ^it^sPouse as a nation are not necessarily compatible alo tb°Se °E other nations, and that, in order to get peacefully in this world, it is necessary to main- ar> effective and efficient fighting force, sve u mucb as we believe in the objectives of detente, the °U ^ n0t ready to assume that we have attained to m ^^de we go about seeking peaceful solutions naany of the world’s problems, there are a few the Cs b>' which the military and naval forces of Publ-'tcd btates can address effectively American f: lc opinion concerning our nation’s need for na-
nal security:
►
the world’s a model of
primarily define the scope of our own defense
c e state of the art takes years, is guaranteed to produce 0verruns, and requires very highly trained, and expen- ^lve, personnel to operate those systems.
Establish a separate society, apart from that composed 0 all Americans. Make the job of national security a 0 only for those interested in that sort of thing; mercenaries, if you will.
Then it would be necessary to dissociate himself m support by an active campaign of criticism. He ^0uld have to criticize the civilian and military leader- ‘P by identifying those few who seemed concerned j^ore for their self-interest than for their nation’s wel- ■ re' would need to point out the huge and escalat- ng costs in non-productive programs which were tak- 8 the capital from legitimate human needs and ordinating our higher aspirations to baser, self aggrandizing goals. It would have to be noted that all this was being done to the rest of us by a small te> n°t even a part of our body politic. And, if he ^ eec*co in laying his groundwork well, he would 6 j but a small, dramatic event to shear the remaining of Ji^nnings ar>d watch that gargantuan Department C cnse drop crashing to the earth. That could be lo C ^n'ted States is sitting astraddle ; j^est and most successful revolution; y .j.J'dnal liberty and personal freedom, of u militafy and naval services form an integral part ite American society and do not exist apart from . tleir efforts contribute to the advancement of the
► nited States in its progress among nations.
e directions and actions of other nations in the world
effort.
► Th •
5 ® resources necessary to raise, maintain, and direct
and C arme<^ borce in the United States can be levied le • adrninistered only at the federal level. Many other ^bniate demands for resources can be and are met at other levels of government, thus placing a duty upon Congress to set a priority on providing those resources as well as a special responsibility upon the Executive Department in their efficient direction and use.
► Regarding the press, in both its printed and its broadcast forms, as an "adversary” serves neither the health of our republic nor the interest of our citizens. Were our government an enemy of the people and the press rather than the law their protector, an adversary relationship would exist. In a participatory democracy such as ours, however, the finest function of the press is to contribute to the enlightenment of the electorate through informing our citizens, providing a forum for the interchange of ideas, and forming legitimate criticism upon which the people can base intelligent judgment. In the discharge of their respective responsibilities, the government and the press are not adversaries.
► That all personnel of the Armed Services serve to support the Constitution: to defend this Nation against its enemies, both foreign and domestic—all on behalf of the American people.
In reviewing those principles, it is worthy to note one postscript, stated recently by a member of the House Armed Services Committee:
"The American people will pay whatever price is necessary for a defense force second to none in the world. But they will stick with you on this only as long as they believe in you, believe you’re doing an efficient job, believe you’re trying to maximize their tax dollars. Once they start believing you’re squandering or wasting it, or using it inefficiently, or in any other fashion, they’ll turn on you. And once they turn on you, it’s going to be damned hard to get them back.”