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X he year is 1977. The headline reads: "TANKER ABLAZE-OFF SEASIDE RESORT-ENTIRE CITY THREATENED.” Reading further, we learn that the ship is a brand-new gas carrier of advanced design lifting nearly 170,000 cubic meters of liquid methane. Following a collision the previous night while transiting in fog, fires had forced her abandonment and strong tidal currents had put her squarely aground on the entrance breakwater of a major coastal port. Wracked by explosions and the pounding of the sea, the ship was beginning to break up and it now appeared certain that she would release her, entire liquid gas cargo to the sea. The warming cargo would expand the cargo 600-to-l as it returned to the gaseous state. Then the gigantic burning cloud would be blown ashore with the prevailing wind. A major disaster was developing.
I
There is an element of risk in nearly everything but, if we become obsessed with doubts, we would soon not want to leave the dock. We should measure our concerns against the yardstick of reality; namely, reasonable risk for reasonable return. Using this gauge, is the current relatively primitive state of vessel traffic systems (VTS) development adequate for the burgeoning crop of superships we are sending onto the already crowded waterways of the world? The question answers itself. We need to improve upon the present traffic systems and expand the concept into numerous high density traffic areas that are presently unprotected. As important, all of our systems, present and future, must be knowledgeably engineered and professionally operated.
"Super” ships and "crowded” waterways? Let us examine these adjectives briefly. Superships are those vessels developed over the past few years which are super in size, performance, and cost. Stated even more simply, a lot of people have put a lot of eggs in these big baskets. A description of some of the more distinctive of these supership types is useful:
► LNG Tankers. Cryogenic gas ships nearly 1,000 feet long with cargo volumes of 125,000 cubic meters and costing in excess of $100 million are now nearing completion in several of the worlds large shipyards.
► VLCC. These are the mammoth crude oil carriers. Vessels with dimensions of 1,250 feet LOA, drawing 90 feet of water, and with tonnages of nearly 500,000 tons are a reality today and we are looking to a growth in size to 1,000,000 tons, the megaton ship, in the near future. Because of their immense proportions these ships are very difficult to handle, some requiring as much as 20 minutes to come to a full stop and all being particularly susceptible to shallow water effect.
► Express Containerships. Extraordinary cargo ships 950 feet long, with the power plant of a warship, and capable of cruising speeds of 33 knots, are now in service and ships of only a few knots less performance have been relatively commonplace for some time.
► LASH. Huge barge ships with the lifting capacity of two dozen 800-ton lighters which, because of their adaptability, can be seen in almost any port-of-call and on most any trade route in the world.
► Chemical Tankers. Not of the immense scantlings of the above ships, but exotic cargoes often require that they be treated with great care.
► Capital Ships of our Navy. Although not expanding in great numbers, in terms of investment, personnel, and strategic importance, capital ships dwarf even the other superships.
Not only are the costs of construction and operation of these types of ships gargantuan, but they are generally the key link in a transportation network which includes huge investments in shore support facilities. Some of these transportation packages involve commitments in excess of a billion dollars—a major financial undertaking by the standards of any industry. The industrialized nations of the world are producing these superships in great numbers now and the mere existence of this great financial investment alone would be reason enough to justify substantial expansion of marine traffic systems. But, notwithstanding this purely financial consideration, the detrimental environmental and safety impact arising from a disaster involving one of these superships can stagger the imagination. .
We spoke of "crowded” waterways. The oceans of the world are not crowded. One can still steam the high seas for days without seeing another ship. Even on the most heavily traveled trade routes, it would be hard to visualize traffic growth to a point which would require control other than high seas traffic separation
lanes. No, we are speaking of harbors and their approaches, and heavily traveled coastal confluence areas found in such locales as: English Channel/North Sea, Malacca Strait, Gibraltar/Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, Japan Coastal, and U. S. Coastal.
The classic crowded waterway which contains the triple threat of restricted shoaling waters, generally poor weather conditions, and dense traffic is, of course, the Dover Straits.
A study conducted by the National Physical Laboratory (NPL) of England in 1971, showed that the flow of traffic through the narrow Dover Straits averaged 350 major ships daily. These Straits have the world’s highest incidence of collision outside of harbor pilotage areas. NPL studies tell us there were 174 major collisions and 34 strandings during the period 1958 to 1972, including the Texaco Caribbean/Brandenburg incident in which four ships were sunk or damaged on the same spot in a little over a month. During this same period, the only forms of traffic control in this area were traffic separation schemes and the Dover Straits Surveillance Service which broadcasts navigation warnings on VHF Channels lO/ll.
If we can extrapolate the Dover Straits horror story to include the anticipated further expansion in world shipping tonnage (the world shipbuilding order book now exceeds 100 million tons) it becomes clear that the introduction of a great number of superships into crowded waterways demands an immediate, vigorous expansion of vessel traffic control.
The concept of traffic systems to facilitate the safe and orderly flow of marine traffic is not new. North Atlantic Track agreements date back to the 19th century and progress up to the sophisticated communi- cations-based, surveillance-aided, control systems which are being planned for some of the world’s major ports. The three cornerstones of VTS development have been radar, VHF radiotelephone, and traffic separation schemes, with the computer and radar transponder coming into play in the more advanced systems.
What are the general steps which might be implemented in a harbor or high density traffic area as traffic demands grow over a period of years?
In the early stages, traffic separation schemes would be established according to IMCO’s Ship Routing and Traffic Separation Schemes. The establishment of a mandatory listening watch on a dedicated VHF frequency for bridge-to-bridge navigation safety such as is required by the U. S. Radiotelephone Law effective 1 January 1973, would be a logical adjunct to this phase.
Next we would likely install a radar surveillance system in the area and broadcast navigation safety warnings over selected VHF frequencies. If it is assured that all ships in the area are participating in the system, as is the case in port areas where pilotage is compulsory, we could furnish ship positioning information as well. We are now at the stage of development found in many of the world’s large ports, namely, harbor advisory radar with some movement report capabilities. As basic as these systems are, they have met with spectacular success in reducing collisions and expediting traffic flow in selected harbors over the past two decades. Rotterdam, London, Bremerhaven/Bremen/Hamburg, to name but a few, have had particularly good returns on their installations.
Lastly, we would add complete movement report and control capabilities to our system through the incorporation of a Transponder/VHF/Digital Positioning package with a computer to process the attendant volume of information.
Because such sophisticated systems are complex to construct and operate, they are almost prohibitively expensive in today’s context. But, just as we discussed a risk/return ratio earlier, there is always a cost/value
ratio which can and should guide our financial decisions.
Assuming we have made a case for the substantial worldwide expansion of VTSs and can visualize the mechanics of the systems, let us now turn to the tough nut: implementation. Earlier, we stressed the importance of the systems being knowledgeably engineered and professionally operated. Keeping this in mind and also remembering that we are analyzing the problem "from the bridge” of operating ships, let us examine some of the design and implementation criteria of VTSs which must be resolved in order to achieve viable systems.
Established Need. In our endorsement of the VTS concept we must be careful not to overcontrol. The blanket imposition of unwarranted traffic schemes, some of which might create an artificial convergence at ends or cross points, is a good example of overcontrol. Further, many interests in the shipping industry today still hold great reservations about the advisability of VTS expansion. They conceive a bumbling bureaucracy placing yet another economic millstone around the neck of free enterprise efficiency. Positive need for proposed systems must be firmly established to prevent these predictions from materializing. We must take a hard-nosed look at topography, weather, traffic flow patterns, past accident statistics, and anticipated area growth. Only if this in-depth study clearly shows a VTS would be beneficial, should we proceed with our plans.
Communications Doctrine. The vital artery of any VTS is VHF voice-communications. There must be either a common language accepted or an internationally- understood phonetic language code established. English, the most commonly used language in international dealings, would seem the logical first choice; however, chauvinism may preclude this option for certain international waters. Nevertheless, the creation df a short vocabulary of words applicable to VTS and easily pronouncable in every tongue, such as our NATO phonetic alphabet, is certainly feasible. We must also learn to exercise proper radio discipline using the guidelines of brevity, clarity, and correct procedures to utilize fully our already crowded frequencies. Passing the time of day over navigation frequencies will have to stop. Another need is for further frequency allocation by international agreement specifically for VTS purposes with sufficient channels assigned to avoid overloading. Overloading of communications frequencies will cripple the best designed VTS in the world and should be scrupulously avoided.
Compliance Policy. Which vessels must be required to participate in our system? All? Only those over 65 feet? Only over 150 feet? Only deep draft and dangerous cargoes? What shall be the minimum required equipment standards for our participants with regard to VHF and navigation gear? Again, close studies of the area are required to determine compliance criteria. Once established, we must consider restricting or excluding nonparticipants from our system, particularly during periods of reduced visibility. Here we might take an example from our domestic Air Traffic Control system. In order for any aircraft, regardless of size, to operate in the system during periods of reduced visibility (Instrument Flight Rules) the plane must have an IFR clearance from ATC, carry the requisite IFR flight instruments, and the pilot must hold a current instrument rating. Recently established TCA (Terminal Control Areas) around selected large airports take the concept a step further and require all aircraft operating in the area, regardless of visibility, to be under the direction of a traffic controller and, in addition to other requisite equipment, must be transponder equipped.
By what authority do we institute the regulations for a VTS? The procedure is relatively straightforward when dealing with areas within a nation’s territorial waters and can be promulgated by national statute such as the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 which gives the U. S. Coast Guard authority to establish and operate VTSs within our maritime boundaries. However, when dealing with an international waterway such as the Dover Straits, the problem becomes complex. One approach espoused by many circles for this waterway is the convening of a European Maritime Convention to deal solely with the pressing problems of the English Channel/North Sea area. Although this approach may have merit from the standpoint of expediency, true international VTS authority can come only from a full international convention.
VTS regulations will require enforcement. Policing helicopter, surface craft or hovercraft, radar, tape recording communications, or reports of other participants will be necessary. Punitive measures should include fines, insurance penalties, or action against vessel certificates or personnel licenses. New Rules of the Road which mandate the compliance with established traffic separation schemes are certainly a step in the right direction but far more international cooperation will be required in the future in order to successfully implement advanced VTS in non territorial waters.
Control. How much control shall be assumed by shore controllers? A study of many maritime traffic systems confirms an almost antiseptic avoidance of the use of the word control, emphasizing rather the advisory nature of the systems. This approach to VTS is more than timid, it is ineffectual. In order to have a true traffic system which gives safe spacing for the participants in the system, advanced VTSs must have the authority, and be ready to accept the responsibility,
for mandatory orders such as Slow, Stop, Anchor, or Stay Outside the System. The proffering of recommended course changes or recommended passing procedures in selected situations whereby safety or orderly flow would be facilitated should also be an integral part of any advanced system. Air Traffic Control does not refer to itself as air traffic systems and although it has its faults, it still represents a system of control far advanced over any we have in the maritime world. Marine Traffic Systems designers would do well to make a close study of our domestic ATC during their research phase.
Equipment and Personnel Standards. Equipment quality standards and personnel performance standards both on ship and ashore are a key ingredient in any VTS. Equipment standards afloat and ashore, must be of the highest with duplication built in for back-up safety margins ashore and supported by a comprehensive maintenance program throughout. Economizing in this area of equipment quality (and thus reliability) is a penny-wise, pound-foolish approach, the results of which could be disastrous. Personnel performance standards must be approached in the same light. An unqualified shore controller is worse than none at all. Again, we might look to the Air Traffic Control System for example. Air traffic controllers both in the towers and in the centers are trained and experienced professionals. They meet stringent standards and are compensated accordingly. As a group, they have a high degree of interest in aviation reflected in the fact that many of them are licensed pilots themselves. This is the caliber of person we must attract and be willing to pay for in any successful marine system. A political friend of a friend or a seaman apprentice in this sensitive position simply will not do. In short, what we are really talking about is one of the intangible but vitally important ingredients necessary for acceptance of the VTS concept—user confidence—which is so slowly and painstakingly built up through reliable performance and so quickly erased by substandard operation. Interestingly, many of the successful VTSs in Europe have placed such importance on this controller post that it is filled by the practicing harbor pilots who , rotate their duties between the center and ship piloting.
Enough advice to shore personnel; we must see if our own house is in order with regard to shipboard personnel standards. Although our ships have been increasing in size, speed, and complexity, the standards of the operating personnel have not kept pace and have in fact been generally deteriorating in recent years. An entire article could be devoted to the reasons behind this decline; however, some of the more conspicuous weaknesses arise from a number of factors. Labor unions, while in the process of gaining fair protection and financial return for their membership, are asking much from others and little from their membership as they wink at inept performance and indifferent attitudes. Secondly, there are ships’ officers who received their certificates perhaps 30 years ago, under the most liberal standards, and who have had no interest in advancing either the grade of their license or the level
of their professional skills since then. Under present shipping rules, it is not uncommon to find an officer of either cut on the bridge of one of our superships. Attempting to implement new concepts with this type of person in the ship organization is understandably an exercise in futility. Maritime unions will have to realign their policy of blind support for individuals who do not produce if we expect professional progress on the ships to match VTS progress ashore.
Lack of motivation or union politics aside, advanced professional training or graduate programs for the industry have been almost nonexistent in the past. Cram schools designed to get the applicant past a written license exam are numerous but full-time schools designed to upgrade the practicing mariners’ skills in specific technologies, such as is found in the U. S. Navy’s excellent fleet school system, are beginning to materialize but it will be some time before their effect is felt. Regrettably, we have come to a situation whereby ship design is being encumbered by crew standards. Steamship company owners are reluctant to install sophisticated and expensive equipment on ships where it is likely not to be properly used or properly maintained.
Another related area which bears attention is the standardization of bridge design and operating procedures. With frequent crew changes due to labor contract limitations and ever-increasing vacation periods, today’s ships are nearly always dealing with the new man on board. Standardizing, so far as possible, the location of bridge gear and watch routines, organized division of duties in periods of reduced visibility, elimination of ship idiosyncrasies, are some of the considerations which would help make the new man an effective member of the team sooner. Crew reductions through extensive automation have also had an impact on the performance level. Manning scales which are economical and reasonable for sea steaming can suddenly become inadequate in pressure situations. When considering manning scales for large high performance ships, the risk/return equation must again be balanced very carefully. Lastly, it would be appropriate to note that standards of ships sailing under some of the flags of convenience leave much to be desired. Lax standards and multinational crews have resulted in some sorely disorganized ships.
Raising the level of personnel competence on the ship will, of course, make the vessel a safer unit to operate within our VTS and is of urgent priority. The real heart of our implementation problem, however, is in that nebulous area of "mental attitude” toward the acceptance of vessel traffic control. Without user confidence and cooperation, no vessel traffic system can succeed. The seaman, by virtue of the demands of his calling, has evolved into what might be described as a recalcitrant, self-reliant entity. He is understandably skeptical of any control system which appears to be making inroads into his historic jurisdiction or interfering with his rightful freedom on and of the seas. Education is the only medium which can effectively overcome this resistance—education through training schools, maritime periodicals, company policy, government policy, or any other appropriate vehicle. Education will get the message across that by adopting an attitude of cooperative participation toward VTSs we will be able to do our jobs more efficiently and safely.
Finally, just as no one man is responsible for the fact that the Dover Straits and other crowded waterways are without a VTS system, no one man can remedy this lack. The problem is too complex. The solution will have to evolve from protracted international meetings of intelligent and informed conferees representing all interests. Great strides have been made in recent years in the field of maritime safety through the United Nations Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization meetings and resultant recommendations, and now with the convening of the U.N. Third Law of the Sea Conference with delegates from 149 different governments seeking agreement on managing the earth’s waters and its resources, the opportunity is at hand to build from this foundation and shape a truly definitive international VTS policy. Hopefully, all of the VTS considerations will eventually appear on this Conference’s agenda and, ideally, be hammered into some form of international agreement which could be given proper weight through a Rules of the Road VTS Annex.
A note of precaution: nothing in this enthusiastic endorsement of the great potential for VTS should be construed as relieving the master or commanding officer of the ultimate responsibility for vessel safety. That responsibility is his by law and cannot be abrogated. Any deviations from VTS instructions would certainly have to be fully justified. However, controllers are human and will make mistakes, and the most foolproof mechanical devices, according to Murphy’s Law, eventually break down. And, when men err, and systems fail, the men who are masters of vessels and of their own fate will have to step in and control their vessels— or be controlled.
Captain Seitz, a 1956 graduate of the U. S. Merchant Marine Academy, served on active duty in the U. S. Navy from 1956 to 1958 as a commissioned officer. On release from the service, he returned to sea with United States Lines, serving in all licensed officer capacities including Master during the Vietnam sealift. In 1968, he joined Hudson Waterways Corporation and continued to sail in berths which included Master of dry cargo, tanker, container, and special purpose ships. He holds a first class pilotage license for waters of New York harbor and San Juan, Puerto Rico and a commercial pilot’s license (aviation). His present position is Master with Hudson Waterways Corporation.