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"King of the Oceans”
(See H. Sanders, pp. 52-59, August 1974 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral J. R. Tate, U. S. Navy (Retired)— The opening paragraph of Admiral Sanders’ article refers to an article by Admiral Jocko Clark, published just prior to his death, in which he told how Ernie King threw him off a special long-range flight for minor personal reasons.[*] I was amazed at the fact that Admiral Sanders had to conduct some "research” to find out what Clark meant when he referred to King as a "sundowner.” Asking anyone who served in King’s time would have brought forth the real meaning. In spite of what Leland Lovette’s book Naval Customs, Traditions and Usage says, it was merely a genteel way to call him an s.o.b.
Sanders seems to think King was a great man. Time and history will decide that point, but there are a few things already that hint otherwise, such as a carrier to be commissioned the USS Nimitz. I predict and hope and pray none will ever be called the King. Admiral Sanders says King was a strict disciplinarian but no martinet. And he knows "no measures he ever took to enforce discipline.”
I suggest Admiral Sanders research the case of a commander who—after the sinking of the carrier Lexington (cv-2) •n the battle of the Coral Sea—made some remarks to a Chicago newspaper reporter that King did not like. The Navy’s top officer is reported to have said, "As long as I am in the Navy, that officer will never be promoted.” The commander was finished.
Consideration for his subordinates? Research me a few of these!
To a great many people, King’s order to reduce the typewriters on each ship in order to halve the paperwork was perhaps spectacular but a bit of stupid action.
Captain Carlton Wright of the cruiser Augusta (CA-31) had my sympathy. Any officer who would take a formation of ships through fog with radar as primitive as the SG of those times was a fool, especially with passengers such as President Roosevelt and the service chiefs of staff involved. If there had been an accident, I ask one question—would King have accepted the responsibility? No— the captain’s neck was "out.” I agree thoroughly, and I suspect many other Navy personnel do also with Nicholas Roosevelt’s opinion of King: "autocratic, preoccupied with security and incapable of understanding public relations.”
There are few other points I would like to hear more about. "King of the Oceans” implies a real seagoing admiral. Most fleet commanders-in-chief went to sea. King "of the Oceans” spent the entire war in Washington, D.C. with his headquarters ashore. But there was something special called "sea pay.” In order to draw his sea pay, King flew his flag on a small yacht tied up in the Washington Navy Yard. Perhaps it should have been "King of the Washington Navy Yard.”
It is said that King claimed to be a naval aviator and that there are pictures extant which show him wearing wings.
It is suggested the Pensacola records will show that he was not a naval aviator. For everyone who believes Admiral Sanders’ last paragraph, ("He was
dauntless and confident in adversity, modest in victory, and generous in his praise of colleagues and subordinates”), I think I can find two who will agree to Jocko Clark’s "sundowner” or s.o.b.
Only time and history will tell, but King surely was not in the same class with Chester Nimitz, William Halsey, Raymond Spruance, or some other real seagoing officer.
Babe Brown, a senior submarine officer, is credited with saying, "The submarine forces’ greatest advance was when King gave up submarines and became an aviator.”
Editor’s Note: The Proceedings researched some of Admiral Tate’s points by sending his remarks to two individuals familiar with Fleet Admiral King’s career. Rear Admiral Tate’s response follows their comments.
Vice Admiral George C. Dyer, U. S. Navy (Retired), aide to Admiral King during Jirst year of World War II and later a member of King’s staff— I think Admiral King was a great naval leader. He was brainy, aggressive, forceful, a clear thinker and an incisive decision-maker.
Admiral Tate’s comment asserts that "Most fleet commanders-in-chief went to sea.” That was not the case in the World War II U. S. Navy. Neither Admirals Royal E. Ingersoll and Jonas Ingram in the Atlantic nor Admiral Nimitz in the Pacific commanded their fleets at sea. These three—in addition to King—were the only fleet commanders- in-chief the Navy had during the war after Admiral Thomas C. Hart left the Asiatic Fleet in April 1942. Admirals Halsey and Spruance were fleet "commanders,” not commanders-in-chief.
Dr. E. B. Potter, Professor of History, U. S. Naval Academy—Officers who served under Admiral King divide roughly into those who could earn his approval and those who could not. Those who could not tend to sound like Admiral Tate. Those who could often developed for him a kind of wry affection. All felt the rough side of his tongue.
Was King a disciplinarian? I’ll say he was. As a mark of his displeasure, he once sent a commander to relieve a rear admiral with orders that the admiral be out of the Navy Department building for good by the end of working hours that day.
As author Ladislas Farago says, King had the arrogance of genius. He really was a genius, respected for his ability, but genuinely loved by few. Nimitz certainly respected him as an officer, though I am not sure what he thought
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of him as a private person. King generally praised Nimitz, but he could be sharp with him too. For example, after King had read the minutes of a conference Nimitz held at Pearl Harbor, King wrote this in a letter to Nimitz, dated 8 February 1944: "I have read your conference notes with much interest and I must add with indignant dismay,” and then he proceeded to blast Nimitz. However, at the end of King’s next letter to Nimitz, dated 17 February 1944, we find these words: "In the meantime, 'remain cheerful’—and keep up the splendid work you are doing.” Now to be specific about Admiral Tate’s discussion. Let me quote from my forthcoming biography of Admiral Nimitz (the information was supplied by Rear Admiral E. T. Layton, Nimitz’ wartime intelligence officer):
"Admiral [Aubrey W.} Fitch with the Saratoga [CV-3] and an improvised screen of cruisers and destroyers at last sortied from San Diego on June 1. This force could not possibly reach Midway in time to participate in the battle unless the Japanese attack was behind schedule, or Layton’s predicted dates were premature. Cincpac nevertheless, just in case, radioed to the Saratoga Admiral Yamamoto’s operation plan, as revealed by cryptanalysis. An officer who shall be nameless here had the atrocious judgment to post the plan on the bulletin board in the Saratoga’s wardroom. Among the interested readers was Stanley Johnston, a war correspondent from the Chicago Tribune, who took careful notes.”
The officer with the atrocious judgment was the man Admiral Tate mentions. Here is the second quotation:
"On the morning of June 8, the Cincpac staff and Station Hypo were thrown into a tailspin by a dispatch from Cominch stating that someone had apparently leaked to the press the intercepted Japanese operation plan for the Midway campaign. Their fears were confirmed when a copy of the June 7 Chicago Tribune reached Pearl Harbor. On the front page was a column-long story headlined 'NAVY HAD WORD OF JAP PLAN TO STRIKE AT SEA.’ Datelined 'Washington, D.C., June 7,’ it began: The strength of the Japanese forces with which the American navy is battling somewhere west of Midway Island in what is believed to be the greatest battle of the war, was well known in American naval circles several days before the battle began, reliable sources in the naval intelligence disclosed here tonight.’
"The story went on to summarize the Japanese deployment, with a description, including names of major vessels, of the Invasion Force and the First and Second Carrier Forces. Though the article did not mention the broken code, Japanese intelligence agents reading it would be certain to suspect some such leak and tighten their cryptographic security. The United States thus stood to lose the priceless fountainhead of information that had made the American victory at Midway possible.
"An investigation revealed that the story was in fact filed from Honolulu by Tribune correspondent Stanley Johnston, whose source was of course the copy of Yamamoto’s op plan that had been posted on the bulletin of the Saratoga. Luckily no Japanese—or German or Italian—spy read that issue of the Tribune, and so the Japanese kept on using their JN25 code, with occasional changes or additives. A grand jury found that Johnston had broken no law, and so he was never brought to public trial—which was just as well, for that would inevitably have drawn the attention of the Japanese to the leak they had missed.’
Once King got down on a man, that man had very little chance of going anywhere in the Navy. I think of Joe Rochefort, who headed the team that broke the Japanese naval code and thus made the American victory at Midway possible. He retired as a captain.
Admiral King did stay in Washing' ton, living on board a yacht and drawing sea pay. James Forrestal as Undersecretary of the Navy, tried to get him to take over the Pacific Fleet, but that was impractical since King had responsibilities in the Atlantic and Mediterranean as well as in the Pacific. Moreover, he was indispensible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A parallel situation occurre
when President Roosevelt toyed with the idea of having General George C. Marshall command the Normandy invasion and the invasion of Germany. Marshall simply couldn’t be spared from the Joint Chiefs.
Before going to Pensacola in 1926, King had amassed 60 hours of solo flight. Before leaving Pensacola, he had nearly 200. At Pensacola he spent five months of intensive aviation training instead of the usual, more leisurely ten because the Navy Department wanted him to resume command of the seaplane tender Wright (AV-i). He was, however, graduated at Pensacola and got his wings. Perhaps Admiral Tate feels that the graduation from Pensacola was illegitimate because the course was speeded up and condensed for King.
No, King was not in the same class with Nimitz, Halsey, and Spruance. Intellectually, he was probably superior to all three. Certainly he was a brighter man than Halsey. But King’s intellect was a cold intelligence. By contrast Nimitz, Halsey, and Spruance were very warm-hearted men, though Spruance, a little shy, seemed cold to those who didn’t know him well. King could never follow the argument about invading the Philippines to free the Filipinos and our 1,700 prisoners of war. He called that mere sentiment.
Admiral Tate—Professor Potter says that officers who served under Admiral King can be divided into those who could earn his approval or those who could not, the latter expressing themselves as I have. I had the fortunate good luck never to have served directly under King, nor did I ever try to gain his approval. The comment was written from the viewpoint of an observer.
Sanders wrote in "King of the Oceans” that "King was a strict disciplinarian but he knew of no measures he ever took to enforce discipline.” I gave the Lexington case as an example of enforcement of discipline. Certainly, as Potter says, sending a com- rnander to relieve a rear admiral with orders for the admiral to be out of the building for good by the end of working hours that day also speaks for itself. I say it was a very poor example, set by a very senior officer.
I did not go into the rights or wrongs of the Lexington affair. I pointed out that in spite of the legal, innocent- until-proven-guilty assumption, the officer was punished without a legal trial of the charges. I saw the officer at the end of the war, and he was still a commander. Most of his classmates were by then captains and rear admirals.
And now we come to the naval aviator bit. Early in the 1920s, Commander Ken Whiting was instrumental in having a law passed that all ships directly connected with aviation should be commanded by aviators. With the Lexington and Saratoga coming up, captains who were not aviators realized something had to be done since the most senior naval aviators were only commanders. The first captains who went to Pensacola and became the first commanding officers of Lex and Sara were issued designations as Observer Naval Aviator and wore wings with an O in the center.
I proceeded to do a little research. Washington has provided material confirming Professor Potter’s information that King went to Pensacola from 27 January to 27 May 1926 and was issued Naval Aviator certificate #3368.
During my research, I learned that pre-1930 records on King are not available. However, on 27 May a Bureau of Navigation dispatch ordered King to depart Pensacola in order to report to the Wright. It said: "Your naval aviator designation approved.”
I just do not like the idea of holding Admiral King up as next to God. Whether he was a genius or even a great naval officer only time will tell.
"The Black Shoe:
Back in Fashion’’
(See P. M. Shepherd, pp. 39-41, December 1974 Proceedings)
Ensign Brigette Rosel, U. S. Navy, Naval Communication, Station, San Diego—It is encouraging to see the Navy rightfully recognizing its deserving blackshoe shipdrivers for the expertise and specialization which they have attained. A gold insignia is a fine way of distinguishing a qualified blackshoe. It is sad, however, to see that Commander Shepherd is so
adamant about recognizing the solidarity and exclusivity of the blackshoe at the expense of the female line officer. There are women in "this man’s Navy” who love it and are more valuable to it than those men who do not consider it a profession. Not all women officers want a naval career, but the Navy’s top minds should not be closed to the presence of those who do.
While women cannot yet legally go to sea, there are women 1100 blackshoes as there are women 1300 brownshoes. Is the 1100 female blackshoe, who is attempting to pursue a naval career, to be referred to as being a part of the growing women officer group” and be combined with the nebulous "non- designated male officers”? One can infer from Commander Shepherd’s article that "non-designated officers,” grounded air- dales, and surfaced submariners assume a state of rank a step below any qualified blackshoe. Is it also to be inferred that fellow women line officers are in the same boat with these non-designated officers?
Exactly who is the "someone” who will have to fill the less than desirable billets that Commander Shepherd describes? The statement about a greater opportunity for "growth within their ranks is rather parochial since there is no women’s naval corps. There is only one Navy with the opportunity for growth within its ranks. Granted, there are those men and women officers who are non-designated, but those who are
striving for designators and specialties should not be thought of as second-rate. They are "striking” for a specialty. Let those who are short-timers or indecisive about a career pattern fill the cocoons that the author speaks of.
The woman officer wants an identity too. She is most often a blackshoe, within the line officer’s ranks. She is not looking for a "second career” within the Navy. She is a professional and she is here to stay.
"Nuclear Warships and the Navy’s Future”
(See H. G. Rickovcr, pp. 18-24, January 1975 Proceedings)
Lieutenant R. T. E. Bowler III, U. S. Navy, U. S. Naval Academy—Admiral Rickover presents a very cogent, albeit one-sided, argument in favor of making all new major combatant ships nuclear powered. However, I don’t agree that we should put all of our eggs in one basket.
The case for constructing only nuclear-powered ships has been considerably strengthened by the actions of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Undoubtedly, the oil crisis has placed oil-fired ships in a more tenuous logistic position. However, before we rush into an expanded construction of nuclear-powered ships, perhaps it would be wise to inquire about the future supplies of nuclear fuel. The lead article in the 15 January issue of Forbes magazine states that the United States faces a potential nuclear fuel supply problem. Uranium sources are concentrated in countries such that a uranium cartel could be formed. In fact, a loose organization, the Uranium Producers Forum, has already been established, and price-fixing agreements have been made.
According to the Forbes article, uranium demand in this country is expected to increase by more than 700% by 1985. An Atomic Energy Commission official is quoted: "The tight (nuclear fuel) supply situation may hit a little later than 1979, but once it does hit it will last forever.” As the article aptly states, because we are "... preoccupied with our struggle to escape the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, we may be rushing right into
the arms of another cartel—the uranium cartel.”
Two other points were absent from the admiral’s case for constructing only nuclear-powered vessels. First, no mention was made of the longer and more demanding training period required for those who operate and maintain nuclear propulsion plants. Second, we can expect some of our nuclear-powered ships to be either damaged or destroyed in time of war. Since nuclear-powered ships are built to higher standards, they must require more time and labor to build. As Admiral Rickover said, in World War II our industrial output, and therefore our fighting capacity, was limited by our labor supply. In the next war, will our labor supply be sufficient to build new nuclear-powered ships and repair those which are damaged?
I don’t know the answers, but I do think the admiral’s argument would have been more effective if questions such as these had been addressed. I strongly suspect that, all things considered, the case for nuclear-powered ships is still overwhelmingly strong. Yet I can’t help being a little skeptical about the wisdom of having our entire fleet propelled by only one kind of fuel, be it uranium or oil.
"I am growing older ...”
(See The Commodore’s Prayer, p. 97, January
1975 Proceedings)
Douglass Flubbard, Executive Director, the Admiral Nimitz Center, Fredericksburg, Texas—Seeing "The Commodore’s Prayer” in the January issue of Proceedings was like hearing from an old friend. It first came to us as "A Prayer for Restraint” from author Fred Goerner {The Search for Amelia Earhart) who got it from Admiral Nimitz. A query to Mrs. Nimitz brought "Yes, it was one of his favorites,” and "No, he didn’t write it.” She thought she might have clipped it somewhere and given it to him.
We’ve had it up on an exhibit panel at the end of a series dealing with the life of Nimitz. It’s titled "Admiral Nimitz’ Favorite Prayer” and elicits many fine comments. We’re pleased to have the Proceedings set the record straight as to General Eisenhower’s
copy, but Admiral Nimitz must have gotten his copy from another source and we still haven’t solved the mystery of who wrote it.
"Last of the Four Pipers?”
(See W. H. Langenberg, pp. 79-81, October 1974 Proceedings; R. Hammell, C. W. Bond, and A. Bennett, pp. 84-85, January 1975; J. M. Kennaday, p. 83, February 1975)
Lieutenant Commander Andrew P. Guzow- ski, former Polish Navy—In his very interesting article on flush-deck destroyers of the U. S. Navy, Captain Langenberg has made one minor error on page 80. This error, however, is of some importance to me and, I am sure, to other- officers and men of the World War II Polish Navy. Contrary to Captain Langenberg’s statement, no four piper ever sailed under Polish colors. The only U. S. warship transferred to the wartime even older R-boat, the R-3 (SS-80), were transferred respectively to the Polish Navy and the Royal Navy in New London, Connecticut on 11 November 1941, less than four weeks before the Pearl Harbor attack.
Lieutenant Peter St. Angelo, USN, turned over the command of the S-25 to Lieutenant Commander B. Roman- owski, PN. At the time, I was a sublieutenant in the Polish Navy and took over the duties of torpedo/gunnery officer. Lieutenant Robert Olsen, handed over the exec’s responsibility to Lieutenant J. Anczykowski, PN.
The S-25, renamed 0. R. P. Jastrzdb (Hawk), sailed from New London f°r Scotland on 14 November, arriving
Holy Loch on 2 December. Alas, the war career of the former S-25 was rather brief. It lasted but five months. On 2 May 1942, while on a war patrol off the northern coast of Norway, she was attacked by mistake and sunk by the escort of a Murmansk-bound convoy, PQ-n. There was a Norwegian four piper among her killers. She was the ex-uss Thomas (DD-182) and ex-HMS St. Albans. The ship had been loaned to the Royal Norwegian Navy in April 1941. When the submarine—after repeated but unsuccessful attempts to identify herself to the attackers with recognition smoke-candles—surfaced, already mortally wounded by depth charges, the St. Albans and a British fleet minesweeper, HMS Seagull raked her with point-blank cannon and machine-gun fire, killing and wounding a number of personnel.
As the only officer who somehow managed not to get hit, I had a dubious distinction of becoming the last commander of the burning and sinking ex-S-25, a command that lasted not quite one hour. The subsequent board of inquiry fully exonerated the submarine from any fault in this deplorable affair. The board put the blame on inadequate radio signals to the convoy which was not informed about the patrol sectors of friendly submarines. At this particular time four other submarines were deployed along the Norwegian coast to protect the Murmansk convoys from expected sorties by German capital ships lurking in the fiords.
Electronic Navigation: Precautionary Advice
Commander Andrew B. Bennett, U. S. Naval Reserve {Retired)—Every navigator, specially those of the pre-electronic age, has known the anxieties concomitant with celestial navigation. He has experienced frustration when rapidly growing cloud cover prevents him from obtaining a reliable fix at dusk when the ship ls going to approach and traverse navigational dangers during the night.
With the development of radar and 0fan, the navigator obtained valuable ’neans for determining the ship’s posi- n°n—independent of cloud cover and orizontal visibility. With the rapid developments in electronics providing further improvements in position finding, navigating a ship safely has become far easier.
However, the danger of placing increasing reliance on electronic gadgets poses the question of how much it will affect the skill and experience of position finding with the marine sextant. The mind can conjure up various situations of electronic failure, ranging from a loran receiver inoperative through lack of a spare part to an electronic navigational system jammed by the enemy.
Some precautionary advice is summed up in concise form below. Hopefully it may find agreement at least among those navigators who have experienced dismay when a black box burned out at a critical moment.
Electronic wizardry may aid your work until it blows a fuse;
Don’t drop your guard; your sextant keep nearby for ready use!
Notebook Item—"United States to Remove Nuclear Plant from Antarctica”
(See pp. 118, 120, December 1974 Proceedings)
Commander G. E. Krauter, Civil Engineering Corps, U. S. Navy, Director Nuclear Power Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command— I read with interest your item on the nuclear plant in Antarctica. Our office was responsible for the safety of the PM-3A nuclear power plant and the decision to dismantle it.
The article describes the history and the future plans for the nuclear plant well. There is, however, an inaccuracy in the description of the inspection that led to the decision to dismantle the plant. Your article stated ", . . that water from the shield cooler was leaking, apparently from a failure in the welding of the primary coolant piping insulation canning, into the steam generator.” There was no shield cooler nor steam generator involved. At no time was there a breach in the primary cooling piping which would cause leaking into the steam generator. The first sentence of the paragraph should read: "In September 1972, a routine inspection revealed that shield water was entering, apparently from a failure in the welding
of the primary coolant piping insulation canning, into the area around the outside of the primary coolant piping and reactor pressure vessel.”
Editor’s Note: The - Notebook item in the December issue incorrectly listed the source of the original article as the September 1974 issue of Polar Record. It should have read May 1974.
"Carrier Deployment:
Waste Not, Want Not”
(See L. Carter, pp. 107-110, December 1974
Proceedings)
Gordon Levine— I agree with Lieutenant Carter that the Department of Defense should not waste either petroleum or manpower. However, economy and morale enhancement—at the expense of combat readiness and efficiency—are not in the least conducive to national security or the implementation of national policy.
In my estimation, the proposed schedule raises several serious considerations, both military and political. Until our Navy obtains a significant antiship missile capability, the major burden of sea control falls on carrier aviation. Therefore, reduction in the number of carriers deployed in forward areas serves notice to friends and adversaries alike that we do not consider an area important enough to have a standing force available. The reduction may also signal, incorrectly, that we are "retreating” from an area, thus motivating others to initiate a crisis, in which they expect us to stand clear. Our allies would wonder whether or not we will send reinforcements during a crisis, and whether or not the incident or war would be over by the time we responded. The transit time would allow our adversary time to block our reinforcement, both militarily and politically.
Another serious problem would result from lack of at-sea time and flying time. Present reductions in these areas have already had an effect on crew efficiency. To cut further may be the final straw to combat readiness, leaving us with a paper tiger.
At a time when U. S. attack carriers constitute our major sea control force,
TIRJST
cytCRQSS!
The U. S. Navy’s Transatlantic Flight of 1919 By Richard K. Smith
Winner of the 1972 History Manuscript Award presented by The American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
A full eight years before Charles Lindbergh secured himself into the cockpit of The Spirit of St. Louis for a flight that was to change history, the U. S. Navy had already completed an air voyage from Newfoundland to Lisbon, Portugal. First Across is the exciting story of that first transatlantic flight. Made in 1919, the flight took a six- man crew nearly three weeks to complete. This book describes in detail the entire operation, the planning, the men and their aircraft, the primitive radio communication and method of air navigation.
Prompted by an offer of 10,000 pounds to be paid by the London Daily Mail to the first plane to cross the Atlantic, aviators everywhere prepared for the test. Although excluded from the prize, the U. S. Navy was in
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a unique position to win the honor. Three big Navy Curtiss flying boats were readied for flight and took off from Newfoundland, but engine trouble and bad weather forced two of the craft to land at sea in the vicinity of the Azores. There were later unable to take off and both planes were lost.
The remaining NC-4 finally completed the unprecedented flight on 27 May 1919, after the twenty-day up-and-down-and-up-again voyage to Portugal.
1973. 279 pages. Illustrated. Appendices. Index.
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of Interest to the Professional section)
Charles M. Melhorn
International rivalries, headlined events, behind-the-scene machinations, and controversial personalities, such as Billy Mitchell, are all elements in the little-known drama which surrounded the rise of the aircraft carrier. TWO-BLOCK FOX is a thoroughly researched, highly readable account of the 18-year struggle which changed the shape of the world’s navies.
It is the customary view that during the 1920’s the Navy sought to bridge the gap between national commitment in the Pacific and the force necessary to underwrite that commitment by plunging single-mindedly into programs of cruiser construction and battleship modernization. Only in this way, it was thought, could a favorable strategic balance be restored.
The author, a retired naval officer and scholar, does not agree. He advances the view that by 1922 the U. S. strategic position in the Pacific had eroded to the point where it could not be corrected by conventional measures. Dr. Melhorn also holds that this state of affairs was recognized by a small, but far-sighted and influential group of naval officers who saw no remedy short of a revolutionary advance in weaponry and tactical concepts. Their solution—was the aircraft carrier.
1974. 192 Pages. Bibliography. Index.
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WINGS FOR THE FLEET
A Narrative of Naval Aviation’s Early Development, 1910-1916 By Rear Admiral George van Deurs, USN (Ret.)
Easily the most complete account of the earliest years of U. S. naval aviation, this book reflects credit on the writer, a retired naval aviator, and those men who established naval aviation in the days of the “bamboo tails.” Through careful description of the early aircraft, and even closer attention to their pilots, naval aviation’s pioneering years are brought to life.
The author gives a superb picture of the captains and admirals who fought for and against this new branch of the sea service. Washington Irving Chambers, “father of naval aviation,” is portrayed fighting the incredible bureaucracy of his day. But it is the aviators who are the true focus of this story. “Spuds” Ellyson, “Jack” Towers, John Rodgers, “Chewy” Chevalier, “Ken” Whiting, and crusty Henry Mustin flew the kite-like craft, rocketed down the catapults, lugged the flying boats off the water, drained the bar at Pensacola’s San Carlos Hotel, and survived an appalling number of crashes.
“This well-written and beautifully produced book ... is an excellent addition to the history of American aviation.” Library Journal
“The numerous photographs alone would make this book a valuable contribution to the history of aviation.” Choice Magazine
“This is a splendid story, told well, and marvelously illustrated.” Military Affairs Magazine
1966. 175 pages. Illustrated. Bibliography.
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the sight of four of them tied up together at the same port seems almost foolhardy. Not only is a large investment sitting idly, but it is also a first-rate target. It reminds me of battleship row at Pearl Harbor.
Signalman Third Class Dan Turgyan, U. S. Navy, USS Raleigh (LPD-i)—Like most fleet sailors, I consider a ship more than a haze gray bucket of bolts. Thus, I look upon our mothball fleet with awe, respect, and sorrow. I recently read that most of the Philadelphia reserve fleet will be scrapped soon. I visited the fleet one peaceful Sunday morning last year to pay my respects. There, nested near the old tender Everglades (AD-24) were several Fletcher-class destroyers. Among them were the ex-USS Robinson (DD-562), Hazelwood (DD-531), Caperton (DD-650), Cassin Young (DD-793), and Gotten (DD-669).
Although I was born in 1950,1 know that the Fletchers, have a proud history behind them. Concerning the fate of these few survivors (the rest have already been struck for scrap, targets, or foreign transfer), I tend to believe that they, too, will be gone shortly. One has only to realize the fate of their predecessors. Of more than 250 flush deckers built from 1918-1920, all were disposed of by 1951. Of the battlewagons which were caught at Pearl Harbor, not one was saved to represent them. The most famous and heaviest decorated carrier in history, the USS Enterprise, (CV-6) met her end in a New Jersey scrap yard. The list goes on and on.
By our standards, the Fletchers are obsolete, although many countries still maintain them as first-line ships. I know the Navy does not relish discarding them but must do so in order to cut expenses. The older classes of destroyers have been struck (Benson-Cleaves-Mayo) and many of the World War II destroyer escorts are gone as well. The fighting Fletchers don’t have long to live, yet as in most cases, the men who would like to save their old friends don’t realize the urgency until they read about their disposal. If just one can be designated as a museum-memorial for the destroyer- men of World War II—as the postwar USS Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. (DD-850) has been—I think it would be a worthwhile, proud, and lasting tribute.
In a short while, they will be gone forever unless we then ask a foreign navy to return one, and that would be quite embarrassing. If the World War II destroyermen get together in a unified campaign with just a little effort now, I’m sure the Navy would be glad to have the opportunity to save one. Otherwise, they will die like the other famous and proud ships because of too little effort, too late.
"A Coming Seamanship Crisis”
(See R. A. Cahill, pp. 117-119, April 1974 Proceedings; T. E. Colvin, pp. 81-82 August 1974)
"The Merchant Marine—
Awash in Manpower Problems”
(See W. M. Miller, III, pp. 61-69, October 1972 Proceedings; J. A. Culver, pp. 82-83 January 1974; P. W. Smith, pp. 85-88,
August 1974)
Keith A. Lewis, graduate of Maine Maritime Academy—One reason for the current manpower/seamanship crisis in the merchant marine is that politicians and union leaders promise jobs but don’t provide or insist upon proper training or sufficient experience necessary for competence. The end result is that not only the industry suffers, but also the individual.
A case in point is a man who had endorsements to sail in a rating requiring welding, machining, and mechanical skills. He had none of these, nor did he have the ability to learn unless taught every step. Since automated ships have very small crews, this puts an additional burden on everyone else. For the good of the ship and the industry, the sensible thing to do is to fire him, or put pressure on him to quit. However, everyone has to make a living. The man might have a family to feed and hopes for the future. To fire him might rob him of further incentive to advance. With these thoughts in mind, a more humane approach is to try to teach him on the job, provided, of course, that the person shows a willingness to learn. This becomes more acceptable when one remembers that no one makes it entirely on his own.
It is burdensome, though, to have to teach a person how to do everything and then also have to do his work because he doesn’t know how—all in addition to doing one’s own tasks. My suggestion then, is to provide job opportunities for all who are willing to work to advance, regardless of race, sex, religion, or age- In addition, though, it is necessary to provide the proper training and insist upon sufficient experience, which 10 most cases can best be acquired by starting at the bottom of the ladder.
Another reason for the manpower/ seamanship crisis is that jobs are often awarded solely on the basis of seniority, rather than giving some consideration to merit. While I agree that seniority is important and should be adhered to in cases of equal ability, I do not a junior person of more merit should be penalized simply because of his youth. A person might have seniority at sea simply because no land-based company will put up with him. Perhaps this obstacle on the seniority list is discouraging enough to drive young men to shore jobs. An even more damaging result is that a sincere, conscientious person might decide that the "work ethic” just isn’t worth all the trouble.
. . Long Has It Waved On High”
(See B. W. Norris and T. R. Strobridge, pp. 40-43, September 1974 Proceedings)
Norman N. Rubin, retired U. S. government aeronautical engineer— While reading the article about the Coast Guard in the September Proceedings, I saw reference to the paint scheme referred to as the "Coast Guard slash.” In 1958 I performed studies which led to adoption of the "slash.” Two disparate problems converged on my desk that year (I was the lone aeronautical engineer at Coast Guard headquarters).
First was the "see and be seen” campaign being waged by DoD in the aftermath of a series of mid-air collisions and near misses with airliners. Emphasis upon increased flying discipline was only part of the answer. Because of the widespread use of bare aluminum as the skin of aircraft, the most alert crews could be caught by surprise. Silver color makes a good camouflage, except in the unusual case of sunlight glinting off it. Several complex lighting systems were proposed to provide instant information. None of them achieved widespread acceptance.
Fluorescent paints were becoming available and offered promise. It seemed tvise to limit use of fluorescents to small areas of the airplane and to attempt to avoid a dazzle effect. Several schemes tvere considered, and finally I evolved an arrowhead design over the nose of the airplane—an attempt to give indication of direction of motion. It was necessary, of course, to keep the markings within the framework of national and international usages for state-owned law enforcement and search and rescue aircraft. The geometry of the UF-1 Albatross
aircraft (later HU-16E) —a Coast Guard mainstay of the period—made the application of an arrowhead awkward, and it became a slash, leaning forward at the top. Sometime later, a small stripe was added for cosmetic effect.
The second problem was offered by the Coast Guard’s public information people. Their need was to so mark Coast Guard aircraft that their identity could not be missed in press photos. Of course, the legend "U. S. Coast Guard” appeared in letters two feet high on both sides of fuselages and hulls, but the public information people showed me a photo of a helicopter rescue operation in which the Coast Guard legend had been painstakingly retouched to identify the helicopter as belonging to another service.
A statistical study of photos of people deplaning after search and rescue missions indicated that the highest probability of a legend appearing in such photos was offered by locating the words either at left or above the cabin exit. The smallest letters legible in typical newspaper halftones would be three inches high. This size and location were adopted. For longer-range photos, the fluorescent orange bow bordered by a black slash, coupled with a bold legend and a Coast Guard insignia of goodly size, made the aircraft uniquely recognizable as Coast Guard. As a final touch, the overall color of white was adopted, both for uniqueness and to satisfy service demands for solar heat reflection to keep down cabin temperatures in the summer sun.
Notebook Item—"Navy Changes Ship Designations”
(See pp. 106-107, March 1975 Proceedings)
Commander Tyrone G. Martin, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Constitution (796-2/)—For a number of years, the Proceedings has published an assortment of pleas, criticisms, and proposals concerning the U. S. Navy’s ship classification system, because it suited no one. The Navy has now done something about it, and most critics should be satisfied. For one thing, the U. S. use of the term "frigate” is being brought into line with its meaning in the rest of the world.
The "frigate” will remain a type in the U. S. Navy; it is to be the new name for the ocean escorts. All DEs bearing hull number 1037 and higher will become FFs of the same number, just as WeyePs Warships of the World has been categorizing them for years. The six Brooke-class DEGs will become FFGs, and the economy model "patrol frigate” PF-109 class becomes the ffg-7 class. Naval records buffs will wince at this one because the five Spanish DEGs built with U. S. assistance were assigned DEG 7-12, and now there will be a duplication of sorts. The final member of the new frigate family will be the USS Glover. Now AGDE-i, she will become AGFF-i.
The present Farragut (DLG-6) class will be redesignated as guided-missile destroyers (DDG), and assigned hull numbers 37 through 46. In view of this development, I would expect NATO to change its designation of the Soviet Kashin class from DLG to DDG.
Although these changes will do much to bring unity to the world of warship types, the Navy is considering a new class of surface combatant which may prove to be the beginning of another cycle. This is the guided-missile strike cruiser (CSGN) described on pages 104-105 of the February Proceedings. It appears that the reason for giving the proposed ship a designation other than CG is her offensive-oriented concept. Admittedly, the bulk of our "new,” soon-to-be classified CGs (from DLGs) are severely defense-oriented, but I wonder if CSG isn’t an unnecessary refinement. Will we now refer to the Soviet Kyndas, Krestas, and Karas as "strike cruisers” also?
"Some Thoughts on Man’s Purpose in Life . . . and Other Matters.”
(See H. G. Rickover, pp. 67-72, December 1974 Proceedings)
Lieutenant (/. g.) John Eric Greenwood, U. S. Coast Guard Reserve—Admiral Rickover and the Spanish intellectual, Jose Ortega y Gasset share similar thoughts about man’s purpose in life. In 1930 Senor Gasset voiced his apprehension over a rising mediocrity, the decline of a willingness to accept responsibility, and a decreasing concern for morals, ethics, and education in his book, The Revolt of the Masses. He wrote, "The select man, the excellent man is urged by interior necessity, to appeal from himself to some standard beyond himself, superior to himself, whose service he freely accepts. The excellent man is the one who makes great demands on himself and the common man, the one who makes no demands on himself, but contents himself with what he is and is delighted with himself.”
Admiral Rickover’s accurate identification of our degenerating national attitudes and values raises the classic dilemma: does one reform or alter the institution or the individual to achieve the desired improvement? It is within each individual that Admiral Rickover places his hope and the responsibility for shoring up our traditional values and goals. His cures for our illness are logical and well-founded.
One segment of American society which is in an ideal position to follow the admiral’s advice, set an example, and reverse the alarming drift of America’s values is the military. The seagoing services would clearly benefit by having Admiral Rickover’s thoughts made required reading for all officer trainees in their various qualifying programs. Furthermore, the courage, ambition, responsibility, discipline, creativity, and moral standards which the admiral speaks of are precisely those principles which should be encouraged throughout the different officer qualifying programs.
George C. Urschel, Jr., Chairman of the Board, Woodville Lime & Chemical Co.— The article by Admiral Rickover is the most concise and clear-cut philosophy for a successful person that I have ever read. I hope you will make the article available for sale in booklet form.
It seems to me that this is a plan of action for all the professionals that you represent and also for the rest of us in the civilian world who hope that you will keep us safe and allow us to keep on producing the goods that you need to keep this country the best in the world.
Captain Jack Caldwell, U. S. Navy, U. S. Element, SHAPE—In the Comment and Discussion section of the October Proceedings, comments by Captain De La Mater concerning the CH-46 Sea Knight were challenged. Wrongly, I believe. From 1966 through 1968, I was on the helicopter class desk in the Naval Air Systems Command (NavAir), responsible for procurement, design, and engineering supervision of all Navy/ Marine Corps helicopters, including the CH-46.
In early 1967, the accident rate for the CH-46 increased alarmingly. The accidents involved loss of rotors, tail separation, and fuselage disintegration in flight. Many of us believed that design defects were causing the problems. NavAir engineers had warned earlier that a helicopter not designed to military specifications, such as the CH-46, could be expected to fare badly under combat conditions. Unfortunately, these warnings were disregarded at the time of the initial CH-46 procurement.
By the summer of 1967, major accidents and mechanical failures involving the CH-46 reached crisis proportions. My office viewed the corrective actions proposed by the contractor (Boeing Vertol) as mere paste and patch jobs. As fatal accidents continued, reaction from the Marine Corps became increasingly angry. They were furious about the unnecessary loss of pilots, and they were almost as unhappy about the effects of CH-46 crashes on their ability to perform their combat mission.
After discussions with NavAir engineers, I concluded that the mechanical problems plaguing the CH-46 would require pulling the helo out of service for a major rebuilding of the airframe. However, since the contractor refused to acknowledge design defects, the entire cost of fixing the helicopter would be borne by the government. The contractor claimed that the helicopter was all right, but that heavy-handed Marine pilots were flying it outside the design envelope.
Considering the multi-million dollar cost of rebuilding a marginal airframe, I recommended that the CH-46 production line be stopped as soon as possible and that a substitute helo be selected for the Marine Corps. The Marine CH-46 project officer supported this recommendation. This solution was considered by ComNavAir but rejected because of political considerations and the fear that if we killed the CH-46 in an attempt to get the Marines a reliable helo, we could get bogged down in the selection process and end up with nothing. The decision was reluctantly made to accept the contractor’s rebuilding proposal.
Shortly after this decision, ComNavAir directed Colonel Kenneth Reiser, USMC, the CH-46 program manager, to proceed to Danang to explain to the very unhappy Marine pilots there the corrective action being taken. I accompanied him. We found the pilots very discouraged. By no stretch of the imagination could it be said that the CH-46 was a well accepted helicopter.
The corrective action required to make the CH-46 reasonably safe to fly consisted of pulling all the helicopters out of the war zone at the peak of the war effort for a major rebuilding of the airframe. The CH-46 proved to be clearly inadequate for combat missions.
The CH-46 is a classic example of a non-specification airframe and the troubles that result from "off-the-shelf” procurement. The government made an initial mistake and was subsequently trapped in an exorbitantly expensive fix effort to achieve a partially satisfactory aircraft. In the meantime, the CH-46 killed a lot of good Marines.
"Linebacker Strike”
(See R. C. Powers, pp. 46-51, August 1974
Proceedings; J. T. Hayward and K. J. Davis,
pp. 76-77, December 1974)
Commander Robert C. Powers, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Claude V. Ricketts (DDG-5)—When I wrote "Linebacker Strike,” I did so to share these exciting operations with professional Navy men, and in hope of stirring comments on current shipbuilding and weapons programs. I would like to reassure Lieutenant Davis that reference to the problems of inadequate ships with insufficient weaponry was by no means inadvertent. So far, the gods of habitability, budget, electronics, soft-kill gadgets and "get-more-hulls-from-Congress- no-matter-what-they-are” seem to have quelled all such logical arguments for firepower, speed, and reliability in our warships. It is hoped that the KERBOOM of a real-life combat scenario will awaken our planners and shipbuilders to an awareness of real requirements. Computerized scenario planners in the Pentagon like to rule out Linebacker-type situations, but in the real world such missions keep coming back.
With the recent emphasis on the offensive capability of surface ships, some changes must be made. The simple fact is that our surface ships have very limited offensive capability at this time. Giving them Harpoon missiles will be a giant step forward but not a total solution. We need a fine balance of guns and missiles—both supported by the increasing technology of the day. It goes back to firepower, speed, and reliability.
For those who would care to see a
more "professional” treatment of this subject I refer you to an article of mine in the November-December 1970 issue of Ordnance magazine titled "Seagoing Weapons.” I quote several paragraphs from this article:
"It is ... a major error not to equip destroyers and cruisers with a surface offensive capability in the form of long range guns and surface- to-surface missiles. The technology to achieve this exists but has not been used as a result of the priorities given to defending the carriers against air and submarine attack. These capabilities are easily maintainable.
"Perhaps a need exists to reevaluate the role of a cruiser. Where the DIG is a long range missile ship with a light gun secondary, a new cruiser (CX) could be a long range, heavy caliber gun ship with a short range missile secondary.
"It would mount three or more of the new 8-inch 55 caliber guns, some 5-inch 54 caliber guns for close-in air defense and medium range STANDARD or point defense missiles, and would have an ASW capability and surface- to-surface missiles SSM. It would be a multi-purpose ship with missions including gunfire support, strike fleet surface defense, offensive action separate from a carrier strike force, air defense and ASW capability, in that order.”
I regret to observe that by 1975 we have not achieved, nor is there on the drawing board, a ship that has the balanced offensive capability projected. Thinking seems to be turning that way, but hardware to match it remains nonexistent. So, I say again, Boom! Boom! That’s the difference between real life and a computer-generated scenario.
Those Mysterious Midgets
(See A. J. Stewart, pp 54-64, December 1974 Proceedings)
Captain Lawrence C. Grannis, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Lieutenant Commander A. J. Stewart’s article is an excellent presentation reflecting broad research. However, on page 58 he describes the USS Antares (AKS-3) as "converted to the mundane duties of tending targets,
USS Antares (AKS-3)
[she] wheezed past the Ward with a target barge in tow.” I must take exception to this statement and clarify the record.
Under my command, the Antares was flagship of Train Squadron 8, Base Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet. ComTrainRon 8 was embarked at the time. We were returning to Pearl Harbor from a mission in which the ship had been loaned to the U. S. Army Engineers to transport miscellaneous cargo to Canton Island, some 1,600 miles south of Oahu, in connection with constructing an air strip and associated facilities. The ship departed Honolulu 3 November 1941 with four barges in tow and all holds and deck spaces fully loaded.
As a result of operational difficulties and a dispatch which ordered the ship to Palmyra Island to receive a 500-ton lighter for towing to Pearl, the Antares was delayed in returning to the Hawaiian area. A tug and pilot were to meet the ship at 0630, 7 December, off Pearl Harbor entrance buoys. The lighter was to be towed to Honolulu Harbor and the pilot was scheduled to moor the ship in Pearl Harbor. The Antares arrived on time, but neither tug nor pilot boat was in sight.
In swinging to the eastward, toward Diamond Head, to await the tug and pilot, an object unidentified at the time but thought possibly to be a broaching submarine, appeared about 2,000 yards on the starboard quarter in the restricted area. Because the Antares was slow, encumbered by a tow, and unarmed, I sent a message to the inshore patrol destroyer Ward (DD-139), which was lying off the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys, to investigate. This was at about 0630. Shortly, the Ward took offensive action which resulted in the sinking of what turned out to be a Japanese two-man submarine. This occurred about 200 yards or so off the starboard beam of the Antares.
The tug arrived to take the tow and was in the process of receiving it when the Japanese attacked at 0758. The Antares was maneuvered to be clear of the ships that sortied from Pearl. Some bombs exploded in the vicinity and several strafing attacks were made by Japanese planes. No casualties occurred. One of the first messages sent by CinCPacFlt was to the Antares: "Do not enter Pearl under any circumstance.” About 1100 the Antares secured to the Navy pier in Honolulu Harbor.
Lieutenant Palmer 0. Hanson, Jr., U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—l was one of the many who inspected the trailer-mounted midget submarine C during a World War II bond drive. I was 14 at the time. My dominant recollection is of an unfavorable connotation associated with the. suicidal mission ascribed to the midget submarines at that time. Curiously, the word "suicide” never appears in Commander Stewart’s article. A potentially suicidal attack was implied in the description of Ensign Sakamaki’s determination to employ his submarine as a manned torpedo when the tubes would not fire.
Souvenir post cards were available at the bond drive exhibit. The picture on the card was similar to the one at the top of page 61 of the article. The caption below the photograph reads "Captured Two-man Japanese Suicide Submarine.” The story on the reverse side of the card reads "The two-man Japanese submarine was captured off Oahu Island on December 8, 1941. This suicide craft is 81 feet long by 6 feet in diameter and weighs approximately 17 tons without the electric motor which was removed to lighten it. The only means of entrance and exit to the submarine is through a 16-inch hatch at the top of the conning tower. In addition to the two 18-foot torpedoes which were carried in the forward end, the submarine had a demolition charge of TNT sufficient to blow up two city blocks.”
In contrast, a thread of admiration for the exploits of the crews of the midget submarines winds through the Proceedings article. For example, consider the final paragraph’s description of "brave and dedicated crewmen” as victims of "the relentless search and attack by alert and angry American crews.” Emotional words, those. What a difference 33 years can make in our outlook.
Commander Earl D. Bronson, U. S. Navy (Retired)—On 7 December 1941, I was chief machinist’s mate on board the USS Plunger (SS-179). We rounded Diamond Head on the surface about 0730, heading for the "barn” after a three-month cruise to the West Coast. Needless to say, our plans for reunion with our families or a Waikiki liberty were rudely shattered when we were thoroughly strafed by planes with "fried-egg” em blems. We quickly dived and headed to the south submerged. Of course, we made no contact. Our boat entered Pearl on the morning of 9 December.
Early on 10 December, after fueling at the submarine base the day before, we—in anticipation of a renewed attack-moved away from the dock and moored to a buoy north of Ford Island to load stores and prepare for departure on our first war patrol.
At the next buoy, another submarine reported a sound contact. We manned our sound gear and between us pinpointed, by pinging, a submerged stationary object. We passed a grapnel and line to the 50-foot motor launch being used to provision us and it made a hookup. Since the object couldn’t be moved by towing or lifting, it was then assumed that we had pinged on some uncharted wreckage. We returned to the chores at hand and departed on our first war patrol at daybreak on 11 December. This "dead” contact must have been midget B or possibly an inert midget E.
In 1952, while serving as first lieutenant of the Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, I was again exposed to midget B. In the process of improving the dockside area at the east end of Sail I, it was
necessary to dredge out the previous fill, drive sheet piling for retention and refill to prevent further erosion of the parking area just inboard of the dock. This was being done by a civilian contractor.
During the work, the contractor- operated dragline grabbed something too big to move and, furthermore, the area was being permeated by a distinctly disturbing odor. One of my crew members reported that he could smell chlorine gas in the area.
When I arrived at the scene, it was apparent that the dragline operator had, indeed, made contact with more than he could handle. Further, the bucket teeth had penetrated and could not be readily extracted.
The construction crew foreman, informed of our suspicions that the dragline had run into a Japanese midget interred during the original construction of the quay wall in 1942, then brought in a smaller rig and commenced cleaning the muck away from the area of the stuck bucket. Sure enough, there is was, midget B, with the bucket teeth stuck through the hull at a point that must have penetrated into the battery compartment causing the unmistakable chlorine gas. The area was not the most desirable place in which to work, so a couple of gas masks were provided and my crew liberated the dragline bucket by passing a line around it and pulling it free with a truck.
We decided that by excavating inboard and parallel to the hull, the boat could be rolled into the excavation and thus made to clear the space needed to continue the sheet piling on its planned line. The hull was reburied, and there it is today. I was unaware that the crew was still inside until I read Commander Stewart’s article.
"Norfolk: Lucrative Target?”
(See M. R. Adams, pp. 90-91, December 1974 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander James C. Van Slyke, Jr., U. S. Navy—Budgetary constraints are forcing the Department of Defense to close more bases, thus resulting in a higher concentration of forces at the remaining ones. This only worsens the problem Lieutenant Adams was pointing
to. It might be more cost-effective to concentrate naval forces in just a few areas on either coast, but it is also making the job of any potential enemy much easier.
The success of the U. S. mining campaign in Haiphong harbor illustrated the relative ease with which a major port might be closed and the forces therein neutralized. How many mines would it take to trap U. S. ships at Norfolk, Charleston, Mayport, San Diego, Alameda, and Pearl Harbor? The Soviet Union has effectively employed sea mines in every conflict in which it has participated and is known to possess a vast stockpile. Certainly the potential enemy must consider mine warfare for any conflict with the United States. It is both cheap and effective. The concentration of U. S. military forces also simplifies the work of the enemy strategic planner. He has fewer military installations to target.
Like Lieutenant Adams, I do not have the solution for the problems associated with concentrating the fleet at a few major bases. However, as the defense dollar is squeezed tighter and tighter, more base closures will be considered. Any further concentration must be avoided. Let’s not make the enemy’s job easier by providing him with a few fat targets.
"We Make Our Ships Ugly by Design”
(See P. Sims, pp. 113-118, November 1974 Proceedings; R. R. Schweiker, pp. 83-84, February 1975)
Benjamin W. Downs—I want to thank you for the enjoyment I got from Mr. Sims’ Professional Note on ship construction and alteration. I always thought that the heavy cruisers (CAs) were the sleekest and most beautiful things afloat. But the change in armament dictates a different ship configuration, I guess, and as a layman on the subject, I shouldn’t dispute the professionals. But neither they nor the destroyers that I have seen look well designed anymore. I keep hoping the Proceedings will run an article similar to this on battleship superstructures in the last 75 or 85 years—including plenty of pictures.
Nobody asked me, but. .
By Lieutenant (j.g.) Gary F. Lehman,
U. S. Naval Reserve, Attack Squadron 165
The Bachelor Junior Officer:
A Minority of One
In today’s Navy, the married junior officer (JO) has a decided advantage over his single contemporary. Most of the services and fringe benefits provided for members of our sea services are designed to assist the family man. Medical facilities, commissaries, housing or basic allowance for quarters (BAQ), exchanges, and (in some areas) recreational facilities are the domain of the man with dependents.
Perhaps the most acutely felt injustice is the additional money which the bachelor JO forfeits for retaining his single status. If assigned to a shore command, he lives in a single room (lieutenants get a "suite” of two). A BOQ room is small, hardly adequate to act as living room, bedroom, and storage room. Because there is no place to pursue hobbies, one is usually left to the mercy of special services facilities during their operating hours.
A particular thorn in the side of single JOs is the problem of storing cars, motorcycles, or bicycles. Every naval base I have visited has had a garage or carport attached to a married officer’s quarters. The bachelor is forced to let his car or motorcycle rust in the sea mist or bleach in the sun, and he must store his bicycle in his already crowded living/bedroom because of lack of security outside the BOQ.
Most BOQ wardrooms are expensive and offer little variety, which makes it difficult to stick to a special diet for health or religious reasons. With no personal kitchen available, the bachelor is generally unable to realize the savings afforded by the commissary. To eat three meals a day in the wardroom generally costs more than twice the monthly allowance for subsistance. Also annoying is the prohibition of
hot plates, popcorn poppers and other small snack appliances which are cited as fire hazards.
Socially—and perhaps professionally-damaging to the single JO is the inability to entertain in his "home” on a private, personal basis or to host a wardroom or squadron party. Most BOQs rules prohibit "visits in rooms by members of the opposite sex” after a certain time or, in some cases, at anytime. This seems a bit Victorian since many junior officers are recent graduates of colleges where coed dormitories are accepted.
Unfortunately, in closed mess-type officers’ clubs the BOQ manager doubles as club manager and works for the station commanding officer, not the advisory council. Thus, command parties are "social events of the year” while the daily BOQ problems are frequently met with indifference.
A further irritant is the policy that requires a bachelor assigned to a deploying aviation squadron to give up his "home” and to arrange for storage— at an additional cost—of gear that he cannot take on board ship. There is little security offered in BOQs, station supply, or security departments for long-term storage. If this JO leaves the ship for another duty station or to be released from active duty, the Navy will not pay for his trip back to the place where his belongings are .stored.
He must use leave time and his own funds to collect his gear. This is not the case if the officer is married.
If the bachelor JO is successful in obtaining BAQ (through seniority) to pay for a house, he finds two more areas of financial discrimination. The BAQ rates for single officers are lower than those for officers with dependents. Moreover, the single man loses his BAQ when he goes on deployment, but his married colleague receives both BAQ and separation allowance.
Why should a married officer be paid
more than a bachelor for doing the same job?
To remedy the foregoing inequities, there are several possible alternatives:
► Give BAQ to all officers who desire it.
► Allow two or three to occupy a home in station housing.
► Design new BOQs as condominium- type housing.
► Make BOQ occupancy mandatory only for transients/TAD personnel/ students.
We’ve all poured our heart out to our boss, spouse, chaplain, or kid and asked, "Right?” only to be told, "I’m sorry, I wasn’t listening.” Nobody listens any more. But a few do read. If nobody seems to care what you think about anything, perhaps you ought to contribute to "Nobody asked me, but ...” a new feature that will appear irregularly on these pages. Maybe what you have been saying isn’t worth listening to. But, if it is, we may print it and pay you $50.00. If it isn’t, you’ll feel better for having got it off your chest.
It seems that policymakers either fail to recognize, or are unconcerned with, many of the reasons for the low junior officer retention rate. When the time comes to make a decision between civilian and military life, the unfair treatment which the single JO receives is a contributing factor in his decision to return to civilian life.