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Today’s top military people can and must consider fully the political, economic, and psychological implications of their military advice. This fact alone dramatizes the distance the modern U. S. officer has moved away from his 19th century counterparts in France, England, Germany, and, yes, in America.
•^^^Lilitary professionalism could not become an issue until the rise of a professional officer corps in the 19th century. In earlier periods the aristocratic officer was bound to the sovereign by blood ties. During the 19th century the idea took root that the new professional soldier, by now often a commoner, owed loyalty not to the monarch but to the state. In practice this loyalty was given to the government of the day. Western Europe, the birthplace of American military and political traditions, produced varying concepts of military professionalism.
By the time the Cabinet had displaced Parliament as the initiator of defense policy and as the instrument of civil supremacy in Great Britain, most of the temptations for professional military men to play the game of parliamentary politics had been removed. There were other factors restraining the military professional: Britain’s strong 19th century strategic position, the physical separation of the military in colonial garrisons and at sea from governmental institutions, and the existence among military professionals of a traditional devotion to the principle of control over military forces by the civilian leadership.
The idea of creating institutions to allow the military to play an orderly role in the making of national security policy was a relatively late development in Great Britain. The Committee for Imperial Defense in peacetime and much smaller War Cabinets in World War II served as such instruments for the British. During World War II, however, Prime Minister Winston Churchill assumed most of the difection and control of the military, and the War Cabinet practically fell into disuse. The British experience, then, was to provide an organization for coordination with, and control of, the military, but the exercise of that control did not always lie with that organization.
France presents a paradox. From 1815 to 1939 the military professional remained loyal to a variety of regimes, republican as well as absolutist. The army obeyed the government of the day against the popular uprisings of 1830 and 1849. In 1851 the military remained loyal to Louis Napoleon when he changed the form of government by coup d’etat. With a minor exception in 1871, the army was the docile instrument of Louis Napoleon during the Second Empire. Through a parade of governments during the Third Republic, the army remained docile, passive, and obedient: la grande muette.
The paradox becomes evident in 1940 and again in the 1958 "revolt of the generals.” In spite of long and strong traditions of political neutrality, the military professional in France was forced to choose sides after the Vichy government was established in 1940. The traditions of political neutrality and obedience were of little help when more than one regime claimed legitimacy. An officer in France in the dark days just before the 1940 armistice with Germany could watch General Maxime Weygand force changes in the political alignment of the government. Or he might choose General Charles de Gaulle, who was already branded a rebel by the Vichy government. Finally, an officer in North Africa was likely to feel the pressure from both sides for his loyalty and support, especially during the Allied landings in 1942. The naval officers who were responsible for scuttling the French fleet in Toulon in 1942 must have felt these cross pressures very acutely.
The North African revolt of 1958 was a complex affair and will not be explained in detail here. The causes of a breakdown in civilian control stem primarily from the frustrations of the professional military as a result of the Indochinese and Algerian wars of independence. A distrust of the regime of the day, previously overcome by traditions of obedience and non-involvement in politics and a strong sense of patriotism to the state, was heightened by what the generals viewed as a sellout of the military. The government was seen as indecisive and without a clear national policy in either of those affairs, and many military leaders felt that the army had been made the scapegoat for both wars. The traditions of obedience, discipline, and patriotism were no longer enough to keep the military professional aloof from politics.
The evolution of military professionalism in Germany has proceeded from different assumptions about the role of the military from those prevalent in Britain and France. In spite of widespread reports of the strict professionalism of the German military, it never abstained from politics. When the interests of the army and the civilian society generally coincided, no problem arose over civilian control, but often the objectives of the army conflicted with those of the popularly elected assembly. In such cases, the military leader often was able to bypass the assembly by appealing to the emperor. A basic assumption here was that the military professional served only the emperor and was not subject to legislative interference or control. General Hel- muth von Moltke’s battles with Bismarck from 18661870 are consistent with this assumption. Moltke wrote the king in 1870:
"Up till now I have assumed that, especially in time
of war, the Chief of the General Staff and the Federal
Chancellor are equally competent and mutually independent agencies under the direct command of
Your Royal Majesty.”
Moltke’s efforts were to free the military from civilian control in all matters of strategy, a word which he interpreted broadly.
After the unification of Germany under the Second Empire, the army gradually became a state within a state, often hounding civilian ministers from their posts. Military leaders claimed the right to define which policies were or were not in the national interest, and oever doubted their duty to intervene in situations in which the government of the day did not act in consonance with their views of the national interest. By 1914, fhe younger Moltke could conceive it his duty to wire ihe Austrians urging them to mobilize against Russia, Without even notifying the German Chancellor in adduce. By the end of World War I the chief of the General Staff was running the German government.
After World War I, military leaders ostentatiously abstained from politics. The new image of the German military professional now appeared to be closer to that °f the British or early French officer. But appearances can be deceiving, and the tradition of military involve- rner't in politics remained strong in Germany. Observers bave noted that the military continued to be a state Within a state, though more covertly than in the past. "Ebere is evidence, for example, that General Hans von beeckt entered into agreements with leaders of the Red Army for training of German pilots and tank officers ln Russia. He formed a special branch of the Eeichswehr ministry to facilitate this cooperation with E-ussian leaders, and used his residence for conferences With Soviet military officers and politicians.
In view of the political power which the army had gamed, it seems remarkable that Adolf Hitler was able lri a few short years to bring this body under his Personal control. By flattery, cajolery, subversion, and Purges, he was able to reduce the army to a postion
sterility in German politics. Hitler promised to ,ncrease the strength of the army above the 100,000 men permitted by the Versailles Treaty, an attractive ^ber, but one for which the price was to prove very high. From late 1933 to mid-1934 the army stood placidly by while Hitler retired several dissenting generals and purged the SA storm trooper organization and the SS. After General Paul von Hindenburg’s death, Hitler proposed, and Chief of the General Staff Werner von Blomberg concocted, a loyalty oath which each member of the armed forces was ordered to take. This oath to "render unconditional obedience to the Fuhrer of the German Reich and people ...” was unprecedented in German military history. No such ironclad oath had ever been given to the Kaisers or to any German republic. Yet there is no record of the refusal of any officer to take the prescribed oath.
After this, the army was firmly aligned with Hitler, whatever qualms some officers such as General Ludwig Beck, a later leader of the resistance to Hitler, might have had. Purges were carried out against those who had the temerity to speak out. By the time some military leaders realized the global implications of Hitler’s military plans, it was too late for the army successfully to disassociate itself from the long pattern of collaboration with him. Civilian control had been restored, but only by a dictator who had gained personal power over the military.
The postwar German army is closely aligned with the civilian government, according to a German government white paper, under the concept of the "citizen in uniform.” It is also subject to the control of the popularly elected assembly. This is another break with German tradition; only time will tell whether the military will again become embroiled in politics.
There is no single pattern of military professionalism
which emerges from this review of the major nations of Western Europe. On the one hand, we find a tradition of a professional military service, with the military leader as a servant of the government of the day. On the other hand, there is a tendency, except in Great Britain and in an earlier period in France, for the military to become rather heavily involved in politics.
In the United States we must go back in time to find the earliest traditions of civil-military relations. These traditions dealt not with the professional soldier, but with a citizen soldier, usually a state militiaman. Prior to the Constitutional Convention the dangers of military tyranny were so strong in the minds of governmental leaders that even the Revolutionary War was fought primarily with organizations composed of state militiamen.
One of the most difficult problems for the framers of the Constitution was the advisability of establishing a standing army for the United States. Only after a real search for alternatives and the greatest soul-searching did they authorize an army and a navy for the federal government. One delegate, Elbridge Gerry, proposed a two-to-three thousand man limit on standing armies. George Washington, who took little part in the debate, is supposed to have squelched this proposal by suggesting in an audible whisper an amendment to Gerry’s motion making it unconstitutional for any enemy to attack the United States with a force larger than we could lawfully raise. Nevertheless, a standing army was authorized in the Constitution, but was surrounded by what the framers considered to be the most stringent safeguards: congressional approval of army appropriations every two years, and exclusion of active military officers from political office, including the presidency. The power to declare war was lodged with Congress. Finally, the civilian President was made commander-in-chief.
The framers of the Constitution were not familiar with the type of military force which was only beginning to emerge in Europe and was as yet unknown in the United States: the standing army staffed with professional military officers. Thus, the Constitution was approved with provision for a standing army. Left unanswered by this document was the status of the officers who would lead this armed force. Although the Constitution does provide some general background for civil-military relations, it does not guarantee civilian control nor does it deal with the concept of military professionalism. For the development of that concept we must await the establishment of a professional officer corps in the United States.
Prior to the Civil War, and particularly in the South, the idea began to take hold that a career as a military officer might be an honorable profession. But the development of military professionalism had to wait until the post-Civil War period. After the war the military was pared to the bone in numbers and became largely isolated from society, with many officers and men stationed at remote posts in the West and Southwest. The isolation from and the rejection by society caused the officer corps to turn inward. Stimulated by the writings of Mahan, Sherman, Upton, Luce, and others, the army developed the concept of military professionalism. That concept was heavily influenced by the military systems in other countries, particularly Germany. General Sherman sent Upton on a world tour of military establishments in 1876-1877. Upton, though impressed by the institutions for civilian control in India, recommended the German military system as a model.
By the end of the 19th century the overall picture reflected a recognition by most military and some civilian leaders that there was a legitimate profession of military officership. The emerging military professionalism was quite narrow, and few military leaders claimed any role for the military in policy formulation. In 1912 Admiral Dewey wrote Admiral Rodgers, commandant of the Naval War College, that the Navy had no business in this area. A few years later the planners of the Army General Staff concluded that the work of the statesman and the soldier were separate: "where the first leaves off the other takes hold.” This position remained essentially unchanged in 1936 when an Army Command and General Staff School publication asserted:
"Politics and strategy are radically and fundamentally things apart. Strategy begins where politics ends. . . The line of demarcation must be drawn between politics and strategy, supply, and operations. Having found this line all sides must abstain from trespassing-” .
In view of the admiration among U. S. Army officers for the German military in general, and von Clausewitz in particular, it is somewhat surprising that the official doctrine of the army was the antithesis of the writings of von Clausewitz, who never believed in strict separation between military and political affairs. Perhaps the British influence was also strong here. In any event, the concept of military professionalism remained narrow, at least until World War II.
There were some dissenters among military officers. Foremost here is Alfred Mahan, who repudiated his earlier narrow concepts of military professionalism in his later writings.
General Leonard Wood was another dissenter, although he later frankly entered the political arena,
becoming a leading contender for the Republican presi- ^ential nomination in 1920. Both Mahan and Wood finally ran afoul of military professionals from their °Wn services, losing their influence both among the Unitary and in the country. It is not surprising that °ther military leaders finally rejected these officers. The prevailing concept of military professionalism was too narrow to countenance their activities. The determination of the officer corps to avoid the political impli- catl°ns of their profession caused the activities of ^ahan and Wood to be suspect among military professionals.
Prior to 1940 the military professional could feel ^ecure in his separation of military and political issues. n 1940 a Joint Board, consisting of four high-ranking military officers, was moved by President Roosevelt to Executive Office of the President, and its advisory uties expanded. The service secretaries did not sit on ffie Joint Board, and when the office of the Joint Chiefs Staff was established, it reported directly to the resident. Secretaries Stimson and Knox were bypassed; they had responsibility for their departments without c°ntrol over their military chiefs. The military chiefs Were rhus thrust into the vortex of the decision-making Process, a position for which their military profes- s'°nalism had ill-prepared them, k ^*nce the Secretaries of War and Navy had largely ^een shunted aside, civilian control was exercised only y President Roosevelt. Commenting on this issue in ^5, Admiral Leahy, a member of the Joint Chiefs 0 Staff during the war, said the JCS was "under no c,vilian control whatever.”
At the end of the war the power and prestige of e rnilitary were at a peak. Military men had branched °ut into many non-military areas, spurred on by war-
The search and destroy policy evolved by the military commander in Vietnam, General William Westmoreland, was not in consonance with our overall policy in Vietnam. But it is hard to find fault with a military commander whose policy guidance from Washington was little more than "Defeat the enemy. ”
time expediency. The traditional narrow view of military professionalism remained, but its practice was broader. After World War II the United States again demobilized its huge military forces, but the immediate postwar difficulties with the Soviet Union created new national security problems. What was the military professional’s advisory role to be in the cold war? It was a new ball game with a different set of rules.
An examination of national security decisions during the postwar period tends to confirm that there are few decisions which can be classed as military at the national level, and that there is often some blurring at the battlefield level. Most obvious are the heavy political and psychological implications of strategic nuclear weapons. At the tactical level, the U. S. decision to use nuclear weapons in the defense of Western Europe has had heavy political overtones. The decision to recross the 38th parallel in the fall of 1950 was made primarily on military grounds, but resulted in a whole host of new problems in the Korean War. The support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was essential to the ratification of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, and most JCS members stated during Senate hearings that they favored the treaty because its potential political advantages overbalanced its military disadvantages. Most of the key decisions of the Vietnam War have had direct and substantial political consequences, even when the nature of such decisions, for example, the bombing of supply lines, appear to be primarily military.
Most postwar military and civilian leaders have agreed that there has been some fusion between the political and military components of national defense policy. Most military leaders have nevertheless insisted that the military professional still retains a competence not found in the civilian sector, an expertise which is not capable of being reduced to computer quantification. The high military officials who have been most effective in defense decision-making are those with a concept of professionalism enabling them to consider fully the political, economic and psychological implications of their military advice. Civilian leaders in the executive branch and in congress have been almost unanimous in praising those military leaders who were capable of raking a broad view of their advisory responsibilities.
The profile of the new military professional begins to emerge from this background of tradition and postWorld War II events. He has largely broken from the traditional concept that the military officer must abstain from all things political. He still eschews partisan politics whenever possible. In some circumstances he may be called upon to support an administration decision which has become highly partisan. Because of the long tradition of military obedience to civilian control, and because of his own military training, he gives his full support to his commander-in-chief. He will try to limit that support, however, to those aspects of the decision which can be closely related to his broad military expertise.
The new military professional is a political sophisticate. He is a product of a broad general education from an ROTC program at a university, or, more recently, a broadly based program at the service academies. Rather than having been removed from American society, he is in the mainstream of and a mirror of that society. He is a graduate of one of the high-level postgraduate service schools, and probably of a joint program such as the National War College or the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. At these schools he has picked up an understanding of both the theory and practice of the democratic system. He has an appreciation for both the letter and the spirit of democracy and ordinarily will not play fast and loose with the system. Often during his career he has had an "adaptive” tour of duty during which he has gained additional insights into the practical aspects of the democratic system.
Another tradition which the new professional has broken with is that of making his assessments based solely on the capabilities of potential enemies. For example, a current member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff could point out to a congressional committee the capabilities of the modernized Russian navy, and in addition could offer his estimate of Soviet intentions for the use of their fleet.
The new military professional has an understanding of the nature of and the political implications of partisan warfare. He realizes that the day is past when our political leadership can turn over completely the conduct of a war to the military. He will make his recommendations within this framework, based primarily upon his military expertise. Once a decision is made he will loyally support the administration’s chosen courses of action.
A picture of the new military professional has been sketched above. If this profile represents reality in any large measure, what will be the implications for civilian control over the military? We have stated that the tradition of obedience to civilian authority remains strong among military leaders. Also, the new military professional has been able generally to internalize the values of democracy, one of which is that elected representatives of the people shall exercise control over the military.
The tradition of civilian control and an appreciation for the spirit of democracy may be slender reeds on which to base civilian control. There should be some other factors which will enhance civilian control over the broad military professional. We should expect our civilian officials to be both capable of and determined to exercise that control. The civilian leadership cannot default on its responsibilities in exercising civilian control because of an assumed lack of knowledge about "military” affairs. We have noted above that guerrilla wars in particular are so heavily political that even tactical military decisions should be analyzed for their political implications. For civilian control to be meaningful, the civilian leadership must not default on these decisions because they appear to be primarily problems of military strategy or even tactics.
A similar default can take place in civilian control over military procurement. When military doctrine dictates the requirement for a certain weapons system should the civilian leadership question that doctrine? They should and must if civilian control is not to be defaulted. There is some evidence that military leaders chafe under close civilian supervision in procurement. A Navy leader once told a congressional committee he would have liked Congress to give him so much money for the Navy for a fiscal year and let him spend it for the weapons he thought were most crucial. Still, because weapons systems often dictate strategy and that strategy may have substantial political implications, the decisions to procure these systems are political decisions and should be taken by the civilian leadership.
Another potentially dangerous situation for civilian control can arise when the military is proposing all or most of the alternative solutions to a defense problem. This is not to say, as is often stated by those who fear that militarism is rampant or that the military-industrial complex has taken over, that military advisers always offer military solutions to defense problems. Nevertheless, if the military voice should be heard but not be dominant, there must be other sources of information and recommended solutions available to the civilian decision-maker. If one agrees that the line between that which is military and that which is political has become blurred, and believes further that most major national security decisions are highly political, perhaps this problem loses some of its poignancy. Former Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates once said that civilians should take responsibility on an informed basis, but
added that "they should not exclude themselves on the basis that they are not wise enough to make military decisions.” In order to help them make wise decisions ^hey need all the sources of information they can find, deluding some which are nonmilitary.
When the military professional has had extensive postgraduate schooling, including training in national defense decision-making, we will encourage the maintenance of civilian control by finding highly competent eivilian superiors. The problem of civilian competence may manifest itself in several forms. The civilian official may have little or no military background and no formal training in military strategy or even in national security policy-making. The result could be that his taek of background may inhibit him in the exercise °f his responsibilities in civilian control. Secondly, the civilian official must be a good administrator in these tlrnes of large bureaucracies within all military departments. He may have the background and military experience, but if he is an ineffective administrator or a novice in the ways of bureaucratic politics, his experience may help him little, if at all.
No matter how strong the background and the competence of the civilian superior, he still cannot exercise' detailed supervision and control over the military professional. Even with modern communications and detailed reporting procedures, the national defense establishment is so complex that complete civilian control by supervision is impossible. During the Vietnam War, for example, unauthorized bombing raids were initiated apparently without the consent or even tbe knowledge of civilian superiors. These raids were made against the spirit and probably the letter of the guiding directives from higher civilian and military Authorities. Because detailed civilian control is not 'kely to be fully effective, we must turn to two other methods of constraint, one internal and one external.
■^s was stated above, the civilian leader must be both competent and determined to exercise civilian control.
be most effective external method of achieving this control is to make his directives as specific as possible.
nere is no excuse for a vague directive to the overall commander in Vietnam which says little more than
"Defeat the enemy.” The search and destroy policy evolved by the military commander in Vietnam was not in consonance with our overall policy in Vietnam. But it is hard to find great fault with the commander when his policy guidance was this vague. All military leaders should recognize, on the other hand, that the policies of the political leadership can never be precise and detailed, and that they may require change or modification from time to time.
The broad military professional should be able to understand more fully the intent of the directives from civilian leaders. When he has internalized the spirit of the democratic system he will be able to exercise restraint, if such is called for, in situations not covered by orders from higher authority. Since detailed civilian control is impossible, the military professional must in some measure police himself. The broad professional will have an appreciation for the letter and the spirit of the directives of his civilian superiors. A spirit of trust between the military leader and his civilian counterpart should be enhanced by the actions of the military professional. Such trust should render visits by the inspectors general, proposed recently by the Secretary of Defense, routine or even unnecessary.
Overall, the potential problems associated with broad military professionalism are not too great, while the advantages appear to be substantial. The professional advice given by the military leader after a consideration of all relevant factors, political, economic and psychological, should contribute to more enlightened national security policy. Civilian control can be maintained and even strengthened by competent civilian direction, by the military tradition of obedience to civilian authority, and by the broad military professional’s deeper understanding of the political nature of national defense policy.
Lieutenant Colonel Jesse graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1947 and served for 20 years as a Marine officer. He received his Master’s degree in I960 from the University of Virginia while serving as an NROTC instructor. After retirement, he continued with graduate work at the University of California, Riverside, and earned his Ph.D. in political science in 1972. He is now a professor of political science at the College of the Desert, Palm Desert, California.
________________________ Sounds Fishy to Me
Recently, His Royal Highness, Prince Charles, a lieutenant in the Royal Navy, visited San Diego in HMS Jupiter (F-60), the British frigate in which he served. SOPA SUBAREA East transmitted an all ships present eastern sector San Diego message with the following: "HMS Jupiter (F-60) will arrive at Pier 3 NavSta at 0800, 14 March and depart approximately 0800, 21 March. His Royal Highness, the Prince of Whales is one of Jupiter’s officers, ...”
Captain F. C. Collins, USN
(■The Naval Institute will pay $23.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)