This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
Air Defense for the Mining of Haiphong
By Captain Arthur M. Osborne,
U. S. Navy, Former Surface Operations Officer, Carrier Division Three
Even though the United States had withdrawn most of her combat troops from Vietnam by early March 1972 and Paris negotiations had been underway for some months, the North Vietnamese were obviously making preparations for a major offensive. Intelligence estimates of a major Tet-type offensive—similar to that in 1968, but concentrating primarily on the central highlands—were provided on a daily basis. Although the extensive troop and supply buildup was detected just north of the demilitarized zone, no one was prepared for the massive invasion across the DMZ on Easter that was to threaten South Vietnam’s entire northern province of Quang Tri. The invasion across the DMZ and the concurrent general enemy offensive throughout South Vietnam would provide the real test of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). No assistance was available from American ground troops.
American air power was unable to provide much assistance for the first few days due to adverse weather over the battle areas. The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) made spectacular progress, and all intelligence estimates were soon to be drastically modified. The supply effort and the quantity of sophisticated
Soviet weaponry available to the NVA had been grossly underestimated, primarily because intelligence activities were curtailed because of the withdrawal of American troops. An estimated 50 Soviet-built tanks proved to be more than 1,000. A short-term supply capability proved to be fully capable of sustaining the effort for weeks.
The initial U. S. reactions in resuming naval shore bombardment and bombing of military targets in North Vietnam were directed at curtailing the flow of supplies and material to support the invasion Lines of communication (loc) in the southern part of North Vietnam and on the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos were interdicted daily, weather permitting. When Navy and Air Force tactical aircraft were not hitting the LOCs supplying the invasion, they were joining the Air Force B-52 effort in support of the RVN in the South.
The ARVN performed remarkably well. The enemy was sustaining tremendous losses but still pursued the costly "human-wave” type assaults, primarily in the Hue area. By early May it became apparent that drastic measures were required to break the back of the North Vietnamese offensive. On 8 May, Washington time, the order was given to
mine the harbors of North Vietnam.
Commander Carrier Division Three, embarked in the USS Coral Sea (CVA-43), was on station in the Gulf of Tonkin directing the naval air war. As Yankee Station commander, he was responsible for the offensive effort of the entire naval force in the gulf and had the full responsibility for the defense of that force. Since the beginning of the invasion, his staff had been planning and directing all naval air and surface gunnery strikes into North Vietnam and all naval air support sorties into South Vietnam. In addition, extensive sorties were conducted daily for defense of the force and for surveillance of the gulf and enemy territory.
The mining plan called for laying mines in the approaches to Haiphong at 0900 (local time), 9 May. An initial assessment of the threat indicated that SAMs, AAA, and MiGs were to be expected in the target area. The carrier air wing commander, embarked in the Coral Sea, elected to lead the strike and decided the best tactic would be to go in low, drop the mines, and exit with as little time over the target area as possible. This tactic was considered effective against SAMs and AAA, but defense
against MiGs would have to be provided.
Traditional Fleet doctrine calls for CAP as the first line of defense. For maximum effectiveness and safety, the CAP should be stationed beyond friendly surface-to- air missile range. The combat air patrol should engage the enemy prior to his reaching offensive missile deployment range. Friendly SAM would then provide backup in case any enemy aircraft or air-launched missiles managed to break through the CAP defense.
This time, however, the situation was different. The strike aircraft were to be committed over land (but adjacent to the coast) and were to remain at low altitude. Why not establish a "free-fire zone” for surface-to-air missiles to provide the first line of defense? At the time there were two cruisers in the gulf equipped with long range Talos missiles, the USS Chicago (CG-11) and the USS Long Beach (CGN-9). In addition there were several medium-range Terrier guided-missile frigates available.
Further development of the concept
of using SAMs as the first line of defense proved encouraging. If the cruisers were to be stationed 20-40 miles off the coast, the effective range of the Talos would permit engagement of the enemy well before he could approach the strike aircraft. Thus CAP would not need to be stationed to landward of the strike objective in hostile territory. The geography of the Hanoi-Haiphong area provided a good "radar look” up the Red River valley. The probable MiG threat was expected to come from the two enemy airfields at Kep and Phuc Yen, in the Hanoi area. Two airfields near Haiphong, Cat Bi and Kien An, were known (or thought) to be unoccupied. The problem of identifkation-friend-or- foe would be non-existent since any aircraft over land above 500 feet could be considered fair game.
While the flight planners were establishing their intended track, orders were flashed to the surface units to position them for the strike. Since the order to mine had not yet been executed, no
further information could be provided other than to take position and be prepared for action.
Orders went out to all other units in the gulf to take up positions for the strike. A group made up of a cruiser and destroyers was to provide a naval gunfire strike on the Do Son Peninsula just prior to the mining attack. Other units were stationed to provide for Search and Rescue (SAR), and SAR helicopters were directed to be airborne on station. The Coral Sea took position well north into the gulf in order to provide for a relatively short-range strike. The Chicago and Long Beach, joined by the USS Sterett (DLG-31) were stationed on the missile defense line.
By the time the mine laying A-6 Intruders and A-7 Corsairs were being launched from the Coral Sea, the missile ships Chicago, Long Beach and Sterett were already in position. The shore bombardment ships were just completing their mission. The CAP proceeded to its station outboard of the missile
Professional Notes 115
defense line as indicated on the map. In order to improve coordination and avoid interference, the CAP was placed under the control of air intercept controllers in the Chicago and the Long Beach. The Yankee Station antiair warfare coordinator (also ComCardiv 3) directed "missiles free” to landward of the missile defense line. All was in readiness.
As the strike aircraft passed by the Chicago at very low altitude, MiGs were detected over North Vietnam. What appeared to be four aircraft were heading southeast toward the strike force. The Chicago locked on with her fire control radars and fired a Talos missile salvo. The lead MiG was destroyed, and the remaining MiGs returned to the northwest. Each time the MiGs attempted to approach the target area, illumination by the cruisers’ fire control radars was sufficient to cause them to turn away and evade. MiGs proved no threat to mining aircraft that day.
By 0904 the mines were laid. President Nixon was appearing on television at that very moment to announce the mining:
I have ordered the following measures, which are being implemented as I am speaking to you: All entrances to North Vietnamese ports will be mined to prevent access to these ports and North Vietnamese naval opera
tions from these ports. United States forces have been directed to take appropriate measures within the internal and claimed territorial waters of North Vietnam to interdict the delivery of any supplies. . .
The mining operation carried out 9 May 1972 was the beginning of an extensive mining effort in the waters of North Vietnam. All other ports of entry were seeded and thus denied to the enemy. At the same time, massive air strikes were mounted to interdict the land routes leading into North Vietnam from the north. Although the flow of war materials into North Vietnam was never fully stopped, it was drastically reduced. The problem of getting each ton of war supplies into the hands of the North Vietnamese soldiers fighting in South Vietnam was made much more difficult. The mining of the harbors was a strong indication to the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China that their continued support of the North Vietnamese aggression could no longer be tolerated.
The role of the guided-missile cruiser in the mining operation represents an innovative approach to the problem of defense of an air strike by closely coordinating the defense forces available, i.e., combat air patrol and shipboard surface-
to-air missiles. Maximum effectiveness was achieved without needlessly exposing friendly support aircraft. The long- range capability of the Talos missile was exploited successfully. The problem of fighter/missile coordination was solved by assigning CAP control to the Chicago. And finally, the effect on the enemy of losing an aircraft to missiles early in the engagement proved to be a positive deterrent when the defending MiGs attempted to penetrate the cruiser radars.
Had ship-based surface-to-air missiles saved the day? Not necessarily. Our fighter aircraft have proved most effective against the North Vietnamese MiGs. There is little doubt that the employment of combat air patrol as the first line of defense would also have been effective in countering the very real MiG threat. Such employment of CAP would, however, have required committing friendly aircraft over enemy territory in an extremely well-defended environment. Employment of the missile cruisers in a defense line again proved the lethality of the Talos system.
The successful mining of the approaches to Haiphong, the downing of one enemy aircraft, and discouraging the remainder does serve notice that, when used properly, the guided-missile cruiser can indeed be a most effective weapon in our national arsenal.
Israeli Saar FPBs Pass Combat Test In Yom Kippur War
By Rear Admiral Shlomo Erell, Israeli Navy (Reserve), Former Commander-in- Chief of Israeli Navy
Historically, last year’s Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War was the first conflict in which most naval actions were fought entirely with ship-to-ship guided missiles employed by both sides. It was also the first combat test for the Israeli Saar- dass guided missile fast patrol boats (FPB), and they emerged with flying colors. These vessels achieved an unchallenged mastery over the contiguous waters of the Eastern Mediterranean, proving decisively superior to the Soviet-built Osa and Komar boats of the
opposing navies, on which they inflicted heavy losses without suffering a casualty.
This somewhat unexpected performance by the "junior” Israeli Navy was so much in contrast with the initial setbacks experienced by the "senior” and more renowned Army and Air Forces that it was soon epitomized by the inevitable war humorists announcing that "the Israeli top brass have been surprised by the Egyptians, the Syrians and the Israeli Navy.”
The Israeli success at sea last year
represents the culmination of many years of pathfinding and hard work, starting in the early 1960s. It has been a common belief that the sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilath by Styx missiles off Port Said in October 1967 triggered the modernization of Israel’s Navy. Another erroneous belief still prevailing is that the Saar-class boats are derivatives of a certain type of a French boat. Because of these misconceptions and because of the singularity and the apparent success of the Saar class, it behooves
us to dwell in some detail on the boats’ origin and background.
The Saar (tempest)-class boats, together with the Gabriel missile system, were conceived in 1961 by Israeli naval planners. They were reacting to a dilemma-being constantly under a real threat of war, being party to no official defense alliance, and having very limited sources and means for purchasing existing first-rate naval vessels.
Israeli strategy had always been oriented toward achieving a quick decision on the battlefield, primarily by means of overwhelming air and armored striking power. This "short-war” concept envisaged only a secondary role for Naval Forces, essentially that of providing an inshore defense against naval bombardment. It discarded as irrelevant any possible threat to the country’s sea communications or the need for any meaningful naval support of the land offensive.
The Navy had never accepted this concept and had for many years endeavored unrealistically to maintain a conventionally balanced force of both offensive and defensive capabilities. Consequently, being constrained by meager resources to depend mainly on obsolescent World War II surplus vessels, it found itself in the early 1960s with an assortment of old destroyers, submarines, a few post-war PT boats, and landing craft for naval commandos.
Since there were only a few of each type, this force was incapable of achieving an effective concentration for any kind of combat mission. At the same time, the Egyptian Navy was going through an impressive expansion and modernization program, equipping itself with modern Soviet-built destroyers, submarines, antisubmarine and mine warfare craft, and above all, with the Komar and Osa guided-missile FPBs. It became apparent, therefore, that in order to have a chance of survival, the Israeli Navy had to come up with a radical program of modernization.
The idea of the Navy pioneering a new warship concept which would include the development of a novel major weapon system, met with natural skepticism and would not have been approved had there existed at the time an alternative solution, within reasonable cost, in other countries. Attempts were made to induce other, more experienced
and similarly interested navies to embark on a joint venture, but most European navies had, at that time, more conservative views and other priorities. Thus Israel had to go it alone.
Because Israel realized that she could not afford a balanced force of several types of naval vessels, each in sufficient numbers to meet operational requirements, the basic concept and the operational and logistical guidelines for the project which eventually produced the Saar-class FPB, were outlined as follows:
► The Navy sought a basic type of a relatively inexpensive small combatant vessel, which could have several different combinations of armament according to operational priorities, but would still allow for serial production, economies of scale and compatibility in task organization. Apart from the economic considerations it was expected that a small vessel would be less vulnerable to the Styx missiles which were recognized as the principal menace to surface vessels.
► To minimize the risks inherent in any new design, the project would utilize as much as possible existing and proven foreign designs and technologies, but it should be feasible at a later stage to pass entirely to domestic construction.
► The vessel should be capable of matching in combat almost all types and sizes of surface vessels, a requirement which could only be met by guided missile armament and very high speed.
► The vessel should have effective AA defense and ASW capabilities.
► In order to utilize its versatility and meet the requirement for concentration, the vessel should have a long range and endurance, good seakeeping qualities, high cruising speed, reliability and reasonable habitability.
► Intended to fight independently as a class, without support of larger warships, the vessel also required extensive communications, combat information, and electronic warfare and control facilities, items which were theretofore not customary in small combatants.
These severe staff requirements were perhaps not particularly original, inasmuch as they must have been every planner’s dream, but they were not considered feasible in the early 1960s. A key to the solution was, of course, the successful development of an effective ship-
to-ship missile system, compatible with the space and weight restrictions of a small vessel. After a promising feasibility study and after the main parameters of the system were established, the development of the Gabriel was undertaken and proceeded simultaneously with the design and construction of the boats.
As for the hulls, a search for an adaptable boat design was undertaken, and all known prototypes in Western Europe were studied. The search finally focused on the West German Jaguar- class FPB as the closest in characteristics if not in size—the design of which might be enlarged and modified into what the Israelis envisaged.
Fr. Lurssen of Bremen-Vegesack, the renowned designer of the 160-ton Jaguars, produced the design of the 250-ton Saar, incorporating successfully most of the Israeli specifications. The original design provided for a varying combination of Gabriel missiles, 40-mm. L/70 guns, ASW torpedoes, and sonar. The first six boats were so equipped. Later, when the 76-mm. OTO Melara compact gun became available, it was decided to sacrifice some versatility in the next six boats and mount this gun forward in exchange for the 40-mm. and the sonar. This armament version strengthened the surface capability of the force and added a valuable shore bombardment and amphibious support potential.
By the time construction was ready to commence, political conditions had changed, and it became necessary to transfer the building to the CMN shipyard in Cherbourg, France under license from Liirssen. This involved further delays, and the construction did not begin until mid-1965. The original order was for six boats with the intention of continuing the building of more boats in Israel after some experience was gained. Because of the loss of time, the order was increased to 12 boats. The next generation of improved Saars was assigned to domestic construction.
Two main innovations were introduced by the Gabriel and subsequently adopted by most of the later tactical SSM projects. These were the extremely low, wave-skimming flight profile, rendering acquisition and tracking impossible and the storage/launch container providing for quick re-loading and instant readiness by eliminating on-board checks and
ISRAELI NAVY
all-weather reliability.
In 1968, as the first Saar boats were becoming operational, the order was placed with the Israel Shipyards for the Saar 4, the larger, improved class, designed with yet greater autonomy and endurance for service over the entire Mediterranean and Red Seas. The first two vessels of this class were commissioned in 1973 and fought with distinction in the war of Yom Kippur in the Mediterranean. In March 1974 they made a smooth, uneventful voyage around Africa to form the nucleus of the Saar force in the Red Sea. The independent journey is a fair measure of the new vessels’ quality, just as their
smaller predecessors’ dramatic five-day winter run from Cherbourg to Haifa had first impressed naval observers with this new type of small combatant in December 1969. Their first test in actual combat did not come until the outbreak of war, 6 October 1973. Of all the impressive order of battle of the Egyptian and Syrian Navies, the Israelis considered the 30 Soviet-built Osa and Komar-class FPBs, with their Styx missiles, by far the most formidable opponents. Somber memories of the sinking of the destroyer Eilath in October 1967 by the same missiles and reports of the successful employment of these weapons during the Indo-Pakistani war had cer
tainly not permitted the Israelis to take them lightly. The surprise achieved by the Arab armies’ offensive had little effect on the Israeli Navy since its main striking force was kept at a high state of readiness and did not depend on mobilization for immediate action.
On the night of 6 October, Saar task units were already sweeping along the Syrian and Egyptian coasts and dealt the Syrian Navy a crippling blow by sinking 3 Osa boats, a PT and a minesweeper off the port of Latakia. These sweeps were maintained nightly with few exceptions throughout the war, the main object being to seek out and destroy the enemy missile boats.
118
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1974
At first, both the Syrians and the Egyptians did put out to sea and gave battle. The Egyptians fared best the first night, losing only one Osa boat. The following night, however, saw another most convincing performance when three out of four Egyptian Osa boats were sunk by Gabriel missiles in a running battle off the Nile delta.
The Arabs soon adopted new tactics. Instead of coming out to meet the approaching Saars, the Osas and Komars would stay near their bases, launch their missiles at extreme ranges and scamper back into port before the Saars could come within the shorter range of their Gabriel missiles. By 10 October or thereabouts, neither the surviving Syrian boats nor the more numerous Egyptian boats ventured out of port at all. Ashore, fierce armor battles were raging on the ground on both fronts. At this point the Saar boats, while maintaining a close watch over the opponents’ navies inside their bases, were able to support the ground battle by harassing enemy rear coastal areas, inflicting what damage they could, and tying down ground forces to the defense against threats of amphibious landings and commando raids. This activity was taken up immediately and continued regularly to the end of the war.
No serious naval or air intervention was ever encountered, although the Israelis considered the Saar quite capable of defending itself against air attack, especially at night, and were quite willing to take the risk. What proved more formidable, and to some extent not quite anticipated, was the density of coast defense gun batteries, mostly Soviet-made 130-mm., radar-controlled, which covered almost the entire length of the Egyptian and Syrian coastlines. The heaviest concentrations were naturally in the proximity of ports and naval bases. The Saar boat commanders quickly learned and adopted suitable tactics for operating under shellfire and developed techniques for shelling shore targets—missions for which they had not been trained as intensively as for naval combat.
Despite the continuous offensive operations, sufficient forces were allocated to cover the movement of merchant ships through the Eastern Mediterranean and even close escort was occasionally
provided for particularly important vessels. Here the remarkable mobility and endurance of these boats paid off handsomely, and the Navy command had little difficulty in positioning task units when and where required. It was also not uncommon for a force to carry out an offensive mission along the Egyptian coast during the night, reaching as far as 400 miles to the west of the Israeli coast, and then sweep to the north to cover eastward shipping movements on the following day. Fueling at sea was also carried out occasionally when the need arose.
Apart from the Osa boats which put out to sea at the early stage, no Egyptian surface vessels ventured out of port throughout the war. Several submarines were known to be at sea, presumably on the trade routes, but they never made any contact. Altogether 10 Osa and Komar boats, as well as several other Egyptian and Syrian naval craft were sunk by the Saars in the Mediterranean. The author witnessed some of the naval encounters on board a Saar boat and could not help but be impressed by the boats’ performance in action as well as the skill and courage displayed by the crews. No less impressive was the remarkable degree of tactical coherence and coordination maintained in a nighttime melee, with a considerable number of boats moving about at high speed. This in itself was a major factor in the Saars coming out of the war without a loss.
Altogether some 50 Styx missiles were fired at the Saar boats without a single hit. Some were probably launched erratically in haste and never locked in. Many were shot down by AA fire, and many were evaded through high speed and skillful maneuvering. Some passed by or hit the water uncomfortably close. The pattern of action was generally the same. The Osa boats would launch all their missiles at extreme range and turn back to port. This gave the Saars sufficient time for effective AA fire and evasive action while giving chase. All of the sinkings were achieved by Gabriel missiles which obtained a respectable percentage of hits while chasing small, fast- moving targets.
This was the first war in naval history in which surface-to-surface guided missiles were the primary weapons on both
sides. It is certainly premature to draw final conclusions on the many aspects of this war at sea, but one lesson stands out clearly—it was not the "pushbutton” warfare that some analysts had predicted. The general conduct of operations by each of the opposing naval commands, and the most decisive outcome of every encounter, bring forward plainly some basic lessons and conclusions. In comparing the Soviet-built Osa class guided-missile boat with the Israeli Saar, the latter is clearly superior in every tactical characteristic but one, namely, the range and payload of the Styx missile. In every other characteristic-hit probability, speed and maneuverability, AA and surface gunnery, detection, control and combat information facilities, crew training, and quality of command—the Saar boats proved decisively superior.
The Komar and Osa boats appeared to be—true to the traditional Russian coast defense concept—little more than floating, mobile launching platforms, to a great extent controlled tactically by headquarters ashore. Their main attributes were numerical strength and the large warheads and long range of their guided missiles.
No hasty conclusions should be drawn regarding the effectiveness of the various types of ship-to-ship guided missiles with which the Soviet and its client navies are equipped. It is not certain that small combatants of the Saar category are completely immune from these missiles. What can be concluded, though, is that these Soviet homing cruise missiles can be countered successfully and are not necessarily the weapons which dominate today’s surface warfare.
[Editor’s Note: The author does not claim to be objective in his comments, nor does he regard his narrative as being complete and accurate in every detail. This Note represents his personal observations and interpretations as viewed from the Israeli side alone. Neither is the author expressing any official Israeli views in this article. The facts and figures herein are substantially accurate to the author’s best knowledge; any inaccuracies or ommissions which may exist do not alter either the main course of events or their implications in any appreciable way.]
Professional Notes 119
A Quarterback for the Helo ASW Team
By Lieutenant Commander John J, M. Curtis, Royal Navy
In all the U. S. Navy aviation specialties save one, the value and importance of the Naval Flight Officer as intercept officer, bombardier-navigator, and tactical coordinator (TACCO) have been accepted and advanced over the years. This requirement for "back-seat” tactical and systems expertise has been brought about by the increasing sophistication of aircraft, advances in technology, and a need for a coordinator of all on-board systems divorced from the "stickhandling” responsibility of the pilot.
In that one specialty the need for a TACCO is felt, the requirement acknowledged, but for an inordinate length of time only lip service has been paid to the introduction of a remedy. A remedy is essential to the future efficiency and credibility of the ASW helicopter. For it is the U. S. Navy’s HS community which has lagged the curve for so long, while the potential adversary—the nuclear submarine—has achieved quantum jumps in speed, maneuverability, and destructive power.
In terms of cost-effectiveness there is no time like the present for this proposal, and in these days of budgetary constraints this proposed program need not be astronomically expensive. The airframes and hardware are all in existence; instructional expertise is available; student bodies and suitable buildings are all that need to be found.
It is a sobering thought indeed that only very recently has the ASW TACCO been scheduled to go to sea at all, to operate in the same tactical environment as is necessary to provide meaningful ASW protection to forces at sea and the sea lanes they are meant to protect. It is time for the rotary wing ASW community to follow the lead of VS and introduce a tactical coordinator as demanded by the growing complexity of ASW in the 1970s and 1980s.
A great deal of research is currently
being done in the areas of confusion and deception—excellent principles of warfare. However, the command and control of dispersed units is an enormous problem, if they are not to be granted a high degree of autonomy and freedom to act independently, following very precise briefings. By denying the enemy knowledge of our position and intended movement, by causing confusion to his sensors, and diluting his potential for concerted offense, we have established only another means to the end. We must have an aggressive end-product. Trying to deny knowledge of our precise position to the enemy presupposes that we expect to be attacked if he does find us. We must, therefore, reserve the right and means to react forcefully and aggressively when the enemy has to reveal his presence, so as to take full advantage of his discomfiture. There should be absolutely no doubt in anyone’s mind that, within established international and political agreements, there is an avowed determination to protect maritime interests and police the oceans without fear or favor.
Within the U. S. Navy there has been no "back-seat” ASW expertise in the Fleet at sea in the CVS or elsewhere in living memory—with the brief exception of the HATS (helicopter attack system) program and advisors to the SH-3H squadron evaluating the sea control ship project. The sensor operators in the HS community undoubtedly do possess a great deal of ASW general knowledge born from long experience, but they are not trained tacticians. The pilots, who have traditionally carried out the tactical task for so long, are usually the first to acknowledge that when the situation becomes complex, the load is too great, and the transfer of tactical matters to another station is desirable, if not essential. The requirement is for a professional navigator and tactical coordinator
in each aircraft who must be an ASW operations specialist. He must be conversant with the execution of new concepts, such as the Uptide exercises, and the problems which face both the surface and subsurface communities. Currently the balance of expertise is very definitely on the side of the submariner. When the attack teams close up in the SSN, the ASW forces lined up against them are faced with the best that that submarine can offer. The searching VS and HS are hopefully long on enthusiasm and aggressiveness, but short on the needed ability to contain their target when at close quarters. In shore trainers and canned exercises the aircraft usually do well, but analyses of free-play exercises are not so encouraging, when airborne resources are balanced against results. Some of the problems traditionally encountered in the ASW helicopter appear easily soluble in isolation, but cumulatively they adversely affect the efficiency and flexibility of what is undoubtedly an extremely potent and versatile ASW detection and weapons system.
During conditions of poor visibility and at night, the HS pilots have about as much as they can handle either to achieve a dip, or maneuver the aircraft in MAD or sonobuoy patterns at low altitude. The transmission of tactical information together with other guidance from a controlling ship cannot be absorbed or processed for vital seconds, sometimes minutes. As a result, tactical reactions are slowed, decision-making at the scene drops in priority, and salvation is sought in stereotyped procedures and searches. Cooperation with other units becomes poor, purely because the human processor is overloaded. All this at a vital time when, after many hours of interminable screening, ASW forces finally obtain firm evidence of the elusive submarine.
120
If the tactical operation and safe navigation of the aircraft are delegated to a TACCO, permitting the pilots to concentrate on the mechanics of flying and visual lookout, it seems obvious that operational efficiency will improve markedly. As a result, the HS TACCO will achieve for the HS community what the TACCO will undoubtedly achieve for VS in the S-3A, and has achieved for VP for many years. His aircraft will be ideally suited to become scene of action commander and a control unit for other ASW air platforms at that scene of action. He will not need to be an entirely new breed, demanding long and exhaustive courses. What he will need is an in-depth knowledge of fundamental ASW doctrine, painstakingly studied and practiced. Like the moves of chess, tactics are the means of offense and defense, but useless without application of basic doctrine.
Having established the need, what sort of hardware should be provided to assist the TACCO in carrying out his job? The SH-3H has now joined the Fleet, and possesses most of the equipment desirable for effective TACCO(H) utilization. In the light of Allied experience in this field, where the HS tactical coordinator has long been a fait accompli (with the Royal Navy, Canadian Forces, Australian, French, and Netherlands Navies, to name but a few), a few proposals are set out below. Perhaps the same innovators who introduced the angled deck and mirror-sight to carrier aviation and pioneered small ship helicopter operations may be permitted to address another problem area.
The appearance of radar in ASW helicopters is not new, and provides an outstanding capability for surface search and independent operations. It is argued that this radar should be air control- capable for a TACCO(H) to function at full potential. When tied in to a ground stabilized plot, as in the Westland Sea King (British SH-3), and so installed to give good air as well as surface coverage, its capability for precise navigation and positive control of other ASW vehicles has been proved beyond doubt. Under EMCON conditions, the doppler stabilized plot is still of considerable value. Should EMCON be so strict as to include aircraft doppler equipment (hopefully an unlikely occurrence due to its directivity
and high frequency, hence small susceptibility to intercept), the TACCO can still revert to DR navigation, and effectively employ his aircraft as a VDS platform by day (doppler being vital to night dipping maneuvers). Sonobuoy and MAD tactics need not be too adversely affected by day or by night, with appropriate procedures and caution.
ESM equipment is desirable, for ASMD as well as versus submarine search radars. Acoustically, an improved passive capability for VDS and introduction of DIFAR will enhance the HS capability, as will the use of data links for acoustic data transmission to the CV and sea control ship, to assist command classification and sonobuoy management. Whether the H-3 airframe could accommodate AQA-7 (S2G type) and BFI is doubtful, without sacrificing a sensor operator, but the aim should be to reduce the HS dependence on ship control at ranges where radar or communications become a problem, or when EMCON dictates
independent operations. Despite outlining the requirement for the TACCO(H), the importance of the enlisted antisubmarine air controller (ASAC) on board ship cannot be overstated. He normally carries out duties involving the safety of aircraft and their tactical employment with an importance and responsibility out of all proportion to his OS rating- In ASW his relationship with the evaluator and command is a very special one, as it is with the aircraft he controls.
From the communications viewpoint, alternate UHF radios are desirable, and SSB HF in peacetime. So also is a reliable underwater telephone associated with the VDS. One might visualize HS, so configured, proving an effective team with the SSN(E). Intercom facilities must provide the facility for the pilots to mute out their stations from r/t and all other intercom during the critical stages of a night transition or when trouble-shooting. The TACCO can thus continue to pass out and receive infer-
121
Professional Notes
mation without prejudicing aircraft safety or tactical flexibility. The Command Active Sonobuoy System (CASS) in the Westland Sea King is an example of such a system. It is felt that the SH-3H provides an excellent starting point, possessing most of the hardware described above. With relatively minor modification this airframe could readily accept a tactical coordinator.
In the area approximately 75 miles around a high value unit, the ASW helicopter, either working as one of a pair, or with LAMPs/vs available at short notice, has immense potential as a rapid investigator of long range passive contacts, ESM data, contacts in the convergence zone, and distant datums, as well as reacting swiftly to an immediate threat or as a defensive barrier when one is required at short notice. In inshore waters its capacity for hold-down or delousing of a probability area is excellent, permitting surface units to sidestep and proceed on their way, maintaining the integrity of their formation. The introduction of an airborne tactical coordinator will extend such capabilities and others immeasurably.
As a result of having a professional ASW tactician in the back seat, there is little doubt that the level of crew and squadron motivation will increase substantially. More original thought and tactics will originate from the HS community, and the aircraft, instead of being relegated to semi-utility and planeguard/SAR roles, will recapture its position as a primary ASW vehicle. Reliance on positive air control may be relaxed, and the aircraft will be fully capable of effectively completing its ASW mission even in conditions of strict EMCON, or in concert with dispersed formations outside the communications and radar horizon of its parent unit. Thus encouraged, maintenance-hours- per-hours-flown may well drop, permitting a minimum tasking of two airborne and one at readiness on deck at any time. While retaining its SAR capability, the HS squadron should be primarily ASW-oriented, with the CV and SCS planeguard and utility requirements being carried out by a separate HC detachment.
How, then, is this specialist to be trained? The need is pressing, since on this concept future ASW helicopters will
have to be designed to provide for the displays and sensors the TACCO(H) requires. Most of the equipment is available off the shelf; the layout and choice of specific items will have to be finalized. Initially the training pipeline would be slow, courses running at a maximum of 12 and starting every six-nine weeks. This would permit only a limited number of NFOs per squadron to begin with, acting as flight leaders until a target of one per crew is achieved. Conversion by other NFO specialists is a likely route in the early stages, but the rotary-wing TACCO must eventually qualify ab initio and develop his own reputation as an acknowledged ASW expert. At present, I believe there is a lack of in-depth knowledge among HS aircrewmen in the areas of applied oceanography, passive acoustics, specific capabilities of other ASW units, submarine tactics, the basics of applicable laws of the sea, and other facets of ASW, general and particular. This is not an individual or collective criticism—a degree in oceanography or ASW systems engineering is fine for the career ASW specialist; but in HS where the academic expertise currently lies with the pilot, he is more likely to channel his efforts into aeronautical engineering and commercial licenses. And who can blame him?
As the TACCO(H) joins the Fleet, he may be absorbed not only into the HS Squadrons, but also become a valuable member of CV and SCS operations staffs, as well as ASW officer of LAMPS headquarters squadrons and the replacement air group, not to mention the instructional staffs of the ASW Schools at San Diego and Norfolk.
The TACCO(H) training course should be designed to produce an NFO with a broad-based knowledge of ASW, well versed in doctrine, and capable of rapidly executing appropriate tactics in any given ASW situation. He must be able to take charge not only of his own aircraft or flight, but of other ASW units as a scene of action commander in his own right. If provided with an air control capable radar, he should be able to provide invaluable command and control to other units on the spot as an ASW tactician and airborne ASAC. Based on the experience of other navies with such a specialist, contact holding, particularly against the evasive SSN, im
proves markedly, resulting in more accurate attacks, especially if the radar vectac is used, as opposed to the less accurate and t’me-consuming visual and infotac procedures.
The product of such a training course should have as much practical experience in the air as can be absorbed into the curriculum time-scale. This would include tactical problems on the tactical game-floor, and rehearsed procedures in a simulator. Ground school would teach him not only all the facts of modern ASW, but also be designed to stimulate an active and inquiring mind, sharpen his reactions and initiative, and give the opportunity to develop and present his thoughts in solo presentations and in syndicate with his colleagues. In short, the course mission should produce an effective, balanced ASW tactician, proficient in all aspects of modern ASW, and possessing those qualities of leadership and self-expression expected from a professional aviation officer.
Admiral Zumwalt stated his determination to make as many U. S. Navy ships as possible helicopter-capable. As a detachment officer with one or more ASW helicopters assigned to such platforms, the rotary wing TACCO could be the tactical advisor to the command on air ASW matters. On HS dedicated ships, this officer would complement the S-3A TACCOs, and a great deal of expertise is likely to rub off between them, leading to obvious mutual benefits in ASW efficiency and multiplatform coordination. When a FIXWEX is scheduled to assess crew readiness and efficiency inside the ASW air communities, it is felt that, with the implementation of this proposed ASW TACCO program, the helicopter world would never again be found wanting.
The fundamental danger is that if not implemented soon, this program may well be overtaken by events. A hostile submarine environment already exists, posing a formidable threat not only to the land masses of the free world, but capable of indulging in disruption of our trade routes and destruction of our reputations as strong maritime powers, dedicated to the protection of those who go about the seas on their lawful occasions. The more efficiently we wield the weapons in our armory, the greater our deterrent over any potential adversary.