The last decade has produced strains on the military which have been felt before in history but which have new dimensions never before encountered. Without delving into the tortuous aspects of the debate over Vietnam and its tragedies, it is clear that the military establishment has suffered considerably as a result of this country’s unpopular participation in the war. Correctly or not, the military was one of the scapegoats of Vietnam. While the most pronounced antimilitary sentiments seem to have diminished, many of the issues raised during the war have continuing validity.
Sources citing antimilitary sentiments and "helpful” criticism are plentiful enough. Journalists, historians, and military men themselves have added weight to the arguments. The American Friends Service Committee, for example, reprinted an article by Colonel Robert Heinl, "The Collapse of the Armed Forces,” from the Armed Forces Journal (7 June 1971). Colonel Heinl referred to many of the problems that had their roots in Southeast Asia, such as drugs, racial incidents, the lack of discipline. This article, while not antimilitary itself, was one of many such "inside” critiques used to make a case against the armed forces. My Lai, the Lavelle case, the Arnheiter affair, and other highly publicized events added fuel to the fire. Despite withdrawal from Vietnam, the U. S. military budget has increased, and environmental concerns, inflation, the energy crisis, and other social ills are all legitimate problems which could be eased if the need for continuing security were less pressing. Since the U. S. withdrawal from Vietnam and the release of the P.W.s, overt criticism and demonstrations against the military have abated, and the news media, preoccupied with domestic issues, have paid relatively little attention to the military establishment. Still, amnesty is an emotional issue which crosses social and political boundaries. The end of the draft and difficulties in meeting recruiting quotas under the all-volunteer concept have created new problems which are still not completely resolved, and the size of the military budget will be an irritant to many as long as economic pressures persist.
All these problems and their complicated ramifications have provided, by their combined effect an impetus for discussion of a deeper issue, that of the role of the military in the social and political life of the United States. Specifically, many authors have examined the impact of the military on the decision-making processes which led to America’s involvement in Vietnam. The most reasoned conclusions seem to be not that the military improperly recommended certain actions or policies, but that the military has a substantial influence on foreign policy (as well as on domestic affairs) and that the necessary counterweights are often ineffective or non-existent. To be sure, military leaders have traditionally and properly acted as advisors to the President and Congress on affairs in which they had expertise. This function of the military has been unchallenged through history, although the soundness of such advice has been attacked periodically. The right, indeed the duty, of the military to advise civilian political leaders is unassailable.
It is clearer now than at any other period in American history that the military is deeply enmeshed in the political structure and the political issues of this country. This situation would seem, on the surface, to call for a reexamination of the role of the military in politics; specifically, one may question the traditional political aloofness of professional soldiers. In the past, if the President, the Congress or the Supreme Court established a policy, passed a law, or handed down a decision, what recourse had the professional military man who conscientiously opposed the action? Had he a right to complain, to voice his protest publicly? The answer, with certain qualifications, has traditionally been an emphatic "No!” When the President has said "Go!”, the American soldier has picked up his rifle and pack and gone, unquestioning. There have, of course, been grumblings from time to time about specific missions or tasks assigned to different branches, and interservice bickering has been both commonplace and healthy, at least until recently. (One of the consequences of the Vietnam era antimilitary movement was a closing of ranks in the military, which may have made life more placid in the Pentagon, but which weakened an important internal check-and-balance system in the armed forces.) But our peacetime military establishment since World War II has been far larger in relation to society than ever before, and traditional attitudes may not apply henceforth.
There are, of course, two aspects to be considered in the relationship of the military to the political processes of government. First, there is the matter of civil liberties and the involvement of servicemen in electoral procedures. There are areas where the liberties granted in the Constitution seem to conflict with military rules and regulations. Second, there is the question of the soldier’s involvement in the formulation of foreign policy at the highest levels of government, a question with obvious political overtones. Bipartisanship is a traditional element in American foreign policy, but this concept by no means excludes foreign policy issues from partisan political debate. These two matters are separate, though related, questions. The simpler is the issue of civil liberties and electoral politics.
It is important to examine the legal and philosophical sources of the tradition of apolitical behavior. There are worse places to start than the Constitution, and, if we examine this document, certain points stand out. First, the Congress is specifically assigned responsibility for making "Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces.” In other words, all Public Laws, including the Uniform Code of Military Justice, (UCMJ) stem from Article I, Section 8. Article II establishes the President as Commander-in-Chief. Article III establishes the Supreme Court, which has jurisdiction in all "Controversies, to which the United States shall be a Party.” This last section would imply that the Supreme Court would ultimately decide upon any case involving political activism by a member of the military in defiance of federal law. At first glance it is difficult to see how the Court could rule against any law established in accordance with Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution. However, the First Amendment states that, "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech ... or the right of the people . . . to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” So the Congress may create laws for the governing of the armed forces, but may not make any law obstructing free speech. It looks simple. But let us try to define "free speech.”
First, free speech is not absolute. Just as your right to swing your fist ends where my nose begins, so your right to free speech ends where my character and reputation begin. You are not free to defame me, slander me, tell lies about me or call me names. Obscenity is still an arguable issue. The establishment of contracts depends on the integrity of the spoken word in many cases. Speech is free but may not be irresponsible, and the speaker may be called to back up his words. Free speech may not include rabble rousing, perjury or betraying secrets to the enemy, or using provoking language. Free speech does not include making boisterous orations at 0300 in a residential neighborhood. In short, the First Amendment is not absolute, and we can scarcely believe that the founding fathers intended it to be. Laws have been passed by the Congress and the States which define the limits of free speech, as, for example, in the UCMJ. Many of these laws apply directly or indirectly to the armed forces. All are presumably subject to interpretation by the courts.
Interpretation of the Free Speech Amendment has been quite liberal in recent years. For example, Title 18 USC §2387, prohibits anyone from advising, counseling, urging or in any manner causing or attempting to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty by any member of the military. Distribution of printed matter of a similar nature is also prohibited. Yet as Colonel Heinl says, "the courts have now gone so far in extending First Amendment shelter to any form of utterance, that there is doubt whether cases brought under this law would hold.” This principle might similarly apply to members of the armed forces making politically oriented public statements. Still, the laws are clearly written and presumably enforceable.
The laws governing the proper political conduct of members of the armed forces are largely covered in DoD Directive 1334.10 of 23 September 1969 and enclosures. These permit servicemen to vote, make monetary contributions to political parties and attend rallies and meetings in civilian attire. The serviceman may urge others to vote, provided he does not use his rank to influence their choice of candidate or side of an issue. He may join a political club, serve in non-partisan civil office or as an election official, sign a petition, write letters on public issues to newspapers or display a bumper sticker. All of the above are subject to obvious restrictions which may be summed up as follows: the serviceman may not wear his uniform or otherwise use his rank or position to promote a partisan cause, nor may he indulge in any time-consuming political activities which would interfere with his job.
Prohibitions against political activity listed in DoD Directive 1334.10 and related laws are more lengthy and detailed. Members of the armed forces may not use their authority or influence to interfere with an election, nor work in a campaign as a manager, nor solicit funds from other members of the service for political purposes. They may not write articles furthering a political cause, or distribute literature, or participate in any public discussion on the side of a partisan political issue. They may not display large signs or banners on cars, or sell tickets for a cause, or attend partisan rallies as official representatives of the armed forces. Wherever specific limitations are not spelled out "reason and common sense will apply.”
Specific paragraphs of the federal statutes address more obvious questions and include prohibition of any kind of political coercion or intimidation, such as marching troops to the polls, or posting troops near polling places. For all practical purposes, the serviceman may not legally express himself in public on any issue which has partisan political implications. There may be some areas such as pollution, schooling, local taxes, housing, and the like, which are basically non-partisan (if political), yet in every election—federal, state, or local—most candidates will take a stand of one sort or another on most issues of significance. It is safe to say, it seems, that every issue will have at least one candidate on some side of it. Therefore, it would seem that all issues have, at some point, partisan political coloring. One point which is not clear is where the serviceman stands when an issue is political but not clearly divided in a partisan sense. Under the recent administration, when the President took a stand on an issue such as amnesty or the future of the draft, one tended to accept this position as the Republican viewpoint. Yet, for example, Congressman Paul McClosky, a Republican, was clearly on the opposite side of the fence from Mr. Nixon on many points, especially Vietnam, during the 1972 campaign. One may fairly ask, if an issue is not divided clearly, is a serviceman bound by the laws and regulations on political activity? The laws specify partisan issues and election campaigns. What is the situation when no elections are in progress? Since it is clear that one generally has a feel for the way political lines are drawn on most issues, one can easily recognize a liberal point of view and tends to associate such views with the Democratic party; conservative views tend to be Republican views.
Still, we have liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats. So it might be argued that a serviceman could express himself publicly on any issue which crossed political party lines, with one important reservation. While elections are not always in progress, a certain party is always in power in the White House and usually in Congress, not to mention state governments. So a stance on an issue would probably be construed as partisan where it agreed or disagreed with the administration position. The fact that the Democratic wing of Congress might be divided would not seem to alter the case; the fact that politicians cross party lines from time to time makes them no less partisan. All in all, it would seem that the law clearly requires servicemen to be publicly silent on most public issues if they have any partisan backing at all, however it is divided. In any case, the laws are definitely oriented towards preventing interference by the military in electoral politics.
If the legal approach does not provide a definitive answer, tradition is even less decisive in its effect. To start with, traditions are often ill-defined, sometimes stultifying, and almost always subject to erosion or change. For example, Marine officers traditionally carried swagger sticks, until a Commandant uttered a few words on the subject, whereupon they disappeared overnight and have rarely been seen since. Tradition has been defined on occasion as "years of habit unimpeded by progress.” Tradition sometimes supplies a reason for doing something which logic tells us is unnecessary, wasteful, or even foolish. One need only let one’s imagination loose for a minute to conjure up examples of meaningless but persistent traditions which might well be dispensed with. Today, especially, traditions are fragile, and this fact is beneficial in many instances. For example, most uniform changes represent the letting go of a tradition to some extent.
Still, traditions are the strength of the military services in many ways. They foster pride, esprit, discipline, and high morale when used as positive leadership aids with individuals, in units, or entire branches. It was the destruction of many worthwhile traditions which led to the collapse of the armed forces described by Colonel Heinl, although he does not address this point specifically. For example, the importance of inspections in maintaining readiness has been diluted, and Heinl’s description of such phenomena as the Concerned Officers’ Movement makes it clear that military traditions have taken a beating along with everything else. Tradition is the ideological cornerstone of conservatism, and conservatism is part of the professional military ethic, for good reasons. Conservatism in the sense of behavior or conduct and loyalty in the armed forces has been the nation’s strength in the past. It is not intended here to make a case for political conservatism, or to advocate undying adherence to all traditions. The armed forces must be prepared to accept radical new methods of fighting as well as technological changes, and to adapt to changing social patterns. But these new challenges can be met without altering the traditional approaches to the modus operandi. Furthermore, it is in the deeper traditions of the military that one encounters the more difficult questions concerning the policy-making roles of members of the armed forces in the foreign policy field. The laws are far less specific than in the case of the civil-libertarian problems.
An interesting case study in military politics is provided by the German General Staff. Indeed, a number of writers have examined the German General Staff and its political behavior in detail. The period 1870-1939 saw the establishment of the German Empire, World War I, and the rise of Nazism and the Third Reich. The tradition in the officer corps was that the Army under the direction of the General Staff was the servant of the state. The Army did not meddle in politics, and politicians kept their hands off the Army. This two-way street is interesting both in the historical sense and in current applications. The Army adhered generally to a philosophy of "Uberparteilichkeit”—the state of being above partisan politics. The German Army, under the leadership of its conservative, aristocratic, Prussian officer corps, did not question foreign policy. Yet in wartime, the Army was the embodiment of foreign policy (Clausewitz), and all other issues were subordinated to the needs of the Army.
In 1933, however, the German Army faced a new challenge, and no amount of tradition provided a clue as to how to cope with Hitler and the Nazis. It was undoubtedly a time of crisis, yet peace prevailed. The Army chose not to meddle in politics, and, as a result, stood idly by while the Austrian corporal embarrassed and humiliated Germany’s elite officer corps. They compounded the problem by taking an oath of loyalty to Hitler himself after Hindenburg’s death. By 1939, they were, collectively at least, a herd of sheep, albeit very competent ones in terms of battlefield strategy and tactics. Although some revolted unsuccessfully in 1944, they never provided an alternative to Hitler. Their failure was complete, and Germany and much of the world were destroyed. By adhering blindly to tradition they had, in the words of Gordon A. Craig, "Individually and collectively . . . shirked their obligations to the German people.” The German Army, Professor Craig tells us, had a preferred position of special trust and confidence in order to protect the national interest. By depriving the German people of their safeguards against absolutism, they betrayed their trust in allowing Hitler to become dictator. The German General Staff was not exonerated at Nuremberg, nor have they been in history books by their claim that politics were not their business.
The sad history of the French Army in 1939 and 1940 provides still another example of the relationship between the Army and the political structure of government, in this case the French government. Where the German Army faced a strong political organization and failed to resist it, the French Army had to operate in what was essentially a political vacuum. Their problem was vastly different from the one faced by the Germans. They lacked the vigor and drive of the likes of Guderian, and became virtually immobilized by indecision and a dogged belief in the security afforded by the Maginot Line. There is no evidence that the French Army could have had any substantial effect on the French political system while remaining properly independent, but a more vigorous approach to the military problems which were heightened by political chaos could have helped. What can be said is that the French General Staff was disastrously conservative in military matters, while being impotent in the political field. The Germans, while revolutionizing warfare, failed to see the implications of the political revolution to which they were eyewitnesses.
These examples along with previous discussions lead toward a tentative conclusion. Political and military factors are virtually inseparable, particularly but not exclusively in the realm of foreign policy. As we look at our own military and political history, there are several areas of traditional military behavior which deserve close scrutiny. In the American Revolution, Washington’s most significant contribution is said by some to have been his unfailing reluctance to abuse any of the power bestowed on him by the Continental Congress. Even when becoming, by necessity, a virtual dictator, he scrupulously avoided any behavior which would have suggested an intention to assume political power. His reasons were closely related to the times, and were rooted in the same traditions which are with us today in civil-military relations. The complaints against Great Britain enumerated in the Declaration of Independence were largely military in scope. It was fear of British military oppression which provoked the colo
nists to resist, and Washington saw the importance of avoiding any opportunity for this fear of the military to be transferred to our own Army. This tradition was so strong, for example, that when the British evacuated Boston in 1775, and Washington detached part of his command to New York, an uproar resulted because the New York legislature was not consulted on all phases of the movement of colonial troops. Further, when General Lee attempted to procure loyalty oaths from the New Yorkers, he was severely chastised by Congress. The complaint was not that anyone objected to the oath in theory—it was just improper for a military officer to be the one administering the oath.
Marshals Goering and Keitel, front row, and Admirals Donitz and Raeder, second row, were among those called to judgment at Nuremberg. Although these and other military men were convicted of "War Crimes," their fate suggests that the military’s participation, or failure to participate, in politics is not a decision to be taken lightly.
These strong anti-military traditions persisted virtually uninterrupted until 1939- Except for periods of war, we had an insignificant military force which neither desired nor sought a voice in politics. We demobilized vigorously after every conflict and generally went to war before we were ready. At the end of the Civil War, for example, we had a powerful Army of over one million men and the strongest Navy in the world. By 1880, we had an Army of 25,000 and an insignifi- ficant Navy. (Most of the Army had been demobilized in 1866.) Even after World Wars I and II, when we were clearly in the center of the world stage, we failed to keep an adequate deterrent force. But the purpose here is not to criticize our past military policy but to examine our history of political activity. During war, the position of the military is clear: get on with the fighting and work with the civil government to supply what is needed; in peacetime, simply disappear. Soldiers have become involved in politics, though most have done so after retirement or separation. Mahan certainly had an impact on foreign policy, though he did not get into the political forum per se until after his retirement in 1896. Other exceptions do not alter the fact that the military has kept out of politics in this country throughout most of its history.
As a new world rose out of the ashes of World War II, old concepts become obsolete. We were not at peace from 1950 onwards, but were in a Cold War. With the exploding of nuclear devices by the Russians, deterrence and massive retaliation became by-words. The old "citizen soldier,” the tiny professional army, the reserves, a small Navy and Marine Corps would not do. So the United States built a large nuclear force of missiles, submarines, and manned bombers. For a while it seemed as though these measures would be enough. But the 1960s brought a new challenge—a return to limited war. The reason was simple: total war was and is unacceptable, just as the devastating 30 Years’ War made war intolerable to Central Europeans. Hence, the limited war of the 18th Century, and counterinsurgency in the 1960s.
The problem for the military in this limited war environment is rather complex. Until Korea, all of our major wars had been essentially total. The Revolution was a total struggle for independence. The Civil War was a total struggle to restore the Union. World Wars I and II saw massive, unified efforts by the Americans. These wars were essentially bipartisan—once we were in, at least. But the aftermath of each of these wars saw bitter political disagreements arise from problems left unsolved by the military. Earlier, much of the Federalist-Antifederalist debate focused on the issue of national security and the military. Strong government and the standing Army were volatile issues as the Constitution was molded.
After the Civil War, reconstruction was needed to restore the devastated southern states. Military occupation, amnesty, and demobilization were at issue. Similar problems prevailed after the Spanish-American War over the proper governing of newly acquired territory. Disarmament, the Versailles Treaty, and the League of Nations were campaign issues in 1920, all of them having decided military implications. World War II left us saddled with the military occupation of Germany and Japan, and once again the military was at the core of hot political problems. The legacy of Korea has included the implications of the Truman-MacArthur feud, and sides were taken in the military and Congress on that one. We have, in short, entered most wars with a generally bipartisan stamp of approval. The aftermath of our conflicts has usually been sticky, with military and political questions being rolled up together.
Vietnam was something of a reversal. While there was not much open debate about our entry into Vietnam, recent books such as David Halberstam’s The Best and the Brightest point out that there was considerable behind-the-scenes debate in which the military had a vital role. Strangely, the aftermath somehow finds the country more unified. With few exceptions, America seems relieved that it is officially over for the United States, and all shades of politicians are glad for whatever reason to be unstuck.
One lesson from Vietnam and the post-World War II era seems clear. Given that nuclear war is unlikely, or that if it does come, it will be a swift, unpredictable holocaust, we can for all practical purposes ignore the political significance of total war. If the button gets pushed, debate will be superfluous and probably of short duration. Only a few squeaky voices see any alternative other than gradual, multilateral disarmament with appropriate deterrents maintained en route. So the lesson is as follows: since it is unlikely that any future war short of nuclear war will be a real, substantial, direct threat to the security of the United States, our involvement in any future conflict is likely to be a subject of further controversy. The military will again be at the heart of the issue, and will find itself again in the midst of heated political debate, either in public or behind locked doors. Cannot one therefore make the case that the military should legitimately have a voice in the public debate, if and when such occurs?
It now appears that some old ideas about national security have fallen into disrepute. One no longer hears dominoes mentioned, and there seem to be hostile internal struggles in what was once assumed to be a monolithic Communist bloc. All is not well behind the Iron Curtain, and newer states are unlikely to fall like plums into the lap of any major power, East or West: Neo-nationalism, if it describes various "liberation” movements, is incompatible with the concept of the monolithic growth of Communism.
If we then return to the basic law of the United States, it would seem that the national security needs of the United States form the basis for traditional apolitical behavior by the military. In other words, if national survival is not at the heart of our future wars, then the more politically oriented issue of "national interest” will be at stake. This whole argument seems now to lead to the related issue of the all-volunteer armed force. Perhaps it can be resolved as follows.
Traditionally, constitutionally, and legally our armed forces have been used for national defense. The War of 1812, the Mexican and Spanish-American wars were less than vital to survival, of course, but they were essentially idealistic crusades based on Manifest Destiny, the Monroe Doctrine or other traditional national moods. It is apparent that where national security is at stake, there will be little political debate, and the whole question of political observations of the military will be moot.
If we allow the possibility that we will fight future wars which are more political than clearly necessary for national security, we might make the case that an all-volunteer armed force should be the sole agency used in any such involvement. Conversely we might say that the draft laws currently on the books should be used to maintain strategic nuclear deterrent forces at optimum levels. Volunteers could then be used as conventional forces which would not necessarily be employed solely in cases of clear, direct national emergency.
This approach would then seem to imply that traditional concepts might be inapplicable to a professional, volunteer armed force. Volunteers then might be allowed to participate more openly in public debate, since they would have a more personal stake in their employment. The question now becomes whether this country wants a mercenary, political army of this type.
The latter stages of the foregoing discussion seem to be leading down a path toward absurdity. A political army, in which debate would tend to drift towards issues far removed from the traditional democratic ideals of our armed forces, can hardly be acceptable for the United States. As Truman put it, "If there is one basic element in our Constitution, it is civilian control of the military.” A volunteer armed force is not in conflict with the Constitution. Anything approaching a political army, however, can only be seen as antidemocratic and undesirable.
Vietnam notwithstanding, our traditional approach has served us well. The military may at any time be called upon for advice. The political implications of such advice must be determined by the people through their elected representatives. The military must continue to be loyal to the government, and above all skillful, professional, and honorable. These goals can be achieved by a variety of means. One is maintaining the draft laws as a reserve measure so that the quality of the armed forces can be readily maintained should volunteers fail to appear in sufficient number.
A second prerequisite for effective military performance would be the reduction of secrecy in discussions of possible military involvement to the absolute minimum level consistent with security. What has irritated the American public above all else in recent years has been their feelings of impotence and, thus, frustration because decisions of vital national importance were being made behind closed doors, out of sight or hearing. This principle applies more to the civilian areas of government who are, by and large, elected officials. Still, the military should avoid being overly sensitive in this area.
Third, the military must stress internal education in political affairs. Future military decisions, in which professional soldiers will have a large voice in advisory capacities, will have domestic and international political repercussions. Therefore, it is essential that personnel in key billets be conversant with the potential political consequences of recommended courses of action. Recent history shows the reaction, if it comes, will be directed against the military, just as happened in Vietnam.
In conclusion, it would seem that for military men to get involved in partisan politics is unnecessary and undesirable. The military will continue to be blamed for others’ mistakes as well as their own, but that is one of the professional hazards the soldier faces. Our traditional role for the military has more successes than failures on its record, and future courses for the United States, wherever they may lead, are more likely to lead to success if we follow traditional patterns than if we adopt radically new behavior.
Finally, one may return to Colonel Heinl’s suggestion concerning the unlikelihood that anyone might be successfully prosecuted for violating laws which tend to conflict with the First Amendment. It would seem clear that the only way in which a professional military man might run afoul of the anti-political behavior laws would be to violate the spirit of the laws. That is, one dare not interfere with the electoral process at any level. Beyond this, there seems to be little doubt that considered criticism by a military professional, even on a matter which might be defined as political, would but rarely lead to conviction in court, military or otherwise. One might, of course, jeopardize one’s career, but would a man who is willing to die for his country balk at risking his career for his convictions? Captain W. D. Puleston, U. S. Navy, seems to have provided one answer to this question in his biography of Mahan. He wrote:
"Much is written of courage in the fleet or in the field; but there is a courage of the closet that is no less praiseworthy and fully as rare, and that is the courage to do battle for a new or unpopular idea.”