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Civilians, Not Naval Officers, Should Supervise Ship Overhauls
Lieutenant Commander John L. Mac- Michael, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Chewaucan (AOG-to) — Recently my ship, a minor auxiliary, completed a major overhaul at a small private shipyard. The shipyard was situated far from metropolitan areas, its work force was under 300 (including casual labor), and the facilities, although adequate, were limited when compared with a naval shipyard. Yet the overall net result, in my view, was far more satisfactory than three major yard periods I had previously witnessed on board ships in two West Coast naval shipyards.
Professional supervision made this possible. All work on board the ship was conducted under the direction of a production supervisor who occupied a position outwardly similar to a ship superintendent in a naval shipyard. The similarity, however, is only superficial. The yard production supervisor had been performing his duties in the same position for some 26years. Based on this vast experience, he could and did recommend beneficial modifications of overhaul specifications to the commanding officer and to the on-site representative of the supervisor of shipbuilding. If the recommendations were accepted, the modification was implemented without the dreary procession of planners, designers, production representatives, and paper-pushers who apparently accompany all changes—no matter how slight—in a naval shipyard. He had the power to control labor directly; he could discharge employees without recourse to grievance committees, review boards, or shop stewards. He worked a 14-hour day and was paid
commensurately with a rear admiral (0-7). He was accountable to the shipyard for making a profit, complying with specifications, and producing a good product. He did all three.
How does this contrast with naval shipyards? The average naval shipyard ship superintendent seems to be a lieu- tenant/lieutenant commander who is getting his "ticket punched” for career development. He has fewer than three years’ experience, unless he has been slow to learn the ropes. Thus only the relatively inexperienced or inept are directly in charge of this most important period of a ship’s life. Below him he has a myriad of civilian assistants, committees, branches, and divisions who, in effect, provide the specialized experience he lacks and further disperse his already limited authority. He cannot unilaterally discharge shipyard employees. This system, despite the often Herculean efforts of the ship superintendents trapped within it, generally produces as much paper as progress and subjects even the slightest change to the scrutiny and time-consuming review of all but the gate guards. Virtually all officers who have undergone an overhaul in a naval shipyard have experienced the teeth- gnashing frustration of watching an essential change, which was detected early in the overhaul, implemented much later (at a much greater overall cost), with corresponding delays as completed work was again torn out. Why? Because the existing production system had not responded quickly enough to program the change before it would require duplication of work that was already completed.
The current situation can be improved upon by doing away with the practice of assigning naval officers as ship
superintendents. They would be replaced by a cadre of highly-experienced, highly-rated, and highly-paid civilians ("master shipwrights”) whose position would be an end in itself rather than a means to an end. Give these shipwrights broad authority combined with strict accountability, and cut down on the superfluous advisors and specialists who currently substitute for the experience the ship supervisors lack. The cost saving should be substantial, the quality of the overhaul repairs markedly improved, and overall productivity increased. In the current austere funding climate, shipyards can no longer function as "ticket agents” for naval officers or employment agencies for the otherwise unemployable.
"Some Thoughts on Ship’s Boats In the Navy”
(Set R. C. Taylor, pp. 232-241, May 1974 Proceedings, Naval Review Issue)
Dr. Dallas A. Johnson, M.D.—The concept of using small sail or power craft to exercise shore-based, as well as seagoing, personnel is to me fundamental. It is so basic that one wonders why the Navy has not been doing this for years. The idea should be explored.
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication in these pages. A primary' purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged. The U. S. Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion published in the Proceedings.
That the 17-foot dinghy is mentioned as a good sailboat for this use is fascinating. The lines of the craft are virtually identical with the Thistle-class sailboat. The Thistle is a boat design that has been actively racing in the United States since 1946. The Thistle was designed by Gordon K. (Sandy) Douglas and weighs a little more than 500 pounds instead of 1,200. With the addition of oarlocks, I suppose it could do all Mr. Taylor suggests. The Thistle-Class Association has maintained strict regulation of the boat through the years so that the molded wood # 1 which is still racing is competitive with the later fiberglass boats now well in the # 3000 scries.
The boat races with a crew of three; it is safe, responsive, and a sheer joy to sail. Such a craft would stimulate great interest in seamanship and competition within Fleets and against other competition in regattas where the Navy could "show the flag.”
"The New Rules of the Road”
{See A. T. Church, pp. 43-49, March 1974 Proceedings)
A. N. Cockroft, Senior Lecturer, City of London Polytechnic; author of A Guide to Collision Rules—In commenting on Rule 7 of the new Regulations for Pre
venting Collisions at Sea, Captain Church suggests that a vessel observing another on the port bow at 30,000 yards on a steady bearing will no longer be able to maneuver "outside the Rules” as there is no range limit to Rule 7 (d) (1). He considers that a vessel apparently becomes "locked in” to the Rules as soon as another vessel is picked up on the radar. As the new Rule 7 (d) (1) is almost identical with the Preliminary to the existing Steering and Sailing Rules, such an interpretation does not seem to be justified. In the British Courts the following extract from the judgment in the case of the Banshee is often referred to. Lord Esher said:
Now at what period of time is it that the Regulations begin to apply to two ships? It cannot be said that they ate applicable however far off the ships may be. Nobody could seriously contend that if two ships are 6 miles apart the Regulations for Preventing Collisions are applicable to them. They only apply at a time, when, if either of them does anything contrary to the Regulations, it will cause danger of collision. None of the Regulations apply unless that period of time has arrived. It follows that anything done before the time arrives at which the Regulations apply is immaterial, because anything done before that time cannot produce risk of collision within the meaning of the Regulations.
The 1972 Conference rejected a definition that "risk of collision” exists between vessels when their projected courses and speeds place them at or near the same location simultaneously. Such a definition, and Captain Church’s interpretation of the new Rule 7 (d) (1), would mean that a vessel which is slowly being overtaken by another vessel, the bearing of which is not changing, would be required to keep her course and speed over a period of several hours, and possibly several days. There is little justification for restricting action at long range, and it is not necessary to have a Rule permitting action to be taken "outside the Rules.” The final version of the new Rules appears to maintain the status quo whereby a vessel is not required to keep her course and speed for another vessel at long range.
I suggest that under the new Rules a crossing situation which involves two power-driven vessels in visual sight of
one another may be divided into the following four stages. The range limits will vary with the circumstances, but the approximate values quoted would probably apply to the majority of cases in the open sea.
► At long range (usually more than five miles and sometimes more than eight miles), both vessels are free to take action of any kind as risk of collision does not apply.
► At medium range (two-four miles minimum), the vessel which has the other on her own starboard side is required to take positive action, in ample time, to keep out of the way and shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, avoid crossing ahead of the other vessel. The vessel which has the other on her own port side is required to keep her course and speed.
► At short range (500-1,000 yards minimum, two-four miles maximum), the privileged vessel may take action to avoid collision by her maneuver alone, as soon as it becomes apparent to her that the vessel required to keep out of the way is not taking appropriate action in compliance with the Rules. An alteration of course to port is not permitted.
► In extremis (500-1,000 yards maximum), the stand-on vessel must take such action as will best aid to avert collision. An alteration of course to port might be the best action in certain circumstances.
The above sequence would not apply to vessels which are not in visual sight of one another, nor would it apply to a crossing situation involving a hampered vessel.
Captain Church apparently considers that very large vessels will be justified under the new Rules in displaying the special signal for a vessel constrained by her draft when using a traffic separation scheme. The signal is only to be shown by a power-driven vessel which because of her draft in relation to the available depth of water is severely restricted in her ability to deviate from the course she is following. It should be shown by a vessel of any size which is unable to alter course to avoid other vessels because of shoals nearby, particularly on the starboard side, but a large vessel using a traffic scheme in an area in which there is no relatively shallow
Comment and Discussion 83
water would surely not be entitled to special privilege. If privilege is to be accorded to a vessel because of her size in a traffic separation scheme or other special area it will be necessary to state the minimum size and/or draft which would qualify. This is done in some existing local rules. As the Rule adopted by the convention relates to the ability to deviate from the course being followed and not to actual size, a VLCC will have no special privilege in deep water except where local rules apply.
"How to Stay Afloat in a Personnel Quandary”
(See W. R. Thomas, pp. 119-121, April 1974 Proceedings)
Captain A. J. Ashurst, U. S. Navy, Com- manding Officer, U. S. Naval Communication Station, Londonderry, Northern Ireland— In his excellent article, Captain Thomas has presented what appears to be a dynamic and reasonable alternative to present-day personnel policies. However, one wonders in these days of the
all-volunteer force if enough emphasis is being placed on the volunteer aspect which implicitly, if not explicitly, shifts at least some of the moral responsibility for effective behavior from the organization to the individual. I firmly agree with the author that a policy is urgently required which simplifies the mutual parting of the ways by the Navy and problem individuals. However, to have to wait a year before initiating action appears unreasonable. If a man can make it through the first year, then chances are that he has adapted himself to Navy life, and the potential for ineffectiveness is substantially reduced. Based on what is admittedly a very small sample, most disciplinary, drug, and low performance problems arise during the first few months after recruit training or Class A school graduation.
A logical derivative of this thesis would be that for the first year both the individual and the Navy should be in a probationary status, during which time either party could declare the contract null and void, perhaps on 30 days notice. Cost of transportation, etc.,
would be chargeable to the party abrogating the contract.
A secondary problem is associated with the success rate of 19-year-old high school graduates. Although the probability of recruiting a non-achiever from this group is undoubtedly significantly less than from a younger and/or nongraduate group, it is still a distinct possibility. In these cases the problem is further complicated by the fact that the man is usually a Class A school graduate and therefore represents considerable investment on the Navy’s part. One answer would be that no one goes to Class A school until he has served at least a year, preferably at sea. Such a policy would permit both sides to evaluate the desirability of follow-on technical training.
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The probationary period would also give the individual an opportunity to observe various rates in a real-life situation, thereby permitting a more realistic appraisal of what his future may be. In keeping with the concept of individual responsibility, and to reinforce the psychological contract, it would also seem
appropriate that the individual would have to show good faith by completing appropriate correspondence courses, be a high school graduate or equivalent, and extend for a specific period, based on school length. The problem with instituting such a policy is, of course, that of the pipeline. How do we meet current fleet requirements during implementation? Perhaps we will have to accept a short-term liability to achieve a long-term gain by being temporarily shorthanded in trained personnel, especially at shore commands. With the fleet at its lowest count in many years, perhaps now is the time to bite the bullet in this regard. The picture would not be completely bleak. Young non- designated sailors could be sent to commands where they could be best used, based on their desires and the commands’ needs. At the end of a year they would be sent to a Class A school if qualified.
The third problem I see with Captain Thomas’ proposal has to do with the dual category of enlistments. The splitting of recruits into "active reserve en
listment only” and "regular enlistments only” could well lead to a first class- second class citizen syndrome. We have been plagued with the reserve-regular problem for many years, and it appears that the proposed action takes us down that same road again. If we are to have one Navy, then we should at least start off on the right foot with one recruiting policy, regardless of age as well as sex, color, creed, etc.
To attain a true volunteer force based on equality, we must have a uniform recruiting policy that is predicated on shared moral responsibilities by both the Navy and the individual. On this basis the following alternative is proposed for consideration:
► Minimum age of 17
► Three or four years (four-year enlistee may choose geographical area)
► First year of duty after recruit training probationary, and preferably sea duty; contract may be abrogated by either Navy or individual; expenses paid by requestor; no formal discharge awarded; simple termination of agreement executed; after first year, discharges gov
erned by existing directives
► Class A school guaranteed after first year, provided: high school graduate or equivalent; correspondence course for rate completed satisfactorily; agreement to extend (time predicated on course length); meets school qualifications; school quota available; and command recommendation
► Bonus of $1,000 per year of honorable service including first year; criteria to be established by BuPers
► Honorable Discharge (unless discharged for other reasons under current directives)
"Naval Aircraft in the Next Decade”
(See S. T. Dc La Mater, pp. 66-89, May 1974 Proceedings, Naval Review Issue)
Two-Block Fox
The Rise of the Aircraft Carrier, 1911-1929
Charles M. Melhorn
International rivalries, headlined events, behind-the-scene machinations, and controversial personalities, such as Billy Mitchell, are all elements in the little-known drama which surrounded the rise of the aircraft carrier. TWO-BLOCK FOX is a thoroughly researched, highly readable account of the 18-year struggle which changed the shape of the world's navies.
It is the customary view that during the 1920's the Navy sought to bridge the gap between national commitment in the Pacific and the force necessary to underwrite that commitment by plunging single-mindedly into programs of cruiser construction and battleship modernization. Only in this way, it was thought, could a favorable strategic balance be restored.
The author, a retired naval officer and scholar, does not agree. He advances the view that by 1922 the U. S. strategic position in the Pacific had eroded to the point where it could not be corrected by conventional measures. Dr. Melhorn also holds that this state of affairs was recognized by a small, but far-sighted and influential group of naval officers who saw no remedy short of a revolutionary advance in weaponry and tactical concepts. Their solution—was the aircraft carrier.
1974. 192 Pages. Bibliography. Index.
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Lieutenant Paul H. Scherf U. S. Navy, VA-55, Lemoore, California—I found Captain De La Mater’s article to be most interesting and informative. However, I must take exception to some of his statements concerning naval attack air-
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craft. He states that only the Marine Corps now uses the A-4 as an attack plane, and that it is doubtful that the A-4 will ever fly from ships on a regular basis. Actually, CVW-21, currently assigned to the USS Hancock (CVA-19), is composed of three A-4F squadrons and two F-8J squadrons. Although not the Navy’s most modern carrier striking force, it has played and does play an important role in our total striking force. During the Middle East crisis, it was the Hancock and her A-4s that were sent into the Indian Ocean.
Another suggestion in the article was that the A-4’s only "all-weather” or night capability was to drop on signal while flying on the wing of another radar-equipped aircraft. Although not equipped with a sophisticated radar system or inertial platform (the A-4N is), the A-4 has for years, been using other 7 "all-weather” systems to expand its ca
pability.
Captain De La Mater further indicated that the A-4 found its most productive service as a close air support plane for the Marine Corps. This statement is true to a point, but it implies that this is the only conventional mission for which the A-4 is suited. Although the A-4 may not be able to carry as many pounds of ordnance or go as far as an A-7, with its system improvements the A-4 has proven to be nearly as accurate as the A-7 in an actual combat environment and certainly has better survivability. During the final year of the Vietnam War the last remaining A-4 airwing more than carried its share of the work load and even "out-sortied” the big decks with their A-6s and A-7s.
The A-4 Skyhawk is probably one of the most versatile, most reliable, and certainly most widely-used aircraft ever designed. The A-4 will be around for many years to come, even if the Navy does finally take it off of the carrier as it has threatened to do for the past six years.
Lieutenant Colonel A. J. Kettering, U. S. Marine Corps, Head, Air Assault Support Systems Section, Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps—As a former CH-46 helicopter squadron commander, I must take exception to Captain De La Mater’s assess-
ment of the status and "acceptability” of the CH-46 in its role as the Marine Corps’ medium assault helicopter.
In his essay, Captain De La Mater states, "The [CH-46], now more than ten years old, has never been a truly adequate or well accepted airplane, and soon it will have to be replaced.” It is true that the first CH-46A series helicopter was delivered to the Marine Corps in 1962, making the early aircraft of that series over ten years old. The Marine Corps, however, no longer operates the A series. It has been replaced by the newer D and F series CH-46. The average service life of this inventory is approximately six years. Additionally, the Marine Corps has initiated a program to modernize and update the entire inventory of CH-46s and extend their useful operational service life well into the 1980s. The updated version will be designated CH-46E. The major goals of this modernization program will center around improvements in lift capability, reliability, aircraft safety, and combat survivability.
The CH-46 Sea Knight has played a distinguished role in U. S. Marine Corps aviation history. Since 8 March 1966, the day Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164 and the first CH-46s landed at Marble Mountain Air Facility in the Republic of Vietnam, this aircraft has been the backbone of the Marine Corps’ medium helicopter fleet. We expect it to remain so for many years to come. During its Vietnam career, the CH-46
contributed significantly to such successes as the defense of Khe Sanh and a variety of vertical assault missions too numerous to mention here.
Over one million sorties, representing in excess of 280,000 flight hours, were flown by the Marine Corps in Sea Knight helicopters in Vietnam. In amassing these flight hours, over two million combat troops, supporting personnel, and civilian refugees were carried. In its medical evacuation role, over 155,000 personnel were lifted to medical aid facilities. Today the CH-46 is the nucleus of the composite helicopter squadrons which support the Navy/ Marine amphibious ready groups deployed in both the Western Pacific and the Mediterranean.
In reviewing these accomplishments alone, I must disagree with Captain De La Mater’s conclusion that "the CH-46 has never been a truly adequate or well accepted airplane.”
"Destroyer Memorial”
(See R. S. Kaplan, p. 100, July 1974 Proceedings)
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The CH-46 performed all that was asked of it by the Marines in Vietnam.
Walter C. Hadley—With reference to the letter in which Mr. Kaplan proposed that a Fletcher-class destroyer be preserved as a naval memorial, he will be glad to know that the USS Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. (DD-850) is moored at Fall River with the battleship Massachusetts (BB-59) and the submarine Lionfish
(SS-298). The Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. is not from the Fletcher class—she is a Gearing with the FRAM I conversion—but is a good deal better than none at all.
"The Coast Guard Approaching
the Century’s End”
(See A. B. How, pp. 90-107, May 1974
Proceedings, Naval Review Issue)
Jerrems C. Hart—Quite appropriately, Captain How makes a point of user fees, and, as a yachtsman, I think immediately of the thousands of small craft that enjoy the benefits of the Intracoastal Waterway from New Jersey to Florida and beyond. How easy it would be to issue, for a fee, permits to use this waterway, section-by-section, over a given period of time and, providing the hinds were used for maintenance and improvements, I doubt there would be significant remonstrations from the boating public. A permit system would be easier to administer than a fuel tax as has been recommended to Congress
in the report of the National Water Commission.
Though Captain How speaks rather blandly of the pleasure boatman’s "use” of the Coast Guard, it has been my impression from monitoring channel 16 on summer weekends and from personally observing some ridiculous incidents, that no real distinction is being made between distress and inconvenience situations involving the Coast Guard. With the proliferation of VHF-FM radios in small craft, the Coast Guard will find itself increasingly occupied with calls from operators whose only problem may be a stalled engine and a pressing desire to get home for supper. There is no reason why pleasure boatmen should not help each other out and reserve calling the Coast Guard for serious situations where life and/or the safety of a vessel are at stake. A well-publicized schedule of fees for assistance rendered in all but true distress circumstances would encourage boatmen to take care of themselves.
In this help-one-another vein it is encouraging to know that the Coast
Guard Auxiliary will finally be put to much wider use, and I would suggest that the U. S. Power Squadron also be drawn into the program. Each organization has its core of enthusiastic and reasonably experienced yachtsmen who would jump at the opportunity to be of genuine service. Both organizations might be enlisted to assume most of the responsibility for training other boatmen through a uniform, graduated curriculum leading to the issuing by the Coast Guard of respected certificates of proficiency, taught by experienced yachtsmen who, themselves, have had to prove their knowledge of subject and ability to teach.
Dags of ET Sail
1974. 240 Pages. Illustrated. Index.
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Captain Andrew Shewan, 1849-1927, was one of the best known of the skillful, daring captains of the Clipper ship era. He and his father and his grandfather before him lived and worked in a fabled age of great ships, fierce rivalries and high adventure. When Captain Shewan, in his seventies, set down his experiences in The Great Days of Sail, he was the last of the Tea Clipper captains creating a unique reference work and an incomparable picture of a vanished age.
He knew the ships whose names are now household words; his knowledge and judgments forged from first hand experience. He was on board almost every one of the British clippers he mentions and raced with many of them on the high seas. And he knew the men who sailed and owned them—the great captains and the men who understood that to be first was everything and second nothing. Men like Old Stormy, father of White Hat Willis, for whom the Cutty Sark was built, and Captain Pirie of the Whiteadder appear side by side with colliers from Sunderland, Peterhead whalers and pirates.
All too true is Captain How’s statement that "neither the licensing of small-boat operators nor the regulations concerning age will cure all problems caused by lack of judgment.” Experience, of course, is the best teacher, but the acquisition of experience takes time. In the meantime, an educational program under Coast Guard direction should be instituted before resorting to licensing and more regulations.
Comment and Discussion 89
Ronald N. West, Flotilla Commander, Flotilla 12-2, U. S. Coast Guard Auxiliary— After reading the captain’s article, I felt a postscript was needed to complete the Coast Guard’s role in maritime safety.
The Coast Guard Auxiliary is the only volunteer boating organization with official recognition, having been provided for in the 1939 Coast Guard Reserve and Auxiliary Act. It received its present name through a 1941 act.
A provision of the 1941 act enabled the Coast Guard Auxiliary to enroll as "Temps” in the Coast Guard Reserve to serve for specified periods of time with pay and military status. This provision allowed an immediate increase in the number of men available to the Coast Guard for its increasing missions. By the end of World War II, over 50,000 Aux- iliarists with thousands of privately owned boats had served the Coast Guard and relieved the regular Coast Guardsmen for more demanding jobs. The Auxiliarists performed all types of work from port security to rescuing survivors of ship sinkings to coastal pickets looking for U-Boats.
In 29 years of service since the war’s end, the Coast Guard Auxiliary has assisted the Coast Guard in the fields of boat examinations, patrols, search and rescue, and public education, helping to better aid the 8,000,000 boaters in the United States today. Last year Auxiliary members saved a total of 314 lives in the United States. Auxiliarists not only work side by side with the Coast Guard but also work independently, which actually doubles the manpower available to serve the government, and the public. Add to this the 16,715 facilities (boats, aircraft, and radio stations) without cost to the government and the Coast Guard Auxiliary can be considered quite an asset to the United States government. To highlight some of the efforts by the Coast Guard Auxiliary to assist the regular Coast Guard, here are a few which have occurred over the past couple of years.
► From 22 through 25 June 1972, 18 Auxiliarists and 7 boats were dispatched to Baltimore, Maryland, to assist in the rescue and cleanup efforts following flooding by Hurricane Agnes. Dozens of
Auxiliarists served in the seven-state area affected by the hurricane for a period of several weeks.
► On 9 March 1973, following a collision in Houston, Texas, of a barge and tanker, 400,000 gallons of oil were spilled and had to be cleaned up. Auxiliary vessels responded immediately to assist in the cleanup with one Auxiliary boat serving as communications center for the on-scene commander. Another boat with radar equipment assisted 30- foot Coast Guard utility boats not equipped with radar through fog to the scene.
► On 12 August 1973, at a marina fire in St. Clair, Michigan, Auxiliarists were called upon to assist the Coast Guard in the fire-fighting efforts when the Coast Guard needed men to help man 40-foot utility boats needed at the fire. These men helped save thousands of dollars worth of property by towing away undamaged boats and by manning fire lines to help put out the fire, which destroyed $2 million worth of property.
These actions were carried out with hardly any cost to the taxpayer. The use
The French Navy, in the sense of a force of ships specially designed for war, dates from the time of Cardinal Richelieu. Starting with its tentative beginnings, the author takes the reader through its triumphs, its defeats and its difficulties. Many famous battles are described, and the careers of many famous men, both sailors and legendary leaders are delineated. The story is taken to the end of the Second World War, while an appendix covers the post-war years and brings the story into the nuclear age.
This very readable, yet enormously scholarly and detailed work has no competitors. Enhanced by maps, diagrammatic plans of battles, as well as by 16 pages of plates, this will prove an invaluable source of reference for historians, students of French history as well as all naval enthusiasts. It is the first history of the French Navy to be published in English.
1974. 364 Pages. Illustrated. Bibliography. Index.
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The European Discovery of America
By Samuel Eliot Morison
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These two volumes, a monumental study of the discovery of America, are the crowning achievement of America's greatest living historian, Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison. With over twenty books, numerous awards (including two Pulitzer prizes) and many thousands of nautical miles behind him, Morison brings to the lives and travels of the early voyagers a rare immediacy, a sparkling prose style, and the wisdom revelatory of a long, full life.
The U. S. Naval Institute is pleased to offer these volumes to members as an elegant boxed set. The gold-stamped spines are handsomely displayed in a slipcase featuring a reproduction of an antique map.
THE NORTHERN VOYAGES
This comprehensive and brilliantly readable account of all known voyages across the North Atlantic to the New World prior to 1600, recreates for the modern reader those who saw or claimed to have seen the shores of North America in the first 600 years after the Norsemen landed. The roll call includes all of the intrepid mariners and the adventurers who sent them forth: Leif Ericsson, John Cabot, Verrazzano, Jacques Cartier, Sir Walter Raleigh, and a full gathering of their competitors. Morison brings to their lives and perilous times a rare immediacy, making the drama and unpredictability of their voyages as significant in relation to the people of their times as the astronauts’ journeys have been for our day.
"It is in all ways admirable, written with wit and easy scholarship and loaded with maps and pictures" . . .
—New Yorker
1971. 736 pages. Illustrated with 210 photographs, IT
maps.
THE SOUTHERN VOYAGES
In this concluding volume of Morison’s monumental study of the discovery of America, the author returns to a subject which has fascinated him throughout his career— Christopher Columbus. He recaptures as well the adventures of two other great navigators, Ferdinand Magellan and Sir Francis Drake, while following the explorations of many other fascinating adventurers around the shores of the Caribbean, Latin America and inland too. The sweep of the narrative, the keen sense of participation Morison imparts to the events make this book along with its predecessor, The Northern Voyages, the capstone of an extraordinary career.
1974. 820 pages. Illustrated with 220 photographs, 33 maps. Notes. Index.
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fly Alexander Laing
What is the sea—with its ancient dialogue of wind and wave—whose mysteries have stirred the minds of men throughout the ages? Its wild freedom nursed our American liberties. Its salt is in our blood. Our mastery of ships and seafaring sustained our early footholds on an ocean- bound, river-laced wilderness. Our merchant navies made our young flag a proud symbol of respect and energy. When our survival depended on our maritime strength, we had that power. And always we have turned to our shores and oceans for renewal and for joy.
This rousing chronicle of our nation's seafaring heritage spans the centuries that produced the men, ships and traditions that have inspired America to maritime greatness. The whaleboats, the age of fighting sail, the transat- lantic packets, the emigrant ships, the clippers, the steam Navy, and the men like Donald McKay, John Paul Jones, Matthew Perry and Nathaniel Bowditch are all here in Seafaring America. But in addition to being a valuable historical reference work, the book is also a treasury of seafaring art with famous paintings, engravings and prints by such masters as Winslow Homer, John Singleton Copley and Currier and Ives. More than 300 illustrations, many in color, show ships’ carvings, scrimshaw, embroidery, macrame and mementoes of voyages to many distant lands.
This deluxe edition, presented for Naval Institute members through special arrangement with American Heritage, is handsomely boxed in slipcase and bound in heavy, gold- stamped buckram.
1974. 350 pages. 329 illustrations, with 48 in full color. Appendix. Index.
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By Adrian Johnson
America Explored is an oversize, lavishly illustrated pictorial atlas which details in words and images the discovery and ultimate exploration of America. In more than 350 illustrations, many of them large full-color facsimiles of early maps—and in compelling text, the progression from the early Viking voyages through Columbus to the midnineteenth-century expeditions of Lewis and Clark, Pike, Ashley, Smith, the Mormons, and Marcy is traced in detail. And it is the cartography which reveals the stage upon which the new American drama was enacted. The detailed maps in this volume have been carefully selected not only to depict man's awareness of a new continent but also to show the increasing precision of the map maker’s art—and his steady substitution of what was certain for what was said to be. The maps take the form of simple sketches as well as detailed ornamental works of art, some drawn on vellum, some later engraved on copper or steel, involving an image of the world as a sphere which could be divided by increasingly fine lines of exactitude.
If only a single lesson can be drawn from the photographs and cartography in this remarkable book it is the striking perseverence of the ideal of accuracy. America Explored tells this story—along with the story of man—as he perpetually seeks to throw back the bonds of circumstance which form his horizon.
1974. 276 pages. 40 pages of color. 350 black-and-white illustrations. 6 pull-out maps. Index.
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of the Coast Guard Auxiliary does not involve cost for personnel, base support, or maintenance, which are all assumed by the Auxiliarists. The cost of fuel for Auxiliary boats is sometimes reported to the Coast Guard for reimbursement. Many Auxiliarists, however, do not ask to be reimbursed for their fuel, thus making their services even more valuable to the government.
"Tiger Hunting in Dinglabash”
(See E. P. Aurand and A. P. Echo, pp. 35-39, June 1974 Proceedings)
Commander Peter T. Smith, U. S. Navy, Patrol Squadron 47—Alas, Admiral Aurand has been duped by his partly knowledgeable and somewhat logical friend, Mr. Echo. Surely the admiral must know why the tigers do not fear the mighty elephants and the Stink- astani Krus.
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United States Naval Institute Annapolis, Maryland 21402
The sultan who lives in Howarya has given the Krus strict orders never to let the tigers know that the elephant is around. This is because the great god Kovertness has so decreed. Most of the Mahouts (being stupid, cynical, lower caste types) do not understand the ways of Kovertness. "How,” they ask, "can we deter tigers if we must continually play the invisible elephant trick? Why are the noseman and earman restricted from using all their magic boxes? The eyeman is not even allowed to blink, lest the glow from his eye be detected by
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the tiger.” But the sultan knows that the Krus are not allowed to kill the tigers—just peek at them. He also knows that if the tigers were frightened they might go home and get tougher. Sultan Barnknee knows this as did Sultan Peat before him. It is only Mr. Echo who is confused.
Mr. Echo is right about one thing. There is a need for greater cooperation and coordination between the hunters of the provinces. But there is hope. The great young Sultan Edwalr is capable of uniting the three areas of Dinglabash (although he is admittedly a Stinkastani by birth) and bringing the strength and wisdom of each community to bear on the tiger. We lowly Krusmen think Sultan Edwalr could even explain the god Kovertness to Mr. Echo.
Captain A. T. Church, U. S. Navy (Retired)— The article on tiger hunting in Dinglabash is both alarming for the future and reminiscent of days gone by. The words of one of the foremost tiger hunters in the world, Alfred P. Echo,
must not be taken lightly.
My alarm stems from current responsibilities of assisting Dinglabash in maintaining an adequate supply of healthy goats, and the future possibility of being responsible for their safe shepherding through the tall grasses of the tiger country.
As for the past, the article reminds
me of the many years I spent in Banga- more with the gongs. I could never understand why the Prince of Banga- more would not listen for the tiger, even if it entailed trailing listening devices deep in the tall grasses. Only tradition demanded that he pour his limited funds into a tiger detection device that defied the laws of physics.
When ultimately assigned to the Ministry for Tiger Hunting in Dinglabash, it first appeared that the opportunity to revise tiger hunting weapons and tactics had at last arrived. Mr. Echo points out succinctly the difficulties of overcoming the power of the princes of the provinces of Dinglabash, "We did not do it that way 20 years ago; why should we do it that way now?”
I could only amend the comments of Mr. Echo in one respect. Despite the secrecy of the tactics of the tiger hunters of the Underbad, I feel confident that the media of Dinglabash will ultimately uncover them and publish them to the great advantage of the tigers.
"A Look at the Nikolaev”
(See E. C. Fisher, Jr., pp. 116-118, March 1974 Proceedings)
Lee M. Wetherhom, Haifa, Israel—The lack of technical competence in preparing this article leaves me a bit distressed.
I have grown to expect better things of both the Proceedings and Mr. Fisher.
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Specifically, there are two types of errors. First, and hopefully easily remedied, there is the matter of typographical
Comment and Discussion 93
errors (at least, I hope they are only typographical errors). These include the photo identifications of Owl Screen and Sheet Screen radars which come out as "Owl Screech” and "Sheet Curve” in the text. The Kresta II is cited as equipped with "Nead Net C radar” and the Nikolaev has "a Big Net (ex-Head Net) . . . which . . . consists of two back-to-back Head Net A scanners.”
Second, and more serious, is the matter of the quality of the information contained in the article. I cannot accept that "habability” (sic) must be at a very minimal level. The Soviet ships do engage in extended deployments, and their crews get ashore far less than the crews of comparable vessels in the U. S. Sixth Fleet. The luxurious American standards of habitability are not necessarily those to use in measuring the product of another culture.
There may be more meaningful questions to ask in evaluating this aspect of the Nikolaev, such as, "How large is the crew?” or, "What is her unrefueled radius of action?” I shouldn’t be surprised to find a much smaller crew than that
required for a comparable U. S. ship. To begin with, even a backward Soviet technology could manage a reduction in the number of watch-standing billets in the engine room specified for most American ships with high-pressure steam plants. There could be a similar reduction in the administrative department, assuming one exists at all. Certainly Soviet sailors are not accompanied by a three-inch thick service record, nor are their ships’ offices repositories for volumes of directives on drug abuse, Seavey/Shorvey, off-base housing and the like. Do we imagine the classconscious Communists provide their ships with a separate, distinct corps of officers’ stewards?
The March 1974 edition of the German-language Marine Rundschau contains a few lines on the Kara class. The German data appear to be far more up to date than the Proceedings. For example, the 30-mm. guns are not twin, as in the Osa class, but multiple, similar to the Vulcan/Phalanx system which is still in the trial stage in the U. S. Navy. When coupled with the SA-N-4 missile
NAVAL OFFICER’S UNIFORM GUIDE
by J. B. Castano
In 1776, the officers serving in the Continental frigate Providence addressed themselves to their skipper, Captain Abraham Whipple, requesting “that a proper Navy uniform be procured” so that "all may have an opportunity to appear alike as brothers united in one cause." This request led to the first uniform authorizations in the United States Navy.
This illustrated reference handbook is a comprehensive guide to all aspects of the male and woman officer's wardrobe. Covering such subjects as formal and dinner dress uniforms, tropical uniforms and service dress uniforms, the Guide also contains hard-to-find information on insignia, badges, name tags and aiguillettes, the customs and traditions associated with the sword, ribbons and attachments and the proper wearing of large and miniature medals. Interesting descriptions of the historical background surrounding particular uniform items as well as cogent advice on the care and maintenance of the uniform make this a unique compendium.
128 Pages. Illustrated. Appendix. Index.
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system, this indicates a significant anti- aircraft/antimissile capability. The SS-N-9/SS-N-10 confusion is another of those troublesome typographical oversights. Main armament is credited by Marine Rundschau as being a new system, the SS-NX-13, with Mach 4 capability and 400-mile range. The failure to mention any specific guidance radar for the surface-to-surface weapons indicates the probability of a self-contained system in the missile. This would permit the launching ship to "shoot and scoot.” It might also allow for some form of advisory "hand-off” control via another ship or aircraft. Otherwise, the weapon range in excess of sensor range is superfluous. Those innocuous little Mayak trawlers that are constantly bird-dogging the Sixth Fleet carriers provide a solution to the problem of target identification prior to terminal homing. It makes little sense to locate a "navigational” radar scanner in back of a solid mast which interferes with radiation patterns forward and may cause either a total shadow or secondary lobe interference. The Nikolaev does have a navigational
radar. The scanner is located directly above the bridge and shows clearly in the Breyer plan.
Much of the awesome firepower of the Kara class comes from the fact that almost all systems are dual. This includes the surface-to-air launchers (both types), the surface-to-surface launchers, torpedo tubes, gun mounts, both types of multi-barrel unit rocket launchers, fire control radars, and even the newly- identified radar decoy chaff launchers (Marine Rundschau). This dualism may stem from a requirement for all-around coverage in fields of fire, or it may be a hedge on systems reliability. Officers
with fleet experience in single-system ships know only too well how often a casualty can leave them with zero capability. I doubt the Soviets have an air resupply organization capable of the same rapid response that characterizes the U. S. Navy supply system.
I cannot argue with the conclusion that the Nikolaev is indeed an impressive vessel. It shows clearly that Admiral Gorshkov is intent upon not repeating the mistake he criticizes in his article in the same issue of the Proceedings: "to build warships similar to foreign warships, without taking into account the conditions under which they would operate, and ignoring the requirements unique to Russia.”
"Convoys: No Second Chance?”
(See C. H. Blair, pp. 112-114, June, 1974 Proceedings)
Captain Eric E. Hopley, U. S. Navy (Retired)— Captain Blair has nicely summarized the convoy problems that need solving. He and other "prospective con
voy commodores” will be pleased to hear that a step, albeit small, has been taken toward finding solutions.
Under Commander Third Fleet’s active sponsorship, I was recently privileged to exercise a "convoy” of naval ships between San Diego and Hawaii, utilizing the newly published and completely revised ACPs i4sB and 149B (Wartime Instructions for Merchant Ships). The new publications are clear and concise in both format and content and provide somewhat more flexibility to cope with today’s potential threat.
Ships are to little purpose without skillful Sea Men.
—Richard Hakluyt 1586
Mix a large portion of shiphandling information with selected Rules of the Road, stir in safety information and aids to navigation, add a healthy batch of nautical tables, lists and formulae, put it all together in a small, sturdy volume which doubles as an appointment book, and you have The Mariner’s Pocket Companion 1975. Compiled for both the yachtsman and the professional naval officer by an experienced mariner, this little book has a new look with its own bound-in 1975 calendar and a wealth of useful information in easy-to-find form. Weather forecasting information is here, along with the Beaufort Scale, speed indicators, and a table of distances between major ports. First aid, damage control, distress signals and survival tips are included, along with wave characteristics, compass corrections and a check list for getting underway.
With its washable beige “leather-look” cover, this compact reference book belongs in the pocket of every mariner who takes his seagoing seriously. 3% x 6%. 216 Pages
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I
A NAVAL INSTITUTE PRESS BOOK
However, I do share Captain Blair’s conclusion that much work is needed to bring World War II convoy doctrine up to date. With yesterday’s experience and today’s analytical techniques, the "how” to accomplish the doctrine overhaul does not appear formidable. The decision to proceed, either through national or NATO channels, is perhaps the stickiest part of the problem. In today’s wonderland of deterrence and detente, is there a commander who can assign such a low priority to the project, especially if there is no second chance?