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A satellite system of NATO’s very own today scans a far different world from that of a quarter-century ago when the North Atlantic Treaty first came into effect. Faced with these changes and with the need to keep on keeping on, NATO members ought to study recent unpublicized accomplishments wherein they did more together and less on their own.
The North Atlantic Alliance is again in some disarray, a condition which is becoming nearly endemic. It seems to change only when some palliative fence-mending is initiated in response to some aperiodic crisis. Since we became involved in Southeast Asia, there have been few serious attempts to "do” anything beyond paying lip- service to the need for unity or for a continued American presence in Europe. The most recent American policy proposal was put forth in 1973, with Dr. Henry Kissinger’s call for a new Atlantic Charter. Although the concept has promise and is innovative in its recognition of the realities of economic regionalism in suggesting that Japan be included in any new Atlantic considerations, the proposal remains dormant. Possibly there was little advance preparation of the allies for the proposal, and certainly more urgent problems precipitated by the war in the Middle East and Arab oil diplomacy have served as centripetal forces so far as NATO has been concerned.
Continued negotiations in SALT (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks) and maneuverings, both international and domestic, relative to MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions) have proceeded with glacial deliberation. Despite the enormous American defense budget, there have been continuing drastic reductions in our defense structure through troop cuts, base closures, and cancelled weapons projects.
The cost of defense is staggering, and there is need for innovation in our defense planning as well as in Alliance planning. For example, the current answer to the question posed by Charles Hitch more than a decade ago, "how much is enough?” is that less will have to be acceptable. In fact, in the past 20 years, the political response to the question has ranged from the strategy of massive retaliation with its heavy reliance on long-range bombers, nuclear weapons, and pentomic armies; to the concept of graduated response, with its expensive broad range of capabilities including beefed- up conventional and unconventional forces, bombers, missiles, and Polaris submarines; to the present doctrine involving a decreasing American profile overseas, force
46 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1974
reductions, and base closures. The nation has yielded to domestic pressure to reduce the cost and influence of defense and to spend more resources for social and welfare-related purposes. This move was made many years ago by our NATO allies.
There are many reasons for the profound changes in American defense policy and its resultant posture. It is a far different world from that of a quarter-century ago when the North Atlantic Treaty first came into force. "Containment” has yielded to "detente” as a strategy and as an acceptable political buzzword. The perception of the threat posed by the Soviet Union has changed, at least in the degree of urgency with which it is viewed. This is not to suggest that military commanders no longer plan for the "worst case” situation. Rather, it underscores the point that the political view of the threat and degree of risk involved in reducing forces, pursuing SALT, MBFR, etc. has assumed that it is more prudent to reduce the defense profile than to fly in the face of domestic pressures for defense reform and reduction.
The reductions in the American financial commitment to NATO began more than a decade ago when the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act was amended in the two following years to allow the President to stop military aid to nations he considered were able to bear their own defense costs. In the place of military assistance, military sales were stressed; offset agreements, either formal or informal, were made with some of our allies which required them to make compensatory purchases of American military equipment to help balance the costs of stationing American troops in Europe. The United States had begun experiencing balance of payments deficits as early as 1958, and some relief appeared necessary. In effect, the sinews which had helped bind the Alliance together through American aid, had been stretched too thin. They have weakened even more in the past ten years.
Although the Alliance has experienced many crises and disagreements, it has continued its existence. Even when France made her ostentatious withdrawal from NATO several years ago, she retained her membership in the Alliance itself as well as in a variety of functional groups providing military logistics support to her forces. That NATO still exists is attributable to such factors as a collective concern for the threat from the East, a memory of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, American influence to retain the Alliance, and a certain inertia militating against precipitous changes in international relationships. The Alliance’s continued existence is also the result of a collective willingness to try to keep it alive, to adapt to changing conditions, and to accept the feasible rather than the ideal in achieving consensus.
It is not the purpose of this essay to chart all the reasons for NATO’s problems, but to point to a series of unpublicized accomplishments which could be used as a basis for a new initiative in the Alliance.
Alastair Buchan has cited NATO as being unique among peacetime alliances in the extent of cooperation and coordination it demands from its members. These qualities are nowhere more apparent than in the field of military logistics. There has been a large amount of activity in that area which has been aimed at giving substance to the supporting structure of the Alliance. It is useful and necessary at this point to review some of the more significant efforts of NATO in the logistics area.
The need for multinational cooperation, coordination, and integration of military logistics was recognized by NATO’s precursor, the Western European Union (WEU). By the time the North Atlantic Treaty was six months old, the smaller nations of Europe called on the United States to take the lead in a pooling of military resources. At the Foreign Ministers’ Conference in May 1950, the members endorsed the concept of cooperation in military logistics to make the most effective use of their available resources. The Conference report also called for the creation of balanced collective forces with national force specialization, i.e., some nations would provide ground forces, some would provide naval/coastal defense forces, etc., leaving many of the members dependent on one another for various types of defense. Such a concept represented an ideal which might have provided a means by which some of the member nations could have reconciled their military/security requirements and expenses with their even more pressing domestic social and welfare needs as they recovered from World War II, but the Conference also left room for continued diversification of national forces rather than specialization. The report did this by recognizing the political interests and related military commitments of some members outside the treaty area.
As a result of the Korean conflict in 1950, signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty became more concerned with the development of a credible defense posture. A number of actions were taken to provide for greater cooperation and coordination in military planning and logistics. These included the establishment of a succession of boards charged with the administration of various aspects of defense production and economics. Moreover, there were a number of organizational changes within the Alliance including the setting up of theater supreme commanders and subordinate elements. In addition, the NATO International Staff/Secre- tariat under a Secretary General was also created to
handle broad administrative matters and provide staff continuity to the activities of the Alliance.
An Alliance Initiative 47
These efforts served to institutionalize the Alliance and created the organizational structure through which planning and management could be handled. As a result of these steps to put the "O” in "NATO” a number of technical agencies were also created. These were responsible for planning, development, and administration of many specific functions related to military logistics. These elements included efforts to standardize procedures and equipment; construction of the necessary supporting infrastructure; and coordination of military requirements for weapons and equipment. An acute observer of NATO, Robert F„ Osgood, noted that "NATO was not intended to marshal military power . . . it was intended to provide political and psychological reinforcement to the continuing political warfare of the cold war.” The agencies and commands established by the North Atlantic Council provided this reinforcement and made its intentions more credible.
Standardization of procedures and equipment in "NATO was not intended to marshal military power considerations. Standardization and a pooling of resources were necessary if the Alliance was to try to meet its military requirements at the same time as the European members attempted to meet their domestic social needs. Progress made in the area of procedural standardization was significant in that complete series of standard procedures were developed and implemented, e.g., the ACPs, ATPs, AAPs, etc. with which those in the military services are familiar. The standardization of weapons and equipment was far more difficult, and the most notable agreement in this area was the acceptance of the NATO cartridge for small arms. Adoption of a standard cartridge represented a partial solution to the larger initial goal of developing standard small arms for the Alliance, a goal which had proved impossible to achieve.
The Infrastructure Program, together with an elaborate review system, to provide the supporting airfields, communications links, fuel pipelines, storage depots, and other facilities needed to meet military requirements was started by the Western European Union and carried forward by NATO. By 1968, about $4.2 billion had been spent on the NATO infrastructure to provide some 220 airfields, 31,000 miles of communications links, 6,300 miles of fuel pipelines, storage for some 528 million gallons of fuel, as well as naval facilities, radar installations, missile sites, ammunition depots, and other support facilities.
Several points worth noting emerged from the infrastructure program. First, the system used in realizing consensus among the participating nations for particular facilities involved all sectors concerned, i.e., the
international military staffs, the national staffs, the various ministries of finance, economics, defense, communications, business and real estate, and local governments, in order to insure that all concerned were in accord. The host nation for a facility was responsible for acquiring the necessary land and easements, preparing detailed construction and cost estimates, and inviting bids from firms for the projects.
Second, the methods used in developing the costsharing formula to be followed in the periodically agreed-upon slices took account of the contributive capacity of the members, the advantages accruing to the user nations, and the economic benefits realized by the host nation. The proportionate share for each nation involved was based on these factors and was developed by the Military Committee and approved techni-
48 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1974
cally and financially by the Infrastructure Committee and other elements of the International Staff before being approved by the Council.
The third point to be noted about the infrastructure system in NATO is derived from this and was represented by the Central European Pipeline System, managed by the internationally staffed Central Europe Operating Agency (CEOA). This agency was responsible for the routine operation of the NATO pipeline system in France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg to meet the requirements of those nations in their NATO commitments, as well as those of three user nations, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Agency directed the activities of five regional (national) operating elements which handled the pipelines in the countries. Although the CEOA took its policy guidance from two other groups, one for military requirements and one for general financial and economic policies, the members of NATO delegated supranational technical control to this functional organization.
The experience in infrastructure organizations served as a model for future management organizations set up by NATO to handle technical tasks.
Joint development and production of a weapons system whose characteristics had been defined by NATO military authorities began for the first time in 1954. SACEUR and his SHAPE staff took the lead in formulating requirements for a lightweight tactical reconnaissance jet aircraft to provide air support to ground forces. An ad hoc committee composed of representatives from the Military Committee, Standing Group, and the SHAPE staff, as well as civilian technical experts, was set up to prepare specifications for the desired aircraft.
By 1957, the design and prototype built by Fiat of Italy was selected as meeting the specifications and as being the most rapidly available design. The aircraft, known subsequently as the Fiat G.91, was placed in production soon afterward, with components and subsystems manufactured by the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, Germany, and the United States. About 600 Fiat G.91s were built, and Germany, Italy, and Portugal placed them in service. France continued development and eventual production of a more technically advanced aircraft for a role similar to that intended for the G.91. Financial assistance was provided by the United States through the Mutual Weapons Development Program, and some 50 G.91s were bought with U. S. funds for distribution to Portugal under the U. S. Offshore Procurement Program.
While the G.91 was still in the developmental stage in 1956, NATO military authorities identified a need for a maritime patrol aircraft to replace obsolescent types
then in use by European nations, and the Military Committee applied some of the experiences of the G.91 endeavor. That is, requirements were developed, and specifications were provided to several aircraft manufacturers in the member nations for design submissions. A French design by the Societe Brequet was finally chosen and called the Atlantique-Brequet 1150. An organization structure was set up to handle the project with a steering committee responsible to the Military Committee. The steering group handled the administration and management of the project, and an international consortium of manufacturers was set up with Brequet as the prime contractor for actual contract execution. Although NATO military commands and the Armaments Committee had been involved from the outset in the development of the Atlantique, only France and Germany actually bought the aircraft initially. The United States already had the far more expensive Lockheed P-3 under development; the British planned to use its Shackleton aircraft; and some others hoped to obtain surplus American P-2s. As in the case of the G.91, however, components were manufactured by other nations as well as those which were actually buying the Atlantique, e.g., the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands all participated. Initial estimates envisioned nearly 200 aircraft, but production contracts provided for only 87, and by 19^6 only 20 were in service. Later requirements and discussions resulted in negotiations with Italy to produce additional Atlantiques to meet Italian requirements.
While NATO members were in the process of undertaking development on the two internally developed aircraft, a political announcement at the conclusion of the NATO Heads of State Conference in 1957 significantly changed the nature and method of handling joint development and production projects. At the conference, the United States announced its willingness to share its advanced military technology. This offer included research and development information, as well as production techniques for missiles, aircraft, and other weapons systems.
In response, the European members of NATO prepared requirements, and two American air defense- related missile systems were chosen for joint production: Hawk, a surface-to-air weapon, and Sidewinder, an air-to-air weapon system. By the end of 1958, an international consortium had been organized by the nations involved (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United States) which served as the prime contractor for the production of the Hawk missile. The management and administrative methods devised for handling the Hawk program served as 3 general model for the subsequent large-scale production projects. By June 1959, the North Atlantic Council had
I established the Hawk Production Organization which
[ had a Board of Directors (national representatives from
1 each of the countries engaged in the project) to provide
policy guidance and direction; a Hawk Management Office, staffed by national experts and charged with the I day-to-day routine administration, coordination, and
1 management of the project; and several functional
t elements responsible for assembly and system test and
i' checkout, as well as the prime contractor consortium.
The organizational structure was patterned after that used in the European pipeline system, i Concurrent with the actions to set up the structure
t | for the management of Hawk production, enabling
An Alliance Initiative 49
actions were also being taken to allow the production of the American weapon system by the European nations, i.e., a series of bilateral executive agreements between the United States and each of the participating nations. These agreements provided for the United States to supply the equipment, services, materials, and information needed for the production, overhaul, maintenance, and repair of the weapons to the government concerned (not directly to foreign manufacturers.) They also stipulated that the second party (other nation) was to provide weapons, components, etc., to third nations at a fair price, allow the movement of materials related to the weapon without tariff or
The United States provided associated component parts for both the Atlantique-Brequet 1150 Maritime Patrol Aircraft, left, and for the F-104G Star fighter, some of which are seen being assembled at the Fokker plant in the Netherlands. Starfighter was the largest joint production effort undertaken by NATO; nearly 1,000 aircraft were produced in European plants.
50 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1974
other restrictions, protect classified information, and not allow transfer of weapons or components to non-NATO nations without American approval, etc.
In addition to the political and industrial agreements which were necessary to provide the skeleton of the production organization, economic and financial agreements were also necessary to provide the flesh and arteries needed to give substance to the Hawk program. The United States provided support through its Military Assistance Program. Grant Aid alone was estimated
at about $32 million; this included the costs of training more than 650 Europeans, converting more than a quarter million drawings for European use, and providing technical assistance from Army arsenals and the American manufacturer. The total cost of producing some 4,000 missiles and their complex fire control and launching systems came to about $667 million.
Production of Sidewinder and Bullpup missiles was accomplished through similar methods, i.e., using a production organization and management office, prime
contractor, U. S. military assistance, and weapons production licenses. In addition, several smaller joint production projects were also completed which included other American weapons, the French AS-30 missile system and an Italian artillery piece.
The largest of these joint projects was the production of the American Lockheed F-104G Starfighter aircraft. This began as a private venture by Lockheed Corporation but it was placed under NATO auspices in 1962. This facilitated the industrial and financial dealings of the nations involved and served to alleviate their prob-
lems of differing national laws, tariffs, and other restrictions. A large portion of the cost for Starfighter was paid by the United States through military assistance programs; there was also an estimated return to American companies of about $1 billion (about half the total program cost for producing nearly 1,000 aircraft.)
which had helped pay a large part of the costs for the joint production of advanced American weapons were no longer available. Instead, we had the U. S. Military Sales Program with an annual target of $1 to $1.5 billion worth of military goods. The United States was using the sales program to alleviate balance-of-payments deficits, but her allies were seeking a more balanced quid pro quo which would involve comparable U. S. purchases of European military equipment. Europe’s increasing concern over the technological gap with the United States was underscored by the exodus of European scientists, engineers, and technicians to America. Moreover, the United States dominated the defense technology of the Alliance. Except for the G.91 and Atlantique aircraft, most of the jointly produced weapons had been American, and despite the cooperation involved in manufacturing them in Europe, the weapons were dependent on American financial aid and production licenses.
A change in the situation of American dominance came with the development of the NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE), an air defense weapons support system. Apart from Starfighter, it was the largest single effort undertaken by the Alliance. It provides an integrated, semi-automated air defense system for all of NATO Europe from Norway to Turkey, has links to the U. S. early warning system, and involves a number of radar stations, communications links, and computerized control centers. NADGE is politically significant in that it is designed to vector interceptor aircraft to intruders, select SAM sites, and fire missiles with little national intervention or decision. NADGE
The experiences the Alliance had in setting up functional agencies to handle specific tasks involving military logistics were formalized in 1962. At the time, the Council approved the standardized organization, missions, and functions of NATO Production and Logistics Organizations (NPLOs). The NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization, Central Europe Pipeline System, Hawk, Sidewinder, Bullpup, and Starfighter organizations all came under the new regulation. The NPLOs used a standard organization; they shared in the juridical personality of NATO, the financial responsibilities of participants were defined, the roles of the International Staff and Audit Service were detailed, and decision-making methods (unanimous aggreement by participants) were established with the regulation.
Although the formalization of the organizational functions and responsibilities of the NPLOs appeared promising as an example of international cooperation, other events were also taking place which retarded further development of the NPLOs.
For example, by the end of 1964, the United States had provided Western Europe with more than $23 billion under its Military Assistance Program, and as the result of legislation passed in 1962 and 1963 amending the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, military aid to Europe was almost entirely ended. Thus, funds
52 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1974
is also significant in that it was initiated and organized differently from previous programs.
For example, the military requirements and specifications were developed through NATO, and these in turn were presented to several international consortia of manufacturers (each composed of manufacturers from several member nations) for design and bidding. The North Atlantic Council awarded the contract to the consortium with the lowest bid. The project was set up so that companies in participating nations were awarded subcontracts with considerable precision to insure that the outflow of currency from each participant was reduced to a bare minimum. In addition, although an American company was a member of the winning consortium, the system design was developed multilaterally and was an Alliance product.
In addition to the change in approach signaled by NADGE, the completion of many of the initial production programs for weapons also helped mark the end of the earlier projects. Alliance-wide acceptance of standardization had never been achieved, and by 1966, another course was taken. A less formal and less demanding policy was put into effect which allowed two or more nations to work together on a subregional basis in the development and production of military equipment which the participants considered would meet their needs. Such projects could become official NATO projects, but the only institutional role the Alliance played was to receive annual progress reports. Other nations could buy into the projects by paying a prorata share of development and production costs. Thus, in place of the sweeping, but unrealized goal of overall standardization, NATO settled for a more feasible policy which supported at least a modicum of standardization among a few of the members. Several projects were started under the new ground rules including the Jaguar ground attack aircraft with France and the United Kingdom, a variable geometry wing aircraft being worked on by Germany and the United Kingdom, several helicopters, tanks, and vertical takeoff and landing aircraft (VTOL).
NATO’s experience in military logistics is notable because it happened at all. The procedures may be somewhat rusty from disuse, but the institutionalization of many of the facets of NATO logistics remains a milestone in Alliance behavior which is not to be ignored.
Recent broad strategic developments such as detente, MBFR, SALT II, and national politico-economic pressures to reduce defense spending have served to stimulate innovations in maintaining defense credibility while reducing overall national financial and force commitments. These initiatives have been largely unilateral and
uncoordinated. A decade ago we accepted the idea that about 10% of the gross national product could reasonably be spent for defense; this theory has been changed considerably. The budget now before Congress for Fiscal Year 1975, pegs the defense budget at slightly more than 6% of GNP and is representative of a trend in the past four years. Even though the fiscal year-75 budget asks for some $84 billion, the amount represents a great reduction in terms of the dollar value of four or five years ago. The reduced buying power of defense money is reflected in the closure of bases, sharp personnel cuts, the retirement of some 400 ships (only partially replaced by new construction), consolidation of services, and a plethora of industry-government "task forces” charged with studying and recommending still further reductions and cost savings in the defense establishment.
In the face of these changes, the members of NATO need to take positive steps toward revitalizing and expanding mutual cooperation in weapons development and production. That is, they need to seriously embark on a course to do more together with shared costs and technology and less on their own on purely nationally funded ventures. Such a move would have an impact in a number of related sectors and would link up with other areas of concern to the Alliance. Some of these are:
► Possible reduction in national procurement costs for defense
► Strengthened credibility in the Alliance defense posture
► Alleviation of currency flow problems
► Improvement in intra-Alliance ties
► Further lowering of U. S. profile.
Reduced procurement costs. With several nations cooperating and each bearing a share of the cost for weapons development, production, and procurement, the net cost per nation can be expected to be lower than for one nation to attempt to underwrite the cost alone. Although cooperative action could be regarded as detrimental to the industries of individual nations, currency flow would be reduced, and there would continue to be an extra-Alliance market for the weapons as well. For example, India, Saudi Arabia, and Ecuador have recently been reported as likely future customers for the Anglo-French Jaguar aircraft. It was also recently estimated that Jaguar will bring about $500 million to the industries of the nations involved during the period from 1965-1975.
Strengthened credibility. Alliance defense posture, as well as its credibility, would be strengthened by joint ventures in weapons development and production because of the cooperation involved, economic benefits,
An Alliance Initiative 53
and the strategic/tactical issues which would be at least implicitly agreed in order to proceed with such ventures.
Currency flow problems. By following the pattern developed through the NATO logistics experience of parceling out contracts and work to participants with a careful regard to avoiding currency drains and equalizing shares of national costs with internal contracts would serve to improve or alleviate balance of payment and currency flow problems.
Improve Alliance ties. The sense of interdependence among participating nations would serve to improve the ties within the Alliance even though all members were not involved in the same programs. Cooperative development and production could also be supportive of further national force specialization than exists with a corresponding reduction in some national costs.
Lowered U. S. profile. With a multination effort to develop and produce weapons through consortia, such as were used in NADGE, it would be possible to place American influence in perspective and produce Alliance weapons rather than just American products licensed for manufacture. A series of cooperative projects would tend to make us one among equals.
Implementation of this proposal is not an easy task. It requires a firm resolve on the part of all participants, particularly the United States, to work together, and avoid negativism and a "not invented here” reaction to projects. It would also call for consensus in strategy and tactics as well as some redirection of Alliance defense policy in order to allocate NATO’s resources to more effectively counter the more likely types of threat posed by an enemy.
The replacement of obsolete or obsolescent weapons with modern ones need not necessarily mean the development of painfully expensive, overly sophisticated hardware. The Jaguar aircraft, for example, has met Anglo-French requirements for a tactical support aircraft in the European environment, but costs considerably less per unit than American aircraft intended for a similar role. Because a capability is technologically possible does not automatically mean that it must be incorporated into a new weapons system without severe scrutiny as to cost and effectiveness.
It has been noted that the present answer to "how much is enough?” is that less will have to do. By sharing development and production costs within the Alliance, we can get more for the defense dollar of each member. The experiences in cooperative military logistics in NATO should be applied to achieve this end. The system for cooperation has been institutionalized for well over a decade, and the economic pressures on the members have caused drastic defense reductions which could be mitigated by innovative cooperative action.
Captain Cox holds B.S. and M.A. degrees from the University of Minnesota and a Ph.D. degree in International Studies from The American University. He has served in a series of line and staff assignments with the Naval Security Group since his commissioning at OCS in 1954 including tours in Adak, Hawaii, and Washington, D.C. He also served as Officer in Charge, Naval Security Group Activity, Kcflavik, Iceland, was Commanding Officer, Naval Security Group Activity, Galeta Island, Canal Zone and then served at NavSecGruHQ as Deputy Assistant Commander for Engineering and Material. He is presently assigned to the National Security Agency in the Directorate for Field Management and Evaluation. Captain Cox also is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College.
Ain’t They Sumthin’?
During his annual inspection, the Commanding General of the 3rd Marine Division stopped in front of a young squad leader of the 1st Battalion, Fourth Marines.
"Have you already inspected your men?” the general asked.
"Yes, sir,” the corporal replied.
"Did you find any discrepancies?”
"Yes, sir, Two. But I got ’em squared away,” he answered, completely unruffled.
"Then there’s no need for me to inspect, now is there?”
"No sir. But you can go through and admire ’em if you like.”
—First Lieutenant Scott W. McKenzie, USMC
{The Naval Institute will pay $23.00 for each anecodote published in the Proceedings).