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Thus, more than a half century after the first U.S- aircraft carrier—the USS Langley (CV-i)—was commissioned, the first Soviet "aircraft carrier” is being completed.
The delay is significant, for even without this type of warship by the early 1970s the Soviet Navy stood ready to challenge the U. S. Navy in both size and general war-fighting capabilities. Why then, when such ships are not required to challenge the United States at sea, has the Soviet Union now apportioned the considerable resources for the construction and operation of such a warship? And, if aircraft carriers are a* capable as their proponents would have us believe, wha' will be the impact of Soviet "flattops”?
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W e have frittered away on carriers the time and attention and money we should have devoted to the missile and the submarine . . . Russia has been too wise to build a single carrier. They have copied every weapon we have devised except the carrier. That has been . . . the only difference in the military programs of the two nations. And as a result America has dropped every year in relative military power and Russia has risen every year . . . There can be no other explanation. It is as simple as that. It is the carrier.”
Thus did Representative Clarence Cannon, the outspoken chairman of the Appropriations Committee of the House, attack Navy plans for another supercarrier in 1959 by pointing to the lack of such ships in the Soviet Navy.
This argument often was used by carrier critics: the Soviets have no aircraft carriers, hence they are not required for the U. S. Navy. Although the argument followed no particular logic, it was uttered into the 1970s by military leaders and politicians who opposed "flattops.”
Then, such arguments began to diminish. On 8 January 1972, The Washington Post announced that the "latest U. S. reconnaissance satellite photos” revealed a very large ship being built in the Soviet Union may be the first Soviet aircraft carrier.
Speculation in the press continued. That March the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., told Congress that the Soviets "are in the process of constructing the largest ship ever built in the [Niko- layev] docks ... a ship which looks like and feels like an . . . aircraft carrier.”
An Early Start
Russian naval aviation, like that in other major-po*,£t navies, began early in this century. As early as FebruaO 1907, the Russian Navy’s Main Engineering Administration established a commission to examine the fe»sl' bility of airships. Subsequently "flying machines” wefC purchased overseas and during the spring of 1911 several tests were carried out in conjunction with Black ScJ warships.
In April of 1911 a couple of Navy planes flying frofil Sevastopol escorted a squadron of warships to sea and i*1 May they experimented in searching for submarined on the surface and submerged—from the air.
By 1912 the Russian Navy had acquired five seaplanC* for the Black Sea Fleet and a couple for the Baltic Fl#1 At the time there was no significant fleet either in thc Arctic (northern) area or the Pacific. (The earlier fleet 111 the Pacific had been destroyed in the 1904-1905 ^ with Japan and its survivors were known as the SibenJtl Flotilla.)
The role of the Russian Navy’s seaplanes was *t0 serve to the maximum possible extent as forward ob’ servers at sea, providing timely information on thc movements of a hostile fleet and transports to bot'’ navy and army commanders.” Thus charged, it 'v:I> reasonable that naval air was part of the Navy’s co^ munications service.
Although it is the aircraft ships and carriers that *<c under discussion, it is important to understand th* general development of Russian naval air. By 191 when World War I erupted, the tsarist navy had so^ 50 aircraft, mostly Curtiss flying boats, plus sevCfJ airships. This was a period of rapid growth for Russ'3” naval aviation. By comparison, in August 1914 ^ Royal Navy had 71 aircraft and seven airships, and thf U. S. Navy had 12 aircraft. 1
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the conflict on the side of Germany and Austria against the alliance of Russia, Britain, and France. In response to this expansion of hostilities to the Black Sea the Russians took in hand and converted two new cargo liners to seaplane carriers.[1] These ships, the Imperator Nikolai I and Imperator Alexander I, each could carry seven or eight seaplanes. The 9,000-ton "hydro [plane] cruisers” and several smaller converted merchant ships saw action in the Black and Baltic seas during the war.
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All of the Russian ships employed as seaplane carriers were of merchant design except for the small armored cruiser Pallada in the Baltic and the armed yacht Almaz in the Black Sea, both of which were fitted to carry seaplanes. Unlike some of their contemporaries in the Royal Navy, none of the Russian ships had flight decks from which seaplanes could "roll off” with the aid of trolley wheels. Rather, the Russian seaplanes were hoisted over the side of the ship and made a takeoff from the water. "Landings” were also made on the water, with the aircraft being hoisted aboard by crane.
But the Russians were innovative. One proposal by a Black Sea Fleet engineer provided for seaplanes to he lowered over the side of a cruiser by a special boom and suspended over the water. The aircraft would be attached to the boom by means of electromagnetics.
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The cruiser would then turn into the wind at full speed and the lifting force, calculated at 30 knots of wind-over-boom, would be sufficient for takeoff. The pilot would start the engine and, when he had determined the proper moment, disconnect the electromagnets and be off. It was an ingenious—albeit probably impractical—plan and typified some of the proposals and developments of Russian naval aviation.
Naval aviator Alexander R de Seversky—later to become internationally known as an aviation promoter in the United States—test fired rockets and an 82-mm recoilless cannon from aircraft. During the war, Russian Navy fighters were armed with 37-mm cannon in addition to the machineguns common to aircraft of other nations, while other Russian Navy fliers piloted the world’s first four-engine bombers, designed and built by Sikorsky.
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These efforts, coupled with fleet and ground reconnaissance, antisubmarine patrols, bombing of ship and ground targets, and convoy escort, led to development of a comparatively strong naval air arm.
This promising beginning of Russian naval aviation ended with the defeat of Russia by Germany and the resultant revolutions of 1917. The existing military establishment fell apart. Major naval air activity ended. A small "air brigade” was maintained on the Baltic
and even smaller, almost irregular, detachments of "naval” aircraft operated on lakes and rivers, and on the Black and Caspian seas during the civil war that followed the revolutions. These aviation detachments fought on various sides—Bolshevik, counter-revolutionary (i.e., forces still loyal to the Imperial household), and interventionist (assisting the British, American, and French forces that fought in Russia in those tumultuous times).
According to Soviet histories, Bolshevik naval aviators flew more than 2,000 sorties during the Civil War. These fliers "proved that they could fight successfully against a strong enemy on sea and land, at any time of year and day, independently and in cooperation with ships, individually and in groups.”
But the cohesive and innovative organization that had led to ingenious plans and developments in the pre-revolution period was destroyed. Gone were the seaplane carriers, the naval aviation organizations, much of the aviation industry, and most important, many of the more astute naval leaders and aviators.2 Without these there could be no development of carrier aviation.
Under the Commissars
The 1920s and 1930s were periods of intensive aircraft carrier development in the United States, Britain, France, and Japan. There was none in Soviet Russia. For more than a decade after the revolutions the insecure Soviet leadership could afford neither the time nor the resources required to undertake warship construction. To those who argued in favor of rebuilding the fleet, Commissar Vyacheslav I. Zof, head of the Red Navy from 1924 to 1926, made the following argument:
"You speak of aircraft carriers and of the construction of new types of ships ... at the same time completely ignoring the economic situation of our country and the corresponding condition of our technical means, completely ignoring the fact that perhaps tomorrow or the day after we will be called on to fight. And with what shall we fight? We will fight with those ships and personnel that we have already.”
Constrained by such limitations and finding it unnecessary to develop a strategy to employ a large fleet of big ships, the "young school” philosophy (after the French jeune ecole of the 1880s) developed. This war strategy argued that submarines and aviation, which had been proved in World War I, could defeat conventional, battleship-led surface fleets. And, since the So-
2 Among those who immigrated to the United States in this period were Sikorsky and dc Seversky.
viet Union was not an aggressor nation, these weapons were ideally suited for coastal defense. Thus, battleships and cruisers, and aircraft carriers that would project aviation, were not required. The new Red Navy would be comprised of submarines, destroyers, torpedo boats, and land-based aircraft.
Thus, carriers were ruled out of Soviet naval plans although effort was expended in reconditioning three tsarist-era dreadnoughts. Considerable emphasis was given to the development of the naval air arm. By 1925 naval aviation—Morskaya Aviatsiya—had some 300 to 400 seaplanes; later significant numbers of land planes were added. Land planes soon began to dominate as they were more efficient and more versatile than sea- based planes. Aside from the land plane’s advantages of speed and range, many of the inland waterways (rivers, lakes, and inland seas) were often ice covered and suitable for operations by wheeled, rather than float, aircraft.
The Soviet aviation industry provided the equipment for most of this growth, with both indigenous and foreign designs, the latter manufactured under license.
Soviet Navy Seagoing Rear Admiral Vice Admiral Admiral
Admiral of the Fleet
During this period of growth Morskaya Aviatsiya remained under the Navy’s control. This was in contrast to the situation in Great Britain, Germany, and Italy where all military-naval aviation was combined into single services. However, the Soviet naval air arm employed—and still does—military rather than naval ranks, as do the other Soviet air forces. These currently include the following flag ranks:
Soviet Naval Aviation
signers and shipbuilders. At the same time technic assistance was being given by Germany to Soviet avis' tion, tank, and munitions development and productioi
The Carrier Plans
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The increase in military programs by Germany an' Japan in the mid-1950s led to the Soviet decision t°| initiate big-ship construction. Stalin had supported the "young school” advocates during the 1920s and earl) 1930s when, because of the state of the Soviet economy he had no alternatives. Late in 1935 Stalin brought to Moscow several junior officers from the Pacific Flotilla Key members of the Soviet government attended the ensuing discussions of the potential of an oceanic naval strategy and the requirements for major warships such a strategy were to be followed. The "big ship strategy was secretly accepted by Stalin and steps weft undertaken to include major warships in the Third Five-Year Plan (1938-1942).
Admiral Nikolai G. Kuznetsov, who soon would be appointed to command the Soviet Navy, later wrote of this change in strategy:
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"It was decided to build battleships, heavy cruisers, and other classes of surface warships; that is, a big surface navy. A large number of submarines was also to be built. Not excluded either was the construction of aircraft carriers; rather they were only postponed to the last year of the Five Year Plan . . . [because of] the complexities of construction of warships of this class and aircraft designed especially for them.”
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Intensive negotiations were conducted with the U. S. government to purchase the plans and even components—especially heavy guns and armor—for battleships that would be constructed in the Soviet Union Similar interest was expressed for aircraft carrier construction. Admiral Ivan S. Isakov, First Deputy Commissar of the Navy and considered by some as the principal Soviet naval theoretician of the 1930s, visited the United States in 1939 to participate in the negotiations.
These efforts to obtain U. S. assistance were unsuccessful, largely because of resistance by the U. S. Navy, and the Soviets turned to Nazi Germany for additional assistance in their naval programs.
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The keels were laid down in 1938-1940 for the fust of the 65,000-ton battleships of the Sovietskiy Soyu’- [Soviet Union] class, the 38,000-ton Kronshtadt class o large cruisers, and the 11,500-ton Chapayev-class ligl'1
cruisers.
Although plans were drawn up for the constructio» of aircraft carriers, apparently none had been begu» before the German invasion of Soviet Russia in Jun<;
The Soviet “Aircraft Carrier” 149
1941 brought most major ship construction to a halt. With the Black Sea shipyards overrun by German troops and those at Leningrad largely inactive because of the three-year German siege of the city, the carrier program simply was forgotten.
As reported by Kuznetsov, the first aircraft carrier was to have been laid down in 1942 with advanced procurement also taking place to provide the components for probably three more aircraft carriers to be constructed during the mid-1940s. By probable coincidence, the German Navy’s so-called "Z” plan for ship construction also provided for four aircraft carriers, of
20.0 tons each, to be operational by 1948.
No official Soviet statements have been made about the size or capabilities of the planned aircraft carriers. Western speculation—official and unofficial—predicted that the lead ships at least would be "light” or "small carriers,” akin to the yet unforseen Independence CVL- type of the U. S. Navy. Francis E. McMurtrie, long-time editor of Jane’s Fighting Ships, reported the laying down of a Soviet carrier in 1939 at Leningrad, which he described as being planned as a 12,000-ton ship capable of 30 knots and to operate 22 aircraft. He listed Krasnaya Znamya [Red Banner] as the ship’s tentative name and admitted the existence of a second carrier, named for Marshal Voroshilov, to be "decidedly doubtful.”
McMurtrie listed the Krasnaya Znamya as "completing” throughout World War II. Even after the war reports of this ship persisted: Mairin Mitchell, a well- known British writer of the period, stated in his The Maritime History of Russia (1949) that the Krasnaya Znamya apparently was completed and in the Baltic and then, at the end of or just after World War II, "it was to Far Eastern waters that the Soviet Government sent its principal aircraft carrier, the Krasnaya Znamya,
22.0 tons, carrying sixty planes, and mounting twelve 4-inch A.A. guns.”
Early in the war there also were reports of a carrier named Stalin operating in the Black Sea. McMurtrie initially reported her as the former cruiser Admiral Kornilov, laid down at Nikolaeyev in 1914. Work was halted on that ship during World War I but then, according to reports of the time, the warship was
The Soviet Navy might profitably have employed a carrier in the Arctic in World War II to help escort the convoys carrying military goods and supplies from the United States and Britain to the Soviet Union. The aircraft in this photograph is a Swordfish from the British escort carrier Chaser escorting convoy JW57 en route to Murmansk in March 1944■ Despite the efforts of the U boats, all 43 ships in the convoy reached their destination safely.
launched in 1937 and completed as a light carrier.
Soviet secrecy completely confused the issue. Possibly the ship involved was the old Komintem, a 6,338-ton cruiser completed in 1905 and employed by the Soviets only as a training ship. Reportedly, she was taken in hand during the 1930s for conversion to a seaplane carrier; however, during the war she saw extensive combat in the Black Sea in her cruiser configuration.
Thus, the Soviet Navy went to war without an aircraft carrier. But there was a significant naval air arm.
War Without Carriers
150 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review 1974
been detected at long ranges from airfields . . . Due to the short operating range, weak armament, and short endurance, naval fighter aviation was not in condition to reliably cover forces at sea even at relatively short distances from shore. This considerably limited the employment of major fleet surface forces in zones accessible to hostile aircraft.”
This theme of the limitations of land-based naval aviation during the war appears again and again in the writing of Soviet wartime leaders. For example, Admiral Kuznetsov’s memoir Nakanune [On the Eve] describes what might have happened had war been delayed sufficiently to permit completion of some Soviet major warships without accompanying aircraft carriers:
"Visualize for a minute that the [construction] program were to have been completed in the second half of the ’forties. We should have had large squadrons with battleships. . . without a single aircraft carrier. Then how far out to sea could they have gone?”
Naval leaders—in subsequent writings—make the point that even before the war it was clearly understood that, again to quote Admiral Gorshkov, "no naval operation is conceivable without air forces.”
Soviet naval aviation fought the Germans primarily as an adjunct of the Red Army. After the crushing German surprise attack in June 1941 the Soviet supreme command employed all their aircraft, when and where required, regardless of service affiliation. Of particular interest was a long-range raid in August 1941 by aircraft of the Baltic Fleet.
Thirteen 11-4 twin-engine bombers from the Fleet’s 1st Bomber Regiment under the command of Colonel Ye. N. Preobrazhensky flew the first Soviet bomber raid against Berlin on the night of August 8-9. Preobrazhensky-later a colonel-general of (naval) aviation— and his colleagues joined Soviet air force fliers in the limited "strategic” air warfare the Soviets conducted while most other naval aviators carried out tactical missions in support of the Army and Navy. According to Soviet sources, naval aircraft flew 384,000 individual sorties and destroyed some 5,000 German aircraft during the war.
But the war was fought without carriers. What difference would a carrier and suitable aircraft squadrons have made to the Soviets? It is difficult to imagine any use for a carrier in the Baltic; with suitable supporting ships a carrier may have been useful in the Pacific had the war continued for more than a week after the Soviet entry into the conflict; in the Arctic a carrier might have been useful in escorting Anglo- American convoys to Murmansk although the Red Navy’s forces that were there did little in that respect.
Possibly a fast carrier force in the Black Sea could have assisted in the intensive conflict with the Germans
and might have provided air support for several of the Soviet amphibious landings in that region. It was h1 the Black Sea and on its tributaries that a 32-year-oW rear admiral, S. G. Gorshkov, demonstrated his abilities and realized the limitations of land-based aviation.
On the whole, though, and in marked contrast to the Mediterranean and Pacific where the presence of one or two additional carriers in U. S., British, of Japanese task forces often could have turned the tide of battle, it is unlikely that one or even two aircraft carriers in the Soviet Navy during World War II woul<f have made any significant difference.
One aircraft carrier did fly the Soviet ensign: The incomplete German carrier Graf Zeppelin was seized b}' the Soviets at the end of World War II. The unfinished 23,000-ton ship had been scuttled by the Germans early in 1945 as the Red Army neared her berth in the Oder River. Depth charges were exploded in the engine and boiler rooms, wrecking the propulsion plant and sinking the ship in shallow water. Later, she was hit by artillery fire.
After the German surrender the Soviets stopped up the leaks, pumped out the carrier, and moved her to Swinemiinde (now Swinoujscie) at the mouth of the Oder.
A tripartite naval commission met in Berlin during the second half of 1945 to determine the disposition of German naval ships and material, with genend agreement that a small number of surface ships and U-boats would be apportioned equally amongst the U. S., British, and Soviet navies.
The Graf Zeppelin was listed as a category "C” ship" "inoperable . . . whose construction or repair could no1 be completed within six months.” Accordingly, fhc ship was designated for disposal.
Western and Soviet sources differ on the eventud fate of the Graf Zeppelin. Most Western accounts contend that the ship sank accidentally while under to"' in the Baltic en route to Leningrad. In these repot1* the ship was loaded with German material, possibb railroad cars, and rough weather or a floating nUnC caused her loss. The Soviets state that the carrier ^ towed to sea and, in accord with the tripartite agrce' ments, sunk by torpedoing.
Another near-carrier also went to the Soviets: Gef' many’s unfinished heavy cruiser Seydlitz was taken i<] hand for conversion to an aircraft carrier during ^ war. Conversion began on the 14,880-ton wars!# which was about 90 per cent completed as a cruisef’ but little was accomplished toward making her i^° a carrier. The Seydlitz was scuttled by the Germans31 Konigsberg in April 1945 and also was given a "C”" ; for disposal—classification by the tripartite agreem#11 However, she too was salvaged by the Soviets and
The Soviet ”Aircraft Carrier” 151
towed successfully to the USSR. Although renamed Poltava, she was never finished and was formally abandoned in 1950. It is unknown if the Soviets intended to complete her, and if so as a cruiser or aircraft carrier.
Postwar Ships and Strategy
The end of World War II found the Soviet Navy reduced to impotence, even though some former U. S. and British warships had been transferred to the USSR as substitutes for Italian war prizes that would be handed over after the war. Then, several ex-German, ex-Italian, and ex-Japanese ships were assigned to the Red Navy. Soviet naval leadership had little big-ship experience and almost a half-million Red sailors had spent the war fighting ashore as ground troops. Within the USSR the major shipyards at Leningrad and along the Black Sea were inactive;5 the damage to the Soviet society, with one-third of the country having been overrun by German forces and some 20 million persons killed, made construction of a navy at that time unrealistic.
Still, Stalin wanted an oceanic navy. At war’s end he declared: "The Soviet people wish to see their fleet grow still stronger and more powerful. Our people are constructing new battleships and bases for the fleet.” A short time later the Soviet General Staff journal Voennaia Mysl’ [Military Thought] echoed Stalin’s views and pointed out the need for aircraft carriers: "The conditions of modern war at sea demand the mandatory participation in the combat operations of navies of powerful carrier forces, using them for striking devastating blows against the naval forces of the enemy as well as for the contest with his aviation. Both at sea and near one’s bases these tasks can only be carried out by carrier aviation.”
The Soviet shipyards that operated during the war had built a few destroyers, submarines, and lesser craft, and from 1945 to 1949 completed several of the cruisers begun before the war. Simultaneously, efforts were put into rejuvenating the Red shipbuilding industry. By 1949 the Soviets launched the first postwar destroyers of the Skoryi class followed by the large, 14,000-ton light cruisers of the Sverdlov class.6 A new program also was begun for long-range submarines.
Beyond the Sverdlovs, the Soviets apparently began construction of a series of large cruisers that were to be known as the Stalingrad class. Plans possibly were
5See Norman Polmar, "Soviet Shipbuilding and Shipyards,” U. S. Naval institute Proceedings, May 1972 (Naval Review issue), pp. 272-280.
6Standard displacement; full load displacement is approximately 19,000 tons; the latter figure is used in all subsequent ship descriptions in this essay.
drawn up for a new series of battleships, and definitely for aircraft carriers. The Soviet Navy’s leadership, under Admiral Kuznetsov except for a gap between 1947 and 1951, understood the necessity for sea-based aircraft to support fleet operations. The number "four” has been used in reports of the planned Soviet carrier program developed in the early 1950s.
Stalin died in March 1953 and with him were buried plans to build a conventional, ocean-going navy with aircraft carriers. A short time after Stalin’s death his former lieutenants, Malenkov, Bulganin, and Khrushchev, cancelled most of the big-navy construction programs. The reasons were in large part economic. Shipbuilding ways previously allocated to warship construction were instead employed to build merchant ships and more submarines. The construction of surface warships was cut back severely.
Khrushchev, emerging as the first among equals in Soviet leadership, openly criticized Soviet admirals as wanting "to fight the next war with weapons of the last” and criticized the new cruisers as being fit only to carry admirals in naval reviews. During the summer of 1955 he appointed Admiral Gorshkov as First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and in January 1956 formally named Gorshkov—then 45 years old —to command the Red Navy in place of Admiral Kuznetsov.
Admiral Gorshkov was directed to get rid of the big warships and develop naval forces for defense of the homeland and cooperation with the Red Army, the traditional roles of Russo-Soviet navies.
During the next few years the Soviet Navy disposed of the surviving pre-World War I battleships, most of the pre-Sverdlov cruisers, and numerous old destroyers, submarines, and other ships and craft; personnel strength was reduced; and naval aviation was halved.
In 1957 the naval air arm is estimated to have consisted of 4,000 aircraft and 90,000 men.7 Admiral Gorshkov was forced to give up some 1,500 to 2,000 fighter aircraft to the Air Defense Force (a separate service in the USSR) and many other aircraft were discarded. When the cut back in naval aviation was completed a few years later the air arm consisted of perhaps 850 aircraft and 40-45,000 men. However, to some extent loss of the several hundred fighter aircraft to Protivo-vozdushnoi Oborony Strany (PVO) was welcome for, though the Navy had administrative responsibility for them, for several years PVO had directed their operations. At the same time, a large number of twin-jet Tu-i6 Badger bombers began entering naval
7 See W. C. Chapman, "The Soviet Air Forces,” Naval Review 1965 (Annapolis, Md.: U. S. Naval Institute, 1964), pp. 166-199.
service along with a few supersonic, twin-jet Tu-22 Blinders. These aircraft, including some 285 Badgers rigged to carry anti-ship missiles, were more in keeping with the new missions of the Soviet Navy.
To assist in the formulation of new strategy for employment of the reduced naval air arm, 42-year-old Major-General of (naval) Aviation Ivan I. Borzov was appointed First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the naval air arm. Borzov had commanded torpedo- bombers in the Baltic and Black seas during the war and later had commanded naval aviation in the Northern and Baltic Fleets. During the war his bombers had operated in the Black Sea where he may have come to Admiral Gorshkov’s attention. When Marshal Zhukov was dismissed as Minister of Defense by Khrushchev in 1957, Borzov’s name was among the commanders listed in the press as welcoming the change in defense leadership.
New Ships and New Strategy
Charged with disposing of the big warships and developing forces for defense of the homeland and military cooperation, Admiral Gorshkov turned to new technologies and tactics.
Unquestionably the principal U. S. naval threat to the USSR during the 1950s was the aircraft carrier. Beginning in 1951 U. S. carriers were able to deploy into European and Western Pacific waters with aircraft capable of attacking Soviet cities with nuclear weapons. A succession of aircraft were developed or modified for this role: the AD Skyraider (A-i), the AJ Savage (A-2), the A3D Skywarrior (A-3), the A4D Skyhawk (A-4), and the A3J Vigilante (A-5). Some fighter aircraft also were modified to deliver nuclear weapons. The maximum strike radius of these aircraft was estimated at 1,000 miles. This meant that the Soviet Navy would have to attack the carriers well out at sea.
Submarines would be useful in the anti-carrier role, especially if firing nuclear torpedoes. However, the problems of attacking the fast-moving carrier with torpedoes were considerable. Thus Admiral Gorshkov and his deputies pushed the development of new weapons for this purpose.
Destroyers, submarines, and naval aircraft were fitted with anti-ship missiles beginning in the 1950s for this anti-carrier role. Within a few years a dozen destroyers were armed with one or two SS-N-i Strela missile launchers, an estimated 15 Whiskey-class submarines were fitted with from one to four SS-N-3 Shaddock missiles each, and various types of bombers were armed with anti-ship missiles. Other naval bombers were modified to search out U. S. and British carriers and
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then provide in-flight guidance to the missiles launched by ships and submarines.
These conversions were followed by new submarines—the diesel Juliett and the nuclear Echo-I and Echo-II classes, respectively—carrying four, six, and eight Shaddock missiles each. By the mid-1960s Sovk1 shipyards had completed about 50 Shaddock-armed submarines in addition to the Whiskey-class conversions. Several other submarines were converted to the radar picket role to provide early warning of carrier* approaching the USSR.
After rearming the destroyers so they could be effective against carriers, the Soviet Navy began construction of large "frigate” or cruiser size ships for tb£ same role. These ships were the Kynda class. With 1 length of 466 feet and a full load displacement of 6,000 tons, the Kyndas are the size of contemporary U. S- "frigates”; however, because the Soviet ships are capabl£ of independent operations and armed with a heav)' offensive missile battery, they more properly warrant their Soviet designation of raketnyy kreyser.
The main battery of the Kynda class ships is eigh[ tubes for Shaddock missiles (with eight reloads). I® addition, each ship has a twin antiaircraft missik launcher, two 12-barrel antisubmarine rocket launcher- six torpedo tubes, and four 76-mm guns.
The lead ship was completed late in 1962 and thre£ others followed, the largest warships to be built in th£ Soviet Union since the Sverdlov class, the lead ship & which had been completed ten years earlier.
For coastal defense against potential enemy amphib1' ous assaults and for support of Red Army operation-*- Admiral Gorshkov fostered the development of th£ Komar and then the Osa classes of missile boats. Tb£ Komars, armed with two 23-mile SS-N-2 Styx missile began appearing about 1959 followed a year later b)’ the four-missile Osa series.
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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review 1974
Thus, during the latter 1950s the Soviet Navy allocated considerable resources—possibly a majority of ‘tS potential—to the anti-carrier mission. In Voyennif Strategiya [Military Strategy], published in 1962, Mjr' shal of the Soviet Union Vasiliy D. Sokolovsky declai^ the "most important task of our fleet from the veff outset of the [future] war will be to destroy enetf) striking carrier-based units. . . . Aviation of the Fket must be capable of inflicting blows on the comb11 vessels of the enemy on the sea at such distances thJt they are unable to use their armament—carrier aviatin'1 and rockets—for strikes against targets in the social'51 states. In addition, naval aviation has the task of straying enemy transports at sea and in port.”
Marshal Sokolovsky thus assigned the Soviet N»v) the primary mission of destroying U. S. aircarft carrier-' Other major missions he listed for the Red Navy ^C<C
the destruction of the U. S. Polaris submarines8 and of NATO’s maritime communications. Although his thesis subsequently was attacked by the Navy’s leaders as being overly oriented toward the defensive, Marshal Sokolovsky, later a First Deputy Minister of Defense, was stating the views of the Soviet military leadership.
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At almost the same time that the Kynda class anticarrier ships were joining the Red fleet and Marshal Sokolovsky was giving anti-carrier operations top priority, Soviet aircraft began overflying U. S. carriers. Between 27 January and 27 February 1963, Soviet reconnaissance planes flew over the U. S. carriers Constellation, Enterprise, Forrestal, and Kitty Hawk, and the amphibious ship Princeton (a former carrier retaining her old appearance). The overflights occurred in both ocean areas—the Constellation was looked over by Soviet planes some 600 miles south of Midway island; the Forrestal just southwest of the Azores.
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Shipboard radar generally detected the Soviet snoopers about 200 miles away and, in the case of the attack carriers, ship-based fighters "escorted” the Soviet planes as they approached the U. S. ships. Significantly, some Soviet air-to-ship missiles have a range estimated as being greater than 200 miles although use of these missiles at such distances could require mid-course guidance information from ships or aircraft closer to the target. The detection or even interception of Soviet strike aircraft at distances on the order of 200 miles could reduce, but not necessarily remove, the danger to U. S. carriers from aircraft carrying anti-ship missiles.
U. S. officials stated that the overflights probably were to undermine American confidence in the aircraft carriers and convince Soviet groups that such ships were vulnerable. Be that as it may, the flights provided realistic training for Soviet fliers.
The overflights have continued on a periodic basis, supplementing the Soviet warships and other intelligence collectors that regularly trail U. S. task forces in remote areas. In May 1968 a Tu-16 Badger streaked over the carrier Essex in the Norwegian Sea; as the plane turned a wingtip struck the water, the plane crashed, and exploded. The carrier suffered no damage.
Then, during the early 1960s Soviet interest in aircraft carriers changed from solely one of hostility to one including the possibility of developing their own carriers for use against U. S. Polaris missile submarines. Simultaneously, in 1962-1963, the U. S. attack carriers were shifted from a primary role of nuclear attack to one of "general-purpose” operations (although still retaining a nuclear strike capability). At the same time, rhe U. S. Polaris program received increased emphasis
under the Kennedy administration, with more submarines armed with longer-range missiles being produced.
The Soviet response to this was to begin development of a new generation of antisubmarine weapons and ships. Among these were the first Soviet aircraftcarrying ships, the Kresta-class missile cruisers and the Moskva-dass helicopter carriers.
The first U. S. Polaris missile submarine began her first patrol on 15 '*' : November i960.
The Soviet "Aircraft Carrier” 153
In addressing the U. S. Polaris development, Admiral Gorshkov later would declare (in 1967) that one-third of the "strategic missile-nuclear potential of the American forces [was] being concentrated in the U. S. atomic submarine and aircraft carriers fleets . . . and it is expected that this figure will increase to one-half” (by 1970). The Soviet Navy’s historical text for higher naval schools subsequently would declare that "the
principal task confronting the Soviet Navy is that of combating these forces.”
After the Kynda-class "rocket cruisers” went to sea, some Soviet ship watchers in the west expected many more of the ships and perhaps a later class of still more-potent missile cruisers to give battle to U. S. aircraft carriers. After four Kynda-class ships were built, the first Kresta-class ship went to sea, in 1967.
The Kresta was slightly larger than the Kynda, but instead of the earlier ship’s eight-tube Shaddock missile battery, the Kresta had only four Shaddock tubes with no reloads. Thus, the ship represented less of a threat to the carriers than her predecessor. Further, whereas the Soviets designated the Kynda as a "rocket cruiser,” the Kresta was called a "large ASW ship.” Although the Kresta has more antiaircraft missile launchers and electronics than the Kynda, in general her ASW weapons are similar, the main difference being better helicopter support facilities in the latter class.
The Kresta was the first Soviet warship to have a helicopter hangar, permitting maintenance of the embarked Ka-25 Hormone at night and in bad weather. Although previously helicopters had operated from Soviet warships, there were no ships with real support facilities until the Kresta appeared. But the Kresta, the first of which went to sea in 1967, operated only one helicopter per ship. For intensive antisubmarine efforts more helicopters would be needed. At the same time as the first Kresta, another Soviet ASW ship went to sea in 1967—-the Moskva.
The Moskva
The Moskva was the first ship to go to sea under the Soviet naval ensign that was designed primarily to operate aircraft.
Plans to construct the Moskva-class probably were approved in 1962-1963 as the potential size of the U. S. Polaris submarine fleet was becoming obvious to Soviet leaders. Possibly related to the Moskva decision was the assignment of Lieutenant General of Aviation Borzov to the post of Commander-in-Chief of Naval Aviation in May 1962. General Borzov’s assignment followed by one month Admiral Gorshkov’s promotion to Admiral of the Fleet, the third Soviet admiral to achieve five-star rank.
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In the western navies the first aircraft carriers were conversions, the American Langley, a former collier; the British Furious, built as a battle cruiser; and the French Beam, laid down as a battleship. Similarly, the Soviets could have converted one of the Sverdlov-class cruisers or even a merchant ship to obtain a helicopter ship.
Instead, when the Moskva entered the Black Sea on trials during the fall of 1967 her lines revealed a built- for-the-purpose ship, owing little to previous Soviet
ship designs or to western ship concepts. With a full load displacement of 20,000 tons and an overall length of 625 feet the Moskva was the largest warship buih in Russia since Tsarist times except for the Sverdlov-class
cruisers.
The Moskva design is that of a missile cruiser forward and a helicopter carrier aft. The hermaphrodfo design is reminiscent of the Japanese battleship Hyu$1 and Ise conversions of World War II, whereby the dreadnoughts were fitted with flight decks aft. In the postwar period many ships have been fitted to operate helicopters from platforms aft, and two designs, the French training cruiser Jeanne d’Arc and the two Italic cruisers of the Andrea Doria class, all completed i# 1964, have extensive helicopter operating facilities. Still none of these ships even approach the Moskva in concep1 or capabilities.
The Moskva has five separate weapon systems, moS(
of them well forward:
► Two 12-barrel MBU antisubmarine rocket launched similar in concept to hedgehogs, but firing a large( and longer-range projectile; these launchers can b£ reloaded automatically.
► One twin launcher for ASW missiles, probably firfol! a missile akin to the U. S. Navy’s ASROC (i.e., * rocket-boosted torpedo or nuclear depth charge).
► Two twin launchers for the SA-N-3 Goblet antiaircraft missile, an area-defense weapon with a range estl’ mated in the West at 20 to 30 miles.
► Two twin 57-mm rapid-fire, antiaircraft gun moun® abreast the superstructure.
► Two banks of five 533 mm (21-inch) torpedo tub£) apparently capable of firing either "long” anti-sM torpedoes or "short” ASW torpedoes. These trainab^ mounts are recessed into the hull below the supet' structure.
This armament is comparable to that of a "double-ended” guided missile frigate.
With respect to electronics, the Moskva has Head Light fire control radars associated with fft£| SA-N-3 missile launchers; two three-dimensional sea**- radars, Head Net-C and Top Sail; two Muff Cob direC I, tors for the 57-mm guns; eight large, circular with electronic/countermeasure warfare equipment; $ numerous lesser antennas for communication and ^ I
hull-mounted sonar as well as a large, variablc-dep' sonar that can be lowered over the stern and to^e behind the ship below the thermal layer.
Many of the foregoing weapon and electronic s)s terns had not previously been seen in Red warsfoP These were the ASW missile launcher, the SA-y
launchers, and the Head Light and Top Sail radars.
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The Soviet ”Aircraft Carrier” 155
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Thus, the Soviet naval leadership obtained not only a large "aviation ship,” but one that incorporated the latest available equipment, demonstrating the ability of Admiral Gorshkov, General Borzov, and their colleagues to obtain the commitment of considerable resources to an aviation ship. From a design viewpoint, the ship demonstrated the innovative concepts of the engineers of the Soviet Navy.
Aft of the Moskva's stepped island structure and eonventional AAW/ASW weapons, the ship has a clear
Two Western predecessors to the Moskva, the French Jeanne d’Arc (upper photo) and the Italian Andrea Doria. Both ships were designed in the late 1950s and commissioned in 1964. Used mainly as a cadet training ship, the 12,370-ton Jeanne d’Arc can also be employed as an antisubmarine cruiser or as an amphibious ship. Her speed is 26.5 knots and she accommodates 4 helicopters on her 197-foot flight deck.
The Andrea Doria and her sister, Caio Duilio, displace only 6,426 tons full load, a third the size of the Moskva. Their speed is 31 knots and they can carry 4 small helicopters. A later ship, the 8,850-ton Vittorio Veneto, can carry 9 small helos.
flight deck of nearly 300 feet, representing almost 50 percent of the ship’s overall length. This deck, with a maximum width of 115 feet, is connected to a hangar deck by two elevators. In addition, there is a small hangar at the forward end of the flight deck, cut into the superstructure directly below the funnel.
The Moskva can operate about 20 Ka-25 Hormone helicopters, the standard ASW "chopper” of the Soviet Navy that also goes to sea aboard missile cruisers. Powered by twin turbine engines with counter-rotating propellers, the Hormone has radar in a prominent "chin” bubble mounting, dunking sonar, an electro-
optical sensor, and an internal bomb-bay for carrying torpedoes or nuclear depth charges.
If the Moskva had been built as a full-deck ship sllC would have been able to operate a larger number ot helicopters and fixed-wing Short Take-Off-and-LancM (STOL) aircarft. Instead, the Soviets made the decisio11 both to provide the ship with a built-in AAW capabil1^ and to rely heavily on ship-launched ASW weapons sn i shipboard sensors. This approach is in marked contr^1 j to the planned U. S. sea control ship that will h3'C minimal self-defense capabilities and no ASW sens°p or weapons other than those of embarked helicop[t’r'
The Soviet ’’Aircraft Carrier” 157
The Soviet decision to provide powerful anti-air and antisubmarine weapons in the Moskva was guided by the threat of air attack in potential operating areas (e.g., the Barents and Norwegian seas) and the desire to insure an all-weather antisubmarine capability during periods that helicopters could not operate. A possible Consideration for the cruiser-carrier configuration may have been political; a full-deck ship would more likely have been construed by some Soviet leaders as an ”air- ctaft carrier”—a ship that still was an anathema to Soviet military philosophy.
/I Limited Success
The Moskva went to sea on trials in 1967, labeled as a protivolodochnyy kreyser [antisubmarine cruiser] by the Soviets. A year later her sister ship, the Leningrad, followed. Both ships were intended to counter the U. S. Polaris submarines.
The Soviet Navy had believed that the Polaris submarine threat could be countered by searching through Wge ocean areas to detect the enemy. Components of area search forces include seafloor acoustics, land-based aircraft, and surface ships. This is in contrast to trailing, the tactic whereby a "hunter-killer” submarine attempts to follow the enemy missile submarine, generally employing passive sonar to follow the prey.
The Soviet belief that the Polaris could be countered by area search methods involving Moskva-dass ships possibly stemmed from the operational limitations of early Soviet ballistic missile submarines (the converted Zulu-V, Golf, and Hotel classes), the engineering difficulties of some of these submarines (with a Hotel class SSBN being towed back to the Soviet Union after encountering difficulties in the North Atlantic in February 1972), and the limited range of Polaris missiles, hence limited ocean operating area of U. S. Polaris submarines. With respect to the last point, the first Polaris submarines carried the A-i missile with a range °f 1,200 nautical miles (2,220 km). This meant that to target Moscow—almost 1,000 miles from the Barents Sea and over 1,100 miles from the Norwegian Sea—U. S. Polaris submarines would have extremely hmited operating areas. The submarines would practically have to run aground on the Soviet arctic coast 'f they hoped to reach any targets in the industrial centers of the Ural mountains.
But the limitations of the A-i Polaris were overcome rapidly. In mid-1962 the USS Ethan Allen went to sea carrying A-2 missiles with a range of 1,500 nautical m'les (2,780 km) and in September 1964 the USS Daniel Webster initiated Polaris patrols with the 2,500 nautical mile (4,630 km) A-3 missile.
These ranges meant that a submarine had comparably large areas in which to cruise in the Arctic,
Norwegian, or Mediterranean seas while being able to target key Soviet industrial and population centers in the deterrent role.
Anti-Polaris (and later anti-Poseidon) operations continued to be a primary mission of the Soviet Navy and, on the basis of statements by the Soviet minister of defense, the Soviet military establishment as a whole. However, the area search capabilities of a single Moskva<\ass ship were limited. It would be necessary for many such ships to be available to have a major impact against U. S. submarines carrying the Polaris A-3 missile.
The Moskva and Leningrad already were at sea. Reportedly, a third ship of the class might well have been under construction. William Beecher of The New York Times wrote in February 1968 that:
"The Soviet Navy has either started or is about to start construction of its third helicopter assault carrier, according to intelligence reports just received here” [in Washington],
Beecher did not speculate on the possible "end number” of Moskva class ships nor did various other sources reporting that a third ship of the type was under construction. Regardless, no more Moskvas emerged from the shipyard at Nikolayev.
In 1970 the first of the so-called Kresta-II missile cruisers went to sea. Basically, a lengthened Kresta I, the Kresta-II has the SA-N-3 antiaircraft missile launchers and the Head Light and Top Sail radars that were introduced in the Moskva-dzss.
If there was little work for the two Moskva-dass ships in the anti-Polaris role, they did not go unemployed. In September 1968 the Moskva made her first appearance outside of the Black Sea, steaming into the Mediterranean for a six-week deployment. Periodically, one or the other of the helicopter cruisers has operated in the Mediterranean, with various pendant numbers appearing on their hulls. On occasion both ships have been there.
These ships have been employed not only in the antisubmarine role but also in a political role. Used against submarines in the Mediterranean and Atlantic, they generally employed their helicopters in conjunction with such surface ASW ships as the Mirka DE and Kashin DLG classes. The value of helicopters in both defensive and offensive ASW is well documented, and evidenced by the efforts of several Allied navies to take more helicopters to sea for those purposes.
In the political role the Soviet Navy has regularly employed both the Moskva and Leningrad to impress Soviet state and party officials, leaders of other Red military services, and VIPs from other nations. For example, in August 1971 the Leningrad cruised the Black Sea with Communist Party chairman L. I.
Brezhnev aboard, entertaining "vacationing” Communist Party leaders from Bulgaria, East Germany, Mongolia, Poland, and Czechoslavakia.
Also, the Red helicopter carriers have served on occasion as flagships for the Mediterranean squadron.
No evidence has been made public that the Soviets have employed these ships in the amphibious assault role, and their elevators appear too small for the larger troop-carrying helicopters. However, there is periodic speculation of this use and the Soviet military establishment has stressed the importance of the vertical assault in professional writing and in the development of helicopter lift forces. During the wide-ranging Okean exercises of April and May 1970 the Leningrad did participate in the amphibious assault on the Rybachiy Peninsula, just east of the Soviet border with Norway. There has been no specific reference to the use of troop-carrying helicopters from the Leningrad during the landings, and she probably served as an ASW escort for the amphibious ships.
A Soviet ”Aircraft Carrier”
Toward the end of the 1960s several situations led to a change in Soviet attitudes toward "aircraft carriers.” Most significant, Soviet warships increasingly were deployed to areas remote from their bases, such as the Caribbean and Indian Ocean. In addition, beginning in 1964 the Soviets observed the effectiveness of U. S. carrier operations in Southeast Asia. The Soviets themselves began to experience the value of sea-based air with the Moskva and Leningrad, albeit limited to helicopter operations.
Verbal attacks against aircraft carriers began to moderate; Admiral Gorshkov’s prolific writing continually emphasized the need for air support and early in 1969 the First Deputy CinC of the Soviet Navy, Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir Kasatonov, stated:
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"If we speak of the role and place of aircraft carriers in local wars and various conflicts, they appear differently. During recent years aircraft carriers repeatedly stepped forth as the main forces of the Navy in the war in Korea, during the Suez adventure, and in many military conflicts in the Middle East, and now they are playing the same role in the United States’ undeclared war in Vietnam.”
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Soviet naval leadership thus acknowledges the different roles of aircraft carriers. Since the later 1950s and early 1960s when the U. S. aircraft carriers had the primary mission of making nuclear strikes against the USSR, the Soviet attitude toward "flattops” apparently has changed from one of fear to one of respect for the mobility and versatility of the ships.
The Soviets have seen a wide spectrum of U. S. carrier operations during the past decade, ranging from
high-intensity air strikes in Vietnam to political pr£*' ence in the Mediterranean. Admiral Gorshkov has bee1' reported as stating that he considers aircraft carriers a* primarily political instruments.
"Proof” of a Soviet change in attitude toward "ah' craft carriers” came in 1969 or 1970 when the Soviet* began construction of a large ship at the Nikolay^' Nosenko yard that had given birth to the Moskva an“ Leningrad. The initial Western press reports on the tie"' ship appeared in January 1972, stating that "the latest U. S. reconnaissance satellite photos” indicated a ship of some 800 feet was being built. Western admiral* began to talk about a Soviet carrier; Western liberal* began to talk about a supertanker. Actually, a series of 150,000-deadweight-ton tankers had been started a1 the nearby Kerch shipyard in 1972.
Then, in March 1972 came Admiral Zumwak* statement to the Congress about a ship which "look* and feels like an aircraft carrier” being built. Apparent!) the new ship—now believed to be named Kiev—^ launched in December 1972. On the 16th of tha1 month General Borzov, head of Soviet Naval Aviatiot1' was promoted to the rank of Marshal of Aviation.
The West’s first look at the Kiev came on 19 Januar)' 1973, when Secretary of Defense Laird released an art' ist’s concept of the new Soviet carrier which he scribed as "very accurate.” Like her predecessors, MosW and Leningrad, the Kiev’s design bore little resemblancC to that of any Western warship.
Information released by the U. S. defense establish i ment indicates the Kiev will have a full load display ment of some 35,000 tons and an overall length 0 just over 900 feet, making her the largest warship evCf completed in the Soviet Union. Just as the Moskd' forward the new ship is reported to be armed as} missile cruiser, but with the superstructure offset [<) starboard like a conventional aircraft carrier. BeginnW abreast of the superstructure and running to the stef|1 is an angled flight deck estimated to be 550 feet M'
This arrangement will permit the Kiev to ope^ Vertical/Short Take-Off-and-Landing (VSTOL) aircra1 as well as helicopters. The Moskva’s straight deck a centerline structure inhibits rolling takeoffs by VST°J aircraft. A deck run significantly increases the payl°;l‘
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of payload over its vertical takeoff weight of 19$ pounds—an increase of 25 per cent.
Significantly, no aircraft catapults or arresting cab^ are predicted for the ship, limiting fixed-wing aircf3 operations to VSTOL. Two elevators are shown H transferring aircraft between the flight and hang' decks.
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The principal electronics identified with the Kiev appear to be the same as in Moskva, with Top Sail and Head Light radars being the most obvious. The weapon systems indicated in the U. S. artist’s sketch are:
^ Two 12-barrel MBU antisubmarine rocket launchers. y One twin launcher for ASW missiles. y Two twin launchers for the SA-N-3 Goblet antiaircraft missile.
y Up to three retractable launchers for the SA-N-4 close-in AA missile. y Up to 14 twin AA gun mounts, probably for 57-mm weapons.
In addition, the ship probably will be fitted with some of the rapid-fire gun mounts of 30-mm caliber being mstalled in several Soviet cruisers and destroyers. These we believed to be close-in weapons for defense against Western missiles and "smart” bombs.
Roles and Missions The key "weapon” of the Kiev will be her air- Crjft: fixed-wing VSTOL and helicopters. Admiral Zumwalt has stated that the ship probably will carry 40 to 50 aircraft. Knowledge of what kinds of aircraft are to be operated could reveal the intended missions °f the ship.
Most probably the helicopters will be the Ka-25 ASW craft. Perhaps as many as 30 Hormones would be embarked. Using published data on U. S. helicopter flight '•me-to-maintenance ratios, with 30 helicopters embarked the Kiev could keep six aloft for sustained pe- t>ods with two others ready on the flight deck for "^mediate launch, either to pursue a submarine contact 0r for other missions. Conceivably, the Ka-25 could be armed with air-to-surface missiles for use against mer- cbant ships and naval auxiliaries. A version of the Soviet Army’s Hind-A helicopter gunship is a possible Candidate for operation from the ship. The Hind-A,
A drawing which appeared in the German magazine Marine Rundschau of the forthcoming Kiev showing the angled deck and the island on the starboard side. The airplane is the subsonic, twin-jet Yakovlev "Freehand” which is said to have undergone trials aboard the Moskva. Like the British Harrier, this VSTOL airplane has been flying for quite some years. It, or something like it, could make the Kiev into a formidable vessel.
larger than the Ka-25, has been seen with trainable rocket pods and reportedly can be armed with anti-tank guided missiles.
In any event, this would leave perhaps 15 "spots” for VSTOL aircraft. Some western estimates place the number of aircraft that could be embarked as high as 35 in addition to 30 or 35 helicopters, although 15 to 25 VSTOL aircraft appears a more reasonable range.
The Soviets have developed several VSTOL combat aircraft, among them derivatives of the Yakovlev "Freehand” fighter. This is a single-seat, twin-turbojet aircraft that has been observed with rocket packs under its wings.
Some fixed-wing aircraft are reported to have under-
gone sea trials from a specially fitted pad on the flight deck of the Moskva.
Other aircraft mentioned in discussions of possible Kiev operations include the "Fishbed-G” variant of the MiG-21 supersonic fighter and the "Flagon-B” variant of the Su-11 supersonic fighter. Both aircraft are capable of STOL operations but are not credited with the ability to make vertical takeoffs and landings.
When the Kiev goes to sea sometime next year, her helicopters will permit her, like the Moskva and Leningrad, to project an intensive antisubmarine capability into remote areas. In addition, these helicopters might serve as aerial guidance platforms to provide targeting data for anti-ship missiles fired by Soviet surface warships or submarines. And, as we have observed, there also is the option of operating missile or gunship helicopters.
The fixed-wing VSTOL aircraft will provide at the least a long-range reconnaissance capability in areas beyond the radius of Soviet land-based search planes. This will be particularly important in the central and possibly western Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. Related to this reconnaissance role is the use of aircraft for electronic intelligence, a use given extensive coverage in recent Soviet writings on naval aviation.
Finally, VSTOL fighter aircraft flying from the Kiev will provide a potent offensive and defensive capability where there is neither a major Allied air base nor an aircraft carrier. For example, VSTOL fighters—even with their limited loads of weapons and fuel—could inflict considerable damage on those surface ships or installations ashore which lack protective air cover or sophisticated surface-to-air missiles. Similarly, Allied maritime reconnaissance aircraft such as the Orion, Atlantique, Neptune, and Nimrod would be defenseless against an advanced VSTOL fighter.
Built around the Kiev the Soviets could have a force that could not be confronted or countered by the Allied navies unless major land bases (and aircraft) or an aircraft carrier were available. The projected U. S. sea control ship and the now-building British "through-
deck cruiser” Invincible will not likely be suitable counters to the Kiev in view of the Soviet ship’s considerably greater aircraft complement and shipboard defense capability against Allied weapons.
Western analysts appear to be in agreement that the Kiev is but the first of a series of Soviet "aircraft carriers.” At about the same time the Kiev was launched in December 1972 there were reports that a second carrier was being started in her building dock. No further news of progress on the second ship has been provided.
It appears likely that the yard at Nikolayev could produce a Kiev-class carrier on a regular basis at perhaps three- or four-year intervals. The Zhdanov or Baltic shipyard at Leningrad also could build carriers at the same rate if the proper priorities were made. Report* persist that the Soviets plan to build six or eight of the Kiev-chss carriers, a program that could permit one ship to be continuously deployed in the Indian Ocean and one in the Mediterranean. With a shipyard in Leningrad as well as that at Nikolayev building the ships, the Soviets could conceivably have as many # ^
four carriers at sea by the early 1980s.
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I
Why Not a Soviet CVA? ;
After experience in operating the Kiev and her sistet ships, will the Soviets construct an attack aircraft carrie1 (CVA) in the U. S. Forrestal or Enterprise configuration'
The opinion of most Red Navy watchers is "no! Commander Robert W. Herrick, U. S. Navy (Ret.), tl* author of Soviet Naval Strategy, has reviewed 12 studio5 ^ of Soviet naval matters and has found that the majooh of the authors do not "expect USSR to construct attach ' carriers.” !
Future "Aviation Ships"
| Completion | Displacement | Length | Speed | Aircraft | a |
Soviet Kiev | 1974 | approx | approx | 30 + | 40-50 helicopters | $ I |
|
| 40,000 tons | 900 ft | knots | and VSTOL | £ |
British Through- | 1978-1979 | approx | 650 ft | 30 + | 15+ helicopters | (S |
Deck Cruiser |
| 20,000 tons |
| knots | and VSTOL | tl |
US Sea Control | 1979 | approx | 650 ft | 26 | 17 helicopters | $ |
Ship |
| 14,000 tons |
| knots | and VSTOL | tl |
US CVN-70 | 1981 | 94,000 tons | 1,092 ft | 30 + | 100 high-performJ111 | ll |
|
|
|
| knots | aircraft | 0 |
The majority view that the Kiev is not the precurs°( to a CVA-type warship is based on a number of factor5 Obviously, if the Soviet leadership were to make d>c decision to construct a 90,000-ton, 1,000-foot lofl? aircraft carrier and provide it with high-performa^
The Soviet "Aircraft Carrier” 161
fighter and attack aircraft, it could be done.
But, since the dramatic changes in the Soviet government’s leadership and policies of the mid-1950s the Soviet Navy has not attempted to mirror the U. S. Navy in areas where the Americans have had superiority. Rather, Admiral Gorshkov has astutely directed the development of forces that can counter the U. S. Navy, such as submarines and anti-ship missiles.
In justifying his non-carrier approach to sea power, Admiral Gorshkov has written that "analyzing the ways in which to develop the Soviet fleet, or the fleets of other naval powers, we are all the more persuaded of the correctness of the course we have selected in its construction.”
The Soviets are on the wrong side of the "power curve” with respect to U. S. carrier aviation. The U. S. Navy has had more than 50 years of experience in the construction and operation of such ships, and has a considerable force of aircraft carriers, carrier-based aircraft, experienced carrier pilots, and the necessary support and training establishments.
In this regard, the recently published Soviet volume Avianostsy i Vertoletonostsy [Aircraft Carriers and Helicopter Carriers] provides a comparatively balanced view of the value and the vulnerabilities of conventional aircraft carriers. But the authors conclude, in part, that:
"The helicopter-carrying cruisers, as their displacement tonnage and dimensions are increased, can over the long run completely replace the obsolete antisubmarine [aircraft] carriers, and for this reason many specialists in the foreign navies feel that over the next decade, a new class of ship will appear in the shipbuilding programs, that is, antisubmarine helicopter cruisers.”
The reference to "specialists in foreign navies” is a usual style for Soviet writers who are limited in what they can say about Soviet military planning and the criticism that they can voice about certain programs.
The authors, who consider the Moskva and Leningrad a "successful solution,” obviously support still larger uircraft carrier-missile cruiser ships. The book was published in 1972 by the Military Publishing House in Moscow and obviously reflects official views.
Further, the missions of the U. S. and Soviet navies aPpear to be sufficiently different to warrant different ships and tactics. The U. S. Navy is perceived primarily as a projection and sea control force; the Soviets employ primarily economic and political projection, coupled with a strong ground combat capability; in this respect the Navy is a "partner” or supporting arm. And, Soviet concepts of "sea control” differ from those of 'de U. S. Navy which has the responsibility of reinforc- lng allies overseas (primarily NATO) with the sealift M military forces. The Kiev-type "aircraft carriers” will
permit the Soviets to employ more naval air power farther away from their shores. Such ships will increase the military options open to Soviet leaders. Depending upon the decisions of the Soviet leadership, the Kiev and her sister carriers could become key elements in a new Soviet concept of naval projection operations.
Finally, as Western naval forces decline, especially the U. S. Navy in the post-Vietnam period, the firepower needed by the Soviets to counter allied naval forces in overseas areas is declining. Whereas the U. S. carrier force numbered 24 decks (CVA and CVS) in 1969, five years later the U. S. Navy has only 15 carriers and that number is going down. It is scheduled to decline to 12 by 1980. Thus, in an area that cannot be reached with high-performance, land-based aircraft or to which a carrier cannot be dispatched, the Soviet Kiev-class ship with ASW helicopters and VSTOL fighter/reconnaissance aircraft could obtain effective control of the area.
In this environment the Soviet Navy will not build CVAs. Critics of U. S. Navy carrier programs who have too often cited the lack of Soviet flattops will, hopefully, have their outdated attempt at logic silenced by the Kiev and her sister ships, at least one now reported to be under construction (reported by Flottes de Combat to be named Minsk). The Kiev, as the largest warship ever completed in the USSR, demonstrates the Soviet leadership’s decision to continue committing extensive resources to naval forces and, in particular, to surface warships. This is of particular importance at a time when Soviet and U. S. surface warship numbers are about equal and the Red Navy has significant superiority in small combat craft and submarines.
When the Kiev steams through the Dardanelles and out into the Mediterranean, and even to seas beyond, she again will demonstrate the understanding of the Soviet Union—primarily a land power—of the importance of use of the seas in the pursuit of national economic, political, and military goals.
The author wishes to acknowledge the special assistance of Dr. Hunter Alexander and Dr. Nicholas Shadrin in the preparation of this essay.
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[1]Sce R. D. Layman and Boris V. Drashpil, "Early Russian Shipboard Aviation,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1971, pp. 56-63.
Major General of Aviation Lieutenant General of Aviation Colonel General of Aviation Marshal of Aviation
The early shipbuilding programs of the Soviet government reflected the resurgent but still highly limited shipbuilding industry. In 1926 the Council of Labor and Defense approved the first naval construction program which, over a period of six years, provided for the building of 12 submarines, 18 escort ships, and 36 torpedo boats. This program apparently was incorporated into the First Five-Year Plan for economic development that covered the years 1928-1932.
The Five-Year Plan for 1933-1937 provided for the first large surface warships as well as additional submarines and small craft. The former were the Kirov-dass cruisers (8,500 tons standard, 9-7.1" guns) and the Leningrad-class large destroyers or "leaders” (2,900 tons, 5-5.5" guns). These ships reflected the technical assistance then being provided by Italy to Soviet ship de
When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in mid- 1941, Morskaya Aviatsiya had some 2,580 aircraft3 distributed amongst the four fleets out of a total Soviet military aircraft strength estimated at 8,000 planes. Apparently, all of the naval aircraft survived the initial German air attacks against the USSR which destroyed almost one-quarter of the Red air forces in a single day. According to one senior Soviet naval officer: "The war did not catch our fleets unawares, despite the fact that in the very first hours of it many naval bases were subjected to attacks by the enemy air forces. The Soviet Navy did not lose a single warship or aircraft from the enemy’s initial blow.”
There were very few naval aircraft designed as such; most naval aircraft were designed for army and air force missions.4 Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov, the current Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, has written that while the Navy’s aircraft were effective for operations against land targets, they were poorly suited for carrying out combat missions at sea.
According to Admiral Gorshkov:
"Naval aviation was unable to successfully carry sufficient torpedoes against warships at sea which had
Comparative figures for other navies in 1939: United States, 2,100 aircraft; Great Britain, 232 aircraft in the Royal Navy (and others in the RAF’s Coastal Command); Germany, 240 Luftwaffe aircraft assigned to naval control. In 1941 Japan had 1,250 naval aircraft. The U. S. naval figure includes about 100 planes belonging to the Marine Corps.
4U. S. Lend Lease naval aircraft provided to the USSR during the war consisted of 48 PBY-6A Catalina flying boats and 138 similar PBN-1 Nomads.