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Preceding Pages: A column of Soviet armored vehicles rumbles past the transports which carried them to a "captured” airfield during Exercise "Dvina” in the Western Soviet Union in March 1970. The transports are An-12 Cubs which have a maximum payload of just over 22 tons. The Soviet airborne forces are far and away the most powerful sea- or air-mobile troops in Europe. Consisting of seven small divisions and several special brigades, they are equipped with self-propelled artillery and light armor. The Air Transport Force has 1,700 assorted aircraft with which to move and support them.
l^^farvik, dawn, 9th April 1940. Watchers ashore hear a heavy explosion in Ofotfjord beyond the bay, but the half light and snow flurries hide from them the fate of the 40-year old Eidsvold, struck by three torpedoes and sunk with the loss of all but eight of her crew of 185.
In mid-February the British destroyer Cossack boarded the German naval tanker Altmark in southern Norwegian waters, rescuing 300 British merchant seamen on their way to German prison camps and calling down violent protests from the German ambassador in Oslo. Since the beginning of April ships and troops have been assembling in German ports. On the evening of the 5 th the British warned Oslo that they were about to lay mines in Norwegian waters. Yesterday, the 8th, the Narvik sea command spent the morning protesting against British destroyers mining the entrance to Vestfjord. At 2:00 p.m. came the first of a series of reports of German warships heading north. In Oslo the Government still hesitated to order mobilisation and the laying of defensive minefields.
Three large German destroyers—or could they be British?—enter Narvik Bay. Two of them thread their way through the crowded merchant shipping to go alongside the quay. Soldiers—German soliders—leap ashore, calling out "We come as friends.” The Norge, sister ship to the Eidsvold, opens fire. There is a delay as the destroyers clear iced-up torpedo tubes, then two
lMThe seaborne/airborne concept is simply the objective study of the means of mobility—sealift, airlift and bases—and their integrated use to give a fully balanced military force a high degree of strategic mobility in a fighting posture.” Lecture by the author, Amphibious Warfare in the late 1960s: Seaborne/Airborne Operations, delivered at the Royal United Service Institute on 15th November 1961, printed in the Journal for February 1962.
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torpedoes strike the Norge; she rolls over and sinks with the loss of half her crew.
Across Ofotfjord three other destroyers land mountain troops who seize the Elvergardsmoen mobilisation depot; a third trio have already landed troops to search for the non-existent batteries at the entrance to Ofotfjord; a tenth limps 50 miles astern, her fuel nearly exhausted by the northerly gale which has swept the Norwegian Sea since the evening of the 7 th.
Landing by motor boat at Narvik, General Eduard Dietl meets the German consul and goes with him by taxi to the Norwegian garrison headquarters. Further resistance, the general argues to the elderly garrison commander, can only lead to futile bloodshed. At 6 a.m., Colonel Sundlo surrenders the garrison. The Germans begin to land guns and deploy troops for the defence of Narvik and to refuel their destroyers, hoping to get them away before the arrival of the British fleet Instead they will be trapped and sunk. The German mountain soldiers, isolated from the main invasion have a hard time ahead of them, facing Allied force* superior in numbers. Except for the Norwegians, ho*' ever, the Allies will be unable to manoeuvre in th£ deep snow and subsequent thaw, and the Germans wiH survive until events in France force an Allied with drawal from the distant North.
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Further south that April morning, German troop* landing from warships seize Trondheim, Bergen, aM Kristiansand. Stavanger falls to two battalions of infat1' try airlanded after a parachute company has seized Sol* airport. In Oslofjord the obsolete guns and torpedo# of Oscarsborg Fort sink the new heavy cruiser Bliicld with heavy loss of life. Her consorts, the Liitzow a^ Emden, turn back. Aircraft carrying parachutists f°: Fornebu airport run into low cloud and are recall^' But one squadron of Ju 52s carrying an infantry batta*' ion ignores the recall and lands in the face of machio# gun fire. Airlift is hastily rescheduled. More troofj arrive, and that afternoon they march into Oslo to ^ that the delay has enabled the King and his minist#* to escape north to carry on the war.
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A few days later motorised columns fan out ^0<{l Oslo to link up with Kristiansand, Stavanger, Berg#1, and finally Trondheim. Their main armies deployed ||! France, inadequately prepared for seaborne operati#”* let alone airborne, assuming too readily that infaf1^ without artillery or armour will do for a distant thea[rCl the British and French flounder disastrously in tb£l( attempts to rescue a Norway which has lost her ports and on whose airfields the Luftwaffe has es[;1 lished itself.2
2 See the author’s The Norwegian Campaign of 1940, published in the as Warfare in Three Dimensions (Ohio University Press, 1967).
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Seaborne and Airborne Mobility in Europe 125
The calendar turns on sixteen years. Colonel Nasser has expropriated the Suez Canal. Anthony Eden, seeing in him another Hitler, and resolved not to repeat the Munich debacle, joins with the French in ordering the assembly of sea, land, and air forces in the Eastern Mediterranean. Rusty LSTs are hastily commissioned from reserve, and Service staffs turn up the lessons of Normandy. Three months later Israel attacks Egyptian forces in the Sinai, Nasser rejects the Anglo-French ultimatum, and Operation Musketeer, the seizure of the Canal Zone, is ordered. On 31 October the first Allied air strikes hit Egyptian airfields and an 8-knot amphibious convoy sails from Malta on its 1,000-mile approach. On 5 November, British and French parachutists drop on Gamil Airfield and Port Fuad. On the 6th a conventional beach assault goes in at Port Said. The town is taken after a day’s fighting, and that night armour and motorised infantry break south. Too late. They are halted by their Governments, now under heavy international political and financial pressures, and soon the withdrawal begins.[1]
Guessing Right and Guessing Wrong
If ever there was an operation unrepeatable under nuclear deterrence, surely it was Normandy. It took the British and Americans four years to mount the attack and the Germans four years to build the Atlantic Wall. Had the British command at Suez turned for a model to Norway, or perhaps to the earlier amphibious operations of World War 2, instead of to Normandy, it could have seized the Canal Zone before international pressures made themselves effective. Whether that would have been a good thing is another matter.
It is the hard task of military commanders and planners to judge, to guess might be nearer the truth, the sort of battle they may have to fight. To do that for the defence is both more important and more difficult than for the attack. When both sides realise that they have an overriding interest in avoiding escalation to nuclear levels and a political interest in not alienating world opinion, long-drawn operations and full-scale campaigns are likely to be impracticable, while a sudden coup remains a possibility. And, because the threat of a coup remains credible, it is likely to be more effective politically without actual implementation than the threat of mutually suicidal general war in which no one quite believes.
3The French called the operation an Overlord du petit pied. See A. J. Barker, Suez: The Seven Day War (Faber, 1964). The chapter on this operation in Bernard Fergusson, The Watery Maze (Collins, 1961) is full of nostalgia for 1944.
"Here the danger lies, it seems to me,” said Lord Balniel, Minister of State for Defence in the House of Commons defence debate of February 1972 referring to the growth of conventional forces, "not only in the possibility of swift, overt, military action in the belief that it will not be met by nuclear response, but in the pressures that can be exerted. Massive military manoeuvres on borders, continuous and visible naval presence off shores—these things can win objectives almost as valuable as any which can be won by direct military action. They can induce in people a sense of despair as to what can be done. ... It can make neutralism seem a pleasant soft option.”[2] There is no denying that Warsaw Pact land and air forces today assembled in Central Europe, like Soviet naval forces on the flanks and oceans, are fully capable of waging general war in the unlikely event that the Kremlin should judge the risk of evoking world nuclear catastrophe acceptable. Less widely realised is the fact that the Pact has provided itself with the capability of carrying through a sudden coup which would leave the West with the choice of conventional counter-attack, nuclear escalation, or submission. As a result, the Pact possesses the political leverage that might be exerted by that capability
Pact Seaborne and Airborne Capabilities
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Europe, bordered on three sides by the sea and on the fourth by the Soviet Union. Notice the central positions of the Baltic and North seas. The proper use of seaborne and airborne forces on the shores of these waters, and even farther north, can have enormous impact upon events on the German front. To the south, the rugged nature of the North Mediterranean lands also favors the use of seaborne and airborne thrusts, as the experience of World War II attests forcibly.
Seaborne and Airborne Mobility in Europe 127
► Marines, or naval infantry, (Morskaia Pekhota), some 17,000 strong organised in brigades with each of the four major fleets.
► Specialised amphibious shipping, largely but not exclusively tailored to short or medium range operations and capable of lifting forces probably totalling rather more than the marines. Behind this lies the government-controlled Soviet merchant marine.
► Airborne forces (Vozdushno Desantiniye Voskaya), comprising seven small airborne divisions plus a number of special duty brigades for raiding, reconnaissance, and similar operations.
► A large military airlift force, consisting of helicopter regiments, air transport regiments, and long-range air transport regiments, backed by the government- controlled Aeroflot civil aviation.
Both marines and airborne are elite troops with the usual characteristics of such corps: distinctive uniforms, selective entry, tough training, emphasis on attack, audacity, and morale.
The marine brigades with the four fleets have a minimum of three battalions each, and at least one has five. The marine infantry battalion is organised on similar lines to the motor rifle battalion, with standard weapons including the RPG7V anti-tank weapon and the 140-mm mortar at battalion level. A light tank battalion is included in each brigade, equipped with the PT-76 light amphibious tank (14-tons, 76-mm gun) and the BTP-60 10-ton 8-wheeled armoured personnel carrier taking 14 men, having excellent mobility on land and in water, and equipped to give covering fire. In an attack an infantry company carried in eight or nine BTP-60 might be supported by two platoons (6-10 tanks, total) of PT-76 amphibious light tanks, or by T-55 medium tanks (36-tons, 100 mm-gun), with which the marines are also equipped.
The Soviet amphibious lift is summarised in Table 1. The largest ships, the eight Alligator-class, comparable to American and British LSTs of the 1955-65 period, and the eight MP-6, considerably smaller, would appear to be fully ocean-going. The next size is much more numerous, the Polnocny, MP-8, MP-4, and MP-2 classes, in all over a hundred ships. Of these, the fifty 18-knot Polnocnys are likely to be fully ocean-going, the rest to have limited ocean-crossing capacity, similar to the obsolescent British LCT 8. These, like the new and smaller Vydra class of twenty-five 500-ton ships, would seem to be designed for short- or medium-range operations in restricted waters, such as the Black Sea and Baltic, sacrificing speed and capacity for shallow draft and handiness.
Soviet doctrine envisages amphibious operations ranging in scale from major strategic movements, in which marines would spearhead army formations, through sea hooks in aid of land advances, to reconnaissances and demonstrations. These could take place in conflicts ranging through the spectrum from nuclear war to unopposed intervention. Amphibious assault may be by day or night, radio silence in approach is emphasised, and in the North troops are trained to operate in bad weather and deep snow. In an exercise described by Major John F. Meehan of the U. S. Army, the landing force was equivalent to a U. S. reinforced infantry battalion. The first wave consisted of PT-76 light tanks and infantry in APC. The second wave was made up of a motorised rifle battalion in its APCs (organic to the regiment) and medium tanks snorkel- ing. Helicopter assault is practiced, but unless within range of Soviet-held territory could only be accomplished by diverting the Moskva or Leningrad from their normal duties or by other improvisation.
Table 1
USSR Amphibious Shipping by Size
Tonnage Lift
Gffi Name | Number | Standard | Full Load | Length {ft) | Speed {knts) | Men | Vehicles | Date Built |
Alligator | 8 | 4,100 | 5,800 | 374 | 15 | 500 | 20-25 | 1965 onwards* |
MP-6 | 8 | 1,800 | 2,000 | 246 | 12 | > | 10 | pre-1961 |
Polnocny | 50 | 780 | 1,000 | 246 | 18 | 100 | 8-10 | 1961 onwards* |
MP-8 | 18 | 800 | 1,200 | 239 | 15 | p | 8-10 | pre-1961 |
MP4 | 25 | > | 800 | 184 | 12 | p | 8 | 1956-58 |
MP-2 | 12 | 600 | 750 | 190 | 16 | 16 | 4 | pre-1958 |
-1 | 25 | 300 | 500 | 164 | 10 | P | P | 1967 onwards |
MP-io | 40 | 200 | 420 | 157 | 11 | P | 4 | pre-1967 |
T4 |
| P | 80 | 69 | P | > | 1 |
Michael MccGwire, 'Soviet Naval Programmes’, Survival, September-October 1973, (I.I.S.S. London) quotes Admiral Zumwalt (enclosure to Zumwalt/ Aspin April 1973), that construction continues at the rate of 2 Alligators and 7 Polnocnys a year.
John Erickson has recently compared the capability of the Soviet Navy for long-range intervention un-
favourably with that of the Soviet Air Force.6 Against the overseas and overland supply of North Vietnam, he sets the air resupply of Egypt after the Six Days War, the airlift in support of Egyptian intervention in the Yemen in 1967 and 1968, and the airlift to the i Sudan. (Although Professor Erickson does not discuss the problem, airlift only reached Egypt from Pact terri- tory by overflying Yugoslav territory.) Closer home, i[ was the arrival of the Soviet 2nd Airborne Division at Ruzyne airfield followed by its march into Prague which in 1968 made the Czechoslovak invasion the slick and efficient, if brutal, business that it was.
Unlike the marines, the Soviet airborne forces afe an autonomous organisation with centralised command and a network of training establishments and schools The airborne division of 7,000 desantniki (paratroopers) is considerably smaller than the standard rifle division of 10,500, but like it is organised in three regiments, each regiment of three battalions and with its self-propelled artillery, heavy mortars, anti-tank missis launchers, and anti-aircraft defences. The battalions, 500 strong, have three companies, each of 140 men, ^ organic support elements equipped with lighter W#P ons than those of the battalion. Vehicles classed ■*' air-portable include the 15-ton 85-mm self-propellc ASU-85 assault gun at regiment, the 5%-ton 57-n1111 ASU-57 at battalion, the PT-76 amphibious light tank and the 13-ton amphibious APC BTR-60P, as well 35
fi Erickson op cit, p. 61.
lighter reconnaissance vehicles, anti-tank weapon carriers, and soft-skinned vehicles.
The other airborne formation, the special duties brigade, has 2,500 officers and men of two sorts: reydoviki (raiders) selected from the desantniki and vystsotniki (high-altitude free-fall parachutists for reconnaissance and sabotage) selected in turn from the reydoviki. The brigade is organised as four battalions and four supporting units and is similar to the airborne regiment except that it has no armoured vehicles, guided missiles, mortars, or anti-tank guns and is
I equipped instead with 122-mm rocket launchers,
flamethrowers, and demolition equipment. Its roles are to seize airfields, to carry out raids and diversions in the enemy’s rear, and to link up with pro-Communist insurgents.
The Soviet Air Transport Force (see Table 2) comprises about 1,700 fixed-wing aircraft—about 800 An-12 < I and ll-i8 medium transports, 15 An-22 very heavy
,-j transports, and a number of older An-24 and ll-i4
J short-haul transports and small An-14 tactical transports. The total helicopter force is probably about 1,750, mainly Mi-6 medium and Mi-8 heavy helicopters, with some Mi-ios and possibly a few very heavy load carrying Mi-i2s. Aeroflot airliners which could be adapted to military use include 275 long and medium range Tu-io4, Tu-114, Tu-124 and Tu-134 types. According to Aerospace International, airlift is available for simultaneous assault by three airborne divisions at 300 miles (260 n.m.) range, or by one airborne division at 1,000 miles (880 n.m.), with no operational range in excess of 1,200 miles (1,050 n.m.). Some other authorities regard this as a rather high estimate; in exercises the airborne element appears to have been limited to a single division dropped and airlanded.
In general war the Soviet main armies would seize the initiative, advancing by day and night up to 70 miles in 24 hours after nuclear and chemical, or alternatively conventional, strikes. Airborne forces would be used to preserve the momentum of the advance, seizing key areas and obstacles and attacking the enemy in the
rear. An entire airborne division thus employed might be dropped up to 250 miles ahead, or single regiments or battalions at shorter ranges. Motorised rifle, rather than airborne, units would be used for helicopter assault 20 to 30 miles ahead of the main advance, for which a battalion lift might be 20 to 30 medium helicopters with a dozen heavy lift helicopters for the battalion’s vehicles and supporting arms.
The range of these airborne operations and the speed of advance envisaged for the main armies implies a link-up within four or five days, in addition to which some days might be held in reserve. It would however be unwise to imagine that the Russians are not aware of the possibilities of airborne maintenance as, for example, developed by Chindits and Marauders in World War 2; indeed the longer range alternative for the airlift implies something of that sort. A third and important possibility is that seaborne operations would be used for the link-up, either in coastal operations on the flanks or for operations in furtherance of a maritime strategy. Major Meehan, indeed, says: "A recognition that an airborne operation cannot by its nature have the striking power of a sea assault has led to one of the basic tenets of Soviet amphibious employment: in the future the joint employment of sea and air landings will be the norm—air alone or sea alone will be the exception. Current Soviet literature and recent manoeuvers document this principle.” Professor Erickson, too, refers to the connection between airborne, helicopter, and beach assault.
Table 2
Russian Military Airlift
Name | NATO Code Name | Max Pay Load {lbs) | Troop Lift | Cruising Speed (MPH) | Range with Max Load/Max Fuel {miles) | Number |
An-12 | Cub | 44,090 |
| 342 | /2110 1 |
|
11-18 | Coot | 29,750 | 90 | 388 | 2,300/4,040 1 | o(JU |
An-22 | Cock | 176,350 | 300-350 | 460 | 3,100/6,800 | 15 |
An-24 | Coke | 10,185 | 40-50 | 280 | 397/1,500 1 |
|
11-14 | Crate |
|
|
| ) | 900 (?) |
An-14 | Clod | 1,590 | 6 | 118 | 292/423 |
|
Seaborne and Airborne Mobility in Europe 129
Of Russia’s Pact allies, Poland has one amphibious assault division and 20 Polnocny-class landing ships, one airborne division and 45 transport aircraft, mainly of the older and smaller Russian types, and 40 helicopters. The German Democratic Republic has one infantry brigade trained in amphibious operations, but no specialised airborne troops. It has an amphibious lift of six Robbe class (600 tons, 12 knots) and 12 Labo class (150 tons) beaching ships or craft and an airlift of 30 An-2 and ll-i4 transports. In general these characteristics indicate employment of Polish and East Ger-
130
A column of East German Labo class small landing ships plows through the Baltic. These 10-knot craft, armed with four 25-mm guns, can carry three tanks each. East Germany has an infantry brigade trained for amphibious operations. The more powerful Polish forces have an amphibious assault division, an airborne division, 20 Polnocny class landing ships and 45 small transport aircraft.
man sea- and airborne forces in the Baltic and Baltic exits, where Poland in particular would be able to deploy considerable forces. Czechoslovakia has an airborne brigade and an airlift of 50 transport aircraft of the older and smaller Russian types and 90 helicopters. Bulgaria has one parachute regiment, 20 landing craft, 16 transport aircraft of older Russian types, and about 40 Mi-4 helicopters; Rumania, one airborne regiment and a transport squadron.
Landings either from the sea or from the air depend perhaps even more than other operations on adequate air cover. In the absence of Soviet aircraft carriers—and indeed until a considerably more powerful force than the Kiev and her problematic sister has appeared—for the Pact this must depend on land-based air. This would certainly be available on the land fronts or within tactical range of Pact territory, but for long range operations the Soviets would have to rely on establishing advanced airfields, either by political agreement, or by seizure simultaneously with the main assault, as in the German attack on Denmark and Norway. Fully alerted, on the spot, and free from political restriction, the carriers of the U. S. 2nd and 6th fleets would undoubtedly inhibit Soviet seaborne and airborne operations. Doubts must hang rather on the possibility that the carriers might not arrive in time, or might not receive political clearance to act until too late. Carrying through a surprise operation, the Russians might hope to establish land-based air cover and air defence before the carriers could act.
What emerges from it all is that Russia, supported by her allies, has comparatively recently acquired a powerful weapon, which could be used on the central front or, subject to the air situation, on the flanks of NATO, and perhaps even further afield. This may be, as Professor Erickson suggests, a spin-off from airborne capability primarily intended for the central front or, as Major Meehan and others argue, may indicate a desire to have an expeditionary capability for rapidly injecting a Soviet military presence in distant areas. The intention—to use it politically, militarily, or not at all—will depend on the internal politics of the Krem
lin, but of the capability there can be little doubt.
In general war below nuclear levels, use of this weapon on the flanks or oceans could be countered by American carrierborne aviation, provided the carriers could be spared from other urgent employment. In nuclear war anything gained by the Soviets could be blotted out by nuclear strikes, albeit at the sacrifice of the inhabitants of the disputed territory. In the subacute balance of power which is likely to be the reality behind the hopefully heralded detente of the late 1970s, neither counter can be relied upon. What is needed is the manifest ability to match Soviet capability with NATO capability, to match the power to carry through a coup by the power to come to the rescue, and, be it said, for Europe not to rely entirely on the U. S- Marines to do so.
Western Europe and Strategic Mobility
We are warned frequently not to see the Soviets ten feet tall. Modern Russian seaborne and airborne forces could mount an operation such as the attack on Norway in 1940 and they could do it without the weaknesses which not only made the German attach a gamble but at times brought it close to disaster; but we need a modern yardstick by which to measure the Russians. The only one available is the seaborne an airborne forces which, if the Soviets were to exert political pressure on, or to attack, outlying NATO tetr1'
Seaborne and Airborne Mobility in Europe 131
tory, NATO could come to the rescue.
Specialised Western seaborne forces divide themselves sharply into two: those of the United States and the rest. Beside the U. S. Marine Corps’ three division/ air wing Marine Amphibious Forces and the U. S. Navy’s 20 knot ocean-going amphibious lift (60-odd ships) capable of embarking four regiment/air group Marine Amphibious Brigades on generous scales, the Soviet marines and amphibious lift are not impressive. But, beside European NATO’s mixed collection of marines variously equipped and organised and landing shipping of various vintages, they look more formidable even though divided between the four Soviet fleets.
The Sovi’t military airlift backed by Aeroflot is certainly a thing to reckon with. Incomplete information together with complications of geography, range, refuelling, and logistic support generally make the comparison with others difficult and inexact. But the American total, consisting of the transports in the Military Airlift Command, Tactical Air Command, U. S. Air Forces Europe, Pacific Air Forces, and in U. S. Army and Marine Corps, without much doubt amounts to considerably more than the Russians have. Moreover, the Americans could be backed in a first-class emergency by aircraft taken up from a civil aviation much larger than the Russian. The total airlift of European NATO, backed by what might be taken up from European civil aviation, is less than either that of the United States or Russia, but it is unlikely to be called upon to operate over the great strategic ranges which are tequired of the Soviet and U. S. military airlifts.
In specialised airborne troops, the seven small Soviet airborne divisions and indeterminate number of special duties brigades, together with the equivalent of about a division from their Pact allies, might appear to be watched by the two U. S. airborne and one air portable divisions, the equivalent of about two and a half airborne divisions in European NATO and one French airborne division; but that comparison would be superficial. Variations in the Western partners’ national policies and defence requirements, in their commitment to ffie Alliance, in their geographical location, and thus 111 role, organisation, and equipment reduces the potential of the whole as a mobile operational reserve to NATO.
On one hand, pre-occupation with the central front, inherited from the early years of NATO, still minimises the demand for skills directed towards strategic mobility; on the other, attributes such as high morale, political reliability, success in voluntary recruitment, scntiment, even military fashion, to varying degrees may rcplace utilitarian function as the raison d’etre. More Wcently the helicopter has, in the opinion of some of lts advocates, outmoded parachute and beach assault.
Only access to operational plans could produce direct evidence of the degree to which operational function has been eroded; in its absence the test to apply is, "How well are the specialised troops organised and equipped for their specialised function?” Readers of Holland Smith’s Coral and Brass will recognise some similarity with the U. S. Marine Corps’ struggles in the 1920s.7
Western Germany is understandably and justifiably more concerned with having an effective army on her home frontier with the Pact than to send parts of it elsewhere. Britain and France until the mid-1960s directed a large part of their defence effort to the residual problems of colonial empire. As a by-product the strategic lift for the British Indian Ocean and Far Eastern military presence was also available for NATO should it be needed, as, subject to the detached French attitude, might be the sea and airborne force d'intervention. Today there are signs in both countries that, in the absence of a clear understanding of their value in Europe, there may be reluctance to replace these strategic lifts as they become obsolete.
The resources of the European members of the Alliance for strategic mobility thus vary widely among member nations. Among them the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force is unique in having an exclusively NATO function and motivation.
Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF)
"A small, highly mobile, multi-national force, capable of playing a deterrent role in any threatened area of NATO Europe, but primarily designed to operate on the Northern and Southern flanks.” So runs the SHAPE description of AMF. General Norstad, SACEUR in the late 1950s, saw the need for a force whose appearance in a threatened area would in crisis demonstrate to a potential aggressor that an attack on one member of the Alliance would be resisted by all. His proposal was backed by the Council, and in I960 the AMF was established.
It has two components, land and air, AMF(L) and AMF(A). Commanded by a two-star general appointed in turn by nations contributing units, AMF(L) is a force of seven infantry battalions, not all of which would necessarily be used at one time, with light supporting units and its own logistic support (see Table 3). It has a permanent headquarters co-located with Central Army Group (CENTAG) in Mannheim and manned by an international staff drawn from contributing nations. Its units are earmarked, but they remain under national control and location except in emergency or when
7Scribncr, N.Y., 1949. Sir Basil Liddell Hart’s Foreword to R. D. Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea (USNI, 1962) is interesting on the British attitude to functional elites.
132
assembled for exercises or training. The period for which an individual unit remains earmarked before being relieved by another unit of the same nation varies between nations from one year to an indefinite time. Both systems have advantages and disadvantages; perhaps the most important factor is that a unit should not have other operational commitments which might clash with those of AMF(L).
Seven nations contribute tactical air support squadrons to AMF(A): Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. AMF(A) has no commander or permanent headquarters, but when deployed comes under the operational control of the allied tactical air force of the area in which it is supporting AMF(L).
In event of crisis AMF would be called into action by SACEUR, after approval by the North Atlantic Council and the host nation. To be effective as a deterrent it would need to arrive before fighting started. Deployment is therefore normally by air, air lift being provided by the contributing nations. Sea lift may, however, be used when more practicable for units whose home station is close to the deployment area or for bringing in heavy items of equipment. AFCENT is responsible for overall planning and control of AMF movements both on exercises and in emergency. Contributing nations are responsible for the maintenance of their units through the AMF logistic organisation; the host nation is expected to provide certain common-
user items. For AMF(L), supplies are handled by the logistic support battalion contributed by the United Kingdom, to which are attached national support elements.
Starting in Sardinia in 1961, AMF has carried out frequent exercises on both flanks, and its component units have become a familiar sight in NATO areas where otherwise there might have been little evidence of support from NATO. Thus, as well as its role of deterrence in crisis, AMF has acquired an associated role of preventing crisis by demonstrating to both sides the intention of support from NATO.
Like other deterrents, if it is to be effective AMF must be an efficient fighting force. The handicaps to a small international force in becoming one are obvious enough: national differences in languages, in procedures, in terms of service, in training standards, and
Table 3 Composition of AMF(L)
Commander and staff from contributing nations. Headquarters sub-units from individual countries, e.g. signals wire troop from W. Germany, radio troop from UK; headquarter company from USA etc.
Infantry
Battalions
Artillery
Batteries
Reconnaissance
Squadron
Engineer
Companies
Helicopter
Flights
Medical
Units
Logistic
Battalion
Belgium 1 (para)
Canada
W. Germany 1 (para)
Italy
Luxemburg 1 (light)
UK
ush
1
1
•Countries other than UK provide national support elements.
Units contributed by Canada and the UK arc trained and equipped for arctic warfare.
Ifl equipment, and the temptation to fall back on the tQken role when these seem too difficult to overcome.
its credit AMF has mastered them and in doing so h*s found some less immediately obvious advantages ln international status. Because no contributing nation to have a unit with AMF which does not do it Credit, standards are high and indeed make single- nation brigades exercising alongside AMF look to their °wn reputation. International competition, self-evident Purpose, an interesting task with wide-ranging exer- c'ses, and the opportunity to learn from other nations strong points of their military systems have thus provided for AMF a third role, that of an Alliance school arms.
The British, the North Sea, and the Northern Flank[3] The geographical situation of the British Isles ensures for strategic reserves located there the advantages and disadvantages of dual availability—for the northern flank and the central front—to which a possibly obsolescent strategic habit adds a third, the Mediterranean. The withdrawal announced in 1968 of the major Brit-
ish military presence from the Indian Ocean enabled these reserves to be brought up to worthwhile strength and gave them as their main role the defence of Europe. Today they comprise:
Commando Forces, Royal Marines
3rd Commando Brigade Group—two commandos (equivalent to battalions) and supporting units in southern England and one commando group in Malta.
45 Commando Group—in Scotland, specially trained and equipped for arctic and mountain warfare on skis.
These forces are also air portable.
sfl
Amphibious Lift
Commando ships (LPH) Hemes and Bulwark with associated specialised naval helicopter squadrons, and assault ships (LPD) Bearless and Intrepid. (The Intrepid has recently been transferred to the Dartmouth training squadron but continues to appear on amphibious exercises.)
,d
Logistic Ships (LST) — the six Sir Lancelot-chss, civilian manned by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary primarily for army movements (cf the U. S. Military Sealift Command), but available for operations and exercises. A naval officer and a marine, Flag Officer Carriers and Amphibious Ships and Major General Commando Forces, are charged with the training and operational planning of amphibious and commando forces, for NATO purposes under SACLant and CINCSouth. Together with U. S. amphibious and marine forces, these British forces are earmarked to form the Combined Amphibious Task Force under Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic in the North and under Commander Striking Force South in the Mediterranean.
U.K. Land Forces— U.K.-based Reinforcements 3rd Division—air portable with additional heavy support elements.
16 Parachute Brigade Group—two parachute battalions and supporting arms.
British contribution to AMP—see Table 3.
22nd Special Air Service Regiment—an army unit trained and organised to operate behind the enemy lines.
In addition to these NATO-earmarked strategic reserves, there are several other formations and units arid individual reinforcements, both regular and reserve army, earmarked for reinforcement of the British Array of the Rhine.
Air Mobility and Support Forces
38 Group, RAF Strike Command—three squadrons of Phantoms (to be replaced by Jaguars) and a helicop ter lift of Pumas and Wessex for about 400 men- Usually a squadron has from 12 to 18 aircraft.
46 Group, RAF Strike Command (tactical airlift assod' ated with U.K. Land Forces)—about 40 Hercules C-OOK.
Strategic and general purposes airlift which, together with overseas commands, amounts to some 100 aif' craft. About half are strategic range aircraft (13 ^ 10, 10 Belfasts, 5 Comets and 15 Britannias), an1 half tactical transports (26 Hercules with long-rangf capability, and 31 Andovers)
The 16th Parachute Brigade Group and the tactie^ airlift and air support for it have recently been organ' ised as the U.K. Joint Airborne Task FofcC (UKJATFOR) under a two-star airman with an arm)' deputy. The tactical transport aircraft, however, renoa'1’ available to lift other U.K.-based reinforcements, llV eluding the AMF contribution.
The 3rd Division and UKJATFOR could be used t0 reinforce either the central front or the NATO flanks- but the 3rd Commando Brigade and 45 Command1
Group normally are sealifted and therefore likely to be used on the coasts of the Norwegian Sea, the North Sea, or the Mediterranean. Thus, while all three are earmarked to NATO, the 3rd Division and UKJATFOR are earmarked to SACEUR and the 3rd Commando Bri- 8ade and 45 Commando Group to SACLANT. The 'kcision to land the commando forces would be taken the North Atlantic Council with the Military Com- ^'ttee coordinating the requirements of the two su- Pterrie commanders. On landing or on entering the
Mediterranean the command of the commando forces would pass from SACLANT to the relevant commander- in-chief under SACEUR, a command switch which calls for, and receives, proper attention in advance.
The World War 2 commandos were conceived of by Winston Churchill and others as ultra-light infantry, independent of fire support, transport, or logistics. In the event they were used as high-grade infantry and fought more of their battles with supporting arms, sometimes including armour, than without. In the
136 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review 1974
postwar period of counter-insurgency wars requiring primarily infantry, the need for supporting arms tended to be ignored. More recently the commando brigade has become a brigade group with a Royal Artillery light regiment, a Royal Engineers field squadron, a squadron of light helicopters, and a joint-services logistics unit added, but the development has stopped short of armour. The commando brigade has nothing equivalent to the armoured reconnaissance squadrons of the Parachute Brigade and AMF, which are equipped with the tracked, aluminium-armoured Scorpion (8 tons, 76-mm gun), or the light tank battalions of the Morskaia Pekhota, which have the 13-ton PT-76 amphibious tank. However, like the parachute brigade and the AMF, the commando brigade has the full range of infantry antitank weapons.
Both the assault and logistic ships are designed to carry the Chieftain main battle tank (55-tons, 120-mm gun), about a squadron (17) per ship. Of the two the much more expensive assault ship is better able to land them in face of opposition or other difficulties, and it is encouraging to see that in some exercises at least Chieftains from UKLF appear in assault ships. Their availability for operations on the flanks would be a matter of priorities to which more attention might well be directed.
Except for the Ark Royal, due to be scrapped in the late 1970s, any British air support for forces deployed on the flanks would have to come from air forces based ashore. The decision of 1966 to phase out British carriers was recognised by the RAF as presenting it with a challenge to develop the techniques, procedures, and equipment needed to take over the task of air support for the fleet.[4] Since then criticisms that the navy’s needs were not being met have appeared from time to time, but have produced little detailed public response from the Ministry of Defence.
Undoubtedly much has been done, and undoubtedly finance has been an important limitation. RAF maritime and close support squadrons have cooperated with the navy on all major exercises, and in such exercises as Strong Express the latter have been deployed to airfields on the NATO flanks. A reasonable guess might be that in crisis or attack on the flanks a determined and coordinated effort would be made to provide the nec- cessary air cover and support, but that by itself the force would inevitably be less than that necessary both
to meet the full Russian challenge at sea and to cover forces deployed ashore. A simultaneous threat on the central front or in the Atlantic would further stretch limited British air resources. Thus the RAF could make a useful contribution but could not make British forces independent of NATO—a situation not confined to the air. Both SACLANT and SACEUR would be involved in covering any deployment on the northern flank, and 1 coordination of land-based and carrier-borne air cover j would be needed.
The Netherlands Korps Mariniers, similar in tradi- j tion to the U. S. Marine Corps and the Royal Marines, | today numbers 2,800. It finds two battalion-sized com- ; bat groups, one in the Netherlands and the other in the Antilles. Both have an amphibious role, and the former has recently taken part in exercises with Commando Forces, Royal Marines. One company is trained and equipped for mountain and arctic warfare. The Royal Netherlands Navy, however, has no amphibious lift; its 13 minor landing craft could only have local operational and training value. For wider employment the combat groups would have to be transported either in Allied amphibious shipping or in non-specialised ships. The Netherlands group and the mountain and arctic warfare company are a welcome and valuable addition of strength to Commando Forces.
The Belgian Army has a para-commando regiment and nine independent parachute companies. In the Belgian Air Force, 12 Hercules C-130 were due to replace i 24 C-119 by the end of 1973. There are in addition four DC-6 transports and 12 Hunting Pembroke light transports.
The Central Front and the Baltic
In the event of a general threat from the Warsaw Pact, the primary role of U.K.-based forces earmarked to NATO would be to bring the British Army of the Rhine up to strength and to deploy strategic reserves under the direction of SACEUR. On the central front UKJATFOR would be used in wooded or hill country, in the Harz mountains perhaps, not in the North German plain where, despite its fairly formidable antitank armament, it would be liable to be overrun by Pact main armoured forces.
The 3rd Division, too, as a largely air portable for- mation, is not fully equipped to meet main Pact ar- mour. It has only a single regiment of main battle tanks (Chieftains), a single regiment of medium artillery (5.5-inch guns), its artillery equipment is towed not self-propelled, and its infantry, high in proportion to its numbers compared to the divisions of BAOR, is not provided with armoured personnel carriers. The divr sion has, however, excellent short to medium range anti-tank capability, and this together with its helicop
Seaborne and Airborne Mobility in Europe 137
ter lift and offensive air support might balance some of these limitations. Nevertheless the division would probably be employed in close country or in built-up areas.
The 3rd Division’s armoured regiment, armoured reconnaissance regiment, medium artillery regiment, and a proportion of its transport would probably travel by sea—the Chieftains because that is the only means of getting them across the Channel, the rest to save air transport—using the logistic ships for heavy lift and some roll-on roll-off shipping taken up from civilian cross-Channel traffic for much of the rest. The whole move according to The Economist would take between two and three weeks, but fighting elements would be likely to have priority, and the first brigade groups could, if necessary, be available before the whole division.
The Federal Republic Army[5] is primarily equipped to meet major Pact armoured thrusts. Most of its infantry is heavily armed, with mechanised infantry combat vehicles (MICV), light tanks, self-propelled anti-tank guns, and guided missiles organic to the battalion. It would usually fight from its MICVs, making full use of the MICV’s weapons and armour, with full tank support. Three airborne brigades, one to each corps, the 1st Mountain Division and the 2nd and 4th Jager Divisions are, however, more lightly equipped and would expect to fight in the Hessian hills, the Bavarian forests, or similar country. These lightly equipped formations are specially trained in helicopter operations.
Each corps has an army aviation brigade equipped with Dornier-built Bell US-iD light transport helicopters and medium transport CH 53A. These, organised in mixed groups, would be used to lift battle groups to threatened ground, to isolate Pact airborne incursions, and to blunt armoured spearheads. Agreement has been reached between the Luftwaffe and Army Aviation on the employment of troop lifting helicopters; the re-equipment of the latter with CH-53 medium transport helicopters was expected to be completed by kte 1973 or early 1974. The Luftwaffe, however, opposes the replacement of fixed-wing aircraft by helicopters in the offensive air support role. Trials of helicopters in the anti-tank role are taking place, but the employment of helicopters on the scale of the U. S. 1st Cavalry Division is unlikely to be accepted.
Although they would usually be helicopter-lifted, the airborne brigades could be airlanded from the C-I60
Transall transports of the Luftwaffe, some 80 in number, which are also available for the German contribution to the AMF. These, organised in two groups (totalling four squadrons of 18 airplanes each) in north and south Germany respectively, are, together with a Luftwaffe group of UH-iD light transport helicopters (four squadrons, totalling 89), retained under central Luftwaffe control.
The Federal Navy has one landing craft squadron, consisting of a pair of old ex-U. S. medium landing ships (LSM) and 10 German-built landing craft (200 tons, 136 feet, 12 knots), for use in the logistic support of the 6th Division in the defence of Denmark and the Baltic coastline under CINCNORTH. According to Weyer’s Warships of the World, recent plans envisage the building of six new 1,400 ton, 17 knot landing ships.
Thus understandably the Bundeswehr is primarily organised for short-range operations in defence of German and Danish territory. It could provide airlifted forces on a scale rather larger than the British to counter aggression elsewhere should it be possible to spare them from the central front. But, in view of the massive forces deployed by the Pact in central Europe and the probability that the Pact would counter the deployment elsewhere of considerable German forces by increasing the tension in the centre, this is rather unlikely.
Southern Flank and Mediterranean
Southern members of NATO tend to be the poorer members of the Alliance, and this is reflected in the material resources available for the defence of the southern flank rather than in manpower.
Italy’s[6] army, equivalent to about ten divisions, provides practically the whole of LANDSOUTH, and her air force practically the whole of 5 ATAF. Under CINCSOUTH these are deployed primarily for the defence of the Alpine north and northeast frontiers, though they are, of course, also responsible for the long coastline stretching south. One parachute brigade and an air transport brigade are both based on Pisa, the latter with 14 C-130 Hercules and some 40 Aeritalia G-222 transports. Five Alpini brigades in the frontier corps would, as light infantry, be suitable for airlift, and there is an Alpini parachute company. Often an Alpini battalion appears as the Italian contribution to AMF.
The San Marco Regiment of marine infantry under the navy has recently been increased from one battalion to two, making with swimmers and small raiders a total of 1,200. It exercises with 41 Commando, Royal Marines, from Malta and with U. S. Marines attached to
11 International Defense Review, December 1972; Lieutenant Colonel Stelio Mardini, "The Italian Air Force,” RAF Quarterly, Autumn 1970.
the 6th Fleet. In the army, the Laguna Regiment is also trained in amphibious operations. The small Italian-built landing ship Quarto (764 tons, 226 feet, 13 knots) launched in 1967 is the sole survivor of a projected class of five, the others having been cancelled. Recently two ex-U. S. Suffolk County-dzss LST, have been transferred to the Italians, and there are also a number of ex-German World War 2 beaching motor transport craft and ex-U. S. LCVP.
The Greek Army has two parachute battalions, two or three commando battalions and two or three battalions trained in amphibious warfare, all under Com
mander, Raiding Forces, which like the Italian marines, exercise with 41 Commando and the U. S. Marines in the Mediterranean. The air force has 25 Noratlas received as military aid from the Federal Republic, 30 Douglas C-47, and two squadrons of mostly vintage helicopters. The navy’s amphibious lift is all ex-U. S. and consists of one LSD, seven LSTs, six medium landing ships (LSM) and eight LCUs, a sizeable lift by European standards, if badly dated.
"My greatest need is modernisation,” said Lieutenant General Kostakos, Armed Forces Commander, "since the threat is modern—and this includes aircraft, avi-
West German ability to move by air and by sea is exemplified by the twin turboprop Transall C-160, (right), of which the Luftwaffe has about 80 and the LCU Schlei (below), a 12-knot 200-ton vessel used for logistic support of troops on the Baltic coast. A dozen LCU are in service, with ten more in reserve. Maximum payload of the Transall (which also serves the French and Turkish air forces) is 77% ton*- The view at upper right shows Italian Alpine troops deplaning from a U. S. Air Force transport at Bodo, Norway, after having flown in from Turin, Italy.
/
onics and weapons ... I need transports that are modern and have a larger capacity . . . there are sufficient airfields in Greece but like the aircraft they must be modernised.”[7]
Turkey, with help from the United States and the Federal Republic, is modernising her forces.[8] Her army, equivalent to about 16 divisions, includes a parachute brigade. Last year the Federal Republic completed the delivery of 16 Transall C-160 transport aircraft, and there are in addition 30 C-47 and eight Hercules C-130. The navy has no amphibious lift; two ex-U. S. World War 2 LSTs are used as repair ships. The role and amphibious capability of three battalions said to be marines is therefore open to doubt.
The sea- and air-mobile elements of these forces indigenous to the southern flank undoubtedly have tactical significance, but for strategic reinforcement that flank would appear to depend heavily on the U. S. 6th Fleet—both for sea and air cover and for amphibious reinforcement—the Royal Marines’ 41 Commando with whatever British amphibious shipping happened to be >n the Mediterranean would assist, and airlifted formations and units might be available from U. S. forces in Europe or in the States, from Britain, and, subject to what has been said above, from the Federal Republic.
1
Seaborne and Airborne Mobility in Europe 139
An important need is to inject an element of modern material into the NATO defence of this flank. While to some limited extent this might be done by strategic reinforcement in a crisis, it could also be done at better cost effectiveness, one argument runs, by providing Greece and Turkey with modern equipment in advance. Neither country is short of tough fighting men; what they need is modern equipment. The last generation to be phased out of U. S., German, or British tanks, guns, and aircraft would, if more modern equipment cannot be spared, be much better than nothing. The argument
is certainly cogent. If carried too far its weaknesses would be psychological and practical rather than strictly logical. Rich nations cannot stand aside and let their poorer allies do all the fighting, nor can all possibilities be foreseen and provided for in advance. Much might be done in re-equipping in advance—the British Centurion now replaced by the Chieftain is, for example, still a valuable tank—but a balance needs to be struck between the cost-effectiveness of re-equipment and the political and psychological demands for reinforcement likely to appear in a crisis.
Thus for both flanks the main NATO reinforcement capability is, with the exception of AMF, provided by the United States and Britain. To this there is one potential addition, the strategically mobile forces of France.
France
France remains a member of the Atlantic Alliance and, as a signatory of the Brussels Treaty of 1948, a member also of Western European Union, the latter carrying a definite obligation to send forces to the aid of other members should they be attacked. What de Gaulle did was to withdraw from NATO, the organisation and command system, advocating instead an alliance of the classic type of nations which retained autonomous military forces. Meanwhile France retains her link with the North Atlantic Council, has missions with the Military Committee and at SHAPE, and cooperates to varying degrees in the training of NATO forces.
In strategic reserve primarily for operations overseas, the force d’intervention, the 11th Division, was reorganised in 1971 as one seaborne and two parachute brigade groups.14 The 20th and 25th brigades thus became the 1st and 2nd Parachute brigades at a strength increased from 3,500 each to 4,600 each. They are stationed in southwest France with the divisional headquarters at Pau. The 9th Brigade (Troupes de Marine), retaining its number, was reinforced by a regiment of infantry tanks and a regiment of artillery, bringing its strength to 5,400. It is stationed in Brit- anny but remains operationally available to the 11th Division for airborne as well as for seaborne operations.
In 1972 there were some 450 helicopters and 300 light aircraft in Army Aviation, the latter due to be replaced by helicopters by 1975. These provide groups of about 50 aircraft for each army corps and of about 40 for each division of the field army and for the 11th Division. Groups comprise light (Alouette 2), anti-tank (Alouette 3), and troop lift (Pumas replacing Sikorski, H-34) helicopters. In the airforce Air Transport Com-
14Major J. R. S. Besley "The French Infantry,” Military Review April 1971; Le Monde 8 January 1972; Figaro 5 January 1972; Rerun Militaire Generate October 1972.
140 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review 1974
mand comprises three squadrons of Transall C-160 (a total of 50 aircraft), four squadrons of Noratlas (total, 130 aircraft of which some may be in reserve), and a few DC-6 and DC-8.
Specialised naval amphibious shipping comprises: the Orage and Ouragan, modern dock ships (8,500 tons, 490 ft., 17 knots), five Argens-class Batiments Debarque- ment Chars (BDC) equivalent to small LSTs (4,000 tons, 328 ft., 11 knots), and eleven L-class Engins de De- barquement d’Infanterie Chars (EDIC) (600 tons, 183 ft., 8 knots). The more recent EDICs were built in 1968-70; the earlier ones, like the dock ships and BDC, in 1959-65. The dock ships and possibly others are at present employed in the Pacific nuclear tests.
Of the two helicopter ships, one, the ex-British World War 2 Arromanches, twice modernized, has just been decommissioned after 27 years; the other, the croiser porte-helicopteres Jeanne d’ Arc built in the sixties, combines the role of commando lift with that of training. The navy has a regiment of Fusiliers Marins Commandos (with a World War 2 lineage) stationed at Lorient for embarkation in the helicopter ships and trained in helicopter assault.
The modern aircraft carriers Foch and Clemenceau and their associated guided-missile and escort ships would be available to cover and support overseas operations. In European waters or the Mediterranean, however, by themselves they would be inadequate in the face of Pact sea and air forces. At a minimum the close coordination of air defence and antisubmarine cover with NATO forces would be needed, possibly at short notice. Political uncertainties might add to the delay, while in situations short of war the policy of detachment from NATO would rob the force d’intervention of much of the political influence it might otherwise exert. Subject to that, these French units might provide an element of strategic mobility to the Alliance comparable to that provided by Britain and one less closely tied to the immediate defence of the central front than that of West Germany.
Scenarios for Rescue
intended for the main continental fronts and no doubt as a reserve for the Far East. But that need not prevent the use of some of them on the flanks of NATO, while the special duties brigades seem well adapted for coups de main there or at greater distances. Similarly, in 3 crisis the bulk of NATO’s airborne and air portable forces are likely to be tied to the role of reinforcing the main fronts or, indeed, to make up strength there in place of standard divisions, as airborne formations and marines often did in World War 2. It could be questioned whether for that role the effort would not be better applied in stationing forces on the spot- When it was formed in I960 before the British withdrawal from the East was seriously considered, the AMF may have represented almost everything the main theatre commands felt able to spare for strategic reserve. The tug-of-war between forward deployment and re- - serve is classic and inevitable and will be intensified by any U. S. troop withdrawals for no matter what reason. In what situations, therefore, might wider strategic mobility be needed?
Despite the publicity that has been given to Soviet advances in the Mediterranean, the northern flank presents the greater potential threat. To open the Black Sea and Baltic exits may have been an historic Russian ambition, but neither gives direct access to the Atlantic and the vital sea communications of Western Europe- Murmansk has better access to that, but the route passes through the North Cape-Svalbard narrows and the straits on either side of Iceland. Opening or easing the passage of these by securing flanking territory for forward air bases, anchorages, and underwater surveillance install3' dons would be a major strategic as well as a major political gain for Russia. There is an acute imbalance of forces in the Far North and, in event of open threat or attack, unless a rescue operation could be mounted quickly and effectively, the Alliance would be left with the dilemma of accepting the situation or firing the first nuclear shot. Thus in the absence of a manife5t ability of NATO to reinforce, it might well seem wiser to local inhabitants to reinsure with the Communis[9] even to the extent of accepting their military presence as until recently Egypt did in the Mediterranean.
Speaking to the press at Bardufoss after Exerd5C Strong Express in the autumn of 1972, Lieutenan1 General Reidar Kvaal, commanding Norwegian force5 in North Norway, said that in event of attack NA"fo reinforcements would have to arrive within 48 hours- Bardufoss, the military airfield and base 65 road mile5 from the ore port of Narvik and 88 from Troms^ thc provincial capital, is not the only possible objective f°r
15 Frank Uhlig Jr, "Speculating on Soviet Naval Strategy,”
Annual 1973.
Seaborne and Airborne Mobility in Europe 141
)t a Soviet coup in the Far North, nor is it necessarily it the most probable and vulnerable. Hammerfest, the e most northerly town on earth, and Banak, the airfield on the eastern side of the North Cape peninsula, are 3 much closer to the Russian frontier and harder to c reinforce from the south and west; Spitzbergen, under g German occupation raided by British commandos in e World War 2, is another possibility. But the Narvik- ,5 Tromsyf-Bardufoss area, the scene of the reinforcement e phase of Strong Express, will serve as an example for ([ a rather closer look at the general problem of rein- , forcement in the North.
The main phase of the Russian Exercise Okean of f 1970 was the deployment in the Norwegian Sea from the Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea fleets of ten missile . destroyers and cruisers, the helicopter carrier Moskva, .. and an estimated 30 submarines, supported by 400 \ bomber and reconnaissance sorties from Russian terri-
l tory. In the second phase, Russian marines in some
, 24 landing ships of the Northern Fleet simulated an
invasion of hostile territory by landing near Pechenga t on the Russian coast.
Bardufoss is some 260 nautical miles (480 km.) from Petsamo, less than an hour’s flying in an An-12, and, 1 provided NATO air defences could be overcome, air- , borne buildup could be rapid. The sea voyage from Murmansk to Tromsy( is about 400 nautical miles, . about 30 hours for a 15-knot ship, but by starting early . the first sea lift could be synchronised with a parachute
, drop. If necessary its first elements could be disguised
t by sailing in the Soviet fishing fleet which frequents the area, or might follow the German example of 1940 ( and use fast warships to seize key coastal points. The , Russians will not have forgotten their experiences in Finland in the winter of 1939-40 and are likely to be fully trained and equipped for arctic warfare, although it might be supposed that under winter conditions the scale of operations would be reduced.
Bardufoss is about 1,200 nautical miles (2,300 km.) from Salisbury Plain in Southern England where most of the British elements of AMF and UKJATFOR are quartered, about four hours’ flying time in still air for a Hercules C-130. In Exercise Strong Express it took 300 sorties spread over six days to complete the move of four battalion groups of AMF with full logistic support to Bardufoss. The main hold up is said to have been due to traffic.^cceptance at the single-runway Bardufoss airfield,''but peacetime safety precautions and economies may also have been responsible for delay. The fighting elements were, however, complete and ready for action well before the end of six days.
UKJATFOR is available at 72 hours’ notice. Used to bft the 16th Parachute Brigade Group, the 40 Hercules of the British tactical airlift could have dropped one
battalion group at Bardufoss, thus avoiding airfield congestion, and been back to refuel and reload in eight to ten hours from take-off. Thereafter, a second battalion group could have been dropped on a similar time scale. Subsequent lifts would probably be affected by servicing and rest requirements, but aircraft of the strategic lift and the balance of the British Hercules arriving from further afield would be available to assist in later lifts and in the logistic support of land and air forces deployed in the North. A low approach would reduce the warning time available for hostile interception of the initial lift, or for a hostile decision to intercept in a crisis short of a shooting war. The NATO air defence ground environment system (NADGE) in Norway should be able to detect and track intruders; air defence would be controlled by the local command, reinforced from Strike Command and other NATO forces as the operation progressed, and coordinated with SACLANT.
The sea passage from Portsmouth to Narvik is also about 1,200 nautical miles, 60 hours at 20 knots for the Bulwark and Fearless, 80 hours at 15 knots for the Sir Lancelots. From Scapa Flow it is 850 nautical miles; 43 and 57 hours respectively. Using helicopters and road ferry hards, unloading need not be unduly protracted, and sea movement would probably be less affected by weather than would air movement in the arctic mountains. Air and sea cover would be required and might be provided by carriers of the U. S. 2nd Fleet, the Ark Royal, landbased air, or more probably by some combination of these.
Ideally the ships would load and sail for the area as the crisis began to develop and, provided adequate sea and air covering forces were available, lie off, if necessary, to wait for the political decision to land troops. To achieve this would call for a state of readiness as high or higher than that of UKJATFOR, possibly precautionary movement to Scapa Flow, or more acceptably for longer periods of waiting, to Rosyth where more facilities are available. Maintained for long periods this might call for some form of rotation and relief, and in any case, if it was intended to deploy much more than the arctic-trained 45 Commando Group in British amphibious shipping, a simultaneous Mediterranean deployment would be impracticable. The maintenance in threatening crisis of a ready force by some system of reliefs within the Combined Amphibious Task Force would appear to present no insuperable difficulties.
Another difficulty is that of the arctic climate. As far south as the Tryfndelag, the populous and fertile area arould Trondheim, Norway lies within the Arctic and Subarctic zones, with deep snow in winter, continual daylight in summer, and the possibility of wet cold and thaw at most times of the year. To meet these
142 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review 1974
conditions calls for weeks of expertly supervised training under arctic conditions, and with special equipment. Without that troops are likely to be a liability, not only in winter, but at any time of year if overtaken by severe conditions. Of the British forces only 45 Commando Group and the British units of AMF are fully equipped and trained for arctic warfare. The ar- ticisation of helicopters, of other aircraft, and of road vehicles is also important and cannot be left to last moment improvisation.[10]
Thus, difficulties of deploying at short notice a force in the far northern flank and of maintaining it once deployed are considerable. It would be unrealistic to suppose that it could be done without risk in the face of determined opposition willing to go to all lengths. What might reasonably be hoped is that the rapid deployment of limited forces would make it clear that seizure of the area was not to be achieved by coup de main, but would require protracted operations, carrying with them the risk of escalation to nuclear levels. Although measures for subsequent build-up and maintenance cannot be neglected, it remains, here as elsewhere, that as long as its members prefer to rely on flexible response rather than meet the costs of complete conventional defence, NATO cannot make full provision for protracted warfare.
Reinforcement of the Baltic exits presents a more tractable logistic problem. The West German 6th Division is assigned to CINCNORTH and should be able to reach Copenhagen and the Jutland peninsula without undue delay, and perhaps, in view of the need to preserve NATO territory intact, to do something for Bornholm. Distances for other reinforcements are correspondingly less; from Salisbury Plain to Copenhagen for example is 600 nautical miles (1150 km); Esbjerg on the west coast of Denmark, 10-15 hours steaming from the English Channel; distances to Southern Norway rather more.
The difficulty here would be to release reserves for the area. A crisis in the Baltic exits would threaten both the main Scandinavian and north German centres of population and the main NATO front in Germany. At very least that front would be fully alerted, both sides of the frontier, in which case SACEUR would understandably be reluctant to commit his strategic reserves to more distant areas. In fulfilment of its role AMF would no doubt be sent to the Baltic Straits. Likewise, UKJATFOR and the 3rd Commando Brigade might be sent, certainly more likely than the 3rd Division, but one or the other might have to be held back in case the threat spread to Central or North Norway.
Such a crisis would in fact threaten general rather than limited war, and calls for reinforcement would be likely to come in from all fronts.
Turning to the Mediterranean, if achieved today the old Russian ambition to control the Bosporus and the Dardanelles would give Russian warships access under all conditions to the Eastern Mediterranean. With the appearance of Trident this will become less important to the strategic nuclear balance and it would not, now or in the future, open the way for them to attack the vital Atlantic trade of Western Europe. Subject to notice, Russian warships can use the straits freely in peacetime, which covers any crisis short of a shooting war, so that unless the Russian were about to engage in prolonged conventional war the rewards for the risk of precipitating nuclear warfare would hardly be worth what was gained by controlling the straits. However, if the Kremlin should think the risk worth the taking, the force level and time scale possible for Allied intervention could not be much more than a gesture against Russian armoured and motorised divisions pouring into the Turkish European plain or across the passes into Thrace and Thessaloniki.
More probable, and more practicable for NATO to counter with conventional forces, would be a local crisis, possibly Russian inspired, between Bulgaria and Turkey or Greece in which Russian forces remained ifl the background. Air support by the carriers of the 6th Fleet and by landbased air forces flown in by NATO might be the most important contribution militarily, but at the stage of threats and border incidents troop5 on the ground would have greater political effect, and at that stage the force level of NATO intervention migh1 have considerable military impact. Distance from the main European front and the circuitous sea passage from the English Channel and North Sea ports would limit early intervention to air transported and seaborn^ forces already in the Mediterranean, the latter including the usual Marine amphibious unit with the 6th Flee1’ 41 Commando Group from Malta should a cot*1' mando ship or an assault ship be available in the Mediterranean, and whatever forces Italian and Greek amphibious or other shipping could ferry to the cris*5 area or that the 6th Fleet could accept, possibly as3 second lift.
At this largely political level AMF would have itS greatest impact and would clearly be the first card f°f SACEUR to play. It might be followed by other NAT^ airborne forces and the seaborne forces already sug' gested. Should the crisis develop into a local war wid1 Bulgarian forces invading Greek or Turkish territory’’ NATO reinforcements might find themselves holding key areas such as Thessaloniki, Gallipoli, or Istanbul, though, in view of the limited depth available for thc
Seaborne and Airborne Mobility in Europe 143
defence, whether Thrace could be held might be doubtful.
At a distance of some 1,000 nautical miles from the Central Mediterranean, the timely arrival of sea lift would depend on some degree of prepositioning as a crisis was seen to be imminent. Assuming the Greek and Turkish armour to be already engaged with superior numbers of Bulgarian tanks, a serious weakness in NATO reinforcement would be in armour. The tanks with Marine amphibious unit or units with the 6th Fleet and any Italian tanks that could be ferried to the threatened area would appear to be the most likely sources for limited armoured reinforcement.17
Other opportunities for Communist intervention might come from local insurgency in, for example, Cyprus or Crete, or in some new development in the tunning sore of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Intervention, whether Russian or satellite, would probably be largely airlifted, with some use of amphibious shipping from the Black Sea Fleet, especially for heavy lift, and could thus be more easily countered by the limited mobile forces of the West than could an overland drive into Turkey or Greece. Here again, the political leverage of threatened intervention by Pact forces, not countered hy the prospect of Western assistance, might be at least as influential as its implementation in a shooting war.
Even if under Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions and the European Security Conference the situation on the flanks as well as in Central Europe should increasingly become stable and secure, the play of power politics is likely to continue outside Europe. The comparatively small scale of Russian seaborne forces and the limited range of the airborne forces make it rather unlikely that in the face of American sea power these could be employed effectively at great distances from Russia except by invitation. But with the prospects before us of population explosion, energy crisis, and continuing use of violent insurgency, it would be unwise for nations as dependent on overseas trade and supplies as are those of Western Europe to restrict their defence capabilities entirely to safeguarding their home
17In NATO Exercise Dawn Patrol 73 (June 1973), a force landed in Sardinia against exercise opposition comprised:
Tac HQ 4th MAB | u. s. |
l/6th BLT | u. s. |
2/6th BLT | u. s. |
41 Commando Group | British |
One battalion 32nd Marine Rcgt | Greek |
Tactical group San Marco Rcgt | Italian |
Tie British shipping comprised HMS Bulwark and Intrepid and RFA Sir Attaint. A troop of 13/l8th Royal Hussars (Chieftains) was embarked in 'be Intrepid before leaving the UK for a series of exercises in the Mediterranean, which included national as well as NATO exercises. In Dawn Patrol 72 a similar landing force was commanded by Tac HQ 3rd Com- 'fiando Brigade.
territory and to deprive themselves of all means either of assisting potential friends at greater distance or of playing some part in international peacekeeping.
How all this will be affected by the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973 at this stage one can only guess. No doubt ways will be found to weaken what now appears as a potential strangle-hold by the Arab states upon all those dependent upon their oil. At least the nations of Western Europe now have less excuse than ever for wilful blindness to all vulnerabilities other than that of invasion in Central Europe. Russia once again has shown both her wish to avoid general war and her intention to continue the game of power politics around the flanks of the central stalemate. North Sea oil has been shown to be a vital interest of Western Europe, and the importance of the adherence to NATO of land areas controlling it proportionately increased.
Technically, in the complex three-way balance of missiles, tactical strike aircraft and armour, tactical air strike seems to have lost something of the dominance achieved in 1967. If so, an aggressor who has established himself in occupied territory will be harder than ever to evict. It will therefore be more important than ever to forestall aggression by rapid reinforcement of outlying areas in crisis without courting disaster by exposing forces in non-tactical transit.
5Charles G. Pritchard, "The Soviet Marines,” Proceedings for March 1972; comments by Captain C. Chapman USN (ret), August 1972, and Major John F. Meehan III, April 1973. Also Meehan, "The Soviet Marine Corps,” Military Review. October 1972; Lieut-Colonel D. K. Cliff, "Paloondra,” Marine Corps Gazette, January 1972; Major General P. Maleenkov, translation Colonel R. F. Staur, "Marines of the Soviet Navy,” Marine Corps Gazette, August 1972. "Soviet Airborne Forces” editorial staff study, Aerospace International, March-April 1973; G. H. Turbiville, "Soviet Airborne Troops,” Military Review April 1973; E. van Veen, "The Soviet Airborne Forces,” U. S. Military Review April 1973; E. van Veen, "The Soviet Airborne Forces,” NATO’s Fifteen Nations, June-July 1972; Maurice Tugwell, Airborne to Battle (Kimber, London, 1971); John Erickson, Soviet Military Power (RUSI, London, 1971). Current issues of the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Military Balance, of Jane’s Fighting Ships and Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, and J. W. R. Taylor and G. Swanborough, Military Aircraft of the World (Ian Allan, 1973) have been used throughout on force levels, ship and aircraft performance etc.
A number of valuable detailed descriptions of Soviet seaborne and airborne forces have recently appeared.5 In brief these comprise:
[2] Hansard for 23rd February 1972, coin 1314. cf Mr. Joseph Luns, Secretary General NATO, "I do not believe that Soviet forces are being built-up for a frontal, all-out attack on the West. The fact that the USSR in recent years has embarked on an unprecedented programme of military reinforcement and related research and development may—and I repeat may—be interpreted as an attempt to draw political benefits from military strength. . . . After all, military forces, without a shot being fired, can in many instances act as a wedge for political influence, in this case Soviet influence.” Lecture to Royal Institute of International Relations, printed in NATO Review for July-August 1972.
[3] Brigadier W. F. K. Thompson, "Britain’s Strategic Reserves,” Brassey’s Annual 1971; Air Vice-Marshal Neil Cameron, "The United Kingdom Mobile Force” Brassey’s Annual 1972; Gordon Lee, "Standing by: Britain’s Strategic Reserve,” Economist Survey, 29 April 1972; Statements on the Defence Estimates (HMSO, 1972 and 1973).
[4]". . . we in the Royal Air Force have been presented with a great challenge. It seems to me that we should now begin to show in tangible form that we can accept this challenge. It is up to us to produce techniques and procedures so that with our new types of equipment we will be able to take over the functions of the carriers as they phase out.” Air Marshal Sir Frederick Rosier, at the time Commander-in-Chicf, Fighter Command, lecture "Modern Air Defence” at the Royal United Service Institute, 14th December 1966, Journal for August 1967.
[5]Jac Weller, "Bundeswchr Infantry Tactics,” Military Review, February
1971; Aviation Week and Aerospace Technology 24th April 1972; International Defense Review, August 1971; White Papers 1970 and 1971/1972 on the Security °f the Federal Republic of Germany and on the State of the German Armed Forces (Federal Minister of Defence on behalf of the German Federal Gov- ernment).
[7]Aviation Week and Aerospace Technology, 20 December 1972.
[8]Guardian (London) 3rd July 1972; Washington Post 10 May 1972.
Continental invasion is a simple, easily understood idea; in contrast the interplay of military power and political pressures in distant areas and on the high seas is a complex and sophisticated affair. Both are subject to nuclear deterrence, but should the effectiveness of that deterrence be doubted, it could be tested at less risk and with better chances of success in remote places or at sea than by blatant aggression in the heart of Europe.
Based around Moscow, on the Volga and in the Ukraine, the Soviet airborne divisions are primarily
[10]Sec Obcrst J. A. Poulsson, "Training for Operations on the Northern Flank,” Brassey’s Annual 1971.