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206
The threat inherent in missiles such as the enormous Soviet weapon seen on the preceding pages being trucked across Red Square is plain to everyone. And more than any single thing it is this threat which led to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks which Commander Beavers discusses here.
The ABM Treaty
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A he 1972 strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT I) between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is likely to be seen in retrospect as a landmark in the panorama of affairs between the two superpowers, but as an arms limitation measure its place in history may be more uncertain.
SALT I consists of two major agreements. The first is the Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union "on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.” This treaty, hereafter called the ABM Treaty, clearly constitutes the centerpiece of SALT I. It is of unlimited duration, though it can be abrogated unilaterally on six months notice by either side. The essence of this treaty is an agreement by both sides not to deploy anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) other than in accordance with very narrow numerical and geographic constraints—so narrow that they amount to acceptance of ABM levels and conditions by both sides which preclude mounting an effective defense against an extensive missile attack. A limited attack, say, by as few as a hundred missiles, might be defended against, though the geographic constraints of the treaty substantially limit even this capability. In short, in SALT I both the United States and the Soviet Union agreed for an indefinite time period to place their civil populations as well as substantial portions of their military and strategic forces in hostage to the other side.
The second part of SALT I is an Interim Agreement with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. This agreement has a duration of five years from the time at which written notice of acceptance by each side was exchanged, on 3 October 1972. It may, however, be revoked unilaterally, provided six months notice is given. It has a Protocol attached to it, which deals with interpretive matters and contains some noteworthy unilateral statements by both sides.
By any measurement, it is the ABM Treaty1 which sets the pace for future Soviet and U. S. strategic arms needs and policies, including the future of naval strategic systems.
The provisions of the ABM Treaty prohibit a natio11' wide ABM system, or a base which could be expand^ upon for deployment of such a system. Where permitted, ABM deployment will be limited to two widely separated areas—one for defense of the national command authority and the other for the defense of1 portion of each side’s intercontinental ballistic missile (iCBMs). For each area, no more than 100 ABM launchers and 100 interceptor missiles may be deployed aI launch sites, all of which will be situated within a 1$ kilometer radius of a central point. This permits, them no more than 200 interceptors and 200 launcherst0 be deployed by each side. Radars to support the t$° authorized deployments may be located only in a spec1' fied number of small complexes within the ABM deployment areas.
In order to assure the effectiveness of these basic provisions of the Treaty, a number of detailed corolM provisions were also agreed upon:
Development, testing, and deployment of ABM s)'5' terns or components that are sea-based, air-base^' space-based, or mobile land-based were prohibited.
Deployment of ABM systems involving new tyPe> of basic components to perform the current functb11' of ABM launchers, interceptors or radars was prohibit
The conversion or testing of other systems, such i' air defense systems, or components thereof, to perfor111 an ABM role was prohibited.
Both sides agreed that verification of compliM1^ with the Treaty would be by national means, whi^ refers mainly to surveillance by satellite, and that oel- ther side would interfere with the other side’s surveillance satellites.
A number of significant points about the ABM TreW will be evident. Three should be highlighted.
First, the low permissible level of ABM deploymer,t means that neither side will be able to defend than a very small portion of its ICBMs.
Second, the Treaty was drawn to the narrowest P1 rameters of the existing ABM systems on each side. Ti’c
Soviets had an ABM system around Moscow, thoug1
the United States had none around Washington, b11' the United States was well advanced in the deployruept
of an ABM system in the vicinity of Grand Forks, Not1
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'Factual material contained in this section, and in the "Interim Arl( ment” section which follows, was obtained in: Department of State Release, June 20, 1972, "Documentation on the Strategic Arms Limit*11 Agreements.”
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207
SALT I
Dakota, a system which could provide defense for a portion of the U. S. ICBMs deployed in the Dakotas. This situation led, therefore, to the balancing of the existent Moscow defense system with a U. S. right to an ABM deployment for the defense of Washington. The Soviets, in turn, gained the right to a second ABM deployment exclusively for the defense of ICBMs.
Finally, in its broadest context, the ABM Treaty is a force level agreement; i.e., in the main its constraints are designed to seek quantitative, rather than qualitative, equality. There are qualitative restrictions on future ABM systems and radars, for example, but the radar constraints are designed to prevent circumvention of the Treaty via radar improvements (in lieu of deployments) which might permit the use of non-ABM air defense systems in an ABM role, thus threatening a Quantitative advantage in usable ABM hardware.
The Interim Agreement on Offensive Strategic Arms
The constraints on offensive strategic arms under the interim Agreement essentially constitute a five-year numerical freeze on certain offensive systems at agreed fevels—presumably at or near those actual numbers existing (including missiles "under construction”) at 'he time the agreement was signed in Moscow on 26 May 1972. In fact, it is possible that the United States, under pressure to reach agreement in time for the Moscow summit meeting, granted the Soviets credit ,r°r more forces than they really had, perhaps, because 'he Soviets claimed more than they had in inventory Jnd under construction and because the United States cither could not or would not effectively dispute those claims.
The main provisions of the Interim Agreement limit 'he aggregate number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and of fixed, land-based ICBM launchers each side. The attached Protocol further elaborates 'hat the maximum numbers of SLBM launchers will be CM0 for the Soviet Union and 710 for the United States, subject to certain other provisos, including limits on 'he numbers of ballistic missiles which may be Counted on "modern,” i.e., nuclear-powered, submarines, and the number of "modern ballistic missile submarines” each side may have. The Soviet Union is Permitted 62 modern ballistic missile submarines, and 'he United States 44. These maximum levels are further c°nditioned by the requirement to destroy each old missile or missile submarine when it is replaced by new equipment. Missile submarines may be substituted for ,(:fi\is within the allowable totals, but the reverse is m^t permitted. When missile submarines are substituted ^°r ICBMs, a number of ICBMs equal to the number
of submarine missile launch tubes added to the inventory must be destroyed.
The Interim Agreement prohibits either side from building additional fixed land-based ICBM launchers other than those already under construction in mid- 1972. According to the President’s letter which forwarded the agreements to the Senate, this could mean about 1,618 ICBM launchers in inventory and under construction for the Soviet Union (exclusive of launchers for testing and training purposes) and does mean 1,054 ICBM launchers (none under construction) for the United States.
It should be noted that the numerical levels spelled out in the Protocol to the Interim Agreement are maximum authorized ceilings, not actual numbers in inventory. This distinction could become an important one in the future.
Senator Henry M. Jackson (D., Washington) has criticised SALT I because, the offensive arms Interim Agreement granted the Soviet Union greater numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs than those accorded to the United States. He successfully sponsored an amendment to the Senate ratification of SALT I which required that future agreements achieve equality.
It may be difficult to achieve numerical equality if subsequent SALT negotiations assume that the Soviet missile inventories are in fact equal to the maximum authorized ceilings under the Interim Agreement. On the other hand, if the starting premise is the actual numbers in inventory, we may find that the actual numbers are much more nearly equal than those permitted under the Protocol to the Interim Agreement.
Crucial to this issue, for example, could be the question of what the Soviet Union decides to do about the many "silo holes” which were dug during 1971-72, apparently for ICBM silos, but which as of mid-1973 had not been filled. The U. S. government accepted this evidence of "missile construction” at its face value, though the Soviet government may not have ever intended to use those silo holes. Or the Soviets may now consider that—given the ABM Treaty—their requirement for ICBMs has been numerically reduced. The Soviets were in a position to "negotiate” via this questionable evidence of construction activity because they had programs of missile deployment in progress. The United States did not. Similar analysis is possible in the case of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the true numbers of which were also subjected to considerable ambiguity in the final weeks before the signing of SALT I.
The Nixon-Brezhnev meeting in Washington in June 1973 produced a joint statement of intent to achieve a further agreement on nuclear arms by the end of 1974, which would include reductions in num-
208 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review 1974
bers of nuclear arms. This could mean that the imbalance contained in the SALT I Interim Agreement may be corrected via the forthcoming reductions agreement, probably involving the elimination of older missiles and perhaps older missile submarines such as the Soviets’ Golf and Hotel classes.
Since quantitative equality evidently was essential to the reaching of agreement on the terms of the ABM Treaty, why did not this same imperative carry over to the Interim Agreement on the Offensive Missile Systems?
The answer is not spelled out in the public record, though a number of possibilities are suggested.
In a Moscow press conference following the 26 May 1972 signing of the agreements, Henry Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, stated: "In assessing the significance of the freeze, it is not useful to analyze whether the freeze reflects a gap between the forces that are being frozen.” The following day, in a press conference held at the Intourist Hotel in Moscow, he pointed out that the Soviet Union had been adding to its inventory of ICBM and SLBM missiles at the rate of about 250 per year. "The question of whether the freeze perpetuates a Soviet numerical superiority is beside the point,” said Kissinger. "The question is: What would this margin have been without the freeze?”
Another plausible explanation of the U. S. decision to grant the Soviet advantage in offensive missiles under the Interim Agreement was the technological lead enjoyed by the United States. This explanation was favored, for example, by Aviation Week & Space Technology, which headlined its 12 June 1972 report on SALT I, "Arms Pact Disparity Laid to Technology.” Aviation Week was reporting on the basis of testimony before Congress by Defense Department officials, including Secretary Laird.
Inability to regulate technological inequality was— and is likely to continue to be—one of the unyielding realities of the strategic arms negotiations. It is possible to monitor most technological advances in nuclear weapons during the test stage of development. When development has reached the point where the new technique is ready for deployment, the chances for confident verification of the other side’s compliance with an agreement are poor, or impossible, in the absence of in-country, on-site verification. The Soviets have expressed extreme reluctance to permit such verification. Russian deployment of multiple inde- pendently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), for example, could not be verified by U. S. national means alone should the Soviet Union ever develop such a capability. The United States would have to assume that Soviet deployment of MIRVs was going forward. In
asmuch as MIRVs constituted the most significant qualitative edge in the 1972 technological environment of strategic missiles, it is possible, therefore, that the Soviets were accorded a slight numerical advantage in the Interim Agreement on Offensive Strategic Arms out of the recognition that U. S. strategic missile systems were "MIRVed,” and thus superior to those of the Soviet Union. If that is the case, it means that Soviet efforts to improve their missiles would be destabilizing of the Agreement on the face of it, and presumably could lead to unilateral revocation of the total package by the United States. President Nixon is reported to have informed General Secretary Brezhnev during the Moscow Conference that Soviet deployment of land mobile ICBMs, for example, would lead to abrogation of SALT I by the United States.2
There is another clue which suggests a possible explanation for the unequal numbers of missiles permitted under the interim freeze. During a plenary session of the negotiations on 17 May 1972, the chief Soviet negotiator, Minister Vladimir S. Semenov, sought compensation for SLBM submarines belonging to third countries (implicitly France and Great Britain) as well as U. S. SLBM bases outside the United States.
Later the chief U. S. negotiator, Ambassador Gerard Smith, totally rejected the Soviets’ contentions on this point. Semenov, on 26 May, repeated the Soviet claim for compensation because of U. S. forward submarine bases and SLBMs of "third countries.” Ambassador Smith immediately repeated the U. S. position as it had been given on 24 May.
"The United States side has studied the 'statement made by the Soviet side’ of May 17 concerning compensation for submarine basing and SLBM submarines belonging to third countries. The United States does not accept the validity of the considerations in that statement.”3 In the end, there is nothing, implicit or explicit, within the SALT I arrangements which in any way affects or constrains any U. S. ally.
Yet the final offensive agreement did give to the Soviet Union the right to possess a substantially greater number of both SLBMs and ICBMs than the United States was accorded. The interim nature of the offensive agreement means, no doubt, that all of the above issues—including the unequal missile numbers—are subject to further negotiation. Thus, it is not certain that Senator Jackson’s "equality” amendment, given some support by the Nixon administration, was merely
2John Newhouse, "Annals of Diplomacy,” part V of a series in New Yorker, June 2, 1973, p. 90.
3 Department of State News Release, "Documentation on the Strategic Arms Limitations Agreements,” June 20, 1972, p. 27.
intended to be critical of SALT I. It may, instead, have been intended to provide future SALT negotiators with added leverage in the form of advance Senate backing. In the latter case, its utility is uncertain unless the Congress is prepared to back-up its words with further action. Strategic equality in international agreements is not achieved by passing Senate amendments, but father by demonstrated economic, technological, and political readiness to prevent our opponents from alter- lng the balance of forces in their favor.
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SALT I and America’s Allies
In a speech before the Military Committee of NATO, ln November 1972, at Bonn, Germany,4 Senator Jack- son criticised what he called the "logic” of SALT I, which led to the ABM Treaty. Senator Jackson described 'bat logic as both countries agreeing "to remain vul- nerable to a retaliatory attack thereby assuring that even Hnite small deterrent forces will be adequate to deter.” He saw this "logic” as a manifestation of the "minimum deterrence doctrine.” According to this doctrine, said Jackson, "all that is necessary for a policy of stable deterrence is to maintain a capability to destroy some finite percentage of the adversary’s cities and industry ln response to a direct nuclear attack.” He concluded that: "Needless to say, minimum deterrence for the United States could easily be understood to mean no deterrence at all for our allies.”
iVital Speeches, Jimmy 1, 1973.
In spite of Senator Jackson’s misgivings, it is not clear that the logic of SALT I—which does indeed consist of an agreement by the two sides to commit their two societies as hostages—leads to any lessening whatsoever in the effectiveness of deterrence for America’s allies. To the contrary, SALT I accomplished two significant results which have extended the scope of deterrence not only for NATO, in particular, but for Asia as well.
First, the United States established during SALT I that its forward based "tactical” nuclear forces were not subject to limitation as "strategic” forces; i.e., the SALT l agreement has nothing to do with them. This could be important if the two sides ever get to the point of negotiating trade-offs for reductions of nuclear forces in Europe—intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), for example.
Second, by freezing Soviet ABM deployment at a low
.
Ballistic missile submarines of rival powers—the United States and the Soviet Union—make some of their rare appearances upon the surface of the sea. The American Benjamin Franklin (upper), displacing 7,320 tons on the surface, is armed with 16 Poseidon missiles. The Soviet submarine, of the G-ll class, displaces 2,200 tons on the surface and reportedly is armed with three SS-N-5 Serb missiles. Though both ships are similar in age (roughly, ten years), the nuclear-powered American ship is still considered first-class while the diesel-driven Soviet vessel is already viewed as a second-line warship.
level, the strategic nuclear forces of America’s alii* which could have been made meaningless by an panded Soviet ABM system, are considerably enhanced in their deterrent significance. Their usefulness has, i<l fact, been assured well into the future.
It also seems likely that the improved strategy stability between the two superpowers as manifest* 1 during the June 1973 Nixon-Brezhnev meeting l<) Washington, which led to a No-Nuclear-War Pledge will contribute to a better climate for the lesser pov* | on both sides. On balance, America’s allies should t^c much comfort from the results of SALT I.
SALT I 211
The Subtler Meanings of SALT I
As Senator Jackson suggested in his NATO speech, however, SALT I does signal an end to attempts by either side to obtain an advantage in strategic nuclear weapons which might make profitable a strategic attack upon the other. This was the grand psychological and political hurdle that both sides had to surmount in order to sign this Treaty. The price paid was dear, because it exacted the civilian population, indeed the two societies, on each side as hostage to the other.
The ABM Treaty limits ABM defenses to such an extent that both sides are precluded from effectively defending their societies in the event of a large attack by the other. As Senator Jackson and a number of other critics have pointed out, it is not an altogether comfortable arrangement. But what were the alternatives?
The principal hope of many who well understood the problem was that an ABM system could be developed and deployed which would have been capable of nullifying the terrifying consequences of an all out attack by ballistic missiles. Such a defensive system would not only have been a huge and expensive investment, taking years to complete, but it would also have required technological sophistication which may have been just beyond the vale of possibility. Those involved in missile defense during the second half of the 1960s were at a distinct disadvantage in attempting to deal with the many techniques which were developed on behalf of the offensive systems, MIRVs in particular, as well as relatively unsophisticated but effective ABM countermeasures.
Technological trends in evidence at the time of SALT I strongly suggested that the offensive was destined to maintain a considerable advantage over the defensive in this form of warfare for at least a decade or two. The development of these techniques on behalf of the offensive occurred largely in anticipation of the foreseeable ABM defense systems.
A technological environment was thus created in which any American administration, seeking to make a convincing case on behalf of heavy public expenditures for a nationwide ABM system, would probably have had to indulge in excessive claims about the prospects of achieving a truly society-saving, defense- dominant system. A decade earlier this kind of oversell might have been successful. In the wake of the Vietnam War, however, it had little chance of success with the American public or Congress.
It may be too early, though, to say that a defense- dominant strategic environment is in fact an illusion, provided the will exists to pay the price. (And provided, of course, that the arms control process can be flexible enough to allow such technological evolution.)
There were many in the United States who were convinced at the time of SALT I that a defense-dominant system was attainable in spite of the lead enjoyed by the offensive weapons in strategic warfare.
Even if a defense-dominant strategic world could not reasonably have been bought, the question will always remain: Was it wise for the United States to foreclose the right later to defend even the majority of its population in the event of a general war?
This failure to pursue all possible avenues, which might have provided for the saving of non-combatant lives in the event of nuclear war, testifies to the self- defeating national mood that restrained defense spending and plagued American policy makers and negotiators as they entered into and pursued the SALT I negotiations. The point here is not to find fault with the negotiators or the administration, whose hands were tied by the Soviet build-up and the unwillingness of the Congress and public to pay for added defense (or negotiating) measures. Rather, the point is to record the predictable outcome of negotiations under such constricting conditions. At SALT I we got what we were willing to pay for. Much of the criticism of the outcome has not been fully candid on this score.
Once the ABM Treaty was assumed in substantially its final form, the offensive agreement followed therefrom. Given the degree of parity already achieved, and the momentum of Soviet strategic programs, the United States could not have agreed to the defensive treaty in the absence of a full halt to the Soviet buildup in offensive missiles.
Another perplexing aspect of the SALT I ABM outcome is raised by the question: Why did we not obtain a Zero-ABM Treaty (no ABM at all for either side)? The small number of ABMs agreed upon provides only a very limited defense, and that (in the case of the United States) only for a few ICBMs. Would not, therefore, a Zero-ABM Treaty have been as good—or better?
This question becomes particularly disquieting as it begins to appear doubtful that the United States will deploy the second ABM (around Washington, D.C.) to which it is entitled. If the United States does not undertake a second deployment, imperfect as it may be, the Soviets will clearly benefit more from the ABM agreement than the United States. The existing Soviet ABM system does defend a significant portion of the Russian population, though the Moscow system can be saturated by a heavy attack and thus made meaningless. But in the case of a "light” attack, say, from China, many Soviet lives would be saved by the existence of this system. A "light” attack against the United States, on the other hand, would be unopposed—unless the attacker is so cooperative as to fire his missiles only at the Dakotas.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review 1974
For the Soviets, the factors leading to the agreements were undoubtedly in part economic. But their decision partially to outlaw the ABM was probably also influenced by an uncertainty of technological success. They faced clear qualitative leadership by the United States in the technological aspects of both offensive and defensive strategic weapon systems, a state of affairs which was not altered by either of the agreements.
Thus, SALT I codified a superpower impasse, a strategic stand-off, deriving from U. S. unwillingness to pay the uncertain cost of a society-saving defense network and Soviet willingness to compensate its technological disadvantages through a "brute force” deployment of offensive strategic missiles in large numbers. This impasse promises to obtain for a decade or two, and perhaps much longer—if the course charted by SALT I is further pursued to its logical destination by the two signatories. Only future generations will finally judge how right or wrong we were in the risks we undertook.
Some Ideological Casualties
basic military strategy in a possible general nuclear war should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been conducted in the past . . . principal military objectives . . . should ^ be the destruction of the enemy’s military forces, not of his civilian population.”[1]
This was a humanitarian statement, very much within the main stream of the military tradition of the West as it has rather consistently unfolded, at least since Clausewitz. In addition, Secretary McNamara hoped, on the one hand, to provide the other side with the maximum inducement not to strike U. S. cities in the event of a nuclear war, and on the other hand, to reinforce an otherwise shaky rationale for the large strategic weapons acquisition program he was pursuing.
Yet counterforce—resting on the premise that strategic weapons should "counter” the strategic weapons of the other side, either by destroying them or nullifying their destructive capacities—is the doctrine that fueled the strategic arms race and led in the end to a more precarious as well as more costly security for America.
Why? Because a deterrence policy which seeks strate- j gic forces sufficient to provide immunity in the event of attack by strategic forces of the other side is a policy that justifies infinite quantitative growth in strategic forces. Strategic commanders on both sides need merely point to the growing strength of the other side (which is taking place in response to the growing strength on one’s own side) as justification of the need for more "counterforces”. Obviously, in this seesaw process of ; building up strategic forces on both sides, a first strike capability becomes more and more elusive and costly.
Whereas the United States probably did enjoy a firs1 strike advantage at the end of the 1950s, and could thus afford to talk and plan in terms of "massive retaliation,” by the end of the 1960s the counterforce-race had pushed both sides to force levels that made a first strike capability unattainable for either side, except at economic costs which neither side appeared willing to pay. But the experience of the 1950s remained, and the "ideal” strategic model of the 1950s—counter- force/first strike strategic forces—continued to exert ! pressure on strategic policies of both sides through the 1960s. !
Though strategic doctrine was slow in reflecting the fact, first strike capabilities clearly had become unattainable by the late 1960s, well before SALT I became a certainty. Perhaps it was the growing perception of this reality that led to SALT I. Thus the most elemental
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5 McNamara, address at the Commencement Exercises, University ol * Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, June 16,1962. Quoted in Henry Kissing'
Problems of National Security (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 19^) p. 12.
rcsult of SALT I could be defined as the legitimization °f the principle that strategic nuclear forces exist only for
purpose of deterring the other Side from initiating their Use- This is the full meaning of the "mutual hostage” premise that underlies SALT I. It is exactly the opposite °f the premise which upheld the decisive kinds of nuclear "superiority” represented by first strike and/or c°unterforce postures.
One who evidently has been troubled by this "mu- tual hostage” premise of SALT I is Fred C. Ikle, recently , Rand Corporation and now Director of the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), replacing Ambassador Gerard Smith. In an article published in Foreign Affairs6 before his appointment to AcDA, Ikle wrote that we need to "cast out the dogma 'hat to deter nuclear attack, the threatened response must be the mass killing of people.” By taking advance of modern technology, writes Ikle, we should be able to escape the dilemma that "the strategic forces °n both sides must either be designed to kill people, 0r else jeopardize the opponent’s confidence in his deterrent.” Ikle suggests that the technology of "smart” bombs and missile accuracy improvements, among °ther precision improvements in strategic weapons, could provide both sides with "assured destruction on military, industrial and transportation assets”—the smews and muscles of the regime initiating war—while at the same time avoiding the killing of millions of non-combatants.
This is a tempting proposition. Its close kinship with me previously cited McNamara 'controlled response’ speech at Ann Arbor in 1962 is evident. The understandable humanitarian concern of both of these gentlemen highlights the degree to which the United States, in the formulation of its strategic policies in this nuclear epoch, must look beyond its cultural value system in order to grasp the bitter fact that as one succeeds in making nuclear general war more tolerable he is also making it more likely. That is, he is making it a more viable option. Ikle, like McNamara before him, seems to be saying that he is prepared to flirt with
that risk in order to deal with what he calls "a form of warfare universally condemned since the Dark Ages.”
The present state of affairs is mainly criticised by Ikle because it is only as sound, even in theory, as the degree to which rational men making rational decisions can be counted on. Granted. But some students of history may ask: What guarantees can we ever have in the case of the irrational assumption? Even "smart” bombs in the hands of an irrational political leader can be misused, or used to destroy non-military targets and non-combatant civilians whose role in the total scheme of the conflict can be the crucial element. The McNamara-Ikle approach suggests that we still some-
214 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review 1974
how lack a full understanding of the totally destructive nature of general war in our time.[2]
Is it possible that one of the intellectual keys which will unlock the enigma of the nuclear age for us is an awareness that the nuclear age does not contain any "perfect world” solutions with regard to the waging of general war? Short of—perhaps—mutual deterrence? Rather than weave elaborate general war technological models around costly and sophisticated "precision” weapons, it may be more important to nuclear stability as well as to our own peace of mind that we prepare ourselves psychologically, morally, and politically to live indefinitely with the imperfections of deterrence.
Of course we are entitled to seek to minimize those imperfections. Arms control negotiations in support of technological evolution toward a defense dominant strategic environment may answer this need. In any event, the point that seems to have been lost in all of the criticism of SALT I is that, imperfect as it may be, it has yet to be shown that it is not preferable to the counterforce-race of the five years that preceded it.
There is, of course, one other alternative. Many have given up on it. Nevertheless, in spite of the skepticism which it raises, perhaps we should not rule out the possibility that arms control might someday rid the world of the nuclear Armageddon kind of warfare. Indeed, that goal may be more reasonable to attain than the "painless” technology version. Admittedly, such international agreement would require progress in the solving of political differences which now seem beyond solution. Particularly forbidding in this regard is the bleak prospect for achieving in the Communist countries the open societies which would be a necessary precondition to the confident verification of such all- encompassing arms control agreements.
Another concept which has been altered as a consequence of SALT I is that of "assured destruction.” In its broadest sense assured destruction means the ability to destroy the other side’s society even if the other side strikes first with the full force of its total strategic capabilities. This capability to absorb a first strike from the other side, yet respond with sufficient force to inflict "assured destruction,” is called a "second strike” capability.
Assured destruction is sometimes given more precise parameters, such as an assumption that a certain percentage of the other side’s population must be killed in the exchange. Many regard the force necessary to provide assured destruction as defining that which constitutes high confidence deterrence.
However precisely or imprecisely defined, assure^ destruction forces will always possess two chaflC' teristics—destructive capacity and survivability. In the past, the second element, survivability, has been corded less emphasis in strategic arms procuremd decisions than the first. It has evidently been a simple and cheaper process to increase the destructive dimefi' sion of one’s nuclear arsenal than to invest in extending the arsenal’s survivability against an enemy attack, A[3] least that was the pattern before the United States h#* dismantled its Minuteman assembly lines. We tovC since, and perhaps belatedly, begun to think abou: extending the survivability of Minuteman.
SALT I marks a further departure from this pattern In its implicit acceptance of the notion that both side* have now reached strategic force levels adequate (°r "sufficient”) to high confidence deterrence, it emph[4]' sizes, instead, the desirability henceforth of enhancing the survivability of nuclear strategic force components This notion may appear to be contradictory, particular!', if the ability to survive is seen purely in terms oI defending against the enemy attack; i.e., ABMs. But11, is in that very element of the agreements—the essent^ outlawing of ABMs—that the ability of a weapon s)’s' tern to survive attack has been vastly enlarged in |[! importance.
During the process of inter-agency debate and delik eration which formulated America’s SALT position- many contended that SALT I should have been pursue mainly for the purpose of prolonging the useful $ of America’s fixed land-based ICBMs, by reaching Jl agreement that would constrain the major thm11' against those missiles and maximize the ABM defcn’£ they could be given. In the end, SALT I accomplish the opposite. It minimized the ABM defense permit , (It could only have provided less if it had achiev£u a zero-level ABM agreement.) And it did not apprechh reduce or control the threat against America’s upland-based missiles posed by Soviet ICBMs. The btt£( statement can be modified by one’s personal assessing; as to how SALT I affected Soviet intentions with regJf to MIRV. SALT I did not impose any MIRV contr°* The number of "large modern” missiles which ^ Soviet Union can deploy was frozen, but at a k' (somewhat below 300) which is probably too high 11 save Minuteman if the Soviets MIRV their huge ^ ICBMs. Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., former Director, DepJfI ment of Defense Research and Engineering, has U1; ten: "We know from watching the progress of gul ance technology that the day is coming when any uN
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8The author was stressing this same point as far back as 195” "Seapower and Geopolitics in the Missile Age,” Proceedings, June 1 41-46.
SALT I 215
weapon that can be found can be destroyed.”9
Other commentators on SALT I have noted its considerable effect on previous strategic doctrine. In his excellent articles which analyzed the history of SALT I, appearing in the May-June 1973 issues of the New Yorker, and later in book form, Cold Daum, John Newhouse describes the choice between an "assured destruction” and a "damage limiting” strategic philosophy. In theory, as he describes it, an assured destruction strategy (as set forth above) is not compatible with damage limiting, because it would "renounce the means of limiting damage to one’s own society.” Whereas a damage-limiting strategy would "deploy offensive forces capable of measurably reducing an adversary’s offensive weapons or would defend metropolitan areas with ABMs, or both.”
As Mr. Newhouse found it, then, the two philosophies are essentially incompatible and represent the extremes of two schools of thought alive in the American strategic community prior to SALT I. Mr. Newhouse suggests that in choosing between the two, America chose in favor of assured destruction, discarded damage limiting, and thereby arrived at SALT I.
It was not that black and white—at least not from the perspective of this marginal participant. Many other knowledgeable members of the strategic community during the 1960s and up through SALT I would probably agree that the split between views did not exist at the time. In other words, it may sound better as a description in retrospect. It is not wrong to say, in fact, that during most of the 1960s American strategic planners were pursuing both goals!
This raises the question, are the two concepts inherently incompatible? Perhaps not. Or if we accept that they are incompatible at the present extreme force levels—the more than "sufficient” nuclear arsenals now possessed by both sides—is there not nevertheless a reduced level of the balance of forces at which the natural desire of both the United States and the Soviet Union to limit potential damage to their own societies would be accommodated without eroding deterrence; he., without crossing the opposite brink of disaster which would bring such warfare to the realm of the viable?
These are good questions which, in this writer’s opinion, SALT I has raised, rather than answered.
We are nevertheless, after SALT I, bound together with the Soviet Union in a world which has been codified at least for a time as almost defenseless against its own most powerful weapons. Even the possessor of a qualitatively inferior missile force can be confident
Astronautics and Aeronautics, Aug. 1970, Vol. VIII, no. 8, p. 27.
that he will be able to inflict intolerable destruction upon the other side’s society—provided a sufficient number of his missiles survive a preemptive strike by the other side. And therein—the ability to survive—lies the key to strategic weapon programs and policies of the future.
Naval Implications
Both geography and technology have combined to make the SLBMs the most surely survivable of strategic weapon systems now in inventory on either side. It is so evident even a Secretary of Defense can say it publicly. For example, in his 1974 Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 28 March 1973, Secretary of Defense Elliot L. Richardson stated: "The sea-based missile force is the most survivable element of our strategic retaliatory capability.” This suggests that less survivable, fixed deterrent systems (iCBMs and perhaps bombers, to a large degree also a fixed system) may be assets of declining value, and that future programs for general war deterrence can be expected to move toward even greater reliance on weapons at sea.
It is easy to make this case in the abstract. It is more difficult to deal with some of the objections which are raised. The most frequently cited objection is that "the United States should not put all strategic eggs in one basket.” This assertion, taken as theological faith by some, has provided the principal rationale for continuation of the "triad” as the premise underlying the U. S. strategic weapons posture in recent years. A triad—three weapon systems, each sufficient unto itself for assured destruction in terms of both ability to destroy and to survive—is essential, it is argued, in order to provide high confidence deterrence. Otherwise, the proponents of triad believe, there is some chance that the Soviet Union might manage to frustrate a single system; e.g., the SLBMs.
The logic seems unassailable. But a new logic—that of the economic market place and competing national needs, military and domestic—is coming into play, partially as a consequence of SALT I. It builds upon a different set of premises. It accepts, as a conditional starting point, the notion that there is of course some chance that a single strategic weapon system (or two systems, called a "diad”) could be negated by Soviet technological progress or a "brute force” accumulation of weapons. But the crucial questions as posed by the new logic are: (1) What is the real likelihood of that occurring? (2) How long would it take the Soviets? That is to say, how much lead time would the United States have in order to compensate? (3) Would we
detect the Soviet activity? And (4) How much are we willing to pay for strategic forces beyond a point of clear high confidence deterrence?
The last question is not answerable on the basis of the depth of one’s anti-Communist convictions or distrust of the Soviet Union, as it is so often stated. Rather, it is a serious issue related to the wise allocation of resources and the building of true national strength for a contest that may last for generations.
SALT I, in its intra-governmental deliberations and in its final treaty manifestations, focused attention upon the above issues to a degree not previously experienced in the United States, and very probably not in the Soviet Union either. Strategic planners, uniformed and civilian, who hope to execute their responsibilities effectively and to influence national policy in the decade ahead would be well advised to mark carefully this implicit outcome of SALT I.
That unquestioned faith in the ultimate virtue of redundant weaponry—the triad—is more theological than logical can perhaps best be demonstrated by drawing a simple parallel. Not many of those who are so passionately committed to the triple deterrent redundancy of the triad would feel the need in their own personal affairs to buy three full value fire insurance policies, each containing the clause "no matter how many policies are bought, actual cash value of the insured asset is the maximum that can be realized.”
Strategic deterrence is that kind of a phenomenon. If adequate protection has been obtained via one system (or two), additional systems do not provide additional return.
On the other hand, if there is genuine doubt as to the lasting viability of even three redundant weapon systems, then it is not deterrence that has been bought but conditional deterrence. Some argue the need for continuing to maintain the triad on that basis. They can, with some justification, point to various menacing possibilities which might threaten to undermine any one of America’s present strategic weapon systems. As noted earlier, those possibilities are clearly most menacing in the case of the fixed ICBMs and the semi-fixed bombers.
Few knowledgeable critics, however, look upon the SLBMs as being in any real danger of nullification within perhaps the next couple of decades. There are a number of reasons for this, mostly having to do with the stubborn character of the difficulties involved in antisubmarine warfare. It is unlikely, for example, that even a highly effective ASW effort—one that would be costly and sophisticated beyond present known technology—could destroy simultaneously all hostile ballistic missile submarines at sea. To this widely acknowledged advantage that submarines possess must now be
added others stemming from the SALT I agreements-
In what it controlled and what it failed to control SALT I accomplished three things which substantial enhance the suitability and durability of the SLB-'1 weapon system as a single system that alone might ^ sufficient to provide high confidence deterrence well into the future.
By severely constraining ABM systems, SALT I cut' tailed the only weapon system (short of a problematical "totally effective” ASW system) which contained an)' promise of some day being able to nullify SLBMs. Alter‘ native means existed, and still exist, for the nullification of bombers and ICBMs; only continued ABM develop ment and deployment could nullify the SLBM.
By failing to constrain MIRVs, SALT I assured SLBM* of a cost-effective future that otherwise could have bed1 placed in doubt by the relatively disadvantageous "o!1 station and ready” character of that weapon system- Normally only about 50 percent of the total U. inventory of SLBMs is "on station and ready.” But will1 the Poseidon MIRV capability, this can number thou- sands of independently targetable reentry vehicle5 which are deliverable at any moment from but 3 handful of submarine launch platforms. Without MIRV this number is but a few hundred.
Another important consequence of the failure to bin MIRVs is, as noted earlier, the downgrading of "coun- terforces.” In the past, to argue that a particular system possessed high counterforce value was to accord th3t system a premium value. In part because their yie^ was smaller than that of bombers or ICBMs the P°' laris/Poseidon systems rated low on this count. Afte( SALT I, not only is that burden of justification substa11' daily removed from the submarine systems, the vets3' tility and survivability of the many-warheaded Poseidon or Trident missiles have become premium factors >n the post SALT I environment with its previously not^ emphasis in favor of assured destruction.
Let us now recall the earlier discussion concerning the seeming incompatibility between assured destruC tion and damage-limiting strategic forces and strategic Among the many virtues of the submarine-based deterrent force, not the least is the fact that its mobib launch platform can be well removed from the hord' land. Unlike ICBMs or bombers, it does not invite attack upon the homeland. In this sense, the submarine-based missile introduces damage-limiting characteristics into the balance of forces equation withou1 lessening deterrence. Exploitation of this virtue bv either or both sides would appear to offer proml5f toward solving the apparent assured destruction versa5 damage-limiting contradiction—a contradiction whid1 may be in name only, and which may be with us old) because too many strategists have viewed this probknl
purely in terms of the land-located weapon systems.
This is to say that if one of the three systems in the triad—the submarine-based system—is contributing to both assured destruction and damage-limitation, then we have disproved the notion that the two concepts are wholly incompatible. At the same time, if either °r both of the other systems (bombers and ICBMs) are hurting their assured destruction value by introducing complications into the damage-limiting picture, then these systems are less desirable in a post-SALT I world which has not entirely given up on the goal of fostering damage-limiting characteristics in our own (and our opponent’s) strategic forces inventory. I believe that this is the case and that "assured destruction” and damage-limiting” concepts are not wholly incompatible in strategic planning.
However, the critical question in any deliberation as to the future of the triad must be: To what extent ate we genuinely uncertain about the efficacy of any one of our present deterrent systems? In truth, we are probably not genuinely uncertain about any one of them! When pushed to the corner, even the defenders of fixed ICBMs can make a moderately convincing case that their system is sufficiently survivable to provide, >n and of itself, high confidence deterrence. If it is true that each of our three costly systems possesses this Quality, then why must we pay for three policies that, by definition, result in no greater return than one? SALT 1 makes it more difficult than before to defend such an arrangement.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review 1974
At the same time, if any one (or two) of our systems is not providing high confidence deterrence, in and of itself, to continue to expend our resources on that system is not only to do so on false premises, it is also to waste funds that could better be invested elsewhere—perhaps in improving that system which commands the highest confidence.
Such "resource allocation” questions are likely to be raised frequently in the future in connection with strategic arms policies. That would also have been true in the absence of SALT I, but the agreements reached in Moscow on 26 May 1972 clearly reinforce this likelihood.
Some readers will reply that winning a war is not an economic enterprise. That is true. But, maintaining deterrence through decades of "peace” is. SALT I reveals an evident longing, on both sides, to eliminate or minimize the need for redundant deterrence forces. One of the unavoidable truths about SALT I would appear to be that it addressed these issues in terms of reinforcing the trend toward greater reliance on the SLBM system for the maintenance of deterrence. The triad concept may yet become one of the casualties of SALT I.
This is not likely to occur, however, until the proponents of submarine-based systems have fully resolved a second specific criticism or doubt about the efficacy of SLBMs as a force, sufficient unto itself, to deter nuclear general war. That criticism arises from another factor which has gained in importance as a result of SALT I—command and control.
The significance of command and control considerations in strategic weapons planning has always been recognized to some degree, of course. But SALT I focused more attention than ever upon the criticality of this facet of the strategic perceptions of both the United States and the Soviet Union.
The explanation here is as much political as military. One of the outgrowths of SALT I—the dimensions of which defy precise description at this time—is the changed political relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is too soon to call this new relationship "detente,” but at the very least it is a relationship in which each side genuinely desires to reassure the other that it harbors no intentions of beginning a major war—nor do the two sides want to run any risk of being misunderstood on this score in the event of accidental or unauthorized events.
It was not just coincidence that the SALT I negotiators reached early agreement—well before other more contentious issues had been resolved—on separate measures designed to control and reduce the consequences of nuclear accidents or accidental or unauthorized missile launches. This agreement included a sub
stantial improvement in the so-called hot-line communications link between Washington and Moscow.
The strong mutual desire to minimize the chances of accidental nuclear disaster was a manifestation of the fact that uncertainties surrounding the other side’s command and control arrangements can be contributing factors to instability and distrust in strategic relationships. A precedent would seem to have been set by SALT I that could lead to further cooperation on this score in the future. It is doubtful that all uncertainties have been resolved for either side.
The United States, for example, has less knowledge of Soviet command and control safeguards than the Soviets have about ours. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is no doubt aware that some have voiced doubts about the dependability of the Polaris command and control system in crises. Such reports have appeared from time to time in the Western press.
SALT I signals that such uncertainties must be dealt with forthrightly, ultimately to the satisfaction of the other side. In the future the command and control element of strategic planning appears certain to occupy more of our attention, efforts, and resources than ever before. Those who favor increased reliance on the submarine-based systems as America’s deterrent force cam not afford to belittle the fact that doubt surrounding the command and control feature of these systems remains a major hurdle to the fullest acceptance of Poseidon or Trident in the preeminent strategic role- If these doubts are unwarranted, no time should be wasted in setting the record straight. Whatever uncertainties may exist with regard to Poseidon or Trident communications, it is hard to imagine that they are not fully correctable—probably at relatively link cost—given present communications technology.
Some Conclusions
SALT I did not end the strategic arms race. Neither did it resolve any of the fundamental political issues between the United States and the Soviet Union. fn both cases, however, SALT I is likely to be seen 10 retrospect as an important landmark, marking substam tial changes in direction—both political and strategic
The new political direction can be characterized as a genuine desire to coordinate efforts in order to m10' imize the dangers of mutual annihilation and to min' imize the costs of a stable strategic balance. Some ha',e called this "detente,” prematurely, in my view. "De‘ tente” would suggest an agreement on outstanding political differences, which, in fact, has not taken place' Whatever this new U. S.-Soviet political relationship is called, arms control—the business of "writing
SALT I 219
rules” of the game—has become its principal manifestation. We see this not only in SALT I and SALT II now in process, but also in the recent arms talks with regard to European security. In purely arms control terms, subsequent strategic arms agreements are likely to make SALT I appear a hesitant beginning, imperfect in many respects, but nevertheless a genuine beginning down the road to a more stable, less costly, nuclear coexistence.
The route ahead is fraught with uncertainty and perhaps contradictions or reversals. Progress may be slow. Whatever may be the reservations of some members of the military community as to the wisdom or lability of arms control, we are nevertheless not likely ro see the end of it in our time. The wise military planner will learn how to use arms control.
This may trouble some readers, suspicious of the lasting qualities of such agreements as attested to by °ur experiences with the "disarmament” treaties between World Wars I and II. But arms control in the present era is a much different mechanism, even if less from choice than necessity. Unlike the naval treaties °f the 1920s and 30s which manipulated marginal dements of the power structure, SALT I dealt with the Aational survival of the two superpowers in its most ttme sensitive dimension. This, alone, does not assure m°re honest compliance, but it does assure more attentive and more forceful follow-up on compliance. Neither side is likely to become so careless and noncha- W in this instance as did the United States and Great Britain in the 1930s.
The SALT I strategic direction, which has consumed the bulk of our attention in this essay, is being characterized by most commentators as the beginning of an effort which leads from a costly, disquieting strategic arms race to a more economical, more stable strategic balance.
As suggested in the text above, however, one can justifiably be cautious, and withold any suggestion of eertainty, that we have in fact found the correct path t0 these possibly contradictory goals. It may be in the nuclear age that satisfactory stability can only be ob- tamed at great cost. If so, we err by measuring accomplishments purely in terms of expensive programs that have been outlawed through arms control, without regard to the life-saving potential of those programs.
Neither can it be concluded, however, that because a program is costly and sophisticated, suggesting a more "precise” or more "painless” version of general War> it will therefore contribute to stability. The latter has been said too often and in error in the past.
The point, here, is not to philosophize about seemly unanswerable questions, but to summarize the 'ntellectual breadth of the track that has been laid down
by the SALT I agreements. Of course SALT I is an imperfect set of agreements. It is only a beginning. If we stop here, we are certain to be dissatisfied. And if we go on, we may very well find that we must alter the track we have laid down. But none of this is intended to imply in any way that we can turn back.
Whether the "perfect” strategic world can be found with virtually exclusive submarine-based deterrent forces, toward which we appear to be evolving, remains to be proved; though I consider that the case is now stronger than ever before.
Given the SALT I framework, the drawbacks of an exclusive submarine-based deterrent appear to be in terms of mechanics and political salability, not theory. It is difficult to believe that the mechanics of a fully reliable SLBM command and control network—if that is a problem—could not be provided.
The submarine-based deterrent could get into difficulty, however, with the political or cost conscious aspects of SALT I. Does Trident, the Navy’s follow-on to Poseidon, for example, buy more survivability that is really needed? This will be a hard case to make unless there is some real doubt about the survivability of Poseidon. If there is doubt about the survivability of Poseidon, then the premise that submarine-based systems are inherently superior to others in a SALT I world is sure to be shaken. If Trident is nothing more than a replacement program for ageing Poseidon, as stated by both recent defense secretaries, Laird and Richardson, then the rationale or "political salability” for the program is likely to be most convincing when presented on the most cost conscious basis. This may favor slower introduction of Trident so as not to appear to be squandering Polaris and Poseidon resources, which are still in the process of modernization and apparently perfectly capable of providing high confidence deterrence well into the future.
That SALT I provides added basis for the placing of greater reliance on salt-water strategic forces in the future, there can be little doubt. What remains is for salt-water thinkers to understand fully the arms control rules and play out the hand accordingly.
The moment of reckoning which SALT I represents must have become inevitable once the United States proved unwilling to exploit its brief "first strike” strategic leadership of the 1950s and early 1960s. Such "exploitation” would have been entirely out of character for this nation. Nevertheless, that period of overwhelming U. S. superiority in nuclear weapons provided America with two strategic concepts which, though they lost their validity as the number of Soviet weapons increased, nevertheless continued to influence strategic weapons policies long after they had become meaningless. In its total impact, its constraints on ABM capabilities, and its concurrent offensive limitations, SALT I signals the demise of first strike and counterforce strategies for nuclear general war.
The first strike strategic concept became widely known during the 1960s. Its essential characteristic was not the notion that one side might conceivably choose to strike first, but rather that (if adequately armed) by doing so, that side might reduce the other side’s consequent counter-attack to acceptable levels. "Acceptable levels” was the key, and the weapon system which came to be acknowledged as containing the most promise of contributing to that goal was the ABM.
The first strike concept arose in parallel with a second basic strategic concept, called "counterforce,” which dominated America’s nuclear weapons policy during the 1960s. The fundamental premise of the counterforce strategic doctrine, as stated by Secretary of Defense McNamara in June 1962, was that ", . .
[2]The author has written more in criticism of the painless notion of
warfare in "POWs and the Political Willpower Dimension of War,” Armed
Forces Journal, Feb. 1, 1971.