This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
NavAir Forever!
Commander S. W. Kerkering, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Using an old aviation cliche, the procurement of military hardware has had the wind at its back. For the past decade, the press of major national commitments necessitated the outlay of billions of dollars for aircraft development and procurement. But the atmosphere is changing. The cost of individual aircraft has soared, and with the present reduction of military commitments and the inevitable attendant cutback in funds, it will be difficult to maintain a viable naval aviation capability fully responsive to all of the nation’s potential requirements.
It does not take much to realize that, even under a level budget, with new
fighter aircraft costing $16 million each and with the continued rising costs of other Fleet aircraft, it will be a tremendous financial burden to maintain a substantial and reasonably modern aviation fleet. Although major reductions in aircraft costs may not be possible, much must be done to retain our naval military aircraft posture. A review of our development and procurement methods is essential. We must take a fresh look at past mistakes, successes, and potential requirements, to determine the most effective methods of providing military aircraft—at the best cost—to the Fleet, through the 1980s.
During the past 30 years, naval aircraft have been effectively improved, even in the face of advanced counter
threats. This, however, has been accomplished by a large increase in aircraft weight, complexity, and in cost. The trends in fighter aircraft are typical, Fig- ure 1 shows what has happened to the weight of Navy fighter aircraft since the end of World War II—over 420% in- crease. During the same period, jet pf°" pelled fighter fly-away costs have increased—in 1972 dollars—from $200 pe( pound to well over $800 per pound, as indicated in Figure 2. The overall result has been an increase in cost, in less than 30 years, by a factor of more than 22, and this does not include the effects of inflation.
Despite the aircraft’s increase in weight, complexity, and cost, the pilot is able to do more, go faster, and accotn-
Comment and Discussion 89
plish his mission much more effectively than he could in the early 1940s. The normal top speed of first line military aircraft has increased tenfold. Computers, sensors, and other automatic systems are common for all phases of aircraft operation. This equipment can navigate the aircraft automatically to within a few feet of its destination, and will permit consistent bombing accuracies heretofore thought impossible.
Obviously, the high cost in aircraft is caused not only by weight increase, but also by a large increase in complexity. The aircraft weight and complexity per se are not the only culprits, it is the complexity of management, obtaining budget approvals, scheduling, testing, production, and the whole gamut of aircraft development and procurement procedures that are also at fault. These, too, are factors which influence costs of military aircraft procurement.
Still, the Navy must have been doing something right, because it has the most successful military aircraft in the world. Friendly foreign countries are requesting and using them, and the Air Force, recognizing their superiority for a variety of missions, obtained a sizeable stable of Navy-developed fighter (F-4), attack (A-7), and observation (OV-io) aircraft.
One reason—if not the most important—why Navy-developed aircraft have been so successful, is its procedures in awarding an initial development contract. The Navy requires detailed technical and cost evaluations by the Naval Air Systems Command (NavAirSys- Com) before choosing a winner of aircraft design competitions or proposals. The technical evaluation is made by some of the most capable military and civilian engineers in the world. No contractor’s performance prediction is accepted at face value, and so detailed aerodynamic, structural, propulsion, electronic, and performance analyses are made. In addition, potential maintainability and support requirements are evaluated. The costs also are thoroughly analyzed independently, not only development costs but production and support costs as well. The final recommendations are not the result of a "source selection committee,” which may be politically influenced, but of thorough determinations independent
of contractors’ estimates, of the true potentials of the proposed aircraft weapon system, and its probable costs. The recommendations, under these procedures, which go forward from the NavAirSysCom to higher levels for approval, have such sound bases that they have rarely been effectively challenged.
Another reason for the success of naval aircraft is the control which is exerted over an airframe contractor’s design by the Navy during aircraft development stages. As progress unfolds, not only are technical aspects reviewed and approved or disapproved by the NavAirSysCom but the aircraft are flown by trained Navy pilots, as early as practicable, so that changes required—and desired—can be incorporated and further tested before scheduled Fleet delivery. Only in this way can the Navy have confidence that a new aircraft model will meet Fleet operational requirements within a reasonable time.
The close control over aircraft development has been possible because of the centralization of all basic, related factors within the NavAirSysCom. They have the expertise to pursue advanced design concepts; to plan and control engineering design, developments, and tests; and to plan maintenance engineering and support requirements—all of which provide the Fleet with the best aircraft and supporting equipment.
A few years ago, a trend developed in aircraft procurement procedures, which gave "total weapon systems management” to the winning airframe contractor, including the full development responsibility of most complex components. This, at first, seemed to be a great idea, to better design and to integrate all required subsystems for a specific new aircraft. But in retrospect, with some exceptions, the government paid dearly.
What has happened under this concept is the often costly, duplication of effort between airframe contractors for the design, development, and procurement of the same basic equipment. Some navigation, escape, and computer systems, for example, could be used in more than one type of aircraft, but the total weapon systems management concept prevented this. Increased cost has resulted over the aircraft’s lifespan, because of separate space parts and support equipment. It should be pointed out,
however, that multidevelopment probably improved component performances more rapidly.
The complexity of total major weapon system designs, involving the concurrent development of numerous subsystems, made control of overall costs and schedules by contractors almost impossible. Many subsystems take longer to design, develop, test, and make reliable than the airframe itself, and yet the airframe design/development plan drives the schedule. The problem then of slippage in aircraft schedules and resultant cost overruns is normally not created by the new air vehicle itself. It is not easy to control progress and costs of engineering development, but the job is more difficult when inter-related multidevelopments are involved.
The problem could be minimized by eliminating the- total weapon system management concept, and returning to the government furnished equipment (GFE) system. Aircraft subsystems must reach a certain stage of development before being specified for a new aircraft design, and they could be designed for use in more than one type aircraft.
Recent examples of stretching the development dollar thin are the efforts in electro optical (EO) sensors. Specifically, there are emerging through numerous airframe contractors, a variety of forward looking infra red (FUR) and low light level television (LLLTV) systems for aircraft, all to do essentially similar, basic jobs. Each variety requires much engineering, tests, drawings, documentation, tooling, travel, and production costs. The costs could be far less, if the Naval Air Systems Command directly funded and controlled development of aircraft subsystems. The Navy knows what its operational requirements are—and they have the experience to establish the criteria for component performance. If GFE does become the norm, the Navy can then concentrate on continued perfection of new systems—with realistic timing of completed equipment, less time slippage and cost overruns, and probably better aircraft performance.
The emphasis in aircraft development now leans toward prototyping, or the "fly-before-buy” concept. This has been hazy and has resulted in a confusing picture, with many interpretations. If "aircraft prototyping” is interpreted to
mean essentially building research type aircraft, such has a big place in advancing our technical knowledge. If, however, it is interpreted to mean building one or a few military weapon systems flight articles (the AX for instance) and fully testing before production go-ahead, the result could be an unnecessary expenditure of millions of dollars.
There is a decided advantage in building isolated research aircraft in some instances. This is true, particularly, for new explorations to obtain a decided jump in performance ability. It is justified in the case of new, unusual, and unproven air vehicle designs. The Navy’s Skyrocket (D-558-i) and Sky- streak (D-558-2) for exploration of high speed aerodynamics; the Seadart (XF2Y) for high speed seaplane performance investigation; and more recently the Navy’s XFV-12A for augmentor wing investigation regarding V/STOL applications; are good examples of the best use of research aircraft.
In the early 1950s, much study was made to determine the fastest and most economical way to introduce new Service aircraft into the Fleet. A NavAirSysCom plan, Fleet Introduction of Replacement Models (FIRM), called for the production of initial Service aircraft for test purposes at a low production rate, using "hard tooling” whenever possible. Subsequent rate and number depended upon complexity, design, and progress. When design integrity had been proven, production rates were accelerated. With some modifications, the NavAirSysCom still follows this plan. The full FIRM plan is a study in itself, but briefly, it provides more test aircraft early in the program permitting qualified new aircraft to arrive in the Fleet at least two years sooner than the fly-before-buy method.
A few "fly-before-buy” aircraft are
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication in these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged. The U. S. Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion published in the Proceedings.
insufficient for a thorough, timely evaluation. Changes are always required; these usually involve lengthy flight tests for structures, avionics, carrier suitability, aerodynamics, and armament systems. Years of effort may be required if only a few flight test articles are available. The "fly-before-buy” route, using only a few aircraft, takes such a long time that the aircraft approaches obsolescence before reaching service—and it costs more.
Indirectly involved in the high cost of aircraft, is the management layering that has occurred over the past several decades in the Department of Defense, as well as the defense industry. For instance, it seems only a few years ago that the recommendations of the Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer), the predecessor to the NavAirSysCom, on aircraft development, went directly up the chain of command to the Chief of Naval Operation for further approval by the Office of the Secretary of the Navy. Close liaison was accomplished by the dual positions in BuAer and CNO of qualified military officers. Today, decisionmaking and approvals of similar efforts pass from NavAirSysCom, through the Chief of Naval Material, Chief of Naval Operations, and Secretary of the Navy to the Department of Defense. There are many reasons for this, but it has led to elaborate efforts to provide better management procedures. Many general and detailed directives, and master plans, emerged at all levels in the Defense Department and the Navy. These spilled over and influenced defense contractors, while many consulting firms formed— all of which had an indirect snowballing effect on aircraft costs.
Another example of management layering resulted from the stress on early operational testing of new aircraft models. In itself, this is an excellent requirement. But concurrent aircraft engineering and operational testing has essentially been done for years by the Navy’s qualified test pilots. Improvements, no doubt, can always be made. Now, however, because of increased visibility in this effort, an expanded office in DOD has emerged, resulting in additional staffing, down the line. The relatively few changes in actual tests and procedures taking place, could be accomplished at a much lower level in the
chain of command, with less cost.
As is evident in the overall business of new Navy aircraft development, much of the decision or approvalmaking has been floating up to higher and higher management. Upper managers recognize the problem, but supris- ingly, only part of it. They see only the layering above them, and not the similar changes that occur below. The number of levels of review now required are expensive, unnecessary, time-consuming, and too excessive for normal check and balance needs. The decision-making process must be simplified. Unification of technical and business aspects must take place at the lowest possible organizational entity, and confidence must be maintained in the decisions it evolves The working level—those who fundamentally manage the hard core engineering and funding of new aircraft development and old aircraft ini' provements—are best qualified to determine the technical way to meet those Fleet requirements spelled out by the Chief of Naval Operations. This group is the NavAirSysCom. What haS changed is the mountain of paperwork, discussions, and meetings produced to satisfy the demands of management under which it now operates. The Na'1 aircraft development programs operated well under somewhat simplified man' agement layers several decades ago,an^ the visibility to upper echelons good. They can work better this *>1 today. A return to the organization 0 20 to 25 years ago, with some modif0' tions, is worth studying.
Naval aviation has made great stride during the years. To a large extent,1 Inis because of the outstanding over^ performance capabilities of its aircrah and their compatibility with ships >n evolving Fleet operational requirement It is not just happenstance, but rathe- the pay-off from the perspicuity, P^11 ning, and professionalism of the Nu'r its aviators, and engineers. j
The Navy will continue to have n" afford the best aircraft, if the targe*1
kept in sight and the NavAirSysCom permitted to effectively control airh^ engineering and development. ResP01^ sibility must not be fractured scattered to the four winds, but c1’" solidated, with more doers and lp reviewers.
EMBLEM OF THE r. S. MARINE CORP
"Modern Realities in Naval and Foreign Affairs”
(Sa H. C. Bucknell, III, pp. 32-40, December 1972; pp. 90-93, September; and p. 84,
December 1973 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral Vincent P. de Poix, U. S. Navy, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency— In his comment on Captain Bucknell’s article, Mr. Barrett said that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
", . . seems to have an absolute lock on the attache systems and appears unable to conceive them as anything other than single-minded intelligence gatherers.”
As Director of the DIA, I would like to present our current view of the use of the attache. The DIA (and the DOD directive on attaches) regards the attache as the military adviser on the embassy staff; as the representative of DOD and the Services in country; as the overt, accredited, professional, military intelligence collector in country; and (when so designated) as the DOD representative for security assistance (military aid, training, and foreign military sales). If any one of these four attache missions is primary, it would be his role as military adviser to the ambassador. The attache should be the broad-scale military professional in the embassy. He should be the embassy’s political-military expert and economic-military expert. He should not have a background limited to intelligence.
It is clear that I am in agreement with Mr. Barrett on what an attache should be. How close are we to having this kind of attache? We do have a preponderance of broad military professionals. Only 16% are intelligence specialists, and even these have other qualifications, education, and experience. We generally have War College graduates in the senior attache positions. We recruit candidates with graduate degrees, with area experience and training, and with language ability and talents. We match military specialization with the characteristics of the host-country military Services. Increasingly, we are able to fill all of our attache positions with these high quality people. We also will be glad to use those officers who have been in the officer exchange program between DOD and State and, just as Mr. Barrett does, would regard this as a tremendous learning experience for them.
This brilliantly colored emblem, created by an unknown craftsman decades ago, captures the rousing spirit and long tradition of the Corps in a distinguished historical print. Reproduced in vivid color from an intricately worked embroidery, the emblem features a proudly defiant eagle astride the globe, superimposed on the fouled anchor. The crossed standards, each with afield of 36 stars, are balanced by a base garland of deep green laurel leaves. The flowing scarlet and gold banner proudly proclaims “Semper Fidelis." A ready-to-frame print measuring 26 X 35 inches overall.
List Price: $10.00 Member’s Price: $8.00
Order Department
United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland 21402
Please send------- copies of the U. S. Marine Corps Emblem print at
$-------- each. $______
(For delivery in Maryland, please add 4% tax) ______
Add $.50 postage and handling ....
Enclosed is check ( ) postal note ( ) Total of____ $
Name_
Address
Finally Mr. Barrett says that . . the attache system would have to be sweepingly revitalized from the career dead end that it has become.” We have done this, too. We do not put an attache into a country to serve a terminal tour. We are interested in their follow- on use. Their current promotion rates are above the Service averages. DOD, DIA, and the Services all regard attache service as high-level joint Service experience and as promotion-qualifying rather than disqualifying. As one pertinent statistic, over 400 officers with attache experience have been promoted to flag or general rank since World War II.
To accept the Battle of Midway as the end result of "the psychological import of 1922” as acceptable rationale goes beyond reasonable logic. It is, of course, an historic attribute of Americans to make do with what’s available, but to imply again that our success was because we "approached these two ships [carriers converted] practically rather than tragically” is sheer nonsense.
The statement "The American fleet was fully prepared to operate without battleships” borders on absurdity. As I recall, in 1941, the loss of our battle fleet caused a shock throughout the Fleet and, when known to the citizens, was akin to downright fear; "fully prepared to operate” is a terrible and complete lack of historic comprehension.
In summation, suffice it to say that the authors, with all due respect to their credentials, cannot really understand the nature of events when they can reach conclusions drawn so conveniently.
Sea Control Ship and the Navy Mission
Norman Polmar, U. S. Editor, Jane’s Fighting Ships— A recent issue of a British aviation journal stated that design of the planned U. S. Navy sea control ship (SCS) ". . . may be unconventional,” and may possibly include application of the small waterplane area twin-hull (SWATH) concept. Unfortunately, however, the design of the SCS is highly conventional.
Current planning now provides for eight sea control ships built to a conventional design 650 feet overall in length, displacing 14,000 tons full load, and propelled by gas turbines. Each ship will have four gas turbines, turning only one propeller shaft and providing a maximum speed of about 24 knots. The SWATH-ship concept has been turned down as have other advanced concepts such as the surface effect ship (SES).
Although the SCS promises to provide an effective platform for 14 SH-3 series helicopters and three V/STOL fighter- attack aircraft, it will be limited by speed and weapons to essentially an open- ocean, low-threat escort role. Planned armament for the SCS is two 20-mm. rapid-fire "Gatling” guns.
An interesting comparison can be drawn with the two Soviet Moskva class "carriers,” the first completed in 1967, 12 years before the first SCS will go to sea. With a length of about 625 feet and
20.0- ton displacement, the attractive Moskva design has two propeller shafts providing a maximum speed of 30 knots. About 20 KA-25 Hormone helicopters are embarked with only the elevator size preventing the operation of winged V/STOL aircraft. The Soviet ships each have two SA-N-3 long-range SAM launchers, an antisubmarine missile launcher, two ASW rocket launchers, two 57-mm twin gun mounts, and two banks of five torpedo tubes. In contrast to the austere electronics of the planned SCS, the Moskvas have elaborate search ; and fire control radars, considerable electronic warfare equipment, and both hull-mounted and variable depth sonars Thus, the Soviet ships are most versatile platforms that can operate in high-threat areas.
Considering the increasing capabilities of the Soviet Navy and the reduced size of the U. S. Fleet in the post' Vietnam period, more-versatile sea control ships would appear necessary for the U. S. Navy in the 1980s.
Possibly, the requirements for open' ocean helicopter antisubmarine ship* could be met by modifying additional LPH-type amphibious ships (such as the Guam) to operate SH-3 helicopters and V/STOL fighter-bombers. At this time- seven of these 18,300-ton, 20-knot ship* . are in service, with six being assigned to the "amphib” role.
Between 1975 and 1977, five large'-
40.0- ton, 24-knot amphibious assault ships (LHA) of the Tarawa class will j°‘n the amphibious force. As these ship* become available, the number of "dig*’[1][2] decks” in the amphib force could he held at six, five Tarawas and one Gild1 type.
The six other ships of the Gut* design could then be allocated to the sea control role. Although slower an possibly less stable than the planned new-design SCS, the Guam and her si*' terships are more heavily armed (sis eight 3-inch guns with a Sea Sparr° missile launcher in some ships) and ha'f better electronics (SPS-40 and SPs search radars, plus SPN-10 navigati011 radar and TACAN).
Comment and Discussion 93
With minimal modifications to the six LPHs for use as ASW helicopter ships, the funding now proposed for eight SCS at $100 million each could be applied to construction of fewer, but more capable warships that might be more suitable for the designation sea control ships. Future U. S. Navy mission requirements appear to demand more-capable ships than will be available with the planned sea control ship.
weight of fuel). The conclusion is that such a ship would not fit into a 15,000- ton hull. This vessel would very likely be as large and as costly as the 25,000- ton ship she is supposed to replace.
Another factor militating against putting all one’s eggs into one hull, is the idea of more smaller, more specialized vessels, which, it is felt, can do ASW and AAW jobs better than one large ship—and are more widely dispersed targets.
It is doubtful that Mr. Sear’s ship could fulfill one of the sea control ship’s main missions—the support of small scale amphibious operations in the absence of an attack carrier—as well as a V/STOL carrier.
One Hundred Years of Naval Authors
Captain 0. F. Unsinn, U. S. Coast Guard (Retired)—The point is well made that naval authors alerted the nation to needs for new technologies and strategies, to cope with America’s defense needs. It must be pointed out, however, that the Proceedings has also been used to give voice to polemics against sister Services. Two examples that come to mind concern the use of nuclear bombs and the "hostage” value of American airfields overseas.
In the first example, the case was made in the pages of the Proceedings, that naval bombing with pinpoint accuracy was somehow more humane than dropping nuclear bombs from miles-high altitudes with resulting civilian casualties. When the nuclear capability was lodged in a naval vessel, a thousand miles from the target, the moral arguments ceased.
Authors also extolled the value of a force afloat with no chance for sabotage in foreign ports, no need for reliance on foreign politics for continuance of the airfield in times of stress, and no large group of dependents abroad who would be subject to both enemy and host country pressures. Granting that a carrier, if undamaged, can move after a diplomatic breach, it is nevertheless true that a carrier homeported in Greece or Japan, has many of the shortcomings formerly decried in Air Force bases.
One last point—the comments following Major Utley’s article, "Special
Boats for Landing Operations,” in the October 1973 anniversary issue of the Proceedings, makes it appear that small amphibious craft were ready for World War II. I remember Marines going ashore in 40-foot motor launches in 1941. I also remember an article in The New York Times during the same year, describing the fight that Andrew Jack- son Higgins was having with the Navy in pushing his design over that favored by Navy constructors.
"The First Hundred Years
Are . .
{See R. C. Smith, III, pp. 50-76, October
1973; and pp. 88-89, February 1974
Proceedings)
Captain W. H. Packard, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Lieutenant Theodorus Bailey Myers Mason, mentioned several times by Captain Smith, was one of the early members and strong supporters of the Institute and a frequent contributor to the Proceedings. He was its Secretary in 1876 and 1878 and its Corresponding Secretary for the Pacific Station in 1880. A check of his name makes it pretty obvious that the first two Associate Members (Bailey and Myers) were probably recruited by him.
As the founder of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) in 1882, he continued to support the Institute. The first written directive addressed to the new office, which he undoubtedly wrote for Secretary of the Navy William E. Chandler to sign (on 25 July 1882), contained the concluding statement: "The United States Naval Institute, a voluntary organization of the officers of the Navy for the purpose of facilitating study, will be encouraged by a contribution to its journal of such matter as may be thought proper from time to time.”
Consequently, many of the early studies and reports produced by the Office of Naval Intelligence were published in the Proceedings, and many of the officers who served in ONI were, or became, frequent contributors. These included: French E. Chadwick, Richard Wainwright, J. B. Bernadou, J. M. Ellicott, Charles C. Rogers, and W. I. Chambers. Some of their writings were stimulated by their study of ONI reports on developments in foreign navies
which reflected adversely on conditions and lack of advancement in the U. S. Navy.
William S. Sims’ "explosive article in 1904” was based on Mason’s observations, first while he was intelligence officer for the USS Charleston on the Asiatic Station in 1896 and then as U. S. Naval Attache in Paris from 1897 to 1900. Improved gun sights and continuous aim firing by the British cruiser, Crescent (one 6-inch gun made 18 hits out of 24 shots in three minutes), which he had noted on the Asiatic Station impressed him greatly. His Paris reports to ONI and personal letters to Navy Department officials on ship construction and target practice attracted considerable attention, particularly his critical comments. In fact, ONI wasn’t permitted to have him return to Washington for debriefing at the conclusion of his Paris tour, as was normal. Rather, he was ordered to proceed to the USS Brooklyn, flagship of the Asiatic Fleet, where he joined the staff of Admiral George C. Ramey, as an aide "with special intelligence duties.” This new
assignment permitted him to continue his critical writings on the U. S. Navy’s inferior gunnery, as it compared to that of other major navies he had observed.
In the early years of the Institute and the Office of Naval Intelligence, almost anything was publishable as long as it didn’t jeopardize the safety of the source of the information. ONI studies were distributed to all officers on active duty, many major libraries, and several members of Congress and their constituents. As time went on, however, ONI found it more difficult to exchange information with foreign navies, because these countries could get whatever they wanted from American open sources, without bartering for it. This unfavorable situation led to the issuance of General Order No. 139 of 16 December 1911, bringing ONI into the censorship business for the first time.
With the improvement of the U. S. Navy, the furthering of knowledge on international naval developments, and understanding of naval science among its officers as common objectives for both the Naval Institute and ONI, it
is not surprising to find so much support for the Institute among the officers assigned to the ONI. In fact, one could consider that the Institute was in some respects a collector and distributor of intelligence during the decade before Mason’s establishing of ONI.
Second Edition
(Please use order form in Professional Reading section. Add 5Oi for postage and handling to each order.)
SAIL AND POWER is the guide for sailing instruction at the U. S. Naval Academy and is the designated text for the Navy-wide sailing program. Covering all elements of basic seamanship, it begins with nautical terminology, takes the learning seaman through the rudiments of handling dinghies, day-sailers, cruising yachts, and single and twin-screw power boats, and goes on to discuss racing tactics, heavy weather sailing, and other advanced aspects of seamanship-
The second edition has been thoroughly updated and broadened in scope with the coverage of many new topics including: basic hydrodynamics of sailing, recent theory on rigging and sails, recent spinnaker theory, instrumentation, boat management in heavy weather offshore, auxiliary engines, and more.
1973. 303 pages. Illustrated. A Naval Institute Press Book
Clothbound—List price: $14.50 Member’s price: $11.60 Softbound—List price: $9.00 Member’s price: $7.20
by Richard Henderson with Bartlett S. Dunbar
and
Power
Sail
Captain J. M. Seymour, U. S. Navy (Retired)—The 100th Anniversary Issue of the Proceedings is a collector’s item. Cap tain Smith’s reference to a lack of interest in the Naval Institute by its first President, Admiral David Dixon Porter, puzzles me because I read a letter from the Admiral, written in 1872, to his nephew, Commander George M. Bache, Jr., an 1861 graduate of the Naval Academy. In it he expressed a keen interest in affairs at the Academy. He wrote that he would agree to resume presidency of a reorganized "branch of U.S.N.I.” in order to put points across to Congress. To me, this indicates sympathy with the early general purposes of the Naval Institute.
Comment and Discussion 95
The letter to which I refer is one of many papers which my wife and I found upon the death of Commander Bache’s last direct descendant, Miss Elizabeth Bache, in 1968. Miss Bache was my wife’s second cousin. The collection includes personal diaries of Commander Bache from the age of 15, when he was captain’s clerk in the sloop Saratoga, letters to his mother during and after the Civil War, the Class of 1861 year book, Autographs and Photographs, several books by Admiral Porter, and many photographs. Now known as the Bache Collection, it is in the Special Collections section of Nimitz Library, where it may prove to be an interesting complement to the Proceedings’ own sources of Civil War naval history, described by Professor Heitzmann in the Professional Notes section of the Anniversary issue.
Other parts of the Bache Collection were donated to the Historical Display Center at the Washington Navy Yard three years before Miss Bache died. Interestingly enough, my friend Roy Smith became Director of the Center shortly thereafter. [3][4]
the wave action was there and the force made its own wind with 40 knots acting on whatever water was acquired on deck. This example is, perhaps, antique, but it is an example of ordinary, daily, routine operations which does not permit reduction of speed because of wet deck effects.lt is a question of not operating at all, or operating and accepting the consequences. It is certain that there will always be equivalent situations.
During the post-World War 11/ Korea period, there were several generations of signal books and tactical publications. Some memory recess recalls one of the pubs carried a signal, "Proceed at maximum speed without incurring topside damage.”
Speed is one of the basic parameters in a ship’s design and operating requirements. The naval architect and marine engineer design a hull form and propulsion to achieve the requirement. The builder demonstrates over the measured mile that the required speed has, indeed, been achieved. The new class will go into the books, probably something like "30-plus knots, speed classified.” The actual operational speed in a seaway may not be at all what the book says. Operational speed is determined by weather, operational imperatives, and willingness to accept levels of risk of damage to ship and injury to personnel.
There will be times when she sticks her nose in green water. The problem is to minimize the occurrence—and, minimize the effects when it does occur. With regard to shedding water, the requirements are sheer, camber, and facilitating flow-down, over and off. The newer freeboard considerations provide increased sheer where the main deck is a flush deck configuration. With a raised fo’c’s’le deck, the sheer is not necessarily adequate. This is in the realm of gross hull configuration presumably determined early in preliminary design. But sheer must be given its due as a factor—and has been notably lacking on some older hull designs.
Camber appears to suffer from time to time in the name of production cost savings. Weather decks with no camber at all can be found. Camber must never lose recognition as one of the prime ways to get the water off, particularly on the fo’c’s’les of small combatants.
Sheer and camber have been around
since the beginning of ships and seafaring. This should be emphasized, because there is so much innovation, sophistication, and other new approaches today, that there is a real risk of discarding the old, without adequately examining its necessity, validity, or the reasons why it managed to last so long.
The third requirement is minimizing obstruction to flow. There are two objectives; first, to shed the water to get the weight off and allow the bow to rise, and the second, to shed the water in as clean a flow of water as possible, without breaking up into other blocks of water or being driven back as spray.
The term wet deck and the word spray may not carry the emphasis intended in this discussion unless the emphasis is supplied. The physical spectrum ranges from gross, solid water to misty spume. The effects range from nuisance value misting of binocular lenses to significant structural damage. Damage to weapons is unusual, but not unheard of. The more usual cases are found in the middle somewhere. Varying amounts of water running on and blown from the wet deck degrades the effectiveness of all topside watchstanders (including those behind window wipers). Water and spray degrade the effectiveness and aggravates the maintenance of all topside optical and repeater equipment for shiphandling, station keeping, lookouts, signalling, and weapons control. It is not just a matter of shirtsleeves versus foul weather gear on the weather decks, it is the fundamental matter of the effectiveness of the ship as a unit.
Let’s invent a term —fo’c’s’le cleanliness. Relative cleanliness is the presence or absence of equipment, fittings, or other devices which impede the clear run of water off the deck and over the side. In many ships, both naval and commercial, one can see evidence of designers’ thought having been given to this problem in individual details. This writer has never seen anything addressing the problem of the fo’c’s’le as a design entity. Perhaps this is the byproduct of the unusual design evolution. The naval architect provides the hull form—let us assume—with adequate sheer and camber, then, the other design groups proceed to clutter it up with their "requirements.”
What is really necessary on the
fo’c’s’le? Foreward weapons; ground tackle and its mechanical handling equipment; and mooring fittings.
What is usually found on the fo’c’s’le? In addition to that mentioned in the previous question, hatches; scuttles; mushroom ventilators; fire stations, complete with all accessory gear; vents, sounding tubes, and overflows; life lines; jack staff; vent ducts and fans on house sides; assorted pipes and wireways; waterway bars; and an endless list. In fact, the fo’c’s’le seems like a handy place to put things on a space-limited ship.
In recent years, a basic change has occurred in fo’c’s’le-mounted weapons— missile launchers, ASROC, and the newer 5-inch mounts. These are not crew- served weapons. This change opens the door to a new look at fo’c’s’le requirements. There is no longer a need for personnel continually on the fo’c’s’le deck underway. Are lifelines really required? They are most efficient at breaking up water into wind-driven spray, and are excellent in collecting ice in subfreezing weather. When not needed, lifelines might be stowed, collapsible or otherwise removed. Safety rails and tag lines, as in submarines, provide safe access for individuals or small groups when lifelines are not in place. In the final analysis, it may be determined that lifelines are required. The trade-off might not work out. Nevertheless, the opportunity exists for a new look at fo’c’s’le design. For a start, a lot can be learned by looking over the shoulders at the submarine decks. Subs have years of experience at cleaning up decks— though for entirely different reasons.
What are a few other candidates? Mooring fittings can be faired in. Waterways are just in the way. Why not radiused gun’ls? Anchor windlass and associated controls can be grouped behind a faired breakwater, thus sheering off water instead of breaking it up into a dozen patches. Forward faces of weapons can be similarly faired. Bulwarks and breakwaters can go far towards reducing the lifeline requirements and attendant problems.
Anchors can present problems peculiar to small ships. The distance from shell bolster to deck bolster is very short, at times all one casting. "Bow flare slamming” will frequently drive water up through the hawse pipe without the
deck itself even going under. Anchors recessed in pockets, with remote operable covers, eliminate this source of wet deck problems.
Distributive systems should not be permitted to terminate on the fo’c’s’le, unless such termination is necessary to meet an operation requirement. A little more thought can move a lot of terminations elsewhere. They should be run inside bulkheads and under decks.
Forward facing bulkheads should be radiused. Consideration should be given to concave radius where the bulkhead joins the deck. The list of candidates is limited only by the imagination.
It should be noted that destroyers produced shortly before World War II evidence many of these characteristics, i.e., radiused house fronts, radiused gunwale, relatively free from clutter. In following years, however, spray-makers, under the name "improvements,” have been added. Decks themselves have lost out to "production economies.” A lot has been unlearned.
All candidates for fo’c’s’le installation must be approached with two questions: Is the location of this item on the fo’c’s’le mandatory to meet an operational requirement; and for each "must” installation, what can enhance shedding water and minimizing spray?
Every item on the fo’c’s’le must first, be justified as mandatory, then, second, the installation designed to minimize the wet deck effect. A really thorough approach would address the fo’c’s’le as a whole; an integrated design considering not only the individual elements, but their relationships to each other to produce an optimum fo’c’s’le design— the fo’c’s’le as an entity.
Some of the suggestions outlined will cost money—additional cost in initial construction. By adopting the clean fo’c’s’le philosophy, however, many benefits can be gained simply by driving the philosophy with its dry ship objectives down into detail design. The results will yield a dryer ship—improved seakeeping ability; higher operating speeds as limited by weather/tactical conditions; reduced topside damage and maintenance; and enhanced watch- stander performance. In the long haul, increased initial costs may pleasantly surprise everybody by yielding more operating effectiveness for the money.
New Soviet Warships:
Are They of Superior Design?
Chief Radio Supervisor Ronald D. Lou\ Royal Australian Navy—A study of the 1973. Jane’s Fighting Ships shows noted differences in naval policy influencing current British and U. S. warship designs, to those of the Soviet Navy. When translated into hardware, these differences become quite revealing in the Krivak and Kara classes.
The Soviet Navy is building its new cruisers and destroyers with a wide range of surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missile systems. The British and U. S. Navies, however, continue to fit their new destroyers and frigates with 4.5 and 5-inch guns, with no apparent SSM capability commensurate to their Soviet counterparts. Furthermore, guided missiles in their many and varied configurations, were extensively employed by both sides during the recent Middle East conflict, and the effective results achieved by these missiles, leaves little room for doubt that they have become the main weapon systems for the future, by land, sea, and air forces.
Is there any point then, in retaining the 4.5 and 5-inch guns on new British and U. S. warships, especially the Type 42, Type 82, County-class, DLGNs, the Spruance, Knox, and the proposed patrol frigate classes? In addition, on the new Soviet ships, the largest gun now mounted is the 3-inch (76-mm.), which indicates that gunnery systems have been relegated to a secondary role ,n favor of SSM armament. Though effec- tive naval gunfire support was provided by allied ships during the Vietnam war, is this reason for continued fitting ot 4.5 and 5-inch guns, when in the future, the "opposition” ashore in similar circumstances, will more than likely PoS' sess an active SSM capability?
Finally, if new British and U. S. warships are not designed to effectively engage in combat with ships of Krivak Kara, Kresta, and Kynda classes, then how are they to be dealt with? The psSt ten years has seen the Soviet Navy de- velop and commission a number of re- markable and advanced warship design*- of which the Krivak and Kara are the latest. In view of this progressive development, it would appear that the Sovi£t Navy may well have established an ufl’
Comment and Discussion 97
questioned reputation and lead for pro- ducing superior cruiser and destroyer designs, compared to current allied construction. This could have serious consequences for future allied control of the seas, if these new Soviet ships are produced in quantity.
"U. S. Navy—50 Years Later”
(See W. F. Postcl, pp. 144, October 1973
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander G. H. Gregory, Medical Service Corps, U. S. Navy— Commander Postel’s nostalgic final letter to the Naval Institute evokes images of wooden ships, iron men, and unswerving dedication to God, country and the Navy; in sum, a simpler time. Perhaps it could be said that "the good old days” are most enjoyed in retrospect, yet it is abundantly apparent that there has been an unimagined change in the Navy in recent years, both in hardware and men. The "transition from coal burners to nuclear reactors” has as its
concomitant the transition from stokers to reactor operators.
Commander Postel’s statement concerning the mutual respect of "officers, chief petty officers, petty officers, and non-rated men” in bygone days contains a signal clue to understanding-the alienation which exists in today’s Navy. That clue is the phrase mutual respect, with accent on mutual. That mutuality of respect does not characterize our present state of interpersonal relations is true beyond doubt. This alienation and lack of respect can be said to exist in virtually all pay grades.
To combat this alienation, we see two concurrent, yet mutually, antagonistic phenomena. Much to its credit, the Navy recognized this problem some time ago and instituted several ambitious counter-efforts which have recently been combined into the Human Goals Program. This program is perhaps the most extensive, comprehensive, and important effort ever dedicated to the improvement of human relations and the efficient, dignified, and sensitive management of our dwindling (and invalu
able) human resources. The new human resource management centers, human resources units, counseling and assistance centers, alcohol and drug rehabilitation centers, and local command programs and councils,- coupled with the necessary personnel, training, and financial support, provide the basis for an effective program with depth, flexibility, and viability.
Given the austerity of human and fiscal resources which have been a part of the Navy for several years, such a mammoth effort would not have come into being had there not been a critical need, exemplified by a retention rate in both officer and enlisted ranks that was fast approaching the zero point, particularly among the highly technical (and hence highly critical) specialties. Concurrently, the number of high quality men and women volunteering for naval Service was also at a critically low point, necessitating the lowering of enlistment standards. Thus, a concerted and dedicated effort was needed simply to maintain the Navy as a viable Service.
Papers from the Conference on Strategic Studies at the University of Western Ontario, March 1972
NAVAL INSTITUTE PRESS BOOK
CONTENTS:
An Historian and the Sublime Aspects of the
Naval Profession
D. M. Schurman, Queen’s University
German Seapower: A Study in Failure
Theodore Ropp, Duke University
The R.N.A.S. in Combined Operations
1914-1915
Commander W. A. B. Douglas, Directorate of History, Canadian Forces Headquarters
The Dardanelles Revisited: Further Thoughts
on the Naval Prelude
Arthur Marder, University of California, Irvine
Smaller Navies and Disarmament: Sir Herbert Richmon’s “Small Ship” Theories and the Development of British Naval Policy in the 1920’s
B. D. Hunt, The Royal Military College of Canada Canadian Maritime Strategy in the Seventies G. R. Lindsey, Defense Research Analysis Establishment, Ottawa
Problems of Naval Arms Control: The High Seas, The Deep Ocean and the Seabed
William Epstein, Disarmament Affairs Division of the United Nations
The Seas in the Seventies Lieutenant-Commander A. D. Taylor, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa
From Polaris to the Future
Ian Smart, Assistant Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies
It is these efforts, born in response
to an overwhelmingly apparent need, which are characterized by some as "experiments in permissiveness, in human relations, in social consciousness, in the pay structure, and in habitability.” Yet, without such effort, the present status of the U. S. Navy would be most disturbing to contemplate, let alone live with.
All this, of course, was the only possible response to a situation born of social change and the continuing demands of the Navy for high quality people. The barnacles of outmoded tradition and self-righteous apathy had to be removed lest the ship become increasingly sluggish, inefficient, and slow-moving. That some, if not most, of these efforts, because of their departure from traditional methodology, were perceived with trepidation is certainly understandable. Yet, one would expect that every individual sincerely interested in the future of the Navy, would see the need for dramatic and forceful action and give his support despite his initial reservation. What was experienced, instead, was a significant negative reaction
Add 50c to each order for postage and handling
A Naval Institute Press Book
CRUISE
of the LANIKAI
Incite ment to ff'ar
by Kemp Tolley
A sometimes rollicking, other times deadly serious classic that encompasses all of the elements of human interest. For more than thirty years, Admiral Tolley, Lanikai's one-time commanding officer, has searched out the background surrounding the remarkable mission of the old sailing schooner—a secret operational cruise ordered by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Aside from the unique saga of the cruise, the tale of the Lanikai is interwoven with the concurrent train of events which ended with the fall of Java. The interplay of international relationships, and the internal squabbling among high level military commands on the eve of world disaster all flow smoothly into a compelling narrative.
1973. 360 Pages. Illustrated. Bibliography.
Index.
Please use book order form in Professional Rending section
with much rhetoric, demands to "return to the fundamentals,” and warnings of impending catastrophe, which leads us to a brief examination of the second phenomenon.
This second phenomenon is exemplified by those stalwart souls who can be seen throughout the Fleet, wringing their hands and telling one and all about the old Navy, good order and discipline, and the evils of "permissiveness,” the new rhetorical trigger word that apparently encompasses everything from beards to decent pay. It is this group who, while demanding respect for their position and belief, deny it to those who have the temerity to differ in any respect or voice any demand for a mutuality of respect. It is this same group who seem to see disloyalty behind every bewhisk- ered chin, and yet are seemingly unaware of their own greater disloyalty as they outspokenly and deliberately deprecate and derogate the programs and policies of higher authority.
The demand is heard for a "return to the fundamentals,” as stated by Commander Postel, which are, in his words,
"command authority and respect, without any compromises, just but strict discipline, personal neatness and military bearing, and a devotion to the Navy and our nation.” These same fundamentals include giving obedience and support to all policies and regulations and apply to every person without any compromises. The arrogance and hypocrisy which permeate the attitude of those who believe that respect can be demanded on a unilateral basis and who also apparently believe that they are being loyal members of the naval Service by openly displaying their lack of support for the policies of the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, the various commanders-in-chiefs, and other high commands, are, to say the least, subversive of the "good order and discipline” they supposedly believe in. Such behavior can serve only to deepen the alienation, increase the antagonism and ultimately do great harm to that which these individuals purport to serve, the U. S. Navy. For individuals to demand that orders and regulations be obeyed, that policy and procedure be followed, and, at the same time, display a blatant disregard for those programs that ate contrary to one’s personal opinions can be devastating to a military organization. Much can be said concerning leadership by example and the deleterious effects on morale and discipline when the example belies the words. Simplistic thinking and rhetorical bombast which cling to concepts and practices which deny reality have no place in a modern, complex Navy. What is needed now is a "return to the fundamentals” of mutual respect and a "devotion to the Navy” of 1974, which includes support for all policies and regulations.
Having been involved in the "people programs at both staff and operational levels, I have had an opportunity t° observe and work with some of the most dedicated, motivated, and enthusiasts people—officer and enlisted—to 1* found anywhere. One disturbing attitude still surfaces with some frequency and can best be described as arrogant overzealousness, an attitude of "I have the answer, the solution, the system, and everyone who disagrees is a dolt.” This posture is, of course, just as lacking in respect for the other fellow’s opinion5
Comment and Discussion 99
as the attitudes ascribed to the barnacles. The advantages of seduction vs. rape need no exposition here, yet we see supposed human relations specialists confronting with ridicule, impatience, and intolerance those who have the "audacity” to express differing viewpoints or ask pointed questions. This confrontation would appear to stem from the mistaken notion that only by brute force can the desired objective be obtained, a rather classic rape vs. seduction situation with, of course, the expected angry and resistent response. There is no way that the Human Goals and related programs can achieve even a modicum of success without the willing cooperation and support of those in key leadership and command positions; one sure way not to get this vital support and cooperation is to mount a frontal attack against the opinions, methods, and beliefs of those whose help is needed. That the cause is just is no justification for arrogance and intolerance. It is imperative to realize that we are experiencing an era of human involvement and a Navy of human programs, yet the true value of this involvement and our resultant programs await the test of time. The concern voiced by many seasoned Navymen that humanism and a military organization may ultimately prove to be mutually exclusive is a valid concern and should be accorded respect and careful consideration. In a nautical sense, we are sailing with new'charts and sextants; and the advice and assistance of the old hands who have sailed these waters before can be invaluable in avoiding uncharted reefs.
There are no magic answers in either tradition or innovation. What is needed now is a careful, considered mixing of both and a willingness to respect and consider the opinions and ideas of all who will provide them. The reality is that society has changed significantly in recent years and this change includes a different attitude toward the role, importance, and desirability of the military. Our new recruits can be expected to reflect this change; rather than concentrating our efforts towards changing only their attitudes and behavior, we need a commitment to mutual change that can and will come only with concurrent mutual respect.
The Time of Great Challenge
Editor’s Note: The following is a speech given by Admiral Worth Bagley, U. S. Navy, to the Pilgrim Club in London, England.
Admiral Worth Bagley, U. S. Navy, Com- mander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Forces, Europe—This is a time of great challenge to the Western military strategist. With his civilian leaders, he is seeking defense concepts that are credible, substantial, and rational under a complex set of realities.
The multilateral arms and security negotiations are based on reciprocal concessions whose ultimate form depends on talks not yet completed.
The bilateral agreements between Western and Eastern countries, including the United States and the Soviet Union, create new conditions and opportunities, but do not invariably contribute to common perceptions of danger.
The growing reliance on international trade and overseas supplies of energy is increasing western strategic vulnerability.
The debate on strategy, highlights the difficulty of sorting out the margin where a flexible response strategy is either credible or an invitation to mutual suicide.
The increasing expense of defense manpower and procurement and the expectation of high standards of living are creating sharp competition for resources between the two. As one deals with these factors, there is no convenient pause for deliberation, no agreement that national decisions will be timed so that options may be studied, nor any hope that tensions will either relax or contract in any predictable way. We see defense budgets already being cut within NATO. The threat of reduced expenditures foreshadows other reductions and, as an opposite trend, mutual, strong Congressional support for the United States defense budget. It is worth noting that the largest share of that budget goes to the Navy—a priority that is unique in the Western world.
There is little need, in this distinguished group, to recount the historical patterns that link maritime power and national destiny. Pitt the Elder did not
confine Britain to a single field of operations. By using seapower to take the initiative in every quarter of the globe, he prevented the enemy from concentrating their forces, confused their plan of campaign, and forced them to dissipate their strength, "so the great years opened,” wrote Churchill, "Years for Pitt and his country of almost intoxicating glory.” Athens, in its time, was ascendant when it retained the initiative through seapower; its fortunes fell as it limited its strategic focus. Great empires and nations have risen and fallen in the centuries since, as the will to use the seas has been gained or lost. The determination of the United States to meet its commitments, to remain a global power, is best judged from the emphasis on naval building programs.
If it is true that seapower is decisive—that no nation can control its destiny without it, no matter what other strengths it may have—then one is struck today with the divergent national attitudes towards this aspect of national security. If the respective national reliances on overseas trade, sources of energy, and geographical links within defense alliances, are kept in mind, the trends for the future are not encouraging. For example, the nation building towards the greatest level of seapower—the Soviet Union—is least vulnerable and least dependent now in regard to each of these particulars.
The continental and Mediterranean states, who lack either the flexibility of large heartland territory or the luxury of multiple coasts, have turned away from the maritime traditions that served and protected them in the past.
The industrially-strong island nations, whose very existence allows no compromise with the sea, are in the act of rationalizing concessions on the character of seapower they require.
It is comfortable, if not wholly satisfactory, to relate these developments to NATO defense concepts that followed on logically from the dramatic invasion and land battles of Europe. Regardless of the logic applied, however, the growing western inability to use and control the seas is becoming the Achilles Heel of any NATO strategy. It narrows the range of response flexibility and raises questions as to the credibility of choices other than nuclear. But, beyond that,
the patterns of strategic thought that heretofore have been natural to the traditional maritime nations are losing the imagination and breadth that contributed so much to our history.
I propose to examine the role sea- power might play within new defense concepts. These are ideas necessarily limited to the perspectives of the U. S. Navy and the policies on which we are developing our seapower for the future, nevertheless, the possibilities should be judged against the realities which I suggested earlier must be taken into account to make our common strategy credible and realistic.
First, let me tell you briefly of the character of the Navy we are building:
It has reversed a funding profile that placed 54% of its resources in manpower and operations to one in which that proportion is now allocated to ship, aircraft, and weapon systems procurement and development. There is no other arm in the world with a more favorable ratio of combat systems and modernization to total resources used.
It has concentrated as a first priority on sea control forces to achieve a modern capability to use the seas in the face of the threat. There are new concepts— the sea control ship with helicopters and the harrier aircraft (much like your thru-deck cruiser), the NATO hydrofoil gunboat with surface-to-surface missiles, a frigate with multi-function weapon systems, a destroyer-based helicopter for surveillance and defense—just to name a few—and these programs are strictly controlled in cost.
It has carriers to project power ashore that combine the strike and antisubmarine function. The force is being built around four nuclear-powered task groups that can proceed rapidly to any point on the seas without pre-commitment as to use.
It has new carrier-based aircraft of the highest quality—a new fighter interceptor designated as the F-i4, with the extended-range Phoenix antiair missile system; a long-legged antisubmarine aircraft with sophisticated processing equipment, the S-3A; a pair of attack aircraft, the A-7E and A-6E, two planes that combine long radius of action, great bombing accuracy, and all-weather attributes; and, the E-2C, with modern early-warning radar and support equip
ment to integrate it within the Fleet defense system.
It has a modern amphibious lift and landing capability that will be centered on five new amphibious ships—the LHA—that combines the helicopter, landing craft, and Marine troop carrying function now dispersed among several types of ships.
It has a modern nuclear-powered submarine force that is soon to receive the first of a class of new fast attack submarines.
This Navy is being developed with a careful balance between quantity and quality, and between low and high cost, based on the threat, the resources available, and the strategic possibilities. We believe that the structure of this Navy and the plausible uses of seapower lead logically to significant strategic considerations:
► The carrier projection force can be employed as a deterrent to the imitation of conflict on land. It provides an additional threat—offset to the sea—which must be considered by a would-be aggressor. It can be used from the sea without posing a direct challenge to retaliation against friendly land targets, while gaining time in the case of an enemy surprise attack on the ground. These are key factors in managing a developing crisis.
► The carrier striking force can be placed and protected in seapower enclaves using a combination of projection and sea control forces. With this support, the force can deter credibly, or strike if deterrence fails, within range of suitable targets.
of
isolating the aggressor from means
► The carrier striking force provides a deterrence capability appropriate to any aggression in the NATO area—whether on either of the flanks or in the center. It permits prompt retaliation from seaward without additional hazard to any particular alliance land area. This concept can contribute positively to alliance political integrity.
There is an asymmetry between the respective pact and NATO lines of communication upon which reinforcement is based. On one side, those lines are centered on land; on the other, over the seas. The capability to project power on land from the sea, can deter interdiction of sea lines of communications being used during a period of strategic warn
ing. If deterrence fails, the carrier group is able to strike land lines of communications from the sea, without directly provoking the other side to retaliate on the ground.
, Naval forces are dual capable and, at choice, can escalate the battle either remotely from an offset position, or in conjunction with escalation initiated on land.
Strategic nuclear units at sea—the ballistic missile submarine—requite friendly sea control forces on the oceans to give credibility to their security. The relationship is not unlike that of an outstanding goalie, suddenly deprived of his forward defense—his task becomes more difficult.
Sea control forces, centered on the new capabilities described earlier, should be in the requisite numbers to patrol sea lanes over which energy resources pass as well as those lines of communication required to reinforce. With ne"' concepts and tactics, the battle may take a different form than in the day of the large convoy. This is proper in the fine of the speed, endurance, and weapons of the nuclear submarine and long-range aircraft. We should not, however, belittle the importance of bases for out own maritime surveillance forces in the near and long term.
From these general principles, idea* that I would stress are personal, arc arguable, but I believe defensible, there emerge several concepts centered on seapower, such concepts are appropriate
To an offset deterrence strategy. The threat from the sea as an initial and highly ready substitute for the cause and effect of the use of power on land.
To a gain time strategy. Crisis management of a conflict initiated with little warning and limited in its aims,
supply and exploiting his other vulnef' abilities. This concept avoids a prenaa- ture commitment on the ground, g'vt* time for broader political action, an" allows for the generation of suitable counter capabilities for use as desired And to a strategy to gain or mainM1* an advantage in reinforcement. The man agement of the asymmetry of lines11 communications in Europe. It empl°'' seapower to deter, but not provoke o11’ flict on the ground, when it has not y(- been initiated.
101
Comment and Discussion
These are strategies to which all of us can contribute. You will note that the emphasis on sea control forces within the American Navy is directed to the reinforcement goal, but also is related to the concept of protected enclaves. Control capabilities of the NATO navies give particular feasibility to this concept, and suggest a direct challenge to those who question the survivability of the carrier.
Let me end with a quote from George F. Kennan, that underlines both the risks and the opportunities of broadening the attention given to seapower in our defense planning. Speaking of the Soviet Union, he said:
The hotheads in their military establishment appear to be obsessed with the hope of breaking the long-standing supremacy of the Anglo-Americans on the high seas, and this strikes me, inciden- talfy, as the most irresponsible and dangerous, at the moment, of all Soviet undertakings, comparable to the Kaiser’s effort to out-balance the British in naval forces before World War I.
"Time to Secure the Seas”
{See F. B. Case, pp. 24-31, August 1973
Proceedings)
Carl H. Builder—Colonel Case has been much more even-handed in describing the balance of Warsaw Pact and NATO combat forces in central Europe than he has been in measuring the Soviet submarine threat. As with many others who view the Soviet submarine threat with considerable alarm, his assumptions may be unduly pessimistic.
He notes that ", . . the typical scenario for a NATO war projects a minimum warning period before Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe.” While this may be a standard and useful assumption for planning, it seems quite inconsistent with another standard assumption he makes: "Soviet submarines undoubtedly would be deployed on a war footing before (emphasis mine) Warsaw Pact forces launched a deliberate attack on Western Europe. If the Soviet Union adopted the sensible plan of wrecking Free World shipping at the outset, as many as 150 submarines, carrying nearly 3,000 torpedoes, might be in attack position on M-day.” Surely the
deployment of such forces cannot be so sudden or unnoticed or ambiguous that NATO shipping and ASW forces remain on square one. It could be argued that such an unprecedented migration of submarines would insure warning and, because of geographic asymmetries, permit NATO ASW force deployments before most of the submarines had reached attack positions.
As to the number of Soviet submarines cited by Colonel Case, one must reckon with the large number of older conventional submarines, such as the Whiskey class. The Soviet submarine force, as described in the August 1971 issue of the Proceedings, included 268 long range attack boats, of which more than 192 (more than 70%) were built in the 1950s. As with our own aging diesel boats, they soon must be retired. Even though they will be replaced by new and more capable nuclear-powered submarines, we can expect a sharp reduction in the total numbers of submarines and torpedoes that the Soviets can deploy in the years just ahead. And that may be a most significant future development, because even now the Soviet submarine threat to shipping is torpedo-limited. The increasing conversion to nuclear-powered submarines seems more likely to reduce rather than increase the threat to NATO shipping. At the same time, of course, the ASW and Fleet defense problems will worsen.
Colonel Case properly notes the evolution of higher-value shipping targets: "A container ship which provides the sustained lift capacity of four or five conventional freighters, when sunk, represents the loss of four or five conventional freighter equivalents.” But to this we might well add: A nuclear-powered submarine which is several times more effective than a conventional boat, is also several times as costly and as scarce a military resource. To use her against shipping instead of the fleet is to risk her loss under circumstances where she remains just as torpedo limited as her conventionally-powered predecessor.
These observations do not diminish the significance of the emerging Soviet submarine threat to surface naval forces and operations. The threat to our sea lines of communication is sufficient for concern without the overstatements of worst-case assumptions. We may, in
fact, do our many legitimate needs for ASW a disservice by either misapplication or overly pessimistic assessments of the Soviet naval threat.
Dr. G. K. Burke—Colonel Case seems to assume that the NATO allies will make no preparations to control the sea prior to M-day. He feels shipping losses will run so high that after 90 days, continuance of the struggle will be impossible.
Some experts maintain that a European war cannot last more than 90 days without becoming thermonuclear. Others (including myself) are far more skeptical, and no challenge to Colonel Case’s theory will be offered on those grounds. But on the grounds of basic preparation it must be pondered why, in time of a crisis, merchant ships cannot be diverted off the sea prior to M-Day; why reserve ASW units cannot be mobilized in advance of hostilities (certainly this would be far less provoca- tory than the mass movement of Soviet submarines to Atlantic strike stations); and why the Soviet fleets would be allowed to assume combat stations at sea unopposed (in the sense of monitoring). NATO admirals, as well as their Soviet counterparts, know where these locales are, and all Soviet submarines must pass the NATO-held Iceland gap. Surely, some basic plan must exist, or should exist, and rudimentary measures should enable initial losses to be substantially reduced.
Second, Colonel Case considered France to be a viable NATO Ally. Whereas President Pompidou’s government has been far more cooperative than General de Gaulle’s, though there have been indications that France is considering a more active NATO role than heretofore, until these trends become realities, dependence upon them is premature. French neutrality in time of crisis still must continue to cast an ominous spectre over every scenario. Regrettably, Colonel Case made his position in only a single sentence, and this could mislead the reader because of its brevity. Then, having given this brief position, the Colonel proceeded to draw conclusions based upon it.
Principally these called for the reserve mobilization plan to be altered in such a way as to delay the deployment of
American forces for Europe. This, the Colonel concludes, will give the ASW forces a chance to effect some disruption of the Soviet submarine fleet, and this in turn will greatly reduce American commercial losses. But, under prevailing conditions, without the presence of France, its forces, airdromes, port facilities, and above all, the critical depth to maneuver, what other basic alternative presents itself? An examination of the forces NATO and Warsaw Pact deploy holds little for the optimist, at least in the short term sense of initially holding central Europe. This becomes particularly cogent if American reserves were delayed in their projected arrival.
At the outset of hostilities, NATO, under current force levels, would have approximately 350,000 combat troops in 24 divisions. Against this the Warsaw Pact could field around 316,800 Pact troops (of dubious zeal) in 33 divisions, and up to 259,200 Russian troops spread over 27 divisions for a total of 576,000 men in 60 divisions. This means the NATO army would be outnumbered by over 50%, but by less than 75%. While that is not a favorable ratio it is not a drastic one if it is assumed that a 2-to-l inferiority is unacceptable.
Within 30 days the situation might well prove to be far more serious. Some estimate that within that time the Soviets could increase their forces to 70 divisions, or approximately 672,000 combat troops. When the 316,800 Pact troops are included that produces a projection of 988,800 men in 103 divisions.
In the same period, NATO’s only real source of counter-reinforcements lies in some six divisions, with approximately 100,000 men, based in the United States. Without their prompt arrival, particularly in view of lack of geographic depth in NATO center, the outcome of the struggle would seem to be, in the short run, assured. This force level would yield a solid 2-to-l advantage for the Soviets even if the Pact troops (whose zeal to die for Soviet imperialism must be questioned) were only granted a value equal to one-half their number. Even with the additional forces bringing the NATO army up to 30 divisions (450,000 men), that would still leave the Allies outnumbered over 2-to-l in total manpower or by better than 75% if the Pact forces were downgraded by one-half. This can
not be considered an attractive picture. A 90-day scenario could also be projected, but the results would differ little. The importance and prompt arrival of American reinforcements would remain paramount.
Under these conditions, it would appear that the problem of survivability of the U. S. merchant marine at the commencement of hostilities requires an approach other than the postponement of its deployment. At least this must be so under present conditions. Should these alter, for example, should France choose to reintegrate itself within the NATO structure, then Colonel Case’s call for deployment delay would be far more valid than it is now.
dates and enlisted men, the Navy must keep its promise to provide medical and other important services. It is imperative then, that the Navy explore new programs and increase others to counter the attrition of doctors—keeping the medical program first class. The new agreement appears to be "just what the doctor” ordered to cure the medical ills.
The Navy has provided, for many years, superior community health care— a successful health maintenance organization—ashore and afloat. It has performed this function and operated this complex system with high professional competence despite logistic, geographic, and professional obstacles. Health care support teams headed by the Navy doctor and nurse are taken for granted by Service people, but the leadership, research, and training expertise essential to develop these teams is only now being recognized nationally.
At every Navy hospital, massive patient case-loads are handled almost routinely by doctor-nurse-paramedic teams so competently that efficiency is expected by all hands. This condition can deteriorate, however, if manpower losses and frustrating career conditions are not countered. A major, logical step [5][6] is increased and better training of the paramedics-radiologic technicians, laboratory technologists, ward and administrative assistants, cardio-pulmonary technicians, and the many other health specialists who manifoldly expand the potential of the doctor, nurse, and hospital administrator.
The new program with Grossmont College for training cardio-pulmonary technicians as a first step, specifies that additional technical programs can be developed to meet Navy needs. Terms call for the Hospital Corps School to provide: sufficient space for establishment of a clinical training laboratory; clinical training for students enrolled in the Grossmont Biomedical Technology program in all phases of cardiac catheterization techniques; training for students enrolled in the Grossmont College Biomedical Training Program in all phases of pulmonary function testing; demonstrations in methods of expired air and blood gas analysis; and demonstrations in methods of non-invasive techniques.
Navy Hospital Corps School instructors with California teaching credentials j
may teach classes at Grossmont and vice versa. Navy and Army students may enroll in the cooperative program. The college will grant formal academic credits to cardio-pulmonary technician students enrolled in the college’s biomedical technology program by the examination process and/or College Level Examination Process. Subjects include technical mathematics; medical electronics; biomedical instrumentation systems; introductory physics; fundamentals of chemistry; and other specialized courses. Students must achieve a "C” grade and complete a minimum of 60 semester units of college work. Credit may be given by the college for up to 30 units to fully matriculated students via the college-level examination program for skills and experience already acquired by the student and/or in English, social sciences, natural sciences, humanities, and mathematics.
Representatives of the Surgeon-General offices of the Navy, Army, and Air Force have taken part in national conferences, seeking means for improved education and training of paramedical
technicians and physicians assistants. The cardio-pulmonary technician training program is a direct result.
New national conferences are being discussed, to focus national attention on the Navy’s successful development of paramedical-doctor health care teams at a time when national needs promise to swamp available resources of doctors and top administrators. Meanwhile, action already has been launched on the Navy- community college front and goals set.
"ARAPAHO—Emergency Helo Cover for Merchantmen”
{See). J. Mulquin, pp. 113-117, November 1973 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Harry E. Obedin, U. S. Coast Guard— The time schedule for ARAPAHO could be shortened by appointing a project manager, charged with the responsibility to make it work, and with the authorization to expend sufficient resources—receiving the same priorities as those provided for our fleet ballistic missile program.
The ARAPAHO project doesn’t go far enough. For example, several merchant ships could carry fleet ballistic missiles, configured to be installed as collections of containers for a fraction of the costs of one fleet ballistic missile submarine. Even one dozen such ships could add another dimension to the Russian defense problem against retaliatory attack from American missiles.
Packaged point defense systems could also be developed. These would enable relatively small, unsophisticated ships and off-shore structures (oil well platforms) to have some defensive capability when necessary without the huge investment of a large standing force. The configurations should be thought out so that any installation could be varied from a single weapon such as a gun/ missile to an armament suit equal to any heavy combatant by the selection of the number and variety of container mounted modules.
By R. L. Trillo
Marine Hovercraft Technology
The first manned hovercraft journey was in 1959. Within a decade, hovercraft were routinely crossing the English Channel at 60 knots with payloads of 30 cars and 250 passengers. Hovercraft have been employed in combat, industry, agriculture, and sport.
Though the hovercraft is a very recent invention, its incredible potential places its technology among the most important of innovational marine technologies.
Robert L. Trillo’s thorough scholarship and comprehensive coverage make Marine Hovercraft Technology a standard reference for this subject.
Profusely illustrated with pictures, diagrams, tables, and charts. Bibliography and index. 245 pages.
$25.00 List Price $20.00 Member’s Price Add 500 to each order for postage and handling
A Naval Institute Press Book (Please use book order form in Professional Reading section)
Comment and Discussion 103
If the occasion warranted, for example, an oil well service ship could have four self-contained vans welded to her deck and become an instant "patrol
vessel.” These modules could be built with standard components in stock containers, trucked to beaches, and helicopter-transported to vessels, even though those vessels were denied port access by congestion or hostile enemy action.
With limited funds, and with responsibilities designed for a far larger Navy, we must be prepared to use programs such as this to give our Navy the ability to respond to peak load situations. ARAPAHO is certainly a worthy start in this direction.
Pictorial—"'Shoes and ships and sealing wax . . 75 years of
Proceedings advertising”
(See Pictorial, pp. 119-131, October 1973 Proceedings, 100th Anniversary Issue)
Ensign C. H. Hollander, U. S. Navy (Retired)— In the Bethlehem Steel advertisement of October 1935, the Potrero Plant and the Hunter’s Point Works in San Francisco, are both mentioned. The Potrero Plant was the successor to the Union Iron Works, whose ad also ap
peared. Since this ad was dated March 1906, it was evidently a part of the Bethlehem Steel organization at that time, since Bethlehem purchased the property in January 1905. This is now the San Francisco Yard, while Hunter’s Point is now a naval shipyard.
The San Francisco Yard, the oldest shipbuilder in continuous operation in the country, built the USS Oregon, No. 3 coast battleship launched 26 October 1893. She established a remarkable record for speed and durability for her day, by sailing under forced draft, from San Francisco around Cape Horn to participate in the Battle of Santiago Bay on 3 July 1898. She also served during the Boxer Rebellion and was flagship of the Pacific Fleet during World War I. She was sold for scrap in 1942, but was converted into an ammunition barge, hauling dynamite to Guam in 1944, and finally scrapped in 1956.
The USS Olympia, No. 6 protected cruiser, also built at the San Francisco Yard, was launched on 5 November 1892. She was one of the Navy’s famous ships, having served as flagship for Ad
miral Dewey at the Battle of Manila Bay on 1 May 1898. During World War I, she was again a flagship, this time for the American Patrol. She was also a part of Russian Expeditionary Force A in May 1918, and in December of that year, flagship for the Eastern Mediterranean Squadron. She returned to the United States in October 1921, with the body of America’s Unknown Soldier, and was finally turned into a national shrine.
Wherever the U.S. Fleet has touched shore, strange and exotic dishes have been "tasted out", written down, and treasured by seafarer's wives.
Now the residents and friends of Carl Vinson Hall—the Navy Marine Coast Guard retirement community—have gathered together their favorite recipes into a beautifully illustrated 159 page cookbook. Some are economical to fit tight budgets; others are for lavish occasions.
Come browse the pages of Appetizers, Soups, Salads, Seafood, Continental Main Dishes, Desserts ... even some com- monsense cooking tips. Then invite friends over to share the good food with you.
Ireasdreq
Rscipss
By SeaFarers' WivES
The Bethlehem Steel Corporation has also been proud of its ability to build quality Navy ships. One of these, the USS St. Paul (CA-73), was commissioned at Bethlehem’s Quincy Plant on 17 February 1945. I served on board her in 1953 as part of Admiral Harry Sanders cruiser division staff. At that time, a pipefitter, who was my neighbor in Long Beach naval housing, had convinced his wife that the St. Paul would sink if he didn’t personally keep the pipes from leaking. Since the ship survived another 20 years and wasn’t decommissioned until 30 April 1971, the pipes must have been kept in pretty foh condition.
I simply cannot subscribe to the supposition that", . . the Navy [U. S.] was better prepared for war with Japan than it knew, in large part a result of better American than Japanese adjustment to the implications of naval limitation after 1922.” In no way can I accept "spurred tactical evolution” was because we understood the full meaning of limitation better than the Japanese, or as a matter of fact, any of the major powers. The historic fact is that Japan initially was better equipped and tactically sounder than we.
With respect to Japanese success at Tsushima, the Japanese strong position ". . . which derived from the armor and heavy guns of its battleships . . .” was a major contributing factor—but one certainly cannot disallow the condition of the Russian fleet at Tsushima as without relevance. I would suggest a second reading of the events surrounding Tsushima.
The authors say: "The fixation caused by the conference of 1922 was still present in 1933 when the Japanese planned the construction of the Yamato.” Our fixations were the battleships North Carolina, Washington, the Missouris, the Dakotas, and the Montanas. We can hardly claim "better American ... adjustment.”
"Tactical Implications of the
Washington Naval Conference”
(See S. M. Silver and T. H. Etzold, pp. 109-111, September 1973 Proceedings)
Bruno Gruenwald—\ detect the manifes- tation of Napoleon’s well known phrase, "History are those agreed upon facts.”
"Some Heretical Thoughts on a
Sea Control Weapon System”
(See A. W. Sear, Jr., pp. 114-116,
August 1973 Proceedings)
John W. Stephan, Jr,—The search for imaginative, possibly heretical solutions to problems of defense has often given birth to great improvements in our military capabilities—e.g., the nuclear submarine.
Mr. Sear recommends a cruiser-size vessel of approximately 15,000 tons with a speed of around 35 knots and carrying the following armament: remotely piloted vehicles (RPV), ASW, and antiship torpedos, surface-to-air missiles, surface- to-surface missiles, and conventional artillery. The appropriate sensors, surface and subsurface, fire control systems, and control systems for RPVs would also be carried. His main argument seems to be that this ship would represent a complete, all-around sea control system in one hull and would be less expensive than alternate proposals for 25,000-ton V/STOL carriers.
A number of questions arise concerning this concept. Such a vessel could and should, act more or less independently, because of her capabilities. Her design would make escorts unnecessary, another of Mr. Sear’s points. In view of this, and the fact that replenishment shipping is at a premium, Mr. Sear’s vessel would have to carry a sizeable supply of missiles and torpedos for her own weapons, maintenance capability for RPVs as well as their fuel, and sufficient fuel to provide the ship itself with a fairly long range. Habitability requirements have increased over the years. The ship would require either a large, heavy power plant to sustain 35-knot speeds or a smaller, lighter plant with greater fuel consumption (requiring a greater
"Destroyer Seakeeping:
Ours and Theirs”
(See J. W. Kchoe, Jr., pp. 26-37, November 1973 Proceedings)
Lieutenant William R. Nichols, Jr., U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Captain Kehoe’s article deals with a problem that has plagued destroyermen since the relatively small, high-speed combatant ship appeared on the scene. I would like to comment on the head seas aspects of the problem, offering some qualitative comments about shedding the water once it has gained the deck, and the effects of the water while it is on deck and the process of running or blowing clear.
[4] was on active duty at sea, when jet aircraft had joined the Fleet, but before there were steam catapults on aircraft carriers. A combat-loaded jet aircraft required a relative wind speed of about 40 knots to get off the deck. Plane guards for individual carriers or the entire task force and screen would steam to achieve 40 knots over the deck. A most common occurrence in the Pacific is the ocean swells derived from weather far removed by time and distance. But
Medical Manpower Problems: Give Up or Train Up?
Charles M. Hatcher—Two events, each of which could have a significant effect on the Navy medical program—and the Navy as a whole—came to light in San Diego recently.
The first was when Rear Admiral Herbert G. Stoecklein, Medical Corps, U. S. Navy, Director of the Navy Regional Medical Center, San Diego, predicted the loss there of from 50 to 60 Navy doctors to civilian practice by
[6] July 1974. He noted the loss of some 500 general medical officers during the past year, and that cuts in outpatient clinic service in San Diego were being duplicated around the country.
The second event was the signing of an agreement between the Naval Hospital Corps School, San Diego, and Gross- mont Community College of El Cajon and La Mesa, California. Under the terms, hospital laboratory facilities and technical personnel will be shared with the college academic resources to benefit Service paramedical students at the hospital school, as well as Grossmont undergraduates on campus. Enlisted personnel in the Cardiopulmonary Technician program at the Hospital Corps School will participate in college-level courses leading to formal Associate-in- Science degrees. The Navy continues to lose doctors at a time when it needs to build up its corps of volunteers, and this may be one answer to the problem.
To attract worthwhile officer candi