Comment and Discussion

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"Can We Really Afford

Surface ASW Ships?”

(See R. J. Alexander, pp. 107-109, August

1974 Proceedings)

Captain Alfred C. Lets, U. S. Navy, Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans, Cruiser-Destroyer Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet—These, has recently been a series of articles in the Proceedings condemning surface antisubmarine warfare (ASW). When couched in a pseudo-scientific cloak, such as Captain Alexander’s recent Professional Note, they lend undue credence to theses which are really straight lines between unwarranted assumptions and foregone conclusions.

A LAMPS SH-2D Seasprite helicopter making its approach on the USS Harold E. Holt (DE-1074)

Obsolete ideas are potentially a greater danger to the national security than obsolescent equipment can ever be. We can always produce ship alterations (shipalts), but "mind-alts” seem to be vehemently resisted and unfortunately arc another matter.

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We all hope that the Proceedings will continue to be the forum for enlightened debate on most naval matters, but there are some subjects—and this is one—that cannot be thoroughly discussed on these pages without giving a lot of aid, and also some comfort, to a potential adversary. Performance levels cannot be dealt with in any specific terms. Likewise, the data which show the many unsolved problems in using the submarine (the usual alternate candidate) in anything approaching a surface escort role are locked away in safes. Yet it is matter-of-factly put forth as a truth—much like the law of gravity is a truth—that submarines are the best submarine killers under all circum

stances. They are not. Surface ASW has been a frustrating uphill climb over the last 20 years, but condemnation of the surface ASW platform without access to the latest statistics is a clear disservice to the security of this nation.

The fact is that landmark improvements have been made to hull-mounted sonars for both active and passive use. These hull-mounted sonars are well complemented by towed arrays, and the effectiveness of the combination of the two has been demonstrated clearly in fleet operations, both against U. S. and non-U. S. submarines. Surface escorts, in combination with the light airborne multi-purpose system (LAMPS) have a significant submarine detection, tracking, and attack capability out to ranges which those officers who milled around in 1950s/l960s hunter-killer (HUK) operations (and whose primary personal surface ASW experience relates to that

era) would find astounding. Experiences, even up to two years ago, are outdated. Surface ship silencing is achievable and has been demonstrated to the point that quiet surface escorts have not been acoustically detected by submarines even at very close ranges. Finally, the surface escort possesses a command and control capability which is unachievable by any other existing ASW platform.

In recent fleet operations, two surface escorts with the latest equipment, one LAMPS bird and one patrol aircraft on station a portion of the time, demonstrated a capability to detect, track—and if need be, kill—nuclear submarines which unquestionably exceeded any performance achievable by an entire HUK group of the "old days.” This capability was not limited to a lucky hour or day. It continued until the exercise was deliberately terminated.

*

m.

Officer Candidate David L. Crow, U. S. Naval Reserve, U. S. Naval Officer Candidate School, Newport—While an officer candidate can scarcely be said to be a seasoned naval professional, I would like to contribute to the discussion which Captain Alexander invited on the future of surface antisubmarine warfare (ASW).

In these days of reduced defense funds and resultant high competition between systems, the cost-effectiveness and trade-off value of this new mini- HUK group with maxi-capabilities warrants serious review at the highest levels. To those of us most involved in current destroyer ASW progress, it is very disturbing to observe what almost appears to be a concerted campaign to downgrade the utility of surface ships in ASW. It is both frustrating and distressing to note that Navy officials have testified before Congress concerning the potential of surface ship sonar which, in view of recent developments, was highly premature in its pessimism. The potential submarine threat to U. S. security is both real and significant.

Antisubmarine warfare must continue to be a team effort of our air, surface and submarine components. The surface combatant is rapidly becoming a better and more cost-effective member of that team than ever before. This is happening despite the fact that the destroyer share of the ASW research and development dollar pales in comparison

I     to that applied to other platforms—y_i0

of total ASW budget, % of funds spent on submarine ASW. Except for the efforts of a very few dedicated people, we would be facing a threat today which would be unmanageable. Instead we have surface ASW systems within our grasp which—as part of the ASW team— are clearly able to take on that threat. If the momentum continues, U. S. sea control capability can once again be assured.

■

The captain reiterated some of the things we have heard for several years now about the final inefficacy of the classic surface escort when matched against the nuclear-powered submarine, especially against nuclear submarines armed with cruise missiles. Such submarines presently have the upper hand, but the young officer candidate with a career perspective before him must ask, "Will it always be so?”

The superiority of the submarine is said to be based on the immutable physical laws of the oceanic environment. The novice is entitled to ask if those laws did not apply as well in 1917 or in 1943 as they do in 1974. Perhaps it is not the environment itself, but the current technological state of the art that produces the present imbalance. Would the captain admit that the initial deployment of the 2,200-ton surface effect ship might once more alter the equation? Similarly, in the wake of the Yom Kippur War, it can no longer be claimed that the cruise missile is, ipso facto, an unbeatable weapon. Rather it is but a new challenge that the U. S. Navy is moving, albeit slowly, to meet.

One is entitled to doubt also the utility of the captain’s recommended ASW platforms—aircraft and hunter-killer submarines. The primary objection to the first is cost, for to provide enough P-3s or aircraft carriers (CV) or even sea control ships to meet the threat would be monstrously expensive. On the second suggestion, I must doubt the ability of the hunter-killer submarine to effectively convoy surface cargo vessels. As the article indicated, the submarine escort would provide no protection against surface or air-launched cruise missiles. A mixed escort would be very difficult to coordinate in actual combat— as opposed to exercise conditions.

I am even more strongly opposed to the intimation that the best employment for our exclusively air/submarine ASW forces would be "patrolling a strait or small barrier area.” The history of

ASW in the two world wars underlines the folly of the dispersion of forces inherent in such a system. Whatever might be the solutions to our critical ASW problems, this is not one of them.

Control of the seas means, at a minimum, the ability to transit those seas in reasonable security. The submarine currently represents the primary threat to our control because of the current irribalance in surface/subsurface capabilities. I disagree with Captain Alexander on the future possibilities for redressing such imbalances, but I agree on the difficulty and the gravity of the problem. If we cannot meet this threat, all of our other efforts are useless.

Commander Thomas B. Buell, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Joseph Hewes (DE-1078)—One suspects that Captain Alexander wrote his Professional Note with tongue in cheek, a suspicion confirmed when he admits that its objective was to stimulate discussion. To a de- stroyerman, the incentive to respond is irresistible, so a stimulated response is submitted herewith in order that "equal time” may be observed.

Captain Alexander’s argument is defective because it assumes that surface antisubmarine warfare (ASW) is unchanged from the past—that destroyers still blindly thrash about the ocean, pinging futilely with their hull-mounted sonars in a vain effort to find the elusive nuclear submarines. His thesis fails because of two facts of destroyer ASW:

►     Destroyers have the capability to detect, track, and kill submarines using passive techniques exclusively, or complemented with active hull sonars.*

►     Destroyers are essential in coordinated ASW operations with air and submarine forces.

Consider first the passive capability. Today’s newer destroyers are extremely quiet, and submarines frequently are unaware that they are nearby. Passive localization (using sensors on American aircraft, submarines, and destroyers) can

I

•Destroyers arc defined in this case as including     ,

the following classes: Brooke (DEG-1), Garris           ,

(DE-1040), Knox (DE-1052), Joseph lieu* (DE-1078), and Spruance (DD-963), all of which | are dedicated to surface ASW.

Comment and Discussion 75

allow a destroyer to covertly close an unsuspecting submarine. Oftentimes, attack criteria can be gained passively. Or, when within assured direct-path sonar range, the destroyer can go active and launch an urgent attack before the submarine can react. Captain Alexander’s argument that the submarine has a stand-off weapon against destroyers overlooks the fact that the submarine first must know where the destroyer is. Finding a quiet destroyer is not easy, even for a nuclear submarine. The point here is that destroyers no longer routinely ping when hunting submarines. New sensors and new tactics have raised surface ASW to a sophistication and effectiveness apparently not recognized by Captain Alexander.

In addition, the destroyer is the only platform capable of effectively exercising command and control when working with ASW aircraft and submarines. And coordinated operations are the best way to find and kill enemy submarines. The destroyer has the endurance, communications, and radars that are needed for sustained operations. The fixed-wing aircraft and helos have limited endurance and can be thwarted by bad weather. The submarine has severe communication problems. Yet the combined destroyer/aircraft/submarine team compensates for the shortcomings of the individual units and blends their combined strengths into a unified whole. We finally are operating as a team, and the results are gratifying. Remove the destroyer from the picture, and the team falls apart.

Dr. T. F. Driggers—Captain Alexander realizes the need for research and development programs in communicating between aircraft and submarines and identifying enemy submarines. (Inci- dently, if the latter goal could be achieved, the ASW problem would be solved!) Unfortunately, the need for the former goal, communications, seems to be incompatible with the goal of placing the submarine’s sensors at the proper listening depth, i.e., when communicating, a submarine’s sonar would face exactly the same problems as the hull- mounted sonar of a surface ship. If one could solve the problem of a submarine

communicating with aircraft while at depth, then there is a good chance that we have solved the hull-mounted sonar problem at the same time.

It might be coincidence that the two vehicles Captain Alexander has chosen as the most effective are also the ones which have officer specialists. On the other hand, too many 1100 officers have not specialized in ASW throughout their careers, and hence are at best marginally qualified (from an ASW point of view) for commanding officer/executive officer/ operations officer/ASW officer billets in a destroyer or destroyer escort. Although I would hesitate to state an exact figure, the average surface ship today probably uses her installed equipment at an efficiency that would surprise many people. Perhaps specialization in ASW would raise this efficiency more nearly to that of aircraft and submarines.

One final fallacy is that a nuclear submarine can outmaneuver any surface ship (excluding from our discussion hydrofoils and surface effect ships). This is true as far as it goes, but I am not

aware of any submarine that can outrun either an acoustic wave in sea water or an antisubmarine rocket (ASROC).

Two points in the article with which I agree are that oceanographic training is a must for any officer or petty officer involved in ASW, and that surface ships are still necessary for missile defense. I cannot imagine either an aircraft or submarine providing adequate defense in this area, and it would be foolhardy indeed to assume the aircraft/submarine combination could "sanitize” the oceans.

Captain Arthur Winslow, II, U. S. Naval Reserve {Retired)—Not considered in Captain Alexander’s Prof Note is a surface system that is as yet relatively unknown to many concerned with ASW. This is the Mark 48 torpedo now coming into the fleet. This torpedo, intended primarily as a sub-launched unit to succeed the reliable but obsolete Mark 37, may be surface-launched as well against either submarines or surface vessels. In early development, this unit had some troubles, but the torpedo now in production is doing very well—the Mark 48, Mod I. Although it is extremely sophisticated and requires special training to operate, this training was initially provided to the Navy by the contractor, along with its own special test and workshop equipment. Deliveries are on time, and there have been some cost underruns. But the really significant effect of this torpedo on the surface ASW problem is its tremendous capabilities. As Captain Alexander has noted, it is not possible to do justice to many arguments in regard to the ASW problem in this forum because of their classified nature. However, having been closely connected with the devel-

ENTER THE FORUM

Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication in these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged. The U. S. Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion published in the Proceedings.

76

opment of the Mark 48, I know that a number of things may be stated without getting into the classified area.

First of all, Captain Alexander implies that the nuclear submarine is practically invincible because it can dive beyond any torpedo depth. Not likely! The Mark 48, Mod I can be said to dive as deep—and furthermore catch up with— any nuclear submarine operating or in design today. After all, both face the same problems of physics. Obviously, explicit speeds, depths, ranges, and other operating parameters are classified, but again it can be said that this torpedo has many options. It is wire-guided or it can operate under guidance of its own on-board computer; it can home acoustically, actively or passively, and at various speeds. Some wags have said that, the more the submarine tries to evade, the better this torpedo likes it. It has demonstrated this in tests. With such a weapon becoming available to surface as well as submarine ASW forces, this must be considered a big plus.

"Linebacker Strike”

(See R. C. Powers, pp. 46-51, August 1974

Proceedings)

Vice Admiral John T. Hayward, U. S. Navy (Retired)—The article in the August Proceedings by Colonel Anthony L. Wermuth ("Deputies of Zeus: Morality and the Vietnam War,” pp. 26-34) is an outstanding one and should be given the widest distribution possible in all the media. I sincerely hope this is done. I can assure you I would help to distribute it.

The next thing that caught my eye in the same issue was the excellent article by Commander Powers, for it goes to the heart of the Navy’s problem. I quote particularly the phrase that is so meaningful for the future: "First, you had to have a ship with two guns and two screws. This eliminated the newer ships of the fleet, the DEs and DEGs and left the task to the older, faster, and better armed DDGs and DDs.” What an indictment this statement is of our present policy of procurement of ships!

During World War II, 28 of our destroyers got home on one engine at 15 knots. Our future prospective ships just won’t get home. There are ten

items in the main propulsion system of the Knox (DE-i052)-class destroyer escorts that—if they fail—can result in the ship going dead in the water. As an aviator of many years and many flight hours, I would never fly a plane with a power plant that unreliable. It also has the disadvantage of not even coming close to the performance of the enemy—the nuclear-powered submarine. It can make 27 knots on full power, far from competitive in a possible antisubmarine battle. The basic requirement for a destroyer-type ship to be able to make 28 knots on half her power plant makes sense even today. While our Navy has been on a youth jag for some time, our elders did have some common sense. Our present youthful group should not try to "reinvent the wheel” again! Tomorrow’s defense depends on today’s decisions. We need the right ones. My favorite admiral, Hyman G. Rickover, had this to say in his testimony in 1971 before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy:

. . . the complexity of modern weapons and the rapidity with which major wars can now be started preclude relying on wartime production capacity to furnish our weapons. We must plan on fighting a major war with the weapons we have at the outbreak. I believe we would be following a short-sighted path if we do not provide our first line striking forces with the best weapons our technology can produce.

Neither the Knox-class escorts nor the proposed patrol frigates meet this criterion. One could also question the Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyers. We cannot continue to prepare to fight World War II and the battle of the Atlantic again. This is 1974, and the subject of quality is ever more important than quantity.

Lieutenant Kenneth J. Davis, Jr., U. S. Navy, Attack Squadron 65—I find it only slightly short of appalling to uncover an article better suited to the less discriminating "men’s” magazines than to the pages of a purported professional journal.

Commander Powers devoted his efforts to the "BONG! BONG! BONG!” and "KERBOOM” side of things, but he might have been better occupied in addressing any one of several very real problems which were, perhaps inadvertently, introduced into his adventure story. He notes that only a portion of our total destroyer-type (DD/DDG/DE/DEG) units were considered suitable for Linebacker operations; he cites the "demanding requirements” of twin screws and at least two rifles, and notes that these requirements more or less automatically deleted the newer DE/DEG assets. Later, he indicates that even twin screws and two rifles aren’t enough. In order to be "ideally suited for Linebacker operations,” his ship, the USS Lawrence (DDG-4), required the installation of Sea Chaparral, Redeye, additional radars, ChafTRoc, and a special electronic warfare suite. Still later, he briefly compares the 5-inch/38 and 5-inch/54 rifles, stating that the trade-off for longer range meant "herculean efforts” on the part of the crew and a special Seventh Fleet gun repair crew.

Any one of these three commentaries could form the foundation of an informative and perhaps profitable paper. Why, for example, must we count on the "older, faster, and better armed DDGs and DDs” for naval gunfire in a hostile environment? Are we unable to provide adequate speed and armament in new construction? If a single-screw ship cannot be subjected to an enemy threat, why are we building them? A

threat from the air is nothing new, yet the Lawrence required five additional systems in order to protect her from this threat; why didn’t she, as a first-line combat vessel, already have these on board? In the same vein, is the Sea Chaparral/Redeye mix optimum against a really low-level (20-50 feet) attack by aircraft or missiles? As a combat- experienced aviator, I’d rather go against the Lawrence than against a World War II DD blazing away. A flak barrage of 5-inch, 40-mm., 20-mm., and .50-caliber fire scares me more than does a sophisticated, complex, and unreliable missile system, or one which can’t go against a really low target. As far as the 5-inch rifles go, is the additional range of any use if the rifle cannot be kept on the line without "herculean” efforts? Can the Navy afford a special gun repair team for each 5-inch/54 unit?

"Battle of the Philippine Sea”

(See T. B. Buell, pp. 64-79, July 1974

Proceedings; pp. 88-90, September 1974;

p. 102, November 1974)

Rear Admiral James D. Ramage, Commander Caribbean Sea Frontier/Commandant Tenth Naval District—The battle of the Philippine Sea, meticulously researched and well described in Commander Buell’s article, is quite familiar to me for two reasons. First, I was a strike leader as commanding officer of Bomber Squadron Ten during the battle, and second, I had the opportunity to discuss the details of the operation at length with Admiral Raymond A. Spruance during his tenure as president of the Naval War College. I was in the first postwar, full-year class (1946-1947).

As a squadron commander on board the USS Enterprise (CV-6) at that time, I tvas one of the young aviators who felt that the fleet commander had been less than aggressive during the battle. However, after discussing the operation m detail with Admiral Spruance, I could fully understand his problem at the time. Admiral Spruance was a very shy mdividual. He rarely took the platform to discuss any items of an operational oature, but he was always available to discuss such things personally with any ^S(udent who would take the time to ^comc to his office. Commander Buell’s

very thorough description of Admiral Spruance’s thoughts and actions during the battle were well borne out in my discussions with him. He simply did not have adequate information to do what we, the aviators, would like to have seen accomplished: the complete destruction of the Japanese Fleet.

In briefing my strike group for the 20 June 1944 attack against the Japanese Fleet, I made it very clear that I expected this to be a one-way flight and felt certain that all or most of us were going to be boating that evening. Selection of the crews to meet this challenge was

keenly competitive; everyone wanted to go. The Enterprise and Air Group Ten had been waiting a long time for an opportunity to resume action against the Japanese Fleet. We particularly wanted to get at their carriers. One rather dismaying event occurred after takeoff and rendezvous of my strike group when we received word from the Enterprise that the position of the Japanese Fleet, which had been given to us in our briefing, was one degree off in longitude. This meant that tbe fleet was about 60 miles farther to the west than we had anticipated. This, of course, had

no effect upon us, except to reaffirm that a night water landing was probably a sure thing. Fortunately—in our case, at least—this did not happen.

The Enterprise was one of the two carriers which still operated the Dauntless (SBD) dive-bomber. This meant that our flying time to the Japanese force would take considerably longer than that of the other strike groups whose base element was the new, faster Helldiver (SB2C). However, we felt good in knowing that we had the most accurate and toughest dive-bomber in the world, although it was somewhat slower and had a slightly shorter radius of action than the SB2C. We arrived on the scene after all other strike elements had made their attack and were en route home. As I left the area of action, it was most apparent that we had not won a great victory. I could identify only two carriers as hit and burning and felt that the bombing had been relatively ineffective that day. I was most disappointed.

One often-mentioned element of that attack was the famous turning on of the lights of the fleet to aid our return and

landing. The idea was good, but it was incorrectly executed. Had the order been to turn on lights only on the aircraft carriers, it would have been a great help to us. As it was, it added greatly to the confusion. Every ship was illuminated and it was quite impossible to tell the carriers from other surface ships until one was close aboard. Nevertheless, I managed to bring the Enterprise group back, augmented by some 30 to 40 stragglers that we had picked up en route, and broke my formation over the Enterprise for landing. I made my first pass at the Enterprise, but she had a foul deck from a crash landing by another ship’s aircraft, so 1 proceeded to the Yorktown (CV-io) and made a very uneventful night landing with only a teacup of fuel remaining.

1 immediately reported to Captain John Crommelin, the carrier division chief of staff and a former shipmate in the Enterprise, to discuss the day’s results. I told him that I was very disappointed in the day’s marksmanship. He looked at me rather quizzically because he had in hand a number of action

summaries which reported that the Japanese carrier fleet was destroyed. Not so, I stated. Probably because of our previous long association aboard the Big E, I believe that Captain Crommelin accepted my assessment. When the facts began to unravel, it turned out that the situation was just about as I described it. Since I was last on scene, I felt that I had the best possible information on what actually had happened.

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Later, in Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher’s cabin on board the flagship, USS Lexington (CV-16), I had an opportunity to review the action with him and with the new fast carrier striking force commander (CTF-38), Vice Admiral John S. McCain. They were quite disturbed that the two SBD squadrons appeared to do quite well both on the target and in overall operational capability. Their question was, "How do we reverse the present situation and retain the SBD in the fleet?” Both the Enterprise and Lexington air groups were scheduled to rotate to the United States for rest and for additional training to prepare for the next deployment. As I

Teenagers Man Sailing Ship

Though many of them had no sailing experience, these teenagers learned quickly on hoard the Adventuress.

left the flag cabin, it appeared to me that the two strike force commanders had arrived at the conclusion that it was probably too late to get back into the reliable SBD, and that we would have to carry on the war with the SB2C.

Lieutenant Commander Kenneth R. Karr, U. S. Navy, Assistant Professor of Naval Science, University of Washington—This past July 1 spent a week I’ll always remember with the Puget Sound Sailing School on board the 101-foot, 98-ton schooner Adventuress, operating out of Seattle, Washington. It was a fascinating experience for me, not only because the schooner is a piece of history and a one-of-a-kind sailing vessel, but also because the sailors manning her were 13, 14 and 15-year-old boys and girls.

The Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps navigation course at the University of Washington is taught to many civilian students who typically make up about one third of the class enrollments. One of these students is a member of the permanent crew on board the Adventuress in addition to her pursuit of a degree in history. She invited me on board for a week to sail Puget Sound and the waters of the San Juan archipelago to teach navigation to the boys and girls sailing for the week. I hadn’t fully anticipated the pleasant surprise in store for me.

Few of the kids that reported the first day knew each other—some being from as far away as San Francisco—and many bad no knowledge of sailing. Yet after just one day at sea, they were all pulling together, perhaps a little roughly at first, but working hard at learning with an excitement and spirit that I’ve not often seen. The enthusiasm, competence, and teamwork that these young sailors displayed was truly impressive. Those of us that believe that "doing your own thing” means making the best use of °ur strongest talents toward achieving ^a worthy goal (like running a ship) can take heart. The kids of today can pick ^up the reins of responsibility and authority and get the job done in the best tradition of the sea. It seems as if opportunities such as this for kids to learn, Pull together, and to depend upon each

other are all too few.

Youth Adventure Incorporated, a non-profit Seattle-based corporation, operates and maintains the Adventuress. This organization has made the schooner available to more than 8,000 boys and girls from all over the United States for sailing training during the 15 years that she has been operated in this capacity. The ship and crew are donated for the purpose of training kids each summer and are supported by volunteer labor and private donations. Another non-profit organization, the Puget Sound Sailing School operates on board the Adventuress, teaching sailing to all those embarked. In addition to instruction in sailing the schooner, the sailing school conducts individualized small- boat sailing using six dinghies that are carried aboard.

It is indeed a refreshing experience to watch such an eager group respond to training in marlinspike seamanship, navigation, customs and traditions of the sea, leadership, duties of the officer of the deck, lookout responsibilities, and many other lecture topics that are provided each day (not to mention a few "pirate stories” along the way).

"Navies in War and in Peace”

(See S. G. Gorshkov, pp. 52-63, July 1974 Proceedings)

Dr. Jack Sweetman, Assistant Professor of History, U. S. Naval Academy—Admiral Gorshkov’s assertion that operations on the eastern front in World War II exerted a critical influence on the campaigns in Western Europe and the

Mediterranean is undoubtedly correct. From the summer of 1941 onward, the principal concentration of German land and air forces was employed against the Red Army. At the time of the invasion of Normandy, for example, there were three times as many German divisions in the eastern war zone as in France. It may also be true, as the admiral insists, that the extent of this influence is not widely recognized in the West. But his claim that these operations had equal effect in the Pacific is completely contrived, and even in regard to the war in Europe his argument abounds with inaccuracies and distortions.

In the first place, the charge that the Western powers encouraged German rearmament is absurd. The draconian peace treaty imposed at Versailles in 1919 reduced the German Army to a gendarmerie, the Navy to a coast guard, and eliminated their air arms altogether. For more than a decade, Britain and France seriously attempted to enforce the treaty’s provisions. The reason they stood by 16 years later when, to quote Admiral Gorshkov, Hitler "threw off the restrictions of Versailles” was not that they welcomed German rearmament, but that the governments then in power feared the consequences of trying to stop it.

It would, in fact, be possible to build a better case that the Soviet Union encouraged German rearmament. During the years in which the Western powers sought to uphold the treaty of Versailles, the Germans made every effort to circumvent it. Among the most successful of their stratagems, as Admiral Gorshkov must be aware, was the con-

elusion of a secret military convention with the Soviet Union in 1922. According to this agreement the Soviets, in exchange for German technical assistance, allowed German firms to construct armament plants on Soviet territory and made available training facilities where Reichswehr officers could acquire firsthand experience handling the tanks and aircraft forbidden the German armed forces at Versailles.

The truth is that none of the powers encouraged German rearmament, but after 1933 none would assume the responsibility of discouraging it either.

Turning to the war itself, Admiral Gorshkov castigates Britain and France for their inactivity following the Polish campaign, which he alleges was intended to induce Germany to attack the Soviet Union. He fa’ils to mention that the Soviet Union was then bound to Germany by a mutual nonaggression pact—signed three weeks prior to the invasion of Poland—which set the strategic stage for Hitler’s blitzkrieg victories of 1939-40. The published portion of this pact freed Germany from the threat of a two-front war, thereby permitting the concentration of her forces against the Western Allies in the spring of 1940. Its secret protocols provided for the amicable division of Eastern Europe between the two dictatorships. It was in keeping with this arrangement that the Soviet Union joined Germany in the conquest of Poland, undertook its inglorious winter war with Finland and annexed Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania— events Admiral Gorshkov veils in silence.

The Soviet conception of history as fable is also apparent in Admiral Gorshkov’s treatment of Hitler’s war aims. These he summarizes as "first, the establishment of supremacy in Europe and the destruction of the Soviet Union, and second, the seizure of the overseas colonial possessions of the European states.” The first part of this formulation is factual; the second is a fantasy, evidently intended to invite Russian readers to reflect upon the prerequisite of seapower to a global strategy. Hitler’s perspective was purely continental. In his eyes, the fleet projected by Plan Z was simply another aspect of an allround armament program. He had no interest in overseas territories and no

understanding of seapower. His overriding objective, to which the campaigns of 1939-40 were mere preliminaries, was the conquest of "living space” for his Third Reich in the expanses of European Russia.

In his discussion of the war at sea, Admiral Gorshkov states that German naval forces attempted to interdict "the communications linking our northern ports with the ports of the Allies” without offering a hint as to why they should have gone to that trouble. The reason, of course, was that the Allies were convoying vitally-needed supplies to the Soviet Union—almost four million tons altogether, including 5,000 tanks and over 7,000 aircraft. Acknowledgment of such assistance would be difficult to reconcile with the myth that the Soviet Union won its Great Patriotic War singlehandedly. (That the Soviet Navy was unable to control the approaches to its northern ports also escapes notice.)

The violence done historical truth in Admiral Gorshkov’s account of the European conflict, however, is nothing compared to the carnage incidental to his interpretation of the war in the Pacific. Like all Soviet authors, the admiral contends that—although engaged in hostilities for less than a week—his country was primarily responsible for the defeat of Japan. He makes three claims: first, that the Japanese chose to advance to the south, against the European colonies and the Philippines, rather than to the north against the Soviet provinces, because of their respect for the Red Army’s stand against the German invaders; second, that the Japanese adoption of a defensive posture in late 1942 was a result of the battle of Stalingrad; and third, that it was Soviet intervention, not the atomic bomb, which prompted Japan to surrender. Of these propositions, the first two are false and the third is debatable.

Of course, the Japanese watched the invasion of Russia with keen interest. What they had seen prior to their selection of the southern option would hardly have deterred them from moving north, however. In July 1941, when the Japanese reached the decision to occupy French Indochina and accept the diplomatic risks that entailed, the German armies were rolling forward as fast as the

Russian roads would carry them. Far from being such as to inspire the Japanese to fear the Soviet Union, the performance of the Red Army seemed to indicate that there was nothing to fear from the Soviet Union. The reason the Japanese chose the southern option was simply that the resources of Southeast Asia were more attractive to them than anything Siberia had to offer.

Another factor which might be deemed worthy of note in any discussion of Japan’s strategic situation was the existence of a five-year, mutual nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union, similar to that from which Germany profited, signed in April 1941. But Admiral Gorshkov has as little to say of the one as of the other.

By far the most imaginative of the admiral’s arguments, however, is that the battle of Stalingrad was the turning point of the Pacific war. He dismisses Midway and Guadalcanal, marshaling quotations and figures to prove what no one would deny, that from an American standpoint both were defensive battles. The implication that a defensive battle cannot be decisive is curious, since (however it may be improved in the telling) Stalingrad was a defensive battle too. He then declares that the Japanese decision to turn to a defensive strategy- more precisely, to abandon the struggle for Guadalcanal and evacuate Buna—in the imperial conference of 31 December 1942, was due to the annihilation of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad. If this were so, it would be a case of an effect preceding its cause, inasmuch as the Sixth Army was still fighting on 31 December and its eventual destruction was by no means assured. Its surrender did not come until 31 January 1943, and isolated pockets held out for several days thereafter. In reality the Japanese decision resulted from the recognition that the battle for Guadalcanal was lost and that to prolong it would be futile.

The relative importance of the Soviet invasion of Manchuria on 8 August 1945 and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 and 9 August in the Japanese decision to surrender remains an open question. In the conferences held during this period, the Japanese high command advocated continuing the war, in spite of everything- It was only through the emperor’s al-

most unparalleled personal intervention that the government resolved to accept the Potsdam declaration. Quite conceivably the news that the Soviet Union had joined their enemies convinced the armed forces leaders that, although honor demanded intransigence, reality obliged them to accede to the emperor’s initiative. But the reports of these conferences also make it clear that the Japanese had been deeply impressed by the atomic bomb.

One wonders if the Soviets will ever realize that the great contribution their country really made to Allied victory in World War II is only cheapened by the bombast with which their spokesmen exaggerate it.

"The Survival of Navy

Medicine”

(See D. L. Custis, pp. 35-45, August 1974

Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander B. W. Fordbam, U. S. Navy—Vice Admiral Custis wrote an interesting and generally factual article on the problems associated with retaining physicians on active duty to meet the needs of the service. It is suggested, however, that far too much emphasis is placed on the financial losses incurred by those who choose a service career. After all, physicians are by no means the only professional group of men and women who face a substantial pay differential upon accepting a commission in the naval service. My own salary, with flight pay and allowances included, is slightly less than $24,000 per year. By contrast, civilian airline pilots with my seniority frequently earn more than $45,000 annually, while a few approach or exceed $60,000. I am sure that there are other professional groups suffering similar differences in pay, but I haven’t heard of any serious problems concerning recruiting these individuals. I would prefer to think that physicians could be motivated to serve their country without the use of monetary compensation as the sole criterion.

United States Naval Institute Annapolis, Maryland 21402

Attach Present Address Label Here, Then Fill In New Address Above.

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While some of the proposals mentioned for getting the most productive use out of the physicians currently serving on active duty are innovative, it is surprising that one of the most basic methods wasn’t mentioned—institut

81

Comment and Discussion

ing longer working hours, together with holding regular clinic hours on weekends on a reduced basis. This change would more fully employ members of the duty section, rather than have them sitting around waiting for an emergency case to be brought into the dispensary.

As a rebuttal to the standard argument, "You wouldn’t want a tired doctor to diagnose your illness, would you?” I can only say that tired doctors are not uncommon at the naval air station where I’m based. Local doctors are allowed to "moonlight” at the county hospital, where they stand 24-hour standby duty in the emergency room. Having had a doctor for a neighbor, I can vouch for his appearance of extreme fatigue after having had "duty” at the civilian hospital the previous 24 hours. What a way to start the week! Considering the shortage of physicians, it is curious that anyone in a managerial position would allow these doctors to work long hours outside their regular military assignments. Such degradation of military medical care should not be permitted.

While no one would deny that personnel would prefer to work in new surroundings, I cannot help but question whether this should be used as justification for a massive building program. Without doubt, some medical facilities should be replaced because they no longer serve adequately as places of healing, not because we want to impress

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physicians with our nice new facilities. Frankly, many of the older structures would present a more impressive appearance to all concerned if they would be given an old-fashioned Navy field day.

I believe prospective candidates for the various medical procurement programs can be motivated to select a military career. The choice should not be based primarily on the amount of money that they will be offered, but rather on a sense of belonging to a select group of individuals serving the country that gave them the opportunity to earn their degrees. Perhaps that is one of the real problems with Navy medicine—an apparent lack of collective pride and dedication to service.

Captain Ralph Gerber, U. S. Navy (Retired)—As a typical "consumer” of Navy medical and dental services for almost 40 years, I feel that it is appropriate to comment in a constructive manner on Admiral Custis’ blueprint for their future. He discusses in some detail the plans for an amplified and strengthened role for the Medical Service Corps. This is timely because for many years this corps consisted of ex-enlisted men promoted to a limited duty group. They had restricted possibilities for promotion and responsibility. By personal observation, the Navy has lagged behind the other services in the development of a viable

and important medical administrative corps, by whatever name. The procurement of highly-trained specialists to function in these disciplines should take equal priority with the plans cited for medical personnel.

Again by my personal observation, the finest doctors in the Navy are rewarded by being promoted out of their professional practice at an age when they are reaching their peak in technical expertise and production. Many of my friends in the Medical Corps requested early retirement from the Navy because of this paradox. It is disappointing that there is no specific plan mentioned in the article to lessen or obviate this condition. Certainly, there is no common parallel in civilian practice. A doctor in his late forties or early fifties is not going to confine himself to purely administrative functions regardless of their importance. Furthermore, the finest professional men are too often the worst administrators, and there has been heretofore no really satisfactory way to acknowledge this in the Navy medical service. The same qualities that stamp

a man as an outstanding surgeon may also make him a lousy hospital commanding officer. Of course, these remarks pertain equally to the dental group.

I also wish that Admiral Custis had somehow recognized more specifically that there are, have been, and will be undeniable attractions and advantages inherent in a naval career, regardless of salaries. In the case of young doctors, not only are there opportunities for free education, an elimination of office overhead expense, and good retirement programs, but there are also the intangible benefits that have attracted people to the naval service throughout the centuries. Not only the doctors, but the engineers, chaplains, lawyers, and even many line officers could leave the service if their principal criterion were monetary income—indeed, many do.

I believe, with Admiral Custis, that the doctors, as well as all others in the military, should be competitively rewarded, but never that money become the paramount consideration for choos

ing a career in the service. If that sad day arises, we may as well do away with the Navy Medical Corps and use civilian medical facilities.

"Oceanic Education Is Needed For Our School Systems”

(See W. W. Simmers, pp. 82-83, August 1974 Proceedings)

Captain James J. White, U. S. Naval Reserve {Retired)—Mr. Simmers’ eloquent description of the need for oceanic education comes at a good time. The United States cannot take her proper place in the new maritime age unless a way is found to make the public aware of the tremendous political, economic, and sociological potential of the world’s oceans for this nation and the rest of mankind. Public education and communication on the subject are vital, presenting almost as much of a challenge as the seas themselves. The Navy cannot do the job alone, although it could do more, despite budgetary restrictions.

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"Deputies of Zeus:

Morality and the Vietnam War”

(See A. L. Wermuth, pp. 26-34, August 1974

Proceedings)

Leonard E. Opdycke, Poughkeepsie, New York—As an occasional reader of the Proceedings for many years (my father is an ex-navyman), I have been aware of its gradual change from a magazine dealing primarily with accounts of specific ships, naval actions, and naval history to a magazine dealing more with management, highly-sophisticated weaponry, and with personnel, legal, and tactical problems. The publication has become a propaganda device for the Navy and its policies. This is no doubt inevitable—perhaps even desirable—but I feel obligated to comment on Colonel Wermuth’s article in the August issue.

I want to pass on my reactions to his piece for several reasons. It is a subject which the services should be on record as considering; it is a subject which reaches far beyond any particular Navy topic; and most important, such a subject might provide a real way for the Navy to undertake dialogue with people who do not automatically respond favorably to Navy policies. In the light of these considerations, the failure of the article is to me particularly depressing. It speaks for all the considerations which—at its most prejudiced—the general public has come to associate with the armed services.

► Colonel Wermuth begins with brief characterizations of five types of anti- Vietnam War criticism, in ascending order of hysteria, and he chooses to deal only with the most extreme and irra

tional, leaving the more reasoned protesters unanswered.

►     Quotations from various critics of the war are dismissed by Colonel Wermuth as all "false” or "wrong”—but without specific refutations. Many thinking people felt that on the basis of published information, and from information subsequently released, these quotations were considerably more substantial than simply "false.”

►     The notion of the United States approaching the war "as a unified nation,” with the result that the war might have ended sooner, is an interesting one, but it assumes only one way of being unified. Another form of unity—abstention—would have resulted in no war at all and no casualties.

►     The suggestion that some of our young people "worked off’ their guilt "by developing the conviction” that the war was "evil [and] immoral” is simply irresponsible; it does the Proceedings and the Navy a real disservice.

►     Wermuth’s discussion of the place of individual responsibility is simply terrifying. He quotes Ralph Potter (an authority?) who states, "The nation is ultimately a moral community. To challenge its well-established policies as illegal, immoral, or unjust is to pose a threat [to it].” He goes on to cite as examples of the supremacy of individual judgment no less than Oswald, Sirhan, and Bremer. Resisters were called "sincere” by some but, adds Wermuth, "so was Hitler and the Inquisition.”

►     His discussion of the war itself, and of the "sparse record of non-deliberate American atrocity” as opposed to the "truly enormous record of Viet Cong and North Vietnam atrocity” would take more time to refute than perhaps it is worth. Needless to say, he does not deal with the official records of what we did (and are we really excused by saying that the other guys did it worse?). The destructive effects of the war are, by official report, far heavier than any efforts we made to heal the sick and to distribute food and clothing.

My concern in writing this letter is not to debate the morality of the Vietnam War, but to suggest that articles so limited in scope and so churlish in tone cannot serve to bring the Navy and the citizenry together, if indeed that is their purpose.

"On the Treadmill to Pearl

Harbor: The Memoirs of

Admiral James O. Richardson”

(See P. Abbazia, pp. 105-106, September 1974

Proceedings)

Rear Admiral John R. Wadleigh, U. S. Navy {Retired)—Dr. Abbazia’s comprehensive book review describes Admiral Richardson’s story as "too bland,” comparing it to the prevailing 4.0 fitness reports of pre-World War II days in the fleet which he commanded. Such reports may have been routine for more senior officers, but in the junior officer messes of battleships and the "fourth wards” of cruisers, it was a bit different. Consider the new ensign who received the following in 1938: "This young officer is neither useful nor ornamental.” Another young ensign later flew a four-star flag but lost many numbers in his two- year probationary period. Those were the days when fitness reports in one’s first two years at sea affected his permanent standing on the Navy’s lineal list.

Dr. Abbazia suggests that the book needs more anecdotes to give a better picture of Admiral Richardson, the man. It seems likely that in the postwar years when Richardson worked with Vice Admiral G. C. Dyer on his book that he was too concerned with his main theme to realize that a few lighter notes would have livened it up.

On my first midshipman cruise in the USS Wyoming (AG-17), one of the few seamen in the fourth division had recently come from the USS Augusta (CA-31), a new cruiser which had been commanded by then-Captain Richardson. This seaman loved to tell us about the West Coast Navy and the "real fleet.” The Augusta, like the Wyoming,

Comment and Discussion 85

had twin heads on the second deck at the stern; the similar spaces were separated by a door which was normally fully dogged down. In both ships the division responsible for these heads had a problem at captain’s inspection on Saturdays—how to have both heads ready for inspection.

In the Augusta some ingenious chief master-at-arms had laid out an inspection route which left a few minutes between the time the captain inspected the starboard head and then reached the port one. During the interval, a pair of head cleaners shifted themselves and a mass of unsightly cleaning gear from port to starboard through the normally dogged-down door. In this manner, cleaning gear lockers were kept neat, and the real working gear and men were in transit one step ahead of or behind the inspecting party. Early in Captain Richardson’s tour, this system was spoiled in the Augusta when—as a horrified inspecting party looked on—the skipper undogged the door and stepped into the port head to face two head cleaners poised to receive the "all clear” and dash into the adjacent space with their rags, buckets, and swabs. As the seaman telling the story on the Wyoming's fantail graphically emphasized, one can not always outguess a smart "old man” on board ship.

Commander J. Keitt Pegues, U. S. Navy (Retired)— The passing of Admiral James O. Richardson brings to mind several sea stories about "Uncle Joe,” as he was known to the sailors of the Pacific Fleet in the Thirties and Forties.

One of the better of these stories dealt with an incident shortly after Franklin D. Roosevelt became President in 1933. America was in the grip of an economic depression. Among his first official acts, FDR decreased the salaries of all federal and military personnel by 15%. This decrease was not taken lightly by the many crew members of the U. S. Pacific Fleet.

On the day that this proclamation was announced, the bugler on board the USS Augusta (CA-31), then anchored in Long Beach harbor, sounded "colors” at sunset. It was a startled crew which heard this well-known bugle call

stopped short of the last few bars. Upon being questioned, the bugler explained that since his pay had been cut by 15%, he decided to reduce his music by 15%.

His commanding officer, Captain James O. Richardson, held captain’s mast, and—so the story goes—sentenced the bugler to five days "bread and water.” However, in view of the 15% reduction in pay and music, the sentence was reduced by 15%.

"Deep Selection—A Caution”

(See J. D. H. Kane, pp. 100-101, July 1974

Proceedings)

"The Navy’s Unwelcome

Visitors”

(See Y. A. Milre, pp. 101-102, July 1974

Proceedings)

"These Dirty Ships of Ours”

(See D. E. Cummins, p. 102, July 1974

Proceedings)

Captain Richard C. Allen, U. S. Navy (Retired), Amsterdam, Holland— The July Comment and Discussion section contained a telling, if unintended, trilogy of comments. Rear Admiral Kane cautioned that our deep selection system may be neglecting the real sailors. His comments were followed by Mr. Milre’s dishearteningly accurate observations on the impressions sometimes made by our ships and liberty parties in foreign ports and by Captain Cummins’ suggestions for remedying practices in our ships, which—as he has had the unusual opportunity to observe—are too often deplorably dirty.

Since retiring, I have spent the past year and a half in Europe, periodically observing U. S. Navy ships and liberty parties in Spanish, Greek, and French ports. I spent the year and a half prior to that in one of the "fashionable E-ring billets” referred to by Admiral Kane. I fear that Mr. Milre’s and Captain Cummins’ comments illuminate only two of the more obvious results of a U. S. Navy leadership problem, created in part by our selection process, which has snowballed over the past few years and continues to do so.

The commander at sea who is a hot prospect for deep selection has too often been detailed to his billet on the basis

of superior staff performance ashore. He too often remains in the sea billet for only the minimum time necessary, and while at sea he too often leaves a disproportionate amount of his attention focused on the myriad political and other aspects of his accelerated career pattern ashore.

Leaving aside the more fundamental question of whether or not he in fact possesses the leadership ability to do so, this promising commander, captain, or rear admiral may only infrequently concern himself with the tedious, seemingly mundane, but fundamental and supremely important details of personal and continuous supervision and inspection of his subordinate commands and the individual sailors who man them. Judging from my experience at sea, it is a relatively rare commander who actually leaves his flagship with any frequency to oversee the standards being maintained in his ships—let alone demand correction of the basic shipkeeping negligence which is readily observable from his bridge.

Thus, alert and concerned observers outside our seagoing chain of command—like Mr. Milre and Captain Cummins—must call our attention to these glaring and disgraceful conditions, easily observable and readily correctable by some aggressive, effective leadership on the part of flotilla, task group, and other commanders at sea. Those commanders who show they are capable of such sorely-needed leadership should be deep selected along with the gifted "horseholders.” It should not be necessary at this point in the long history of the U. S. Navy to have third parties point out to us such conditions, inexcusable in a first-rate Navy; and it is inexcusable, to say the least, that our ships and sailors are permitted to disport themselves around the world in such a lubberly manner.

"The Navy’s Unwelcome Visitors”

(See Y. A. Milre, pp. 101-102, July 1974 Proceedings)

Yeoman Third Class William Auth, U. S. Navy, USS Guadalcanal (LPH-7)—Mr. Milre sees the arrivals of ships in Venice as strictly courtesy visits. He apparently

is not aware that the personnel on board these ships have been at sea on station for up to 45 days. They have been working an average of 16 hours a day, seven days a week, for six or seven weeks. They need—and have earned—a week of liberty ashore.

The fact that our combat ships are not the most esthetic creations upsets Mr. Milre. Navy ships are, and one trusts always will be, designed with the ship’s mission as the primary criterion. The hull discrepancies are the normal result of cruising and operations. Furthermore, many of the fleet’s ships have only 75% of allowed manpower, and operational commitments must take precedence over appearance. Upon return to homeport, side cleaning and hull maintenance are looked after.

The attitude of American sailors ashore is naturally cause for concern. As an American citizen himself, Mr. Milre should recall our country’s traditions of basic individual freedoms rather than recommending that the liberty of U. S. sailors be regimented by denying them the right to wear whatever haberdashery

they choose. Overall, sailors ashore on liberty in civilian attire look no worse than American civilians.

While drunk sailors are a disgrace to the Navy, the way to remedy the problem is through effective leadership to prevent unfortunate occurrences and to administer appropriate disciplinary action when they do occur. It is grossly unfair to punish responsible sailors— who are in the majority, despite Mr. Milre’s opinion—for the excesses of irresponsible sailors.

Lieutenant Commander Frederick E. Phil- lippi, Jr., U.S. Navy, USS Guadalcanal (LPH-7)—Mr. Milre presented an opinion from his point of view, but, lest we be discouraged and discontinue such visits, I would like to put forth the feeling and reaction that I have received from my encounters with both tourists and businessmen in Venice as an officer on board one of the visiting carriers.

Many tourists felt that the presence of American warships was a welcome

touch of home, and they were as eager to photograph the ships as any of the other beautiful sights of Venice. Not only that, people would say to me, "It sure is a comfort to me to know that even way over here, America is standing close by,” and other words to express similar feelings. Even an Italian national said he wanted me to know that he appreciated the role America plays in his own country’s defense. In each case, these comments were made prior to any mention that I was from one of the visiting ships. It is also difficult to see how large ships moored in the Bacino would destroy a tourist’s perspective of Venice when a short walk or a boat ride in almost any direction removes the Bacino and its contents from view.

NAVAL OFFICER’S UNIFORM GUIDE

by I. B. Castano

In 1776, the officers serving in the Continental frigate Providence addressed themselves to their skipper, Captain Abraham Whipple, requesting "that a proper Navy uniform be procured" so that “all may have an opportunity to appear alike as brothers united in one cause." This request led to the first uniform authorizations in the United States Navy.

This illustrated reference handbook is a comprehensive guide to all aspects of the male and woman officer’s wardrobe. Covering such subjects as formal and dinner dress uniforms, tropical uniforms and service dress uniforms, the Guide also contains hard-to-find information on insignia, badges, name tags and aiguillettes, the customs and traditions associated with the sword, ribbons and attachments and the proper wearing of large and miniature medals. Interesting descriptions of the historical background surrounding particular uniform items as well as cogent advice on the care and maintenance of the uniform make this a unique compendium.

128 Pages. Illustrated. Appendix. Index.

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While I agree with Mr. Milre that the wearing of the uniform would enhance both image and discipline, to say that U. S. crews in civilian clothes offer "an unrelieved panorama of untidiness and odd costumes” seems to disregard the fact that young tourists who come to Venice from all over Europe and Asia, as well as the United States, seem to

dress in similar fashion. I too abhor the abuse of alcohol and other drugs, but to imply that "a surfeit of drink” is simply a problem of U. S. crews belies the universality of the problem.

It is my hope that the Navy will always enjoy the privilege of visiting the beautiful city of Venice in ships both large and small.

MSC Supplies Glass Slipper For Mistreated Falcon Princess

Lieutenant Sidney IT. Emery, Jr., U. S. Naty, USS Halsey (DLG-23)—While on deployment to the western Pacific, I had occasion to visit the MV Falcon Princess. She was berthed at a fuel pier in Subic Bay. The ship has a rather interesting— if slightly deplorable—history. Her poor state during private ownership provided a sad indication of what avaricious operators can do to take advantage of U. S. government aid to maritime programs. The ship’s deteriorated condition represented a far cry from the hoopla and headlines which accompanied her launching just over two years ago.

She and her sister ships, the Falcon Duchess, the Falcon Countess, and the Falcon Lady were featured in the cover story of the April 1972 issue of Marine Engineering/Log. She was designed for unmanned engineroom operations and one-man pumping control from the deckhouse shown in the photo on this page. In practice neither of these automated features has been employed as originally designed. The Falcon Princess is now skippered by a most congenial and experienced master, Charles T. Gladden, brought in specially for the billet from another Military Sealift Command (MSC) vessel in Glasgow, Scotland. She was built in 1972 by Litton’s Pascagoula yard for Falcon Tankers and is registered out of Wilmington, Delaware. She was turned over to the MSC to operate in April of this year after being repossessed by federal agents when her owner/operator, Iranian Destiny Tankers, went bankrupt. It was all too evident at the time of her civilian demise that she had been woefully mistreated, receiving virtually no maintenance or repairs. Indeed, after her initial MSC voyage from Bayonne, New Jersey, an estimated $200,000 refit at Newport

News ballooned into $1 million.

The MSC operation put the service into its own tankships earlier than previously planned and as a result placed a demand for tanker mates and skippers and for diesel engineers that has strained the ranks of the Civil Service. At the time of my visit, mid-August, she was finishing a run which carried jet fuel from Houston to Sasebo, Naha, and Subic. Current operational demands indicate that she is likely to remain in the Far East.

As a side note, the navigator, who was standing the pump control watch while I talked with him, indicated that he’d had but one and a half hours shore leave since leaving the United States on 4 July and didn’t expect that policy to change much in the rest of his six- month hitch. Little wonder that Civil Service crews are paid slightly more than their union counterparts on civilian ships as well as their contemporaries on Navy vessels.

Editor’s Note: Larry C. Manning, the Military Sealift Command’s legislative/ public affairs officer, submitted the following response to the report on the Falcon Princess:

Lieutenant Emery’s letter is substantially correct, but two points need to be clarified. The first concerns his comment that the four Falcon tankers were "repossessed by federal agents.” Actually, the four Falcon tankers were on consecutive voyage charter to MSC, providing delivery of petroleum products to the military services. Iran Destiny, Inc.,

88

the operator of these ships, did have both operational and financial problems. As a result, MSC found it necessary to negotiate a bareboat charter (the ships only, without crews) for these tankers to assure that the command would continue to have their services. Consummation of the bareboat charter and manning of the four ships with Civil Service crews allows MSC to upgrade the materiel conditions of the ships. Bareboat charter also is cost advantageous to the government.

Lieutenant Emery further suggests that Civil Service crews on board the Falcon tankers are "paid slightly more than their union counterparts on civilian ships.” This is not quite accurate since MSC is required by law to pay prevailing maritime industry wages to its Civil Service seamen. Pay rates for both MSC licensed and unlicensed seagoing personnel are in accord with prevailing rates on the East and West Coasts of the United States.

"Skimmer Ops”

(See ). F. Ebersole, pp. 40-46, July 1974 Proceedings)

Lieutenant William K. Fogerty, U. S. Naval Reserve, Commanding Officer, DD 1818 Ship Reinforcement Unit, Denver Colorado—During most of 1969 I was assigned to Inshore Undersea Warfare Group One, WestPac Detachment, as a patrol officer. I was stationed in Nha- trang, South Vietnam, a deep-water port. As part of Task Force 115, our main responsibilities were harbor defense and security.

Our patrols were run to prevent ship damage by swimmers or floating mines, to check the shoreline for swimmer entry or exit, to enforce boundary regulations around the islands in the harbor, and to inspect craft transiting the harbor for contraband or explosives. Our patrol craft consisted of four large personnel landing craft (LCPLs) and two skimmers, the latter powered by 85 h.p. outboards and armed with M-60 machine guns.

The skimmers were particularly useful in sector patrols because of their speed, mobility, and firepower. They could cover more territory than the larger LCPLs and could easily be reassigned to

help inspect junks or to lend fire support in a problem area.

Fishermen often wandered into and out of the out-of-bounds areas—places where Vietcong activity was suspected and where resupply could be easily accomplished by offshore small craft. The skimmers were able to go into these shallow areas and extract fishing boats with a minimum of danger and disruption to fishing lines and nets.

Random patrols were also of great value because the skimmers were able to cover so much area that predicting their presence became very difficult. Their effectiveness increased significantly when their crewmen dropped depth charges or grenades randomly to discourage swimmer activity. Surveillance

duty in concealed or drifting situations was also possible because of the skimmers’ low profiles.

Lastly, the skimmers were often used in landing and extracting the unit’s ground reconnaissance team, developed to search for known underwater demolition teams on the islands. The skimmers were well suited for this sort of task because of their ability to approach a small beach or point of land quietly and fairly rapidly and still be able to provide strong fire support if anything out of the ordinary developed.

In short, because of their speed, firepower, mobility, and shallow draft, the skimmers were an integral and extremely valuable part of the harbor defense organization in Nhatrang.

"Too Many Senior Officers, Not

Enough for Them to Do”

(See W. W. Cornelius, pp. 79-81, August 1974

Proceedings)

Rear Admiral Elliott B. Strauss, U. S. Navy {Retired)—In March 1968, the Proceedings published my "Stars, Stripes and Gresham’s Law” which attempted to cover the same territory. I hope that Commander Cornelius’ comment will have more result than did my article.

On 18 April 1933, I addressed to the editor of the Proceedings a letter which dealt with the fact that there was no intrinsic correlation between the technical competence of a rated bluejacket and his ability as a "leader” and that, therefore, there should be established a specific petty officer designation, with accompanying added pay, for those so qualified. I do not have a copy of the Proceedings in which this discussion was published, just my manuscript. In the July issue of this year, Lieutenant (j.g.) M. H. Hoskins covers the same ground more than adequately.* I wonder if the suggestions will receive serious official consideration. All the Proceedings can do is to air these ideas, and that is a most useful service.

"The Airborne Destroyer”

(See W. G. Marshall, pp. 27-34, March 1974

Proceedings; pp. 83-85, July 1974)

Lieutenant William G. Marshall, U. S. Navy, Tactical Coordinator, Patrol Squadron 64—Constructive criticism has always been beneficial, so I was quite interested in the letters published in response to my article.

It would be a great injustice to many fine crew members—and the needed concept of the patrol plane crew—if I elevated any one position to superior importance. The P-3 crew functions best when each team member selflessly contributes his best performance to the team effort. The point I was attempting to make with the body analogy in my article was that all parts of the body are equal; if any one of them fails to func-

•"Spanning the Leadership Gap: A Dual-Track Pay Scale,” p. 103, July 1974 Proceedings.

Comment and Discussion 89

tion, then the body (the mission) will lose. A second point was that the role of the tactical coordinator (TACCO) is that of positive direction (leadership) and management of information (of which "filtering” out of unnecessary data is only a small part).

Citing OpNav instruction 3710.7G, Lieutenant Commander Wells correctly pointed out that "the Mission Commander is a reality, not a concept.” He further indicated that the TACCO now has the opportunity to compete evenly against pilots for a command position. Unfortunately, the reality of operation in the fleet is different from the instruction. Since most TACCOs are in their first patrol plane tours (by virtue of the fact that the majority depart after their first tour) and most patrol plane commanders (PPC) are second tour, the PPC is the mission commander. This divorce from actual practice is why I choose to call mission commander a concept.

The pilot and TACCO roles, by virtue of the technology of the weapon system, are not interchangeable. In the P-3, only one man can make continuous, viable decisions regarding mission execution— the TACCO. Only one man can be responsible for safety of flight—the pilot. Until reporting seniors recognize the equal importance, but separateness, of these roles, the Navy will not obtain maximum performance from its antisubmarine aircraft, and TACCOs will

continue to leave the Navy. The system needs to accept the fact of equality.

The most disturbing comment was made by Lieutenant Commander Carpenter, a P-3 tactics instructor at the replacement air group. It is disturbing not just because Commander Carpenter believes it, but because it permeates the patrol plane community. He wrote, "The P-3’s prime target is the ballistic missile submarine, while the S-3 and destroyer’s prime target is the attack submarine.” He and his associates are much more optimistic than I regarding our foreknowledge of an impending nuclear attack, and therefore, patrol air ability to execute a viable defense effort before attack. Nevertheless, patrol planes do have a mission to perform in this area—convoy (task force) defense.

As the interdependence of the Free World economies grows, so does the almost unilateral capacity to interdict them. The Soviet Navy currently has in excess of 400 submarines and is continuing construction of both conventional and nuclear platforms.

Based upon the growing Soviet submarine capability, the limited antisubmarine capacity of the Free World navies, and the magnitude of necessary Free World trade, it is reasonable to anticipate that a patrol squadron might someday be called upon to assist two or three destroyers in escorting a convoy across the Atlantic. The technological