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In reading Admiral Gorshkov’s brilliant series on "Navies in War and Peace,” I could not help but reflect on the fact that when I graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy, Gorshkov was already serving as a rear admiral in the Soviet Navy. The experience of his 33 years as a flag officer has served him well. In the publication of this series, Admiral Gorshkov emerges as a 20th century Russian Mahan, an articulate advocate of seapower as a vital—indeed indispensable—attribute of great power status.
The parallels between Gorshkov and Mahan go beyond their roles as advocates of seapower. Both were perceptive strategic thinkers who were able to appreciate new technology, and to discern its relevance to the changing art of naval warfare. Mahan wrote in 1890, following the authorization of our first iron-clad, big- gun steam warship in 1883. A technological revolution of comparable dimension took place in the Soviet Navy in the 1950s, with the application of nuclear power to submarine propulsion, and development of the cruise missile. And now, almost 20 years later, we see Gorshkov, like Mahan, weaving his perceptions of naval history into a major treatise on seapower.
Both Gorshkov and Mahan view a strong navy as essential for any nation which would be a world power. Both subscribe to the strategy of meeting your enemy while he is still well distant from your shores. Both also hold that their respective nations require a fleet large enough not only to defeat its strongest adversary, but adequate to deal successfully with any combination of hostile navies.
But Gorshkov is much more than a historian or seapower advocate. He is the architect of today’s Soviet Navy—the world’s most modern naval force. Not only has he been a flag officer for more than 30 years; but he has been commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy for almost 20 of those years. This continuity is unparalleled in any modern navy; and the Soviet Navy has clearly benefited from it.
Gorshkov inherited the Soviet Navy when it was at a particularly critical crossroad. Stalin, in the early postwar period, had authorized the construction of a large surface fleet—a pre-war Soviet goal which had been interrupted by World War II. After Stalin’s death, the value of a surface navy was called into question; and building programs which were then underway were cancelled.
In Khrushchev’s eyes, the future of the Soviet Navy lay in a large submarine force, supplemented by land- based air, with surface ships relegated to a basically coastal role. These thoughts echoed a strain of thought which had periodically competed for predominance in the Soviet Navy prior to World War II, and which had eventually been rejected by Stalin in favor of proposals to build a balanced, seagoing navy. Stalin, like Gorshkov, appreciated the political value of a surface navy; and saw its utility as a vehicle to expand the U.S.S.R.’s worldwide influence.
The combination of Gorshkov’s arrival in command, and Khrushchev’s retirement from the political scene,
20th Century Mahan? 71
turned the Soviet Navy once again in the direction of a balanced, oceanic force.
But Gorshkov had formidable obstacles to overcome before he could be sure of obtaining the necessary resources to achieve his grand design. The Soviet Union is a great land power, spanning the Eurasian continent. From earliest Czarist times the Army has held vast influence in the councils of the Russian Government. Although there were periods when Russia built up large navies and exhibited an interest in seapower, these efforts were intermittent; and in time of war, first thought always went to the Army.
To this day, Army marshals dominate the Ministry
of Defense and the General Staff. Soviet defense policy is predominantly the product of a land-oriented politico-military hierarchy. It is all the more remarkable, therefore, that Gorshkov was able to sell his case for "a navy second to none,” and to obtain the resources necessary to achieve that goal.
His success was largely the product of changed historical circumstances, on which Gorshkov capitalized by the forceful advocacy of which the Morskoi Sbomik series is an example.
At the commencement of Gorshkov’s tenure, the prestige of the Soviet Navy within the Soviet military establishment was low. A series of important political and technological developments ensued, however, which let Gorshkov make the case for greatly increased emphasis on seapower. With the development of the SSBN, Gorshkov ensured that the Navy would share in the Soviet strategic budget. With the Cuban missile crisis, he was able to demonstrate the requirement to project surface seapower over great distances, in strength sufficient to stand off a major naval adversary.
With the perfection of the antiship cruise missile, he was able to argue that the Soviet Navy could challenge the traditional supremacy of Western naval forces at times and places of its own choosing. During the Middle East crises of 1967, 1970, and again in 1973, Gorshkov succeeded in demonstrating the high political utility of projectable naval force in time of peace.
The cumulative effect of these individual developments has been to persuade Soviet leadership of the desirability of a large oceangoing navy.
Yet there is still another, and perhaps more important accomplishment to which Gorshkov can lay claim. He has taken his navy to sea. The Soviet Navy, which formerly seldom operated out of sight of land, has acquired a true oceangoing capability. Soviet warships are permanently stationed in the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans, regularly patrol off the west coast of Africa, have established a major (and politically significant) presence on NATO’s northern flank, and are frequently seen conducting visits to the Caribbean. Admiral Gorshkov accurately boasts that the Soviet naval ensign flies over all the oceans of the world.
In the early chapters of his series, Admiral Gorshkov outlined the history of naval developments in Czarist and Communist Russia, and pointed—with something less than total accuracy—to the contributions which
the Navy has made to Russian history. In so doing he was not reluctant to emphasize the political opportunities which unenlightened Russian leaders missed owing to their failure to appreciate the value of sea- power. He implicitly equates statesmanship with the support of naval programs by pointing out that the rise of great powers historically has been linked with their acceptance of a maritime strategy. Throughout his description of history it is clear that he is drawing analogies to today. To understand his interpretation of history is to understand his views with regard to the roles of the Soviet Navy in the contemporary world. His typically propagandized view of history makes interesting, albeit scarcely objective reading; but, more importantly, it allows us to see inside the mind of the Soviet naval leadership and appreciate its views of the world, and the relevance of Soviet naval power to it. This provides invaluable insights to current Soviet activity and to the likely shape of Soviet intentions for the future.
Throughout the series there is the constant repetition of ideological themes which one expects of all Soviet writing. Yet there are some fascinating undercurrents of great Russian chauvinism as well. Despite the facade of Communist ideology, basic Russian attitudes and desires come through which are unchanged from the attitudes and aspirations of the Czars. Gorshkov argues for access to warm water; Gorshkov argues for the need for acceptance of (Communist) Russia as a great world power; Gorshkov displays the almost messianic urge of Russians to export their view of the world—be it Orthodoxy or Communism. Had one of Gorshkov’s illustrious predecessors—Admiral Ushakov—written these articles almost 200 years ago, many of these basic thoughts would have been the same.
Gorshkov’s writings do not force us to do much reading between the lines. He spells out Soviet intentions for all to see—and therein lies one of the most important aspects of the articles. The theme which runs through the entire series is the requirement for a large, balanced Navy consisting of subsurface, surface, and air forces, capable of contesting control of the seas with the strongest naval powers of the day, either singly or in combination. Even a most cursory analysis of Gorshkov’s writing leads to the conclusion that all elements of Soviet seapower will be expanded. This includes, of course, not only the Soviet Navy but also the Soviet merchant marine which has already outstripped ours and is one of the world’s largest and most modern merchant fleets; the Soviet fishing fleet, to which Gorshkov points with pride as the world’s largest; and the oceanographic and research ships required to support long-term Soviet goals for exploitation of the resources of the sea. The Navy’s role in this expan
sion of Soviet seapower is to protect Soviet interests in, on, and at the bottom of the sea, as well as to advance the political, economic, and military interests of the Soviet Union in areas distant from the Eurasian landmass.
Since the publication of these articles, there has been some speculation in the West over the question of whether Gorshkov is announcing an approved strategy, or whether he is merely advocating such strategy in hopes of gaining its acceptance. The best information available to us indicates that the articles represent a "going public” of positions previously articulated in the more confidential forums within which major Soviet policy decisions are actually made. Had Gorshkov’s arguments been rejected in their earlier presentation, it is most unlikely that they would subsequently appear in the carefully controlled Soviet unclassified press. In the Soviet system, such a series of articles by a member of the Central Committee and the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy would not appear if they failed to reflect basic Soviet policy. This conclusion is supported by other evidence as well, including the Soviet shipbuilding programs which have taken place in the approximately three years since the articles were written. The first Soviet aircraft carrier is in the water. The second is under construction. New classes of bigger, more seaworthy guided missile cruisers have been launched and remain in series production. Other cruisers have been modified into command and control ships designed for support of fleet operations distant from the Soviet Union. Entire classes of underway replenishment vessels are in series production and the Soviet Delta class submarine, armed with a missile which the United States will not be able to match until the end of this decade, completes a picture of large capital expenditures indicative of strong governmental support for the powerful, well-rounded Navy which Gorshkov describes in his articles. Clearly the advocacy phase of Gorshkov’s campaign for a navy "second to none” preceded the publication of his articles in the open literature; and that advocacy was effective indeed, witness the sustained high level of capital investment in Soviet naval forces which has characterized the last five years.
Gorshkov has announced that the Soviet Navy is going to sea. We scarcely need his announcement. With the passage of time, we see steadily increasing numbers of sophisticated Soviet naval units operating farther and farther away from their home waters. Already the Soviets have the largest presence of any nonlittoral state in the Indian Ocean; and they have acquired a logistics infrastructure around the Ocean’s littoral capable of supporting a much larger presence.
The Soviet Mediterranean Fleet, with its rapid surge
20th Century Mahan? 73
capability, graphically demonstrated during the October 1973 Mideast crisis the ability to concentrate naval forces in an area of great strategic importance in support of political objectives. The pattern should not have surprised us; it was clearly presaged by Gorshkov’s description of the Soviet Navy’s peacetime role in advancing key Soviet politico-military goals outside the U.S.S.R.
In the future we can anticipate that wherever ships of the U. S. Navy operate we will see modern, highly capable, and sea-wise units of the Soviet fleet juxtaposed to our presence. In time of peace, their mission will be to provide active support to Soviet foreign policy, and to frustrate attainment of our own political objectives whenever those conflict with Soviet aims.
In time of war, their mission will be to contest control of the seas with the United States. Gorshkov makes clear that the Soviets’ ultimate goal is the ability to win control of the seas in the principal theaters of operations. No longer will the interdiction of sea lines of communication and defense of the homeland be the main missions of the Navy. Throughout the series, Gorshkov repeats the theme that the strategy of today’s Soviet Navy must be an offensive, not a defensive strategy.
The asymmetries in the respective geographical positions of the United States and the U.S.S.R. give the Soviets great leverage from their employment of naval power.
To the Soviets, the use of the seas is a bonus. They are 90% self-sufficient in natural resources; and the preponderance of their profitable trade could be conducted with minimal resort to the sea. To the United States, however, seapower is a necessity. Our dependence on overseas supplies of raw materials was brought home during the recent Middle East war and the resultant energy crisis. A large segment of our economy is dependent on foreign trade, and our critical political and military alliances presuppose our ability to control the sea lanes to our allies. Were the Soviet Union to be deprived of its access to the sea, it would work a diplomatic and, to a lesser degree, an economic hardship; but it would not impact severely upon the survival of the Soviet Union. Were the United States to be deprived of free use of the seas, however, it could represent political, economic, and military disaster.
Our ability to utilize the sea in support of U. S. interests is dependent on our possession of the seapower required to ensure our independence from foreign threat—whether that threat takes the form of overt military challenge, or such action as a shipping boycott against the United States. The recent oil embargo highlighted the danger of dependence on the goodwill of other nations. Yet we have allowed ourselves to be
dependent on the ships of other nations for much of our seaborne trade, and have seen our Navy shrink to the point that we are hard-pressed to meet even routine peacetime commitments.
The United States requires a total reawakening to the importance of seapower to the welfare of our nation; and a commitment to complete U. S. self- sufficiency with regard to our use of the high seas. As Gorshkov points out, the ocean bottom is a source of almost incalculable raw material wealth in a world of shrinking resources. The sea, as both Mahan and Gorshkov observe, is the highway for commerce and intercourse among nations. The United States requires the large modern merchant marine which can successfully compete for world trade routes. We need a resuscitated fishing industry to exploit the natural resources off our shores. We need ocean mining and other resource exploitation capabilities, and we need the additional emphasis on hydrographic and oceanographic research which is required to support these industries. Along with this, of course, must come the revitalized shipbuilding industry needed to support a national reawakening to the need for seapower, and the Navy required to protect U. S. interests at sea and overseas.
But where does the United States stand at the moment? Our merchant marine is aging and non-competitive; our fishing fleets are disappearing from the world’s ocean; other than offshore oil drilling, ocean resources are scarcely being touched; our shipyards are obsolescent and sometimes inefficient; our hydrographic and oceanographic research is modest; and our Navy is at its lowest ebb since before World War II. While the Soviet Union builds ships of all descriptions and announces its intention to utilize these in direct support of Communist policy, the United States—a nation with a true seafaring tradition—allows its seapower to atrophy-
Gorshkov has spelled out Soviet intentions for us. The issue is whether we are prepared to recognize the implicit threat in these intentions, and take the actions necessary to provide our nation with the wherewithal to counter and, in time, neutralize this threat; or whether we as a nation will persist in the hope that Soviet intentions can be rendered benign without the maintenance of countervailing U. S. strength. With Soviet intentions now a matter of record, I do not think we can take that chance.
"The flag of the Soviet Navy flies over the oceans of the world. Sooner or later the United States will have to understand it no longer has mastery of the seas.”
Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov
Commander in Chief,
Soviet Navy