From the time of their arrival in Vietnamese waters in July 1965, the primary mission of the 82-foot patrol boats (WPBs) of Coast Guard Squadron One was to prevent enemy infiltration by sea. Serving as part of the U.S. Navy's "Market Time" patrol force (CTF us), the Squadron's 26 WPBs were responsible for the security of a major portion of South Vietnam's 750-mile coastline and eventually became participants in the river war as well.
To meet their king-sized offshore responsibility, the units of CTF 115 used a vigorous board and search campaign for the thousands of sampans and junks which could be found plying the coastal waters of Vietnam at any given time. From Da Nang to An Thoi, a variety of watercraft (from reed basket boats to steel-hulled trawlers) were found along the coast engaged in the nation's commerce, carrying fish or produce to and from market, and transporting the fisherman in search of his daily catch. But, some of these same craft were also known to be transporting men and munitions to North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units along the coast.
The discovery in February 1965, of a 130-foot junk off-loading enemy supplies in Vung Ro Bay brought about the decision to order the Coast Guard patrol vessels to Vietnam. In this particular case, the camouflaged junk had infiltrated with enough arms and sup plies to outfit an entire enemy battalion. There were reasons to believe that similar landings were being made at other points along the coast.
During their first year of operation in the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand, the Coast Guard units inspected or boarded over 65,000 junks and sampans. In so doing, they discovered some 250 tons of munitions as well as food and medical supplies intended for the VC, and detained hundreds of Viet Cong suspects. In compiling this impressive record, the WPB crews quickly learned that their part in the war was to have little glamour.
The routine boarding was a hot, dirty, and monotonous job. It was normal procedure for the boarding party, one or two Coast Guardsmen and a Vietnamese Navy liaison officer, or petty officer, to make a complete search of the vessel, its cargo (including fish) and, in some cases, its crew to determine the presence of any contraband. Often, the search would include a check for a double bottom (several were found in the Mekong Delta region) and even an inspection of the keel by rigging a line under the junk's hull and pulling it from stem to stern to detect any unusual underwater appendages or trailing lines. The identification papers of all persons on board and the vessel's papers, if commercially operated, were examined closely by the VNN liaison for authenticity. Those without papers, or with expired or otherwise suspect papers, were detained for questioning by Vietnamese Navy officials at one of their bases along the coast.
Depending upon the size craft, cargo, number of persons on board, and the availability of a metal detector to the boarding party (particularly valuable in searching large cargoes of rice), a thorough boarding would take from 10 to 30 minutes or more to complete. This procedure was repeated many times during a day, a month, a year, and often under less than ideal conditions. Choppy seas, pungent bilges (nuoc nom, the odoriferous fish sauce that was a part of every Vietnamese's diet, was everywhere) and difficulties in translating instructions could, and often did, complicate and lengthen the boardings.
An “inspection” differed from a boarding in that it usually entailed only a visual examination from alongside and a check of the personal identification papers. A crewman did not actually board unless something suspicious was noted. This procedure was reserved for use with the smaller, open sampans and basket boats where boarding could pose a danger of capsizing (which did occur from time to time, even in the larger sampans.)
At first, both the boardings and inspections performed by the Coast Guard were done only from the deck of the 82-footer. This provided a high degree of security, as a modified general quarters condition was maintained during such operations, and it provided a relatively stable platform from which to work. However, several disadvantages also became apparent:
- delays in bringing the Vietnamese alongside (notoriously bad ship handlers, for the most part) reduced the number of boardings possible to a small percentage of the total vessels in many areas;
- delays in clearing the side again also occurred frequently, particularly if two or more junks were tied abreast;
- reduced mobility for the WPB owing to junks alongside for examination precluded a quick response to evading craft ; and
- inability to move with the concentrations of fishing vessels because of reduced mobility while boarding.
Recognizing the need for a more rapid and efficient way in which to carry out these boardings, the Coast Guard cutter's small boat was pressed into service-the diminutive 13-foot, fiberglass, Boston Whaler that is familiar to many Americans as a standard recreational vehicle for fishing and water sports. Fitted with a steering wheel and a 40-h.p. outboard engine, this boat was identical to those manufactured for the pleasure craft market except for a coat of grey paint.
Nicknamed “skimmers” in recognition of their ability to skim along the top of the water at high speeds (up to 40 m.p.h.), this and similar type boats proved to be invaluable in a variety of missions. It provided the WPB with new flexibility in boarding procedures. For the first time the small boat, or skimmer, was used to “round up” the sampans and junks in an area and direct them to the parent vessel from which the boarding was accomplished. In areas of restricted maneuverability, such as narrow river mouths or where rocks and shoals were known to be present, this tactic allowed the cutter to anchor while the skimmer rounded up the sampans and junks.
Another procedure commonly used was to board or inspect directly from the small boat. Because of its superior speed and maneuverability, the outboard was able to move from junk to junk much more quickly than the WPB. Additionally, in those cases where a sampan or junk attempted to evade inspection by running or entering shallow water, the speedy Whaler was invaluable for its ability to pursue and apprehend.
When boarding, the skimmer would go alongside the vessel to be examined, putting the liaison/ boarding officer aboard, and then laying off while the examination was conducted. By standing clear, the small boat could more effectively provide cover (as did the patrol boat). This also minimized possible damage from the boats beating together and kept the skimmer out of grenade range.
With either of these methods of boarding, or a combination whereby the skimmer and the WPB were boarding simultaneously, it was possible to conduct a thorough examination of a hundred or more craft per day (a large increase over the WPB-only procedure). However, when the 82-footer and skimmer were both boarding, it was important that the two work in close proximity so that the skimmer would not be endangered by the WPB's reduced reaction time.
When using the skimmer for boarding or other operations, sea conditions were a prime concern. The 13-foot Boston Whaler proved itself to be an extremely rugged and seaworthy boat when properly handled. It was successfully launched and recovered in seas of six to eight feet. However, this was certainly the exception. A chop of two to three feet was considered a maximum for most operations.
The comparatively light weight and small size of the 13-foot skimmer made it easy to handle and secure aboard the 82-footer even in fairly heavy seas. But, these same features imposed limitations in its use. Personnel and equipment had to ·be kept to a bare minimum to prevent swamping and to prevent loss of crucial speed and maneuverability.
In selecting the skimmer's crew, an experienced leading petty officer and an engineer were assigned to accompany the VNN liaison who made most of the hoardings. Each of these men was equipped with an automatic weapon. The liaison officer and the Coast Guard boarding petty officer usually carried only a sidearm to keep both hands free for transferring from boat to boat. The coxswain, who stood-off during the boarding, would cover with an M-16.
Each member was also equipped with a helmet and a floatable flak jacket. The latter provided dual protection from shrapnel and a dunking; however, because of bulkiness and the heat, they were never popular items. Many crews eventually shunned the flak jacket entirely for routine hoardings and carried a Mae West type inflatable life vest when in the skimmer.
Other equipment for the small boat included a flak jacket to wrap each gas tank, a portable radio, anchor and line, pop flares, a first aid kit (primarily for treating minor injuries among the Vietnamese boarded), a few basic tools for the engineer, psychological warfare operations (Psyops) material for distribution to those examined, and the “Junk Log.” The PsyOps material provided normally included soap, government propaganda leaflets, South Vietnamese flags, and occasionally candy for the children,. The WPB's commissary also provided apples, oranges, and other fresh fruit which, on the whole, proved to be the most popular.
The “Junk Log” was a ledger in which each vessel boarded or inspected was listed. Also included were any unusual circumstances that might bear reporting or continued observation.
Through its service in offshore boarding and PsyOps operations, the skimmer gained a reputation for versatility and endurance which was put to the test on the inland and coastal waterways.
As Commander R. L. Schreadley, U. S. Navy, pointed out in “Sea Lords” (Proceedings, August 1970), “By almost all measurable criteria the task forces (Market Time, Game Warden, and Mobile Riverine) had achieved a high degree of effectiveness (by the fall of 1968). There had been no known attempts to infiltrate large shipments of men or arms into South Vietnam by sea since the Tet offensive earlier in the year. Possibly, small intra-coastal transhipments may still have occurred, but if they did, it was at a high cost to the enemy because of the intensive and well co-ordinated Market Time air and sea patrols. These patrols had forced the enemy to reorient his entire logistics system and to organize and construct networks of infiltration routes in the Demilitarized Zone, in Laos, and in Cambodia.” In the words of one Market Time Swift boat (PCF) skipper, “If we hadn't done our job so well, they wouldn't have had to build the Ho Chi Minh Trail.”
As the emphasis on interdiction of the enemy's supply lines shifted inland in late 1968, many of the Market Time units found themselves a part of the inland Sea Lord operation. This was particularly true of the cutters assigned to Coast Guard Division 13 at Cat Lo.
Located just north of the rice-rich Mekong Delta, with its intricate network of rivers and canals, the WPBs and PCFs at Cat Lo became increasingly active in operations along the intra-coastal waterways. These Market Time units were frequently assigned to Sea Lord missions which took them up to 20 miles inland from their normal coastal patrol areas.
Working in such rivers as the Ham Luong, Co Chien, the mighty Bassac and the treacherous Ganh Hao, the WPBs of Division 13 and their PCF counterparts found themselves at work in some of the strongest Viet Cong sanctuaries in the Delta. These enemy strongholds included the Rung Sat, Thanh Phu, and Long Toan Special (or “Secret”) Zones and the inhospitable Dung Island Complex.
Operations included intelligence gathering, troop insertions, harassment and interdiction, and an inland version of the familiar board and search. To be effective in these missions, surprise and quick response were essential. These were often difficult to achieve, especially when working in the smaller canals. While often 30 to 40 feet in depth, many of the canals running through the Special Zones were less than 100 feet wide. An 82-footer transiting such waters, with her prominent superstructure and mast visible above the bordering tree lines, might well have appeared to be some waterborne behemoth to enemy eyes, but hard to detect she was not; nor was the smaller, but noisier, Swift boat with its distinctive engine exhaust.
As for quick response, these seagoing patrol craft were again hampered in the more restricted canals. The PCF, being some 30 feet shorter and 10 to 15 knots faster, was the more agile of the two, but even the Swift boat had difficulty in pursuing the enemy's motorized sampans and junks on the narrow, winding tributaries. This point was driven home to one PCF skipper in the heart of the Thanh Phu Secret Zone. As he attempted to apprehend an evading sampan at high speed, he failed to negotiate a sharp turn in the monsoon-swollen canal, cleared the bank, and found himself hard aground in an adjacent rice paddy.
Reports of WPBs having to back out of unfriendly canals to find room enough to turn around; losing whip radio antennas to overhanging trees; and engaging the enemy through the use of spotters looking over the tree lines from exposed perches atop the cutter's mast were not uncommon. However, they were received with mixed feelings by the cognizant operational commanders. While admiring the courage and tenacity of the units involved, the extreme dangers were also recognized. There had to be a better way.
Here was another area in which the skimmer could be of assistance. The Coast Guard patrol boats had continued to use their small boats for board and search work after moving into the river mouths. This, coupled with the limited experiences gained in using the small boats as waterborne guard posts during their offshore patrols (keeping an eye on suspected enemy landing points along the coast), enabled the Coast Guard units to make an easy transition to the requirements for Sea Lord skimmer operations.
With an outboard or two in company, it was much easier for the WPBs and PCFs to probe the many small canals which laced the VC controlled Secret Zones and had proven so troublesome in the past. The speedy skimmers enjoyed a much higher success rate than had their parent units (by way of clarification, the PCFs did not carry a small boat) in surprising and engaging the enemy. Unfriendly small craft and personnel ashore were often caught unexpectedly as a skimmer appeared suddenly around a canal bend in advance of the covering patrol craft. The Whalers were also effective in detecting camouflaged VC small craft and supplies along the canal banks, and in probing connecting waterways, too narrow for the covering unit to turn around in.
Certain safeguards were employed in all small boat operations. The skimmer was always accompanied by another unit when probing a canal (a “two unit minimum" doctrine also applied to PCF and WPB canal operations). A single skimmer was not allowed to operate in canals where the parent WPB could not cover, and, if necessary, enter and physically remove the boat. When using two or more small boats, they were staggered and assigned to opposite banks to minimize the effects of possible enemy ambushes.
Some of the WPBs greatest results in detecting and disrupting the enemy's in-shore movements occurred in conjunction with nighttime small boat operations. Typical of these was the covert surveillance operation. A skimmer would be launched by an 82-footer well clear of a suspected VC position and then be towed into the vicinity so that only the single unit was heard. Once the small boat was cast free the WPB would proceed out of the immediate area leaving the impression of a routine transit. The skimmer was then either anchored or paddled into shore (using a compass or the starlight scope to navigate). Once in position, a listening and visual surveillance was maintained, often for the entire night. If enemy activity was detected this was reported to the supporting unit(s) by radio, using a set equipped with a pilot's helmet-type head set to prevent detection.
The experiences of one such skimmer guard post illustrates the value and the hazards of this type operation. Late in 1969, the cutter Point Grace launched a surveillance skimmer in the Co Chien River which detected a great deal of nocturnal activity in an adjoining section of the Long Toan Secret Zone. Anchored in the mouth of a canal which flowed from the Zone into the river, the small boat crew detected a number of male Vietnamese voices and caught occasional glimpses of movement along a nearby embankment through the starlight scope. Their surveillance was cut short, however, by the sudden appearance of a small motorized sampan exiting the canal. With neither showing lights or expecting the other, a collision nearly resulted. In the ensuing excitement the sampan was halted and found to be carrying a very surprised, unarmed man and woman. As they had no identification they were escorted to the Point Grace for detainment and eventual delivery to a VNN Coastal Group. They were later identified as Communist sympathizers.
In apprehending the sampan, the skimmer had revealed its presence to those heard earlier on shore. Thus, when the small boat attempted to resume its watch, it was welcomed with a barrage of automatic weapons fire. In the fire fight which followed, the skimmer was able to clear the area (with several holes but no casualties) under the Point Grace's protective umbrella of .50 caliber fire. Subsequent daylight mortar fire from the Point Grace and an air strike by the highly regarded “Black Ponies” (OV-10) of Vung Tau-based VAL-4 resulted in a number of secondary explosions and heavy black smoke. An enemy supply point had been detected and destroyed, thanks to a 13-foot "fishing" boat.
Skimmer operations similar to those conducted by the Coast Guard were also performed by the U. S. and Vietnamese Navy personnel assigned to the Coastal Groups in the Delta. While most Coastal Groups served primarily as bases for the Vietnamese Navy's junk force, the U. S. Navy advisory staffs at the bases on the Ham Luong, Co Chien, and Bassac rivers were also equipped with 22-foot Kenner Ski Barges. These were beamy, flat bottomed, twin outboard skimmers which also emerged from the U. S. recreational boat market. They boasted considerably more room and speed than the 13-foot Boston Whaler.
Inasmuch as the Coastal Groups normally had but one of these skimmers assigned, the offer of a WPB Whaler for a joint operation was welcomed by the senior U.S. Navy advisor. Also working under a two-unit doctrine, the addition of an experienced Coast Guard crew and skimmer permitted the Coastal Group to mount probes and surveillance operations in the more hostile regions of their areas of responsibility. It also permitted board and search activities to be conducted in the more shoal reaches of the rivers where WPBs, PCFs, and VNN junks alike were barred by their draft.
One result of these joint WPB-Coastal Group skimmer operations for the Coast Guard was the recognized value in having a larger, twin-engine boat for particularly hazardous missions. The greater size permitted the assigning of additional weapons while the extra engine provided both speed and a back-up in case of engine failure.
To capitalize on this experience, two 17-foot Boston Whalers, one with dual 40-h.p. outboards, the other with a single 85-h.p. engine, were placed into service as Coast Guard Division 13's “special ops” boats. Unlike the Kenner boat, these big brothers of the 13-foot Whaler were capable of being carried aboard and launched from an 82-footer without any modification to the WPBs boat cradle or boom.
The “special ops” boats were armed with a twin M-60 machine gun mounted forward and single M-60s mounted on the sides. The twin mount on one of these boats was replaced in the spring of 1970 with an aircraft type “mini-gun” that was “borrowed” from the Air Force. However, use of this sophisticated weapon proved to be a short-lived experiment as its rapid rate of fire advantage was offset by a temperamental nature and an inability to carry enough ammunition in the small boat to realize its full potential. Nonetheless, for several operations the Viet Cong must have been impressed by the fire (every fourth round a tracer) which originated from the head of this waterborne “baby dragon.”
To man the 17-footers for offensive or hazardous missions, the boat was assigned a crew of five-a boat officer (usually the WPB's CO or XO), an engineer, a gunner's mate, and two others. This provided three gunners, a radio operator (the boat officer), and a coxswain.
The 17-foot Whaler offered other advantages in addition to those already mentioned. Its "cathedral" style hull provided a higher degree of seaworthiness than found in either of its previously mentioned contemporaries; this permitted its use in unprotected waters and in more severe sea conditions. Its size permitted an increase in passenger load which was invaluable during troop insertions and extractions.
Reminiscent of one of the Coast Guard's roles in World War II, the WPBs frequently found themselves acting as a type of amphibious assault vessel, landing and removing ground troops from enemy soil. Both U. S. and Vietnamese army troops were teamed with the 82-footers and their skimmers to carry out probes of enemy territory, particularly the more remote regions where overland travel was difficult or impossible and where insertion by air could preclude essential surprise.
Between 30 and 40 troops, most often Vietnamese with U.S. Army advisors, and their equipment was a typical force for a single cutter. These troops would be landed at a given site either by placing the WPB's bow into the bank (if in a canal or river) LST style, or by using the skimmers if in shallow water. Once ashore, the ground force could conduct a sweep of the area while the patrol boat provided gun fire support and the skimmers conducted a “blocking” action to prevent any enemy escape from the sweep zone via water. If the troops were caught in an ambush, the skimmer provided a way out. Many an outnumbered allied force found it necessary to take advantage of the skimmer's fast ride to the safety of a covering WPB. The outboard's low profile, speed, and maneuverability (even though reduced by a load of up to a dozen troops), made for an elusive target during such “extractions.”
Whether rescuing trapped soldiers on unfriendly beaches or rounding up sampans for routine inspections, the small boat saw increasingly important and varied use until the time of U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. Criticized by some as a craft dangerously vulnerable to both combat and the natural elements, the skimmers achieved their successes as a result of the thorough planning, sound judgment, courage, and skill of those who manned them.
The Coast Guard skimmer ended its role in Vietnam with the disestablishment of Coast Guard Division 13 in August of 1970. Turned over to the Vietnamese Navy along with the last of the original 26 WPBs, these versatile skimmers will be remembered for their contributions to the war afloat.