This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
Convoys:
No Second Chance?
By Captain Carvel H. Blair, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Historically, the first months of war at sea have seen merchant ships sailing independently. After periods of heavy losses, the maritime combatants reluctantly shifted to the convoy system, groups of cargo vessels escorted by men-of-war. Despite inherent disadvantages, convoying invariably reduced merchant sinkings so sharply that it then became standard practice. With each return of peace, however, the world’s merchant fleet has been happy to resume independent movements while the world’s navies shifted attention to more interesting offensive developments. The convoy system would vanish until the start of a new war.
Today the U. S. Navy and NATO retain the convoy system, but its exercise, study, and development have low priority. Having completed a naval career with typically little thought to merchant shipping or its escort, I belatedly came to grips with these problems at the convoy commodore’s course. The Atlantic Fleet ASW Tactical School at Norfolk and the Pacific Fleet ASW School at San Diego convene annual courses "to train retired officers . . .
in their responsibilities and duties as prospective Convoy Commodores.” (BuPers Instruction 01000.6 gives details of the program.)
the capacity of six old tankers; the (very large crude carrier) at sea
Like most of the others who participated, I concluded that much work is needed to bring World War II doctrine and procedures up to date and to keep them there as the potential threat changes. The ASW Schools and the War and Staff Colleges can do part of the work; some is the province of the fleet planners; a small portion can be done only in Washington. It is not my intention here to suggest how to accomplish this overhaul, but rather to outline the convoy problems that need solving. These are summarized roughly in order of importance.
► The nuclear submarine and cruise missile threat. There is no doubt that an adequately escorted convoy is the safest and fastest way to move slow cargo ships when they are in danger of attack by torpedo-firing diesel-electric submarines. But note three significant modifiers in the preceeding statement: slow ships, torpedo, and diesel. Revolutionary changes in each of these are upon us. First, ship
speed: cargo ships of 15 knots "c(t "fast” in 1945, but today’s fast contain^1 ships reach twice that speed. Seco^ enemy weapons: torpedoes, alth°u?, similar in range and speed to those 1945, can now carry nuclear warhei An even more dangerous threat. 1 cruise missile, can approach a convoy hundreds of knots from a launcher1 board a submarine, surface ship, orJl( craft tens of miles distant. It, too, to- be nuclear tipped. Third, submit’11 capabilities: today’s nuclear submit’ (SSN) can steam at speeds comparJ ^ to a destroyer’s and need not surface1 expose even a snorkel. Only slightly b dramatic is the increase in size of °r:\ ships. The OBO (oil-bulk-ore) ship
to<b)
displaces up to 265,000 tons with million-tonner on the drawing bolt Loaded, these ships draw 60 to 80 1 and can enter only a few of the "0t “ ports. Paradoxically, automation his lowed, and economics have demand a reduction in crew size. A supertax manned by no more men than a Nl; fleet tug, has little reserve manpowef
handle the tasks added by sailing in convoy. What is needed is a re-examina- hon of the convoy concept with each °f these parameters expanded from 1945 co 1975 and to 1985 values. For example, how many escorts should be assigned to a convoy of six OBOs travelling at 16 knots? Should containerships travel singly or in a small, 25-knot, heavily escorted convoy? In short, the matrix of capability vs. threat is several-fold raore complex than before. We know 'he answers to a few of the combinations; we must now solve for the others.
► Formation. Closely spaced, rectangular, broad front convoys were stand- lrd in World War II. This formation facilitated screening without increasing vulnerability to torpedoes. Today’s SSN, however, has the ability to steam at convoy speed in the acoustic bedlam directly under the ships of the convoy. Safe from the escorts, here he can find a sanctuary for reloading and re-attack. The closely-massed main body also pre- sents an attractive target for the nuclear kurst. Opening out the spacing, in either rectangular or circular aspect, interacts both of these enemy advan
tages but proportionally increases the difficulty of screening by a fixed size escort. What is the best compromise?
► EMCON. World War I and II formations could keep station by seaman’s eye and visual signalling. Radio/radar silence was the rule. Today this situation has changed. Sonar can detect acoustic emanations at distances comparable to, or perhaps greater than, countermeasure receivers can detect low power merchant ship radars. Radio, while more detectable than flag hoist or flashing light, is faster and more flexible. Since acoustic noise cannot be eliminated, does it make sense to impose EMCON, depriving the convoy of the benefits of radar for station-keeping and voice radio for maneuvering?
► Zig-zagging. Against the various expected threats, what type of zig-zag plan, if any, gives best protection, and at what convoy speed? This problem interacts with those above—speed, radar, communications.
► Command relationships. Should we retain the tradition which gives tactical
command to the escort commander, regardless of the relative rank of escort and convoy commanders and the size of their respective units? The shortage of ships in today’s shrinking fleet could conceivably place a lieutenant PG skipper, as escort commander, in tactical command of a ready reserve captain or a recently retired rear admiral convoy commodore. Several factors are involved as well as seniority: armament, communications, experience, up-to-date tactical knowledge. The principle that gives responsibility and authority to the senior line officer present is so basic that departures from it, as in convoy practice, demand frequent and compelling justification. As a corollary, there needs to be a workable relationship between convoy commodore and escort commander when the latter is airborne with no surface escort. Both communications and chain-of-command need examination in this context.
► SSN as convoy escort. Would a single SSN be a good escort for a 25-knot convoy of high-value, fast containerships? The absence of surface or air escorts— perhaps forced by shortage of numbers—
would remove the possibility of mutual interference, which has so far prevented submarine employment in close contact with friendly forces.
There are other problems to be solved as well, and all solutions need documentation followed by incorporation in ATP 2A, (Allied Naval Control of Shipping Manual) and ACPs 148 and 149 (War
time Instructions for Merchant Ships). The questions above, however, seem the most urgent. In World Wars I and II, the U. S. Navy had time to perfect a convoy system based on prior experience of the Royal Navy and on our own efforts in the early months of hostilities. These learning periods came at a high cost in men, ships, and cargo. Historian
Allan Westcott has noted: "In the Atlantic, for example, the [World War II] U-boat ultimately destroyed some 3,000 vessels with a total displacement of more than 14,000,000 tons.” Today the American merchant marine numbers about 600 active ships. If we once again must sail convoys into a Battle of the Atlantic, we had better be right the first time.
The ordeal of the deep submersible vehicle Pisces III began at 0940, 29 August 1973, when she sank in 1,375 feet of water with two men on board. She had been engaged in the laying of an underwater telephone cable. The accident occurred 100 miles southwest of Ireland as the craft was being towed by the mother ship Vickers Voyager. The towline ripped the hatch off the after machinery compartment, and the submersible’s reserve buoyancy was unable to compensate for the inrush of water. At the time of the sinking, she had, theoretically, about 72 hours of life- support capability.
The craft’s owner, Vickers Oceanics, Ltd., immediately appealed to the U. S. Navy for assistance as back-up to their primary plan to raise the distressed submersible with the aid of her sister DSVs Pisces II and V, which were being airlifted to the accident scene. The U. S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage accepted the assignment.
Detailed to participate in the rescue was the Curv III, third in a series of unmanned, remotely controlled vehicles developed by the Naval Undersea Center (NUC), San Diego. She was sponsored by the Naval Ordnance Systems Command, primarily for use in recovery of test ordnance. Her predecessor, the Curv I, had placed the lines to recover the hydrogen bomb off Palomares, Spain, in 1966.
The Curv III system consists of an underwater, remotely-controlled vehicle,
a vehicle-to-surface tether cable, monitor and control console within an instrumentation van, a surface-supported power source, and surface handling and launch equipment. The Curv vehicle is five and one half feet wide, seven feet high, thirteen feet long, and weighs
5.0 pounds. On its open aluminum frame are mounted three electrical propulsion units (two horizontal and one vertical), still photo cameras, lights, active and passive sonar, altimeter and depthometer, and two television cameras. The vehicle is driven to depth against its innate positive buoyancy by its vertical thruster, thereby providing a fail-safe surfacing capability if the electrical power is interrupted.
A hydraulically actuated manipulator functions as the tool arm to perform undersea work tasks and recovery operations. The Curv can lift up to 200 pounds with the manipulator. For heavier objects, such as the hydrogen bomb or the Pisces submersible, the vehicle attaches a recovery device to the object with one of several special tools placed in its manipulator, then ejects the tool (to which is attached a long lift line) allowing the object to be pulled to the surface with a shipboard winch. The Curv has a normal operating depth to
7.0 feet (this depth can be increased to 10,000 feet in emergency situations).
Two U. S. Air Force C-141 Starlifter aircraft transported the Curv vehicle, its support equipment, and crew direct from North Island (San Diego) Naval
Air Station to Cork, Ireland, arriving 30 August. At Cork, the equipment was unloaded from the aircraft, transferred to a barge at the dock, and taken to the Canadian cable-laying ship John Cabot. The John Cabot arrived at the accident site about 1730 on 31 August.
In the meantime Deep Submergence Vehicles (DSVs) Pisces II and V, had arrived on site, but due to their limited power they could not place a line large enough to provide a fair safety factor for lifting the great dynamic load. The seas were running high and a strong wind was blowing, making the operations most difficult.
The Curv was prepared, so as to be ready in case it would be used in another attempt to rescue the submersible. A recovery attachment device, in the form of a large toggle bolt, manufactured by Vickers, was given to the U. S. Navy crew for use by the Curv. Since the after hatch of the Pisces III was open, the easiest place to make an attachment to a structural "hard point” for lifting the submersible was through this hatch Also, most of the submersible was covered by a fiber glass fairing, which could not sustain the loads needed for lifting- The toggle bolt was welded to a spare Curv tool holder, which was then inserted into the hydraulically actuated manipulator. An 8-inch (circumference), double-braided nylon line was attached to the toggle bolt, then taped (with low-strength masking tape) to the Curt frame and taped at intervals all along
the tether cable. This was to reduce the catenary in the liftline and to keep it from twisting around the Cun s tether cable.
At 0942, 1 September, the Cun was 0ver the side ready to dive. At 1030, it arrived on the bottom at 1,500 feet depth and proceeded to locate the Pisces Ul by sonar scan. The toggle bolt was placed by 1040, and it was ascertained television camera that the bolt was secure. Then a strain was put on the Hftline by the John Cabot, and the tool bolder was ejected from the Cun ma- n‘pulator. The masking tape ties broke as the lift cable separated from the Cun 'ether, and the lift of the Pisces III began.
' 1300, the submersible had been raised to the surface and an additional lne was being attached by swimmers so l( could be brought to a horizontal Position for the exit of the personnel. I 1320, the men had climbed out and "ere transferred, in good condition, via 'Cibber boat to the British Vickers Voy- y* The rescue had taken nearly 76 0urs f'om the time of sinking. Fortuity. the two pilots were experienced cJCrs and had used their oxygen supply
The water was pumped out of the after machinery compartment and the Pisces III was then returned to the Vickers Voyager, thus completing not only the rescue of the two men but also the salvage of their submersible.
As the result of this operation, several recommendations can be made that would lead to more efficient response to future undersea emergencies. First, in
regard to deep submersible vehicles, each should carry an acoustic locating device (a pinger); each vehicle should also incorporate easily accessible external lift points, preferably two large diameter rings placed at 90 degrees to each other, each tied to a structural "hard point” that can sustain lifting loads; submersi- bles should have a minimum of 72 hours of life support capability, and hopefully
more. Second, the Curv III system should be modified for easier adaptability to the Military Airlift Commafl<) automatic loading pallets to speed up preparations for aircraft loading. Third a continuously updated inventory of search, rescue, and salvage equipment should be maintained to simplify the determination of tools available for use in future undersea emergency situations.
The Navy Research Associate
By Commander Gerald A. Fulk, U. S. Navy, Research Associate, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, and Commander Gus C. A. Laskaris, U. S. Navy, former Research Associate and present Executive Officer, USS Sanctuary (AH-17)
The Navy is making a little-known contribution to science in its research associate program at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in Livermore Valley, California. Here, naval officers with technical backgrounds and education are assigned to research billets, where they become associate members of the laboratory’s professional staff. They conduct research in diverse areas related to nuclear weapons and to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
In all cases, Navy Research Associates have an opportunity to produce meaningful scientific results which can be important contributions in the field. The Army and Air Force also take part in this unusual program.
The Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLL) is operated for the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) by the University of California. It is one of two laboratories which have responsibility for the design of all nuclear explosives in the United States. The LLL also conducts research in controlled thermonuclear reactions, laser technology, and biomedical subjects.
Many LLL-designed nuclear warheads are now operational with the Services. Navy weapons include the W45 nuclear warhead of the Terrier missile, W55 nuclear warhead of the submarine rocket (SubRoc) system, the W47/MK1 reentry body (RB) for the Polaris A2 system, the W58/MK2 RB in the Polaris A3 system and the newest W68/MK3 RB in the
Poseidon C3 system. In service with the Army and the Marine Corps is the 155-mm. nuclear projectile and the Medium Atomic Demolition Munition (MADM). Soon to be made available to the Army is the nuclear warhead in the surface-to-surface Lance missile and the warhead for the Spartan ABM system. The warheads in the Air Force’s Min- uteman Mk-11 and Mk-12 reentry vehicles (RV) were also developed by the lll.
Technical branches proliferated in the Navy with the coming of the nuclear age. There was early recognition of the need for naval officers qualified to fill billets in these branches. The Navy Research Associate program at the LLL was established, informally, in 1953 as one measure to improve technical expertise in the officer corps. The first Navy Research Associate was then Lieutenant Commander John K. Beling. He retired as a rear admiral after a distinguished career in both research and operational positions. The first formal agreement between the AEC and the Navy concerning the assignment of officers to the laboratory was in 1959.
Officers assigned to the 18 billets at the LLL, are required to have sufficient graduate education to meet the criteria for a science or weapons engineering subspecialty P-code. Typical backgrounds include engineering, physics, chemistry, electronics, mathematics, and computer science. If accepted by the Laboratory, the officer is quickly inte
grated into the scientific staff. A specific research assignment is usually requested by the individual, after interviews to identify areas related to his experience t and personal desires.
The normal tour of duty in a research
associate billet is two-to-three years. In his tenure at the Laboratory, the officer acquires an unusual scientific experience in nuclear weapon design, effects, and related technologies. Such experience prepares officers for future assignments >n joint AEC-DoD nuclear weapons development programs; the Defense Nuclear Agency; the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy; the Office of Director, Defense Research and Engineering; the Division of Military Applications of the AEC; the Navy’s Strategic Systems Project Office; and other positions requiring technical nuclear qualifications.
The Laboratory’s policy of placing naval officers and officers from other Services in research positions, and to have them work with civilian scientists *n all phases of research, was greatly
117
influenced by Dr. Edward Teller, a former director and currently an Associate Director-at-Large at LLL. Dr. Teller, commenting on the relationship between the Navy and the LLL said:
The future of the Navy depends on novel technical developments. Unless officers of the Navy have expert knowledge in the relevant technical fields, the Navy will lose control over its future. Unless naval officers have an intimate knowledge of the research proceeding at Livermore, our Laboratory will not be able fully to serve the requirements of the Navy.
The spectrum of studies conducted by research associates is wide. Officer assignments have included: use of a pulsed laser to produce holographs of plasma density profiles; use of high speed digital computers to study thermonuclear reactions pertinent to the design of a modified Spartan antiballistic missile; design
Professional Notes
and conduct of experiments in proton back-scattering from thin foils, using the Laboratory’s two MeV Van de Graff accelerators, the study of solid earth geophysics with specific attention to the effects of underground nuclear explosions; development of a detonator system; and measurement of X-ray-induced photoconductivity and charge transfer in dielectrics.
Of particular significance, one Navy Research Associate, John W. Green, did the major part of the nuclear design work on the warhead for the Polaris A2 missile, which was the backbone of the Polaris force for many years. Another officer was the executive assistant to the project scientist for an elaborate underground nuclear vulnerability test.
Officers who are considering assignment as research associates often express concern about the effect on their careers. Livermore is, indeed, outside the mainstream of the operating and support forces. Yet, it is in the mainstream of advanced scientific research. The Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Naval Personnel have indicated that the Navy must have officers with technical expertise as well as operational skill.
Officers assigned as Navy Research Associates have made substantial contributions to all phases of weapon design technology and the general body of scientific knowledge. As individuals, they have formed bonds with the scientific community, improving mutual understanding between two somewhat diverse professions. The research associate program has been of distinct benefit to the Laboratory and to the Navy.
e
Computing Current by OR Position Error
% Senior Chief Quartermaster (SS, DV) Sviatoslav S. Seteroff, U. S. Navy, Former ^t. Navigator, USS Sculpin (SSN-590)
Most ships today are equipped with some type of dead reckoning position lndicator. Assuming that the required c°utse and speed inputs are accurate, and the equipment is calibrated for con- stant error, this is a valuable navigation
aid that is more accurate than a hand DR when accelerating, decelerating, or maneuvering. This is not intended to devalue the hand DR, which is still the only method not subject to power failure.
Readings are normally recorded half- hourly and with each navigational fix, and a correction or position error determined for equipment reset. This position error lends itself nicely to current computation using a maneuvering
board, modified by the addition of longitude scales.
Since the length of a unit of longitude varies with latitude, longitude error must be converted to miles prior to plotting on a graph or maneuvering board. This may be accomplished by the use of Table 6, H.O. 9, or by following the procedures for the construction of a small-scale plotting sheet. The author has found the repeated use of. Table 6 cumbersome and has followed the plot
ting sheet construction procedure directly on a maneuvering board. This method yields a semi-permanent scale that can be used directly for longitude conversion.
Latitude error need not be converted and is therefore plotted directly on the graph or maneuvering board.
Once the longitude conversion is accomplished, the problem becomes a simple vector computation. Of particular note is the scale of two-units-per-inch
used on H.O. 2665-10. By pasting a 10 X 10-inch graph paper directly on the maneuvering board, a vector may easily be determined and the velocity then obtained using the logarithmic scale.
Example:
► DR equipment last reset to fix at 0600Z.
► 0730Z position is
40-02.3N 122-32.0^ DR position
40-04.6N 122-310^
DR error
L-02.3S +01.0^
► To compute current, note that latitude correction is to the south arl^ longitude correction to the west. The current is thus in a southwesterly direction.
► Latitude error is plotted on the prepared maneuvering board in a south- erly direction.
► Longitude error is picked off on the longitude scale for latitude 40 and trani" ferred to the vector diagram.
► Set is determined to be 199°T an drift (velocity) as 1.6 kts.
Had the current been in a northwesterly direction, the maneuvering board would be used upside down usin$ the inner azimuth ring.
If desired, additional latitudes may ^ computed for greater accuracy. Ho" ever, a good interpolation may be m^c by laying a straight edge between plotted adjacent latitudes along the l°n gitude reference and picking off conversion at the desired latitude "it dividers.