We can say, in fact, that the importance of amphibious warfare as an integral part of naval power will increase with the years because the need for bases will increase . . . naval power will be even more necessary than now to the defense of our country and the initiation of offensive efforts, and the organic ability of naval power to seize and hold advance bases will also increase in importance.
—Lieutenant Colonel R. E. Cushman, Jr., USMC Proceedings, March 1948
The limitations of military prophesy are clearly revealed in this case by a quarter century of experience and hindsight.
For proof, let us turn to the actual uses we have made of amphibious forces since 1948. During this period, there have been over fifty non-routine deployments of Marines, at battalion strength or greater. In variety of missions, these ran from 1950's full scale assault at Inchon to 1972's disaster relief operations in the Philippines during Typhoon Rita. No deployment was made to seize advance bases in the World War II sense. True, airfield defense was an initial mission of the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade when it landed at DaNang in 1965; but those Marines were guarding a facility already in hand.
That 1948 Proceedings essay attempted, among other things, to deal with the implications of aircraft and missile technology and the advent of the atomic bomb. It described national security requirements in terms of a need to blunt an attack on the continental United States, either from the sea or along a north-south continental axis, to regain the offensive, and to project power into the enemy's sphere. To the extent that the new weapons had measurable characteristics, the essay assumed that their probable impact on strategy and tactics could be forecast with some degree of certainty.
Before long, however, that concept of defense of the homeland was overwhelmed by the technology of war, with its quantum jumps in destructive power and in the ability to deliver that power on target. This technological growth was reflected in evolving national strategies, which also reflected our changing perceptions of the world and the network of alliances and commitments which arose from them.
It has been along this threat-sensitive path of perceptions, with responses evolving from "Containment" to "Realistic Deterrence," that our interests and our ability to protect them have been determined. It is further along this path, whose turns increasingly are unpredictable, that we will have to seek new answers to the old questions of the proper applications of military power.
This uncertainty might temper one's readiness to accept any conclusions which might be drawn about the military scene a quarter century from now; but it should nor temper our enthusiasm for looking ahead to the practical limit of our military vision. A long perspective is needed to balance a sometimes myopic concern with the requirements of day-to-day operational readiness to meet a full spectrum of contingencies. We must stay in the race, bur by devoting excessive rime and resources to breeding better horses and building better buggies, we might eventually be outstripped by those who have seen the promise of the internal combustion engine.
Ahead are potential breakthroughs in all three of our amphibious warfare environs:
- At sea, through Surface Effect Ship (SES) technology;
- In the air, through further developments in Vertical/Short Takeoff and Landing (V/ STOL) technology; and
- On land, through developing electronics and laser technologies.
The technology of surface effect ships has reached about the same stare of development as the technology of aviation had achieved in the 1920s. It may well be that the full range of SES applications at the close of this century is just as unfathomable now as today's full range of aviation capabilities was unanticipated in Lindbergh's time. Yet, without even taking into account the accelerating rate of technological change, the prospect of a breakthrough in strategic mobility induced by surface effect technology is an exciting one.
Consider briefly the implications inherent in freeing our amphibious task forces from a 20-knot speed of advance.
Using surface effect ships such forces could respond to crises four or five times faster than they can now—arriving at some of their destinations within hours, instead of days or weeks. Their relative invulnerability to submarines, mines, and surface combatants of the displacement type promises to increase their chances of delivering landing forces to their objectives intact, while reducing—or even eliminating—the requirement for escort vessels. The increased ability to disperse the ships of our task forces, a concomitant of their high speed, provides them better passive defense against air and nuclear threats. In addition, their markedly reduced response and turnaround times would ease the problems of the reinforcement and logistic sustainability of the forces placed ashore.
The reliance on such high speed task forces as instruments of national policy might eventually lessen our dependence on advance bases and forward afloat deployments, and lead to a reduction in the number of ships required to meet our worldwide commitments. They would retain the flexibility inherent in today's amphibious forces, but the limiting factor in response to a number of crises could conceivably shift from the ships' speed of advance to the time needed to embark the landing forces. This would place an added premium on highly trained and combat ready forces.
The coupling of V/STOL and SES technologies can open even more opportunities to this amphibious task force of the future. Our experience indicates that a platform well shaped for aircraft operations—with a length about twice its width—holds the most promise in surface effect ship development. There is a further indication of sharp improvement in the payload to horsepower ratio as the size of the platform increases. However, we have yet to attain enough construction and operational experience to determine how big we can go before this rate of improvement flattens out. In combination, these phenomena could lead to the eventual development of both surface effect aircraft carriers and air capable surface effect ships, the latter perhaps carrying V/STOL aircraft. In the case of carriers, the increase in speed over that of displacement ships could have a dramatic effect on wind-over-deck launch requirements for conventional aircraft. Ships of the second type could bridge the gap in capabilities which now exists between our various helicopter bearing ships and our attack carriers.
For the foreseeable future, the requirements of air defense, among other things, dictate the possession of large carriers which can support high performance fighters. These fighters are needed to counter any adversary who poses a sophisticated air threat. In considering less intense crises, however, eventually we reach a point where the commitment of major carrier task forces becomes at best uneconomical and at worst unnecessarily provocative. Conceivably in such situations, where forces at sea have generally enjoyed a marked degree of sanctuary, smaller amphibious task forces could deter hostile acts or keep them from escalating into a major conflict. By including surface effect ships carrying V/STOL aircraft, such forces would have the otherwise unattainable advantages of possessing usable tactical aviation both en route to, and in, the objective area.
Additionally, the basing flexibility of V/STOL aircraft would permit, as the particular situation required:
- Air operations from small offshore islands;
- Early air operations from ashore, without the delay inherent in airfield repair or construction. Even the Marines' Short Airfield for Tactical Support (SATS) requires about 72 hours to become operational, under the best of conditions.
- Forward basing of aircraft for immediate response to calls for close support of ground troops, in addition to operations from afloat.
The ability of both the surface effect ship and the V/STOL aircraft to disperse would increase greatly the effort an enemy would have to make to neutralize or destroy the landing force's aviation. This could be a decisive consideration in a sub-theater situation where an adversary might be tempted to risk a surprise escalatory strike against aircraft concentrated on a few large carriers. In a more sophisticated aerial warfare environment, V/STOL aircraft could complement the air defense capability of high performance conventional fighters, under a "patrol leader" concept. This envisions the coupling of the advanced target acquisition capabilities of, for example, the F-14 with the essentially visual combat capabilities of the less sophisticated V/STOL aircraft.
In considering warfare ashore, the potential exists for Marines of the future to be able to pierce the "fog of war" far better than we can today. Developing electronic and laser technologies show promise in providing means to:
- Maintain effective command and control over widely separated, fast-moving units;
- Acquire and select targets at great ranges; and
- Bring fire to bear on those targets rapidly and with a high first-hit probability.
In such an environment, the infantryman would be part of a search and attack system, designed to help him defeat an enemy from increasing standoff distances. However, he would remain an infantryman. The cold steel bayonet charge would remain in his repertoire, perhaps as an anachronism, yet available as an act of last resort. These new developments would rend merely to correct an old imbalance, in which the infantry has done a small share of the killing bur a large share of the dying.
The blending of these varied technologies promises to enable Marines to accomplish our traditional amphibious and force-in-readiness tasks with greater speed and flexibility than ever before. However, several sobering considerations must be taken into account:
- Constraining influences within the technologies themselves;
- The certainty that all combat power is relative, and that our own research and development efforts must outpace a constantly changing spectrum of threats; and
- The probability that our concepts of the uses of national power, including military power, will change as our perceptions of the world and of our own interests in the world continue to change.
Despite the newness of Surface-Effect Ship technology, for example, one finds that sufficient data are presently being gathered to permit a plunge into large ship construction. Two 100-ton test craft, though—the Aero jet SES-100A (with waterjet propulsion) and the Bell SES-100B (with super-cavitating propellers)—should enable designers to ascertain the nature and extent of extrapolations which can be made from these small ships to larger ones. The data from these experiments will also enable them to define the design preferences and other special characteristics which will be required to build ocean-going surface effect ships for both combatant and support roles.
Data of this sort will enable us to jump directly from the test models now in operation to the construction of a 2,000-ron surface-effect ship, bypassing a 500-ton version which had earlier been considered the next step in development. Such a ship could be completed for builders' proof of performance trials in a four-year period, for Navy acceptance trials within two additional years, and could achieve an interim operating capability a year later, with minimal technical and financial risk. Construction of a 3,000-ton military surface-effect ship is also feasible, but involves an additional year and moderate risk.
Yet ships of this size, conventional or otherwise, carry insufficient payload to be cost-effective in the normal amphibious assault role, though some applications can be visualized by using them as fast transports for small raiding parties. The payload curve would climb into a cost-effective range as the SES moves into the 4,000-6,000 ton size. At present, we are on the threshold of such construction.
In the development of V/STOL technology, there is also a great distance to go—although, in contrast to the SES situation, we have operational V/STOL aircraft. Almost from the beginning of Marine Corps development of the vertical assault concept, shortly after World War II, we have sought to march the basing flexibility of our fixed-wing tactical aircraft to that of our helicopters. Because V/STOL technology developed slowly in the United States, it was not until the mid-sixties that we were able to stare a firm V/STOL development objective, and not until 1969 that we formulated the program for procurement of the AV-8A Harrier from Great Britain. The Harrier buy, of a little over 100 aircraft, will be complete this fiscal year, with enough pipeline aircraft and trainers to support three operational squadrons of 20 aircraft each and to end reliance on pilot training in Great Britain.
The Marine Corps bought the Harrier as a proved aircraft, with thousands of RAF flight hours in the NATO environment. Additional resting is still underway in the United Stares to evaluate the Harrier's capability for amphibious operations, close air support, and air-to-air combat. The most spectacular of these trials was the 1972 Sortie Rare Validation Test, ordered and closely monitored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In this, the Harrier exceeded by 50 percent its nominal operational sortie rare, while flying from a variety of landing locations in both the vertical and short takeoff and landing modes.
Subsequent resting of its maneuverability in simulated air-to-air combat has offered new evidence of the Harrier's survivability against higher performance aircraft.
The Harrier was designed for the arrack role. However, because of its vectored thrust design and its unique reaction controls, it is highly maneuverable. Unlike conventional airplanes, whose jet exhaust is directed through a single tailpipe, the thrust from the Pegasus 11 engine of the Harrier is directed through four rotating nozzles, two located on each side of the fuselage. The reaction controls are similar to those employed by space vehicles. They enable the AV-8A to maneuver even when the airspeed is zero, far below the stall speed—roughly 150 knots—of conventional jet aircraft. These two advantages, together with the high thrust to weight ratio of the aircraft, give it excellent fighter qualities.
Air-to-air combat opponents chosen for the Harrier were the F-4J , F-86H, and T-38. In one hundred flights over the Pacific Missile Range at Point Mugu, the Harrier achieved impressive results, despite the fact it used only limited thrust vectoring. Besides its slow-speed maneuverability, the AV-8A's small size and smokeless engine exhaust made it difficult to track, and its relatively low fuel consumption enabled it to double the fighter endurance of its faster opponents. Thrust vectoring in forward flight has added new possibilities to air combat maneuvering. We are continuing rests to explore all the possibilities of thrust vector control, and to determine its application to air-ground arrack.
In tests aboard the USS Guam (LPH-9), we have learned how to handle the Harrier within the space limitations of amphibious ships, and have determined the effects of different sea stares and wind conditions upon its shipboard operation. Normally, for example, landings were made vertically, while takeoffs began with a short deck run. Bur during high seas, takeoffs too were made vertically. Ordnance handling and loading procedures have been worked our in derail. Standing operating procedures for both day and night operations have been developed.
AV-8A and helicopter operations aboard the LPH have proved to be compatible both within the sea control function and during the ship-to-shore movement of the amphibious assault.
To maintain our V/STOL momentum and to modernize our light attack force, we have developed a Specific Operational Requirement for a new aircraft based on the AV-8A design. This growth version of the Harrier, designated AV-J6A, would replace our A-4s and AV-8As commencing in the late seventies or early eighties. Some airframe changes are envisioned, bur the major area of improved performance is found in the Pegasus-15 engine, which will provide significant improvement in thrust over the current Pegasus-11. This engine will double the AV-16A's payload over the AV-8A's, while retaining the basing flexibility of the AV-BA. Even further growth potential exists within Pegasus technology, offering possible applications in terms of supersonic v / STOL lighters.
On balance, the AV-16A is a low risk, cost effective design for the next generation V/STOL, which could be operational within a reasonable rime.
The answer to a major question yet unresolved will influence all new aviation design philosophy including V/STOL: Will airframe performance or missile performance be the controlling factor in future conflict?
Despite continued improvements in missile performance, and our apparent ability to produce missiles which can hit the most violently maneuvering aircraft, the latter has continued to dominate, despite predictions daring back co 1917 of the demise of the doglight. V/STOL technology offers a measure of promise of supporting both possibilities raised by the airframe versus missile question, without falling into the trap of trying co do both and accomplishing neither. With high thrust to weight ratio, essentially visual attack capabilities, and excellent maneuverability, the V/STOL aircraft appears as if it will have a high degree of survivability in an environment dominated by aircraft performance. Moreover, V/STOL aircraft equipped with data link and shore-range air-to-air missiles would also be valuable in an environment dominated by electronic.
Technological constraints also appear in land warfare, where a promising concept is being developed: The Marine Search and Arrack System (MARSAS). Three contract studies, visualizing the period shortly after 1980, have been completed. They cover: a MARSAS infantry platoon; a MARSAS infantry battalion; and an effectiveness comparison between a MARSAS battalion and a current Marine infantry battalion.
The MARSAS concept is being defined at the Marine Corps Development and Education Command, Quantico—with a final report due in the first quarter of FY 75, recommending organizational changes, if required—based on the weapons and equipment expected to be available in 1977.
The MARSAS concept envisions the infantry battalion commander exercising tactical control in a tridimensional environment—with a need for airspace control being generated by friendly aircraft, as well as by cannon and missile artillery. Reliance is placed on a mixture of old and new technologies. Introduction of new sensor and communications equipment along already proved lines is visualized, along with a new howitzer and a surface-to-surface missile system with terminal guidance ordnance.
In essence, the MARSAS concept endeavors to apply technology to the world of the infantryman in much the same manner that technology has been applied to the world of the aviator. Instead of seeking even greater increases in his currently formidable close-range lethality, it aims at giving the infantryman a greater sense of his total operating environment, with the concomitant ability to detect and identify his adversary first—and to strike first with accuracy. Close combat can never be ruled out as a possibility, but it can be reduced as a probability.
Aside from the considerable expense of the new systems for surveillance, detection, target acquisition, and command, control, and communications, as well as the weapons themselves, several other constraining factors must be dealt with in the course of this study. These are the suitability of MARSAS for both the amphibious assault and the subsequent operations ashore; the portability, durability, survivability, and maintainability of the new equipment; and the susceptibility of MARSAS to electronics countermeasures on an electronically dominated battlefield. Should such a situation arise, the available alternatives must be examined.
A major constraining feature which curs across all new technologies is the cost of our basic resource-manpower.
Perhaps the most critical factor in the design of any combat organization of the future is the individual Marine himself—the man who must operate and maintain the new equipment. There is no escaping the fact that in the All Volunteer environment, the technically trainable Marine carries a higher price rag than his rifle-carrying or truck-driving counterpart. Even today, at the prices we are able to pay, we have a formidable task in filling the "hard skill" military occupation specialties to operate and service equipment currently on the shelf. How far can we push this situation before we find ourselves in extremis?
The question becomes one of our ability to afford the total costs associated with the introduction of any new capability. In a rime of rising manpower costs, with nearly three of every four Marine Corps dollars devoted to manpower and related expenses, it becomes apparent that modernization trade-offs must occur m terms of manpower.
At present, we seek to minimize the impact of manpower reductions on the Fleer Marine Forces and other operating forces by looking for opportunities to pare down the general supporting structure. Despite stringent cuts in support forces during the post-Vietnam drawdown which reduced total Marine Corps strength by roughly a third, the search for curs continues. Eventually we will challenge almost every biller in terms of whether the work can be performed more efficiently or the biller can be eliminated altogether. In addition, a general support force study is aimed at isolating the driving factors behind general support costs.
There is danger, however, in the tendency to evaluate the efficiency of military organizations solely in terms of the leanness of the combat-to-support ratio. The structuring of balanced forces is far too complex a process to be judged by such a simplistic, arbitrary yardstick. The specific tasks assigned to each force must be considered carefully when determining the mix of combat and support units if we hope to arrive at a correct answer.
It is ironic that our developing technologies tend to reverse the drive (always popular outside, as well as within our ranks) toward leanness in the combat-support mix. As improved firepower, sensors, and weapon systems are developed, more support is required for fewer people in contact with the enemy. This makes the trade-off between modernization and manpower more complicated than it might initially appear. For example, in the case of the new M-203 grenade launcher, fired as an attachment to the standard M-16 rifle, a distinct improvement in firepower is introduced without the requirement for an additional, specialized member of the rifle squad—the grenadier—a requirement which developed in the case of its predecessor, the M-79 grenade launcher. In the case of new sensors or communications equipment, on the other hand, the support requirements might rise significantly.
In either case, additional combat power would be accompanied by either no increase, or even a decrease in combat personnel strength. Carrying this out to the logical extreme, an idealized goal for any combat organization would be co place, nor vulnerable men, but totally unmanned weapon systems in contact with the enemy. This thought probably first occurred with the invention of black powder. Yet, although he may represent a continually shrinking portion of the total combat capability, even in the nuclear age the infantry· man remains the non-replaceable combat force.
In light of this, we must continue to work our way through the constraining influences of technology, people, and money—adding significant improvements within the limits of our ability to pay for them.
The question "What costs can we afford co pay?" has a darker side:
"What costs must we be able to pay?"
Our developmental priorities must be examined continually in terms of potential threats we must counter. Merely keeping pace with such threats may nor be sufficient, in light of our national strategy which emphasizes the deterrence of conflict or, if deterrence fails, the prevention of escalation. Since deterrence is really a state of mind—the enemy's mind—a key factor in our ability to deter a conflict or keep it at a low level is his recognition of our ability to fight at the next higher level.
Although the question of relative combat power must be considered in the broadest sense, the truly crucial consideration is the degree of our combat power in relation to that of our opponent at the precise rime and place, and under the specific circumstances of its application. Awareness of this weaves a grim imperative through our efforts, be they organizational, developmental, or operational: There can be no shift for us to a position of even temporary inferiority, whether it arrive through someone else's technological breakthrough or through the erosion of our own power, which could confront any of our deployed forces with the alternatives of abject surrender or certain defeat.
Within the broad elements of the well-documented threat at sea, two areas are of particular concern to our amphibious forces.
The first is the steady growth of Soviet amphibious capability, highlighted by the re-emergence of the Naval Infantry as a Soviet elite. Their Alligator class of tank landing ships, comparable to our own Terrebone Parish (LST-1156) class, make long range operations possible, though it has been argued that most likely targets for Soviet amphibious assault are no great distance from the U.S.S.R. Another significant development is the construction of the first Soviet aircraft carrier. This ship, displacing about 40,000 tons, will carry V/STOL aircraft. These developments tend to underline a departure from traditional defensive force concepts and the adoption for the future of a Soviet naval projection force.
Another phenomenon with disturbing overtones for our amphibious forces is the emergence of a small combatant effective against large warships. This development, stemming from the practical emergence of the surface-to-surface missile, has been dramatically accented by the sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat in 1967 and India's successes against Pakistani destroyers with her Osa boats in 1971. With about three dozen navies in possession of surface-launched anti-shipping missiles and, in some cases, sophisticated fire control systems which incorporate computerized tactical data handling and data-link communications, the defense of the amphibious task force as it closes on its objective area could become difficult in even a limited war. This suggests a mission for the first of our surface effect ship prototypes.
Improvements in tactical aviation will continue to be keyed to known or anticipated threats. There is a natural tendency for the increased performance of new aircraft to be offset by reductions in their numbers. Except for V/STOL aircraft, this tendency leads to a reduction in the total number of sorties which can be flown. If it is allowed to be carried too far, the result is an aviation force structure which has too few airplanes and which depends too much on the best use of all resources. This is unrealistic, especially in time of war when the combined effects of attrition and marginal increases in enemy capability could place a thin aviation force at a distinct disadvantage.
Surface-to-air missiles affect the aviation picture greatly. Practically any potential enemy in the world today can be expected to possess a formidable antiaircraft capability, which would likely include defense against the practice of low altitude penetration. To neutralize highly mobile radar controlled AAA guns and surface-to-air missiles in the forward battle area, we must continue to provide our attack aircraft protection from enemy electronic warfare measures—either through individual ECM pods or through designated and equipped EW escort aircraft.
Although the desirability of using the same types of aircraft used by the rest of naval aviation influences the Marines' aviation structure, the likely threats are also considered in estimating future needs.
Our fighter aircraft estimates are based on the number of sorties required to maintain combat air patrol stations to detect enemy aircraft at low altitudes; on the number needed to provide a strip alert for air defense; and on the number needed to provide escort and fighter sweeps for deep support and interdiction missions. Moreover, when surge demands dictate, fighters must augment attack aircraft in the close air support role.
Determining attack aircraft requirements is more complicated, because of the wide array of potential targets in an amphibious operation, the variations in the time sensitivity of each target, and the nature of the threat each target poses. Before the landing, for example, attack aircraft are employed in an intensive effort directed primarily at fixed targets; airfields, missile sites, supply dumps, POL resources, and transportation and control facilities, intended to reduce the enemy air threat because friendly forces cannot be landed until the enemy's power to attack us with aircraft and missiles has been reduced to an acceptable level. Once this point has been reached, the attack effort is divided among close air support, deep interdiction, armed reconnaissance, electronic surveillance and countermeasures, and any other efforts which may be required to isolate the battle area from enemy measures and protect our forces within.
For round-the-clock close air support, the most cost-effective mix would include a sophisticated aircraft, such as the A-6E, for reconnaissance and attack in bad weather and at night and a simpler one, such as the AV-16A, for times when the target can be seen by the pilot.
The importance of an all-weather attack system must be evaluated not only in terms of the casualties and damage inflicted on the enemy, but also in terms of denial to him of concealment, or the restriction of his movement, and the eventual exposure of his forces to visual air attack. This would have critical impact on enemy attempts to reinforce the beachhead defenders under cover of darkness or bad weather.
If of the V/STOL variety, the visual attack aircraft would lend themselves to the developing concept of ground loiter, in which fully combat-loaded aircraft are deployed close to the supported ground units. This would reduce aircraft vulnerability, through their dispersal, while maintaining tactical flexibility through their quick response and rapid turnaround.
V/STOL technology also appears to promise reduced vulnerability to one of the newer threats: the man-portable surface-to-air missile (small SAM). The most significant qualities needed for survivability against heat-seeking missiles are speed, maneuverability, and a low infra-red signature. The high thrust-to-weight ratio and vectored thrust characteristics of the AV-8A give it quick acceleration, sustained turning performance, and a high degree of maneuverability, and these qualities will be matched or exceeded in the AV-16A. New technology will reduce the infra-red signature of the Harrier, now comparable to that of other current aircraft, to an acceptable level.
The question of the survivability of our light attack aircraft against other V/STOL airplanes hinges on essentially the same factors which apply to other air-to-air engagements, mainly speed, maneuverability, and armament. One critical consideration could be the ability of an opposing V/STOL aircraft to match the vectored thrust maneuverability inherent in the AV-BA/ AV-16A design.
Development of the AV-16A in a two-seat trainer version will also satisfy the need for a high performance Tactical Air Coordinator, Airborne (TACA) aircraft. This will provide a better chance of survival than is enjoyed by the light observation aircraft now employed in this role.
We envision the augmentation of our reconnaissance aircraft with the Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV), though to what extent we can do this we do not yet know. Although the final RPV requirement will be influenced by related technological development currently underway, it is probable that some RPVs will always be required, to operate in areas of intense hostility, where risk to piloted aircraft is high.
Finally, in considering warfare on the ground, it is generally unproductive to examine weapon systems in isolation. To determine correct weapon mixes through threat analysis and cost effectiveness criteria and then to integrate them into the Marine Corps force structure must be a continuous process.
For example, the anti-tank study which provides the basis for the programmed introduction of the Tow and Dragon missile systems in the Fleet Marine Forces had to consider both the high intensity amphibious assault requirements and the more probable mid- and low-intensity conflict situations. Tow is a crew-served heavy assault system with a range of 3,000 meters; Dragon is a one man medium assault system with a range of 1,000 meters. Four scenarios, ranging from conflicts of very low to very high intensity, with a wide range of geographic and climatic variables, were considered. The capabilities of other supporting arms were considered in determining the residual threat to be defeated by anti-tank assault systems (including our own tanks). The mobility, maintainability, and vulnerability of a variety of platforms—in the case of Tow, both helicopter and ground platforms—had to be considered. Although this type of detailed study satisfies the requirements for initial programming decisions, continued validation and refinement of the anti-tank program will continue even after Tow and Dragon reach the field.
It is our practice to task organize those air and ground forces most likely to respond in the lower ranges of conflict. These are the Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) and Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB).
The Marine Amphibious Unit is employed routinely in forward afloat deployments. Normally, the ground combat element is a battalion landing ream and the aviation combat element a composite helicopter squadron (one capable, among or her things, of troop movement, escort, and command and control), although in some cases it may consist of an attack squadron, a helicopter squadron, and elements of an observation squadron (in such cases the advantages of V/STOL aircraft come through forcibly). Long-range communications, mobile air traffic control communications, and control facilities for direct air support operations are incorporated as required. The combat service support element is formed primarily from division, wing, and force troops. Minor detachments from Navy combat service support resources may also be required. Such an MAU will consist of from 1,800 to 4,000 troops embarked in from 4 to 7 amphibious ships.
The Marine Amphibious Brigade can conduct air and ground amphibious assault operations in low- and mid-intensity warfare and may be forward deployed afloat for extended periods during a crisis in the same manner the 9th MAB operated in Vietnamese waters during the North Vietnamese offensive in 1972. The ground combat element will usually be a regimental landing ream, and the normal aviation combat element a Marine aircraft group, with a substantially wider range of capabilities than the MAU's air element, such as those provided by reconnaissance and fighter aircraft. Significant increases in combat service support capability are included. A MAB will consist of from 8,000 to 12, 000 Marines embarked in from 15 to 21 ships.
Each such task organization can deploy with its capabilities marched to its mission and its expected area of operations, though its size and composition will also depend on the availability of pilots, aircraft, and amphibious ships.
One effort which may influence both the MARSAS study and our efforts to increase the flexibility of our force structure is our troop resting of the infantry battalion structure, which compares some promising battalion organizational concepts and weapon system mixes, using equipment that generally will be available in FY 75. There are two main areas of concern: the rifle company and the battalion headquarters and service company, the second of which provides the battalion's mortar and recoilless rifle support. Within the rifle company, the three rifle platoons and the weapons platoon also have complementary roles, and as such must also be considered in tandem, rather than examined individually. In addition, the troop resting pays particular attention to the mobility of new anti-rank weapons, relative to the targets they are likely to engage.
While dealing with these considerations of our structural flexibility, we have sought also to improve our operational flexibility by increasing the tactical options available to our forward afloat deployed units. One such option, known as a sea-based amphibious operation, confers the ability to retain most of our coordinating, control, and logistic support facilities at sea during the operation ashore. Freed from the need to drag along—and protect—a "tail" of service support elements, the combat forces can selectively be put ashore and, when no longer needed, be withdrawn.
This flexibility has particular value in limited, low- and mid-intensity conflicts in which the sea generally serves as a sanctuary. In these, our assistance to allies is predicated upon the understanding that our threshold of involvement is to be high and our level of involvement—especially in terms of ground combat support—is to be low.
To provide the amphibious task force commander with the ability to conduct such sea-based operations, planning and embarkation must permit men, equipment, and supplies to be unloaded selectively from all ships of the force. Unlike a force embarked for conventional operations and general unloading, which may nor be able to conduct a sea-based operation effectively, a force configured for sea-based operations can perform effectively in either a sea-based or a conventional operation. (For example, a force prepared to operate ashore from a base afloat will have spaces set aside for medical, supply, repair, and maintenance tasks. A force prepared for conventional operations only would not necessarily have such space available.) In support, a logistic system, tided the Seaborne Mobile Logistics System (SMLS), is being developed with the Navy. We are attempting to improve our planning techniques and procedures in embarkation, coordination of logistic operations, selective loading and unloading, and the conduct of landing force maintenance work aboard ship. Procedures for MAU-level operations have been developed and tested in several exercises, including a West Coast amphibious landing exercise which was devoted principally to a full evaluation of SMLS procedures. Additional evaluation of the procedures has been conducted in the Mediterranean, and SMLS procedures for MAB-sized task forces are now under study. That is as high as we intend to go for now. Applications at the Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) level appear to be impractical, at least for the next several years. At that level, the anticipated intensity of conflict would increase to the point where the threat to the ships of the task force would tend to negate the advantages of sea-basing.
Seabasing and SMLS are not outgrowths of the earlier sea-basing concept for 1980, whose postulation of massive forces sailing about the world in oversized ships drew shivers of horror from many quarters. Rather, they are a response to an anticipated need for small landing forces able to operate in low-intensity crisis control environments, while—until the very last moment, if troops must be landed—maintaining low levels of commitment and visibility.
Conclusion
From the practical limit of our military vision, we have worked our way through the real world of constraints and threats back to the present, where the daily requirement exists to practice the art of the possible in structuring and developing Marine forces for a full range of contingencies.
We can draw some tentative conclusions about our developing technologies:
Surface-effect ship development depends on both the rime it will take to acquire adequate data to commence large ship construction, and by the costs involved in this marriage of aviation and shipbuilding technology.
V/STOL development is a relatively low-risk, cost-effective effort as long as we stay on the Pegasus engine technology, but newer technologies will require both time and costly engine development.
The development of sophisticated land warfare systems is influenced both by their own cost and by the cost and availability of the quality of people needed to man and maintain them.
It must be recognized that solutions to these problems of the future will emerge from the baseline of our responses to the problems of today.
The first of these is that the amphibious fleet, though modern, has fewer ships than at any rime since 1950. Thus, to meet large-scale amphibious requirements we must look increasingly to civilian means of sea and air lift.
The second is that our major caliber naval gunfire support now rests solely, and tenuously, within the three turrets of one ship, the Newport News. Even the number of small guns has dwindled, as the trend afloat continues to replace guns with missiles, and reductions in gun-bearing destroyers continue. The art of the possible is being stretched in the search for other naval gunfire platforms and substitute fire support capabilities.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, today's manpower squeeze demands that we continue to find ways to do the same or better job than we do now with fewer people than now. New technology can assist in this, up to a point. That point is reached quickly when new equipment brings with it a new set of manpower requirements.
As indicated earlier in this essay, the ultimate applications of our military power will be derived from our perceptions of the forces at work in the world today, and from our perceptions of the threats they pose to our interests and our security.
We are seeing the emergence of new forms of force, some overt, some more difficult to recognize or define, and fewer purely military in character than before. This phenomenon occurs at a time when the scope and visibility of U.S. overseas interests present an unparalleled array of targets for potential adversaries.
Although the direct use of military force would not appear suitable to a growing number of conceivable situations, history has shown us that economic, political, and psychological pressures can often be augmented, or partially countered, through military means. Roughly two thirds of our non-routine deployments of amphibious forces since World War II have involved non-combat missions: alerts, evacuations, humanitarian assistance, and the like.
The range of likely employments of amphibious forces is greatest at the low end of the intensity scale. However, the functions of crisis deterrence and-'crisis limitation each demand perceptible capability further up the scale. In this regard, our task becomes one of providing low key, low profile forces which are capable of discouraging a growing number of "could-be" challengers, but not so formidable that they provoke counterproductive fear, resentment, and hostility. Properly balanced and properly deployed, such forces can provide an effective means—and at rimes the only means—of exerting influence on situations where our interests are involved.
It is difficult to assign a trade-off value to deterrence. How can one measure the cost of a crisis which didn't happen because the would—be participants took into account our amphibious presence? The truly costly reckoning comes only if deterrence fails.
Finally, it is impossible to cover all our bets the way we would like. In fact, despite the 1948 prediction of the need for more advance bases we find ourselves covering a greater range of potential contingencies with fewer bases than we had then. Nevertheless, the necessity of grappling with the uncertainties of shifting interests and alliances helps provide a hedge against the future. Practicing the art of the possible requires a measure of innovative thinking which is unlikely to occur within a climate of traditionalism and self-delusion about our relative degree of national security.
Since wars rarely occur according to anyone's plan, it is necessary that our present task of coping with the imponderables sow the seeds of our future ability to cope with the unexpected—for in Rilke's words:
"The future enters into us, in order to transform itself in us, long before it happens."