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Due to a series of political and historical reasons, the development of the Navy of Russia, the largest continental power in the world, transpired in a very unique manner.
Without a strong Navy, Russia had been unable to join the ranks of the great powers. However, at various stages in history her leaders often did not understand the role of the Navy within the system of the country’s armed forces and underestimated its capabilities. To a
Western historians have tong believed that the genesis of the Russian Naty can be traced to one man and one ship—Peter the Great and the vessel he built with his own hands in 1693—a statue and replica of which occupy a place of honor in the Naval Museum at Leningrad. Admiral Gorshkov suggests the Naty had its beginnings ten centuries earlier.
considerable degree this was fostered by many centuries of propaganda conducted by states that were hostile toward Russia, headed by England, which strived to prove that such a large continental power as Russia could not have interests at sea. This psychological coercion began when the Russian Navy under Peter 1 became one of the strongest navies in the world, and England became seriously alarmed with regard to her title of "Mistress of the Seas.”
It must be acknowledged that the propaganda which was inimical to our Motherland had its results. It penetrated into Russia and often found ardent supporters among influential Tsarist high officials, who held the view that the country did not need a powerful Navy and that expenditures for its construction and for maintaining it at the required state of readiness should be cut in every possible way. Thus, in particular,
CLAUDE P. LEMIEUX
War Minister Kuropatkin wrote in his diary prior to the Russo-Japanese war: "Yesterday with Witte ... we rapidly convinced His Majesty of the need to halt expenditures for the Navy and the Far East.”[1]
The hostile propaganda continually promulgated the idea that Russia is not a maritime country, but rather a continental one, and therefore she does not need a Navy. And if she indeed does need one, then it is only to handle modest coastal defense missions. These ideas were based on the slanderous assertion that the Russians are not a seagoing nation, but rather a dry-land nation, that the sea is alien to them, and that they are not good at seafaring.
Our country, without doubt, has been and is the largest continental power in the world. However, at the same time it has been, and remains, a great sea- power. It is enough to recall that the length of the maritime borders of Russia is almost twice that of the coastline of the United States of America and almost 15 times that of France. The portion of the maritime borders of Russia, the U.S.A., and France are about the same—about two-thirds of the total national borders—while for Germany (up to World War II), it was one-third. Yet no one reproached Germany for the fact that, while a continental power, it was striving to have a large Navy.
And today there is widespread propaganda abroad, produced by American ideologists, asserting that the Soviet state does not need a powerful Navy. An example of this is President Nixon’s speech of 4 August 1970 in which he stated: "That which the Soviet Union needs in the way of military preparations differs from what we need. The U.S.S.R. is a land power . . . We, however, are primarily a seapower, and our needs are therefore different.”[2]
One hardly has to say that Nixon’s speech, which is a modern-day version of the old attempts by English politicians to show Russia’s lack of need for a strong Navy, bears no relationship to the actual state of affairs and contradicts the interests of our state both past and present.
The opponents of Russian seapower have widely used (and are widely using) falsification of her military history. In particular, they assert that all of Russia’s victories have been gained only by the Army, and that she can be powerfulonly by strengthening the Army at the expense of the Navy. For example, the same Kuropatkin reported to the Tsar in 1900: "The lessons of history have taught us to follow the same path
which our forefathers took, and to see Russia’s main force to be her land Army . . ,”3
Actually, as is well known, both the Army and the Navy have actively participated in all of the wars which Russia has waged. Wars without the participation of naval forces have been very few. Thus, in the 200 years preceding the First World War, Tsarism waged 33 wars,4 and the Navy failed to participate in only two of them (the Hungarian Campaign of 1849 and the Akhaltekinsk Expedition of 1877-1879).
The narrowness of the thinking and the intellectual limitations of the Tsarist satraps of Kuropatkin’s type and his successor, Vannovskiy, did not pass Russia by without leaving a trace. Their reactionary ideas in opposing a Navy did noticeable damage to the coordinated development of the armed forces, and, consequently, to the defensive capability of the country.
An examination of the role of the Navy in the centuries-old history of Russia leads to the main conclusion that in all stages of the life of the country, she had need of a powerful Navy as an integral part of her armed forces commensurate with the interests of a world power. And therefore Russia repeatedly attempted to build up her Navy even prior to Peter 1 (for example, the privateer Fleet of Ivan The Terrible in the Baltic).
The development and employment of the Russian Navy undoubtedly was greatly determined by the fact that Russia was the largest continental country in the world. The defense of her borders in wars with contiguous land enemies took place mainly with the aid of armies, which created the preconditions for the underestimates of the Navy by Tsarist high officials. As a result of this and a series of other reasons (among these not the least of which was the economy) the Navy of the Motherland developed rather unevenly- Surges in the naval might of Russia gave way to declines. And each time, a reduction in her seapower evoked new difficulties in the historical path of the state and led to serious consequences. Thus, the outcome of the Crimean War of 1854-1856 was predetermined by the economic superiority of the English and French as expressed in the better armament of the armies and in the superiority of their fleets. The underrating by the Tsarist government of the role of the Navy led to the fact that under the conditions of the peace treaty of 1856 Russia was prohibited from having a Fleet in the Black Sea.
3Itogi voyny. Otchet general-ad”yutanta Kuropatkina (Results of the War Report of Kuropatkin’s Adjutant General), Vol. 4, Warsaw, 1906, TipO' grafiya Okruzhnogo shtaba, p. 68.
4Shatsillo, K. F., Russkiy imperialism i razvitiye flota nakanune pervoy mirotfi voyny (Russian Imperialism and the development of the Navy on the E'c of WW I), Izd-vo Nauka, 1968, p. 12.
A
Navies in War and in Peace 29
The lessons of this war were not studied by the autocracy. In the war with Turkey in 1877-1878, the appearance in the straits of English ships forced the victorious Russian Army, which was crushing the enemy before it and which was already standing at the walls of Constantinople, to flee without achieving one of the main goals of the war—free access to the Mediterranean Sea. In this case, errors by the Tsarist government with regard to questions of building up the Navy were one of the reasons for the fact that Russia, having begun a "semiwar” in 1877, could only conclude it with a "semipeace.”5 While at the same time England, without participating in this war, and by making only a demonstration of naval might, "was permitted to occupy the island of Cyprus . . . England thereby came into possession of the most important strategic point in the eastern Mediterranean.”6
The weakness of the Russian Navy, which was revealed in the course of the 1877-1878 War, greatly alarmed public opinion in Russia. As a result, in 1878 a Voluntary Navy, created by public contributions, was founded in the country: from April through September, broad sectors of the population donated several million rubles to its construction. The work of the cruisers of the Voluntary Navy began with the transporting of Russian troops who had participated in this war from Turkey to the Homeland. Such was the reply of a wide sector of Russian society to the underrating of the role of the Navy by the Tsarist government.
After the war with Turkey, somewhat greater effort was devoted to the strengthening of the country’s naval power than prior to it. With regard to building up the Navy, this was expressed mainly in an increase in the number of ships. However, the necessary attention was not given to the qualitative side of the armament and also to the training of the personnel, which had a considerable effect on the results of the employment of the Navy in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.
In addition to the fundamental economic and political causes, the inactivity of the Russian Navy at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War and later its defeat could not have failed to have, according to V. I. Lenin’s analysis in the article "The Fall of Port Arthur,” a decisive influence on the grave outcome for Tsarism in this war.
In the period of decline, the Navy of the Homeland became inactive (particularly after the Industrial Revolution when the general lagging of Russia in comparison with the other large countries was vividly displayed). This was indicative of the gradual loss by
5Oiplomaticheikiy slovar’ (Diplomatic Dictionary), Vol. 1, Gospolitizdat, I960, p. 402.
6Vsmimaya istoriya (World History), Vol. VII, Izd-vo AN SSSR I960, p. 175.
Tsarist Russia of the position of a great power following an independent and sovereign policy and of her transformation into a supplier of cannon fodder to the imperialist plunderers fighting for interests which were alien to the Russian people.
The considerable difficulties for Russian seapower stemmed from her geographical position, which required having an independent fleet capable of ensuring the performance of missions confronting it in each of the far-flung naval theaters. Nonetheless, despite this, the Navy wrote many remarkable heroic pages in the history of the Motherland and played an important role in the fate of the state.
The history of the Russian Navy usually begins with the era of Peter I. In characterizing this era, Karl Marx said that one cannot imagine a great nation so shut off from the sea as Russia prior to Peter I. "Not a single great nation has ever existed or has been able to exist in such an inner-continental position as the state of Peter the Great did initially; no nation has stood by in such a manner to watch her shores and river mouths being wrested away from her. Russia could not leave the mouth of the Neva, the solitary path for delivering the products of the Russian North into the hands of the Swedes.”7
Russia’s struggle for outlets to the sea required the building of an army and a powerful navy with all urgency. Therefore the construction of the Navy under Peter I was the logical continuation of the preceeding development of the Russian state and the actual recognition of the rebirth, under the new conditions, of the qualities of a seagoing people inherent in Russians since ancient times.
Actually, beginning as early as the 7th century, our forefathers engaged in armed combat on the Black, Mediterranean, and Caspian Seas (it was precisely at this time when the birth of the Russian naval art began). In the early 9th century, the feats of the Russians were widely known. History recalls the cruise of Oleg through the Black Sea to Constantinople with 2,000 ships carrying 80,000 warriors, and the sea cruises of Igor and Svyatoslav, and others. The voyages of the Russian princes overseas have received sufficient coverage in domestic historical literature.
Beginning in the 9th and 10th centuries "Russian ships sailed the Black . . . and Baltic Seas,”8 "at the end of the 11th century the shores of the Gulf of Finland became part of the Novgorod possessions,”9
7K. Marx. Taynaya diplomat iy a XVIII v. (Secret Diplomacy of the 18th Century).
*Vsemimaya istoriya (World History), Vol. Ill, 1951, p. 251.
9Istoriya voyenno-morskogo iskusstva (The History of the Naval Art), Vol. I, 1953, p. 81.
and by this time "the Russians knew the sea route around Europe via the Varanger and North Seas, along the shores of France and Spain, through the Mediterranean Sea to Constantinople.”10 In the 13th century after a prolonged and arduous struggle with the Swedes and the Livovian Order of Knights, Novgorod began to play an important role in commerce on the Baltic Sea and entered the Hanseatic League of maritime commercial cities. In the 12th century, the Russians engaged in maritime industry and trade on the White Sea, penetrated into the Pechora territory, and in the 15th and 16th centuries they sailed to Grumant (Spitzbergen), Novaya Zemlya, and to the Kara Sea.
Many foreign researchers have also written of the Russian navymen of that day. Thus, the English researcher Fred Jane pointed out: "This (the Russian) Navy can claim an older origin than the British Navy. One hundred years before Alfred built the first English naval ships, the Russians were already engaged in far off sea battles, and one thousand years ago the Russians were considered to be the best navymen of their time.”11
The fatal invasion of the Tatars destroyed Russian seapower on the southern seas and for a long time separated Russia from the Black and Caspian Seas. She retained in her hands only the shores of the White Sea and a small section of the coast of the Gulf of Finland at the mouths of the Neva and Narva Rivers, where the people of Novgorod steadfastly opposed the enemies which were striving to completely cut them off from the Baltic Sea.
As a result of the prolonged, yet unsuccessful struggle for an outlet to the Baltic Sea, Russia, by the Peace Treaty of Stolbovo (1617), was completely cut off from the Baltic coast. The Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus called this peace one of the "Gods’ greatest good deeds”, and stated that it would be difficult for the Russian people to surmount the obstacle which had been set up.12
The Tatar yoke and the Polish and Swedish interventions following it held back Russia’s development for almost five decades. The difficult period for Russia also affected the development of her Navy and maritime commerce (it was reduced to almost nothing). The Western countries, however, which were not subjected to such serious tests and which were protected from the Tatar invasion by the Slavs, developed rapidly
w Morskoy Atlas. Opisaniye k kartam (Naval Atlas. Description of the Charts), Vol. Ill, Part 1, pp. 54-55.
11 Jane, Fred. T., The Imperial Russian Fleet. Its Past, Present, and Future., London, 1904, p. 10.
12 N. P. Lyshin, Stolbovskiy dogovor i peregovory emv predshestvovavshiye (The Stolbovo Treaty and the Talks Preceeding It), St. Petersburg, 1857, p. 58.
and built mighty fleets which were used to conquer colonies and to expand maritime commerce.
However, the activity of the Russians, which had been checked on the southern and Baltic seas, continued in the north, where almost the entire shore from Pechora to the Sea of Okhotsk was explored, and the first information concerning Sakhalin and the Shantar Islands was obtained. In the south, despite the opposition of powerful enemies, the Don and Ukrainian cossacks reached the sea from the Dnieper and Don Rivers. The reunification of the Ukraine with Russia also had a great effect on the development of the Russian state.
Russia had not resigned herself to being cut off from the seas and continually waged a struggle for egress to them. In the situation which developed at the turn of the 16th century, the further development of the state and its economy could have proceeded only with the re-establishment of outlets to the sea. Yet this could be achieved only by the military route for which, in addition to a strong army, a navy was also required. The backward country had to surmount exceptional hardships to solve such a problem in a short time.
It was resolved to begin the breakthrough to the sea with the taking of Azov, which would relieve Russia from the threat of the Turko-Tatar attacks. The international situation and the system of military and political alliances (Russia, Poland, and Austro-Hungary against Turkey) affirmed the correctness of the choice of this direction. However, as the First Azov Campaign (1695) showed, thc Strelets troops [soldiers in the Russian Army in the 16th and 17th centuries—Ed.] turned out to be poorly suited to waging a large war, and the Army alone, without the aid of a fleet, was in no condition to capture the fortress, which received constant aid from the sea. Already by the spring of 169^ the construction of ships permitted the Navy to join the siege of Azov and by joint operations with the Army to capture it. It should be noted that the concerted operations of the young Russian land and set forces in the taking of this fortress were favorably distinguished from similar but unsuccessful attempt of the British to capture Quebec (1691) and Saint Pierre (1693).
It is true that the capture of Azov did not solve the question of the return of outlets to the sea free maritime commerce. A difficult struggle had to be won with one of the strongest powers—Sweden-^ which was dominant in Northern Europe. For this. Russia had to have not only a modern Army but also a no less modern Navy, without which it was impossr ble to achieve success in the struggle on the Baltic SeJ The first step in this direction was the transport, in 1702- of two warships which were built in Arkhangelsk frotn
the village of Nyukhch (White Sea) to Novenets (Onezhskoye Ozero). They were delivered by portaging them over "His Majesty’s Road,” which stretched 160 verst [a Russian unit of measurement equal to .06629 miles—Ed.] through dense forests and swamps.
The appearance of a Russian Fleet in the Baltic had an immediate effect on the combat operations for an outlet to the sea at the mouth of the Neva and for possession of the island of Kotlin, and also on the success of the defense of St. Petersburg, which had been recently founded. By 1705, when the Swedes undertook a combined attack of land and sea forces against the city, Peter’s Navy already numbered 11 frigates and 107 more light craft (mainly galleys). Encountering opposition by the Russian Army and Navy, the Swedish attack failed.
One of the most important dates in Russian history is 27 June 1709—on this day the victorious Battle of Poltava took place, signifying the end of Sweden as a great power. However, the aims of this war were not achieved. Twelve more long years of intense struggle were required to achieve them.
h
In order to clear the Gulf of Finland of hostile warships they had to possess Vyborg, to remove the direct threat to Petersburg, and to open the path for
the Russian Fleet to the Finnish skerries. An attempt to solve the problem with some ground forces did not lead to success. Vyborg was taken later by closely coordinated operations by land and naval forces. It was followed by Riga, Pernov, Arensburg, the Moon Sound Islands, and Revel. The Navy gradually became the most important factor in the'continuing struggle. As a result of joint operations of the ships and the troops landed from them, in the summer of 1713 Helsingfors [Helsinki] and Abo were captured, which created the direct threat of the seizure of the coast of Sweden and its capital. Yet, despite this, the Swedes did not consider themselves beaten, because they were confident that their ships of the line would be able to destroy the Russian Navy and to prevent the transit of landing forces across the Gulf of Bothnia.
The Hanko victory was the "first important victory (of Russia) at sea which raised the spirits in the Army and Navy and made them believe in their own power. Peter the Great, who equated the Hanko victory with the one at Poltava, awarded all of its participants with a medal struck in honor of the triumph.”[3] This victory opened the way to the shores of Sweden and consequently to Stockholm to the Russian Navy and Army. "Both hands of the Russian potentate” had given Russia a glorious victory, which was of vast significance to her.
England and France, and subsequently also other states, fearing the strengthening of Russia and the complete defeat of Sweden, wove every type of intrigue against Russia and put pressure on her. However, Peter I did not give up his intentions to consolidate the shores of the Baltic Sea taken by him for Russia with the aid of a battle-proven Army and Navy, which became the real force supporting the independence of the state’s policy. The Russian Baltic Fleet continued to grow. According to the general consensus there were only two powerful navies in the world at that time— the English and the Russian Navies.
Attempts to restrain Russia in her desire to reach the sea were not limited to intrigues and diplomatic pressure by foreign states: in the summer of 1719 England introduced her ships into the Baltic Sea. Inspired by this, the Swedes undertook active naval operations. However, in a naval battle off of Ezel [Saare] Island on 24 May 1719 the Russian line forces under the command of N. A. Senyavin defeated the Swedish squadron and captured three ships (including the flagship), and in July and August, galleys under the cover of ships of the line landed large landing parties in the area of Stockholm.
At the end of 1719 England concluded a military alliance with Sweden, directed against Russia, which inspired the Swedes to continue the war.[4] In 1720, large English naval forces again entered the Baltic Sea. However, the Russian Fleet, operating actively off of the Swedish coast, won a victory over the Swedes in a battle off Grengam Island. In 1721, despite the presence in the Baltic Sea of the English, the Russian pressure on the Swedes continually grew. On 30 August 1721, Sweden was forced to sign a peace treaty with Russia according to which it relinquished forever the areas of the Baltic coast taken by the Russian troops. This treaty was clear evidence of the importance of a Navy operating in concert with ground troops to achieve the goals of a war. Even the interference of England and other states could not ruin the results of the Poltava victory and prevent Russia from becoming firmly established on the Baltic shores.
Thus, the Navy fulfilled an important role in Russia’s long and difficult struggle, initiated to re-establish outlets to the seas ensuring the development of her economy and freedom of overseas trade. Following the victory of the Russian Army at Poltava, the Navy smashed the Swedish naval power in battles at Hanko, Ezel, and Grengam, and forced it to relinquish forever the land captured by the Russians on the shores of the Baltic Sea.
On the medal struck in honor of the victory over Sweden it is written: "The end of this war through such a peace was obtained by no one other than the Navy, for it was impossible to achieve anything by land.”
Although the Navy still remained a formidable force, signs of deterioration began to appear more and more after the death of Peter I. Ships, being maintained ever more poorly, fell into decay and were not replaced by new ones in time, since shipbuilding had slowed down. Russia lost her importance as a great seapower.
Russia’s participation in the Seven Year War (1756-1763) evoked a timely increase in attention to the Navy, which blockaded the Prussian coast, acted in concert with the Army in taking Memel and Kolberg, and provided sea transportation.
For Russia, the problem of the return of her outlets to the southern seas which had been taken from her still remained, and this required the restoration of the Navy and an increase in its role within the system of armed forces. In 1769, the construction of warships was renewed in the Petrovsk shipyards, and as early as the Russo-Turkish War of 1768 to 1774 the young Black Sea Fleet, under the command of A. N. Senyavin,
14Tarle, Ye. B., Russkiy jht i vneshnyaya politika Petra I, (The Russian Navy and the Foreign Policy of Peter I), Voyenizdat, 1949, p. 83.
Navies in War and in Peace 33
opened the country’s way from the Sea of Azov to the Black Sea, won a series of glorious victories over the more numerous Turkish Fleet, and smashed the landing of its landing force in the Crimea, which aided the establishment of Russia on the shores of the Black Sea.
At the same time, the expansion of the Russian state was taking place toward the East for access to the Pacific Ocean. In the 17th and 18th centuries, the Russians first explored the vast territories of Siberia and the Far East and later Northwest America surprisingly rapidly. The results of these explorations are among the geographical discoveries of world-wide importance. Bering’s expedition was organized by Peter I. It was followed by the expeditions of Malygin, Chelyuskin, the Laptev brothers, and others. They explored the shores of Siberia, Kamchatka, Alaska, the Aleutian and Kurile Islands, Sakhalin, and the Sea of Okhotsk, and pioneered Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka.
In the course of the long-time struggle for egress to the sea, Russia managed to build a powerful Navy and her own shipbuilding industry, possessing great potential capabilities. The talent of the Russian officers and admirals was crystallized in an advanced naval art and shipbuilding science. The glorious traditions of the Russian naval school, which gave the world and the Homeland such prominent naval leaders as Spiridov, Ushakov, Senyavin, Lazarev, Nakhimov, and Makarov, and such remarkable shipbuilders as Sklyayev, Vereshchagin, Kurochkin, Yershov, Titov, Bubnov, and Krylov, have been preserved for ages and are being multiplied by Soviet navymen.
The Russians in the Mediterranean Sea
The ancestors of the Russian people appeared for the first time in their ships in the Mediterranean Sea as early as the 6th and 7th centuries. More than once they participated with the Byzantine Fleet in combat operations off the coasts of Italy, Sicily, Crete, and Cyprus. In the following centuries, cruises by Russian ships to the Aegean Sea and to the shores of Asia Minor continued. Owing to these cruises, political, cultural, and trade relations were maintained with the peoples of the Mediterranean countries. Later, the Russian Navy, in supporting the security of its own country from the southwest, did not lose a single battle in the Mediterranean Sea, and the remarkable victories in this region brought it world acclaim.
A brilliant page in history was written by the Baltic Fleet squadron, under the command of Admiral G. A. Spiridov, which was located in the Mediterranean Sea in the period 1769 to 1774. This expedition was intended to support the making of major political moves
by Russia by threatening Turkey from the sea and by supporting the uprising of the Balkan peoples enslaved by the Turks. The Baltic squadron, consisting of 10 ships of the line and other combatants, were entrusted with unprecedented missions, which until then were considered inconceivable by many. In a letter to Orlov, the Commander in Chief of the Russian forces in the Mediterranean Sea, Catherine II analyzed this cruise in this manner: "All of Europe is marvelling at your feat and is looking at you with expectation.” And the squadron brilliantly justified the hopes placed on it. Over a period of several years, in conducting military operations far from its own shores, it destroyed the Turkish Fleet in battles at Khios and Cesme, blockaded the Dardanelles, interrupted the sea communications' of the enemy, landed numerous landing forces, thereby drawing the enemy’s forces away from the main northern Black Sea area, and captured 20 islands in the Aegean Sea and several coastal cities, including also some on the coast of Cyprus. The Turks, who were constantly in fear of an attack against Constantinople from the south by the Russian Navy, were forced to maintain considerable army forces and the main part of the Navy in readiness to repel this threat.
The stay of the Russian Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea is an outstanding example of autonomous operations by a large naval formation completely cut off from its home ports, which increased the international prestige of Russia and evoked warm sympathy toward her by all the peoples of the Mediterranean Sea basin.
However, the countries hostile to Russia, above all England, still prevented the Russians from achieving full freedom of passage from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean. Only successful actions by the Russian Army and Navy from the north and from the south forced the Turks to conclude a peace, according to which Russia received land between the Bug and the Dnieper and finally established herself on the Sea of Azov and an outlet from it to the Black Sea. The Crimea was recognized as being an independent state by Turkey and subsequently joined Russia. However, the most important thing was that Russia acquired the right to free commercial navigation in the Black Sea with the right of transit into the Mediterranean.
Turkey did not resign itself to the results of the war. The rapid political rise of Russia had evoked irritation among the states hostile to her, which supported Turkey in every possible way in its attempts to compel the Russians by force to give up their territorial acquisitions in the south.
In August 1787, Turkey again initiated military operations against Russia, thereby forcing the drawing off of the Russian ground forces to the southern borders of the state. Taking advantage of this, Sweden, whose
leaders still nourished hopes of wresting Baltic areas from Russia, in the summer of 1788 initiated military actions without declaring war, putting Petersburg in a critical position. The Swedish King, Gustav III, intended to seize the border fortresses by decisive attacks, defeat the Russian Navy, land a landing force on the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland, and seize Petersburg. The main burden in the struggle for the security of the capital lay on the Baltic Fleet, which successfully defended our shores and, after a series of victories at sea, together with the Army, expelled the enemies from the borders of Russia. Clearly, had there not been a strong Navy, the ground forces would have been unable to rapidly cope with such a danger due to their insufficient strength.
The states supporting Turkey and Sweden in this war shifted from diplomatic pressure to threats: England introduced her Navy into the Black and Baltic Seas, and Prussia concentrated troops on the Russian borders. Yet the military actions in the south turned out favorably for Russia. The Black Sea Fleet under
the command of F. F. Ushakov inflicted a defeat on
the Turkish line fleet in 1790 at Kerch and off the
island of Tendra, and in 1791 it finally routed it off
of Cape Caliacra. Thus, the Turkish Fleet was expelled from the Black Sea and its Army, deprived of ship support, soon reduced its resistance. In 1792, peace was concluded in Yassakh according to which the Black Sea coast from the Dniester to Novorossiysk went to Russia.
During this war, Russia was unable to dispatch a squadron to the Mediterranean Sea due to the need to conduct combat operations in the Baltic and Black Seas. However, by taking advantage of the sympathy of the Mediterranean peoples, the Russians were able to rapidly outfit privateer detachments of Greek ships, and both at Trieste and Syracuse they created privateer squadrons which, by interrupting the enemy’s shipping and attacking his coastal bases, diverted considerable Turkish land and naval forces from the main, Black Sea theater. This essentially created a second front for the Turkish Army, which undoubtedly had a considerable effect on the course and outcome of the struggle in the main area.
The international situation at the turn of the 19th century was extremely complex. After a bourgeois revolution, France waged a fierce struggle with England, which had already been a capitalist society for a long time, and which had seized the main colonial regions. Serious disputes arose between France and Russia, who were striving to take advantage of the legacy of the disintegrating German empire. In this period, Engels pointed out, it was only a question of whether the weak German states would form a French or Russian
Confederation of the Rhine. The stratagems in the situation led to sudden sharp turns in the policies of the major countries of Europe and to changes in the directions of their main military efforts.
From 1797 to 1800, Russia, allied with England, Austria, and Turkey, conducted military operations against France. The Russian Army led by A. V. Suvorov displayed wonderful heroism in Switzerland and northern Italy. The Russian squadron in the Mediterranean Sea, under the command of F. F. Ushakov, freed the Ionian Islands from French domination, and later took an active part in driving the French out of Italy. One of the most brilliant deeds of the Navy was taking the strong fortress of Corfu in 1799 after a three month siege. Having received news of this Suvorov said: "Our Peter the Great lives. What he said upon beating the Swedish Fleet off of the Aland Islands in 1714 is, namely, that nature made only one Russia: she has no rivals—that we now see too. Hurrah! To the Russian Navy! . . . Now I say to myself: Why wasn’t I at Corfu, even as a Warrant Officer?”15
It should be recalled for comparison that at this same time the English Fleet under the command of Admiral Nelson was conducting a siege for the second year of the weaker fortress of La Valletta on Malta and was unable to take it.
The political consequences of the victory of the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean Sea were very significant. Napoleon felt that the Ionian Islands were the most important jump-off position for military actions against Egypt, the Balkans, Constantinople, and the south of Russia. Therefore the expelling of the French from the Ionian Archipelago radically altered the situation in the Mediterranean Sea. Thus, the Navy was the most powerful weapon of the foreign policy of Russia, who by the actions of her Navy drew Italy, Sardinia, and even Tunisia into her own sphere of influence.
Despite the vast contribution of the Russian Navy in changing the political situation in Europe, Western European and American historians even today with the light hand of Mahan continue to ignore Ushakov in every way and refer to him merely as a conscientious pupil of Nelson’s, supposedly due to which he achieve^ success. However, a simple comparison of dates of the largest battles conducted under the leadership of these two famous admirals shows that the main naval victories of Ushakov were won considerably before Nelson was able to display his talent as a naval leader.16
The flourishing of the naval art in Russia in the
15Istoriya russkoy armii i flola (The History of the Russian Army and Navy)- Vol. IX, Moscow, 1913, p. 57.
16F. F. Ushakov’s victories: at Kerch in 1790; at Tendra in 1790; at Caliacf3 in 1791; and the taking of Corfu in 1799. Nelson’s victories: at Abuklf in 1798; and at Trafalgar in 1805.
Navies in War and in Peace 35
second half of the 18th century coincided with the furious development of the Russian art of war as a whole. Thanks to A. V. Suvorov, the Russian Army considerably increased its glorious combat traditions. F. F. Ushakov performed the same service for the Navy.
After the main forces of Ushakov’s squadron had left the Mediterranean Sea, part of the ships and naval infantry remained there in order to ensure the safety of the Ionian Islands. Yet within only a few years Russia again began to concentrate naval forces here under the command of Admiral D. N. Senyavin to counter new attempts by the French to carry out takeovers in the Balkans and also to protect the Ionian Islands as bases for the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean.
Naval operations in this period were prosecuted in a very complex and rapidly changing military and political situation. At the end of 1806, Turkey, at the urging of Napoleon, declared war on Russia, which completely changed the mission of the Russian Mediterranean squadron, whose main goal became operations against Turkey from the south together with the allied English Navy. However, the true intentions of England boiled down to not allowing free passage of Russian ships through the Black Sea straits, thus ensuring complete sway for her ships in the Mediterranean Sea. As a result, Senyavin was forced to limit the squadron’s mission to blockading the Dardanelles. Nevertheless, in a battle off of the Dardanelles and in the battle at Aphantos, it routed the Turkish Fleet.
At the same time as the Russian Fleet was winning brilliant victories in the Aegean Sea, peace talks were underway in Neman between Napoleon and Alexander I. On 25 June 1807, within a week after the Aphantos battle, the Peace Treaty of Tilsit was signed which sharply altered the foreign policy of the Tsarist government which shifted to an alliance with Napoleon. Russia received a breathing space, which was purchased at an extremely expensive price: Napoleon’s territorial
seizures in Western Europe were recognized, Russia was obliged to participate in the continental blockade of England, starting a war with her, she had to accede to France and Turkey all the strategic positions won by her by that time in the Mediterranean Sea, to withdraw all of her forces, and to put a squadron under complete French authority.
This sharp turn in Russia’s foreign policy created an exceedingly difficult situation for the Mediterranean squadron. And it was only after almost 20 years that it again appeared in the Mediterranean on the pleasant mission of rendering aid to the Greek people.
In 1827 the Russian squadron under the command of Admiral L. P. Geyden, together with the English and French squadrons, was supposed to force the Turkish occupation forces in Greece to cease exterminating the population which was fighting for national independence. Joint operations of the allied fleets began with the famous battle of Navarino (October 1827) in which the more numerous Turkish Fleet was completely crushed. In the Russo-Turkish War of 1828- 1829 a Russian squadron under the command of Admiral P. I. Rikord tightly blockaded the Dardanelles and the Turkish coast from the south.
Later the Russian Navy did not conduct combat operations in the Mediterranean Sea, although its forces, right up to the squadrons of steam vessels, were regularly located there.
Thus, in summing up what has been said, we clearly see that the Mediterranean Sea, which is located close
36 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1974
to the southwestern borders of Russia, beginning with the period of the sailing fleets, was the region having a most important significance for her defense. Russian squadrons conducted combat operations there not to seize foreign territories or enslave peoples, but for the sake of ensuring the security of their own country. This was a struggle of forces on the foremost line of defense of the country when threats of aggression arose from the southwest.
The operation of the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean Sea, which was of an exceedingly active nature, each time led to results which had a very significant effect on the overall course and outcome of the armed defense of the country from aggression from the southwest. Thus, in 1770-1774, the Navy rendered most important aid on the strategic plane, not only in the defense of the southwestern regions of the country, but also by diverting large enemy forces toward itself, and directly aided the Russian Army in achieving remarkable victories on the Danube front. And the timely movement of naval forces to the Mediterranean Sea and their brilliant victories played a great role in the conclusion of an exceptionally favorable peace treaty for Russia in the war of 1768 to 1774.[5]
The combat operations of Admiral F. F. Ushakov’s squadron in the Mediterranean Sea from 1798 to 1800 had the goal of heading off the imminent aggression of Napoleonic France against Russia from the southwest. At that time the situation was crystallizing in such a manner that the capture by the French of the region of the Ionian Archipelago, which represented a first rate position for the subsequent development of military operations capable of having an effect on the course of Suvorov’s campaign in Italy, forced Russia, while not expecting a direct attack, to send naval forces into the Mediterranean. The victorious actions of the Navy led to a radical change in the situation not only in the Mediterranean Sea, but also on its entire coastline, which was of inestimable aid to Suvorov’s Army and aided in achieving the goals of the armed struggle of the state.
The presence of the Russian Fleet under the command of D. N. Senyavin in the Mediterranean Sea in 1806-1807 also had as its objective strategic cooperation with the Russian Army battling with the troops of Napoleonic France, which was allied with Turkey. And also in this case our Fleet achieved its goal, de-
livering a series of crushing defeats to the Turkish Fleet at sea and to the French troops in the Balkans.
As is seen, historically it has turned out that when a threat arises of enemy encroachment on the territory of Russia from the southwest, the Russian Navy has been moved into the Mediterranean Sea where it has successfully executed major strategic missions in defending the country’s borders from aggression. In other words, our Navy has shown the whole world that the Mediterranean Sea is not anyone’s preserve or a closed lake and that Russia is a Mediterranean power. The location of her forces in these waters is based not only on geographical conditions (the proximity of the Black Sea to the Mediterranean theater), but also the age-old need for the Russian Navy to stay there.
Today, when the capabilities of the imperialist aggressors to attack the Soviet Union directly from the Mediterranean Sea have increased extraordinarily, this region has assumed especially important significance in the defense of our Homeland. The constant presence there of the U. S. Sixth Fleet, with aircraft carriers and missile-carrying submarines, has as its basic mission a surprise attack against the Soviet Union and the countries of the Socialist community. The U. S. Navy command openly states that the missiles of the nuclear- powered submarines and the carrier aircraft from the Mediterranean Sea are aimed at objectives in the U.S.S.R. and the states of Eastern Europe and are in a constant state of readiness to deliver nuclear strikes against them.[6]
It is natural that in response to the direct threat, the Soviet Union is forced to undertake defensive measures and implement its undisputable and legal right to have warships in the Mediterranean Sea. They are there not to threaten peace-loving peoples, and not to implement any sort of expansionist desires, which are alien to the very nature of our Socialist state, but in order to nip aggression in the very bud, should the imperialists attempt to undertake it from this region.
And if our enemies more and more often look at the Soviet Navy and see it as a hindrance to their adventures, this means that it is accomplishing the mission assigned to it.
For several years, the Western bourgeois press, and state and military figures have been conducting a high- flown propaganda campaign with regard to the stay of Soviet warships in the Mediterranean Sea. A majority of the statements, having the goal of deceiving public opinion, are colored by false assertions that the Soviet Union is sending warships to the Mediterranean Sea supposedly to put pressure on individual states of this region, to conduct "gunboat diplomacy,” to threaten
18 Newsweek, 19 July 1971.
Navies in War and in Peace 37
the southern flank of NATO, etc. They write and say that the "political influence of the Russians in this strategically important sea is directly proportional to the numerical strength of their Fleet.”19 Admiral C. Duncan, an American who is Supreme Commander- in-Chief of the NATO Forces in the Atlantic, recently asserted that the most dramatic challenge that NATO is running up against is the fact that the Russians have put to sea.20 Such statements are an attempt to ascribe to the Soviet Union intentions which are completely alien to it. Our influence in this region (as well as throughout the world) is growing, primarily owing to the policy of peace and friendship being conducted by the Soviet state.
Undoubtedly the strengthening of the prestige of the U.S.S.R. in the opinion of the Mediterranean peoples is also being fostered by the comparison by them of the policy of our state with U. S. policy. The most important instrument of American policy in the Mediterranean is the Sixth Fleet, which has repeatedly interfered, in the internal affairs of the Mediterranean states and has supported aggressors in their actions against freedom-loving peoples. Such actions characterize U. S.
19Newsweek, 19 July 1971.
20 Associated Press, 13 December 1971.
policy as a clearly expansionary, antidemocratic, and policeman policy.
In contrast to the Sixth Fleet, the Soviet Navy has not once interfered in the internal affairs of the Mediterranean states and has not committed any sort of aggression against them. The presence of our warships in the Mediterranean Sea constantly prevents the disturbance of the peaceful atmosphere in this region and plays a deterrent role. As early as 1968 a TASS statement pointed out: "The Soviet Union as a Black Sea power, and, consequently, a Mediterranean power, is exercising its indisputable right to have a presence in this region. Soviet naval ships are in the Mediterranean not to create a threat to any people or state. Their mission is to promote the cause of stability and peace in the Mediterranean Sea region.”
A graduate of the Naval Academy in 1925, Admiral Eller served in the Pacific during most of World War II and, in 1946, assumed the duties of Director of Public Information, Navy Department, Washington, D.C. After graduating from the National War College and serving on the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he commanded the Middle East Force, 1950-1951. After his retirement in 1954, Admiral Eller became Director of Engineering at Bucknell University, a position which he held until 1956 when recalled to active duty as Director of Naval History Division, Navy Department. Since his retirement in 1970 he has been spending his time writing, including his recent book The Soviet Sea Challenge. Admiral Eller is a three-time winner of the Naval Institute’s Prize Essay Contest. He has received honorable mention in the Contest on three other occasions and has been a frequent contributor to the Proceedings.
Admiral Gorshkov well understands the magic advantages which control of the sea bring a nation. Writing with clarity of perception and skill in slanted argument, he drives home the correct conclusion that the U.S.S.R. needs great power afloat to force the world into Communism. Without this force, she cannot insure successful insurgencies. Neither can she expand and dominate the world.
He sings the propaganda song of friendship and support of "peace-loving people.” Yet throughout, his historical examples demonstrate to the Party that a strong Navy has helped bring vast territorial gains—and today opens to the world as "the most powerful weapon of Russia’s foreign policy.”
The shrewd leader of the Red Navy not only perceives the importance of seapower himself, but obviously has so convinced the leaders who count in
Commentary
By Rear Admiral E. M. Eller, U. S. Navy (Retired)
At the 24th CPSU Congress, L. I. Brezhnev said: ". . . Attempts to ascribe to the Soviet Union intentions that are alien to it do not deceive the people. With full responsibility we declare: we have no territorial pretensions whatsoever, we threaten no one and we intend to attack no one; we stand for free and independent development of all peoples. ... In contrast to the aggressive policy of imperialism, the Soviet Union presents a policy of active defense of peace and the strengthening of international security.
the Politburo. Pronouncements like this group of significant articles are not made lightly in the U.S.S.R. They speak the party line, so we should listen carefully. With Gorshkov showing the way, the Kremlin has concentrated immense resources into all elements of maritime strength. The results are frightening. Almost overnight the Soviets have rushed ahead to pass the United States and to become Number One on the oceans. These articles help show why.
As a professional naval officer, Admiral Gorshkov says strikingly little about tactics, training, naval weapons, leadership, and other essentials of the naval art. Clearly writing to inform, and to convince doubters, he concentrates on the military and political benefits to the country of a strong Navy.
Like the others, this second article has a facade of party line ideology. Yet the points Gorshkov drives home show understanding of the historical importance of seapower, astute thinking, and clever presentation to gain acceptance from the land-minded hierarchy:
► He blocks opposition to naval power by accurately showing that "The Motherland” could not "join the ranks of great powers” without a strong Navy. Russia’s past setbacks and failure to win territorial gains in war, he says, came usually because she lacked the necessary fleet. Many examples drive home the point and the effect upon the "historical path of the state.”
► Russia suffered in the past because Tsarist leaders swallowed hostile foreign propaganda (led by Britain and now the United States) that she is not a maritime country and therefore does not need the sea. Thus, if any Soviet leaders today oppose the aggressive build-up in all facets of seapower, they become suspect dupes of foreign anticommunist propagandists.
► The U.S.S.R. has the longest maritime frontier in the world, almost twice that of the United States, and 15 times that of France. Thus, considering sea borders (he does not note that most of the U.S.S.R.’s are icebound most of the time), the Soviet Union has first need for seapower.
► Russians are inherently sea going people. Therefore Peter I merely achieved a rebirth by creating "one of the strongest fleets in the world.” The surge to first place today continues the trend and can produce the same large benefits.
► In the homeland, the Army sorely needs a strong Navy ",cooperating jointly with ground forces to achieve the goals of the war.” When Peter I did not have a powerful fleet, he failed. When he did, he won his
objectives. "The land army,” Peter said, "has one arm, but the Government that possesses an army and a fleet, is a body with two arms.” When Russian monarchs after Peter failed to maintain an adequate fleet, Russia either lost battles or failed to gain desired territory, especially in the Black Sea-Mediterranean area—or between wars did not attain her diplomatic objectives. Thus seapower is a main instrument of national policy.
► The Army needs a fleet also for distant operations. In the Napoleonic wars, Russia was not endangered by threat of attack from the Mediterranean. However, the conquests of Russia’s Mediterranean fleet greatly furthered operations of the Army in Austria and Italy. Admiral Gorshkov calls this "strategic cooperation with the Army.”
► A Navy can ensure security of sea frontiers. The U.S.S.R. wants superiority for this purpose and not for the "imperialistic designs” of the capitalistic nations. Yet this frayed mask can’t hide the evidence: Peter the Great had to have a fleet to hope to expand to the Azov and Black Seas. He needed it to gain the Baltic. He and successors needed it to reach for the Mediterranean.
Taking customary communist liberty with facts, Admiral Gorshkov gives the impression that the U.S.S.R.’s present European frontiers constitute, in considerable part, the bounds of a thousand years ago. Aggrandizement since against Moslems, Persians, and others in the south, the Baltic States and Central Europe in the west, the Tartars, Mongols and Chinese in the east—all have been merely protective measures in expansion that has not ceased-
► The Motherland is a Mediterranean Power, and requires free access to it. The fleet now there "is based not only on geographical conditions (the proximity of the Black Sea to the Mediterranean theater) but also the age-old need for the Russian fleet to stay there.”
► When the Navy has superior strength {as against Sweden in the Baltic and Turkey in the Black Sea) then it can carry the war overseas to the enemy. Invasion and territorial gains can follow. Illustrations of successes must whet Politburo appetites for distant shores.
Indeed, territorial expansion is a major theme of this article: expansion to the west to win the Baltic coast; expansion "toward the east for an outlet to the Pacific Ocean”; and with special emphasis, expansion to the south, which has occupied so mud1 of Russian history, and where opportunity of critical import still awaits in the Middle East, Africa, and tbe Indian sub-continent.
4
Navies in War and in Peace 39
Singularly, in recounting territorial gains, Admiral Gorshkov carefully refrains from citing the large conquests from Persia around the Caspian. He does not mention the acquisitions west of the sea grasping for the Persian Gulf and Middle East (once again, as for most of history, critical for control of civilization), where the U.S.S.R. has made significant gains in recent years. Neither does he mention the conquests to the east of the Caspian—nor the long yearning for India and the Indian Ocean, now close to fruition.
Takeover of the Crimea in one of the Turkish wars illustrates a maneuver not forgotten in Moscow. The Army with the Navy "forced the Turks to conclude a peace, according to which Russia received land between the Bug and the Dnieper, and finally established herself on the Sea of Azov and an outlet from it to the Black Sea.” He adds that "The Crimea was recognized as being an independent state by Turkey and subsequently joined Russia.
Actually, of course, Catherine set up a puppet government, just as Stalin did after World War II in bordering states, employing ambitious nationals of these countries.
The Mediterranean stands out as the ultimate goal for southwest expansion (or semi-ultimate, for beyond lie the Suez Canal, Egypt, and all the vast seething continent of Africa to communize). The operations of a Russian fleet in the Mediterranean for several years in the 1760s and 1770s against Turkey evoke another statement of import. These, the Admiral writes, are "an outstanding example of autonomous operations by a large naval formation completely cut off from its home ports, which increased the international prestige of Russia and evoked warm sympathy toward Russia by all the peoples of the Mediterranean.” And he adds of operations a few years later, "the Navy was the most powerful weapon of the foreign policy of Russia, who by the actions of her Navy, drew Italy,
Sardinia, and even Tunisia into her own sphere of influence”—an 18th century preview of today.
The Soviet Union’s predominant influence throughout the latest Arab-Israeli war, and the grave energy threat it raised for the Free World, demonstrate the correctness of Admiral Gorshkov’s emphasis on the value of the Navy in international crises beyond her shores. It surely added to his stature and influence in the Politburo. Thus the Kremlin’s intense drive to control the seas, and therefore civilization, will not slacken.
In condemning the U. S. employment of the 6th Fleet "as a clearly expansionary, anti-democratic, and policeman policy,” Admiral Gorshkov reveals why
the Russian Navy has returned to the Sea of History in force. He remembers how the Kremlin retreated in Azerbaijan, how it relaxed threats against Turkey, and how it failed to overthrow governments in Greece, Lebanon, and Jordan, to be replaced by Communist regimes.
Having shown how the Russian Navy through history has furthered conquests, the Soviet CNO concludes with a soothing note. His fleet in the Mediterranean, he avers, has only the mission "to promote the cause of stability and peace . . .
"We have no territorial pretensions whatsoever, we threaten no one and intend to attack no one.”
In this connection, and as anchor to our comment, it seems appropriate to quote F. T. Jane’s words of three quarters of a century ago: "Every Russian feels himself a member of the empire that will be the world empire of the future. And that empire will be a great sea-empire ... At some future date that great struggle . . . this new Punic War . . . is . . . likely to be absolutely decisive.” Since he quotes from another passage of the book where these words appear, Admiral Gorshkov must have read these words, believed them, and preached them in the Kremlin. He is obviously preparing his Navy for "that great struggle.”
[1] A. I. Sorokin. Russkoyaponskaya voyna 1904-1905. Voyennoistoricheskiy ocherk (The Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905. Military Historical Essays), Voyeni- zdat, 1956, p. 19.
[2]Thc Washington Post, 5 August 1970.
[3] Voyennaya entsiklopediya (Military Encyclopedia), Vol. VII, St. Petersburg,
1912, p. 175.
[5] Keep in mind the Kuchuk-Kaynardzha Treaty concluded by Russia and Turkey on 10 (21) July 1774, according to which Russia acquired the land between the Bug and the Dnieper, finally established herself on the Sea of Azov and outlets for herself to the Black Sea, and received the right of free commercial navigation in the Black Sea and an outlet to the
Mediterranean Sea. The Crimea was recognized as a state independent of Turkey.