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High School Howgozit”—
The NJROTC Comes of Age
By Chief Yeoman Thomas W. Murphy,
U. S. Navy (Retired), Naval Science Instructor, Navy Junior ROTC Unit, Woburn Senior High School, Woburn, Massachusetts
This month, as the high school fall semester commences, some 39 schools throughout the United States will enter their sixth year of participation in the Naval Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (NJROTC) program that is continuing to bring a better awareness of the U. S. Navy to Main Street, USA, and to the young people who live there.
The first three-year class was graduated in 1970, and in offering this interim status report on the NJROTC, this observer suggests that a look at some of the cadet products of just one unit, the Woburn, Massachusetts, Senior High School, will provide an impressive measure of the program’s potential for advancing the individual’s career.
There was, for example, Robert McHugh, who received the first full four-year NROTC (full tuition-paid) scholarship to Marquette University. Barry Fenton received the Army’s ROTC scholarship to Norwich University, and Robert Mann received an appointment to the Air Force Academy. Timothy Murray was selected for the Navy’s
Nuclear Power Training Program, and Donald Beagley became Honor Man of his Marine platoon at Paris Island.
With these accomplishments as a point of reference, today’s cadets can anticipate an even more promising future and, surprisingly enough for many potential candidates of this volunteer program, there are increasing benefits to be gained for the applicant who is not seeking a military career, who is not preparing for an academy appointment, and who is not planning on a ROTC scholarship. For just as many former NJROTC students have applied their school training in moving on to college, to favorable job positions and advanced vocational fields. Tomorrow’s cadet graduates will gain some unexpected benefits from participation in the NJROTC. As those who went before them can attest, they will learn more quickly than most of their contemporaries, the value of the qualities of applied leadership and teamwork, and the special comradeship they will encounter in the program. Too, they will
have opportunities, on field trips, to familiarize themselves with the Navy and its installations, and with other branches of Service, and to become acquainted with the nature of the many skills which must be developed by the individual as he takes his place in a highly technical world. More recently, the opportunity for foreign travel has become available and, as one cadet has concluded: "I could be called a Navy ambassador and still be a civilian!”
As an applicant considers these matters, another question, frequently posed by student and parent alike, asks: Does the NJROTC program, in the secondary school level, function as an alternate source of discipline? And the answer is "Yes, in some ways,” for the student himself may want and seek out discipline when he volunteers for the program. At the same time, however, NJROTC cannot be considered as a convenient reform activity which can force discipline on individuals who have not responded to parental control. On the contrary, the NJROTC prides itself on the
Both male and female cadets of the NJROTC, the author notes, receive "on-the-job” training during field trips. They ", . . become acquainted with the nature of the many skills which must be developed by the individual as he takes his place in a highly technical world.” Above and at right, navigation instruction is given both on board ship and at shore installations, while below, training is given in fire fighting and simulated ship control.
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The annual Naval Ball is a social event that each NJROTC cadet and his date look forward to, while the highlight of the cadet’s three-year program is his graduation, enabling him to enter the Navy as an E-3 (seaman).
Professional Notes 109
personnel quality control which has earned for it the special, high approval of the parent, school, and the local community. The NJROTC unit, in turn, is keenly conscious of its responsibility, and supports its standards through its disciplinary board, which recommends appropriate courses of action to be considered by the Senior Naval Science Instructor in dealing with offenders. In this way, readers of the Proceedings will note that the process of selection and retention of good cadets, and the weeding out of persistent offenders coincides with the policies and practices which operate within the U. S. Navy.
Far more frequently, however, the number one obstacle confronting a cadet may be the problem of scheduling his NJROTC program to be compatible
with his other subjects, and just as often, he must seek the assistance of his Guidance Counselor to resolve scheduling difficulties.
There is, this observer has noted, another important factor which exerts a significant influence on the young man as he considers volunteering for the NJROTC. That factor is peer pressure, or the awareness of the approval or lack of approval of his fellows. In this regard, it must be remembered that, during the past five years in which the original 39 units have been in operation, the winds of social change have moved across the campuses of the nation’s colleges and universities with often disruptive effects that have led to the abolishment of many ROTC units. It cannot be denied, either, that a considerable measure of
this disapproving attitude has spilled over onto the high school level, to become an additional, if undeserved obstacle to both the unit and the individual candidate. Nevertheless, and interestingly enough, the forthright rebuttal, by cadets on the secondary education level, of the criticism directed at the NJROTC, can be stronger than that evoked in the college level student. As this observer has concluded, the explanation is simply that the high school cadet is quite proud of his program, and he will defend it.
In turn, those associated with the administration and supervision of the NJROTC are equally proud of the young men and women cadets in the program today as they work to become better informed, more useful citizens in tomorrow’s world.
Tactical Implications of the Washington Naval Conference
By Captain Steven M. Silver, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve, and Thomas H. Etzold, Assistant Professor of History, Miami University, Ohio
Diplomatic and naval historians frequently have emphasized links between the Washington Naval Conference in 1921 and 1922 and the attack on Pearl Harbor 20 years later. Indeed, well before that attack, American naval officers and concerned observers had feared Japanese naval superiority in the western Pacific, superiority confirmed by American agreement to leave island outposts m that area unfortified. When the assault came with such disastrous impact, the obvious truth of navalists’ interwar complaints and forebodings became the textbook commonplaces of succeeding years. The Washington Naval Conference, for two decades considered a tri- nmph of American diplomacy and lead- ership, after 1941 seemed less substantial a support for the reputations of Secretly of State Charles Evans Hughes and other interwar advocates of diplomatic testraint and arms limitation.
The nature of the Japanese attack and 'he magnitude of loss have obscured the m°re important relation of the Washington Conference to elements of ulti
mate American victory in the Pacific. To account for American success in terms of righteous determination and anger (and superior fighting ability) has been overwhelmingly tempting. These aspects of American reaction do not alone fully explain American resurgence from the nadir of 7 December 1941, to equilibrium and then offensive momentum within little more than six months. In fact, the Navy was better prepared for war with Japan than it knew, in large part a result of better American than Japanese adjustment to the implications of naval limitation after 1922. Naval limitations accepted at the Washington Conference spurred tactical evolution in the American Navy that substantially limited the strategic effect of the Japanese attack and underlay American resilience in its aftermath.
Late in the 19th century, the Japanese had been innovators in naval tactics. In this time of fierce comparison, competition, and technological change, naval engagements everywhere in the world attracted the attention and scrutiny of
officers in all the naval powers. The Japanese taught and learned lessons in a considerable interaction with the United States. Two aspects of continu- ing Japanese tactics passed the test of battle in the turbulent ten years between 1894 and 1905—lessons of the Sino-Japanese, Spanish-American, and Russo-Japanese wars. One lesson concerned the use and the importance of the battleship, the other concerned the mode of fleet organization and operation.
Warring against the Chinese in 1894, the Japanese relied with considerable success on cruisers equipped with the most modern and largest guns the ships could accommodate. The value of large capital ships, platforms for the heaviest available ordnance, found confirmation in Japanese observations of the Spanish-American War, in which new, large American ships and weapons had brought complete disaster to the Spanish fleet. By 1905 and war with Russia, the Japanese had constructed a number of battleships for the main battle fleet,
and the Imperial Navy employed them with the utmost success against Russian ships. At the Battle of Tsushima, Japan established itself as the primary Asian naval power, a position which derived from the armor and heavy guns of its battleships.
Coincident with the rise of the battleship, the Japanese developed the tactical concept of semi-independent forces. Against both China and Russia, Japan separated warships into squadrons operating independently yet close enough for mutual support. Navy men from all nations, including the United States, studied this technique with interest. During the Spanish-American War, the American Navy operated a "Flying Squadron” similar to the Japanese Flying Squadron at the Battle of the Yalu on 17 September 1894.
The key to Japanese thinking lay in estimates of the striking power of each fleet segment. Strength lay in the tur- reted naval rifles of battleships, grouped in the main battle fleet. There could be no interference with the battleship’s ability to strike, and it became the function of the rest of the fleet to protect the battleship so that she might deliver the decisive blow.
Major European powers before World War I agreed with Japan’s identification of the battleship as the most advanced and useful weapon at sea. These states backed their judgment by embarking on extensive naval arms races, especially in the battleship and large cruiser categories. Long before war came in 1914, people feared that the naval competition would spark hostility. After the shock and horror of prolonged modern war, many Americans and western Europeans desired an end to provocative weapons competition. The battleship, the most complex, advanced, and powerful weapon of her time, became the focus of this concern at Washington in 1921.
The Japanese, on the other hand, had found World War I more a source of opportunity than of suffering or punishment, and lacked almost entirely even such mixed motives and impulses towards limitation as the British showed in conference in Washington. In hard bargaining, the Japanese sacrificed the prestige of nominal first rank for virtual supremacy in their own sphere. But it was not a supremacy accompanied by
peace of mind. The limitation on battleships seriously disrupted military and defense planning for all the major powers, removing the building block on which policy architects had relied in their planning structures.
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The most important effect of the Conference on the Japanese Navy was psychological. The loss of forthcoming battleships to the 5:5:3 ratio devastated the morale of Imperial Navy militarists. Fleet Admiral Tomosaburo Kato, not a militarist, represented Japan during the Conference and served as Prime Minister on his return to Japan. He favored the number three position for Japan in naval strength, relying on deterrence to offset America’s industrial potential. Though he died in 1923, the militarists did not gain strength until 1930, when the London Disarmament Conference reopened the wounds to pride of 1922. With this added impetus, the militarists gained influence in the navy. The United States became the hypothetical enemy in fleet exercises and talk shifted from potential war to probable war.
Despite aircraft carrier development, the Japanese remained .fixated on the one class of warship they were forbidden to build—the battleship. During the 1920s, only officers with poorer records were assigned to naval aviation. Much more prestigious were assignments in battleships, cruisers, and destroyers— even submarines. Although this situation began to change in the 1930s as air power demonstrated its potential, battleships remained the foundation of the Combined Fleet (the traditional name for the Japanese main fleet). Within the Combined Fleet, tacticians segregated the Main Battle Force from the Carrier Force. Though intended for use against the same objectives, both forces moved independently, but neither was capable of supporting the other against air attack. The battleship was the monarch of the seas and the main source of Japanese pride, so battleships received greater numbers of support vessels.
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Japanese thinking resembled the philosophy of the Royal Navy, but for different reasons. Traditionally, the British had won their most crucial wars by destroying or at least neutralizing the enemy’s main battle fleet. Trafalgar and Jutland were partners in this tradition. Fleet exercises in the 1920s and 1930s
apparently assumed that battleship* would settle all future challenges on the sea. The emphasis was on battle fleet versus battle fleet engagements. Aircraft carriers, introduced in the Combine^ Fleet Exercise of 1928, supported the battleships. Naval judges continually underrated the potential effect of theoretical strikes by aircraft. The relatively large number of British carriers, six if all before the war, did not compare if size or effectiveness with the American or Japanese carriers. At no time did the ability of the Fleet Air Arm approach that of the highly skilled American Navy carrier air groups.
The fixation caused by the Confef' ence of 1922 was still present in 1933' when the Japanese planned the construction of the Yamato, a 70,000-ton battleship. Three other ships to be bu>h were also scheduled to be battleships was not until after the Battle of Midway in 1942, that the Japanese converted on£ of these ships, the biggest in the worli into an aircraft carrier. By that time 11 was too late. In 1932, the United State* had three carriers and Japan four. T«'° of those in each navy were conversion* resulting from the Washington Treat) In the first month of 1939, each na'1 had five carriers, with one more Ante'1' can and three Japanese building. In Jud 1942, Japan used eight carriers for ope(' ations around Midway Island, where thc United States had three. The Japanc^ divided their forces into no fewer thn11 ten groups, with the greatest protect!011 not for the transports or carriers, h1'1 for the battleships. At Midway, the J3F anese lost four carriers to one America1^ carrier. The psychological impact of 19-- had lasted 20 years and had proved fat^'
The U. S. Navy did not suffer t^ same blow to its morale as the Japan^ in 1922, even though the Americans I0*1 more ships to limitation than did tl* Japanese. For another, the naval dis*( mament scheme was largely an Amd1 can idea. In fact, for the American Nav!' the limitation of 1922 was benefit Like the Japanese, the Americans cd1 verted two large hulls to carriers. Unl>° the Japanese, however, the America11 approached these two ships practical rather than tragically. This was due f tially to the relative infancy of ^ American Fleet concept, which datr only to about 1890. Hence, the keyst°fl
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Professional Notes
of the traditional fleet, the battleship, had not gained the absolute supremacy she had held in the Royal Navy. The influence of the "battleship admirals” was great indeed, but did not approach the level of control held by the Japanese senior officers. A second reason for practicality was the lack of a building program for the American Navy from the end of World War I until 1933. Of necessity, the Americans made do with what they had.
Enforced austerity led to two tactical concepts which proved superior to the Japanese plans. First, with the scarcity of ships, the Americans tended to operate all their ships as one unit. Battleships and carriers, with supporting ships, operated together in naval exercises. The battleship line shielded the carriers. With the loss of the battleships at Pearl Harbor, the lighter ships naturally closed about the aircraft carriers. As battleships returned to the Fleet, they joined the cluster of ships operating around the carriers, providing the combat-proven carriers with heavy defensive fire. The second concept resulted from the Fleet Problems of 1929 and 1932. In both instances, in marked con-
trast with the British war games, the carriers operated decisively and proved their ability to strike and withdraw before the battleships would close with them. Incidentally, the two Fleet problems were raids on the Panama Canal and Pearl Harbor, and they were highly successful, the latter strikingly similar to actual Japanese attack nine years later. The Fleet exercises firmly established the potential of carriers in the mind of the American Navy, no longer dominated by the stolid "battleship admiral” mentality of earlier times.
The first American tactical doctrine, the integration of the Fleet, went far to undercut Japanese strategic success. In the Pearl Harbor attack, Japanese fleet officers had hoped to damage or destroy the two American carriers that had been in port with the battleships. Few Japanese officers viewed the absence of the carriers as more than a disappointment. At worst, they expected relatively easy destruction of what forces the United States did not completely withdraw from the western Pacific. With its battleships destroyed or inoperative, the American Navy would be unable to interfere with Japanese projects. But two
decades of divergence in tactics made the remaining carriers far more important than the Japanese could have imagined. The American fleet was fully prepared to operate without battleships.
At Washington in 1922, the Japanese Navy suffered a defeat the extent of which would not become apparent until 1942. The Battle of Midway 22 years later, however, recapitulated the Japa- nese-American tactical divergence of the previous two decades. An American carrier-led attack force dealt successively—and successfully—with the individual squadrons of the Imperial Japanese fleet.
In retrospect, Midway seems almost a blueprint for the rest of Pacific war. The Japanese continued to divide the fleet, and American naval officers continued to deal with the Japanese squadrons piecemeal, and to great effect. Ironically, the Japanese denunciation of limitation and Japan’s subsequent buildup after 1934, which did so much to establish Japan’s outlaw image and harden American resolve to obstruct Japanese expansion, only enlarged upon the doctrinal weakness which would prove so expensive in war.
A New Look at Tidal Dynamics
By Victor R. Gardy, Armament Systems Design, General Electric Company
This writer believes that scientists have been making a significant basic er- tot in their interpretation of the dynamics by which the moon’s gravitational pull causes the tides.* The purpose of this Professional Note is to suggest a correction to the hypotheses prevalent in the explanations of tidal behavior. The basic cause of tides is not in question, but the dynamics of how it operates may be in error, and in need of revision.
I never did have a clear understanding of how the moon’s gravitational attraction caused the tides, I believed that it
' See "Book Review— The Analysis of Titles,” Proceedings, this issue, pp. 101-102.
caused the tides, but when I noticed that high tide did not occur directly under the moon as present theory indicates, I felt there must be something lacking in the theory, especially since no suitable mathematical model had been formed to describe how the dynamics worked. It seems that tidal predictions are based solely on observational data. However, no math model has been devised yet that can predict observed behavior. In researching the subject, this writer has found consistent agreement to this fact among all theories. Consequently, I have pursued an idea which seems like a reasonable proposition to describe the phenomenon more accurately.
I have often wondered why the observed tidal data in the tables show the high tides occurring about 30° ahead of the moon and 120° behind it, instead of directly under it and 180° behind it as present theory indicates. I also wondered why a second high tide should occur at a point on the earth farthest from the moon, where the moon’s pull is weakest and actually reinforces the earth’s pull toward the earth’s center. You can see pictures in an encyclopedia or navigational handbook, such as shown in Figure 1.
The earth’s pull on a particle of water on the surface of the seas is about 500 times greater than the moon’s pull when
they are in line. It is hard to visualize how the moon’s pull could possibly overcome the earth’s pull and give a net acceleration towards the moon. My initial schoolboy reaction to that hypothesis was highly skeptical. The particle of water may be lighter and may float a little easier, but it could not actually be accelerated toward the moon, which would be a prime requisite for motion toward the moon to occur. The rationalizations used to explain such non- conforming tidal behavior have never been challenged. Several supporting arguments such as the earth’s rotational speed, the Coriolis force, wave theory time lag and pulsation, and the like, leave me with more questions than answers (which may indicate my naivete).
This writer suggests that we take a new look at the tidal dynamics. At this time, I shall not undertake the task of refuting all the points of the present or combined hypotheses. Neither will I counter all the reasons for deviation, although there are legitimate reasons for deviation from any theory, even the one I propose.
The very simple proposition that I wish to make is that the true mechanism of the moon’s gravitational pull has the strongest effect on points 90° from the moon’s transit. This is where the earth’s gravity is perpendicular to
the moon’s gravity, and offers no resistance since moon and earth are not in opposition as when they are in line (See Figure 2).
Only minor balancing forces, such as internal friction of the water and the Coriolis force, need be overcome to cause a bona fide accelerating force and consequent motion. I would further suggest that a convenient frame of reference, the earth’s center, be used, and only moon and sun gravitational force components tangential to the earth’s surface be considered and analyzed (See Figure 3).
This eliminates the need for the earth’s gravity to enter the picture except in the secondary and subsequent effect of the potential energy of the water above the mean sea level and its involvement in restorative wave motion. Then, in all likelihood, the equations of motion resulting from a thorough force balance will yield a reasonably accurate math model which need only be modified by local geographic conditions. The necessary forces to consider would be the sinusoidal distribution of the tangential component of the moon’s pull, the cohesive factor, or surface tension of the water, and the Coriolis forces. Subsequent motion will then be additionally influenced by the potential energy of the water above mean sea level.
Present explanations state that the
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strongest gravitational pull of the moon occurs on the point of the earth nearest the moon. This is very true. I do not believe, however, that this is the determining factor at all. I feel that the prime effect is caused by the net or resultant accelerating force on each particle of water over the earth’s surface. This is where present explanations fail to convince this observer. Consider the force balance on a particle of water directly under the moon (i.e., transit of the moon). The instantaneous motion of the particles will have radial and tangential components. The radial component, because of the gravitational force imbal- ance, must be zero since the earth’s pull is 500 times greater than that of the moon. Maybe a particle will weigh 3 little less, but it certainly cannot move outward against such odds. This is the crux of my basic exception to present theory. Consequently, the only instantaneous motion of a particle will b" tangential because of the force imbalance between the Coriolis force, surfa"" tension, and the tangential component of the moon’s pull at the two point* 90° from the moon’s transit. Therefor"- only the resultant accelerating force tangential to the surface of the earth isol consequence in tidal motion. As ead1 particle tends to pile up against ead1 neighboring particle, some vertical °r radial motion does occur. This mono" is above mean sea level and subsequent potential energy is accumulated unO1 the sheer strength of water’s cohesi'* nature is overcome and wave motio" results. This wave motion must be a1 counted for in subsequent motion an3 lyses. High tide should thus be expect"; to occur somewhere between 0° and 9° on either side of the moon’s tran*|[ with low tides occurring under $ moon and on the far side of the ear""' A quick check of the tide tabl"’’ indeed, shows more agreement with t1' hypothesis than with the present. Sin"* these tangential forces will cause hi?" tides somewhere between the moo"' transit and 90° from it, there should b less than 180° between high tides the moon side of the earth and grcl[C than 180° on the opposite side. Th" there should not be a consistent hours between high tides, but proba"
10 hours on the moon side and 14 hou^ on the opposite side. Again, a qu'L
113
Professional Notes
check of the tide tables shows considerably more agreement with my hypothesis. In considering the total sphere, present models show a point, or zenith, of high tide directly under the moon. It would reasonably follow, from the present hypothesis, that only one high tide a day—not two—should occur. This would be in a conical shape directly under the moon. Based on my hypothesis, however, water would be drawn tangentially in from the periphery of the
sphere and cause an annular ring of high tide over a hemispherical section of the earth’s surface. Many of the tidal anomalies, such as the fact that some points on the earth experience one tide a day, others four tides a day, while most have only two a day, might be easier to understand and to explain under my proposed hypothesis.
In summary, then, it is proposed that the present hypothesis of tidal dynamics may be basically in error. The maximum
effect in tidal dynamics caused by the moon and sun is not directly under the moon, but 90° from that point. Using my hypothesis, it should now be possible to formulate a meaningful mathematical model of tidal behavior. This is something we have been unable to do because of what may be an erroneous hypothesis. It could also be applicable to planetary dynamics, and should clarify and simplify our math models of planetary motions.
TACAMO:
A New Airborne Weapons System and Warfare Specialty
By Commander Antonio Apap, U. S.
Navy, Staff, Chief of Naval Air Training
TACAMO is an airborne communications station which supplements the Navy’s shore based transmitters and thus provides an alternate communications link to the Fleet. An acronym, formed from the phrase "take charge and move out,” TACAMO is the mission of the Navy’s two most recent Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadrons, VQ-3 and VQ-4, The squadrons were commissioned in July 1968 with four aircraft assigned. Today, with 11 aircraft in the Fleet and a fully operational aircraft on station continuously, TACAMO has been a dynamic and expanding program. Because the TACAMO program is relatively new, the objective of this Professional Note is to acquaint the reader with the AN/USC-13 (TACAMO III) weapons system and the squadrons that operate it.
The AN/USC-13 (TACAMO ill) system is an airborne message-handling terminal installed in the EC-130 aircraft. It consists of radios and associated control, monitoring, processing, and antenna equipment (see Figure 1). The system is installed in the cargo compartment of the aircraft, and is operated by a TACAMO Operational Team consisting of five enlisted men and an airborne communications officer (ACO).
The TACAMO III system has facilities for receiving, transmitting, storing, originating, and relaying messages. Messages may be plain voice, FSK (teletype), or KCW (hand keyed continuous wave).
TACAMO III is equipped with HF transceivers, HF and MF receivers, UF1F transceivers, UHF receivers, VLF and LF receivers, and a VLF transmitter. These radios provide reception and transmission capabilities from the VLF through the UHF frequency spectrum. The system also has the capability to store received messages for future reference or retransmission. Audio signals (voice or teletype) can be transferred to magnetic tape through the use of a tape recorder unit. Those signals can then be transferred directly from the magnetic tape into an HF, UHF or VLF transmitter. KCW can be transmitted by the VLF transmitter or the HF transceivers. Various control and signal processing units are provided to route operator-originated messages to the appropriate transmitters.
The TACAMO III system consists of the AN/USC-14 (communications central); the OZ-i/USC-13 (receiver-transmitter group); the OG-78/USC-13 (am- plifier/coupler); the OE-42/USC-13 (antenna group); and ancillary equipment.
Communications central occupies the lower, forward area of the cargo compartment and is made up of nine stations. Each station is composed of shelves on which the various control equipment for the TACAMO III system are mounted. The stations are arranged so that the four operators have access to the front panels of all units with controls or indicators. The left side of
communications central is lined with nine removeable access doors, one for each of the nine stations. Cabling terminal boards and miscellaneous units that do not require operator attention are located behind these doors.
The receiver/transmitter group (OZ-i/USC-13) is in the cargo compartment aft of communications central. It is made up of four racks, each rack composed of shelves that contain the receiver/transmitter equipment. Most of the remotely-controlled HF and UHF radio units are in the receiver/ transmitter group. Also in this section are various power and processing units.
The amplifier/coupler (OG-78/USC-13) is just aft of the receiver/transmitter group. It contains the power amplifiers and antenna couplers for the VLF transmitter. It is made up of five racks; one rack contains the local control panel and power application controls; the other racks contain amplifiers, drivers, a dummy load, and antenna couplers.
The antenna group (OE-42/USC-13) is immediately aft of the amplifier/coupler. It is composed of an inner enclosure that contains the trailing wire antenna reel and electrical and hydraulic units that control antenna cable deployment, and an outer enclosure that contains several electrical and hydraulic panels. The reel operator’s position is at the rear of the antenna group, where he physically controls the extension and retrac-
tion of the antenna. At the extreme rear of the antenna group is the antenna exit assembly. The antenna cable passes through the exit assembly and leaves the aircraft through a drogue nest that is on the aircraft exterior.
The ancillary equipment consists of items that are not required for operation of the system, such as the galley, bunks, loud speakers, storage lockers, and the like.
To provide a feasible airborne platform for the TACAMO system, several aircraft types were considered, including the C-130, C-5, C-i4i, and P-3. Because of its extreme versatility, the Lockheed C-130 Hercules was selected for the role. This aircraft has an outstanding reputation around the world for dependability, safety, performance, and reliability, and has specifically demonstrated these capabilities in its crucial participation in the Vietnam conflict. For employment of the TACAMO system, the C-130 was specially modified to become the EC-130.
A typical TACAMO flight crew consists of 14, broken down into five aviation officers and nine enlisted aircrewmen. It should be noted that the enlisted composition of the crew enables them to perform all organizational maintenance functions on the aircraft when deployed. TACAMO crews continuously deploy to both civilian and military airfields throughout the Atlantic and Pacific. This self-maintenance capability, coupled with the outstanding supply support received at Navy and Air Force bases, and the dedication of the crews themselves, affords the TACAMO squadrons an extraordinarily high degree of operational effectiveness.
Each crew flies approximately 80 hours per month on operational and training flights. Because of the need to provide communications services to the Fleet in all areas of the Atlantic and Pacific, flight crews average two weeks out of six on deployment.
Based at Naval Air Station, Agana, Guam, VQ-3 is the smaller of the two TACAMO squadrons. VQ-3 has a personnel allowance of 42 officers and 185 enlisted men, and has four EC-130 TACAMO aircraft assigned. VQ-4 is based at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland. This larger TACAMO squadron has a personnel allowance of 92 officers and 387 enlisted men, and is assigned seven EC-130 aircraft. The TACAMO
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squadron personnel structures are similar to other Navy multi-engine squadrons with the addition of the radioman rating, which is required to operate the sophisticated TACAMO III communications equipment.
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The only other significant organizational difference between the two squadrons is that VQ-4 provides all the TACAMO replacement training. As a consequence, training is a separate department in VQ-4 rather than a division of operations. The replacement training division, (RTD) has as its primary function the offering of detailed technical courses in the operation and maintenance of the TACAMO systems. In so doing, it provides replacement training
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operational since 1 July 1971, using the TACAMO III system with a high degree of reliability, an even more improved communications system (TACAMO IV) was introduced into the Fleet in the fall of 1972.
Although only operational for a relatively short time, the TACAMO system of communication to the Fleet has proved to be completely reliable and is now a permanent part of the Naval Communications System.
tive airborne communication officers (ACO) train with VT-29 after completing four weeks of communication school and six weeks of TACAMO training.
Since the ACO position is of critical importance to the TACAMO mission, qualification depends primarily upon individual progress, but averages five months. As an incentive and to improve crew flexibility, NFOs are encouraged to cross-qualify as both navigator and ACO.
Although both squadrons have been
-- for communications and maintenance personnel designated to operate and maintain the TACAMO equipment. Establishing RTD required an initial outlay of almost $2 million for facilities, and there is a staff of 18, including 15 instructors, offering 11 courses year-round in TACAMO systems technology.
A tour of duty in either of the TACAMO squadrons offers the multi- engine, aviation-oriented officer the opportunity to be designated as a crewmember in a relatively short time, while becoming qualified in a heretofore unknown weapons system. The average first-tour pilot arrives at the squadron after completing Air Force C-130 flight training at Little Rock Air Force Base, with a total of approximately 300 pilot >' hours. About one year later, he will be a qualified EC-130 aircraft commander, 'c having accumulated over 1,000 total T pilot hours. All prospective navigators arrive at the squadron after completing t airborne navigation training with Train- 0 ing Squadron (VT) 29 at Corpus Christi, c Texas. Within about three months, the ^ new naval flight officer (nfo) will be a qualified navigator. All NFO prospec-
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Since weaver John Kempe received patent protection from the King of England in 1331, the process of the protection of invention has been responsible for the technological advance of mankind.
The patent has had its finest hour in lhe United States. Even the critics of S. patent policy give the American patent system credit for the technological advances made in this country. The leadership is easily demonstrated by the fact that more than half of the 100,000 patents registered worldwide each year are recorded in the United States.
The American standard of living is n° accident, it is the product of U. S. patent policy. Not only has our patent
policy raised our standard of living, it has also allowed us to defend ourselves against aggressors, and assisted in the growth of new enterprise by protecting individuals and small corporations.
The Navy’s Office of Naval Research (ONR) has a large stake in patent policy and in the creative genius who invents the items protected by those patents. It was ONR which pioneered in ferrite memory cores, time-sharing, and magnetic drum storage systems for digital computers.
The Navy was the first government agency to allocate funds for the study of atomic fission in 1939- Later, the Navy was the first agency to perform research in the use of atomic power for
propulsion. The first practical demonstration of radar was presented at the Naval Radiation Laboratory (NRL). That same NRL first achieved separation of isotopes in its nuclear studies.
In materials research, ONR was a leader in titanium fabrication, boride patents, liquid and solid propellants, polymer plastics, and ion propulsion.
In the biological and physiological sciences, ONR leads the way in plastic corneal transplants, oxygen pumps for heart surgery, ultrasonic irradiation for Parkinson’s disease, ear plugs, dental compositions, antibacterials, and vaccines.
Military applications first explored by the Navy include many aerial vehicles,
sonar apparatus, hydrophones, data processing devices, sophisticated oceanographic instrumentation, and the immensely successful Polaris Fleet Ballistic Missile System.
In other fields, ONR has led the way with masers, lasers, Bayesian statistical analysis, very low frequency (VLF) radio navigation, satellite navigation, numerical weather forecasting, shock dynamics of nose cones, human engineering of instrument displays, infrared (including the most successful air-to-air missile in history—the Sidewinder), high altitude balloon exploration, radio telescopy, cosmic ray research, solar disturbance studies, and worldwide satellite tracking.
In 1970, the Vanguard I, a Navy satellite, and the first U. S. satellite program vehicle, became the oldest satellite in orbit. That Navy satellite will retain that honor for another 290 years, or until approximately the year 2259- This is but one of many important Navy achievements in space research.
The Office of Naval Research figures prominently in other research activities of the United States. In fact, the research staffs of the National Science Foundation, the Atomic Energy Commission, and NASA were supplied by ONR when those organizations were founded.
When ONR was founded in 1946, it was the dominant voice of government in support of basic research. That is no longer true, and rightly so. The Navy’s share of the total United States research and development budget is a relatively small amount. One of ONR’s missions is support of basic research in U. S. universities. As the first to recognize the advantages to the government of the peacetime university-operated, government-sponsored laboratory, ONR established a number of labs, each of which has become a leader in its field. The Applied Physics Laboratory of Johns Hopkins University is a prime example of this leadership.
The Office of Naval Research is in a class by itself in government. Its mission statement notes that it ". . . encourages, promotes, plans, initiates, and coordinates naval research,”—a statement that is unique to the Navy’s research organization. The ONR also supervises the administration of patent activity in the Navy and coordinates all
Navy research. Such centralized coordination of research personnel is not present in other DoD agencies.
With 600 or more patents per year, the Navy has an important stake in the 50,000-patents-a-year generated throughout the United States. The U. S. government has gained rights in more inventions as a result of Navy employees than any other agency of government. In 1963, more patents were granted to Navy employees than all other agency employees combined. In the years 1964 through 1968, Navy employees far exceeded any two other agencies in the number of U. S. patents granted. Although other agencies are now closing the gap, Navy patent applications filed and patents issued consistently rank high.
In the same years in which the Navy produced more invention disclosures than any other agency, Navy research and development (R&D) expenditures were less than the Air Force and NASA and on a par with Army and Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) allocations. Research and development and the attendant patents produced are strong suits in the U. S. Navy. What are the policies that permit the Navy to excel in this field? Generally, government patent policies are either "license-taking” or "title-taking” in nature. The government can own patents (take title) just as it can other property, or it can be a licensee under a patent. Government-owned patents can also be made available by dedication to the public or by exclusive or non-exclusive licensing.
The government can also exchange licenses to patents which it controls for equivalent rights in other patents it desires. Or it may receive a royalty free license from an employee in exchange for free patent solicitation services.
Basically we have two opposing theories: should the government allow a contractor or employee to retain principal rights to an invention, merely granting a royalty free license to the government ("license-taking policy”), or should the government make the patent freely available to anyone by holding title in its own name ("title-taking policy”)?
Those who argue for title policy contend that since the research is carried out with public funds, the rights to
resultant inventions must be taken by the government and dedicated to the free use of the public. License advocates, however, argue that the public interest is best served by granting exclusive rights for limited times to those who invent or discover. They feel that making the creative efforts of government contractors or employees freely available to the public does not benefit the public interest or carry out the intent of patent laws. These are probably oversimplified explanations, but they set the stage for a discussion of patent policy.
The Armed Services have traditionally favored a license policy. This is also the policy favored by most professional patent attorneys and experts on invention, creativity, and economics. On the other hand most of the non-military cabinet departments have followed a title policy- In some cases, the title policy was dictated by the general welfare benefits desired from inventions in the fields of health, public safety, and agriculture-
In 1946, an attorney general study proposed a uniform title policy throughout government. The study cast a pall of doubt over military patent actions. It is easy to see the pressures which lent support to the attorney general’s study. Of the Patent Board members, all but one favored title policy of were committed to title policy by law- Only the Armed Services favored a U" cense policy. In any Patent Board decision, the vote would be 9 to 1. The Defense Department, however, has 80$ of the patents and spends 90% of the R&D funds. The inequity of DoD representation of the Patent Board was obvious. Following the attorney general’5 1946 study, a number of Congressmen began to press for a title policy.
In January 1950, a new policy statement on patents by government em- ployees appeared in Executive Order 10096. It specified that the government should take title whenever the invention: was made during working hours! was made with government facilities, equipment, material, funds, informa' tion, time, or services of other employees on official duty; or bore a direct relation to the official duties of the inventor. As Congressional rumbling5 for a title policy grew, the presidential science advisor, together with other in- terested officials, drew up a compromise
Professional Notes 117
position which was presented to a Congressional Subcommittee in March 1963. The gist of this statement reappeared in a Presidential Memorandum of October 1963 on Patent Policy. A comparison of the two documents reveals a striking similarity.
The same general wording of this memorandum was used in the DoD’s Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR), the rules by which government contracts are let. The "onscene” official who determines whether or not the government will take title, uses ASPR as his guide. This "on-scene” official in the Navy is the field patent attorney in one of 20 or more Navy Field Patent organizations.
Given his intimate knowledge of the history of patents and patent law and policy, one can assume that he will liberally interpret ASPR’s flexible wording to favor a license-taking approach, wherever that course of action seems justified and in the best interests of the general public. The latitude given him by default in ASPR is counter-balanced by a steady stream of restrictive laws being passed piecemeal by Congress. Individual areas of patent interest are being brought under the umbrella of title policy one at a time. A count showed 14 statutes calling for title to government or dedication of inventions, in certain categories, to the public.
It is easy to preach and to believe that to give title to contractors paid in government funds is a "multi-million dollar giveaway.” Cliches like that are hard to answer.
Before deciding that a title policy is best, it would be well to examine patent policy and see what the government really wants. Patent policy even reaches back to the Constitution for its meaning. Section 8, Article I, authorizes Congress to ". . . promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” This specific statement contains the key words "limited times,” "to inventors,” and "exclusive.”
As an incentive, the inventor himself must enjoy an exclusive right just long enough to stimulate the creative faculties of the man of talent. That is what the U. S. patent is all about.
Under a title policy, the government gives free non-exclusive licenses to all who wish to develop and market an invention. Because private risk capital is often necessary to bring an invention to the point of practical commercial application, no one is anxious to assume the risk unless he has some exclusive rights in the invention. For every dollar of basic research, it takes $10 to prove and demonstrate workability and $100 to provide the necessary plant, equipment, marketing, and sales effort to launch a product. That additional $110 is risk capital, not taxpayer money. One can see that the public interest is not necessarily served by a policy which discourages the development and marketing of useful inventions. After all, the government does not use patents; it uses products or items incorporating inventions.
Generally speaking, a patent title in government possession is unnecessary. The government can obtain every benefit which it set out to gain and to which it is entitled by securing a royalty-free license.
The ownership of patent rights is often an important nutrient for the establishment and growth of small companies. It is these companies which merit concern. The large corporation, although it dislikes a title-taking policy on the part of government, will rarely turn down a multi-million-dollar contract on that score alone. There are other reasons why the government has not earned the right to take title in many cases. For example, there is the research and development firm that has been chosen because of its special knowledge, talent, personnel, and facilities in a specific field. The government has received royalty-free license to the inventions subsequently discovered and developed by the contractor. What further benefit can the government rightfully expect? The answer is none, because they have received what they have paid for. To take title would be to take something the government has not earned nor the taxpayer paid for.
If the Navy is to attract the best teams of scientists and engineers to expedite development and civilian use of the resulting inventions and promote healthy industry competition, it must be sensitive to the existing patent policy and current threats to that policy. What
reasonable patent policy objectives should the Navy press for?
Many patentable ideas are never patented. To secure the maximum benefit to the general public, most discoveries of merit should be patented. Unless there are important reasons to the contrary, the government should content itself with a royalty-free license, giving title to the contractor or employee who discovered it.
Publication or public dedication of patents or patentable ideas should be generally discouraged. To publish or make public dedication removes a potential source of revenue and a valuable position in trading patent rights in cross-exchanges.
We should follow a title-taking policy: (1) for products affecting public health and welfare; (2) when the government has obviously been the principal developer (AEC development of nuclear power is a case in point); and (3) when the contractor has merely coordinated or directed the work of others.
We should grant title to the contractor wherever he has established prior technical competence, and increase emphasis in the practice of negotiating with certain inventors, offering to bear development costs in exchange for a royalty-free license to the government.
We should also encourage cross- licensing arrangements in which the Navy uses its current patent rights to trade for valuable privately-owned patent rights. The Navy did this with 102 patents on radio devices prior to World War II, acquiring 57 cross licenses which gave the Navy a number of ways to manufacture radio equipment without infringing on other privately held patents.
We should require contractors to commercialize, within a reasonable time, on patents to which they receive title. If they do not, then other companies should be granted licenses to produce the invention.
The Navy’s preference for a license policy is under fire and in danger of floundering in a morass of piecemeal statutes. A title-taking policy is anathema to the Navy. An understanding of the reasons for a license-taking policy is important to the continuation of the Navy’s leadership in the field of research and development.