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Vice Admiral L. S. Sabin, U. S. Navy (Retired)—My comments might add a bit of "color” to the historical record of Vice Admiral Riley’s account of the dismissal of the late Admiral Louis Denfeld as CNO by the late Louis Johnson, who, at the time, was Secretary of Defense.
My first assignment after being selected to flag rank was to the Industrial College of the Armed Services as Deputy Commandant (Administration). Shortly after I reported, the Commandant of the College, Major-General A. W. "Van” Vanaman, U. S. Air Force, set up a series of calls on top Pentagon officials starting with the Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson. The purpose of the calls, in addition to protocol courtesy, was to explain the origin, objectives, and functions of the College. The Deputy for Operations at the College, Brigadier General "Pinky” Holman and I accompanied the Commandant on these calls.
We arrived at Secretary Johnson’s office a few minutes ahead of our appointed time and were asked to be seated and wait in the outer room since the Secretary had with him the Chairman of the House Armed Forces Committee, the Honorable Carl Vinson. When "Uncle Carl” emerged from the inner sanctum, the expression on his
face left no doubt that his time with the Secretary had been less than palatable. In fact, he nodded to us as he stalked out, mumbling to none of us in particular, that he hoped we would have a more pleasant visit than he had. Not knowing what had transpired during his time with the Secretary of Defense, I can only say that ours, to put it mildly, was lively.
After preliminary amenities and introductions, General Vanaman started to tell the Secretary about the College. The latter was slouched in his desk chair staring out of the window when suddenly he whirled around and bellowed:
To Hell with all that. What / want to know is whether you or your officers have any doubts about who is the boss of this establishment?
Vanaman, as well as Holman and I, was incredulous, non-plussed, and disappointed. (He later remarked to us: "He didn’t hear a word I said about the College.”) Hesitantly, the Commandant replied: "Well, I don’t think so, Sir.” The Secretary then said:
You don’t think so? .... Well, let me tell you that anyone who doesn’t cooperate with me won’t have his job when the sun comes up in the morning.
The Secretary pointed his finger at me and said: "You there, you with the blue suit, they told me your Chief—what’s his name? Denbill, Den-some- thing? . . .”
"Admiral Denfeld,” I interrupted as softly as my rising blood pressure would allow without blowing a gasket.
"Yes, that’s the fellow,” he said, continuing: "They told me he wouldn' cooperate. Well, he’s cooperating, $ right.”
As there appeared nothing more to say, General Vanaman arose to leave Holman and I followed suit. As ,c walked towards the door, the Secretary said to me: "What’s your name? You look like a friend of mine named Kelley.”
Having been a flag officer for less than a year, I was tempted to say, at the least, that Kelley was a first cousin or something, but I admitted that my name being Sabin, there was no relation and I didn’t know this Kelley.
"Well,” he said, "Kelley is a good Democrat. Are you a Democrat?”
Taking a deep breath with the thought that "here goes nothing, ' replied that I was a naval officer and couldn’t see what difference it made what my political persuasion was. agreed and then asked me what I thought of what he had said. This time> I took two deep breaths and blurted out that as a naval officer, I had been brought up to believe that one shorn speak up freely, fully, and frankly to ^ superior before a decision was matt whether or not his views agreed with his superiors; but that after the decistoj’ was made, he should support it wit complete loyalty whatever it was.
Mr. Johnson hesitated a moment an then said: "Well, I can be talked oft
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incident to the CNO and later w
before the Deputy Chief of Naval Oper- ltions (Administration) to substantiate ln detail the occurrence. Later on, when b beard on the evening radio news that Denfeld had been fired, I told my wife d>at I was going to his office the next Corning before I went to the College lnd just stand at attention for a few minutes. I did just that, arriving at ^O’s office a little before 0800. Several high-ranking officers were gathered in his office. The Admiral was a little late and since the wheels must keep turning, foe others returned to their desks before he arrived.
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When Admiral Denfeld arrived and saw me, he asked: "What are you doing here?” I explained to him that I had heard the news of his dismissal on the radio the previous evening and that my indignation at the way it was handled simply made me want to come to his °ffice and stand at attention before him for a few minutes. He walked over to a coat stand in the corner of his office, removed his hat and overcoat and then turned to me. Pointing at the clock which, as I remember showed the time ^ approximately 0915, he said: "As of this moment, Sabe, 1 have still not been officially informed by the Secretary of Defense or anybody else of such an action, and if any such decision has been made, I think it would have to be made by the Secretary of the Navy. I am going to see him in a few minutes and he may well tell me then.” Then he added. Thank you for your confidence,” and i departed.
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Bettis M. Frank, Head, Oral History Unit, Historical Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps— It was with great pleasure that I read the article by my fellow worker, in the lush and fertile vineyard °f oral history. It was only to be expected that, considering Jack’s pioneer work in interviewing senior officers for ihe Columbia University Oral History Research Office naval history project, the Naval Institute program is as successful as it is and merits the deserving acclaim that it receives. From the very 'iception of the Institute’s program, the Marine Corps Oral History Program has worked closely and cooperated with Dr. Mason and his project. As a matter of fac'- copies of the transcripts of all cur- 'ently completed Marine Corps oral his
Comment and Discussion 87
tory interviews in depth have been sent to the Institute to be deposited in its oral history collection for use by researchers.
I am appending to this letter a list of such interviews now accessioned in the Institute oral history collection. An asterisk besides the name of an interviewee indicates that he is a graduate of the Naval Academy:
Allen, Maj. Gen. C. R.
Bare, Lt. Gen. R. O.*
Berkeley, Lt. Gen. J. P.
Bethel, Maj. Gen. I. M.
Blake, Maj. Gen. R.
Bourke, Lt. Gen. T. E.
Bowser, Lt. Gen. A. L.*
Brown, Maj. Gen. W. S.
Buchanan, Brig. Gen. W. W.
Cates, Gen. C. B.
Cloud, Maj. Gen. G. H.
Cooley, Lt. Gen. A. D.
Craig, Lt. Gen. E. A.
Curtis, Brig. Gen. D.*
Cushman, Lt. Gen. T. J.
Dawson, Maj. Gen. M. L.*
Deakin, Brig. Gen. H. O.* del Valle, Lt. Gen. P. A *
Dessez, Brig. Gen. L. A.
Devereux, Brig. Gen. J. P. S.
Dyer, Brig. Gen. E. C.*
Hart, Maj. Gen. J. N.*
Hermle, Lt. Gen. L. D.
Hogaboom, Gen. R. E.*
Jones, Maj. Gen. L. R.
Jordahl, Brig. Gen. R. N.*
Krulak, Lt. Gen. V. H*
Lasswell, Col. A. B.
Luckey, Lt. Gen. R. B.
McQueen, Lt. Gen. J. C.*
Megee, Gen. V. E.
Miller, Brig. Gen. I. "W”*
Mulcahy, Lt. Gen. F. P.
Noble, Gen. A. H.
Paige, Maj. Gen. H. R.*
Peck, Maj. Gen. D*
Pfeiffer, Maj. Gen. O. T.
Roberts, Lt. Gen. C. A.
Robinson, Gen. R. A.
Rogers, Maj. Gen. W. W.
Schilt, Gen. C. F.
Shepherd, Gen. L. C., Jr.
Silverthorn, Lt. Gen. M. H.
Smith, Lt. Gen. J. C.
Smith, Gen. O. P.
Snedeker, Lt. Gen. E. W.
Stewart, Brig. Gen. J. L.
Thomas, Gen. G. C.
Torrey, Brig. Gen. D. W., Jr.
Underhill, Lt. Gen. J. L.
Wallace, Lt. Gen. W. J.
Woods, Lt. Gen. L. E.
Wornham, Lt. Gen. T. A *
Worton, Maj. Gen. W. A.
Captain Frank V. Rigler, U. S. Navy (Retired)—For the record, there were four Chiefs of Naval Operations who continued on active naval duty subsequent to serving as CNO. Admiral Robert E. Coontz (November 1919 to July 1923), who was second officer to serve as CNO, became Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and later Commandant, Fifth Naval District.
Admiral Harold R. Stark (August 1939 to March 1942) became Commander, U. S. Naval Forces after being relieved by Admiral King as CNO. Admiral William M. Fechteler (August 1951 to August 1953) took command of Allied Forces, Southern Europe subsequent to being relieved as CNO by Admiral Robert B. Carney in 1953.
Of course, the present Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, U. S. Navy, has continued on active duty since 2 July 1970, after being nominated to the higher post from his tour as CNO.
"Youth and the U. S. Navy”
(See C. G. Reynolds, pp. 26-33, July 1973
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander James E. Auer, U. S. Navy—While agreeing with the overall theme of Mr. Reynold’s article, I cannot agree with his rather absolute statement that, "Unlike the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, which send uniformed officers to civilian universities for the Ph.D. and M.A. degrees in history in order to teach in their academy and ROTC courses, the Navy does not allow any of its officers such pursuits.” Along with three other lieutenants, I entered the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, in 1968. Although this curriculum is billed as
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members arc invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication in these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged. The U. S. Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion published in the Proceedings.
political science by the Navy’s postgraduate school catalog, it is at Fletcher an interdisciplinary program in international relations made up of courses in international politics, diplomatic history, international finance, and international law.
All four officers entering in academic year 1968-1969 emphasized history in their courses of study, and all were granted a third year in residence to pursue Ph.D.s in academic year 1970- 1971. This extension had not ordinarily been granted to more senior officers who attended Fletcher in the past; however, some have been sent back later for two additional years to obtain doctorates. Since the class which entered in 1968, succeeding groups of entering officers have enjoyed the same liberal third-year doctoral opportunity. (Of the four lieutenants who entered in 1968, three were subsequently eligible for early selection to lieutenant commander during the second year of study; all three were so selected.)
It is yet to be determined whether these officers will be used as Mr. Reynolds suggests. In the past, it appears that the Navy has been the least effective of the Services in using the postgraduate and war college specialty education of its officers, a failure that has not gone unnoticed by the GAO recently.
It is my understanding that there were over 75 unrestricted line Ph.D.s (of all disciplines) in the Navy in 1970 with the number on the increase. Several of my Fletcher colleagues and I have been given specialty codes and have been designated further as Proven Subspecialists under the Operational Technical Managerial System (OTMS). This will possibly contribute to better use in the future.
The critical factor for the future, however, might be a more informal vehicle for improving the use of officers with advanced degrees, i.e., the promotion of highly-educated officers to flag rank and their influence on the assignment process. The assignment of Rhodes Scholar Stansfield Turner as President of the Naval War College is encouraging. Further, the Fiscal 1973 flag selection of Max K. Morris (Ph.D., Fletcher) and the 1974 selection of William J. Crowe (Ph.D., American University), and the assignment of Rear
Admiral Morris from the Naval Academy to Deputy Director of the Politico- Military Policy Division of OPNAV as his first flag assignment are indicators of the recognition by the Navy of the value of such eduction and the proper use thereof. It is hoped that these flag officers and other officers, such as Captain S. A. (Archie) Swarztrauber, U. S. Navy (Ph.D., American University and author of the U. S. Naval Institute Press book, The Three-Mile Limit of Territorial Seas), will champion the cause of the proper role for liberally-educated Ph.D. officers in the Navy.
Notebook Item—"Details of Indo/Pakistani War Reported In Marine Rundschau'
(See Notebook, pp. 127-128, March 1973 Proceedings)
Af. I. Butt, Minister (Information), Embassy of Pakistan— Excerpts from Marine Rundschau lean heavily on India’s pronouncements and claims about its 1971 war on Pakistan and, therefore, do grave injury to facts.
Lieutenant Commander D. G. Farra• ply Corps, U. S. Naty— I should like 11 compliment the Naval Institute fot f
1 ■ i by
For instance, quoting the Indian Prime Minister, it is alleged that in this writing, ". . . weeks of fighting . . . broadened into regular war on 3 December 1971 initiated ... by Pakistan’s declaration of war.” It is a matter of common knowledge that on the pretext of overseeing the March 1971 elections in the state of West Bengal, India had massed 100,000 troops with complete supporting arms on East Pakistan’s borders. Although the elections ended in March, the troops were not withdrawn until long after the fall of Dacca. They were used all through 1971 to shell East Pakistani territory. On India’s own admission, these troops advanced into East Pakistan on 22 November. Later, it was India, and not Pakistan, that extended the war to the western front. There was no declaration of war by Pakistan.
the
Equally inaccurate is India’s claim that against its loss of only one frigate, Pakistan lost 34 ships. The Pakistani Navy sank one Indian frigate, one submarine, one minesweeper, three patrol craft, and one maritime aircraft. One frigate and one submarine were damaged.
The Pakistani Navy lost one destroyer,
one minesweeper, and one patrol craft The Navy scuttled two of its own pat#* craft. The submarine, PNS Ghazi, not because of enemy action, but as[1] result of an accident on board.
"Marine Helicopters—
Stunted Growth”
(See J. D. Watson, pp. 34-41, July 1973
Proceedings)
First Lieutenant James L. Smee, LJ. S. ^ rine Corps, Marine Fighter Attack Stpt^ ron 235—Major Watson’s article '*'sS poignantly germane in its call for sold type of terrain-guidance radar on heft copters operating under instrument ■1-‘- night-flying conditions. My only critl’ cism is that his indictment for the deb) is not worded strongly enough. Ind11' sion of this gear in rotary-wing aircrak could have occurred years ago, as it in the A-7, F-iii, and F-4 aircraft; dally since the helicopter operates at 1°* altitudes the majority of the tin* whereas jet aircraft seldom fly «her£ terrain collision is a factor.
Perhaps the Major’s article could ^ dedicated as a memorial to two of °uI classmates from the class of 1970. L>cU tenant Henry Pilger lost his life dudnF Operation Strong Express while his Huey during IFR conditions. Ll£U tenant Lowell Van Wagenen died 1,1 August on Okinawa when his CFM6 e*11 into a mountain, at night.
Pictorial—"The Turkish Naval Academy: 200 Years of Naval Education”
(See H. Tczcl, pp. 73-85, August 1973 Proceedings)
lecting the most interesting Pictorial Lieutenant Tezel of the Turkish The naval and military exploit5 Turkey are not well known in United States. The Pictorial is a step1 the right direction, in an effort to t>rl ^ the naval side of our NATO ally broader attention. This is partied1^ important when you consider Tufkd strategic location in the Eastern i'1 terranean.
Comment and Discussion 89
Ship-to-Ship Missiles”
(fe C. J. Eliot, pp. 108-114, November 1972
Proceedings)
lieutenant {j.g.) Steven J. Bannat, U. S. Navy—As the missile/gunnery officer of Ae USS Trippe (DE-1075), the first U. S. warship to have a specifically designed surface-to-surface missile system installed on board, I was surprised that n« mention of this system was made in Commander Eliot’s Professional Note 0n this subject.
In early 1970, the Navy, considering use of present Free World missile systems, commenced its own extensive de- velopment program in an effort to find an interim answer to the surface-to- surface missile problem that ultimately would be solved by the Harpoon system.
By December 1971, the Trippe had the Interim Surface-to-Surface Missile Capability (ISSMC) on board, installed, and fully operational.
Designed by Raytheon Corporation for use primarily on board the DE-1052 ocean escort class ships, ISSMC many components of the 1052’s presently- 'nstalled weapons systems in an effort to reduce development time, cost, and also to reflect on the system’s "interim” status.
The ISSMC is basically composed of a modified antisubmarine launcher, the ship’s gun fire control track radar, and a newly-installed computer complex and guidance radar section. The system fires Ac Standard missile and, although deigned for anti-surface firing, possesses good anti-air capability.
At first glance, the ISSMC and the other Free World missiles described in Ac article appear impressive. The Rus- sian Styx missile, however, is by far the World's largest medium-range surfacc- t(>-surface missile and, in the newer versons, one of the fastest. As Israel and Pakistan have painfully discovered, the huge warhead of this missile is ex- ttemely effective in destroying large, compartmentized, and lightly-armored vcssels.
The effectiveness of the much smaller free World missiles against patrol craft Would undoubtedly be impressive, but 0nc wonders just how effective they Would be against a Russian destroyer or Agate.
"The Eagle Boats of
World War I”
(See F. A. Cianflone, pp. 76-80 June 1973
Proceedings)
Commander James H. Davis, U. S. Navy {Retired)—As an ensign of less than a month, in July 1942, I spent several days in the Eagles then attached to the Sound School at Key West (not "Sonar” until later). This was still early enough in the war to allow me, then a student, to meet officers and crewmembers, including the commanding officers, who had been assigned to the Eagles prior to Pearl Harbor.
The Eagles were very much a breed unto themselves, at least in my experience. Probably because of the capsizing mentioned in Mr. Cianflone’s article, and doubtless because of some others that nearly capsized, the Eagles in Key West had long since been ballasted with many tons of concrete. This naturally posed some maintenance problems when repairs were required below the concrete level, step one being the jackhammer.
Prior to Pearl Harbor, in the austerity of the depression Navy, the Eagles had served, despite their obvious shortcomings, as sea commands for officers needing that qualification. Skippers were variously senior lieutenants and lieutenant commanders. 1 was surprised to learn that these had been choice command billets, much sought after by some during the 1930s. The Eagles were typically moored alongside in such "hardship” ports as Perth Amboy, New Jersey, and were underway only a few weeks each year, usually for Reserves.
As ships at sea, they did better than might be expected, especially with concrete ballast. In rough weather, they were decidedly bow-heavy, and their roll, while apparently not dangerous, was often slow and erratic. But even in heavy weather they were very maneuverable and seemed well-suited to ASW. Like any single-screw ship, they turned better to port. The ASW equipment on the Key West Eagles at that time consisted of basic echo ranging gear, depth charges, a stop watch, and a good sense of relative movement on the part of the conning officer. In smooth weather, attack speed was around 14 knots, but because of the short length of the ship and bad tendency to pitch, attack speed
in any significant sea state was slower.
Because the Eagles were choice sea billets for the skippers during the 1930s, they had been classified as major ships of war, and still had this status in mid- 1942. Their official recognition signals were in the same category. On one re-entry into Key West, I had the fun of watching the problem this created in wartime. The tower at the harbor entrance, doubtless manned by a newcomer, sent the challenge which was duly answered by the Eagle. Back across the sunny, calm waters came the challenge. Again the Eagle replied. The tower, now annoyed, came back with the blinker message that the Eagle was replying with the answer for a major ship of war. The skipper, a senior lieutenant commander, by this time in a near frenzy of injured pride, ordered his signalman, "Tell that dumb so-and-so that we are a major ship of war.” The signal was sent as directed, and we steamed into port as though nothing had happened. [2] I
of a number of qualities—self-confidence, self-sacrifice, paternalism, fairness, initiative, decision, dignity, and courage.
"Self-confidence results from the officer knowing; knowing his business, knowing the duties of his grade and of the two grades next above him, knowing each man and knowing how to articulate lucidly and effectively what he has to say to them, in other words, to put what he knows into grammatical, interesting, forceful English.
"Self-sacrifice means that you will give of yourself physically, for the longest hours, the hardest work, and the greatest responsibility. It means giving of yourself mentally, in sympathy with and appreciation for the men in your charge. They are your foundation. Your house of leadership will tumble about your ears unless it rests securely upon them.
"When I say paternalism I use the term in its better sense, the paternalism that manifests itself in a watchful care for the comfort and welfare of those in your charge.
"Fairness is another element without which leadership can neither be built up
nor maintained. There must first be that fairness which treats all men justly. I do not say alike, for you cannot treat all men alike; a punishment that would be dismissed by one man with a shrug of the shoulder is mental anguish for another. An officer who for a given offense has a standard punishment that applies to all is either too indolent or too stupid to study the personality of his men. Study your men carefully as a surgeon studies a difficult case. When you are sure of your diagnosis apply the remedy to effect a cure, not merely to see the victim squirm. Don’t be diverted by any false sympathy for the patient.
"Hand in hand with fairness in awarding punishment walks fairness in giving credit. Everybody hates a human hog. When one of your men has accomplished an especially creditable piece of work, see that he gets proper reward. Turn heaven and earth upside down to get it for him. Don’t try to hog it for yourself. You may do this and get away with it, but you have lost the respect and loyalty of your men. Sooner or later your brother officers will hear of it and shun you like a leper. Give the man
serving under you his proper due.
"The element of personal dignity15 important in military leadership. Be the friend of your men, but do not become their intimate. Your men should stal'd in awe of you, not fear. If your men presume to become familiar it is yt>ut fault, not theirs. Your actions have o'- couraged them to do so. And above all don’t cheapen yourself by courting the'1 friendship or currying their favor. They will despise you for it. If you are worthy of their loyalty and respect, they surely give these without asking. If yoU are not, nothing you can do will ffl11 them.
"Any reasonable decision is better than no decision at all. It is better to do the wrong thing than to hesitate> hunt around, and wind up by doing nothing at all. Having decided on order stick to it, don’t vacillate. have no confidence in an officer doesn’t know his own mind.
Command,
Control,
Compromise
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The basic purpose of this book is to instill in the military man a resolve to pursue his career according to a clearly defined system of personal and professional values toward an attainment of objectives that he establishes for himself and for the service of which he is a part.
Command, in the terms of the author, means not only to have
the power to cause others to do one’s bidding but also the intelligence
and wisdom which will enable one to bid the right things.
Control consists in verifying whether or not everything occurs in conformity with the principles established, the plan adopted, and the instructions issued. Its object is to point out weaknesses and errors in order to rectify them and to prevent recurrences.
Compromise, as it is here applied, has to do with the kind of agreement that is reached between two or more individuals, each enjoying freedom of expression and will, when they concur on a goal which they both desire to attain, but when each has a different idea as to the means of its attainment. The compromise, then, has to do with operational means and not with ethical or moral surrender.
By James H. Carrington, Ph D., Commander, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Dr. Carrington has developed and expanded these principles to produce a behavioral approach to successful management, with emphasis on the concepts of motivation, personal evaluation, and the need for a personal, professional value system.
1973. 352 pages. List Price: $12.50 Member’s Price: $10.00
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"Courage is more than bravery. Bra' ery is the absence of fear. The mer°[ dolt may be brave, because mentality to appreciate his doesn’t know enough to
Comment and Discussion 91
Courage is that firmness of spirit, that moral backbone which, while fully appreciating the danger involved, nevertheless goes on with the undertaking. Bravery is physical, courage is mental and moral. Use judgment in calling on your men for displays of courage or bravery. If common sense tells you that a place is too dangerous for you to venture into, then it is too dangerous for one of your men. His life is as valuable to him as yours is to you.
"Study men, particularly those under your command. Study each to determine wherein lies his strength and his weakness; which man can be relied upon to the last gasp and which cannot.
"It is in the military service that we can hope to realize leadership in its most exalted and distinguished sense.”
Retirees—The Forgotten Men”
(See T. E. Beard, p. 94, June 1973 Proceedings)
Signalman First Gass A. J. MacDonald, U.S. Navy (Retired) — 1 had to react in some way to the discussion by Warrant Officer Beard. After 21% years in the Navy, I neither feel disenchanted nor foel a lack of appreciation.
I volunteered for service to my country. That was my prime desire. I do not in any way feel that my country or the Navy has let me down. I am not depressed, nor do I think myself ill used. I’m extremely proud of my naval service.
I wonder what benefits he referred to Js", . . slowly and steadily being whittled away.” As a retiree, I was compelled to enter a naval hospital as a cancer patient. The treatment I was given was outstanding and was not lacking. My youngest son was accidentally burned over one-third of his body, and since the uaval hospital did not have the facilities to handle his case, he was admitted to a civilian hospital. The Navy however, paid the lion’s share of the bill.
I do, of course, become saddened when I go to the nearby Charleston Naval Station and observe that out of seven destroyer-type ships at the pier, only two are late classes, the rest are of ^forld War II vintage.
It may appear to be true that the Navy is some kind of a stepchild, bur
always, when the chips are down, the Navy still comes through—old ships, worn-out gear, and all. I am extremely proud of my years in the Navy and my affiliation with the Naval Institute. I can assure you that the Institute will not get a letter of resignation from me.
"The Black Midshipman at the
U. S. Naval Academy”
(See R. L. Field, pp. 28-36, April; and p. 98,
August 1973 Proceedings)
Commander Gordon R. Prentice, U. S. Navy, Head of Race Relations Education, Human Resource Development Center, Norfolk, Virginia— Lieu tenant Commander Field has addressed a most timely subject in his article. If his intent was to illuminate the progress of the U. S. Navy in acquiring non-whites in the officer corps, he could have appropriately mentioned the recently established NROTC units at Savannah State, Prairie View A&M, Southern University (Baton Rouge), Florida A&M, and North Carolina Central; all predominantly black.
There are two themes suggested by the article which I feel may tend to mislead the reader: (1) that discrimination in the Navy has been long ago eradicated by fiat, and (2) that our officer corps remains approximately 99% white, simply because there are not sufficient "qualified” minorities available to achieve a realistic representation, and such representation might come only as a result of lowering the entrance "standards.”
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by Geoffrey Bennett
Seventh in the “Sea Battles in Close-Up" series. Tells the dramatic story of Churchill's decision to send these two capital ships to Singapore against the advice of his First Sea Lord and how they were swiftly sent to the bottom by an enemy whose naval air power had been woefully underestimated. Profusely illustrated with plates and diagrams. Fourteen appendices. 1973; 95 pages. Illustrated.
I THE LOS5OFTHE
!j PRINCE OP WALES
j] & REPULSE
31 Geoffrey Bannett
PRINCE OF WALES & REPULSE
THE LOSS OF THE
Lieutenant Commander Field states: "By 1945, integration of the Navy had become a fact.” Later, he asserts that the Navy ", . . has modified and finally reversed its policies of subordination and segregation of its black personnel.” I find these statements incredibly naive. Beginning with President Harry S. Truman’s Executive Order 9981 in 1948, there have been no less than 11 directives (DoD Instruction 1322.11, SecNav Instructions 5350.5A, 5350.12, 5350.6A, and 5350.10A; OpNav Instructions 11101.20, 11101.26, and 1710.5; additionally "Z-66” and NavOp 197 of 1972) whose existence tend to discredit those statements. Moreover, for those of us
T
who have been in the Navy for ten years or more, we merely have to reflect upon the slow change in the racial composition of the steward and the "pro-pay” ratings to conclude the extent of change in the practice of subordination and discrimination in the Navy.
When we speak in terms of "qualifications” and "entrance standards” as the author frequently does, the topic usually narrows to the subject of testing. Traditionally, test batteries have been regarded as tools to measure the ability of an individual to learn (to qualify for a Navy school) or to achieve ultimate success (become an officer candidate). Now, it has become clear that such is not necessarily the case, but that test results are largely a regurgitation of information based on life-long acquired knowledge and personal experiences. Assuming that post-testing training/ schooling will logically result if the scores meet the arbitrarily assigned norms, have we really selected the potential "good” learners or achievers by this process? Is it not possible that individual cultural backgrounds are anoma
lous to the tests, and that the resultant bias culls potentially desirable personnel?
Although there has been a quantitative improvement of sorts in black representation among Naval Academy midshipmen, as the author has pointed out, such achievement is only a small glimmer of light at the end of a long tunnel. Readers might do well to examine the total situation in the Navy.
"U. S. Navy—Middle Age Spread”
{See]. C. Bussert, pp. 18-25, June 1973 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Ronald T. Strong, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Most naval officers—active or retired—will give a hearty cheer for the author’s plea for reduction in reports and paper work. But this is no easy problem. Admirals and even a Secretary of the Navy have tried to correct it with very indifferent success.
Immediately after Pearl Harbor, Navy Secretary Frank Knox circulated the following:
MOTTO OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WE MUST BECOME INTOLERAN1 OF DELAY.
WE MUST TEAR OUR WAY THROUGH RED TAPE.
WE MUST PILLORY BUREAUCRATS WHO STUPIDLY SACRIFICE TIME IN THE PURSUIT OF AN IMPOSSIBLE PERFECTION.
He followed this up with a dirtc' five on 18 December 1941, to all short activities, ordering ten measures to 9* time and short-cut normal peacenik procedures, ending with:
(j) Under present conditions, the imp01' tance of most written records is seconds to getting the job done.
(s) Frank Kno*
SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS OF U. S. SUBMARINES
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1974 Naval Institute Calendar
The 1974 Naval Institute desk calendar and engagement book covers seventy-five years of U. S. submarines. From the USS Holland, the Navy’s first submarine, skippered by her derby-hatted inventor, to the nuclear powered boats of today, the years of development of the silent service are faithfully recorded. The photographs, carefully selected from both official sources and private collections, make up an outstanding collection that will be retained and treasured long after the calendar year.
This convenient and functional weekly calendar includes holiday dates, Julian dates, and a section for monthly planning.
128 pages. 6’/a x 9 inches.
Lies flat when open.
For an additional cost of $1.50 per calendar, the recipient’s name can be stamped in matching foil, one line, on the cover. Order early for Christmas
def/ve-v.
Shortly after this, all ships were ot' dered to "turn in” half of their type writers. It was a great publicity gesture but of no real value since the numb£t of reports required from the ships «aS not reduced in proportion. The net rt suit was a surplus of typewriters ashort*
Comment and Discussion 93
'tare there were already too many, "’liereas yeomen on board ships had to tap the remaining machines hot 24 hours per day. Had the order required Ashore establishments to eliminate half °f their required reports, it would have tan infinitely more effective.
Did the shore establishments grasp 'his golden opportunity to lighten ship? ^ey did not. At that time, I was production officer in the Industrial Manor’s office, Eleventh Naval District, tai Diego, already chafing under the frustrations of peacetime red tape. I saw n° indication of any changes in the office routine, in spite of these direct otders from the top.
I retained copies of several official letters that I consider insignificant gems,” typed with probably six carbon copies each, with details that could have tan decided in five minutes by expended Navy personnel—people we had at the command. The following are excerpts of these letters, along with frgnificant happenings of that day:
22 December 1941 — Letter from the Superintendent of Ships, San Diego, to ta Chief of the Bureau of Ships, asking whether, on the ship’s bells of five auxiliary motor minesweepers we were building, we should engrave the ship’s "umber or her name (which had not yet been assigned)? On the same date, the Japanese were sinking U. S. tankers off San Francisco and Los Angeles.
29 December 1941— Further on the previous letter. Superintendent of Ships, New York, to the Commandant, Eleventh Naval District. "Engrave bells USN in letters 1% inches high and filled with tack enamel.” On the same date, Corregi- ta was bombed and the Japanese captured ta tin center of Malaya.
21 January 1942—A letter from the Chief of the Bureau of Ships and the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance to multiple addressees concerning nuts for holding down bolts. The letter ended Wlfh, "Further instructions will be is- sued when results of this investigation are known. On the same date, the Japanese u'ere crossing the Salween River into Burma.
dO January 1942—I wrote an unoffi- Clal long-hand memo to my immediate suP«rvisor saying, ", . . we have been piking about these bushings for over
ree months, and getting exactly no- Wtae. Unless this matter is definitely
settled immediately. . . .” On the same date, the British were driven back onto the island of Singapore.
6 March 1942—I wrote two official letters to the Industrial Manager, listing the many delays in ship completions because of non-receipt of official plans or sketches, and stated that most of these delays could be avoided if ". . . the Naval Inspector was permitted to use his own good judgment.” On the same date, Java fell to the Japanese.
On 20 May 1942, I was ordered to sea duty. The sigh of relief from the Industrial Manager’s office was almost deafening, but no louder than my own.
But that was not the end. In October 1944, I joined the staff of Rear Admiral R. L. Conolly, U. S. Navy, Commander, Amphibious Group Three in the South Pacific as logistics officer and Group beachmaster. It had been ten months since I had touched at San Diego. Nevertheless, Admiral Conolly received two official letters from the Naval Supply Depot, San Diego, asking by what authority Commander Strong had signed requisitions and received five canvas folding cots and also an excessive supply of toilet paper for one of our assault transports. Admiral Conolly replied that Captain Strong had no recollection of the incidents, but he was sure that the material had been put to good use.
So my best wishes to Master Chief Bussert, and if he sees no immediate results, let him know that even Secretaries of the Navy have tried and failed.
"The Press: A Matter
of Perspective”
(See R. Leider, pp. 34-41, June 1973
Proceedings)
Louell Ponte, Syndicated Columnist—A newspaper is dedicated above most other values to profit. Its news is expected to sell papers by being entertaining as well as informative. Thus sensation, exaggeration, and fabrication all crop up more than they ought to in the information media. And editors are moody, opposed for no logical reason to some topics, and often attuned to what they believe the public wants to read about. Thus, some topics gain in volume, much as dogs (watchdogs, ideally) echo one another in howling at a new moon.
Colonel Leider is right to say perspective gives new meaning to news stories. The question is, where and upon what values shall we stand to gain the most useful and wise world view? From Sky- lab, the earth’s newspapers are unseen, as are its flags. Does commerce stand above all other values way down there on that blue planet, where history’s constant example has been that military greatness has led to mercantile greatness—not the other way around?
Inasmuch as Colonel Leider is an Army man, one assumes he would keep both feet flat on the round planet. We, at least, should keep our heads above water, and below the clouds, in this time of fluid and flowing values. A useful course is to nibble as many varied publications and gain as many impressions as feasible, devouring those that are best.
For myself, and several other journalists, no month would be complete without the Proceedings, one of the most nutritious and vitamin-rich parts of my regular, balanced reading diet.
The Naval Aviation Officer:
Is Flight Pay Really Needed?
Captain Albert A. Gallotta, Jr., U. S. Navy—”What I don’t understand is how you captains could have let this happen.” This comment came from a recently augmented Navy lieutenant during a discussion of legislation contained in the 1973 Defense Appropriation Act. It reflects not so much on his lack of respect or confidence in his seniors, but rather echoes the frustration and confusion of his youthful contemporaries pursuing aviation careers.
Specifically, Section 715 of this Act revises previous legislation on flight pay in a manner which will most certainly have a disastrous effect upon the recruitment and retention of aviators throughout the military Services. The enacted bill terminated flight pay for all o-7s and 0-6s not actually engaged in combat flying as of 31 May 1973. In round terms, this represents a reduction of between $24,000 and $26,000 from a normal anticipated 30-year career flight pay package of about $80,000.
While deliberations over the past several years both in Congress and in the Department of Defense had suggested that some future revision to the legisla-
tion then existent was likely, the 1973 bill nevertheless came as a great surprise and shock to the Services. It effectively halted what has been known as hazardous duty pay (rather than career incentive or specialty pay) for almost all o-6s somewhere between their 18th year of service (early selectees to captain/ colonel) and their 23rd year (normal or late selectees to 0-6). No provisions were made regarding a save-pay clause nor were the inevitable inequities which surround such actions treated in the act. One example is the 24-year o-5 not performing combat flying who will still receive flight pay.
On a basic aviation career package which had been fairly stable and successful, at least from the standpoint of the military Services and the Department of Defense as well as the individual aviator, the congressional action impacted in generous terms, smartly. It represented, of course, another of the several systematic steps taken over the past few years to reduce government spending by cutting back the Services’ combat readiness training programs. Earlier legislation had permitted the Services to restrict,
voluntarily, certain aviators from such proficiency flying. Aviators in schools of 90-day duration or longer and those with at first 20 years and later 15 years of flying experience were involved. These aviators still received flight pay if otherwise eligible.
Why even worry about it?
COS®
Direct and indirect training
The career naval aviator’s unique skills, expertise, and judgment are certainly in high demand by decisionmakers on operational staffs, in schools, and in program acquisition and management offices. One would be hard pressed to find a more loyal, informed, and dedicated cadre in the naval Service. That a specialty long-range career plan is needed to revitalize this important area of naval warfare continuously can hardly be questioned. The fact that aviation officers are volunteers must be a dominant consideration in laying out any viable career-oriented retention plan.
will
0-6 aviator with 20 years of service
of
for
maining combat flying assignments
One may ask then, what happens if this is not done? How can it be accomplished? The first thing that will happen, and in fact already has started, is that new aviators completing their obligated service will leave to seek commer-
cial aviation positions. One need glance at salaries, time away from fa®*' and home, working conditions, af hours of airline pilots to acknowrf the attractiveness of such em ploym'”1 Recent statistics on aviators choosing terminate military Service already ref^1 a decided increase on the order of th<^ times as many as those experienced1* the past few years. This can be tl( directly to the recent legislation,
for each new Fleet pilot approxi®J|f $800,000. The return on this training investment for a pilot leaving d|£l six years of service is approximate $133,000 per year. This yearly figu|t alone is about twice the total cat^1 flight pay package for a 30-year 0-6, fact, under the current new legislati°n it will be about three times as mud1, It is obvious then that the retention one pilot will be cost effective on tb order of 10-to-l relating only total tram* ing costs ($800,000) to the old total career flight pay costs ($80,000). 1®’ provements in Fleet capability related10 a generally higher skill level and safe1' record in a force weighted with caret' aviators is an obvious added benefit Several inequities exist in the presen1 legislation. A career naval officer exp®1 encing a pay cut at age 40 to 45 shot" be cause for some concern. A select'
receive less total pay than he did as ® 0-5 with flight pay. Additionally, d® condition will continue until reaches his 25th year. Newly selected- especially deep or early selected, aviat® 0-6s screened for their potential and pr0 grammed for positions of higher resp011 sibility will experience the antithesis reward, at least in their take-home f1)' This will persist even though man! senior aviators may continue in assign ments directly related to aviation sud1 as aircraft or weapons system acquisiti°n program managers. A typical demot'd izing remark often heard now ff0111 those who chose to remain on acti'C duty is, "When I agreed to stay im expected a total career flight pay paC^ age. Isn’t this a breach of contract b) the government?”
Other more subtle long-term effects will be felt. Competition for those tC
Of Lord Nelson’s three great sea victories, the Battle of Copenhagen was at once the most daring and the one he most nearly lost. Based on much newly available source material, this large and completely absorbing book not only covers the historic naval action with exceptional technical clarity, but provides the fullest explanation yet presented of the complicated sequence of events leading to the battle and of the complex personalities involved.
This is certainly the definitive book on what Nelson termed the hardest battle of his life.
1972.579 pages. Index. Bibliography. 33 Illustrations. 6 Maps.
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NELSON AT COPENHAGEN 4$---------- by Dudley Pope jj§f=
o-6s, while certain to increase, could N
Comment and Discussion 95
toy number of turns. A redefinition of direct aviation-associated assignments to include flight pay will certainly occur, further expanding these competitive and fragmenting forces. Attracting the more aggressive and dynamic officers to be future commanders of aviation units "'ill be more difficult and forced without adequate incentives. A drift away from aviation specialty by senior officers into sub-specialty areas will have a demoral- izing effect upon the aviation cadre and leadership. This overall narrowing of the field of senior aviation specialists who will still be directing and operating aviation units well into the future will be the most insidious and least discernible effect of the current legislation.
In response to congressional pressure to reform the flight pay program, the Department of Defense has submitted a proposed bill to restructure both the pay schedule and the total program costs. The proposed legislation recommends a 25-year career specialty pay plan totaling approximately $65,000 compared to the older $80,000 30-year plan. The profile recommended effectively front-loads a 25-year career specialty pay plan with step-downs occurring from the 18th year to the 24th year of active service. A three-year, save-pay clause is part of the proposal, after which time a reduction of overall annual flight pay costs will begin. The Department of Defense and all the Services apparently anticipate that the proposed bill will provide sufficient reward during the high flight time early years and will also be an adequate long-term inducement to attract sufficient young volunteers to pursue military aviation careers.
Most naval aviators obviously opt for the proven 30-year career plan even though the proposed Joint-Service/ Department of Defense Bill is fairer and ls more cost effective than the provisions °f Section 715 of the 1973 Defense Appropriation Act. The proposed legislation does accommodate to the long-term pressures to restructure the military flight pay program. It represents a conscientious effort of almost one year by all the Services to develop a plan which, ln its concept and effect, delicately bailees reward for performance of hazard- °us duty and incentive for retention.
It deserves the careful study of our legislators. Our Senators and Congress
men owe this much to the thousands of military aviators, present and future, who have been so dramatically and trau- matically punished by Section 715 of the 1973 Defense Appropriation Act.
The President’s Message to the 99th Annual Meeting of the Membership of the U. S. Naval Institute
Mrs. Olga Clark—The report by Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., U. S. Navy, to the membership on 15 March 1973, so outstanding in its sagacity and depth, should be reprinted in current publications. The general public could benefit from this timely, clear-cut analysis by a man who knows his business—the defense of this country.
May I add that my late husband. Admiral J. J. (Jocko) Clark, U. S. Navy (Retired), the pioneer of aircraft carriers, had urged the nation, not yet ready for his farsightedness, to build them. I do feel that for this report, he would say to Admiral Zumwalt, "Well done, sir.”
"Worlds Apart”
(See D. N. Edclstcin, pp. 18-25, February; and pp. 81-82, September 1973 Proceedings)
Lieutenant John H. Daniel, U. S. Navy— Many assertions in this article demand examination and varying degrees of refutation, in particular, the author’s basic premise that the military is becoming alienated from civilian society primarily because of the military’s resistance to social reform.
It is a fundamental error to assume that such a general alienation is taking place. A vocal (and liberal) minority in this country has captured a disproportionate share of news in the past few years by means which were amply publicized by the liberally-oriented news media. It is this minority which has become alienated from the military, not society in general. And, in fact, the professed philosophies of this minority are so foreign to the average military officer that no amount of social change could ever reconcile the two groups.
The vast majority of American civilians are sympathetic to the military. If the Vietnam veteran gets less respect
and admiration than that shown to veterans of previous wars, it can be attributed to the unpopularity of the war itself, a condition that evolved through public dissatisfaction with its prosecution rather than the highly touted "moral issues” raised by this very same liberal element and nurtured by the media. The facts do not support a contention that the attitude of today’s average citizen toward the military is significantly different from that of civilians in the past; it is only the attention focused on the liberal minority which makes it appear so. The return of the POWs on the other hand, was a moving demonstration of the underlying respect and affection the majority of Americans have for their military members, further emphasized by the horrified public reaction to subsequent statements of "Liberal Reformist” Jane Fonda.
Having disagreed with the very premise of "Worlds Apart,” let us return and assume for the sake of argument that there is a growing gap between the civilian and military societies and then address the issue of the military’s responsibility for presenting a more liberal image, as the article’s author sees that it must. But first, to prevent any misunderstanding, it should be made sufficiently clear that it is not the intent of the ensuing discussion to advocate that there be no social change in the Service. In fact, many of the changes and innovations instituted by the incumbent Chief of Naval Operations have been long overdue and will ultimately result in a better Navy. This endorsement does not, however, apply to such "change for change’s sake” moves as the enlisted uniform conversion, the never-ending and unnecessary changes in names of organizations and installations, and reporting procedures which constantly change in tune with the personal preference of those officers from whom such requirements emanate, to name a few examples. Nor, obviously, is it beneficial for the military to alter its basic traditions and behavior patterns to the extent that the qualities of discipline, adherence to the chain of command, and loyalty and respect to superiors are adversely affected.
Returning to this issue of the military’s "urgent” need for social reform it would appear that any further altering
of the social structure which exists in the Service will be counter-productive in the sense that the worth of the military should not be based on its ability as a society to "relate” to civilian society, nor on its in-Service harmony or social awareness—although both have importance in their own right. As far as known, the military exists solely for the purpose of defending this country, and therefore attempts to measure its effectiveness in terms associated with sociological concepts of personnel efficiency or social responsibility can be very misleading, and in some cases entirely inappropriate. That is not to say that these are not worthwhile objectives: but how does one, for instance, measure such efficiency with respect to the calculated risks and unfortunate expenditure of human life that is associated with military operations? The point is that contemporary measures applied to civilian organizations and institutions cannot necessarily be applied to the military since there exist fundamental differences in purpose which prevent a meaningful comparison.
Too, this writer rejects the implied notion that there is never a permanently effective way to accomplish a specific objective—that constant change is always an absolute necessity for a progressive and viable society. It is, of course, characteristic of such a society that some needed changes will become apparent by virtue of the constantly increasing knowledge of group behavior, some will be inspired by the social reformist, and others will be forced upon us by circumstance. However, a constructive change in social patterns can best be accomplished by a natural balance of the "conservative” and "liberal” elements of the philosophical spectrum. In this respect, the military plays a significant role as a restraining, or "conservative” influence. It seems only natural that there must be a satisfactory point of equilibrium somewhere between the liberal ideal of complete freedom and independence of the individual and the diametrically opposite goal of what might be considered the protective and cohesive "big brother” approach of the conservative. In other words, the right of
society to reasonable freedom must k preserved while at the same time constraining some individual rights in order to serve the common welfare.
Parenthetically, the military officer has a right, especially under wartime conditions, to expect unquestioned obedience of orders, since the slightest variance from this principle leaves wide- open the opportunity to question &} order. And, under some circumstances where time is critical, this could prove to be a fatal indulgence to liberal social reform. Nevertheless, one of the most striking trends in today’s social reform is the increasing emphasis upon the right of the individual—indeed the responsibility of the individual—to decide for himself what is a proper order.
If, as now seems clear, civilian society is shifting more and more toward the rights of the individual, the military should not rush to accept such reform, since it is contrary to the entire basis of military unit effectiveness.
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—A tribute to the unknown seamen of an era long past and the maritime masterpieces they painstakingly fashioned—
This first detailed survey of the remarkable ship models made by French and American prisoners during and after the Napoleonic wars deals with the prisoners themselves, their tools and raw materials, and the astonishing variety of the models they created.
Unique both as an art form and as a record of ships of the period, the models range from full-rigged war ships to open boats and include Mediterranean vessels. The materials used include bone, ivory, wood, straw, glass, and hair; and their sizes range from less than two inches long to over seven feet. The construction and intricate detail of the models are displayed in copious photographs, engravings, and contemporary drawings.
1973. 192 pages. Over 130 illustrations.
Appendixes. Bibliography.
Another area which may be potentially harmful to the military is the apparent development of a "parallel rank
Comment and Discussion 97
structure” which has the ultimate effect of bypassing the chain of command, even though this has been frequently and profusely denied in recent years. To explain what is meant by this statement, consider a few examples. First, consider the master chief petty officer of the Navy, who is unquestionably junior to all commissioned officers, yet by virtue of direct access to the Chief of Naval Operations, has acquired an influence that no junior officers can claim. There are many indications of his "superior” status: the significance attached to his presence at a command, the facilities at his disposal, the privileges which he is granted, and other trappings normally associated with higher authority.
Certainly, personnel at all levels should have adequate means of submitting legitimate grievances without fear of consequence. However, a reasonable alternative to the MCPO concept might be a group of senior petty officers rotated on a continuous basis so that no special distinction would be attached (o any one man.
There are other examples of this ex
plicit recognition of a parallel rank structure. To mention a rather trivial one, although significant in the practice that it represents, there are parking spaces at many Army and Navy exchanges and commissaries marked "Reserved for colonels, captains, and above;” and right next to them are spaces labeled "Reserved for E-7 to E-9.” These signs represent a radical departure from normal military practice of granting privilege commensurate with rank. It might even be suggested that it is, in effect, an abandonment of the traditional military social structure based on the chain of command, or, at the very least, a minor, but growing, short circuit of its associated principles.
Another not-too-subtle example of the disappearing distinction between ranks is the change in the enlisted uniform to one of similar appearance to the officer-CPO uniform which, incidently, is being accomplished at some significant cost during a time of extremely austere funding in far more important areas. This decision was purportedly based on an all-Navy vote, yet this author has not
met anyone—enlisted or officer—who cast a vote, thus casting doubt upon the unanimity of opinion on this issue. The intention of these examples is simply to show that there are aspects of the social reform taking place which may be regarded as destructive to the chain of command.
Thus far, use of the word "traditional” has been largely avoided, mainly because it has been turned into a dirty word by social reformers. However, tradition undeniably plays an important role in maintaining continuity and stability of an organization. Traditions should not be forsaken simply because a social scientist, much less an amateur social scientist, declares that it must be so for no other than ephemeral, arbitrary, and unsubstantiated reasons. This is not meant as a defense of the status quo, however; changes which serve to increase military unit effectiveness obviously are needed and should be encouraged. In this regard, a major failure in the past, but nonetheless essential change apparently inspired by the reformist element, is the increasing tend-
THE ROYAL NAVY IN AMERICA, 1760-1775 by Neil R. Stout
In 1764, Captain James Hawker, R. N. reported on the difficulties of enforcing British Colonial Policy in America. The incident took place when a British officer boarded an American merchantman to check clearance papers.
.. the owner who was on board instead of giving the officer an Answer to the Questions of where the vessel came from, etc., and shewing her Papers, not only knocked him down, but, to use his own words, threatened to flog him, and toss him overboard, and that he would serve his Captain in the same manner.”
Page 75, The Royal Navy in America
British colonial policy after the end of the Seven Years’ War in 1763 had three basic aims: (I) to defend the empire, (2) to place colonial government and trade under stricter central control, and (3) to raise a revenue in the colonies that would help defray defense expenditures and ease the debt burden at home. The British government counted on the Royal Navy to help achieve these aims, and the Americans, in resisting, came into direct conflict with the navy. The purpose of this book is to show what the North American Squadron of the Royal Navy did during the fifteen years before the battles of Lexington and Concord, how it enforced British colonial policy, how the American colonists challenged the navy, and how the navy dealt with colonial opposition.
216 Pages. Notes on sources. Bibliography. Index.
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ency of the senior officer to listen to and respect the opinion of his juniors. On the other hand, the currently popular belief that only the younger person ("young bloqd”) can infuse new ideas, or that only he can see the need for social reform is a patently untenable and historically refuted theory. Age, or more precisely, experience, plays a vital role in the decision-making process and therefore in the military social structure. Looking back to his first few Navy years, this author can recall some rather unpleasant incidents which made little sense at the time, and, in fact, seemed like the abrasive and unwarranted use of authority. Retrospective consideration, though, reveals that development of the ability to work under pressure is an example of a lesson from the "school of hard knocks,” something that cannot be taught by more pleasant and rational means. The full implications of this were certainly not apparent at the time of occurrence.
There are other examples of the author’s attitudes in the past with which no doubt many readers could relate— and which critical self-inspection at a later point in time revealed to be foolish or unwise. This is, of course, all part of the maturing process; however, the purpose of this digression was simply to point out that occasionally decisions are made which appear infinitely wrong in the best judgment of the young person, yet given the advantage of experience, he would see the situation differently. The moral of this story is that "young blood” does not necessarily equate to constructive change.
In summary, it is the opinion of this author that the plea contained in "Worlds Apart” for urgent social reform in the service, and more particularly the Navy, was to some extent immature, misguided, and unnecessary. However, a healthy "sign of the times” is that such sincere and innovative ideas arc permitted, and indeed encouraged.
. . Now Relieve the Watch”
Fire Control Technician (Gunfire Control) Third Clou IT. H. Bailey, Jr., U. S. Navy— As a thoroughly indoctrinated participant in all phases of destroyer life.
I would like to take this opportunity to examine that most flagrant (yet cherished) manpower misuse of all, namely, the Quarterdeck Watch Bill.
Perhaps a trial system of "electronic eye” robots should be initiated on every quarterdeck. Similar in operation to the doors of larger department stores, the robot’s arm would salute smartly whenever personnel embarked to or debarked from the quarterdeck area. Although costlier initially than a humanoid counterpart, this durable watchstander would more than pay his own board through innumerable man-hours saved. To complete the scenario, a docile orangutan could be suited up to fulfill whatever extra quarterdeck functions were deemed necessary. Finally, an answering service could handle all telephone traffic.
However facetious this suggestion may appear, it would nonetheless net equal results at less cost than the present system of quarterdeck watchstanding. Until such time as rational remedies for quarterdeck watchstanding can be implemented, naval personnel should expect the wanton wastage of both their time and talents to continue.
will be developed into a small co®' batant. She has several advantages whi^ the small navy cannot afford to ignore First, she provides a large, stable pb1' form and high speed at a remarkably 1°’ price. Second, she is amphibious; she ® not restricted to operations from port[3], to use of marked channels, or established waterways. This greatly increase* the possibility of surprising and confounding an opponent. And finally, cause of her passing acquaintance wid* the water, the ACV could mimic aircraft and the Swedish S-tank; she could carp' a single large gun and maneuver to ai® the gun. Equipped with terminal guid ance devices, the ACV could fulfill her interceptor functions, even if she could only fire the gun over the bow.
"Goodbye, Admiral Ageton”
(See N. J. Fay, p. 93, June 1973 Proceedings)
Captain Arthur Winslow, U. 5. Naval serve (Retired)—As an NROTC student who matriculated when Admiral Age- ton’s tables HO. 2ii, was the best and latest navigation method, I can recall, in four years of navigation, taking up, in turn, Mark St. Hilaire, Dreisenstok, and the Ageton methods. Later, on active duty, I used H.O. 214.
Mr. Fay notes the compact convenience of the Ageton tables in one nca( little volume as contrasted to later multi-volume H.O. 214, 218, and others, 'flu* feature alone made Ageton preferable >n any vessel where the storage and working spaces for navigation publication* was very limited—such as small craft-' and too, obviously a great boon to seagoing yachtsmen not surrounded b)’ electronic systems.
One of the great advantages of Af' ton was and is, in addition to the mo*1' for-the-moncy compact book, that unlike Dreiscnstok or H.O. 214, th£ navigator works from a dead reckoning as opposed to an assumed position. Thc advantage of this lies in early evaluation of sight data. If the value for little ’1 (away or towards) appears over-largc- the sight becomes immediately suspccl and will probably be thrown ou<- Whereas, working from assumed p0*1 tions (such as in H.O. 214), large valu®' for little ”t” are often the case, and sigbc
data cannot be evaluated until almost all lines of position are plotted.
Of course, H O. 214, 218, and the like, are one or two steps shorter than Age- ton, but Ageton, including plotting, evaluation, and judgment, is a method that takes about the same time to complete.
Since the last years of World War II, celestial navigation has been gradually eroded and overridden by faster and more automatic electronic aids and systems including echo-sounding, radio direction finder, the various Lorans, Decca, and the ultimate. Inertial Systems. All of these systems are subject to either blind spots and range limits or breakdowns or both, however, the celestial method and art cannot be entirely neglected.
May 1 join in lamenting the passing of the publication of H O. 211 and express the wish, which must be shared by many, that it be printed again when and as it may be needed.
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"The Montreux Convention:
Prospects for an
Imminent Change”
(Set P. A. Dur, pp. 110-112, July 1973 Proceedings)
Commander Tyrone G. Martin, U. S. Navy—In his very interesting and, I think, accurate discussion of this thorn in the Soviet side. Lieutenant Commander Dur noted the apparent exception to existing Montreux Convention rules made by the Turks in permitting the Soviet guided missile helicopter ships Moskva and Leningrad to transit the Straits. Perhaps unknown to Lieutenant Commander Dur is one small way in which the Soviets seemed to have "assisted” the Turks in making an affirmative decision in this matter.
By way of background, the Convention does not consider aircraft carriers to be capital ships, such as battleships and cruisers. Furthermore, it distinguishes between a ship that includes aircraft in her equipment and one that exists primarily for the purpose of operating aircraft: only the latter is defined as an aircraft carrier. The Convention permits the passage of capital ships be-
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longing to the riparian powers, but it does not mention any rights for aircraft carriers and so leaves the matter open to interpretation.
Among the earliest apparent references to what became known to us as the Moskva and the Leningrad were general discussions in such Soviet publications as Morskoy sbomik and Krasnaya Zvezda on the use of "helicopter carriers”— vertoletonosets in Russian—in several roles, but principally ASW. Such an official-type designation almost certainly could cause problems relative to the Montreux Convention, but the writings in which it appeared were largely theoretical and purported to be discussing developments in foreign navies, anyway. By the time the Moskva appeared, however, her official designation was announced as protivolodochnyy kreiser— ASW cruiser. This simple word shift made it easy to stay clear of any confrontation over interpretation of the Convention’s definitions, by permitting all concerned to take the position that the ship was a capital ship, that she did not exist solely to operate aircraft, and that her helicopters were, in fact, no more important to the ship’s purpose than were the several missile and rocket launchers located forward.
And now the Kiev reportedly has been launched, said by Western observers to be the first Soviet aircraft carrier. A recently published sketch showed her clearly to have the Moskva as an ancestor. Although bigger, and with a proportionally larger flight deck, still very much in evidence are a Moskva-tytpc superstructure and heavy weapons installations forward on the same level as the flight deck. What will the Soviets call her—an ASW cruiser, another new, nicely ambiguous term, or perhaps the Soviet Union’s equivalent of the U. S. "sea control ship?”
If we don’t see the moves noted by Lieutenant Commander Dur in the near future, it’s a pretty safe bet the term won’t be avianosets— aircraft carrier.
The NESEP Program:
A Leadership Problem?
James C. Bender, Officer Candidate, NESEP Unit, Purdue University— After observing the so-called leadership crisis in the ranks of petty officers in the "new Navy,” one wonders about those from the ranks of petty officers who will become officers under the Navy Enlisted Scientific Education Program (NESEP). Every year, 50 to 60 petty officers enter the NESEP Program at Purdue University. Many of these come straight from the Service school environment, such as nuclear power schools. Many other new officer candidates have spent, at most, a year or less "in the Fleet.” Presumably, the screening is careful, but those chosen, of necessity, tend to be those who will succeed in school, rather than those who have displayed outstanding leadership.
Actually, there is a broad cross-section of humanity entering the NESEP Program. There are those whose admission to Purdue was in doubt because of their past scholastic achievements, and those whose academic success was never in doubt—36 NESEP officer candidates received academic stars for academic distinction from Purdue (the equivalent of a "Dean’s List”). A few men flunk out. The vast majority of the officer candidates are adequate, if not spectacular students.
The Purdue University NESEP Unit is organized into a battalion of three companies, with appropriate officers from the officer candidate ranks. The seniors who occupy the higher ranks are often not those who made high grades in school, but those who showed initiative in battalion committees and other extracurricular activities. Outstanding scholars may be rewarded, but they are comparatively few.
The vast majority of those in the ranks neither excel in leadership nor in academic abilities. It is these men who will continue to occupy an increasing
segment of the officer corps. These future officers with a degree in engineering or science, may well be in the same position as petty officers in the technical ratings—especially electronics technicians —where technical knowledge, not leadership ability, is the way to pass rating exams, and to be advanced in rate in an age of a contracting Navy. However knowledgeable these men may be, it >s they who are failing to enforce grooming standards and uniform regulations, and failing to provide leadership in raff relations and drug abuse. There are exceptions, but judging from the recent experience, the petty officers involved in the Constellation and Kitty Hawk ina- dents were not able to avert trouble- Despite drug amnesty programs, there are still too many drug problems in the Navy, along with the older problems of alcoholism. With the increased unrest of the present, there is little prospect of a return to tranquility in the near future. It will be the responsibility of the prospective officers in the NESEP Program, when they become division officers, to meet these challenges.
It remains to be seen if men chosen from the ranks of petty officers, most often from technical ratings, will be able to meet head-on the demands of lead ership—courage to stand up for high standards of behavior and competence, and ability to influence subordinates- Men whose only training in leadership before OCS may be short lectures, once a week during drill periods, will have to strain their abilities to meet these leadership challenges. Even now, f°t- merly required courses in management and leadership skills are being downgraded in an effort to get men through the NESEP Program in less time, Pre‘ sumably to save money.
In the past, there have been g°° reports on NESEP officers in the Flee' With the number of officer candidates in the program being increased, 'be Navy will have to depend more on the leadership abilities of these men.
• • . a study of enforcement of British Colonial Policy in the era of the American Revolution.
[1] quote from the address in part, leaving out references applicable only to the Army such as horses, bivouacs, and foraging. Said Major Bach: "Your commissions will not make you leaders, they will merely make you officers.” Contrary to the popular apothegm, leaders are not born, nor are they graduated, they evolve in a process of growth as intrinsically and intricately woven with their experiences both before and after assuming the control of men, as the root system of a tree. "Leadership,” continued Major Bach, ", . . is a composite
Leadership: A Process of Growth
Captain Alexander JV. Moffat, U. S. Naval Reserve {Retired)—Whether as commanding officer or as division commander afloat, certain qualities are requisite. A Major Bach, U. S. Army, in an address to a graduating class of officers at Fort Sheridan, Wyoming, in 1916, so presented the personal characteristics for leadership that his words have survived. There is no information about Major Bach presently available other than his rank and surname. To me, and to others who were junior officers in the Naval Reserve in 1916, his words were inspiring and helpful. Time has not changed their wisdom.
"Small Combatants—1973”
(See A. D. Baker, III, pp. 238-269, May 1973 Proceeding!, Natal Review Issue)
Lieutenant Commander Albert H. Robbins, U. S. Naval Reserve-R— Even in the smallest navy, the small combatant will be acting in unison with other units of the defense establishment—shore-based helicopters and aircraft, artillery, and other ships. While carrying two Exoccts on board is impressive, a country with a long coastline could bankrupt itself buying defense at $270,000 per round. Recent developments in artillery (Laser range-finders and illuminators, rocket- assisted projectiles, soft-recoil fire-out- of-battery, terminal guidance) may result in an improved kill capability at a greatly reduced cost. One of the prime missions of the coastal defense craft may be to identify and illuminate targets for shore-based artillery. She may also launch and control RPVs Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV) to extend their effective search range.
The air cushion vehicle (ACV) or