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The Middle East holds two-thirds of the world’s oil reserves and accounts for almost one-third of its production. The major producers, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, and Iraq all border on the Persian Gulf. These four countries rank immediately after the United States, the U.S.S.R., and Venezuela. In terms of world oil reserves, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait together hold one- third, while Iran holds almost 12%. The other countries on the Gulf—Qatar, Bahrain, and the recently-formed Union of Arab Emirates—also produce oil, but in lesser quantities. Adding importance to the Gulf, all of the littoral States—even Saudi Arabia and Iraq, which are tied to the Mediterranean by pipelines—ship oil by tanker. All of this is most important to the United States, which handles half the oil moving in world trade, and to Western Europe and Japan, which obtain most of their oil from the Middle East.
The political withdrawal of the British in 1971, and with it the termination of long-standing treaty arrangements with ten of the 13 states bordering on the Persian Gulf, raises the question of the future stability of this critically important world area. This issue is reviewed here against a geographical and historical background that contrasts Iran, whose dominion extends over the whole northern coast of the Gulf, with the Arab States who share sovereignty over the southern coast.
The black oil that pulses through these pipes at Ahmadi makes Kuwait—and all the other oil-rich monarchies that rim the Persian Gulf—crucially important to the rest of the world. But outsiders, especially the two superpowers, must tread these sands softly, for tempers are volatile and passions deep in the Middle East.
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The shallow Persian Gulf, 500 miles long by 200 miles wide, separates the Arabian Plateau from Iran. Its deepest channel, seldom deeper than 50 fathoms, lies close to the Iranian shore. The coastal zones of the Gulf are largely devoid of cover, attesting to an annual rainfall of between three and eleven inches that falls mainly from November to April. High temperatures, aggravated by excessive humidities, prevail in summer. Winter temperatures, notably in the west, are comparatively refreshing and often reach a cool 40 degrees at night.
Viewed from Iran, the Persian Gulf appears as a remote region to which access is barred by the vast arc of the Zagros Mountains. Only the oil-rich Khuzes- tan plain in west Iran is free of their shadow. The lower reaches of the plain merge into the complex of islands
and mudflats, extensively planted to dates, that make up the delta of the Shatt-al-Arab at the head of the Gulf. The 120-mile-long Shatt-al-Arab River, which is formed by the confluence of the Euphrates and Tigris, provides access to the main port of Iraq at Basra. When joined by the Karun River further downstream it leads to the major Iranian ports of Khorramshahr and Abadan. To the northeast along the coast of the Iranian mainland are the ports of Mashur and Shapur; to the south and west lies the brief, open coast of Iraq.
The Arab coast, some 1,300 miles from the Shatt-ah Arab to the Musandam Peninsula, may be likened to the low side of a tilted platform. Because of this, the transition from land to water is ill-defined and coastal waters are made hazardous to navigation by shoals, reefs, and numerous islands. The inland areas, alternat'
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Stability in the Persian Gulf
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The Persian Gulf—the peoples of its western bank call it the "Arabian Gulf'—is in fact an unofficial boundary line between Arab and Aryan worlds. Until Hitler corrupted the term, "Aryans”—the Sanskrit word for "nobles”—were Indo-Europeans; and "Iran” literally means "Land of the Aryans.” The Gulf’s location in the heart of the troubled Middle East and its proximity to the source of all the trouble, those vast subterranean seas of oil on which the region floats, have combined to give new importance to these ancient waters.
ing between stony desert and sand dunes, are without marked relief until the Musandam Peninsula is reached There, the Hajar ranges, rising to 8,000 feet, folio# the Peninsula and reach the sea as cliffs.
This long coast is shared unequally among seven sovereign states that also vary greatly in area and popU' lation. Iraq, the most populous with 8 million inhabit' ants, has the shortest coast; a few miles along the right bank of the Shatt-al-Arab. This compares with tl* extremity of the Musandam Peninsula which is occupied by the northern province of the Sultanate ot Oman. The province is isolated from the remainder of the Sultanate by the seven former Trucial States, no# confederated as the Union of Arab Emirates. Tltf Union has 400 miles of coast, roughly equal to that of Saudi Arabia and Qatar combined. Saudi Arabia with an area of 800,000 square miles is the large*1 country in the Middle East. Qatar, in contrast, is 1 peninsula that juts 90 miles into the Persian Gulf and has a population of 70,000. The tiny Sheikhdom ot Bahrain consists of several islands whose total area |S 245 square miles. The other Arab country on the Pef' sian Gulf is Kuwait. Its 6,000-square-mile-area and half- million inhabitants place it among the least imposing states of the region; yet, it has among the richest and most easily accessible oil deposits of the world.
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Among the Arab states bordering the Persian Gulf Saudi Arabia and Iraq produced oil before World Waf II. In all of the other countries, however, large-scale oil production is largely a postwar phenomenon that is radically changing the demography of the region Until recently, the Arab countries of the Gulf had conservative populations which engaged in local economic activity and conformed to traditional culture patterns under paternalistic governments. Now the populations are growing and diversifying, notably 1(1 the smaller states. This is diluting the conservative and traditional elements within the societies and is exposing them to the influences of the modern world. Further the availability of foreign exchange enables the i*11' portation of foodstuffs and manufactured goods which is causing economic activity, once largely rural, to take on new forms and move toward the expanding urb*n areas.
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The monarchial governments are seeking to keep pace with these revolutionary changes. However, conservative leaders in several of the countries have ahead) been deposed.1 Iraq, a republic since the monarchy ^ overthrown in 1958, offers the example of a success^11 of leaders who have brought more turmoil than stabil
'The bloodless coup that replaced Sheikh Ahmad of Qatar by Shd^ Khalifah in February 1972 followed closely upon the coup that cost d# ruler of Sharjah his life.
Stability in the Persian Gulf 53
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*ty to their country. Beyond this evidence of political Uncertainty, there lie long-standing disputes over borders and jurisdictions. Iraq was deterred from annexing Kuwait in 1961 by a British show-of-force. A few years Earlier, British support for the Trucial Sheikhdom of Abu Dhabi and the Sultanate of Oman kept Saudi Arabia from taking over the Buraimi Oasis.
Iran recognized the independence of Bahrain in 1970, thereby relinquishing a claim over the area arising from control in the 18th century. However, Iran seized (he islands of Abu Musa and the Tonbs in 1971 to settle an ancient jurisdictional dispute with two of the Trucial States that had been held in abeyance by the British presence. Most disturbing is the tension along the Iraq-Iran border, particularly along the Shatt-al- Arab, where the international boundary follows the Iranian shoreline rather than the main channel. These Samples, few among many, are indicative of the strains and stresses that characterize the southern coast of the Persian Gulf. The contrast with the opposing shore is striking.
The northern coast of the Persian Gulf is part of the southern maritime frontier of Iran. That frontier, deluding the offshore islands, extends for a total distance of 1,400 miles. A western sector fronting on the Persian Gulf proper reaches 600 miles from the Iraqi Border to the Strait of Hormuz. A central sector covering the Strait, together with Qeshm and other lesser ■stands, has a coastline 500 miles in length. Lastly, an eastern sector runs for 300 miles along the Gulf of Oman to the Pakistani border.
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This coast, along the north shore of the Gulf of Oman, is backed by ridges of the Zagros Mountains ■hat reach to 7,000 feet within a few miles of the shore. The coastal plain is narrow throughout and is characterized by sandy beaches, mudflats, and mangrove swamps, all occasionally interrupted by sea cliffs. A third °f this coastline is suitable for landings by dhows and similar craft. There are over 200 sites well able to ac- commodate such operations.
Five roads lead across the Zagros Mountains from ■he central plateau of Iran to the sea. The Tehran-to- Abadan road and the Kerman-to-Bandar Abbas road are Paved. The other three roads, from Shiraz to Bushire, bom Shiraz to Bandar Abbas, and from Zahedan to Chah Bahar are unpaved. The Shiraz-to-Bushire road, some 180 miles in length, is being paved with but 50 ■■tiles remaining to be completed. Lateral travel along the coast is possible on an indifferently maintained Unpaved vehicle road. This road generally follows the inland edge of the coastal plain at the base of the high ground to avoid the many inlets that intersect the shore. It also is subject to flooding, and in several
stretches is little more than a meandering track. While communications along this coast and into the interior are sparse and mostly primitive, they are considerably superior to those on the Arab side.
The population on the coastal plain of Iran ranges from 100 inhabitants to the square mile at the head of the Persian Gulf to less than two people per-square- mile in the eastern sector. Population concentrations are in the Khorramshahr and Abadan areas and in the towns of Bushire and Bandar Abbas. There are also perhaps as many as 2,000 villages scattered over the coastal plain, most with less than 100 inhabitants. This coastal population varies in composition as well as density. Arabs dominate in the area at the head of the Persian Gulf where the oil and shipping industries are centered. Toward Bushire, there is an intermingling of Arab and Persian, the former tending to live on the coast proper, the latter usually found a few miles inland. Lastly, Baluchis appear in the central sector and become the dominant people in the east where they extend over into Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Of Iran’s 67 ports, 65 are along the southern coast; the other two are on the Caspian Sea. More than 90% of Iran’s foreign trade, amounting to three million tons of imports and 150 million tons of exports each year, is channeled through Khorramshahr, Mashur, Shapur, and Kharg. These sites plus Abadan, Bandar Abbas, Lengeh, and Bushire are the only ports in the south able to berth oceangoing ships. Ten lesser ports have small jetties, some privately owned and others only remnants of wartime construction. These are used by dhows and other local craft which also use the remaining 47 unimproved customs ports.
The activity at these lesser ports is modest when compared to that involved in Iran’s total maritime trade. Local coastal traffic amounts to about 50,000 tons per year, exclusive of construction material moved to selected islands. Trade with neighboring Arab states totals about 80,000 tons of imports and a ten times greater tonnage of exports. This latter trade, while also limited, is important to the coastal communities on both sides of the water since it principally concerns the movement of foodstuffs, local building materials, and products of cottage industries. To this traditional trade, high cost luxury items transshipped to Iran from low-duty or duty-free Arab ports have been added in recent times. The bulk of all this traffic moves between Iran and Kuwait, Bahrain, and Dubai. Trade of much less volume takes place with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, and Muscat.
The southern coast of Iran is administered under two provinces and two governorates. Of these, the Khuzes- tan province in the west and the Sistan-Baluchistan province in the east have limited coastal fronts and
lapse of the weak Kajar dynasty in Iran, and the rise of a vigorous nationalism under Reza Khan. This was accompanied by an extension of German influence which ended with the occupation of Iran and the abdication of the Shah in favor of his son in 1941' The successor’s fortunes, at first uncertain, later improved with the support of the Iranian army and economic assistance from the United States. That assistance, coupled to the military aid first granted Iran during World War II, helped give the government i Western orientation. This association continues, as evidenced by Iran’s continuing participation in CENTO, which it joined in 1955, and by the enduring presence of U. S. military missions to the Imperial Iranis11 Armed Forces and Gendarmerie which were originally established during World War II. Although Iran *s closely associated with the West it must live in the shadow of Russia. This has led to a settlement of the difficulties that characterized postwar relations between Iran and Russia. More recently, there has been substantial growth in economic and technical cooperation.
Relations with Pakistan are cordial, those with Afghanistan satisfactory, and those with Great Britain are good. However, Iran enthusiastically supported the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf and pursue^ its claim over Abu Musa and the Tonb Islands as soon as that withdrawal was assured. These acts aroused Arab suspicions but they do not appear to have permanent!' exacerbated relations. Thus, it is only between Iran ai^ Iraq that the strain is truly disturbing. Yet, Shah hammed Reza Pahlavi has maintained control over sub ordinates who would react violently to Iraqi incursion* into Iranian territory and has assured access of intern^' tional shipping to the Iranian ports on the Shatt-a!" Arab without resort to force.
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extensive land borders with Iraq and Pakistan respectively. The governorates of the Persian and Oman Gulf Ports and Islands with their administrative centers at Bushire and Bandar Abbas, are concerned only with the coastal area. These territorial divisions correspond in general to those used by the Customs Service and by the Gendarmerie, whose five regiments along the coast are responsible for control of the maritime frontier and for security of the inland rural areas.
On a broader political scale, Iran is the only country bordering the Gulf that also shares a common frontier with Russia. That frontier was first established in 1801 when Russia annexed Georgia. It then continued to displace southward under Russian pressure until 1907, when Russia and Great Britain divided Iran into two spheres of influence separated by a neutral zone that included all of the Persian Gulf coast. Tsarist ambitions in the south were ended within a decade by the Revolution of 1917. They emerged again in Stalinist form in 1941 when, because of the threat of German armies approaching the Caucasus and the need to open a southern supply route to Russia, Iran was occupied by Russian and British troops. The Russians took advantage of the situation to foment separatist movements in northern Iran. These, however, were unsuccessful and Russia withdrew its forces in 1946, but only when forced to do so by the United Nations.
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Stability in the Persian Gulf 55
dependent economic region wherein the Arab culture taminates among the populations along both shores, ‘fid wherein traditional trade patterns have long flour- [shed. Today, almost 3,000 dhows, many with Iranian fgistry and Arab crews, maintain a steady exchange f basic commodities among coastal communities.
There is evidence that these patterns may change, bn is improving communications across the Zagros fountains and seeking to develop the economy of its °nce remote and isolated southern coast. In so doing, ran is reorienting the economic perspective of the :0astal peoples—urging them to look inland. This Process is being abetted by the oil income available t0 the Arab states which, as already mentioned, enables •hem to acquire necessities as well as luxuries from °utside the Gulf region and lessens the need for Gulf ■rade.
It remains a fact of geography, however, that the coasts of the Persian Gulf are within easy sail of °ne another; half a day usually suffices for most crosses. Moreover, the introduction of diesel power to the filing dhow has minimized the adverse effects of wind lnd weather. Conversely, it still takes over 16 hours S train from Tehran to Khorramshahr, and almost two bys to cover the same distance by motor vehicle. This lndicates that maritime trade of a regional nature will c°ntinue for some time. This is of local rather than Worldwide importance in contrast to the oil trade. Yet 1( represents one more argument for the free movement
all legitimate maritime traffic over Gulf waters.
The withdrawal of the British ends a peacekeeping [°le played for more than a century. The act is political; l( does not entail a lessening of economic interest, nor 'kcs it signal the disappearance of the British presence and its attendant influence. Indeed, the British first 'aPped the oil resources of the region in Iran at the 'Urn of this century and now own more than 30% of 'he investment interest in Gulf oil, which earns about blf-a-billion dollars per year. Because of this and a Notable balance in other trade, it was argued until Gently that the $40 to $50 million required each year to maintain British forces in the area was justified by 'hc value of the economic interest. But, the British 'hd withdraw and, in so doing, affirmed that this was 'he inevitable outcome of a process whose origins and delusions are to be found outside of the Gulf proper.
Although the British emerged as the leading com- "lercial power in the Gulf in the 18th century, it was 'n fhe context of the far greater British interest in India ^at the Gulf acquired its importance. This at first was j. Matter of communications. However, because of the Car* aroused by Napoleonic ambitions, the Gulf came to be considered as essential to the defense of India,
and Basra was looked upon as the "backdoor to India.” This view, understandably, was fostered by the government of Bombay which controlled the British Resident in Bushire until 1873. The responsibility then went to the government of India where it remained until 1946 when the Residency was moved to Bahrain and the office became subordinated directly under the government in London.
The strategic concept calling for the control of the Persian Gulf in support of Indian security has been debated. However, regardless of its merit, it did encourage British forces operating from India to clear the Gulf of pirates and open it to peaceful navigation. It further influenced British policy in the direction of excluding outside states from the Gulf area. This policy objective was realized at the end of World War I with the collapse of the Ottoman, Russian, and German Empires—all of which had contested British dominion in the Gulf. The impact of these events was actually more extensive. Great Britain’s eventual, undisputed control over the Persian Gulf was but part of the authority it held over the Middle East, and shared with France over the Arab world.
The years following World War I were marked by the development of the oil industry by American as well as British enterprise. The postwar period was otherwise essentially uneventful. British power, more implied than actual, combined with the economic advantages of peaceful trade to ensure relative tranquility. This was shattered early in World War II when a resurgent Germany began to drive across North Africa and Southern Europe in a vast pincers movement aimed at the Middle East.
The task of blocking the German move in Africa fell to the British; that of holding in Europe went to the Russians who first faltered but then rallied with outside supply support. Most of this support came through Persian Gulf ports and required secure land lines of communications in Iran to reach Russia. This requirement precipitated the occupation of Iran by British and Russian forces.
At the end of the war, the British and French Empires, shaken to their foundations by the Japanese in the Far East, continued to disintegrate with active Russian encouragement and minimal American interference. By 1946, British forces had left Iran, and the French had cleared out of the Middle East by withdrawing from Syria and Lebanon. In 1947, British India was divided and India and Pakistan were granted independence. The same year, the United Nations agreed on the partition of Palestine, and soon thereafter the State of Israel affirmed its newly gained independence by defeating combined Arab forces in the first of a series of conflicts that continue to this day.
The succeeding decade began with the nationalization of the oil industry in Iran. This act, inspired by anti-British sentiment, precipitated an economic and political crisis in the country. This was finally resolved in 1953 when the authority of the Shah was restored with the support of the Imperial Army. During this same period, the violently disturbed political situation in Egypt erupted into open revolt and was stabilized only in mid-1953 with the establishment of the Republic and the rise of Nasser.
The unfolding of these events was paralleled by increasing U. S. involvement in Middle East affairs. This was intended to counter and contain Soviet ambitions
which first appeared, in traditional form, as efforts to annex Turkish and Iranian territories to use as buffer zones along Russia’s southern frontier. American response to these heavy-handed machinations, and to Communist guerrilla operations in Greece, was to extend economic and military aid to Russia’s southern neighbors and other nearby threatened states. This was accompanied by American promotion of defense alliances, notably the Baghdad Pact which, in 1955, united Great Britain, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan in a regional security agreement.
The Pact infuriated the Russians who viewed the establishment of a tier of hostile Muslim states along the border as just the situation they had always sought to avoid. In Egypt, the Pact appeared to sponsor Iraq as a rival to Nasser’s plan for leadership of the Arab world. The Pact also made Egypt move from a position of neutrality toward an increasing involvement with the Communist bloc. This set into motion a chain of events that led Egypt to nationalize the Suez Canal, and culminated in the initiation of military operations against Egypt by France and Great Britain in late 1956. This action was promptly condemned by the United States and Russia, and the Anglo-French offensive was halted soon after it had begun.
The American stand against the British move to
'verthrow Nasser marked the end of British power in the Middle East; after Suez, the decline of Britain’s Position in the area became irreversible.2
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Stability in the Persian Gulf 57
In the emergence of the Middle East from European dominance, Great Britain came to be associated with the more conservative Arab states such as those that prevail along the shores of the Persian Gulf. This did little to promote British prestige among the more vocal progressive” states whose socialist programs earned them the willing support of Communist countries. It did, nevertheless, grant Britain 15 more years of political influence, if only in the Persian Gulf.
But, it was not this development nor any single event that caused the eclipse of British political fortunes; rather, it was military weakness resulting from the loss of bases and human resources when colonies became independent and mandates were terminated. Thus, what the British Empire had done to resist Russian encroachment in the Middle East could not be continued by Great Britain acting alone. The re- sponsibility then passed to the United States. Thenceforth the confrontation took place between the superpowers, and the supporting roles came to be played by the Middle Eastern countries themselves. In this ^alignment there was no place for an outside state— Not even for Great Britain which had long enjoyed the fading part.
After World War II, Western interests in the Middle East were safeguarded by France and Great Britain with El. S. support. The Suez Crisis of 1956 ended this collective responsibility and Soviet-Western rivalry became Soviet-American.
In the exercise of this rivalry there has been a dramatic increase in Soviet naval capabilities. This is all the more noteworthy since for much of the postwar period Soviet military power in the Middle East was Nonexistent or negligible. This rivalry has also resulted >n an escalation of armament support that has made the Middle East the most heavily armed nonindustrial area in the world. The U.S.S.R. has been involved in this effort since 1955, when the Western monopoly in armament supply was broken. However, it has been °nly since the crushing defeat suffered by Egypt at the hands of Israel in 1967 that Soviet support programs have approached in form those of the U. S. Military Assistance and Advisory Groups.
The author, who was a military observer in Algeria in 1957, visited Captain H. Liddell-Hart who, that same year, was assisting the Minister of Defence Preparc a White Paper on the Suez affair. The noted British military writer 8ave as his opinion that the French were far better prepared than the British ''i: the move into Egypt. Hence, he concluded, if the French had pushed 0,1 instead of waiting for the slower British, and if the United States had less precipitate in its condemnation, Nasser would have been overgrown.
These developments attest to the Russian conviction that their national security depends upon their ability to match the military power of the United States. That this balance now appears to have been attained and the Middle East penetrated points up to the questionable merit of the American policy of containment. It also makes clear that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can succeed Great Britain as the stabilizing power in the Middle East. Russia cannot intervene without inviting U. S. counteraction; the reverse is equally true. Thus, the equalization of the military capabilities of the superpowers has severely reduced the freedom of action that these capabilities otherwise normally provide. This does not deny opportunities to the superpowers to exert their influence through intermediaries, but such second-hand diplomacy demands caution, for tempers are volatile and passions deep in the Middle East.
Notwithstanding this apparent impasse as it affects the Middle East at large, there is little doubt that a stabilizing influence in the Persian Gulf is desirable and necessary. The oil trade and related economic wellbeing of the populations argue for such influence; so does the general situation in the area. The conflict that engages Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq against Israel continues to fester. Only Iraq of the states bordering the Gulf is directly involved; however, the conflict evokes the sympathy when not the active support of all the Arab countries. This includes those on the Persian Gulf who number among their populations some 100,000 Palestinians. Geographic remoteness does not assure noninvolvement of the Gulf States in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Of more direct concern to these States are the questions of their uncertain borders and other disputed territorial jurisdictions. Less evident but no less perturbing is the vulnerability to sea-based acts of sabotage of the facilities and installations associated with the oil industry. This is particularly true in the case of Iran where the Abadan refinery, until recently the largest in the world, is within mortar range of Iraq, and where the major offshore oil port on Kharg Island can be easily reached by a raiding group from the same country.
While these circumstances call for a peacekeeping authority in the Persian Gulf, it is evident that such an authority could not be cut to the pattern of Great Britain. No state enjoying recent independence is likely to yield any element of its sovereignty willingly. This is exemplified in the case of Bahrain and Qatar, which declined the opportunity to federate with the Trucial States as the British were urging. The peacekeeping role cannot, therefore, take on the protectionist form wherein treaty agreements enable direct military intervention.
Because of this, the stabilizing influence would have to appear first as a surveillance effort intended to assure the freedom of international waters and minimize the possibility of irresponsible hostile acts. In time, it could be expected that the peacekeeping authority would be enabled to arbitrate local disputes and take part in actions to keep local conflicts from spreading. This latter role would be assumed only on invitation or by prior agreement.
No Western or Communist-bloc country could take on the peacekeeping function for the same reason that the superpowers would be excluded. Moreover, the nature of the task, depending for its effectiveness largely upon the location of the authority concerned, argues strongly for the authority to be a regional power. A review of likely candidates makes it clear that Iran is the best possible choice.
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This view is supported by substantial evidence. First, Iran maintains friendly relations with both the United States and Russia, engages in significant trade with them, and enjoys their technical assistance and other forms of support. Iran also has demonstrated notable restraint in dealing with Iraq and in renouncing its
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claim over Bahrain. It may be challenged over its occupation of Abu Musa and the Tonb Islands, yet this was done only after ample warning and for understandable cause.
In the important religious realm, Iran is a Muslim State in which the Shi’ite sect is dominant. Shi’ite Muslims view the succession to Muhammad differently than do the Sunni Muslims who dominate the Arab world. Nevertheless, both sects are bound by the Koran, and Iranians, like other Muslims, aspire to visit Mecca. In similar vein, Iranians differ culturally fro® Arabs, yet' Farsi, the language of Iran, is written in Arabic script and reveals other affinities with Arabic-
Finally, Iran ranks second only to Saudi Arabia in size and is by far the most populous country on the Persian Gulf. It also controls a coast with numerous ports that extends the length of the Persian Gulf and reaches well along the Gulf of Oman. In sum, Iran has the advantage of being part of the Muslim but not the Arab world. Hence, it should be able to vietf the problems of that world with understanding, and yet with detachment. It also has resources and assets which combine with location and a government of proven performance to augur well for the role of peacekeeper in the Persian Gulf.
A surveillance effort carried on unilaterally by Iran to promote political stability in the Persian Gulf would depend upon visibility for its effectiveness. The effort would initially have to be limited to the identification of shipping and the reporting of suspicious maritime activity. These functions are essentially passive and can serve their purpose only when all traffic in the area knows that it is or can be observed. Action as such would normally be restricted to the tracking of ship5 in international waters. Clear violations of international law in such waters, however, would be met with appropriate force.
Such surveillance requires careful definition of its operational limits. This would be critical at the beginning of the effort, when a major objective of Iran as the sponsoring authority would be to demonstrate that its endeavors were impartial and intended only to ensure freedom of navigation and enhance regional security. To further this end and encourage the cooperation of the littoral states, great stress would have to be placed on the utility of surveillance forces for air/sea rescue operations, disaster relief, and general civic action. Indeed, it is conceivable that the humanitarian aspects of the effort could be the decisive factor in achieving its early acceptance by the Gulf states and its eventual improvement through coordinated activity among them.
As a continuing endeavor carried on in time peace, the surveillance effort could not disrupt legit1"
Stability in the Persian Gulf 59
mate traffic nor could it resort to coercive measures is can be done in time of war. Even though the surveillance role would be largely police-like in nature, it Would need to have an evident military base in order to derive the desired effect. Thus, both military and paramilitary forces would be required, as would a command organization with the authority and communications to assure positive control of all elements concerned at all times. It would also require secure base areas with the facilities to permit uninterrupted and sustained operations. These areas would need to be located for coverage of the whole of the Persian Gulf and its approaches. This would extend the requirement for base support beyond the Strait of Hormuz to the coastal front of the Gulf of Oman.
Iran is well on the way to satisfying many of these requirements. Among the military forces available, the Army has recently been reorganized into mobile field forces and relieved of fixed territorial security responsibilities. While the Army would have no direct role to play in the surveillance effort, its improved responsiveness to its national defense mission adds credence to Iran’s image as a stable and secure state. The Air Force has a growing inventory of aircraft suited to the teconnaissance role. Further, the Air Defense Command Under Air Force management has now extended its early warning radar system to cover the southern coast.
The Navy, as the major agency concerned with tiaritime surveillance, is currently carrying out surface patrolling and is expanding this capability substantially. Of particular interest is the existence of a "strike force” Quipped with British SR.N6 and BH 7 hovercraft that *s able to navigate shoal waters and otherwise gain access to unapproachable coasts. Although the tactics and organization of this unit are still evolving, it al- ready can land a battalion-sized force anywhere in the Persian Gulf in a matter of hours.
The Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie, under the Minis- try of the Interior, is an important complementary component to this surveillance effort. In addition to Us overall rural area security functions, the Gendarmerie ls responsible for border control. The U. S. Army Mission, with the Gendarmerie since 1942, has been emphasizing the frontier zone responsibility both along (he coast and in inland areas subject to penetration by Uarcotics smugglers. As a consequence, new equipment ls being procured and measures are being instituted to ■utprove the patrol of inshore waters and generally to 'utensify coastal surveillance.
If Iran is in fact already involved in a surveillance offbrt over the Persian Gulf, it does not appear to be a coordinated effort nor does it seem to promote the regional peacekeeping role visualized for Iran. To do this, it would be necessary for the Persian Gulf Fleet
to be given the task of directing the regional surveillance effort and authorized to coordinate the activities of the Air Force and Gendarmerie units required to conduct and support the effort. Further, to ensure the uninterrupted exercise of command, the Fleet Headquarters perhaps ought to be moved from Khorram- shahr to the newly constructed facilities at Bandar Abbas. It might also be desirable to provide an advanced naval base on the Gulf of Oman to support the patrol of the approaches to the Persian Gulf. Such a base could be located at Jask or at Chah Bahar and might initially be an afloat facility only. Eventually, facilities could be established ashore. This would not only be in the interest of Fleet operations, it would also contribute to the opening of a remote and underdeveloped part of Iran.
The command arrangements required are straightforward and have precedents in U. S. experience. Iran, however, has had less opportunity for joint operations. The U. S. Military Mission could readily assist the Iranian Armed Forces establish the organization best suited to the conduct of a fully coordinated maritime surveillance effort. This assistance might well include the temporary assignment of U. S. naval advisory personnel to the Persian Gulf Fleet to help get the surveillance operation underway; there is only one U. S. officer currently serving in a liaison capacity at the Fleet Headquarters. At the same time, the U. S. Army Mission to the Gendarmerie, in furtherance of its ongoing efforts, could encourage strict enforcement of regulations calling for the annual registration of all dhows to better control their movements.
These American advisory roles would have to be kept within existing levels of activity. Similarly, the operations of the U. S. Navy’s Middle East Force should retain their established patterns. This discretion would be intended to minimize the possibility that the U.S.S.R. should feel compelled to introduce a naval presence in this critically important world area.
Commissioned in the U. S. Marine Corps in 1940, Colonel Croizat has commanded all Marine units from a platoon to a regiment. He commanded the first amphibious tractor unit in combat at Guadalcanal in 1942, and, in 1954, became the first advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps. In 1957, he was assigned to observe the employment of helicopter-borne forces in the Algerian War. Between 1958 and 1961, he served, successively, in Haiti (conducting negotiations that led to the establishment of the U. S. Naval Mission there), French West and Equatorial Africa (on a fact-finding mission), and on Okinawa (as Chief of Staff, FMF Seventh Fleet). From 1961 to 1964, he was U. S. Military Advisor’s Representative to SEATO Headquarters in Bangkok. He commanded the Fifth Marines in 1964 and prior to his retirement in 1966, returned to Vietnam to prepare an interim doctrine for the conduct of riverine warfare.