Soviet Carrier Strategy

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Modern Soviet naval doctrine, formulated in the mid-1950s and reexamined, refined, and expanded in the early 1960s, may be about to undergo further revision. And, as the Soviet fleets continue to groiv and their operations expand, such new construction as the carrier Kiev, above, would seem to reflect the Soviet’s abiding admiration for—and fear of—U. S. attack carriers.

Soviet Carrier Strategy

Modern Soviet naval doctrine, formulated in the mid-1950s and reexamined, refined, and expanded in the early 1960s, may be about to undergo further revision. And, as the Soviet fleets continue to grow and their operations expand, such new construction as the carrier Kiev, above, would seem to reflect the Soviet's abiding admiration for—and fear of—U. S. attack carriers.

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JL/y perfecting the most formidable combatant surface ship in naval history—the strike or attack aircraft carrier (CVA) —the U. S. Navy enabled the American government to invigorate and enforce its foreign policy, make more credible its participation in world-wide security pacts, and expand the protection of U. S. interests around the world.

Congress, convinced of the efficacy of the carrier, endorsed and funded its construction, and the Navy built and operated a surface fleet founded largely on the attack carrier concept. Many U. S. naval strategists hold that the attack carrier is the key ship for any real or would-be naval power and that a navy structured around any other concept would not possibly be able to control the sea areas.

Only recently has this concept been questioned in the United States as it has been for over 20 years in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet view. While the Russians have a continuing high respect for the CVA’s striking power, they appear to maintain that attack carriers are not necessary to achieve their own objectives at sea. Moreover, they hold that the U. S. attack carrier can be neutralized in sea areas from which it might threaten the security of the U.S.S.R. and in sea areas where the Soviet Navy intends to operate.

Consider first the Soviet view of their need for strike carriers. Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union holds that it:

►     Has no significant commercial investments overseas which must be protected periodically.

►     Is not a party to any security pact with nations overseas which might require support by attack carriers.

►     Has no overseas military bases which would require the development of an attack carrier force to assure safe transit of ships to and from them or to assure the security of the base itself.

►     Does not consider strike carriers to be the most effective, efficient, and economical force with which to counter enemy naval forces at sea, protect Soviet interests in foreign countries, or achieve any of their many other military, political, and economic objectives.

►     Believes that the strike carrier is becoming obsolescent and increasingly vulnerable to attack.

The Russians, however, did not always hold these views and carriers were seriously considered in two periods of Soviet naval development: in the late 1930s and in the period right after World War II. Soviet efforts to obtain aid to build carriers in the prewar period proved futile. While there is some evidence that strike carriers were to be part of Stalin’s postwar surface fleet there is no substantial evidence that any were

ever started or that any carrier-based aircraft program was ever undertaken.

There is no doubt that Stalin ultimately intended the postwar surface forces to be ocean-going, but what was built or even started reflected a poor understanding of the art of naval warfare in this era. A Soviet oceangoing Navy had to be capable of countering U. S. carrier task forces at sea. If carriers were to become a part of this counterforce, the problems were formidable. The Soviet Navy had practically no useful experience operating on the high seas under combat conditions—certainly none that would qualify for surface operations in the 1950s. It lacked ships and weapons capable of defending a carrier at sea. It had no logistic support fleet. The Soviets had no carrier-based aircraft program under development. They had no experience in designing and building carriers. The cost of such a program would be enormous, and it would take at least six to eight years to produce the first carrier— which at best would be little more than a prototype.

What had been an uncertain policy under Stalin was resolved shortly after he died in March 1953 when Soviet naval, military, and political leaders made one of the most important decisions of the postwar period affecting the future of their Navy. They ruled against the construction of strike carriers.

In the early 1950s, the Soviets considered the U. S. carrier to be:

►     The hard core of naval forces tasked with protecting U. S. interests world-wide and carrying out U. S. commitments in peace or wartime.

►     A major weapon in securing the safety of the U. S. naval forces at sea and a highly effective counterforce.

►     The nucleus of U. S. surface naval power—providing the air superiority in military operations believed vital by U. S. military strategists.

►     The key ship in antisubmarine warfare.

►     The source of air cover for amphibious assault and a platform for assault troops.

►     A platform for launching nuclear strikes.*

In their eyes, then, the carrier had emerged from World War II as the most feared single U. S. naval ship.

Concomitant with the Soviet decision not to construct strike carriers for their own fleet was a proposal to create an alternate force: specially designed and equipped long-range submarines and aircraft capable of operating independently or in concert and at greater

* Excluded from this article is any discussion of ballistic missile submarines except when they are considered in association with carrier development or operations.

Soviet Carrier Strategy 29

distances from the homeland than the range of carrier- borne bombers. Later, surface forces were to be assigned an anticarrier role when carriers were in the strike zone. The strategy was simple: destroy or neutralize the carrier as a platform for launching air strikes.

These decisions were of major importance to the Soviet Union and the strategy and forces that were subsequently developed have caused a re-examination of naval policies among the world’s maritime powers.

The development of the Soviet Navy after Stalin’s death falls broadly into two time periods: from 1953 until the early 1960s, and the period thereafter.

From Stalin’s death until the 20th Party Congress early in 1956, broad concepts for the development and use of the Navy were envisioned. Decisions made during this period have since been praised continually by Admiral Sergei Gorshkov and others as the "correct” ones. In fact, Gorshkov has referred to this period as a time when the Navy was converted, in the full sense of the word, into an offensive type of long-range armed force. Gorshkov’s statement exaggerated the time frame, however. The Soviet Navy changed conceptually in the mid-1950s—but force realization did not come about until the late 1960s.

The "broad concepts” envisioned by the 20th Party Congress were just that. Soviet strategists had settled on a course for naval development which anticipated by many years the development of the industrial technology necessary to implement it. Nevertheless, the Politburo, convinced of the correctness of the new strategy and persuaded by naval strategists to accept their innovative approach, gave unqualified support to sweeping the old slate clean and starting new programs for rebuilding the Navy.

But even a society as controlled as that of the Soviet Union cannot, without considerable difficulty, institute changes as drastic as those proposed for the Navy. For some years after Stalin’s death—well into the 1960s— even the role of the Navy appeared to be unsettled. Despite great differences among high and influential military and political leaders, however, there appeared to be enough support among the ruling group to give high priority to building an anticarrier force and a submarine ballistic missile force.

One of the best indications of Soviet concern obviously is the way in which the government allocated its resources. Together, these two major projects for the Navy clearly required substantial defense funds. The Navy, however, had to split a big part of its allotted resources between the two projects. During the critical 1950s, the Navy appeared to get all the research and development money it could effectively use for both projects. All other naval projects, much as they may

have been desired by naval leaders, simmered on the back burners to boil up only occasionally when sparks from the major projects momentarily ignited the fire under them. For the two major projects, the rate of technological development—rather than the availability of funds—was the pacer.

The first distinct anticarrier force was programed to repulse the CVA in its then pre-eminent role of delivering nuclear attacks against the homeland. This was in the context of a full nuclear war and at a time (in the mid-1950s) when the United States had only one means—land-based or carrier-based aircraft—for delivering nuclear strikes. Soviet naval strategists saw that part of the threat could come from strike groups permanently stationed in the northeast Atlantic, the northwest Pacific, and in the Mediterranean Sea. Each strike group would contain two to four strike carriers and would be protected by deeply echeloned antisubmarine and antiaircraft ships deployed in large numbers.

Although Soviet naval strategists saw some of the strike groups as permanently stationed within aircraft striking distance, they held that forces should be built to counter the carrier in three zones: in the strike zone; en route from U. S. bases to the strike zone; and at U. S. bases. Soviet strategists saw the optimum defense zone as the area of the ocean lying just beyond the launch point of carrier strike planes, and it was against the carrier force in this zone that they developed their first counterforce.

New submarine construction programs were already authorized before the 20th Party Congress which was held in early 1956. These consisted of the F and N attack classes and the G and H ballistic missile classes.* The first units of each of these classes became operational in the 1957-1959 period. The N and F classes were the first of many long-legged classes of submarines—designed for the new anticarrier strategy— which were to follow.

The projected anticarrier weapon for the N and F submarine classes was the nuclear-tipped torpedo. Research on a submarine-launched cruise missile had already begun by 1955 and the Russians kept a close eye on U. S. progress in developing the Regulus missile. But theirs was to be developed for a different purpose—that of hitting a moving target at sea. Although the first indication of a Soviet submarine-launched cruise missile occurred in 1956, it was not until about I960 that a satisfactory missile was made available to the Fleet. This missile was designed to be launched from a surfaced submarine standing well outside the

*Thc ballistic missile submarine programs are mentioned here only to show the competition between the anticarrier and ballistic missile forces for funds in the mid-1950s.

30 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1973

protective screen of the carrier task force. Because of the over-the-horizon firing range, target data were to be relayed to the firing submarine generally by reconnaissance aircraft.

By 1958, however, the engineering feasibility and design parameters had been established well enough to allow the Soviets to begin conversion of some W class submarines to missile-launching units. A more important cruise missile submarine program was the nuclear- powered E-I class, the first completed unit of which appeared in I960. This class may have been designed for other tasks and converted during late design or early construction stages to a cruise missile submarine.

With the W and E-I classes, the Russians, for the first time, had a submarine-launched cruise missile weapons system with the potential for attacking carriers while en route to the strike zone.

In the late 1950s, authorization was given to proceed with the design and construction of two new classes of missile submarines: the nuclear-powered E-II and the diesel-powered J. The first units of the E-II class were completed in 1962 and those of the J class in 1964.

Paralleling the early development of the Soviet submarine arm was the buildup of their anticarrier long- range air (LRA) reconnaissance and strike capability.

The air program was not as distinctive as the submarine program. Aircraft assigned to naval aviation—

with the exception of the disappointing TU-14 Bosun, which was designed specifically for the Navy—were adaptations of basic designs developed for other services. No special facilities were built to produce naval aircraft. The air program was important nonetheless. It received as high a priority as that of the submarine program and even as high as the priority given the major missile delivery programs—ICBMs, IRBMs, long-range strategic aircraft, and ballistic missile submarines. In fact, the Soviet Navy could project its power farther to sea earlier by aircraft than by submarines.

One of the earliest bombers was the TU-4 Bull (copied from the U. S. B-29) which appeared in service in the late 1940s. Actually it was for this bomber that the Soviets developed their first air-to-surface missile, the Kennel, with a range of about 50 nautical miles.

Following closely on the heels of the Bull was the IL-28 Beagle. This aircraft has operated as a free-fall bomber, a reconnaissance aircraft, and a torpedo carrier. It was never fitted with an air-to-surface missile. The Beagle became operational about 1950 and some are still in service.

In the early 1950s, Russian designers came up with the TU-16 Badger, which became operational in the mid-1950s. Closely following its deployment in the LRA forces it was also assigned to naval forces, an action precipitated by the introduction on U. S. carriers of the A3D aircraft.

The Kennel missile was fitted to the Badger but this was, at best, a makeshift fit. By the end of the 1950s, the Russians had developed the Kipper, which had twice the range of the Kennel and was more compatible with the higher operational altitude and faster speed of the Badger.

In the early 1950s, when the U.S.S.R. was faced with the necessity of building long-range aircraft capable of delivering nuclear strikes against the United States, two heavy bombers were designed and built—the TU-95 Bear

and the M-4 Bison. Both designs reached the production stage about the mid-1950s. These bombers gave the Soviets their first effective means of delivering nuclear strikes against the United States. But unlike the United States, the Soviets could launch offensive strikes only from land bases on their own soil.

The Bear and Bison, therefore, were most critical to the offensive mission of the Soviet military. Yet, some idea of the urgency and high priority assigned to the development of the air arm of the anticarrier forces can be seen in the deployment of these aircraft. A year or so after series production of the Bear began, some were being exercised in naval tasks. The same Was true of the Bison several years later.

The Bear’s principal naval roles are open-ocean reconnaissance and missile strike and the Bison’s those of reconnaissance and tanker support for the Bear.

In the immediate postwar period the Soviet Navy was charged with repulsing the enemy’s carrier aircraft and, with the land-based air defense forces (PVO), its fighter and bomber aircraft. Later, when the decision Was made to reject the carrier concept of counter- ^strategy, the Navy was charged only with the destruc- ^tlQn of the launch platform. Preventing penetration of homeland by enemy strike aircraft was the sole responsibility of the PVO. This action showed a basic ^shift in the operational strategy for surface ships and seemed to have the immediate effect of pushing back rheir development.

When the long-range reconnaissance and strike aircraft arm was beginning to take shape, the Soviet Navy ^ln 1959 lost or gave up its land-based fighter air arm. ^his action is quite logical because the PVO, in any event, was charged with preventing the penetration of ^cnemy aircraft, including carrier bombers.

From 1959 to the early 1960s, Soviet military bought underwent a critical examination. For the fi'hvy this meant a thorough review of its doctrinal ^aPproach and strategy as well as a judgment on the

progress it had made since 1953 and its potential for the future. As a consequence of this examination, the Navy emerged as one of the strongest arms of the Soviet military forces. Its role was broadened, new ship programs were initiated, and operations at sea were extended and intensified. The basic discussions of earlier conceptual anticarrier strategy had now given way to live exercises and tactical considerations.

The Russians now had probably gained confidence that they had developed a successful counter to enemy carriers in the pre-launch zone. Basically, their strategy appeared to rely on the invulnerability of torpedo and cruise missile submarines and on large numbers of medium and long-range reconnaissance and bomber aircraft to exhaust the carrier’s intercept capability.

From this springboard the Soviets even increased the momentum of their drive during the next phase. More importantly, perhaps, there was no change in policy regarding the construction of strike carriers.

Regardless of past pretensions to an oceangoing fleet, it became apparent only in the 1960s that the Russians felt they had the appropriate ingredients and basic naval

policy and strategy to move to sea. The 1960s saw the Soviet Navy emerge for the first time and in its own right as a truly aggressive force. It was to take on a new character. This "new fleet” enabled the Russians to go to sea in a meaningful way.

With the growth of the fleet, including a modern force of surface ships, Soviet military and foreign policies became intermingled. The Russians realized that a basic—and indeed the most appropriate—ingredient to the furtherance of foreign policy is a strong Navy. And some changes in notions about carriers emerged.

Each of the major tasks which the Russians saw for the U. S. carrier forces continued to be a threat to the U.S.S.R., but Soviet ranking of these threats in the 1960s seemed to differ from that in the mid-1950s. The U. S. use of carrier forces to control sea areas was always of concern to the Russians and was not overlooked or neglected by them in the 1950s. In the 1960s, however, with the gradual extension of their naval force operations on the high seas, this concern became a major one.

Almost coincidental with—but not, however, as a result of—the rise in Soviet naval power, the Russians noted that the United States might downgrade the task of carriers in the strategic strike role. ICBMs and Polaris submarines were becoming the main delivery systems. Soviet military writers had already expressed their thinking on this strategic shift in the early 1960s. Despite their view of a reduction in the nuclear strike threat from carriers, the Russians did not lessen their drive toward the development of a counterforce or slacken pace in testing this force in operational exercises. In fact, Soviet efforts to counter enemy carriers were increased. On these and other considerations turn the argument that the Russians have grown more concerned about carriers operating in opposition to the exercise of their own naval power.

Although Soviet naval strategists see a limited nuclear strike capability remaining in U. S. carriers for many years to come, they see the carrier as a growing threat to their submarine and surface fleet out-of-area operations, and to the effective pursuit of their political policies in many areas of the world.

Parenthetically, to the Russians since World War II, the most continually annoying use the United States makes of its carrier forces is that of carrying out its military commitments, supporting foreign policy and projecting U. S. naval power at any point in the world’s oceans. This continues to gnaw at the heart of many Soviet military writers.

Soviet naval leaders have used this growing combination of threats to argue their case with the Politburo that an expansion of anticarrier forces is vital to the future of the U.S.S.R. And they are getting results.

As the long-range anticarrier capability was being refined and improved in the 1960s, Soviet strategists gave increased emphasis to combating the carrier in the near or strike zone. The permanently operating U. S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and the occasional forces operating in the Norwegian Sea, the Sea of Japan, and elsewhere indicated that a force capable of quick reaction and flexible response was needed. This meant new force capabilities and strategy.

Submarine forces. By the middle of the 1960s, Soviet strategists believed they had completed or had on order enough submarines fitted with long-range cruise missiles designed for operating on the high seas. Both the E-II and J class programs were terminated by the end of 1968.

Construction of two new submarine classes, both nuclear-powered—the torpedo-attack V class and the cruise missile C class—was authorized in 1962-1963' The first completed units of these classes appeared about 1968 and apparently construction is continuing These submarine classes are viewed as having those characteristics needed to give the Navy a quick reaction against carriers already in a strike position. Improved anticarrier capabilities include the faster speeds of both classes over earlier Soviet models and the submerged- launch, short-range cruise missile in the C class. Not overlooked either are the ASW capabilities of these submarines or their capability to deploy anywhere in the world’s oceans.

Soviet plans to develop a stronger and more balanced anti-ship submarine force appear undiminished. Although the Soviets might have considered earlier that the force of submarines armed with long-range cruise missiles was adequate for the time being, they still probably would like to develop a force of submarines capable of launching long-range, antiship missiles from a submerged position.

Air forces. After the early 1960s, the Russians began to acquire new higher speed aircraft and more advanced and longer range air-to-surface missiles, and to develop vertical and short take-off aircraft (VTOL/STOL).

During this period, the Bear was fitted with the long-range (upwards of 300 nautical miles) air-to- surface Kangaroo missile. This gave the Navy its longest range missile on its longest range aircraft.

The introduction in the middle 1960s of the TU-22 Blinder offered the Navy a supersonic dash capability- The Blinder, however, has not been used in the Navy as extensively as the main workhorses—the Badgers and Bears.

In the late 1960s, the new Kelt air-to-surface missik began to replace the earlier Kipper on Badger aircraft

The Kelt has only a slightly longer range than the Kipper but it is an advanced weapon design. Furthermore, two Kelts can now be carried on Badger aircraft which previously carried only one Kipper.

Almost certainly the Soviet Navy is looking forward to the recently developed supersonic, swing-wing, strategic bomber, the Backfire. This aircraft armed with an advanced long-range air-to-surface missile will in the near future give the U.S.S.R. its strongest and most effective air weapons system against carriers.

The Russians are continuing efforts to increase the effectiveness and reaction time of their land-based anti- earrier air arm. This is viewed by them as a particularly pressing problem now that their surface forces have been given a broader role in naval matters and are operating in many "remote” areas of the world’s oceans. Soviet strategists are aware that as the fleets operate farther from the homeland, the effectiveness of the air arm is weakened in proportion to the operational distance from the homeland.

The advantages of foreign-based aircraft, such as the short-lived arrangement with Egypt, would be quick reaction time, low cost, and greater use of an already developed air capability. The disadvantages are largely political: the uncertainty of a satisfactory and enduring

political accommodation and the danger that the Soviet Union would lay itself open to the same sort of criticism it had leveled against Western powers in the past.

Another important contribution to the second-phase buildup of the naval air capability was the increased use of long-range air forces in naval missions. This trend was not unexpected as the requirements for these forces to conduct strategic strikes on land targets diminished.

Soviet research and development in VTOL/STOL aircraft appear to have added a new dimension to Soviet naval surface forces. It would seem that the Soviet’s newest carrier, currently under construction—the Kiev— has been designed to include such aircraft in its complement. More about this carrier, and its mission will be said later.

Surface ship forces. In the first half of the 1960s, Soviet strategy for the use of surface forces became apparent. For the first time, surface ships began to be integrated into the anticarrier role outside local sea theaters.

The resurgence in the 1960s of surface ship production is attributed largely to a resolution of strategy for surface ships. The role of the surface ship changed rapidly as the Navy as a whole began to grow. Now,

surface ships such as the Kara, Kynda, Kashin, Kresta, Krivak, and even the smaller Nanuchka classes equipped with surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles can perform in various modes. For example, in an encounter with an enemy antisubmarine carrier, their surface-to-surface missiles can be fired from a great distance—well over 100 nautical miles—against the carrier, and their surface-to-air missiles can be used against the enemy’s ASW aircraft. In the Norwegian Sea, these ships can operate also as a counter to U. S. land-based ASW aircraft targeted against Soviet submarines when such submarines are being escorted or operationally defended by Soviet surface ships. In the Mediterranean, where Soviet ships are permanently on station, surface combatants fitted with surface-to-surface missiles, are a threat to both CVAs and CVSs. Soviet ships fitted with surface-to-air missiles, however, are primarily tasked to protect Soviet surface ships from air attacks.

Basically, then, Soviet surface forces have an important role against carriers and carrier-based and land- based antiship aircraft in certain combat conditions in waters peripheral to the European land mass. It would be a serious mistake, however, to assume that surface forces will be confined to these areas in the future. Soviet surface force exercises in the "remote” areas of the world oceans are growing each year and the striking power of the fleet is rapidly increasing. Where earlier—in the 1950s—the stress was on developing a long-range submarine/air navy, the 1960s saw the rebirth of the surface fleet to add an additional threat to U. S. carrier operations.

The force that operates continuously in the Mediterranean and the forces that on occasion operate in the Norwegian Sea, northwest Pacific, and the Indian Ocean attest the progress the Soviet Navy has made since the early 1960s and all indications are that Soviet naval forces of this sort will continue to grow.

As the Soviet naval fleets continue to grow and their operations expand, Soviet fear of enemy carriers continues to be manifest in fleet force structure, deployment, and operations.

Soviet fear of U. S. carriers in ASW. Soviet fear of U. S. carriers operating in an ASW role has grown rapidly with the increase in size of their long-range submarine fleet, a fleet designed for operating outside local sea theaters. The increasing concern with countering carriers in an ASW role certainly has raised this threat much higher on the Soviet ranking scale of threats than it was in the 1950s.

Nearly all Soviet long-range submarines are based in the Northern and Pacific Fleets. With the exception of those units based at Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka

peninsula, all submarines must pass through the somewhat restricted passages in the Greenland/Iceland- United Kingdom (G/l-UK) gap, the Japanese Sea, and between islands of the Kurile chain. Because the major portion of these submarines are based in the Northern Fleet, the G/l-UK gap became a major focal point for developing a Soviet naval counterstrategy. Where som^e Soviet exercises have been evaluated as classical exercise* to repulse U. S. strike carrier forces making nuclear strikes against the U.S.S.R. and supporting amphibious landings, it now appears that part of these exercise* in this same area might have been aimed more at forcing the U. S. ASW barrier and securing the passage of Soviet submarines to sea. Forcing this gap and barriers in other restricted waters has grown to be a major concern of Soviet naval strategists.

The issues which the Russians face today differ, to a considerable extent, from those they faced in the mid-1950s and at the beginning of the 1960s. In the Russian view, their Navy, in conjunction with an effee tive and deeply echeloned PVO, has been rapidly developed into a balanced force and one which is a credible deterrent to enemy strike carriers aimed at delivering air strikes against the homeland. They almost certainly view their cruise missile and torpedo submarines, surface ships, and aircraft as having the task of defeating the mission of the carrier should it attack their naval forces at sea or engage in any other strike role inimical to Soviet interests.

A further Soviet judgment seems to emerge at this point. As mentioned earlier, the Soviets believe the)' have developed an effective counter to carriers approaching waters near the Eurasian continent. A Soviet notion—and a disturbing one—is that once the carrier is neutralized, whether approaching the continent of in the strike zone, Soviet surface-ships with their long- range surface-to-surface missiles and their submarine and air fleets can effectively deal with the remaining U. S. ships.

Soviet propagandists are trying to characterize their emerging Navy as one which will assist "oppressed countries to throw off the yoke of "imperialism.” how do they intend to achieve this? Soviet experien^ in political involvement in these countries over the p^¹ 15 or so years has served as a useful primer to g^u'd^e future operations. The degree of support and mann^fr of involvement will be determined by the value of ^ country to Soviet military and political objectives uⁿ by the level of political rapprochement.      .

Considering then the current state of Soviet "na^v‘ art” and some Soviet military and political issues, few options concerning aircraft carriers are clear ^wtl1 others are still in question.

Soviet Carrier Strategy 35

v The Atlantic Ocean

Pacific Ocean

In Submarines Against Submarines, published in 1968, Soviet strategist N. I. Suzdalev told his Russian readers about (and illustrated, left and below) the ASW defensive zones that America had established in the Atlantic and Pacific and in the narrow seaways of the Baltic, Black, and other seas. How to force these barriers and secure the passage of Soviet submarines to sea continues to be a major concern of the Red Navy.

Geographic narrows (straits)

ASW carriers and/or helicopter carriers

U. S. Submarines

U. S. Shore-based aircraft

Fixed hydroacoustic systems for long range detection of submarines

Seattle

U. S. A.

San Francisco Los Angeles Diego

Strike carriers for their own feet. As recently as 1967, Admiral Gorshkov set forth what in effect was a restatement of the policy formulated in the mid-1950s. Again he emphasized that there were those in the West who still stressed construction of carriers*, but as for the Soviet Fleet it was being built along different lines which were not only correct for them but also for all navies. When this policy was first formulated, the defense of the Soviet Union was the principal issue. At that time the Russians chose not to try to combat enemy strike carriers on the carrier’s own terms but rather to develop a force aimed at destroying the carrier as a platform from which air strikes could be launched.

Although Admiral Gorshkov’s statement was made more than six years ago, Soviet naval strategists appear to be holding with this early option.

The U.S.S.R.’s preoccupation with its interests in the Eurasian and African continents and the apparent confidence in its strategy and naval forces to defeat the mission of the enemy’s carrier, seems to argue that any significant change—in respect to strike carriers for its own fleet—is not about to be made in the foreseeable future.

Carriers for antisubmarine warfare. Further notions the Russians have about aircraft carriers for their own fleet emerged with the creation of the Mediterranean Squadron. Having settled in the early 1950s on the policy of not building CVAs, they saw in the early 1960s the need to move some of their land-based helicopter ASW forces to sea. This move, basically, appeared to be integrated with the conceptual development of the Mediterranean Squadron. Authorization to build the two helicopter-carrying ships—the Moskva and the Leningrad— was apparently given in the early 1960s, probably about the same time the decision was made to create the Squadron for a second time. An abortive first attempt was made in the late 1950s from a base in Albania.

How the Russians view the success of these ships is a bit uncertain. It might be that they judge the effectiveness of these ships against Polaris submarines to be somewhat less than they had earlier hoped for. On the other hand, they might believe these ships to be of value in protecting their surface forces against attacks by enemy submarines.

It would be prudent to assume that the Russians will continue to build carriers of this sort and, as technology advances, with improved ASW capabilities.

Carriers for amphibious warfare. Two situations in which Soviet naval forces might be used should be

•Gorshkov here is referring to strike or attack carriers.

considered: in a general war wherein amphibious fof^(C would be used to support the sea flanks of Sovi^ ground force operations and in a limited war involvW Soviet naval support of a Third World country.

In preparation for a general war, Soviet use of $ phibious forces has been well demonstrated. Howe^v£! they have yet to demonstrate that they consider^Ji: support launched from a carrier necessary to success^ over-the-beach assault operations. Land-based air s^uf’ port is probably viewed as available and adequate.

In support of military operations in Third Wor^ situations, Soviet strategy is less clear. This is a rek tively new problem for Soviet naval strategists and ofl^c which would turn, to a large degree, on their ni'¹' surface forces operating at some distance from d^lC homeland.

Soviet amphibious forces have grown since 1963. when the Soviet naval infantry was reinstituted, afl^ on occasions since then some amphibious ships ha^vC been deployed to the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean* How these ships might be used by Soviet forces ha* not been made clear.

Although the Russians have used their Navy ^t0 create the image of a protector of sea frontiers 0* troubled countries, there has been a noticeable lack °- force development which would support these coun^- tries with an over-the-beach assault by airborne troop* launched from an amphibious carrier.

It would appear that the Russians have opted U a different strategy, especially for those countries i*¹ which they have a deep military, economic, or politic' interest. In these cases, the Russians apparently pk^,n on becoming, in peacetime, so deeply intrenched in³ designated country that a beachhead will already ha'^,£ been established should a situation arise which wo^ be unfavorable to the local government in po*^ct Should a situation then arise which would require th^£ use of military force, the Navy would attempt to & pulse any attack from the sea much in the same mann^tf it hopes to defend the shores of the U.S.S.R.

It would appear that a rather drastic shift in mili^tat! and political philosophies would take place before d^l£ Soviets develop an airborne amphibious assault capa^' ity from the sea. A consideration of no little important here, as with many other naval problems, is the c^0>1 of developing such a fleet capability.

Carriers for air defense of the fleets. The Soviets are ^ aware of the need for improved defense against strik^e aircraft and against missiles. As the Soviet fleets opera^[C farther from the cover of their home-based reconna¹* sance and bomber aircraft the problems of defend against air strikes increase.         ,

They see aircraft strikes emanating from carrier-bas

Soviet Carrier Strategy 37

2nd from land-based aircraft. The counterstrategy against carriers as launch platforms has already been discussed but counterstrategy against enemy carrier and land-based aircraft has not been as easily apparent. At 'he present, shipborne antiaircraft weapons are the only mans of defense at sea against enemy aircraft and missiles.

The Russians would like to improve the air defense of their fleets by basing reconnaissance and strike aircraft, if only on a contingency basis, in foreign countries close by fleet operating areas. They are also trying 'o reduce the threat of land-based air strikes by encouraging or forcing a host country to deny the United States basing rights.

But the Russians are quite conscious of the hazards of relying solely on shipborne weaponry and on basing aircraft on foreign soil.

In a move to enhance the combat stability of their fleets the Russians appear to be engaged in the production of a pilot program of aircraft carriers aimed at significantly improving the air defense of surface formations.

The Kiev. Early this year the U. S. Press carried an artists’ rendering of an aircraft carrier reported to be under construction in the Soviet Union. This sketch showed a ship about 900 feet in length and an angled flight

deck, some 600 feet long. This carrier, the first of its kind in the Soviet Union, appears to be designed to handle the VTOL/STOL aircraft. Such aircraft can perform many tasks. In view of the foregoing discussion, however, these aircraft most likely will be charged primarily with the protection of the fleet against aircraft, and possibly missile strikes, and to assist in ASW operations. It should be noted that any improvement in air defense has the consequence of enhancing ASW capabilities.

In this pilot series, the Russians might experiment in the early operational periods of the carrier with various mixes of aircraft—VTOL/STOL and helicopters. In any event, it must be said that Soviet naval strategists apparently are looking to this ship and her aircraft complement to improve fleet defense and at the same time to advance fleet ASW capabilities.

Mr. Funkhouscr is a maritime specialist with more than 30 years’ experience in this field. In 1938, after studying architecture at George Washington University, he joined the Technical Division of the U. S. Maritime Commission. While with the Commission he was engaged in the design and preparation of plans and specifications for the construction of merchant ships and naval auxiliaries including writing the hull specifications for the construction of 50 Escort Carriers (CVE-55 to 104) built by the Maritime Commission for the U. S. Navy. Since the early 1950s, he has been involved in research work on Soviet maritime affairs, and is associated with the Central Intelligence Agency. The opinions and assertions in this article are his own, however, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Agency.