Professional Notes

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The Anglo-French Seaborne Deterrent Force: Impossible Dream or Imperative Reality?

By Vice Admiral B. B. Schofield, Royal Navy (Retired)

There are a number of reasons for the prominence recently accorded to the question of Anglo-French nuclear cooperation, and the part it might play in updating the seaborne deterrent forces of both countries. First, there are the fears that a reduction in size of the U. S. troop commitment in Europe might lead to a lessening of U. S. interest in world affairs there, which, in turn, would result in a weakening in the credibility of the American nuclear umbrella, under which Europe has huddled for so long. Second, the recently- concluded Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty between the, United States and Russia has aroused a fear in Britain that the United States may be reluctant to renew bilateral agreements on nuclear cooperation. Third, the doctrine propounded by French General Pierre Gallois in his book, Strategic de /’age nucleaire, that the advent of nuclear weapons has made traditional alliances obsolete, and that no matter how powerful a state might be, if it came to the crunch, it would not risk nuclear annihilation for an ally, has had a profound influence on French strategic thought.

There is also the realization in both countries that technical advances are

being made both in the delivery systems and in the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) field which, by about 1980, may reduce the credibility of existing seaborne deterrent forces to a point where they can no longer be counted on to fulfill their function.

Britain and France are the only two European countries in possession of ballistic missile-armed submarines (SSBN). The Royal Navy has commissioned four of the Resolution class (7,500 tons surface, 8,400 tons submerged displacement), each of which is armed with 16 Polaris A-j missiles purchased in the United States under the 1962 Nassau Agreement. In addition to supplying the missiles and providing technical assistance, the U. S. Navy made available the launching and fire control systems which included the gas underwater ejection system as well as the important ships inertial navigation system (SINS). Britain was then able to build and equip these four nuclear-powered submarines in five-and-a-half years (1964 to 1970). In contrast, however, the French Navy’s development of similar submarines, designated sousmarin nucleaire lance-engin (SNLE), has been slow and entirely national with one important exception, the provision of highly-enriched ura

nium purchased in the United States under a bilateral agreement of 7 May 1959. Although France has access to considerable supplies of natural uranium, it did not, at the time, possess the plant capable of enriching it. Britain, on the other hand, must purchase its requirements, but has the capacity to enrich it.

The keel of what was scheduled to be the first French SNLE, known as the Q.244, was laid early in 1958, on the assumption that the reactor could be operated on natural uranium. When it was discovered that this was impracticable, however, the hull was used for the conventionally-powered submarine Gymnote (Q.251), which has been employed as a test vehicle for experimental firings of the French equivalent of a Polaris A-i missile, known as Mer-sol- balistique-strategique (MSBS) Ml. The United States offered France a complete propulsion reactor in 1959, and three years later, a complete nuclear-powered submarine, but both were turned down.

It was not until 1964 that the keel of the first actual French SNLE, the Le Redoutable (7,500 tons surface, 9,000 tons submerged), was laid. The keel-laying of the first British SSBN, HMS Resolution occurred at the same time, but the Brit-

ish submarine was completed in October 1967, while the French counterpart did not start trials until 1969 and was commissioned on 1 December 1971. While finance undoubtedly played a part in reducing the momentum of French construction, it was mainly due to the lack of technological assistance by the United States which Britain had. This has resulted in a British advantage in nuclear-powered submarine design, construction, and operation. The fourth French SNLE will not be completed until 1976, with the fifth coming two years later.

Because of its longer experience in the design and production of nuclear weapons, Britain has already fitted triple-thermonuclear warheads to its Polaris A-3 missiles, while France is not expected to complete development of thermonuclear explosives before 1975. This was the primary reason behind the importance attached to the recent trial nuclear explosion series which France conducted off Murora atoll in the Pacific.

When it comes to missile design and operation, the French aerospace industry is in better shape than the British, because it has not suffered the same setbacks, but it is still a long way behind the United States. For example, the Poseidon and Polaris A-3 missiles have a range of 2,500 nautical miles, while the French MSBS M i has a range of only 1,360 nautical miles. It is believed that the M.2, currently under development, will have a range of 1,650 nautical miles. No date has been released as to when the M.2 will be operational. At the present time, therefore, while British SSBNs could attack Moscow from the Arctic Ocean, the Eastern Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Arabian Sea, the French SNLEs would need to be stationed in the North Sea, off the West coast of Norway, or in the Aegean Sea in order to reach the same target.

Although there are no signs of a breakthrough in the methods for detecting submarines, given the intensive effort being devoted both in the East and the West, it would be foolish to ignore the possibility of such an event. Hence, there is good reason to increase the range of missiles carried by SSBNs to enable them to operate from waters

controlled by their own forces, or at least enlarge their area of operations so they can retain the present high degree of invulnerability. Presumably, this has prompted the development of the Trident missile system in the United States, which is expected to have a range of some 6,000 nautical miles. At the same time, the progress being made with ABM systems and electronic countermeasures designed to interfere with the missile’s guidance system has led to the development of the multiple independent reentry vehicle (MIRV) and other refinements to ensure that the missile reaches

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the target area. Thus, the Poseidon mis- 1 sile, the successor to the Polaris A-3, >^s expected to carry ten warheads.            ¹

2

Criticism frequently has been leveled at the small size of the British and French seaborne deterrent forces, noting that if pooled, they would be a more formidable deterrent. In theory, both navies would expect each submarine to carry out four patrols a year, each lasting ' about eight to ten weeks. Since these 1 submarines have two crews, each crew would complete two patrols a year. Each submarine must be refueled every three

Professional Notes 109

years, and the combination of the refueling and a yard overhaul could last up to six months. Theoretically, therefore, a force of four SSBNs should be able to maintain a minimum of two on patrol, while a force of eight would have four. Yard periods, however, tend to run over their schedule, and it has been British experience that many times, only one SSBN is available for patrol.

The normal time spent on patrol by 2 U. S. Navy SSBN is 60 days. This, however, is not the way British and French schedules are based. By coordinating the patrols and refitting of the two French SNLEs, now operational, and the four British SSBNs, it would be possible to ensure that at least two or three °f these submarines would be on patrol at one time. Such an arrangement would have to be supported by joint targeting plans, which do not exist at present.

Within NATO, there is a growing feeling that Britain’s seaborne nuclear deterrent force is relatively small and 'hat a means must be found to integrate " with that of France as suggested. When French President Georges Pompidou became Prime Minister back in April 1962, he advocated the idea of Anglo-French collaboration in the nu- ^cfear field, and in November 1968, it was considered by the National Assembly, during the tenure of office of Michel Ffebre as Defense Minister, however, bttle progress was made. He took the that only a complete severance of Britain’s link with the United States ^would create the conditions under "'hich collaboration could take place. Fhs successor, M. Roger Galley, whose ^t|ffe has been changed to Minister of the Armed Forces, appears more favorable, ^he point on which the French are seeking reassurance and one which they ^regard as a test of Britain’s sincerity, is ¹ firm decision on its part not to pur- ^chase Poseidon missiles from the United ^'ates with which to re-equip its four ^SSfiNs. On 22 August 1973, the Expend- ^ltUre Committee of the House of Com- ^rr'^0r,s published a report on Britain’s "Uclear weapons program, in which it "^as recommended that Britain should ^not build any additional SSBNs nor fe°uld it purchase Poseidon missiles for . four existing ships. This last deci- ^Sl°ⁿ appears to have been based on an

assumption that ". . . the penetrative ability of the present Polaris A-3 missiles is adequate . . .” and therefore, the Poseidon would be "an expensive luxury.” The cost of conversion of an SSBN to carry Poseidon missiles is estimated at about £20 million ($50 million), to which must be added the cost of the 16 missiles at £3 million each, making a total of £68 million ($170 million) per ship exclusive of warheads. On the question of the alternative solution by which Britain and France would pool their resources to produce a new Anglo- French missile as a replacement for the Polaris A-3 and the French MSBS, the report states, "We believe that instead of emphasizing Anglo-French nuclear collaboration, it would be more beneficial if a greater emphasis were placed on a United States, French, and British relationship in nuclear matters, hopefully leading to greater French participation in discussion over allied nuclear planning.”

It would be foolish to underestimate the difficulties to be overcome before Anglo-French cooperation in the nuclear field could take place, and in which the United States must necessarily be involved, but that is no reason for not tackling them. The possible courses of action which could be taken are as follows:

►     The United States could agree to the transfer by Britain of technical knowhow acquired as a result of the close collaboration which exists between the two countries in this field. Britain would thus be acting as agent for the United States, which would not be a party to any bilateral agreement concluded between Britain and France.

►     The United States could conclude a bilateral agreement with France, thereby enabling that country to receive the information already available to Britain. This would not prevent France from entering into a separate agreement with Eritain and the two countries would be on an equal footing.

►     The United States, Britain, and France could conclude a trilateral agreement covering the exchange of nuclear information, while Britain and France could enter into a separate agreement for the development of a new missile system.

It is generally assumed that the first course is the one most likely to be

adopted; yet, from the point of view of the United States, it has two serious objections. It would mean that the United States would no longer control the passing of information and would probably receive little credit for its part in facilitating cooperation with France. From the British standpoint, it would entail drawing up a complicated agreement with the United States. It would also fail to place France on an equal footing with Britain and thus offend that country’s amour propre, since Britain would become the intermediary through which information of U. S. origin would be received.

Although the second course avoids the pitfalls of the first, it raises another difficulty. Since France would be able to obtain the information it needed direct from the United States, there would be no incentive to enter into a separate agreement with Britain. Given the somewhat nationalistic approach which the French have shown so far in dealing with this problem, it might be desirable to make Anglo-French cooperation a condition for the release of information by the United States. It is unlikely, however, that such a condition would find favor either with France or the United States. France would feel it was negotiating with Britain under duress, while the United States would feel it was getting too closely involved in what is primarily a European problem.

The adoption of the third course would avoid the objections which have been raised against the first two, since it would enable each country to control the information released by its agents and enable the United States to avoid becoming involved in anything more than the dispensing of information. A trilateral agreement such as envisaged, however, would not be an easy document to formulate and operate, and the French might well feel that American influence would necessarily dominate any Anglo-French agreement drawn up in such circumstances. On the whole, therefore, it seems that the second course is the least objectionable of the three.

Although France has spurned several previous offers of help from the United States, while at the same time accepting the supply of enriched uranium, tactical nuclear weapons under the double key

arrangement, and assistance in several fields connected with the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, it is suggested that there is now good reason to re-examine the question of the transmission of classified information about nuclear weapons as governed by the Atomic Energy Act. This might be linked with a discussion of France’s attitude to NATO which, according to re tired French General Andre Beaufre, arises from the belief that the organization is focusing . . too much attention on defense on the assumption that a good defense posture produces the best deterrent, and not enough on crisis management.” There is also the question of France’s non-adherence to the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which would put the United States in a somewhat embarrassing situation, vis-a-vis, the Soviet Union, if American assistance were given to the development of France’s nuclear forces.

In May 1972, the Soviet Union informed the United States that it proposed to include the number of British SSBNs and French SNLEs as forming part of the total under the SALT agreement.

This suggestion has twice been rejected by the United States. One point which appears to have been overlooked is that a signatory of the present SALT agreement could circumvent the agreed-upon limits by subsidizing the SSBN development of its non-signatory allies—and it appears that Russia is very much alert to this possibility. In addition, a third power could emerge, creating still more trouble.

It is clear from what has been said that progress towards Anglo-French cooperation in the nuclear field is beset with difficulties. Yet, if the problem is not tackled soon, there is a strong probability that the seaborne deterrent forces of both countries will be obsolete by 1980 and there will be no hardware with which to replace them. The U. S. Poseidon program is not likely to continue once the 31 SSBNs have been re-equipped with new missiles in 1976 and 1977. In addition, it is most improbable that either Great Britain or France could afford the Trident weapons system, even if made available. Another suggestion has been the possible financial support of West Germany. This, however, is not likely without German insistence on a

voice in the control of such forces—not to mention the reversal of current French thinking.

While it seems obvious that Britain and France should pool their resources in order to develop a second generation of missiles for their SSBNs and SNLES, it is not suggested that Europe should become a third nuclear power. The SALT agreement has established that there are only two major powers in the field of nuclear missiles. At the same time, the existence of British and French nuclear deterrent forces ensures that in a situation in which the United States might be hesitant to challenge Russia to a nuclear contest, Europe would not be subjected to nuclear blackmail. This is perhaps the strongest argument for their continuation.

No attempt has been made to relate the Anglo-French SSBN missile replacement predicament to the wider question of the use of nuclear weapons in Europe to deter Soviet aggression, since in the writer’s view, this is a separate issue. Enough has been said, however, to shove the importance of this problem to the defense of the West and of the need to grasp the nettle before it is too late.

Hydrofoil Home for the V/STOL Jet

By Captain John K. Clifford, U. S. Navy (Retired), Operations Research Analyst, Naval Electronics Laboratory Center

There is little doubt that lightweight high-performance jet-V/STOL aircraft will become an important part of our future fleet. In the foreseeable future, perhaps in the last decade of this century, it may be an all V/STOL-equipped fleet. Within a comparable period of time to that in which monoplanes replaced biplanes and jets replaced propeller aircraft, V/STOL aircraft could replace conventional take-off and landing aircraft.

Paralleling the development of jet- V/STOL aircraft has been the development of a new breed of Navy combatant small craft, whose mode of operation differs significantly from conventional

displacement surface ships. This new breed of surface craft includes the hydrofoil (supported on "wings” that "fly” through the near-surface water mass), the air cushion/surface effect vehicle (supported by a constrained air-mass above the water surface), and the semi- submerged catamaran (supported by struts from twin hulls below the nearsurface water mass). State-of-the-art advances in the new-breed technology now point to the feasibility of extending these concepts from the small craft category to ship concept categories with open-ocean capabilities.

The early marriage of jet-V/STOL aircraft and the new breed of ships could

effectively counter the Soviet’s naval objective of denying the North Atlantic to U. S. aircraft carriers. To achieve this objective, Soviet technology has developed anti-ship cruise missiles with great capability and potential. All surface ships are vulnerable to the cruise mis^- siles. There is a good probability, however, that aircraft carriers, with their heavy armor and escort of various surface combatants, could survive a coordinated cruise missile attack. On the other hand, if the carriers cannot survive—an^ many critics say they can’t—then out planned sea-control ships, unarmoret! tankers, ammunition ships, troopship⁵' supply ships, and the like, cannot sur-

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Professional Notes

vive. The loss of our sea-based aviation platforms would also mean the loss of air space control over mid-ocean sea lanes. Thus, if the Soviets chose this course of action in a NATO war, the situation would be critical.

There is good reason to believe the Soviets would pursue such a course. They have modernized their fleet to oppose an updated version of our present fleet. They shadow our forces, with particular emphasis on aircraft carrier operations. They conduct multi-ocean war games pointed toward simultaneous attacks on simulated carrier task forces. Much of their naval and weapon system development is oriented toward neutralizing our largest naval surface ships. Therefore, to assure continued control of the seas, we need an alternative to an updated version of today’s fleet, i.e., a few large aviation ships surrounded by an escort of surface combatants. One attractive alternative would be a force concept predicated on jet-V/STOL aircraft dispersed on numerous small high- performance aircraft carriers. Such a concept would complicate the Soviet’s targeting problem and dilute their surveillance and offensive capability. To maintain their current level of success probability in a fleet confrontation, they would have to locate and target the many aviation elements. As a result, their force would become more costly and/or less effective, while our force defensive capability would be enhanced.

A dispersed force of small aircraft carriers equipped with jet-V/STOL air- ^craft located on the periphery of a

300-mile circular formation would provide more favorable time and distance factors than standard fleet formations. Targets could be intercepted at greater distances from the force center, and deck-launched interceptors could be used instead of orbiting combat air control (CAP). Multiphased intercepts could be made in cases where the initial intercept fails, and there would be improved "pouncer” capability against missilefiring, surfaced submarines. As a result, the Soviet success probability in an attack on our forces would be decreased.

The problem of selecting which of the new breed of ships would make the most effective small aircraft carrier for jet-V/STOL has yet to be resolved. Many mission application studies have been conducted over the past ten years, and sufficient data, i.e., speed, range, payload, sea-keeping qualities, and cost, has been gathered to determine combat mission effectiveness. Based on this data, it ap

pears that the 1,000-ton hydrofoil has more of the desired operational features than comparable-sized air cushion or catamaran ships.

Proven hydrofoil ship designs and construction methods support the feasibility of building a 1,000-ton hydrofoil having a maximum speed of 50 knots, and capable of maintaining a speed in excess of 40 knots in Sea State 6, i.e., 8 to 12-foot waves and 22 to 27-knot waves. In fact, 1,000-ton hydrofoils have been postulated in several mission application studies. In one study, a proposed large hydrofoil design was modified as a small hydrofoil aircraft carrier (SHAC). To hypothesize the jet-V/STOL-SHAC weapon system, the AV-8 Harrier jet- V/STOL aircraft was used. The resulting system, although using a high bypass fan-jet v/STOL aircraft as the criterion, is applicable to most other lightweight jet aircraft being developed or on the drawing boards.

Bubble Surface Effect Ship

1,000-ton Small Hydrofoil Aircraft Carrier (SHAC)

Semi-submerged Catamaran Ship

To understand why the SHAC is so

effective, it is necessary to understand its inherent jet-V/STOL aircraft support characteristics. These are summarized in the following paragraphs:

►     Harrier take-off—The AV-8 Harrier is payload-limited when operating in the vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) mode. In the short takeoff and landing (STOL) mode, lift increases approximately 100 pounds with each one-knot increase in wind. Thus, to achieve maximum payload take-off, the Harrier uses a runway until the airspeed reaches 50 knots, which speed increases the payload 5,000 pounds. The SHAC has no runway. Since it can accelerate from hullborne speed to a foilborne speed of 50 knots in less than two minutes, full payload can be achieved by using the resulting 50-knot ambient wind. Moreover, a few knots bonus speed will result. The Harrier obtains its vertical lift capability by swiveling its exhaust ports to the vertical, rather than to the horizontal as in normal flight. The flight deck beneath the Harrier is grated to dissipate the downward jet blast away from the flight deck and vent the hot gases aft. The aft-vented exhaust gives additional forward thrust to the hydrofoil.

►     Roll Stability—\Jnlike the helicopter, the AV-8 Harrier and the other jet-VTOL aircraft do not have lift systems whose thrust vector is controlled independent of fuselage attitude. As a result, the landing platform roll must be minimal, although moderate pitch is acceptable. The foilborne SHAC is more stable in heavy seas than air cushion and catamaran ships of comparable size.

►     Freeboard— The AV-8 Harrier requires a minimum of 25 feet of freeboard during takeoff and landing maneuvers. Below this height, the thrust of the downward jet engine exhausts generates salt spray which could be ingested into the engines, or impair the pilot’s visibility. The SHAC flight deck will be 44 feet above the waterline during foilborne operations.

►     Propulsion— Two Rolls-Royce Pegasus engines, which is the same engine used by the Harrier, will be used to propel the hydrofoil. Using the same engine in both platforms simplifies maintenance and fuel problems.

►     Flight Deck—The SHAC’s planned overall length is 183 feet with a 50-foot

USS High Point (PCH-l)

main deck beam. As the Harrier requires a 75-by-50-foot launch and recovery area, a 150-by-50 foot flight deck will be included. This will provide for grated VTOL areas for two Harriers. A third Harrier can be accommodated by staggering two of them in the aft area.

The military payload for 1,000-ton ships normally represents 10 to 20% of the gross displacement weight. The 1,000-ton hydrofoil, as discussed, has a weight breakdown that allocates 120 to 150 tons to military items and 400 + tons to JP-5 fuel. Carrying this load, the SHAC will be capable of traveling 2,000+ nautical miles at nominal foilborne speed, or 3,000+ nautical miles at a nominal hullborne speed.

The foil system to be used is the canard (forward moving foil) system that has been proven on the 60-ton hydrofoil gunship USS Tucumcari (PGH-2), and the research and development hydrofoil ship USS Highpoint (PCH-i). The SHAC’s mission will sometimes require all-out operations in all- weather, and this foil arrangement will permit safe operations in Sea State 6. In very rough seas at high foilborne speeds, foil broaching can occur, but the canard configuration retains adequate control even under these conditions.

The ship’s hull structure would be constructed of aluminum alloy using processes already proven on the PGHs. The foil system would be constructed

of corrosion-resistant steel as used on the PGH-2.

The general approach to the command control and communications problem would be to adapt E-2C and S-3A aircraft systems to the SHAC. The principal reasons for this are that the SHAC, like an airplane, is weight and volume- limited, and "flies” at a speed that may require the radar antenna to be radome enclosed. The heart of the system would be two plasma displays and a mini-computer with an extended memory. Like the aircraft systems, it would provide sensor and weapon control, and a data link to other tactical communications systems.

When designing communications and control equipment, it must be remembered that operations will f^fe' quently require quiet operations with no "normal” RF emissions. Long-haul communications would be by UHF secure satellite link; tactical communications, by UHF voice.

A key feature of the radar suite would be a multipurpose antenna for surveillance, surface search, and height finding, all enclosed in an E-2C type radome. The radome could be located aft or in the forward part of the ship atop the pH^ot house, and flush with the flight deck

The weapons suite will consist of the jet-V/STOL aircraft, cruise missile electronic countermeasures (ECM) jamming equipment, and RF/IR decoy launcher ■ The jet-V/STOL would carry short-range- air-to-air missiles for cruise missile °^r

Professional Notes 113

aircraft interception, and air-to-surface weapons (guns, bombs, or guided missiles) for surface ship or surfaced submarine attack. The installation of a point defense or other surface-to-air system is not contemplated because of the SHAC’s inherent high-speed and maneuverability, the jet-V/STOL’s air-to-air missile capability, ECM, decoys, and weight and space limitations.

Ordnance storage capacity will be sufficient for 8 to 12 days of operations between replenishment. The ordnance hold and handling system will be capable of handling air-to-air and air-to- ground weapons, and SHAC-launched decoys.

The navigation suite would include an inertial navigation system for jet-V/STOL aircraft support, Omega, TACAN, navigation satellite receiver, and fathometer.

The following scenario illustrates the capability of the jet-V/STOL-SHAC weapons system. Envision a CVA quiet task force (difficult-to-detect radio/radar/ acoustic emissions) transiting 4,000 miles at an average speed of 20 knots. The force is dispersed in a 300-mile circular formation. Six jet-V/STOL-equipped SHACs and six LAMPS helicopter- equipped destroyers are operating in pairs on the forward sectors of the for

mation periphery. Airborne early- warning surveillance is provided by E-2Cs operating 150 to 200 miles from force center. Five pairs of LAMPS/SHAC ships are on station and the sixth pair is refueling or available for contact prosecution. The LAMPS helicopter buoy plant is deployed between the peripheral screen and force center, and the helicopters are monitoring the buoy field. The jet-V/STOL aircraft would be used as deck-launched interceptors or pouncers. The process would require about 25% of SHAC fuel per day, and would thus require refueling every one or two days if normal Navy operating doctrine is observed. In an enemy confrontation, it would be very difficult for the Soviets to locate, identify, and solve the missile fire control problem on U. S. ships because of the combined effect of quiet operations, paucity of targeting information, and dispersed formation.

Many other illustrations of mission scenarios, covering a variety of mission applications, could be written to show the flexibility of the jet-V/STOL-SHAC weapons system. These include escort duties without a carrier, coastal patrol, early warning and reconnaissance, amphibious assault support, tactical deception, and showing the flag.

The approximate cost of the proto

type ship would be $50 to 75 million, with a 10-ship follow-on cost of $30 to 45 million each. These cost estimates are based on thumb rules acquired from past experience, plus known prices of off-the-shelf equipments.

USS Tucumcari (PGH-2)

For the future, it is felt that the arrival of operational high-performance jet-V/STOL aircraft will mean a change to our present fleet concept. Historically, aircraft carriers have constantly been expanded in size to accommodate increases in aircraft performance with attendant higher take-off and landing speeds. This trend will be reversed as jet-V/STOL squadrons are formed and placed on smaller aircraft carriers. By 1980, when the older carrier aircraft approach the end of their operational life, and new high-performance jet- V/STOL aircraft become operational, the transitional period is expected to begin. During the transition period, however, both the CVAs and small aircraft carriers will be a part of our strike and defensive force. Sometime after 1990, the new breed of small surface ships and V/STOL aircraft will dominate. If this concept is accepted and work is begun on a prototype hydrofoil aircraft carrier, this nation will gain invaluable operational experience with the ships and aircraft of tomorrow’s Fleet.

Gitmo—Vestige of Americana in Cuba

By Professor Lynn D. Bender,

Department of History and Political Science, Inter American University of Puerto Rico

Perhaps the most anomalous aspect of contemporary U. S.-Cuban relations, given the enmity and distrust between the two nations, is the continued existence of a U. S. military installation within Cuban territory. The Guantanamo Naval Base—known affectionately as "Gitmo” by old Navy hands and referred to as "Caimanera” by the Cubans—stands today as the last remaining symbol of the U. S.’s "traditional” relationship with Cuba. But, as Premier Fidel Castro puts it:

There is a base on our island territory directed against Cuba and the revolutionary government of Cuba, in the hands of those who declare themselves enemies of our country, enemies of our revolution, and enemies of our people.

Thus, its presence is not desired by the Cubans, only tolerated, owing to the lack of a means or a capacity to remove this vestige of "Americana” from their soil.

The Castro regime has repeatedly insisted that the United States "return” the territory occupied by the Guantanamo base to Cuba, and the revolutionary regime has always included the question of the "illegal” occupation of Guantanamo in its lists of "demands” which must be met before any negotiation contemplating a normalization of relations can be initiated. This has never been an issue of central importance to Cuba, but unquestionably the status of the base will figure in any agenda of matters to be resolved before major links can be forged between the two countries.

Officially, the U. S. position on the Guantanamo issue has wavered only slightly from this Presidential statement made on 1 November I960:

While the position of the government of the United States with respect to the naval base at Guantanamo has, I believe.

been made very clear, I would like to reiterate it briefly: Our rights in Guantanamo are based on international agreements with Cuba and include the exercise of complete jurisdiction and control over the area. These agreements with Cuba can be modified or abrogated by agreement between the two parties, that is, the United States and Cuba. Our government has no intention of agreeing to a modification or abrogation of these agreements and will take whatever steps that may be appropriate to defend the base. The people of the United States, and all the peoples of the world, can be assured that the U. S. presence in Guantanamo and the use of that base pose no threat whatever to the sovereignty of Cuba, to the peace and security of its people, or to the independence of any of the American countries. Because of its importance to the defense of the entire hemisphere, particularly in the light of the intimate relations which now exist between the present government of Cuba and the Sino-Soviet bloc, it is essential that our position in Guantanamo be clearly understood.

Cuba, on the other hand, argued that it was not only dangerous to have a U. S. base in the "heart” of its national territory in the event of a war between the United States and Russia, but also that it feared the United States might use the base as an excuse to promote an incident in order to justify an attack against the regime. Such arguments have not served, of course, to convince the United States that it should abandon the base. But, in fact, Cuba has, from the very beginning, recognized that it was powerless to evict the United States from Guantanamo either politically, militarily, or legally; as a result, it has taken a consistently moderate approach to this issue of contention with the United States. For example, first in I960, Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos stated:

In the proper time and through the proper political procedures, we will claim the territory, [but] we would never commit the stupidity of providing the North American empire with a pretext to invade us by attacking the naval base.

Then, in 1964, Castro asserted that the Guantanamo issue was "not urgent,” and that force would not be used against the base. Finally, as recently as 23 November 1971, Castro stated with confidence that his country would "eventually” get the U. S. Navy out of Guantanamo, and perhaps "without firing a shot.” And, in fact, Cuba has taken no direct action against the base, nor, rather inexplicably, has it made the existence of a foreign base in its territory the focus of a major campaign in international forums such as the United Nations.

The only significant incident involving the Guantanamo base occurred on 6 February 1964, when Castro cut off the base’s water supply in retaliation for the U. S. "seizure” of four Cuban fishing vessels. Prior to this date, Cuba had supplied the base with two million gal- Ions of water a day, pumped four-and- one-half miles from the Yantera River, for which it received some $14,000 per month. But, no treaty provision was violated by this action; the supplying of water to the base had been the subject of a separate contractual agreement first signed in 1938. The Navy quickly in^- stalled desalinization equipment and has not since used Cuban water. But the incident did result in the tightening of the base’s defenses, which in turn led to the dismissal of hundreds of Cubans who had been employed as workers on the base. Thus, at this point the Castro regime had deprived itself of all economic benefits from the base—the $3,386.25 a year it received in rent, the $14,000 per month from the supply ^ot water, and most of the $7.8 million ³