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Our government lies moored in apathy as the New England fishing industry and a portion of our maritime heritage nears extinction. Having weathered the natural risks of their chosen profession for centuries, the New England fishermen have now been pitted against a man-made hazard. Today our beleaguered fishermen must ply their trade sandwiched between floating factory ships that have travelled halfway around the world to decimate our traditional fishing grounds.
Foreign vessels have fished off New England since colonial days. Since that time our fishermen have respected the right of these foreign nationals to fish on the high seas. During the last decade, however, an exponential increase in foreign fishing activity has critically endangered the fisheries resource off our eastern seaboard and has sent our fleet into a rapidly spiraling decline.
In 1961, a Soviet exploratory fleet first appeared off Georges Bank, an area currently providing 20% of America’s fish catch. Within a year, the first Soviet commercial fishing vessels began to deplete fish stocks which had been a traditional American quarry. This initial Soviet success attracted vessels from more than 14 nations in search of a protein source. Presently there are ten times more foreign trawlers off our shores than during the 1960s, and three times the number that were fishing there only two years ago.
This armada of foreign vessels has devastated stocks of highly valued fish. Haddock, hake, yellowtail, and even flounder have been seriously depleted. Foreign competition has forced a significant increase in fish prices, a decline in America’s percentage of the world’s fish catch, and a dramatic increase in imports. While the American catch has remained virtually unchanged over the last decade, the fish catch of other countries has been climbing steadily. The United States now lands 5% of the world’s fish catch compared to 13% ten years ago, and has dropped from second to sixth among the world’s leading fishing nations. The New England landings of food fish have diminished 46% during this period, and foreign fish imports have increased until they now constitute 70% of all fish consumed in the United States. A billion dollars of the fishing industry’s lifeblood is being drained from our economy each year.
The largest contingent of vessels off our shores is of Soviet registry. Although the Russians had no commercial fishing effort 20 years ago, today their fleets are large, modern, and government subsidized. In military formation large fleets of mother-factory ships, supply ships, oil tenders, processing ships, and helicopters descend upon our eastern shore sweeping everything before and beneath them.
The Russian method of attack, termed "pulse" fishing, concentrates upon a single species of fish until too few remain to make the fishery profitable. Anothcf
fpccics is then designated for exploitation in a cycle "irrupted only by intervention or decimation of the tnt>re fisheries resource.
How has our government protected its threatened shing industry from this foreign onslaught? A major has been made to obtain bilateral and multilateral shing agreements with nations fishing in the north- Wcst Atlantic. Unfortunately, these agreements tend to Co*e about only after significant depletion of the fish St°dcs. The failure of such agreements is easily under- St°°d. International machinery moves slowly. The
agreements reached are political compromises which often reflect considerations other than U. S. conservation, economic, and social needs.
The freedom of the seas concept has failed in areas of concentrated fishing. The concept’s "common property” interpretation has meant that any fish left by a fisherman for tomorrow will be taken by others today. There is no incentive for fishermen to restrain effort in the interest of future returns.
Having weathered the natural hazards of his profession, the New England fisherman now faces a more ominous threat—Soviet bloc fishing fleets like the one shown below which covers an area of IS by 20 miles. These foreign fleets threaten to decimate the fishing resources off our New England coast.
45
Confrontations on the high seas occur constantly between American fixed gear operators and foreigners
trawling. Lobster gear markings are costly and unable to stand up against rugged New England weather. Consequently, the fixed gear is inadequately marked. Lobstermen alternate working mile-long strings of pots with trips to port. When they return, their gear is damaged or missing and foreign trawlers are fishing in the area. In order to prove a gear loss claim, however, the lobsterman must have witnessed the trawler fishing through his gear or have seen his gear on the trawler’s deck.
the
area.
In A Protocol for Consideration of Claims Resulting from Damage to Fishing Vessels and Gear, signed with the U.S.S.R. 21 June 1973, the State Department has provided assistance in solving gear loss disputes. Yet, the lobsterman hesitates to file a claim because of expensive legal fees, lost fishing time, and the difficulty of proving his case.
The fixed-gear operators insist that compensation f°( their gear losses should be provided by the governtfellt as it has done for the West Coast tuna industry. The situation is not the same, however. The tuna vessel in a predicament resulting from the actions of a foreign government with no possible legal recourse. The gear operator can bring suit against an individual vesse or person who caused the loss.
Although most Americans assume that all Sovi£t bloc fleets return home with fish-laden trawlers to fee® their people, it too often occurs that they return la^e" with U. S. currency instead. In August 1970, W. ^ Grace and Company signed a contract with a Roman13" firm for delivery of two million dollars in frozen e° during 1971, and up to ten million dollars by 19^' The contract provides for delivery of the cod to SainI Pierre and Miquelon, a French possession in the Can1 dian Maritimes, where it will be transshipped in C ‘ ships to Gloucester, Massachusetts. This fishery lS direct competition with American cod fishing in
Armed with this American contract, the Roman1311 are purchasing a relatively large fleet of stern trawler5 from Poland and East Germany. Ten of these 3,000-e°nj 300 to 350-foot-long vessels were afloat in 1971. 3lj, 20 more are scheduled to be built by 1975. The C- firm is in effect financing expansion of a Soviet o high seas fleet to compete directly with the Amefl fleet. In addition, the bulk of the cod caught b) 1 ^ Romanians will be processed in the United States
irill be marketed as "Made in the United States.”
The Romanians are not the only Soviet bloc fishing ket with ties to an American corporation. The precedent was established by the Polish fleet, which is anced in similar fashion by Gorton’s of Gloucester, sachssetts, and Continental Seafood of New York ity. Like the Romanians, the Poles transship their tch through ports in Canada at Halifax, Nova Scotia, lnd Saint Pierre and Miquelon. The Poles and Ro- nians then return home with their contribution to 0ur balance of trade deficit.
Following the precedent established by the Japanese to>m 1927 to 1941, the Russians have achieved high ^ordination between their military and fishing efforts, ussian fishing vessels currently locate radar installations along our eastern seaboard and determine their Power, frequency, and pulse. They intercept state, fed- N, and military radio communications, both en- pted and plain text, and attempt to break our codes. Oceanographic, hydrographic, and meteorological data ^gathered for antisubmarine, submarine, and mining °Perations. The Russians also collect photographs of sfr'ps, fleets, and port traffic, and locate focal points ^commercial shipping along our coast.
The fish-detecting sonar mounted on Soviet trawlers tables them to serve as ASW platforms. The sonar is ttScd to locate and track our nuclear submarines. Acoustical signatures from our submarines can then be horded and forwarded to the homeland for future % use. Our submarines are often unaware of being trjcked by these " innocent” vessels.
lcm to the shore. The high and low frequency ma- toery noises from the fishing vessels cruising above
Russian trawlers have fished for our sea floor sonar ^vices and severed the electrical cables connecting
toe devices ruin the sonar reception of the sensitive
tor.
blaval operations in the vicinity of fishing grounds 'ln be seriously hampered by foreign fishing vessels. lant NATO and naval fleet maneuvers can be post- fM halted, or interfered with by a handful of vessels p 'ng in the maneuvering areas. In addition, special t"ffr/o-like trawlers "fish” behind our carrier task forces grating in the Atlantic and gather electronic intelli- toice
0fcign trawlers represent a definite hazard to U. S. ( m3rine operations. Nuclear submarines have sur- only to find Russian trawlers steaming toward trn from 500 yards away. Rammings and bent perils ^ have resulted, and the possibility of a missing Sunk submarine disaster always exists.
,(j[i nc American fishing fleet provides an interesting rast to the modern task force of foreign trawlers
New England Fishermen—Imperiled Species 47
F< ’
H,
flanking the East Coast. Unlike the competing foreign fleets, our fishing fleet is not government-subsidized. The weary fisherman has been left standing in the bight caused by foreigners depleting his traditional fishing grounds, duty free import competition at home, and government restrictions. Consequently, our fishing industry is dying. Sons of fishing families turn to other lines of work, and this segment of our maritime heritage is lost with the passing generations.
As the fishing industry declines, banks and corporations are less willing to finance and outfit vessels and crews. The average American vessel fishing off the New England coast is 26 years old, underpowered, undersized, and ill-equipped to be economically competitive. Owing to the small margin of profit earned by even the best captains, loans are largely unavailable for overhauling and modernizing the boats. Because of the inefficiency of outdated equipment, the high probability of gear losses to foreign trawling, and the risk inherent in fishing, insurance corporations require a prohibitive price for protection. Insurance premiums have skyrocketed and most vessels and crews are underinsured. Modern foreign construction is not possible because of 46 U. S. Code 251 which requires any fishing vessel landing her catch in the United States to be U. S. built. This law prohibits American fishermen from taking advantage of foreign construction which would lower costs by 40 to 50%.
Although our fishing fleet has great strategic potential, it has never been fully used by our government. Unlike the Japanese and the Russians, very little coordination exists between our fishing fleet and the military. Both the Navy and the fishing industry gather hydrographic, oceanographic, and meteorological information. The data accumulated by our fishing vessels is pertinent to all types of naval operations and warfare. It could be applied to antisubmarine, submarine, amphibious, and mine warfare if the Navy and the fishing industry cooperated.
The U. S. fishing fleet should be incorporated into the scheme of antisubmarine warfare. Fishing vessels mount sonar equipment and can be employed as ASW platforms. They generally operate outside of commercial shipping channels and are, therefore, in areas of major submarine operations.
During wartime it will be necessary to assign all available destroyers to protect transoceanic convoys. By installing hand grenades and explosives on board sonar-mounting trawlers, these vessels can be used to harass submarines in destroyer-type tactics. Such "destroyer” trawlers can then be employed to convoy coastal traffic and protect focal points or ports from foreign submarines.
By stationing fishing vessels 1,000 to 2,000 miles at
sea, remote ocean surveillance against larger surface fleets or submarines can be undertaken. Fishing vessels with radios can notify the friendly forces of enemy movements so that defenses and surprise attacks can be organized, a favorite tactic of the Japanese during World War II.
Finally, the development of a transoceanic fishing fleet comparable to the Russian or Japanese fleet is necessary. An oceangoing fishing fleet would allow us to engage in the surveillance tactics currently employed by the Russians off our coast. Operational, environ-
mental, and intelligence data collected off enemy coasts would be of significant value to our nuclear submarines and to other types of U. S. naval operations.
It should be recognized by the government and by the American people that the New England fishing fleet is not yet incapable of restoring itself to the success it once enjoyed. The time has come for our government to stand with the fisherman and afford him the opportunity to compete in his chosen profession. The time has come to preserve this segment of the economy. Without these fisheries, the American consumer will be forced to pay the market price demanded by foreign nations.
In order to salvage the fishing industry, remedial action in three areas is needed. The first step would be to increase American fishing capacity. This would require government subsidy in accordance with Public Law 91-279, which extended and amended the U.S Fishing Fleet Improvement Act. This law authorized construction subsidies during 1970 and 1971. The funds to implement the program, however, were never appropriated.
During the early 1960s, a government subsidy pr°' gram for fishing boat financing was implemented. All but two of the vessels built under this program ended up in the black. Seafreeze Atlantic and Pacific, the two unprofitable vessels, accounted for over half of the funds appropriated under this program. Costing million dollars apiece, they mounted foreign gear that American fishermen could not operate. Recruiting crews for the vessels was difficult since they were designed to stay at sea for extended periods. In these respects the vessels were conceptual mistakes. The) wasted funds that would have resulted in profit-making vessels similar to the other smaller trawlers built under the program.
Public Law 91-279 is an extension of this progra”1 It contains two phases, each of which is desperate!' needed by the fishing industry. The Fishboat Subsid) Plan consists of a government construction subsid' which would support small private shipyards, current) falling into disrepair. The law would aid machinery an. parts suppliers through the construction and repair0 fishing vessels. The government would benefit by 1,1 creased tax revenue from shipyards, suppliers, and hsh ermen. Furthermore, unemployment would be reduce®' Direct and indirect taxes generated by a subside fishing vessel would return the subsidy in two to ^ years. .jc
The Capital Construction Fund portion of Pu Law 91-279 would allow an owner to place his earner in the fund before taxes htfd been levied. He requite his boat loan from the income he piaee the fund without having to pay Federal income
New England Fishermen—Imperiled Species 49
on that money. The profits remaining after payment #n his loan would then be taxed. In this way he would We more profit remaining than if he were taxed prior ,0 retiring his boat loan. Earlier, fishermen with older boats and a small depreciation allowance would not *11 their boats because of the resulting tax on the gain, ^nder the new program, the revenue from the sale ''ould be placed in the fund and not be taxed. In this *ay an owner could set aside a large portion of his ‘"come for construction or modernization without Wing to pay a tax on it. The yearly cost to the 'ixpayer for the funding of these two programs has Wn estimated at 20 million dollars, less than even the c°st of a single merchant ship.
Another step in the revitalization of our fishing fleet Wild be to provide a government insurance program b°r vessels and men. In addition, a program of com- Nsation for gear lost to foreign trawlers should be sPonsored by the government.
The future of the New England fishing grounds c°uld well be determined at the International Law of ’be Sea Conference, which is scheduled to convene in 'Wtantive session in the spring of 1974.
The Law of the Sea Conference presents a crossroads "Wh must be approached with an effective national P°licy supported by a firmly committed government. ^ must begin to protect the industry and to limit ^°'eign imports from nations which continue to exploit W natural resources off our coast.
Most importantly, the fishing stocks must be pre- Wed. An adamant national policy presented to the inference must demand nothing less than immediate Implementation of fishing controls off Georges Bank, decontrols must sustain the fish stocks to provide >r 'he future. Conservation measures can be effected J "vo ways, cither by extending our fishing juris- lc'ion to cover Georges Bank, or by designating spe- d quotas. The most desirable bargaining position for c United States would be to offer a species quota Ts'em
as a preferable international alternative to ex- tnded U. S. jurisdiction.
tsti;
"ot
^'CS of the maximum sustainable yield. If this is accomplishcd, no viable commercial fish stocks will
^ regulation by a species quota system is to be Cc'ive, it must be undertaken in three steps. Initially, Mediate legislation must establish emergency quotas each fish species. These quotas must be well below
l( at 'he time of final ratification by a quorum of t,;endant nations. Second, an international, coopera- ,0l’^entific effort must be established to study the fj^ 8y and the population dynamics of currently . SPec'es> anc^ to evaluate the exploration of new Cs' This research would refine the estimate of max
imum sustainable yield for each species and determine the time necessary to regain optimum level of harvest. Finally, permanent species quotas for the various nations must be established. Two important parameters in establishing these quotas should be considered. The conservation of the species is mandatory, and primary consideration for the nation adjacent to the fishing grounds should be authorized.
The government now argues that extending our territorial waters to include Georges Bank would threaten our national security. Both the Departments of State and Defense maintain that many nations would follow our lead by extending their jurisdiction over strategic waterways and strangling naval operations. Territorial waters should not be extended. Jurisdiction should include only the fisheries resources to provide conservation of the resource. Foreign vessels would be allowed to fish in these areas by license only, so that conservation measures could be enforced.
The upcoming Law of the Sea Conference glimmers as a last hope for the American fisherman. Few fishing vessels this year will be able to make a profit, and even fewer will be able to survive another year. Without change, our New England fishing industry may cease to exist within the next few years.
The proposed financing of the Ship Subsidy Program, the Capital Construction Fund, a government insurance program, and government compensation for lost gear are all valueless token programs unless the fisheries resource is preserved. It rests squarely upon the shoulders of our administration to formulate and support the national fisheries policy to be presented at the International Law of the Sea Conference.
It has been predicted that in the future man will live in the sea, farm the sea, and rely on the sea for a significant proportion of his protein. Our northeast fishing banks would then become a resource of even greater importance than can be appreciated today.
Will this resource be available when it is needed? If neglected, the answer is an irrevocable no.
Midshipman Rogcrson is a member of the Class of 1974 at the U. S. Naval Academy. His field of study is Marine Engineering. He seeks upon graduation an assignment with the nuclear submarine force. This essay won Second Honorable Mention in the U. S. Naval Academy Midshipman Essay Contest for 1973.