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The idea of transporting cargo across a land barrier that separates two bodies of water is by no means new. Probably the first major land bridge was across the Isthmus of Suez between the Mediterranean Sea and the Gulf of Suez with camel caravans as carriers. In our own hemisphere, the Isthmus of Panama became an important land bridge commencing in the early 1850s.
It was only a question of time and technology before these two short spans of land would be cleaved by canals. With the construction of the two great canals, it seemed to many that the land bridge concept was an idea whose time had come—and gone. Thus, it was somewhat of a surprise, as the 1960s drew to a close, to hear new talk about the feasibility of "land-bridging” containerized cargo across the United States.
But, as the discussion continued, the possibilities seemed to be outweighed by the problems, the most serious of which was the fundamentally different philosophies held by the blue water men and the railroaders. Steamship lines generally viewed containerization as an overall cost reduction approach whereas railroads considered container shipping a premium service similar to their domestic piggyback trailer operations.
To further frustrate land bridge advocates, U. S. routes seemed to be effectively roadblocked by government regulations, and American railroad rates were geared to domestic shipping.
Elsewhere in the world, nationalism further complicated matters. Where potential land bridge routes would cross two or more countries, problems caused by customs agreements, the development of traffic at the expense of ports and ocean carriers, and even different rail gauges had to be resolved first. Yet, somehow, between 1967 and 1972, the world’s two principal land bridge routes emerged. The development and success of each route has grown at about an equal pace, in spite of the fact that these two routes are roughly half the world apart and exist under vastly different political and economic systems.
The route most important to Americans is the North
American land bridge which uses various U. S. and Canadian rail routes to link major ports on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, and Pacific Coast with Gulf of Mexico ports. The other land bridge is the Siberian route linking Japan and Western Europe. This particular land bridge is one of the most unusual transportation arteries in modern history. While both operations are founded on the same basic principles, they are not comparable as each has its own characteristics.
The Siberian Land Bridge. In November 1967, the first trial shipment was made with 10 containers filled with household goods and office equipment moving from England to Japan via the Siberian land bridge route. According to reports this first Siberian land bridge movement was not impressive. It now seems that there was no commercial need or economic justification for such an overland route between Europe and Japan at that time. But this initial movement, and other movements of similar size that followed, did prove that such a route was technically possible and that further experiments in reducing transit time and improving service would be worthwhile.
After the completion of these trial shipments, three foreign freight forwarders in Japan began doing business as non-vessel operating common carriers (NVOCC) via the Siberian land bridge. Their operations were m alliance with influential forwarders in Europe and under license of the All-U.S.S.R. International Transport Corporation (Sojuzuneshtrano, generally referred to as SVT)- A master contract for land bridge operations was signed by representatives of both the Japanese and Russian
A modern container reloader unloads the Soviet motor ship Grodekovo at Nakhodka, near Vladivostok, the sole entry point for Siberian land bridge cargo destined for all of Europe. Westbound cargo is transported across the U.S.S.R- rail and, for the United Kingdom, Scandinaiia, or other West European countries, is dispatched by ship from the ISaltic ports of Riga, Tallin, and Leningrad.
Governments in Tokyo in September of 1970.
In the first quarter of 1972, an average of 200 to 300 containers (i.e., 20-foot modules) moved each month on the Siberian route. Although experts considered this a normal amount of traffic, an unforeseen circumstance—the Japanese merchant seamen’s strike effectively closed down cargo liner and container services to Europe—made 1972 a decidedly fortuitous year for the Siberian land bridge. This strike boosted the monthly land bridge total to 1,000 units by June of that year.
The Japanese strike provided the economic justification that had been lacking for the land bridge route. By the time the strike ended, the monthly volume had increased to 1,500 units. In the final quarter of 1972 the monthly volume averaged 2,000 units—1,500 units from Japan to Europe and 500 units from Europe to Japan.
The Siberian land bridge route has its eastern terminus in Japan’s major seaports: Kobe, Nagoya, Shimizu, Yokahama, and Tokyo. The first leg of the westward trip is accomplished by containerships across the Sea of Japan to the Russian port of Nakhodka, near Vladivostok. Here the containers are transferred to Russian rail cars for the continuation of their journey via Khabarovsk, Irkutsk, Omsk, Moscow, and on to either a port or a border crossing point.
Land bridge shipments destined for Western Europe, Scandinavia, and the United Kingdom are dispatched via the Baltic ports of Leningrad, Tallin and Riga. Shipments bound for inland destinations in Central Europe move through rail transfer stations located at Chop (Russian-Czech), Brest (Russian-Polish) and Ungeny (Russian-Romanian) border points. There the containers are transferred to Western European rail cars because of the difference in track widths. The only exception to the transfer point operation is for container traffic moving to or from Finland. Here no rail car change is necessary as Russian and Finnish railroads are of the same gauge.
According to earlier reports it was the problem of transferring containers between rail cars of different gauges that brought about the development of the alternate method of moving containers into the Western European area. With little publicity, but with British advice and technical assistance, a fleet of small containerships was built for service between the United Kingdom and Russia. By moving containers directly to and from Russian rail cars (at a port terminal) the transfer of containers between rail cars of different gauges at border exchange points could be eliminated. However, sufficient traffic appears to have developed to enable both systems to operate concurrently at a profit.
The containerships employed in this service accom
modate 20-foot containers and have a capacity of 120 to 150 units. A weekly service is maintained between Tilbury Docks in London, the Seaforth Container Terminal in Liverpool, and Leningrad. Preliminary reports indicate full loadings in both directions.
Service is also provided into Spain, Southern France, and Italy by means of two feeder ship routes from Russian ports on the Black Sea. The Ukrainian port of Zhdanov serves as the base for feeder ship service to Naples and Genoa. Odessa is the base port for service to Marseilles and Barcelona.
One of the most interesting aspects of the Siberian land bridge route is the fact that the initial (fflt Westbound) and terminal (for Eastbound) portion of the total transit is made by containerships. Unlike the European end of the system where a choice between the Baltic service or a Russian border interchange point is available, no choices are available in Japan because of its island geography. All land bridge containers arriving or departing must use the containership service linking Nakhodka with Japan’s major ports.
In early 1972, land bridge shipping interests in Japan asked the Russian state-owned, Vladivostok-based, Fat Eastern Shipping Company to provide a containership service between Japan and Nakhodka. In April 1972. the 3,860-ton converted log carrier Kavaerovo entered service between the two countries. Her container capae- ity was reported as being 55 20-foot containers. Injure she was replaced by the motor vessel Grodekovo with three others to follow: Pavlovo, Anadyrles, and
Rubtsavsk. Like the Kavaerovo, all four are reported 35 being semi-containerships that were converted from log carriers.
In late December 1972, the Leningrad built Pio,,tr Vladivostoka arrived in Japan by way of South Afnca' carrying a delivery voyage cargo of 217 containers o' peat moss. She was formally placed in service by thf Far Eastern Shipping Company on the Japan/ Nakhodka route on 2 January 1973.
The Pioner Nakbodki completed her delivery voyagc from Leningrad to Japan, also by way of South Africa in late February 1973. She inaugurated her service from Nakhodka on 5 March.
As of this writing, technical details of the Pio"1' Vladivostoka and Pioner Nakhodki are lacking but it15 known that the gross tonnages are 4,787 and 4,78 respectively. Both vessels are full containerships, e:uh having a capacity of 218 containers in terms of 20-(°°l equivalents.
In the commercial press these ships are described being in the Trans Siberian Container Service. In addition to the Pioner Vladivostoka and the Pioner Nakhodki, four semi-container ships, Grodekovo, Pavlovo, Anad)V and Rubtsovsk have been kept in the fleet. These f°ut
Land Bridge Comes of Age 41
ships appear to rotate, with two in service while the other two are in upkeep or temporary lay up. Therefore, Jt any given moment there are always four vessels in active operation between the Japanese base ports and Nakhodka.
Another problem of the Siberian land bridge was container supply. In the normal course of events in 'nternational ocean shipping, containers are supplied to 'he shipper by the ocean carrier who will transport the cargo. No ocean carrier can be expected to willingly permit its containers to be used in a land bridge route 'hat may compete with its own service. Even were there "o competition, ocean carriers would not want their equipment to be employed in services other than their own.
The problem of container supply for land bridge shipments was resolved by leasing containers in either Japan or Western Europe. Container leasing companies are very flexible and will lease container equipment on a one-way basis in quantities sufficient to meet traffic re<]uirements in either direction. Fortunately for land bridge shippers and consignees using the Siberian route, 'he larger leasing companies are established in Japan and throughout Western Europe. They have extensive networks of depots and agents that can supply containers for originating shipments, or take delivery of empty "nits after consignees have devanned the contents.
It is still too early to assess the full impact of the Siberian land bridge route. At present the total transit '■me between London and Tokyo is two or three days tas than the all sea route. Savings in shipping costs have been reported at 20% over the all sea route. Whereas three NVOCCs were active in land bridge operations in the beginning, this number has now §rown to twelve, all licensed by SVT. These include ^me of the most prominent names in the world of "Hernational freight forwarding together with a Japa- nese and Russian flag ocean carrier. Unlike the U. S. approach to intermodal transport, it is permissible in Japan and Russia for an ocean carrier to also operate Js an NVOCC.
the North American Land Bridge. The North Ameri- can land bridge is as unique as its Russian counterpart. There is, of course, the obvious geography difference. This applies not only to the location of each—roughly half the world apart—but also to their respective geographical compositions. In the Russian or Siberian bridge system, small containerships are used on the Astern end (the Sea of Japan) and in the western or European sector (Baltic and North Sea) particularly for b K. traffic. Conversely, the U. S. and Canadian routes are through rail movements from and to the major P°rts on either Coast.
In 1968, the concept of land bridge shipping across the United States was offered to the public as a regular service under the authority of a published tariff. As there are no transcontinental rail lines under one ownership or management linking both coasts of this country, it was necessary for two or more railroads that had coast to coast connections between them to create jointly such a service.
One of the earliest was the Santa Fe Railroad’s "Super C” service between Chicago and Los Angeles. Connections between New York and Chicago were offered by other railroads: the Penn Central, Erie Lackawanna, and three other eastern roads offering a joint service among them. These various railroads in combination offered the first fast intermodal train service from coast to coast with Chicago as the common interchange point.
Today, only five years later, this first land bridge rail service seems primitive. It was offered to domestic shippers and to the ocean shipping cargo liner services concurrently, under a freight-all-kinds (FAK) rate structure as a premium service employing both trailer- on-flatcar (TOFC) and container-on-flatcar (COFC) operations. From the standpoint of total transit time—three and one-half to four days—and operating efficiency, the service proved to be most satisfactory. It was the rate structure, the lack of joint or intermodal tariffs, and continued general satisfaction with existing ocean cargo liner services that kept pure land bridge shipping to a minimum.
For the next three years U. S. land bridge shipping grew at a slow but relatively steady pace. It was used for those few time-sensitive, high-value shipments that occur now and again. Perishable foods shipped in 40- foot refrigerated containers moved in season from California to Europe. And, as was the case when Japan’s seamen struck, the service was most used when longshoremen strikes closed the ports on either coast and containerized cargos moved to the ports on the opposite coast.
Early in 1972, two major American flag carriers filed identical intermodal tariffs with both the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) and the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). These tariffs were for West Coast European and East Coast Far East traffic which literally drew a straight line for containerized shipments moving in either direction. In this new thinking, the Panama Canal route, the vital link in all such sea route considerations since 1914, was no longer a factor.
Neither the FMC nor the ICC found the tariffs to be improper as the jurisdictional area of each Agency was adequately covered. As a result of these new tariffs, for the first time an ocean carrier could quote a through rate (combining ocean and rail freight charges) from
Yokohama to Baltimore, or from Los Angeles to London.
The filing of these tariffs and their acceptance was a bold step that was both necessary and overdue. In all probability it was the unanimous position of U. S. shippers and carriers of all modes plus the impressive advancements of Canadian land carriers and European ocean carriers in intermodal development that caused our own agencies to see that lack of adaptability on their part would be detrimental to the foreign commerce of the United States.
Fully aware of the additional business developed by a through service between those ports normally served on a coast by an ocean carrier, and those ports on the opposite coast not served directly by the carrier, other U. S. and foreign flag carriers proceeded to file intermodal tariffs of their own. These tariffs combined the best features of their ocean carrier service with those rail routings providing the most direct service to ports on the opposite coast.
Various schedules and illustrative route maps describing origin to destination containerized shipping services were published by both U. S. and foreign flag carriers in the commercial trade press. These give a good indication of the aggressive marketing of this first international intermodal transportation system.
In order to differentiate between those containerized shipments that move across the North American continent from one foreign country to another, as opposed to those cross country shipments that terminate or originate within the United States, the word "Mini- Bridge” was coined. For our purposes, let us use the following definitions:
► Land Bridge—containerized cargo moving between the Far East and Europe that travels trans-Pacific, North American Continent, trans-Atlantic, or vice versa.
► Mini-Bridge— containerized cargo that arrives at Atlantic Coast or Pacific Coast ports and then moves by rail to a consignee in a port area on the opposite coast or Gulf of Mexico. The reverse definition would apply for export shipments.
An unusual feature of mini-bridge is that the same traffic could be routed by ship direct to the destination port via the Panama Canal. As a result, ocean carriers serving both coasts compete with themselves when offering mini-bridge transport.
Cargo being discharged from the afterhold of a Japanese containersbip in Los Angeles may be transhipped by rail to an East Coast consignee (mini-bridge) or reshipped from an East Coast port (land-bridge) to Western Europe.
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The U. S. land bridge and mini-bridge systems have been accepted in the world of international distribution to the point where it is unlikely that any external economic forces could challenge their position. That the government is well aware of the importance of accommodating this intermodal traffic was confirmed on 20 February 1973 in a press release which announced the formation of the Interagency Committee on Intermodd Cargo (ICIC). This committee consists of staff members from the Civil Aeronautics Board, Federal Maritime Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission, and Department of Transportation. An outline of IClC’s program objectives clearly indicates that the land bridge system of transport will be greatly strengthened in the not-too-distant future.
Commercial Evaluation. After five years of slow but steady growth, the world’s two major land bridge routes now are capable of diverting cargo from well entrenched ocean carrier liner services. In both the Siberian and North American routes, technology" although at somewhat different levels—has played an important part in development.
From the standpoint of commercial transportation
Land Bridge Comes of Age 43
economics, land bridge has undoubtedly won itself a place in the world-wide distribution pattern of manufactured goods by either reducing present shipping costs (Siberian route), or by reducing total transit time (North American route). With other considerations being equal, cargo will gravitate to the lowest cost or minimum transit time route. Artificial and contrived though land bridges may be, they will for the present continue to reduce overall shipping costs and total transit time.
Military Land Bridge. The U. S. Army uses containers provided by the several U. S. flag ocean carriers under contract with the Military Sealift Command for the bulk of its point-to-point overseas traffic, and, in Edition, has about 5,000 20-foot containers of its own. These containers have the prefix letters MILVAN, which distinguishes them from the earlier and smaller CONEX container. These MlLVANs were built to established international standards and are completely interchangeable f°r handling and stowage in cellular containerships.
Military container shipping differs from its commer- c,al counterpart, most notably in the movement pattern S1nce many Armed Forces depots and bases are not near commercial installations. A second difference is the fact 'hit the container under military load and control is subject to diversion to another destination, in-transit "’irehousing requirements, and possible retention in 'be local area rather than return. The Armed Forces neod to control their own equipment at all times, but 'hey also need the speed and economy of both land bodge and mini-land bridge when projected movements combine both transcontinental and overseas shipping. The 20-foot MILVAN appears to be the answer as ‘t can fulfill all these requirements.
It is probable that the mini-bridge services would meet the transport needs of the Armed Forces to a far heater extent than land bridge itself. There are major defense supply depots on both Coasts that originate °verseas shipments which commence with a cross- c°untry rail movement. The movement of cargo from ne foreign country to another via the North American and bridge probably has a rather limited application r^usc of the volume of military cargo that might ^ expected, for example, to move directly between • S. bases in Germany and Japan.
In wartime, land bridges can become a vital transport ar'ery only if the route lies within the political juris- ‘ct‘on or military control of the user country and its les. Should our merchant shipping be insufficient or . e Panama Canal be closed to us, the North American "d bridge could contribute significantly to our sur- V‘Vah Land bridge shipping would expand rapidly to It'ect the wartime needs of industry and the Services.
According to current shipbuilding schedules, 1974 will be the final year in which new containership construction is placed in service in any appreciable number. Therefore, those containerships—both U. S. and foreign flag—that are in service by early 1975 will comprise the great majority of the world’s containership fleets for the next decade. Nearly all conventional break-bulk operators have already converted to containership services.
Barring unforeseen circumstances which could slow land bridge growth, the construction of new container- ship tonnage will be curtailed as a result of the land bridge development. A few long distance containership services via the Panama Canal could be discontinued as more containers are shipped via land bridge routes. This could increase requirements for container capacity and sailing frequency on the Atlantic and Pacific but this should be no problem. Both of these routes have adequate capacity to accommodate additional cargo.
When developing sealift contingency plans for the Armed Forces, the Department of Defense planners must constantly adjust or revise their plans to meet changing circumstances of both military requirements and sealift capabilities. There can be no doubt that the replacement of a relatively large number of general cargo liners, a type well suited to naval operations, by a small number of large cellular containerships—a type suited only for point-to-point lift—has caused considerable disruption in sealift capabilities planning. The problem of container logistics must also be fitted into plans since a containership without her complement of vans is like a rifle without bullets.
Unlike sealift requirements which can only be accommodated with fixed numbers of conventional and cellular containership tonnage, the U. S. land bridge capability can be expanded overnight in both capacity and service network. It is probably the only major land bridge route in the world that can be relied upon at all times and under all conditions for whatever may be required of it. And this requirement could range from total peace to total war. Fortunately for our country and its allies, this particular land bridge route lies within our boundaries.
Licucenant Saunders served on active duty in the USS President Adams (APA-19), USS Burdo (APD-133), USS Fairview (E-PCER-850), and USS Caloosahatchee (AO-98). As a student officer, he joined NROS 3-2, later transferring to the Staff as an Instructor. He was engaged in ship design work until I960, when he became active in the field of containerization and became container manager for a leading steamship agency in New York. He is a member of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers and the National Defense Transportation Association. At present he is employed with a leading West Coast Steamship agency.