Comment and Discussion

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Gmmander IT. N. Pugliese, U. S. Navy— Some of the real lessons of Vietnam appear to have escaped Captain Green- lacker, just as surely as they eluded a host of other respectable names.

^ History shows that for a nation to ^e*ist, it must be organized and possess a national will. The power of a nation to defend itself lies in the collective will °f its people, and its effective organ- nation for execution of the national "dll. South Vietnam appears to lack ⁿational unity, will, and organization, ^while the North had an overabundance °f those same commodities.

^ It is quite apparent that throughout course of the conflict in Vietnam, ’he amount of force which the North ^Used was usually graduated to the small- ^est scale estimated as being required for Access because of weapons supply. In tome areas of endeavor, however, this toale was of gigantic proportions (for Sample, anti-aircraft defenses). The ^Source of supply for the materials needed ^t0 support the fighting was obviously jtot in North Vietnam (or it would have ₁^cen bombed into oblivion). Therefore, “'Ouse the supply of munitions and "Opons controls the intensity with Il'ich war can be waged, and the source ^ °ot in North Vietnam, then the

Furthermore, although the United States initiated many military actions, the majority of such actions was in direct response to provocation by the North. Glaring initiatives such as annual Tet offensives plainly reflect control of the tempo of the war by the North.

► The sense of timelessness involved in the Vietnam war has been grasped by only a few western observers. The United States has been at war for a long time, but the reality of the situation is that the war has just been continued through another very short phase. With an end to U. S. involvement, the war will continue to its ultimate conclusion much the same as that concluded by Mao Tse-Tung in his "liberation” of mainland China. The United States was weary of this war, but it is well to remember that the winner is seldom the most weary in any contest.

The stated objective of the United States of ensuring the survival of South Vietnam as an independent nation, either as an ally, or at least not hostile, is indefensible. The geographic and political circumstances of South Vietnam are such that the national strategy of attempting to maintain a status quo could not be successful.

It is here that Captain Greenbacker approaches recognition of a "Vietnam lesson,” and then casts out any wisdom he may have gained. He states, "If the lesson of Vietnam is that we must be careful that our national reach not exceed our maritime grasp, the proper application of that lesson is to maintain or strengthen that grasp while operating

within its limits.” This indicates to me comprehension of the fact that success, not victory, was beyond our national grasp (maritime or any other grasp). However, it further indicates that military power, albeit limited by reality (dollars?), should be maintained or strengthened for carrying out national purpose in a cold war environment.

As a naval officer, I must agree that the Navy should be maintained and strengthened. I also must point out, however, that a poor harvest year in Soviet Russia has done more to ease the Cold War than any buildup of forces has ever accomplished. Of course, poor harvests overseas cannot be the basis for national policy; however, the economic facets of the cold war should be studied and well understood by the policy maker and the naval planner too.

The real lesson of Vietnam is that, short of total war, conventional military force must be reshaped, probably into socio-economically profitable tools of national policy, and kept clear of commitments such as Vietnam. In retrospect, applications of military force in

ENTER THE FORUM

Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication in these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged. The U. S. Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion published in the Proceedings.

such circumstances appear futile; and to our younger generation who rebelled, supported in large part by the intelligentsia of the nation, it appeared futile from any respect. Time will prove the correctness or futility of U. S. military involvement in Vietnam—and that will be the ultimate lesson.

"Modern Realities in Naval

and Foreign Affairs”

(See H. C. Bucknell, III, pp. 32-40, December

1972; and pp. 90-93, September 1973

Proceedings)

ColonelJack N. Rogers, U. S. Army Reserve, Military Intelligence— Since I first entered the military Service 29 years ago, I have held to the evidently erroneous belief that my "basic goal” as a soldier was to ", . . uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States.” Now, Mr. Barrett, in his comments on Captain Bucknell’s article, tells us that, "after all, our basic goal is a world of free and independent nations,” which appears to me to be an entirely different thing. If Mr. Barrett holds dear the "basic goal” he states, I wonder what his decision will be, or for that matter what his decisions have been in the past, when he is carrying out his duties in the U. S. Department of State and must take some action in a case where the pure national interest of the United States is in clear conflict with his view of improving the "world.”

Further, Mr. Barrett states that he seeks "actively and realistically to strengthen the peacekeeping and peacemaking facilities of the international community,” and that what is needed is ", . . active, honest, and reasonably humble diplomacy in the United Nations, O.A.S. [Organization of American States}, and elsewhere.” Unfortunately, he does not tell us how we can build up the U.N. militarily and still maintain our own national sovereignty. We don’t control the U.N. It is controlled in a great majority by nations of people who have no heritage of freedom and have not the slightest interest in maintaining freedom in the United States.

If this is truly the "diplomat’s approach” and is the accepted point of view in the U. S. Department of State,

then thank God we still have a Navy, and the rest of our Armed Forces made up of men sworn to defend our Constitution against all enemies, for we are surely going to need them. If the "diplomats” have come to the point of believing that we have no enemies, or that we can be protected against them by Mr. Barrett’s brand of baloney and the United Nations, then I recommend the officer exchange program between the Navy and the Department of State be scrapped forthwith, before the infection spreads and a military officer’s oath of office becomes meaningless.

ill

It is an insidious and very serious danger to dilute basic bed-rock loyalty to the United States with these internationalist theories. The fundamental and overriding goal of every military officer and every officer of the Department of State should be the same, above all other considerations, the continued national security of the United States and the maintenance of the freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. Deviation from this standard will inevitably bring about progressive disaffection, disloyalty, and treason. These words are harsh, but what else can we say of an officer in the service of his country who has higher loyalties than those he has sworn to uphold?

fed

Thom Hook— In a phone con versa¹ with my friend, Gordon Vaeth, we

I enter a plea for rationality on this subject. What will be the result if the "balance of powers” advocated by Mr. Barrett falls suddenly out of balance through a working alliance of all the Communist nations together in an attack upon the United States? Is this an unreasonable possibility? Particularly is it unreasonable if these Communist nations come to believe that the United States won’t fight, because its officer corps and its State Department have become indoctrinated with the idea that the "international community” is more important than national sovereignty? May I suggest that to be secure, we must consider the actual capabilities of our potential enemies, rather than speculate upon their future intentions.

reasons the Daughter of the Stars not flee from that fatal thunderst⁰

It was six. Sorry, Gordon, but

Mr. Barrett pleads for more "political military expertise.” From what he says in his letter, I certainly agree that the Department of State could use some officers trained in this field. He ignores the political facts of life which, through ideology, bind the Communist nations

together against us. He also says noth ing of the Soviet arms buildup whid* is obviously beyond any remote possibility of control through the U.N.

There are worse dangers to our nation than competition with the Communist*

"The Sea, 1967-1972”

(See J. D. Hayes, pp. 296-310, May 1973 Proceedings, Naval Review Issue)

Lieutenant James F. Drahos, U. S. Reserve, Second Officer, M/V Hughd Glomar Explorer—I would like to c^flt' rect an error in the essay by Adm^d Hayes. The Glomar Conception and tl* Glomar Grand Isle are not "large-typt⁰¹ platform support vessels.”

These two vessels belong to $ Global Marine’s growing fleet of propelled drilling ships and are capa^ of drilling to depths of 25,000 feet i*j water in excess of 600 feet. Addition*

specifications are: length, 400 beam, 65 feet; depth, 27 feet, 6 incheSi draft, 20 feet, 10 inches loaded; dispb^cC ment, 11,200 tons loaded; su pply of ity, 6,000 tons; speed, 12 knots.

This class of drillship carries suffieie¹¹* diesel fuel to operate for over 100 da)' without replenishing. She is a ^se sufficient base, having berthing, feeding laundry, recreation, and medical facili'^lP for the crew, independent of on-sh⁰^ camps or bases. This contrasts shat?¹' with the size of most, and the purp°- of all, supply boats (oil platform supP° ships), which are about 160 to 190 long, and less than 300 gross tons.

"Daughter of the Stars”

(See J. G. Vacth, pp. 61-67, September Proceedings)

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dis

cussed whether the Shenandoah's p⁰"^ plant had six cylinders, as I will^sa)’ my forthcoming book, or eight, . Gordon said in the article. We ag^f^₍ to let Jane’s All the World’s Aircraf¹ ® 1923 and 1925 decide what we ^ agreed is not an inconsequential P°'ⁿ'|_lC since lack of power was one of ¹ ^

85

Comment and Discussion

for an otherwise excellent article that divulged some facts about the Shenandoah that had eluded me during a solid Fear's research on the subject.

Lionel John M. Verdi, U. S. Marine Corps weme (Retired)—I am disappointed 'hat no mention was made of Dr. Jerome Hunsaker, who headed the de- ^s'gn tarn and supervised the conduction of ZR-i, nor of the ship’s exec (then lieutenant commander) Charles hosendahl, who saved the lives of the $ survivors by free-ballooning the aft Action of the ship to a successful land- 'ⁿg. The available issue of the M.I.T. ^Cjtalogue lists Dr. Hunsaker as Dean Emeritus of the Department of Aero- ^r,Jutical Engineering, and I believe (I hope) Admiral Rosendahl is still in residence at Toms River. Certainly there is ¹¹⁰ one in this country (and since the Fussing of Dr. Durr and Dr. Eckener, Probably no one in the world) who kttows more about the construction and ^ration of rigid airships, and I’m sure 'hey would have appreciated being remembered along with their ship.

^U$S Nevada (BB-36)

Musician Mike Af. Hammond, U. S. ^ty (Retired), Historian, USS Nevada Relation—Through 19 annual reun- ^l0ns of the USS Nevada Associa- ^tl!)n—and continuing—I have been the location’s historian. I was also presi- ^tnt for two of those years. In gothic

lettering, I have hand-printed on parchment paper, the activities of the reunions, including facsimilies of programs, and the like, and bound them in tooled leather covers in four-year volumes. Many mementoes of interest pertaining to the ship have been donated by shipmates for display at the reunions. A highly-detailed history of the ship is also in the making. I mention these facts merely as a matter of passing interest. My main point is in regard to the model of the ship which 1 have constructed.

The model was constructed on the scale of one-eighth of an inch to the foot of the prototype. The model is 72% inches in length overall, and 13% inches across the beam. The hull was carved from layers of close-grained ponderosa pine, using patterns at various frames, secured with screws and contact cement and hollowed. The fo’c’s’le and main deck aft were covered with scribed birch veneer. Most of the top hamper is of sheet brass, tubing and angle bars, soldered together. The screws were fashioned from bronze stock. The main battery guns are of steel, complete with tompions, and the 5-inch mount guns are of steel, with bronze face plates. The stern crane consists of 105 pieces and each 40-mm. mount consists of 65 pieces.

The screws, rudder, and running lights are remote wire-powered, and the anchor chains are stoppered and secured with pelican hooks. I obtained signal flags from a model manufacturer which are close to scale. On the port side, in plain English rather than in code, the

hoists spell out, "Welcome shipmates, USS Nevada (BB-36) reunion.” The outboard hoist on the starboard side in the names of pre-war days spells, "Sail- Hypo—William,” a signal known to all in those days, which meant "Cease present exercises.” Also hoisted is a handmade, two-star admiral’s flag.

My wife made a suggestion that the ship have a crew, so from a model manufacturer I obtained some lead figures, which measured out to be five-feet, ten- inches tall in scale. I painted and affixed white hats, and installed them on board.

"The Military Critic”

(See P. M. Flammer, pp. 28-36, March; p. 83,

July; and p. 97, August 1973 Proceedings)

Lieutenant John A. Van Devender, U. S. Navy— What are the underlying irritants that cause the disgruntled officer to separate at the first available opportunity? One is the emasculation of the individual’s initiative and sense of prestige. This is a complex problem involving the relegation of the officer’s life work to the filling of statistical blocks, the erosion of the officer’s personal sense of indispensability within the chain of command, and the absence of short term, meaningful goals from which the officer can take pride. Secondly, disillusionment often results from the awareness by junior officers of the lack of moral courage on the part of their superiors.

Consider the flight student. Over a period of two years as an instructor, I learned that the high morale and dedication of these young men were severely tested over the months, but that the goal of becoming a naval aviator was enough to override any of the hardships they were to endure. They were willing to do whatever was required to reach that Fleet cockpit and glory. (There are parallels in the cases of the officer candidate or midshipman.) Morale is high and the percentage desiring a naval career corresponds.

The first cracks occur when the student encounters something called the pilot training rate, which requires the student to be pushed to the maximum limit of his capabilities in order to complete the syllabus as quickly as possible. This works strain on both the instruc-

tors and the students, with a corresponding decrease in the quality of actual training. Yet the percentage of aviators actually getting Fleet seats out of the training command is inordinately low. Many good solid aviators and officers will spend their initial tours of duty behind desks in such non-careerenhancing billets as BOQ officers or special services assistants (coffee runners). The effect of all this leaves a lingering taste in the mouths of the young officers.

CRUISE

of the LANIKAI

luritewnit to Har

A sometimes rollicking, other times deadly serious classic that encompasses all of the elements of human interest. For more than thirty years, Admiral Tolley, l.anikai’s one-time commanding officer, has searched out the background surrounding the remarkable mission of the old sailing schooner—a secret operational cruise ordered by President Franklin I). Roosevelt. Aside from the unique saga of the cruise, the tale of the Lanikai is interwoven with the concurrent train of events which ended with the fall of Java. The interplay of international relationships, and the internal squabbling among high level military commands on the eve of world disaster all flow smoothly into a compelling narrative.

1973. 360 Pages. Illustrated. Bibliography.

Index.

Another major problem is what might be called the "One Navy” syndrome. The increase in the rights and privileges of the enlisted ranks has subtly but definitely detracted from the prestige of the junior officer. The decline in appearance and the associated decline in discipline has closed the gap which ought to separate officer and enlisted. The One Navy concept, while not without its good points, has discredited the "spit and polish” which is the cornerstone of the pride of self and pride of unit, essential to the morale of the officer and enlisted man. A major re

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cruiting program is aimed at the honor and pride of the naval officer corps and this is as it should be; yet the words have a hollow tone. The sacred "special trust and confidence” that is the hallmark of the junior officer is less and less evident and it is this erosion that takes the greatest toll from the officer’s personal sense of worth.

ties in the critical areas of look-oui trine, and the severe penalties asst*¹³^ with errors in judgment have prod³¹ a robot-like attitude among pu°^ts j ward their airborne procedures, j unthinking adherence to rules h'³ them into never attempting new ¹ or deviating from established P^fC*_f dures. A favorite expression from ³ cates of more stringent controls is hf. .. heard more and more: "the days ot ,.

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A point to be considered when evaluating the motives of young men is the importance they place on their "heroes.” A fundamental drive behind a naval career is aspiration for command. To many young officers, there is nothing more impressive than the thought of leading a group of fearless men into combat (or simply leading men, period). This reaches its epitome when commanding a squadron or ship. The thought of assuming responsibility and authority over a small fighting unit culminates a successful career. It appears, however, that more and more, the authority and decision-making powers of the CO are being shortened as intermediate commands are set up. The junior officer now sees his immediate superior,

while retaining responsibility for ¹ command, being backed into cofl¹^ The CO does not set policies and pities as he once did within his own mand. Prime examples of this are ¹ establishment of basic training plans¹ entire aviation communities dut* turn-around cycles, requirements ³ reporting in detail the progress of tenance and operational programs higher authorities, and in some the requirement by intermediate m¹* mands of special restrictions in implementation of organizational F^r‘ grams. The promulgation of all-eno’* passing policies and directives sevc^ hamper the squadron CO from shaf^:'- his command along the lines he feels¹¹⁽¹ essary from his close observation of³¹"¹ performance.

The promise of adventure and ^! ‘ challenge of danger were major reas⁰" why many joined the Navy. The ex^f ment associated with naval aviation any of the branches, elevated the ^nJ' officer a cut above the average nin^c"‘ five civilian. With the ever increas'¹ importance of safety, however, the da* ing image of the naval aviator is ^ diminished in the eyes of the U³) officer himself. The vague term "p^ri,t^ sional” has become the ideal for wh> all must strive. No longer, in ¹ austerity-minded view of high mand, may the young pilot push aircraft or himself to the limits, exp³¹'¹ ing his knowledge and his abilities-

Dependence on radar separation^Jl’ strict traffic control has reduced his^3P

scarf-in-the-wind aviator are long# This may be true, but gone, too, ^ be those qualities which proved so

able in combat—aggressiveness, ³? ,

of thought and action, and 'ⁿ‘^,e .₍₁. knowledge of equipment—all ^3re ' ficed to a degree in the interest of The by-product of enforced ^ ^ emphasis on safety is mediocrity.^3,1

87

Comment and Discussion

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What can be done to improve on the present situation? One of the first and most important steps, is the reinstitu- '•on of the military image as an elite group working as a team. This can be ftcomplished in many ways, but only ¹¹ the command level. The junior officer has to be impressed with the idea that he is integral to the chain of command, ^lhat his ideas and his beliefs make a difference within his own sphere of influence. To accomplish this, the "one mistake and you’re out” attitude about fitness reports should be eliminated. Personality differences, which will crop ^UP, should not have the career destroy- ^lng capabilities that are presently evident.

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More should be done to strengthen 'fle unit commander’s authority and Vestige. He should be given more flexi- dity in his exercise of command with ^cmphasis on end result proficiency in- ^t(;id of basic safety record. (Of course, Mklessness is not to be tolerated.) This "'ll serve to increase the junior officer motivation and carry over into an in- ^CrtJse in individual proficiency. The '’gw spirit is the incentive enabling the ^Jggtessive JO to endure the separations ^ hardships associated with naval fvice throughout the years, and it °uld be developed to its maximum

Potential.

I^fie military provides, for certain ^lr|ds of people, the opportunity to !^0rk with others toward the accom-

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With the extension of time in grade h°r ensign and lieutenant (j.g.), an opportunity for institution of short term Ms is readily available. Promising l°ung officers should be selected early, ¹¹ intervals basically equivalent to the ^0r'ginal time in grade requirements re- <*ntly extended. This would strengthen ^ prestige of the motivated junior officer while preserving the monetary ^Savi_ngs gained by limiting advancements. The officers not making the early elections would then be advanced ac- ^c°rding to the new time-in-grade retirements.

., '^mei't of ideals transcending the _Cj^C,'^{an ma}king a living” trap of the

'^an ^^{CrC Can wof}k fi°^r both God

^ country in the tradition of selfless ^en through the ages. But, if he ob

serves those ideals being endangered by the ascendance of mediocrity, or the creeping decay that has characterized the mercenary throughout history, he will be forced by those very ideals to separate from the Service.

When the military has to say "So long, Tiger,” as it now does to these men, the real danger of the junior officer crisis is evident.

"Graduate Education—

The Continuing Imperative’’

(See M. Freeman, pp. 56-60, September 1973 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Myron Hura, U. S. Navy—To date, 1 have not seen a cost analysis which indicates that the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) program is less expensive or more cost effective than a comparable degree program in a civilian university.

Attempts to dismiss studies, which indicate the higher cost and economic inefficiency of the NPS graduate program as compared to civilian university programs, without offering statistical figures or a single reference that supports such dismissal should be considered irresponsible.

As an example of the costs that can be expected at civilian institutions, I would like to cite the average costs incurred by the staff members of the UCLA NROTC Unit (Naval Officers) in obtaining M.S. degrees at UCLA. The educational costs per quarter depending on field of interest (and state of residence) ranged from $400 to $900. On the average, a total of five quarters were required to complete the program. Therefore, the total costs of obtaining a master’s degree at UCLA ranges from $2,000 to $4,500. Similar costs can be expected at other state university systems.

It is hard to perceive how the NPS graduate program can be considered less expensive than a comparable civilian university program. For years, the Army and the Air Force have been sending their officers to civilian universities for graduate education. Obviously, their cost analysis studies are not in agreement with Admiral Freeman’s assertions.

The statement that only 20% of NPS students could gain entrance to civilian

institutions for postgraduate programs is a revelation. If this figure is accurate, we should begin to worry about the caliber of our officer’s undergraduate programs. Admissions to civilian university graduate programs are based on undergraduate academic performance and graduate record exams. Time out from school and type of employment subsequent to graduation from college are given little consideration. Obviously, civilian universities feel that a good undergraduate program is essential for graduate education. I see no reason why the same criterion is not used for NPS applicants. It appears counter-productive to provide graduate education to individuals who were incapable of good performance as undergraduates.

The notion that in-house education programs are as conducive to broadening the individuals’ capacity for original thought as civilian universities is at least questionable. At a graduate educational level, the quality of the institution’s faculty is only one factor in the development process of original thinking. Civilian universities provide the exposure to a diversity of ideas, personal interests, modes of life, career programs, and conflicts of interest not found within the student body and faculty of NPS. A career naval officer in a civilian university is one component of that community and, as such, has complete freedom to pursue any interest that he desires. The NPS offers a limited number of graduate fields of study and exposes students to a community of individuals interested in pursuing the same career— Naval Science.

Lieutenant Commander DavidJ. McNunn, U. S. Navy and Lieutenant Commander Richard S. (Howard, U. S. Navy—The author finds "basically non-substantive” the concept that graduate education of naval officers at civilian institutions has a broadening effect. Yet, except for a short discussion concerning faculty parochiality at civilian graduate schools, the burden of proof for such a statement remains with the author.

As officers currently under instruction at Georgetown University, we are obliged to comment on our experience as students in the Navy’s international

relations postgraduate curriculum. We have found the faculty by no means parochial in outlook; it is responsive to our academic needs and the Navy’s requirements, and well-disposed toward the naval profession.

Diverse views have been presented, but never forced. The atmosphere has also been refreshingly free of antimilitary bias. In the student-to-student relationships, we may not have prompted a rush to the recruiting center, but we believe that the exposure has helped dispel some of the naive antimilitary conceptions. We recognize this in no way obviates the need for a strong NPS. Indeed, the NPS is clearly best suited to meet the predominately technically-oriented graduate education requirements. Our experience does, however, suggest that civilian education is not only broadening for the officers so assigned, but also in the wider context of American society, and merits inclusion in Navy postgraduate education of the future.

. Going, Going, Gone!”

Captain Ernest W. Longton, U. S. Navy {Retired)—The USS Hopkins (DD-249) was one of a number of San Diego-based ships which made a summer cruise to the East Coast in 1934. On arrival in New York, some of the players in the accompanying picture enjoyed a fine liberty and, in the process of establishing good relations with the city police, bragged about their baseball team. Somehow, they managed to give the police the impression that they were the Fleet champions.

The police immediately set up a game for the following Sunday between the New York City Police Team and the "Fleet Champs.” Since the game was to be a charity benefit, the police used sound trucks all over New York to publicize the event. A huge crowd attended. The Hopkins team had always been pretty good, but that day they hit like never before. Fortunately, they lived up to their assumed name by soundly beating the police team. The police entertained the team at a big banquet after the game and all hands had a wonderful time.

The New York Tims gave the game quite a spread. They were especially in-

terested in the Hopkins’ first baseman. In addition to hitting well, he threw off his shoes after the first inning and played the rest of the game barefoot. As a boy, he had always played barefoot and this was the only way he ever played. He claimed shoes hurt his feet.

By the next day, James L. Holloway, the Hopkins’ skipper, began to receive messages from other ships requesting a game with the "Fleet Champs.” Of course, the real Fleet Champs sent a message, too. Although our team was anxious and willing to play anyone, Captain Holloway decided that to be champions for a day was sufficient and, rather than press our luck, he declined.

The Great Carrier Debate

Lieutenant William J. Veigele, U. S. Naval Reserve {Retired)—For many years, with increasing intensity, our Fleet composition has been under scrutiny. Most recently, this focused on what could be termed "The Great Carrier Debate.”

Friend and foe, proponent and antagonist vied in private and public about the virtues and deficiencies of aircraft carriers, especially attack carriers. News, literary, and professional magazines and journals were a favored medium for the debate. Both the Proceedings and Seapower magazines carried many of the presentations.

A casual glance at the tables of contents of these two publications shows 15 articles in the Proceedings between 1968 and 1972, some of which were Prize Essays, and ten in Seapower be

tween 1969 and 1972, specifically abou¹ carriers. In addition, each magazine cd¹' tained numerous comments, letters, I®” editorials on the subject. There also »^el< many other articles which included ⁰¹ dealt in part with the pros and cons⁰ carriers. And, of course, there were tl* congressional hearings in 1969 on tl* status of naval ships.

Most of these declarations were & vorable to carriers. Considerable tale¹¹¹ and influence from the naval, milit^jr)' professional, and the news report>ⁿf communities were assembled by ^ forces proposing further developm^tf! and expansion of our carrier fleet. Art*¹ ulate arguments from authorities "'^e,( used to defend the present carrier fo^tCt and to justify its expansion. Dignity and authorities such as Adrn^,rJ Thomas H. Moorer, Admiral El¹"⁰ Zumwalt, Admiral John S. McCain,}■’ Admiral Stansfield Turner, R^eF^ff sentative Craig Hosmer, George ^ Ashworth, George Chapman, and Edg¹' Prina were active in the debate. T>^f' stated variously that possibly more tb^,n 25 carriers would be necessary for ^ollf

Communist imperialism, and defense⁰ the United States. Admiral Moorer"⁰ quoted as stating that at least 15 arta*. carriers were needed. Eloquent pk^J were made for more than four nude^Jf powered carriers.

world commitments, containment

The debate reached an apparent°^rC scendo this past year. No articles I'¹' appeared in the Proceedings on this - ject, for example, since the First H‘^irH able Mention Prize Essay by Gf'-¹

Comment and Discussion 89

Schratz in August 1972, which has been followed in subsequent issues by many observations and comments. After this time, it began to appear that the debate had ended, carrier advocates had lost, and the U. S. Navy would not expand or even maintain its carrier forces.

One illustrative item in the Proceed- ms in December 1972 conceded that Admiral Zumwalt predicted that the Navy would have only 12 attack aircraft carriers, including four nuclear-powered ships, by 1980. This represents a decline in force from 24 in 1968 to 16 in 1972 to 12 in 1980. Seven of the 12 will be 30 years or older at that time. This is in spite of the numerous predictions by Admirals, members of the administration, and Congressmen, that without ^J larger number of carriers, the United States would forfeit to Communist Russia the control of the seas.

What happened? Were all the authorities on naval strategy and tactics so "'tong that their theses could not be defended? Were these articulate persons 'ncapable of clearly presenting their case to the decision makers, or were the decision makers influenced and mislead

by unimportant and specious arguments?

We who witnessed the debate, and especially those who were swayed affirmatively by the great mass of seemingly logical evidence, have a right to know why the advocates of a large, modern carrier force were not successful in winning the debate. In addition, and of more importance, an analysis and critique of evidence and events is justified to determine if proper and true cases were presented, if the resulting decisions were based on rational judgments, and if these decisions were in our best longterm interests, or if they merely satisfied present expediency. The issue is too essential for us to brush aside and turn instead to other contemporary events.

I believe that it is in the national interest, just as was the debate itself, to analyze its results. The protagonists and those who made the decisions should now be invited to state their epilogues. In particular, the victors in the debate should give evidence supporting the negative decisions that have been made. Communist acquiescence or inferior technology, increased aid from our allies,

new ships or strategy, miscalculation of needs, budget restraints, lack of national determination; what are the reasons? We were told repeatedly that world freedom and our national life depended on an increased carrier force. Should we not be informed then of why this force is not to be provided?

"Russia’s Fictitious Naval Tradition"

(See P. J. Rollins, pp. 65-71, January; and p. 93, June 1973 Proceedings)

Arthur J. Hathaway, Jr.—Whether or not Western writers "create and foster” a mythical Russian naval tradition would appear to be of little consequence. Naval confrontations are not decided by recitations of the opponents’ naval tradition; they are decided by the men and weapons on hand at the time.

GRAND STRATEGY

Principles and Practices by John Collins

most complete one available. It includes many entries that are in common use, but have never been formally defined.

. . . the Vietnam case study is unique. No one else has reviewed that conflict in an integrated strategic context that takes cognizance of fundamentals.

The author has been Director of Military Strategy Studies, and Chief of the Strategic Research Group at the National War College and is now Senior Specialist in National Defense Congressional Research Service.

Grand Strategy should be part of every professional library.

Grand strategy, the art and science of employing national power and influence to attain national security objectives is the most important and least understood aspect of national defense.

. this is the only book on grand strategy. Liddell Hart's classic Strategy contains a seven-page chapter on the subject. Most texts ignore it entirely.

. this is the only book that surveys the full scope of U. S. defense strategy in a way that correlates national security interests, objectives, policies, and concepts with national power and strategic constraints.

• the glossary of strategic terminology is the

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Lawrence F. I lamp—The remark by Dr. Rollins that ". . . current developments depart significantly from the historical

pattern . . is open to debate and attack from any number of directions.

The failure of the Russians to put a fleet at sea in modern times in no sense indicates a lack of desire to do so. Bad luck, war, economic depression, and a host of other causes have prevented, until recently, a Russian fleet-in-being.

The modern Soviet Navy exists only because the economic situation within the Soviet Union has allowed the necessary expenditure. The Russian people are willing to bear the burden to avoid humiliation at sea, and currents in world affairs have allowed the allocation of men and material to naval pursuits.

There is no significant departure from the pattern of Soviet naval strategy. The arrival in large numbers, of attack aircraft carriers, the current offensive surface units, or a system that negates the value of carriers, will herald the arrival of an offensive-minded Soviet Navy. Until that time, the Soviets must be thought to be planning denial of command of the sea to the west, rather than planning on controlling the seas for themselves.

"CHD—The Heart of

Military Readiness”

(See W. V. R. Vicweg and D. A. Lee, pp.

49-55, June 1973 Proceedings)

Commander Lawrence H. Schlang, U. S. Naval Reserve-R—One of the possible coronary heart disease risk factors not mentioned in the article is the ubiquitous Navy coffee mess. Recent studies by a group of doctors from the Boston University Medical Center indicate that people who drink more than five cups of coffee per day are twice as likely to have a heart attack than non-coffee drinkers. In this research, a number of patients admitted to hospitals with acute myocardial infarctions were compared to a control group of four times as many patients who were admitted for other than heart attacks. All the heart attack victims were found to have consumed appreciably greater quantities of coffee. The researchers suggested that the caffeine in coffee has the ability to liberate stored fat into the bloodstream and elevate the cholesterol level.

One of the weaknesses of most articles on heart disease is the statistical

analysis to show cause and effect with little mention of the physiological factors involved. Unfortunately, this article suffers from this same weakness. Specifically, the paragraph on obesity should point out that for every pound of excess fat on a person, there are approximately 200 more miles of capillaries that the heart must pump blood through. This is in addition to the work required to carry around each extra pound. The relationship between obesity and high blood pressure can be readily seen from this physiological analysis. Lose weight and the blood pressure will drop.

Another point worth mentioning is physical conditioning. Physical conditioning per se won’t prevent CHD, but it can mitigate the effects of occluded coronary arteries. Before discussing the beneficial effects of exercise, it would be worthwhile to include more detail in the simplified diagram of the heart shown in Figure 1 of the original article. The

left coronary artery actually divides into branches. These branches continue to divide and subdivide. The branches eventually connect together and converge to form a network. This network forms detours and bypasses (called anastomosis) between the left and right coronary arteries. Thus, with these detours, if one of the arteries become occluded with fatty deposits, the bypass connections in the arterial network establish a collateral circulation path allowing blood to reach the rest of the heart muscle. Therein lies one benefit of exercise and physical conditioning.

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Exercise increases the vascularity aflt resiliency of the arteries and builds up the arterial detours. It does this by dill¹' ing the arteries during exercise when tb^£ heart is demanding increased amount⁵ of oxygen carrying blood. It should be pointed out, however, that only those types of exercise that increase the ox)" gen delivery requirements to the hear¹ are the most beneficial in ameliorating the debilitating effects of coronary heart disease. For instance, isometric exercise⁵’ wherein the shape and length of the muscle do not change, do little to in' crease oxygen demand to the heart, and thus are of little value in combating CHD. In overcoming the deleterious effects of coronary heart disease, those exercises that work the heart and circulatory system, and assist in weight control should be considered.

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Although the authors suggest a simple physical fitness test in their article the test is just a rough measure of physical fitness and is not a valid yardstick for measuring incipient CHD. Autopsies performed on deceased athletes and other persons in seemingly excellent physical condition, have disclosed heavy fatty deposits and occluded arteries. P0⁵' sibly a more meaningful index would be a quantitative scoring of a person’s susceptibility to CHD based on the risk factors enumerated in the article and other valid medical criteria. This test could be used to screen out potential recruits and officer candidates w ho fill outside the accepted numerical parameters of the CHD Susceptibility Index. For those already in the Service, deviation from accepted limits would signal medical personnel to counsel and monitor the potential CHD victim, and to implement a physical fitness program and diet control for that individual.

"Nordic Balance in the 1970s

(See A. L. Romancski, pp. 38-41, August

1973 Proceedings)

Commander Robert C. Steensma, V- Naval Reserve-R— Having recently returned from nine months as a Fulbrigb' lecturer at the University of JyvSsky® in Finland, where I was able to observe closely the difficult problems of Finnish neutrality, I find Colonel Romanesk'⁵ assessment of Finland’s position in F¹¹

Comment and Discussion 91

^,0pean politics and east-west relation- ®ips both accurate and enlightening.

During my time in Finland as I forked with Finnish university students ^nging from the conservative to the ^radical, I found the Finns to be very friendly toward the United States. Many ^,Jf them had visited the United States ¹⁵ high school students, as summer ^Camp counselors, or as on-the-job train's in American industry and business; ^ln<l many of them, as well as their dders, are members of the Finnish- Wrican Society, which has some ^f«,0OO members. Except for the radicals (*t most 20%, including the Communis), they were very restrained in their ^tomments on the 1972 election, the ^tergate affair, and American involvement in Vietnam. By and large, they ^st>U look upon the United States with ^miration, while on the other hand % view the Soviet Union with varying Agrees of amusement, contempt, and fear.

But, as Colonel Romaneski points °^ut, Finland occupies a delicate and Peculiar position in European affairs. As ’f'e only eastern European nation which '•d not disappear behind the Iron Cur- ^tJln> it finds that many of its political, gnomic, and military decisions must ’^K made in the light of its close geo- 8^raphic proximity to the Soviet Union, * situation which is, at worst, perilous ^S|d, at best, uncomfortable.

Economically, for example, Finland j^lfres that it must join the European conomic Community (EEC) in order to ’’’dntain and protect the trade rela- ^tlonships essential to the continued 'til-being of its wood and metals insides. Illustrative of this fact is that ^ln *971 about 22% of Finland’s exports 26% of its imports were derived ^r°m trade with the EEC nations, while J® of its exports went to the eastern- °^c countries, from which Finland re- ^Ct|ved 32% ₀f ;_ts imports (in the same Finland exported only 5.5% to the ^nited States and Canada and imported '**)• Over the past year or so, the lotion of joining the EEC has been a ^Vo*atilc one which has engendered a ^’d deal of debate in the news media ^d occasioned numerous street demon- , ^atl°ns and petitions. The debate has ₍^en heightened by the nagging realiza- ⁾⁽¹ that the Soviet Union does not

approve of Finnish participation in the European Economic Community.

Further, as Colonel Romaneski suggests, Finland must weigh every diplomatic policy against the provisions and emotional coloration of the Mutual Assistance Treaty of 1948, which evolved from Finland’s two wars with Russia in 1939 to 1940 (The Winter War) and 1941 to 1944 (The Continuation War). The Finns’ brave stand (they held off a million Russian troops for 105 days) against the Russians captured the world’s imagination as the exemplary fight of a tiny democracy against a brutal imperialistic power, and the Finns still think of themselves as the first nation to defend freedom against Russian tyranny. But the treaty of 1948 imposed strongly-implied limitations upon Finland’s autonomy, and in the last 25 years the Finns have had to be extremely wary of displeasing the Russians in matters of such consequence as the choosing of a prime minister, and even such workaday decisions as the location and construction of a nuclear power plant. The pressure of Russian influence has even been felt by some Finnish historians and politicians who, in recent years, have adopted a revisionist history which sees the two wars as conflicts growing out of Finland’s failure to appreciate Russia’s military and geopolitical dilemmas of the 1930s and 1940s. This is a view pronounced by Urho Kekkonen, the very popular Finnish patriot and president, in his address on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Mutual Assistance Treaty at Helsinki in April of this year. It should be noted, however, that President Kekko- nen’s address evoked some startled reactions in the Finnish press (except for the Communist Kansan Uutiset, which, of course, seconded him).

Thus, Finland’s situation in regard to both the United States and Russia is different from that of any of the other Scandinavian countries. It cannot openly side with the west, as do Denmark and Norway, nor can it afford the bland neutrality of Sweden. These two options are luxuries that Finland cannot afford. But Americans need not fear for the Finns, who remain a brave and freedom- loving people trying to maintain their sovereignty and fulfill their sense of destiny in a cruel political environment

not of their own making. As one Finnish student told me, "We Finns have plenty of sisu (guts); if the Russians push us too far, we’ll fight them again.”

Notebook Item—"New Soviet Cruiser”

(See Notebook, p. 122, August 1973 Proceedings)

Robert S. Egan—In studying the photos of the Russian guided missile cruiser Nikolaev, several observations arose which might be of interest.

The rake of the stem is extreme which, along with the far forward anchor location, indicates a bow sonar dome on the Kara class, as on Kresta II. An even more positive indication of a large bow dome is shown by the deep bow wave trough aft of the stem, where a crest should be. This also occurs on our ships, with such domes, and shows the presence of some form of irregularity, such as a dome, which could produce a low pressure region in the water flow just below and ahead of the surface indication.

The directors mounted on the 02

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level, port and starboard of the forward end of the stack, appear to serve the SA-N-4 pop-up launchers just ahead. The pop-up seems to be similar to the English "Slam” retractable sail mounted submarine anti-aircraft rocket launcher. These directors are similar to those mounted for this purpose in the Krivak class DDGs.

The U. S. Navy has been developing the "Vulcan-Phalanx” automatic multiple 20-mm. AA gun system to shoot down incoming cruise missiles. To date, we have made one experimental installation in the USS Baussell (DD-845). Its installation on operational ships is well in the future, however, after we use up our limited funds on sewage systems, habitability, and other items which do

not contribute directly to increased combat power. The Russians apparently decided the Vulcan idea was a good one, and are already installing banks of single or twin 30-mm. AA guns on the sides of their combatant ships. For example, the Nikolaev has two singles each side in a special deckhouse, while the Kresta II has two twins per side, as do the Kanin class DDG conversions. The Kanin class has a two-deck high house installed on each side, carrying two twin mounts each. These are backfitted, after conversion, on the main deck opposite No. 2 stack. The two-story deck house suggests this volume is needed for ammunition stowage. Thus, on the Nikolaev, it is quite probable that the ammunition space extends down to the

main deck below the 30-mm. gu»'

Special directors for the 30-mm. g^u:,j are not apparent on the Kara or Kre^[1]' II. The Kanins added two Drum T® units on the after radar tower to seH theirs. That Drum Tilt is a suit^l director for such guns is shown by ¹³ use on the Osa class missile boats.

The Nikolaev has a deckhouse j^uS inboard of her 30-mm. guns with empty top. Watch for a director to f pear here in the future.

As a naval architect, I find that^0(li of the most interesting features of df Nikolaev is the helicopter hangar, ft¹¹’ is identical to the hangar on Kresta ^ Both represent a change from ^ Kresta I arrangement for two reasons'' the need to install a deckhouse on $ main deck aft to accommodate the van' able depth sonar VDS, and the undo# edly wet condition of a helicopter #■' with such low freeboard. The VDS hotr^e required slightly more height than tb*¹ available between main and 01 levels, ^s° the hull shows a strong sheer up as *' goes aft, just forward of the aft end⁰ the 01 level. The deck camber app# to flatten out in that center portion of# deck, over which the helicopter m# move, to make it flush and horizon^ with the landing platform.

In the 1972-1973 issue ofJane’sF$‘ ing Ships, there is a picture of a Kre^slS I with a Kamov KA-25 Hormone copter partially in the hangar. hangar height is just enough to acco!®' modate this type helo, which I assn# is the one used on the later classes. T# Hormone is very tall as a result of # two sets of rotors, and Jane’s gives # figure as 17 feet, 7J inches, more th®¹¹ two deck heights. This caused # Kresta I’s hangar top to project j^u>t above the 02 level. The interest# thing, however, is that the hangar not raised one deck on Kresta fl ³¹¹ Kara when the landing platform raised, so how do you get the bird ^1,1 the hangar?

I believe that a portion of the hang³' overhead is split down the center# and hinges up and outboard to clear¹ upward projecting engines and rotors^ the Hormone, allowing the bird to brought forward into the hangar. A# nately, the roof may hinge open in ^ door. The deck of the hangar (& portion of it, or just some wheel g^ul

Comment and Discussion 93