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Danish defense ministry
"Nordic Balance is a theory of regional equilibrium maintained by the Nordic nations i between the major power blocs of NATO vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact by reasons of geography, political, military, and economic factors, and most importantly, by the roles of the Nordic countries themselves. ”
Soviet activities in the Mediterranean have focused the attention of the Western Alliance there. The Arab- Israeli dispute has heightened the tension and the danger of a major power confrontation on this southern flank of NATO. By contrast, little or nothing is being written or discussed about the growing Soviet naval threat on NATO’s northern flank and more particularly about the Nordic region, largely because few crises have arisen in this area.
Nordic balance is a delicate phenomenon which operates only within the limits of relatively low level crises confined primarily to the Nordic area. Notable among the several historical examples of the functioning of Nordic balance is the 1961 Fenno-Soviet note crisis, in which the Nordic countries helped to deter the Soviets from establishing bases in Finland. An understanding of Nordic balance and its limits can assist U. S. policymakers in analyzing and responding to crises in the Nordic area. Hypothetic modes of extreme variations in Nordic balance tend to show how major imbalances can virtually destroy the Nordic balance mechanism, thereby requiring more U. S. and NATO resources to protect northern Europe.
A Soviet Krivak-class destroyer transits the Baltic Straits
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The current political and security orientations of the four Nordic countries are traceable to the outcome of World War II. Norway and Denmark, conquered and occupied by Nazi Germany during that conflict, are members of NATO. Sweden, a successful neutral during the war, continues its peacetime nonalignment; whereas Finland, associated with the Germans as a cobelligerent against the Soviets in the war, now maintains a special kind of precarious neutrality strongly influenced by Soviet pressures. Taken together, the Nordic countries maintain a posture which tends to balance the interests of East and West. This delicate balance is one cause for the relative calm on the northern flank of NATO. Nordic balance is capable of adjusting to minor shifts
100-mile long frontier with the Soviet Union. The long Norwegian coastline in the Far North, stretching from Narvik to Kirkenes, is of strategic value to NATO bo cause it dominates the sea lanes to Murmansk, the Soviet Union’s only year-round, ice-free port in the West with access to the Atlantic. Murmansk and nearby White Sea harbors, estimated to accommodate the largest and most modern naval facilities in the world- shelters the most powerful of all the Soviet fleets, the Arctic Sea Fleet, numbering about 600 ships. Of these, 170 are submarines, half of them armed with missiles, and more than 65 of them nuclear-powered.
If the North Cape fell, this powerful Soviet flee1 would enjoy largely unhindered access to the open seas The threat to Great Britain would be similar to and more intense than the threat posed by German naval elements after the Nazi occupation of Norway in April of 1940.
34 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1973
in power, but is incapable for the most part of correcting major imbalances, such as a surprise attack by the Soviet Union.
In geographical terms, Sweden occupies a central position among the nations of the Nordic region. Until 1709, when the Swedes under Charles XII met defeat by the Russians at the Battle of Poltava, Sweden had challenged Russian ambitions on the Baltic. After this defeat Sweden’s role as a great world power ended. The Baltic provinces were ceded to Russia and Peter the Great moved his capital from Moscow to St. Petersburg (now Leningrad). Russia thus arose as a major power on the Baltic envisioning then, as now, that the Baltic provided access to Europe and a natural outlet for the Russian Empire to the West. The current build-up of the Soviet navy and merchant marine in the Baltic and Arctic Seas is occurring simultaneously with parallel expansions in the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean. Rapidly increasing naval strength testifies to the Soviet ambition to become the world’s foremost global naval power. To many observers the Soviet naval threat takes the form of a three-pronged naval pincers with the southern arm through the Mediterranean, the northern arm curving down into the Atlantic from Murmansk, and the central arm emerging through the Baltic. Against the northern two arms of this naval threat, the Baltic and the Scandinavian Peninsula arc of vital importance to the security of Western Europe and of vital importance to the sea communications between the United States and its North Atlantic Allies.
NATO’s position in the north is centered on two critical areas or anchors. The first of these is the narrow waters between Denmark and Sweden, termed in NATO parlance the "Baltic approaches.” The other is the North Cape area (Nordkalotten) of Norway which curves over northern Sweden and Finland and accounts for Norway’s border with the Soviet Union.
The Baltic approaches block the exit from the Baltic Sea of the Soviet Baltic Sea Fleet to the North Sea and the Atlantic. Prior to World War II, the Soviets owned only 60 miles of the Baltic Sea coastline in the vicinity of Leningrad. With the acquisition of territory from the Baltic States, Poland, and Finland, and with access to the present coastlines of East Germany and Poland, the Baltic Sea has become a Soviet-dominated inland sea. If the Baltic defense were to fall, the Soviet Baltic Sea Fleet could break out and cut NATO sea communications to Norway and the North Cape, the defense of which would then collapse.'"
At the North Cape, Norway shares a more than
•Srr G. F-. SynhorM, "Soviet Strategic Intercvt in the Mantime Arctic,' May 1973 Pnauthgi, pp 88-111.
The North Cape defenses might be assaulted directly or they might be outflanked by naval or amphibious landing operations to neutralize coastal defenses in Norway from Narvik south. Another axis of attack is the land movement, supported by air, through northern Finland and Sweden to Narvik. Once again, the result would be to make the North Cape defense line untenable. Biannual NATO exercises in Norway, as well as NATO naval operations, are intended to demonstrate NATO’s intent to resist such attacks or an attack along the coastline limited to Norwegian territory. The weakness of these exercises lies in the difficult)’ of logistical support in northern Norway and the difficult)' of reinforcing the far north during a concurrent crisis on NATO’s central front.
Soviet possession of southern Sweden, the ancient province of Scania, which with Denmark, dominates the narrow Baltic approaches, would also result if the opening of these straits. This factor, plus the proximity of Swedish territory to the North Cape and Narvik, constitutes Sweden’s main strategic value to NATO Even the existence of a major Soviet military base on southern Swedish soil would reduce NATO’s Baltic blocking position in the Baltic Straits.
Illustrative of the importance of the straits are the yearly statistics. Approximately 100,000 ships of $ nationalities pass through Danish waters in a year. 0t these, about 400 arc Soviet naval vessels, to include 60 submarines. Also included are 7,300 Soviet merchant ships and about 7,900 Soviet trawlers. The Soviet Baku Sea Fleet, combined with the Baltic fleets of Poland and East Germany, numbers about 1,045 ships of $ types including 80 submarines.
In the case of Finland, the value of strategic warning is the critical issue. Were Finland occupied by Soviet forces, the strategic warning time would be reduce
NAUTICAL MILES
to a critical and unacceptable level for Sweden, which requires a reasonable time to mobilize its armed forces. The strategic warning reduction would be less critical but still grave for the other Nordic countries.
Finally, the Nordic region lies beneath the shortest missile flight routes between the Soviet Union and the United States. Defensive or offensive strategic weapons of either major power bloc would constitute a significant advantage. Additional warning time, improved accuracy to targets, defensive missile screens and tracking stations, launching sites on non-national soil, reduced missile flight distances with enhanced payloads, and greater dispersion arc among the specific favorable factors which the region affords to an occupying power. Surveillance sites in Norway and Denmark would be of the utmost importance in tracking the activities of the Soviet Arctic and Baltic Fleets, and loss of these sites would seriously affect NATO’s readiness. I he Soviet Union considers control of these sites as critical to wartime naval operations.
The population of the Nordic area numbers only 22.3 million persons, but these are almost all literate and possess a strong spirit of independence. All of the four countries arc Western democracies with freely elected parliaments and an ingrained tradition of political participation by the public electorate. Any power occupying these countries would face difficult problems °f control and guerrilla warfare The industry and skills °f the people, although considerable, would probably
not be of sufficient strategic advantage to constitute an important consideration nor an advantage weighed against popular resistance to occupation.
With the exception of hydroelectric power the region is not rich in natural power resources. Wood and wood products and iron ore (principally from Sweden’s Kiruna mines) constitute the primary exports from the northern Nordics, whereas Denmark continues to produce and export significant agricultural products. Sweden alone has significant heavy industry. Swedish iron ore and high-grade ball bearings did assist the German war machine during World War II.+
With these geographical considerations in mind let us now turn our thoughts to a military appraisal of the respective countries.
Denmark. The Danish monarch is nominally the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces; however, civilian control effectively rests in the Defense Minister, who is responsible to the Prime Minister and Parliament. The senior military officer is a Chief of Defense with three service chiefs answerable to him. I he total strength is about 45,300 active duty military personnel, composed primarily of short-term conscripts between 19 and 25 years of age.
Denmark’s strategic importance astride the narrow
fi<r (i F. Synhorsi, "Soviet Strategic Intcrevt in the Maritime Arctic," May 197} franinji. p 106.
36 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1973
Baltic straits far exceeds the modest size and strength of the armed forces. The country is particularly vulnerable to amphibious assault from Poland and East Germany. Its small size and lack of natural obstacles also make it vulnerable to overland invasion through Jutland.
Denmark relies on reinforcement from Central Europe for its defense since it maintains a policy of not permitting foreign bases on its soil in peacetime even though it is a member of NATO. The Danish forces are mostly earmarked for NATO’s Northern European Command entitled Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNorth). This command is responsible for the defense of Norway, Denmark, Schleswig-Holstein, and the Baltic approaches. Its commander is a British general. A subcommand of AFNorth, Allied Forces Baltic Approaches (ComBaltAp), is commanded by a Danish or German naval officer in alternating assignments.
Since 1950, Denmark has received $618 million in U. S. military grant aid assistance. This type of assistance has been zero since FY 1968; however, a program of military sales has continued within the country. There is a small U. S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) of less than 20 persons still in Denmark.
Finland. The President heads the Finnish Armed Forces as the Commander-in-Chief, and he has considerably more authority over military affairs than does the head of state in most nations. The Defense Minister fulfills an administrative function with no command authority. The Finnish Armed Forces arc integrated into a single force within which army, navy, and air force elements arc still distinguishable, although less than separate services. The senior military officer, the Commander of the Defense Forces, is directly responsible to the President and serves as a member of the principal advisory council in national security affairs, the National Defense Council (similar to the National Security Council in the United States). The other members arc the Prime Minister, who serves as Chairman, the Defense Minister, four other Cabinet Ministers, and the Chief of the General Staff.
The size of the armed forces is limited to 42,500 men by the World War II peace treaty of 1947 with the Allied and Associated Powers (U.S.S.R., U.K., Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, India, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa). The treaty also prohibits nuclear weapons, guided missiles, submarines, motor torpedo boats, and bombers. It has been interpreted to permit defensive surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles, however.
The Finnish north blocks the Lapland land invasion routes into the Soviet Union. While the Finnish armed
forces pose no threat to the Soviet Union, they arc sufficiently strong and well-trained to make a conventional attack by the U.S.S.R. or any other power quite costly. Because of their northern position, the Finns have specialized in winter warfare and are leading experts in this field of military science. Finland’s defense is enhanced by the cold and barren Fjeld (mountain) region of the extreme north, and by the forests and lakes of the central part of the country. There is, however, little defensible terrain in the southern heartland of this small land, especially between the Finnish capital in Helsinki and the Soviet border.
In 1948, the year of the Communist coup d’etat in Czechoslovakia, the Finns concluded a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. Article 4 of this treaty pledges the Finns "not to conclude any alliance or join any coalition” directed against the Soviet Union. In effect, the treaty strengthens Finnish neutrality by making it more credible in Soviet eyes.
In conclusion, it suffices to add that the Finnish defense organization based on universal conscription could probably mobilize rapidly as in the Winter War Period of 1939-40. The territorial defense is divided into seven area commands coinciding with the seven civil provinces of the country, so that each Finnish soldier would, when mobilized, be engaged in the defense of home and hearth with the additional will to fight that this factor engenders in the human heart. It is generally recognized that the Soviet Union could overpower the Finns with conventional forces but only at an unreasonable cost.
Norway. Norway, like Denmark, is a constitutional monarchy with the nominal command of the armed forces vested in the King. In practice, the effective control of the three independent military services rests with the Minister of Defense and the Cabinet.
With the exception of Turkey, Norway is the only NATO country which shares a border with the Soviet Union. This factor, the so-called North Cape defense, plus Norway’s extreme length, constitutes the primary defense problems of the country. Norway’s eastern border is almost 1,600 miles long, and the sparse population in the north, together with difficult lines of communication, make an adequate defense extremely difficult.
Possession of Norway’s numerous ice-free fjords would provide safe havens for Soviet submarines interdicting North Atlantic sea lanes. Great Britain would be threatened and isolated by the hostile possession of Norwegian territory. The principal overland invasion routes are through the town of Kirkencs (Norwegian territory only), through the "Finnish wedge” toward Tromso (Finnish and Norwegian territory), and
Nordic Balance in the 107Os 37
through the line Kemi-Kiruna-Narvik (Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian territory). Norwegians are understandably most sensitive to the isolated attack on Norwegian territory, and this threat, plus the World War II failure of a neutrality policy, was the fundamental reason for Norway’s joining NATO. Norway has tot, however, completely forsaken its neutralist tradition, and it has consistently refused to allow the stationing of foreign troops and the stockpiling of U. S. nuclear weapons on its soil. The NATO regional head- Suarters located at Kolsas near Oslo, called AFNorth, has representatives of our other NATO nations on the staff. NATO units of various nationalities also regularly Participate in maneuvers with Norwegian forces.
The total active military personnel number about 55,000, maintained by an annual conscription of 20,000 men for one year’s service.
Military assistance grant aid from the United States since 1950 has totaled $888 million with an additional ll46 million in military sales.
Sweden. The Swedish armed forces are by far the most powerful and well-equipped among those of the Nordic countries. The Swedish air force deserves special note. It is the fifth largest and one of the most modern in (he world, composed of more than 1,200 aircraft, in- dueling 720 combat jet aircraft, mostly of Swedish design and manufacture. The first line of Swedish defenses, the air force, provides the umbrella under which the rapid mobilization of the armed forces could be Kcomplished. A substantial number of Swedish planes are constantly on patrol over the Baltic, and another ^gment is maintained on ready alert.
In addition to the air force, the Swedish armed forces c°nsist of an army and navy, within which there is dso a coast artillery, somewhat similar in mission to toe U. S. Marine Corps. The services train and equip fences for the six unified commands into which the c°untry has been divided since 1966.
The military structure is founded on a rapid mobili- 2jtion system based on universal military service for a'l male citizens over 18 years of age. The peacetime Organization of about 85,000 active duty personnel is Primarily a cadre and training organization managed the chiefs of service. In wartime the training centers ^appear, and the mobilized wartime units become Subordinate to the unified commanders, who arc, in tUrn, subordinate to the senior military officer, the ^premc Commander of the Armed Forces. The Su- Preme Commander, in turn, answers to the Defense Minister and through him to the King-in-Council— '^at is, to the Prime Minister and his Cabinet since King has only nominal authority.
Swedish defense strategy is strongly wedded to a n°nalignment policy which dates back to the victory
of the Swedes over the Danes in Holstein and the subsequent Treaty of Kiel in January 1814 by which the Danes ceded Norway to Sweden. Since then, neither Norwegian independence (1905), nor World War I, nor the Soviet-Finnish Winter War of 1939-40, nor World War II, nor the Cold War has induced the Swedes to forsake their neutrality. Nevertheless, the policy has experienced some measure of difficulty, and Sweden has not, strictly speaking, been a true neutral during wartime. World War II affords numerous examples of non-neutrality, such as Sweden’s permitting German troops to traverse its territory en route to and from Norway. Sweden also permitted Germany to shift combat troops from Norway to Finland in 1941, a blatant violation of neutrality; however, later in the war, as the tide of battle turned against Germany, the Swedes cancelled transit privileges and cooperated more openly with the Allies, especially Denmark and Norway, and this cooperation, however commendable, was also not neutral. In World War II, for Sweden, as for some other small countries, the national goal was to avoid war at almost any price short of occupation, and by clever diplomacy linked with adroit opportunism, the Swedes remained nonbelligerent.
The importance of Sweden’s World War II experience cannot be underestimated, for Sweden alone among the Nordic countries succeeded in remaining an independent nonbelligerent. This experience, together with long historic tradition, binds the Swedish government to a nonalignment military policy. This policy is accepted and supported by all political parties without debate. There is also general acceptance that non- alignment requires a certain credible defense establishment. Questions concerning defense usually involve priorities and budget levels rather than fundamental changes in the national goal of maintaining credible defense forces aimed at deterring attack.
Sweden’s strategic importance lies in its geography. In the south, Sweden, like Denmark, overlooks the Baltic approaches, and in the north, Swedish Lapland lies astride an accessible route through Finland to the largely ice-free port of Narvik, Norway.
Swedish industry has an excellent capacity for the manufacture of a wide variety of conventional weapons systems. These range from simple individual weapons to sophisticated armored vehicles, warships, and jet aircraft. In many cases the Swedish requirement for a particular weapon is so limited as to make domestic production uneconomical, and the country then looks to the West, primarily to Great Britain, France, and the United States as sources from which to buy military hardware. Since 1950, U. S. military sales to Sweden have, for example, totaled $31 million (not including sales by U. S. industry).
38 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1973
Because Sweden's defense strategy is strongly wedded to a nonalignment policy, Swedish armed forces are by far the most powerful and best-equipped among the Nordic countries, and Swedish coastal defense installations, their nerve centers buried deep in the mountains, dare not relax their tigilance.
Military Support of U.N. Peacekeeping Activities. The failure of negotiations in 1948-49 aimed at the formation of a Nordic Defense Alliance and adherence to NATO by Norway and Denmark isolated Sweden from regional defense arrangements. Finland was already excluded from any sort of Western-oriented regional defense arrangement by its mutual assistance treaty of 1948 with the Soviet Union. It would thus appear that the Nordic countries operate independently of each other in the regional military context. There has, however, been one area in which practical military cooperation has been of significant advantage in establishing military contacts at the working level, and this area is U.N. peacekeeping operations. All Nordic countries have participated energetically in most U.N. operations, and Sweden operates a school for U.N. staff officers with even Finnish officers in attendance.
Some of the literature on the Nordic countries has used the notion of "Nordic balance” without definition, with a resultant confusion over what the term means and its applicability. The definition intended here will be more precise—namely, a theory of regional equilibrium, maintained by the Nordic nations, between the major power blocs of NATO vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact by reasons of geography, political, military, and economic factors, and, most importantly, by the roles of the Nordic countries themselves. This definition is not without difficulties because Norwegian and Danish participation in NATO is grounded on a conditional basis of minimum commitment.
Nordic balance is a delicate subsystem of the wider European power balance, which is the real deterrent to Soviet expansionism in Europe. Nordic balance docs not have the importance nor the determinative quality of the traditional pre-World War II power balance of Great Britain against the dominant continental power. The balance is accomplished, rather, by a delicate role- playing in diplomatic, political, and military terms, which tends to stabilize crisis situations arising in the Nordic area. From another point of view, Nordic bal
ance is a set of power restraints accepted by the mai°r powers.
There are three essential operational elements Nordic balance, and although the relative important of these elements has varied over the years since the post-World War II period, their absence or even tb£ absence of any one would terminate the notion Nordic balance. These three are:
► The Norwegian and Danish membership in NATO with reservations on foreign bases and nuclear weapon (minimum commitment).
► A credible Swedish non-alignment.
► A neutral Finland maintaining friendly relations with the Soviet Union.
Although not provable in the absolute, Nordic balance has been demonstrated in several crises, most notably in the Fcnno-Soviet note crisis of October- November 1961.
In the note of 30 October 1961, the U.S.S.R. >n' voked that provision of the 1948 Mutual Assistance Treaty with Finland for military consultations because of the threat of a revanchist Germany. The Soviets cited the formation of the NATO Baltic Approaches Command with West German participation as evidence of the growing threat. Even with the erection of the Berlin Wall in August and the explosion of the fin*1 Soviet 50-megaton H-bomb, on the same day as the note, the insistence on military staff consultations came as a surprise. Gromyko stated then that the note represented the view of the Soviet military who presumably wanted radar stations in Finland as an improvement to the Soviet missile warning system.
The initial external reaction of the Nordic countries was a calm one. Finnish President Kekkonen did not interrupt his state visit to the United States and in fact returned home as late as 5 November 1961. The Finns attempted to handle the note as if it were motivated by Finnish domestic politics and moved their elections up from mid-1962 to February. The Soviets were not satisfied by this move and re-emphasized the requirement for military consultations on 16 November. As
pressure on the Finns intensified, the mild statements
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the Swedish and Norwegian governments and newspaper editorials changed. The Norwegian Defense Mincer reminded the Soviets about the Norwegian atti- (ude toward stationing nuclear weapons in Norway and Earned the Soviets about the consequences of continued pressure on Finland in terms of possible changes ‘n this Norwegian security policy. The Swedes intensified the operation of their warning systems, and the Danes reconfirmed their NATO policy on 17 and 24 November. Neither Denmark nor Sweden issued explicit warnings as Norway had. Sweden, however, ■mplied that it was prepared to increase significantly its expenditures for defense. In the subsequent meeting with Chairman Khrushchev in Novosibirsk on 24 November, President Kekkonen warned that the Soviet note was creating a malaise in the North and driving Norway and Denmark more firmly into NATO. He also argued successfully that the withdrawal of the note would reduce the necessity of war preparations in Finland and Sweden. The net result, as reported by the Joint Communique, was that the Soviet Chairman, decided "that the Soviet Government considered it could put off the military consultations it had proposed.”
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Other less dramatic examples occurred in I960 in 'he aftermath of the U-2 incident, in the so-called night frost” period of 1958 in Finnish domestic politics, in 1961 when Finland became associated with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), in 1949 when Norway and Denmark joined NATO, and in 1948 when the U.S.S.R. failed to make Finland another Czechoslovakia. None of these crisis periods are as dramatic as the 1961 note crisis, which is a classic example of how each Nordic country played a substantial role in the Nordic balance.
The historic signing of the Treaty of Accession to the European Economic Community (EEC) on 22 January 1972 seemed then to foreshadow the enlargement of the Common Market Six to the Community of Ten. There remained only for the four applicant countries— Great Britain, Denmark, Norway, and Iceland—to obtain formal domestic ratification of the Treaty. By the tlate of formal entry in January 1973, Norway alone of these applicants had failed to gain the necessary Internal ratification, largely because of domestic concern about agriculture and fishing. Only Denmark of the Nordic countries now belongs to the EEC.
With Denmark’s entrance into the Common Market, the Nordic alternative of a regional customs union, already largely visionary, became even less feasible because of the trading patterns of the enlarged EEC. Great Britain’s entry in particular left the remaining
Nordic Balance in the 107Os 39
EFTA members in a semi-isolated position. Like the other "Mini-EFTA” nations, Norway, Sweden, and Finland continue to seek some form of association with the expanded EEC. For Sweden, the objection to full Common Market membership is primarily domestic, as in Norway. The Swedes fear that belonging to EEC would jeopardize their long-standing, nonalignment foreign policy. On the other hand, Finland operates under externally imposed restrictions. Any Finnish link to the EEC must have at least tacit Soviet approval, similar to the Soviet concurrence provided for Finland’s association with EFTA in 1961.
Proposals for a Nordic Defense Alliance, such as proposals for a Nordic economic union, have been advanced from time to time. However, they seem now to run counter to the Western European trend toward economic and political integration. As long as Denmark and Norway adhere to NATO, there is no possibility of an overlapping Nordic defense alliance with Sweden.
The withdrawal of Norway and Denmark from NATO, though not likely, would constitute a significant alteration of the power balance on the northern flank. In the Baltic approaches, the cork would be out of the bottle. Similarly, without NATO membership, Norway’s current base and nuclear policies would lose their significance. Without the U.S. nuclear umbrella, defense of the Northern flank by local defense forces would be virtually meaningless. Some security might be salvaged by NATO’s explicitly underwriting the territorial integrity of Norway and Denmark in case of attack or threat of attack in a vein similar to the U. S. Middle East guarantees under the Eisenhower Doctrine.
Any diminution of the present level of balance would be clearly undesirable because of the inhibitions on combined advanced planning. Moreover, withdrawal from NATO by these countries might presage the exit of other member countries.
A Nordic Defense Alliance would probably result if Norway and Denmark quit NATO, but this alliance would be a poor second best to membership within NATO for Norway and Denmark. It would also be the end to the theory and fact of Nordic balance. It would, however, strengthen the trend toward Nordic cooperation and integration, which gained momentum in the 1950s and found expression in the meetings of the Nordic Council and consultations on a Nordic Customs Union. Were such an alliance formed, it would behoove the United States to pursue a benevolent policy toward it. However, U. S. policy should energetically seek to keep Denmark and Norway within the North Atlantic Alliance.
As implied previously, unilateral guarantees by the United States or multilateral guarantees by NATO
40 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1973
would strengthen a Nordic Defense Alliance and make it less susceptible to Soviet pressures. The credibility of such guarantees would be significantly less than similar ones formulated within the NATO structure and therefore less effective for deterrence.
This set of circumstances would terminate Nordic balance as herein defined and substitute a less effective Nordic buffer between the major power blocs. It can be argued that a neutralist Nordic bloc would reduce tensions by eliminating a direct (Norwegian) NATO border with the Soviet Union. The contrary argument is more persuasive—i.e., that in crises such as the Fenno-Soviet note crisis of 1961, the Nordic countries would play significantly reduced roles; the Norwegian warnings and Nordic arguments about consequences would sound especially hollow without the convincing link of Norway and Denmark to the United States in NATO.
The Stationing of Soviet Troops in Finland. Under this hypothesis, the Soviet Union would force consultations with Finland under the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. As a result of these negotiations, the Soviets would set up bases on Finnish territory, such as would have resulted in 1961 had not Chairman Khrushchev then reduced Soviet demands. Soviet advanced bases in Finland would reduce the strategic warning available to the Nordic countries in a conventional action by the Soviets.
Possible countermeasures to redress this imbalance include Swedish adherence to NATO, and the establishment of NATO operational bases in Norway and Denmark. Bases in Sweden might be another option, but carrying out this option would probably not be acceptable to the Swedes unless the)' perceived an imminent threat of Soviet attack on their territory. Confrontation and worsening the Finnish condition should be avoided, and it is conceivable that the suggestion of foreign NATO bases in Sweden would serve to restrain the Soviet Union short of provocation, whereas the actual establishment of such bases might cause a Soviet military counteraction.
One important factor must be constantly held in mind in this situation: The Finnish geographical position next to the Soviet Union makes that country a particular security concern to the U.S.S.R. There is nothing that can change this fundamental fact. Moreover, the Soviet occupation of Finland, however deplorable, would not constitute a vital loss to United States security. It is a serious problem on NATO’s northern flank, but it is not by itself a consequence of such import as to deteriorate seriously the parity on Europe’s central front. In a real sense it is a regional problem for the Nordic countries with troublesome implications for NATO. The requests of the Nordic
countries should be weighed carefully against the details of the particular situation, especially with respect to tensions elsewhere on the NATO scene. As a minimum it would seem advisable to position nudeaf weapons in Norway if Norway makes such a request This action would provide leverage for negotiations to normalize Finnish neutrality.
Limited Soviet Aggression. This scenario hypothesizes a limited invasion of the North Cape area of northern Norway arising from a Soviet miscalculation about the U. S. response. In the past, most strategic thinking about Soviet aggression has led to the conclusion that the U.S.S.R. would select fairly deep objectives and that the response by NATO would be at a high level. The limited, remote area objective scenario appears to represent a more credible Soviet action.
The Soviet Union, because of assumed U. S. troop withdrawals from Europe and an apathy on the part of the American public toward the defense of Europe in the aftermath of the Vietnam experience, decided to probe Western resolve and gain additional territory for submarine operations from northern Norway. The Soviets demanded that Norway cease surveillance activities in the North Cape area against the Soviet Arctic Sea Fleet centered at Murmansk. The Norwegians rejected the Soviet demands, and the Soviets issued an ultimatum, after which they quickly seized the Varan- ger Peninsula and Finnmark area of the North Cape.
The Soviet attack met with little resistance, and Norwegian military operations aimed at retaking the seized area proved unsuccessful. The Soviets announced to the world that this action completed their requirement for additional security of the Murmansk bases and that they had no further territorial goals in the Nordic area.
Mobilization of NATO forces on the central front and mobilization of American reserves in the continental United States coupled with Allied naval actions against the Soviets in the Atlantic, Norwegian and Barents Seas should communicate the resolve of the NATO members. In this situation it might be necessary to grant some sort of narrow neutralized zone (half Norwegian and half Soviet) as a buffer to separate the belligerents. Such a step might also provide the Soviets an "out” in partial compliance with their original demands. The important point is that the North Cape warrants a strong response to maintain the credibility of the alliance. Therefore, limited Soviet aggression should be confronted vigorously, preferably by conventional means, especially where the front is narrow and at the very most by conventional means supported with tactical nuclear weapons.
In this situation, as in the previous two hypothetic examples, Nordic balance—that is, role-playing by
Nordic Balance in the 1970s 41
the Nordic countries to produce restraints against the super powers—failed. By definition, Nordic balance fails in any situation which results in armed conflict involving the United States and the U.S.S.R. By definition it also fails in situations which remove the great power restraints which form part of the definition. Nevertheless, in any crisis situation in the north, the Nordic countries can be expected to play a vigorous tole toward stabilizing the imbalance. In the final scenario, Sweden and Finland would try to convince the Soviet Union to withdraw and would offer various formulas to facilitate this action and end the hostilities, for such a conflict so near their borders would be an '^mediate threat to their survival even as it would be to all of Europe. The advantage of Swedish and Finnish diplomacy is that the neutral positions of their governments might cause arguments to prevail where direct negotiations via the "hot line” and elsewhere have faltered.
The examples of extreme variations in Nordic bailee postulated above are really instances in which Nordic balance has ceased to exist or has become so educed in influence as to change its nature entirely. These scenarios illustrate the effectiveness of Nordic Glance by analyzing the logical consequences of deter- l0ration of the balance mechanism. They also serve to show the preferability of Nordic balance to other secu- r,ty arrangements such as a Nordic Defense Alliance. They demonstrate that Nordic balance as it presently e*ists in the Nordic region is a significant phenomenon whh reasonable prospects for the 1970s even though "operates without fanfare and does not receive a great ^al of attention.
The operative notion of this article is that it is an ‘"sportant interest of the United States that this re- jl'onal balance continue to perform its function. The n>ted States and NATO should support the roles of 'he Nordic countries in their contributions to Nordic glance. This support should include: h°r Denmark and Norway: a willingness to station forces and nuclear weapons on Danish and ^ °rwegian territory, if requested.
h°r Finland: an absolute respect for Finnish neutrality atld an understanding of Finnish pronouncements ^hich perforce support Soviet policies on occasion. h°r Sweden: a respect for Sweden’s nonalignmcnt "‘ch serves as the fulcrum for Nordic balance because Sweden’s central geographical and political position pCtween NATO Denmark and Norway and neutral ‘"hnd living in the shadow of the U.S.S.R.
^ The United States should work to keep Norway and ^enmark within NATO as essential to preserving °r<hc balance. This balance not only reduces tensions
and helps to solve minor crises, but it also affords NATO an economy of effort on the northern flank, thereby permitting more concentration of force and effort on the central front and southern flank.
With regard to Finland, it is not helpful to Finnish neutrality to leave uncertain whether the United States would intervene in the event of a Soviet occupation. Countermeasures should be implied, exclusive of military intervention for which the United States and the rest of NATO would be at an extreme strategic disadvantage. It should be recognized that the Finns know how to handle the Russians, with whom they have been involved intimately for hundreds of years. Finland is not vital to American security, however admirable Finnish courage is; and it actually benefits the Finns in dealing with the Soviets if the Finns can contend that the United States and NATO, especially Western Germany, have no intention of using Finnish territory in any crisis situation as an area of operations against the U.S.S.R.
With regard to military sales of equipment, the United States should continue its helpful policy toward Norway and Denmark. Whenever possible, the United States should also sell war material to Sweden and encourage other NATO countries to do the same, in order to maintain the Swedish military strength at an optimum level of modernity and effectiveness.
Finally, it should be emphasized that Nordic balance is at most a delicate phenomenon from which one may not expect too much, but awareness of its existence and some theoretical knowledge of its mechanism hopefully will provide policymakers in the United States with an extra advantage, additional patience, and reinforced confidence as they face the as yet unknown crises in Europe during the remainder of the 1970s.
Colonel Romancski graduated from the U. S. Military Academy in 1950. He has since received graduate degrees from the California Institute of Technology, Gslumhia University, and George Washington University, and has studied International Relations at the Graduate School of the University of Stockholm His military assignments span a variety of command and staff positions, including Executive Officer to the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for International Affairs and Military Attache in Sweden. A graduate of the Army War College and the National War College, he is currently assigned to the Panama Canal Company as Engineering and Construction Director.