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JL 1 new destroyer, smartly backing out from her berth for her first deployment, is suddenly shaken by a fiery explosion in the engineroom; the deployment is delayed for months. A submarine, fresh from difficult operations, is making a deep, swift transit home when a momentary anomaly in diving plane operation causes a rapid depth excursion downward. A reflex-like response from the crew arrests the dive before disaster overtakes them, but it results in unknown effects on the hull owing to the deep pressure cycle, and extensive tests and analyses are in order. A seaman standing on the deck of a drydocked ship is inadvertently swept to his death by a crane operator in too much of a hurry—and on, and on. Although these incidents are fabricated, they are not unusual or uncommon in this day of sophisticated "fail-safe” systems, check-off lists, warning signs, and "enlightened management.”
Over the past two decades, the management of safety programs (e.g., hazard prevention, risk management) in technically-oriented organizations has become rapidly more and more complex. The Navy has been no exception, and is among those whose safety specialists are beginning to use some rather unusual, system-oriented methods to arrive at workable solutions. That the problems are substantial can be no more starkly illustrated than in the $11.5 million lost this past fiscal year as a consequence of reported non-combat Navy ship accidents. These same accidents took over 16,000 man-days to repair, and resulted in the loss of more than 4,300 ship operating days. To fleet scheduling activities during the past fiscal year, this last figure is numerically equivalent to the destruction of roughly two dozen ships in July 1971. The loss of 31 lives during this same period as the result of ship-related, non-combat accidents, of course, cannot be reasonably quantified for comparisons in any other way.
It should further be pointed out that this compiled dollar loss is substantially less than the actual loss. Accident data is only as good as its reporting system. The Navy’s accident reporting system for ships, Forces Afloat Accident Reporting Procedures, in operation for over two years, has thus far produced a disheartening response, particularly in the "borderline” accidents (e.g., material failures) from ships already overburdened with other paperwork.1 Solutions to this are underway; but more on this later.
Initial rough estimates of the actual accident costs (using sample data printouts of the Navy’s Maintenance Data Collection System with selected cause
'At this writing, the Naval Safety Center is working on a new accident reporting instruction to include accidents reportable under OpNavInst 3040.6B and the Navy’s personnel injury reporting form, primarily to eliminate duplication and overlapping.
codes) indicate the total to be possibly almost ten ttf the above amount. Why? Almost one-third of Navy’s ships have never sent in an accident report the system was implemented. The reasons for this ( addition to the burdensome administrative probl^ are basically twofold, and psychological in nature, first is due to the nature of the environment. A co( parison with the naval aircraft mishap reporting sys[t > is often made: an unsatisfactory condition in an airtf is a frightening fact; aircraft are grounded for equ- ment anomalies that ships take in stride daily. Al‘ under normal circumstances, the people who file aitf* mishap or near-mishap reports are not the maintain^ in a ship, they live (and sometimes sleep) with $ equipment for months at a time; operators and rtf tainers are usually one and the same. The second rtff reason is the inherent human fear of reprisal for tell>r on one’s self.
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2"Any unplanned or otherwise accidental act or event which damage by or to a forces afloar unit, its equipment and/or cargo, or J* ncl injury or death.”
The Naval Safety Center is working on these ptf lems, and making some slow progress in convince the ships that they are not placing themselves 1 report” by documenting their accidents. Also invol'* with this effort is the task of educating the gc^ Navy public as to the new definition of an accid^ The biggest part of this job is to point out that' accident may result in only relatively minor matf damage, but add these up over the entire Navy, ^ the results are surprising to almost everyone.
In "The Department of the Navy Safety Prog^ Implementation of,” dated February 1970, the Chid' Naval Operations has directed that the objective of[t Navy Safety Program is "to establish an effective a aggressive accident prevention program in order enhance operational readiness by reducing deathsJ injuries to personnel as well as losses and damagc all Navy material from accidental causes.” Thus, accident becomes not only the obvious casualty (®f. an injured leg or a ship collision), but also include those other unforeseen incidents (in between these t* extremes) involving personnel and material as This "new” accident concept could involve a burtf out generator because preventative maintenance not properly performed, or a ruined electronics which had been the victim of erroneous testing instf .3
3Ac this writing, the Naval Safety Center is working on a method of the Navy's Maintenance Data Collection System to compile the needed statistical data on material-nlattd accidents, thus precluding thf for formal accident reports in this, the most "foggy”, difficult-to-defii* of accident statistics gathering.
Preventing the Preventable Accident 59
In the Navy (as in almost any section of the Defense en t)(1’ apartment) an unfortunate legacy from earlier, "easy- °f ' oney” times is that the Navy Supply System has ort si11tmej
to be an endless cornucopia. Accidents, whether
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In the current trends of falling budgets and sky- r 't lc^tct*ng hardware costs, we can no longer afford this ^ury. It is in this climate that the Navy has broad- aifL its emphasis to include not only the prevention ua'n, p personnel injuries, deaths, and major catastrophic d fltfP acc'^cnts> but also to attempt to reduce the need l,r the repairs and their costs because of virtually all jjJ “"planned events,” with the ultimate goal of preclud- tc 'lfl? ship mission degradation, through viable accident
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vint'jij^he basic causcs f°r (reported) accidents over the
three fiscal years are tallied in Figure 1. Again,
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cause factor is "personnel.” It is well known that human error is the major cause of accidents in almost any field of endeavor. The reasons for human error vary from seasickness through insufficient training to negligence. And to add to the complexity, these reasons themselves are being constantly altered, owing to the ever-more-rapid changes in our human society. The contemporary sailor is a far different person from his predecessors; indeed, this process has accelerated so much that his forerunner of only a decade ago had a significantly different education and sense of values: political, social, and moral. This rapid change extends into the physiological, too, and although not nearly as pronounced as the psychological, it nevertheless must be considered in the human engineering aspects of complex systems.
From a material, or engineering standpoint, there are, generally speaking, two basic causes for our problem of increasing safety hazards in naval systems, both related to increasing complexities: a trend which promises to continue at an extremely rapid pace.
The first reason has to do with complexities associated with sheer magnitude. A ship the size of the Nimitz (CVAN-68), now under construction, simply has
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60 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1973
more systems and subsystems jammed into her huge hull than did the USS Yorktoum (CV-io), of World War II vintage.
The second reason is a different type of complexity: that which is related to the employment of advanced technologies that depend upon relatively new engineering and scientific principles still not completely researched and tested. Good examples of these might be surface-effect craft, glass diving bells, or water jet propulsion.
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These, in a nutshell, are the three general variables which are affecting all cause factors and which are compounding the problem of preventing naval accidents afloat: complexities of increased weapons system size, new engineering principles, and the changing human equation. It is the nature of these mercurial variables and their impact on rapidly rising costs and mission degradations resulting from accidents that has necessitated the Navy’s increased efforts, both technical and managerial, in the hazard prevention field. And this increased challenge, because of its tantalizing potential benefits, is generating an increasing response at all levels of responsibility.
Can these accident cause-factors be eliminated? In the case of the psychological and physiological changes of our own sailors, the answer is obviously no. They are the products of their own diverse pre-military environments. A person’s sense of values ingrained during childhood and subsequently developed over his or her lifetime (albeit a relatively brief time span at the time of basic training) are changed little by a few months in the Service. The answer to the changing human equation lies in the difficult task of the proper direction of this young and still-changing energy into the safe, efficient (and thus proper) operation of ships’ equipment. The human engineer, the psychologist, the technical engineering specialist, and others all must be interfaced here, and various naval commands, including the Safety Center, the Bureau of Naval Personnel and the Naval Training Command, as well as the (technical) System Commands, are now becoming involved in the search for worthwhile solutions.
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cavitation erosion on a high-speed propeller or "wings” of a hydrofoil; the complex stress pattern a prolate spheroidal pressure hull; the explosive haza00’ of new submarine oxygen generation systems: all11 these, and countless other new problems are surfac101 now and will continue to arise (at even more rap1 rates) in the future. Thus, the problem of nt" ■ evolving technology could be said, generally speak!0? to be equipment-oriented. The previously mentio0^ problem of size and complexity could be more syste0lj oriented. The combination of these two problems (J(1 indeed, even the problem of the changing human tion) can be illustrated with the case of the surf*1*’ effect vehicle. This craft’s contact with the surface.j( air cushion, is certainly a new concept for naval ar^ tects, and its nearness to that surface poses a chalk11?
In the case of the two technologically-related complexities, the answer, again, is that they, like the human complexities, cannot be eliminated. The operators of our fleets generate requirements for systems that must be sophisticated enough to meet whatever challenges may be expected or postulated in crises, confrontations, and wars. It is the responsibility of the System Commands to provide these capabilities. The result is almost always reflected in increased size and complexity. If this is to be avoided, most often the only alternative which will provide both a simple, more compact system, yet one which can meet the challenge of an adversary’s
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equally excellent technology, is the alternative invflf ing new engineering principles of system design.
In the case of great size and complexity, our big$ problems lie in the internal relationships governing countless interactions between the subsystems of a sc face ship or submarine. The proliferation of more & more subsystems replete with diversities never befc' integrated into engineering designs is nowhere mk apparent than in the Navy’s newest supercarriers submarines, with huge advances evident in propulsi°f electronics, and other areas over their dependable simpler predecessors. The idea of a monstrous, huma0; populated steel shell, floating (or submerged) in water, riddled with sea-access ports, veined with a m5' of cables and pipes, containing various flammable M uids, gases, and even high explosives, sounds like1 accident waiting to happen. The fact that the inter0' equipment, and even the ship herself, are constafl1 in all sorts of independent motion, including unwant0 vibrations, and that they are maintained by what CO1 be termed no better than a transient labor force, ^ not add confidence in the area of hazard prevent^ The tragedies of the carrier fires and the Thresher ter were rather horrifying examples of how the orous” design technology of the 1950s had far o01 distanced the fledgling, less romantic disciplines 1 reliability, safety, quality assurance, and human neering. The use of these new multi-system monst£(! simply requires overviews of the entire project many of these "adjunct engineering” angles (i.e., safW maintainability, etc.), using a systems approach notj11 to achieve system operational goals, but to develop cost-effective system compatible with these other vie" points as well.
In the case of the companion problem of nc^ evolving technologies, our major difficulties in haz^ detection and prevention lie in the interactions of the' new concepts with their environments. The effect0
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for aeronautical engineers as well. Sizes of these vehicles may vary widely, and speeds are high: up to 2,000 tons and 150 knots are contemplated in the near future. Again, systems and their means of contact with their environments are unusual, including propeller and *ater jet propulsion, and the air cushion itself, which *s "captured” within the sides of the craft with skirts. The amphibious possibilities of these vehicles, of course, add yet another dimension of complexity to hazard analyses.
Thus, the "triad” of causes that increase the complexity of hazard prevention in modern naval weap- °ns systems is inescapably with us if we are to stay 111 the business of producing systems sufficiently sophisticated to meet the challenges in our future. The problems caused by complexities cannot be eliminated; ffius, they must be somehow circumvented. Also, they ^e far from being mutually exclusive; they overlap a,most everywhere. We are living with equipment that Peonies more and more complicated. Consequently, Safety becomes an increasingly difficult problem.
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The Technical Problems. To circumvent, or accommo- 'W, these complex hazards in a time of ever more c°nfusing technology has required new concepts. Traditionally, safety in our naval material programs has ^en accomplished through two primary approaches. The first of these is what has been termed "tombstone safety,” or the correction of operational mishaps after 'be fact. There will always be unforeseen events. But 'eliance on this method of reaction alone to mishaps as a major input to safety programs is a dangerous Practice with today’s complex systems. Also, because °P so-called "bad press,” this approach has tended to tarnish the concept of safety in the past. On more than °«e occasion, safety has been a thorn in the side of People in charge of ship design, construction, and °Peration.
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Preventing the Preventable Accident 61
The second primary approach has been termed, atoong other things, "design safety.” This has Counted to a type of piecemeal approach involving todividually designed components, based on scattered ■storical data and the designer’s own background nowledge or experience. This method has rarely been Tilled out in contracts (nor can it be in most cases). at«y in his equipment was merely a matter of the signer’s own pride; the more spare time or money e had, the safer the equipment would be. The old cbche, "safety is everybody’s business” applies in this Case> and, as usual, because it is everyone’s business, Car>not really be the responsibility of anyone. Therefore, a new approach to our problem was in (>rder. This approach has been named "system safety.” ls systems engineering and management from a
safety, or hazard prevention, viewpoint. It has been called simply, "organized common sense.”
System safety does not eliminate the two older approaches. On the contrary, it uses and expands upon them, so that three new areas of activity are added as a result:
► A systems approach with principle emphasis on prevention of accidents.
► Safety not just in design or operation, but on a system life cycle basis.
► Money paid specifically for safety, separately from the other engineering efforts.
In other words, in order to achieve recognizable safety standards in a large program, safety is made the focus of individual specialized effort, and not just labeled abstractly as "everyone’s job.”
Historically, system safety has been essentially monopolized by the aerospace field, having been first implemented on a major Defense Department project in 1958 in the Minuteman missile system. This complex nuclear delivery system frightened everyone. Spread over a large, multi-state area, the missile silos were connected by computers, had their guidance systems on at all times, and were unstoppable once started. The Air Force elected to use the system safety approach. The first missile was deployed in 1962 and since then there has never been an accident of a size reportable under Air Force regulations. The cost of the system safety effort was roughly one to 2% of the total design costs, but the loss of one site would have easily equalled i this total system safety expense, not to mention the possible consequences of a "successful” inadvertent firing.
The principles learned and experienced gained in the Minuteman Program were eventually formalized and adapted for use by the Defense Department under Military Standard 882 in mid-1969. Generally speaking, a system safety program performs a type of "watchdog” function on major weapons system design. System safety engineers, along with engineers in other "adjunct” disciplines such as reliability, maintainability, and quality assurance, run the original design through a series of formalized, systematic checks. In the case of system safety engineers, the designs are checked specifically for hazards. In a complete program, these checks continue from the level of individual component interfaces up to the complete system assembly, with all of the multitudinous subsystem interactions in between.
To accomplish these objectives, a variety of analysis techniques are used, including logic diagrams, matrices, and charts, some developed specifically by system safety analysts over the years, and some being common to other disciplines as well. One of the most well-known
techniques to evolve from the system safety field is the Fault-Tree Analysis, an example of which (by W. F. Larsen) is shown in Figure 2. It is basically a logic diagram based on Aristotle’s proposition that a logical statement is either true or false, but never partially true or false. Fault-Tree analysis is essentially a mental aid which allows the system designer to trace the path of an accident from the undesired event itself back through the system in time. The top of the "tree” begins with the major undesired event, and branches downward to multiple lower-level causes. Thus, failure paths may be found leading up through "and” and "or” gates of the tree that could lead to the end (undesirable) event. The technique is easily adaptable to computerization and may be qualitative or quantitative, depending upon whether individual event failure data is available. Simulation techniques are currently most popular as a method for quantitative evaluations of system hazard risk.
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As a child of the aerospace discipline, it has only been in the past four or five years that system safety has crept beyond those boundaries and into new fields of application. With the advent of the federal Occupa-
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tional Safety and Flealth Act (OSHAct) of 1970, ever-increasing demands for product safety, industry b literally jumped into the system safety field in the pJl) two years. Total (system) plant safety has been tl> newest approach to compliance with the comprehensi new OSHAct requirements. The same systematic haz$■' prevention approach to a great variety of produc® from washing machines to toys, has been quick! adapted by firms eager to avoid a glaring "Nader sp®1' light.” The expansion of system safety to many otb areas is now in progress.
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One of those areas, fortunately, is the business0 ships: their design, construction, and operation. Tb is the Navy’s concern, and happily, the connect^1 between this concern and the tools of system has been recognized. To employ the concepts of system safety in ship design is no small undertaking psych1’ logically, for there are in many respects few more co11 servative engineering disciplines than naval architect^ and marine engineering. One of the reasons behind tb is the sheer size of the objects we deal with. Tried i®* true solutions, proven over a century of long, hab lessons learned, are understandably tough to chan£c There are not many engineers who build contraption the size of the Empire State Building, yet capable self-propulsion, immersion in salt water, withstandib constantly-cycling bending moments and pressures, a®1 simultaneously supporting the lives of, sometin^ thousands of people for months at a time. Also, becab of the non-linear complexities of ship structure computer-aided ship design is really very recent histo*! Changes, then, have been relatively slow in the sM design business not because of stubbornness, but simf' because of the size of the problems, their individ^ complexities, and available Research and Developtn^1 money that has been sufficient only for biting off stn; chunks, precluding the quantum jumps found in sob{ other disciplines. Yet, system safety is in use today 1,1 several major naval ship design projects.
Among these are the SSN-688 high-speed nuck;l attack submarine, the DD-963 gas turbine destroyer, ^ PHM patrol hydrofoil, and the Trident missile marine.
The system safety focus in the Navy has not confined alone to these so-called "glamor” projects. T'l( principles of system safety engineering have also b^ applied recently on case bases to various existing sMr board systems, including weapons-handling areas °f many ship types, submarine oxygen and compressed ;il systems, and most recently to the study of the integb tion problems in the LAMPS (helicopter-destroyd* weapons configuration.
Programs such as these are given strong impctt from the Chief of Naval Operations who, in l9/l1
Preventing the Preventable Accident 63
70, an stry
[cted the Chief of Naval Material to . . ensure safety is designed and engineered into all ships (and) in so doing, ensure systems safety hensi' ’incerinS anc^ management principles outlined in hazJf ‘I'tary Standard 882 are applied to the above.” Subse- 'nt directives on down the chain of command have, course, followed this theme.
One of the key words in the excerpt above is man- ^ent. This is, of course, the crux of the "new safety,”
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{ 0t^ 1 is the vital ingredient of the system safety philoso- p- The concept of attacking the many-headed (and elusive) monster of safety in an organization as ., as the Navy requires the "systems approach” afcr, opworn as the words may sound), and perhaps the , ^ sizable area where experience is now being gath- 's-chi' is in the development of the large weapons systems e cof ^nt‘one^ above, with their ancillary' system safety
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A fundamental question, however, must arise sooner ‘d an£ k'ater; t*iat cost- a system safety program worth
langt *lfasure how "safe” a system is? Can we really predict, ptj0ji an entirely new system never before fielded, how ble d, y accidents it "would have had,” had it not had ndin£ ^stcm safety program? Hardly. And because of this s ani *S difficult at this point to make even educated
guesses as to how much to spend; how far to go in a system safety program. The costs of the Minuteman program and a few other large system safety programs in the past (Apollo included) have usually run from 1% to 3% of the total design cost for the system. This percentage increases, however, as the size of the overall system decreases. These in turn are strongly effected by the nature of the system (i.e., is it existing state-of-the- art, or is it something like a developing solar power space platform?). Prior to the systems approach to safety, the "tombstone” safety effort went into a system largely during the testing and operational phases, when costly backfit corrections were made for hazards that had not been foreseen or analyzed. The attractiveness of the system safety approach is that it is started very early in the system life cycle (See Figure 3), because the earlier these inherent system hazards are detected, the less expensive it is to eliminate them. Far better to blow up an engineroom "on paper” than when backing out of the slip for initial builder’s trials. The curves in Figure 3 are not taken from any real ship system; none so complete exists as yet with a system safety program. But the point is made that with proper safety program management, the old tombstone costs are cut way down by the life-cycle approach to hazard prevention. The system safety management effort, as
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64 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1973
previously described, combines the system safety engineering effort with the tombstone effort, making an integrated life-cycle-program. System safety engineering cannot possibly point out all the hazards in a ship design; there will always have to be "safety backfits.” But this planned organized safety effort early in the project’s life can significantly reduce hazards so that total costs of design over the whole ship life are less than they previously were, not to mention savings due to accidents avoided.
Cost control in an area so ephemeral as safety may seem at first to be difficult. But the system safety engineering analyses make it no more difficult than any other portion of the development program. Acceptable levels of risk are identified in various areas. Then, preliminary qualitative analyses determine if the risk level is near "borderline.” If the risk is obviously low, the problem is solved. If obviously high, then redesign of some sort (to systems or procedures) is required. If a "fence-sitter,” the analysis may then be quantified to give management a better picture of the exact probabilities and costs involved. But costs soar in the process of quantification, and in the last analysis, as in all other fields of endeavor, the final decisions by the program managers are subjective, based on as much objectivity as costs will allow.
The Human Problems. We have thus far concentrated on accommodating the "easy” half of our task: the engineering problems of new technologies and giant weapons systems. The more difficult half, unquestionably, is the human equation, for there does not exist a more "non-linear” natural object than the human mind. The attempts of our civilization at quantifications and generalizations thus far have been mostly clumsily empirical, but nevertheless research goes on, and surprising breakthroughs do happen often enough to encourage us to push farther along in our quest.
The application of psychological and physiological knowledge to hazard prevention is a foregone conclusion, if we are to expect results of any value at all. There is an inescapable tie-in with our system safety analyses: almost every "event” deduced through these engineering examinations is directly or indirectly related to human judgments, reactions, or physical structure. To perform, properly, a system safety analysis of a complicated system, one must "crank in” the human equation. To do this most effectively, the system engineer’s inputs must be complemented by those of the behaviorist and the human engineer, among others. The Naval Safety Center is presently expanding its efforts in this most promising direction. A glance again at Figure 1 reminds us that the number of personnel- induced accidents dwarf those engendered by other cause factors.
The directions that we may take in such a bro entire quest for helpful knowledge is almost infinite. O to dis interesting example, is the subject of "biorhythm 1
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Some rather intensive research over the last 30 j$ traim
has pointed to the distinct possibility that beginn'5 at the moment of birth, each human being starts th; separate "biological clocks,” each with its own uni^ sinusoidal-like frequency. One cycle is normally terf1 the "physical” cycle lasting 23 days, and relates strength, endurance, and resistance. Another has b1 termed the "sensitivity” cycle lasting 28 days, and lates to moodiness, creativity, and intuition. The - is the "intellectual” cycle, lasting 33 days, relating logic, memory, and ambition. The cycles are surf1 ingly regular (affected and masked, of course, by ^ environment), manifesting themselves in positive, "productive” periods, and negative, or "regenerati'1 periods. The "critical” periods are said to occur at inflection points of the cycles, when the individ1 passes from "positive” to "negative.” There is convi ing evidence that at these points (particularly dut>f the physical and sensitivity cycles), individuals are eral times more accident-prone than at other tin11'] Biorhythmic charting has been used in accident anal) in several countries, including the United States, & ada, Switzerland, and Germany. The impact of findings, if thoroughly substantiated, on naval accidft prevention programs is obvious.
Once research has been sufficient to result in mfi ingful findings, the problem is how to apply this n£* found knowledge in a practiced way. Technical rese^1 resulting in hardware recommendations is applied1 systems development via the engineer, whose sp£Cl' expertise lies in the application of scientific princip^ to useful, real-world designs. Likewise, human W, neers may apply those psychological and physiolog11’ discoveries to technical applications. These processed those in which system safety engineering plays an11 timate role, particularly at the interfaces of both 1 systems themselves, and the management structured1 designs and produces them.
But what about the operators of these systems? ^ to this point we have covered everything else, includ'1? the interface with their particular equipment. Fig11 1 clearly shows that probably the largest rewards1 be reaped from any safety program will be those from attacking the major cause of all accidents, ’ human being at the controls. Once research in personnel-related area is complete, the obvious generally the only) way to apply it directly to person1', is through training and education. This applica^ must be an input (from the systems viewpo'11 throughout the life cycle of any system, whether * are speaking of a sailor’s career in the Navy, or1
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Preventing the Preventable Accident
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bn1 entire life of a weapons system from conceptual study 0 to disposal. The inputs to the sailor are obvious, from the first time that the Navy can reach him in recruit training, then extending throughout his naval career in schools, on-the-job training, publications, and a great variety of other ways designed to educate him regarding the costs of accidents as compared with the relative ease of their prevention. The inputs to weapons systems through ongoing hazard analysis have been described $ herein, emphasizing that this must go on not just (luring design, but throughout the system’s (i.e., ship’s) ife. A ship alteration (ShipAlt) to correct one problem may create other hazards in other areas, unless properly analyzed from the total systems viewpoint. Safety lessons learned and new hazard prevention developments must be applied throughout the ship’s life cycle (within Practical dollar limitations) in order for a safety program to be totally effective.
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Accidents in our ever-more-complex modern Navy are each becoming increasingly expensive. And what >s really worse in the last analysis, these same accidents result in reduced readiness to cope with mission demands. This problem, because of burgeoning worldwide technology, is not confined to the Navy or even
this country, but scant comfort may be taken therefrom when solutions, albeit difficult, are within our grasp.
The present-day sailor, with mercurial attitudes and an all-too-human propensity to err, is becoming surrounded by ever-more-complicated, ever-more-numerous systems, and potential combinations for accidents rise exponentially. The newly created problems cannot be eliminated and maintain a viable, strong naval force: therefore, they must be circumvented. The answer proposed herein is, the "new safety.”
The new safety is not really new at all. Its components (training, psychology, systems analysis, etc.) are familiar to all of us. What is new is the concept of using a systems management approach to provide the adhesive which bonds together these diverse elements into one effort, aimed at one goal: preventing mission degradation by eliminating preventable accidents.
An Engineering Duty Officer and graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy with the Class of 1961, Lieutenant Commander McGinley served six years in the submarine service prior to undertaking graduate studies at leading to the S.M. and Advanced Engineer's degrees in naval architecture. In 1970, he reported to the Naval Safety Center, where he served as Head, Submarine Systems Analysis Division for two and one-half years, while at the same time receiving his M.S.A. degree in management from George Washington University. He is currently stationed at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard.
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On board a fleet ballistic missile submarine, during a surface transit in heavy weather, waves were regularly breaking over the bridge. The bridge watch, consisting of an officer of the deck, a junior officer of the deck, and a lookout, were getting soaked, and because of the increasing height of the waves were considering asking permission to go below and station the watch in the control room. As one particularly large wave was about to break on top of them, the lookout turned to the officer of the deck and said:
"Sir, request permission to scream.”
—Contributed by Lt. Cdr. Michael J. Lees, USN As Big As Life
The chief mate on an old windjammer was on the quarterdeck peering through his telescope at the horizon when he was approached by the galley boy, who asked him what he was looking at.
"Sonny,” replied the mate, "I’m looking for the Equator, and I believe I’ve found it. Would you like to sec it?”
"Yes, sir,” answered the boy, quite excited. As he squinted through the scope with one eye open and the other closed, the mate slyly plucked a hair from his long beard and held it across the sighting glass saying, "There now, can you see the Equator?”
"1 sure can!” exulted the lad, "And what’s more, I can see a camel walking on it!”
—Contributed by Cdr. J. M. McPhail, USMS
(The Naval Institute will pay $10.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)