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Among the Americans uho, as a result ‘I'he participation of the United States in Southeast Asia military conflict, have Offered anguish from insults and injury to ^de and honor and memory of distinguished to a grateful nation in the "just” of this century are the many elder ^'mes of all Services, officer and enlisted, deioted their lives in the routine of Retime and the deadly combat of war, ufvr ‘^paradoxically—preserving for all
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I ^hcans the very freedoms which now ft I "^It the detractors—the amateurs on cam- [ fj,f I and at cocktail parties and the profes- . I iUl>>a^s tn the media—to castigate the profes- \C I % 0y armS' for whatever reasons. The F I being letter from a spokesman of that r*l‘red community, Brigadier General ' G. Chynoweth, U.S. Army (Retired), tsl Point Class of 1912, 82 years of age M July 1972, who retired from active u,y on 31 October 1947 after 39 years of Stnb, responds with eloquence and strength Ir‘ lh detractors. His views are his ouv, of ltflr<e~not officially endorsed by the Naty part men t or the Naval Institute Board °f Osntrol—but his letter should be read v’ith care by everyone who believes there exists pff tie remotest possibility that another imi” war might be thrust upon this country “Gome time in the future. And, remember, was already 10 years old when the 20th ty began.
Agadier General B. G. Chynoweth, U. S. Army (Retired)—For this observer, in Seating the military profession as it f*'S(s today in these United States, I Sin where I began 64 years ago, at c b. S. Military Academy. Whatever
else West Point is or is not, it ought to be a sanctuary where military ideals can take root and grow, safe from the harsh, hot, shifting winds of political ideology.
At the 60th reunion of my class, we rendered the traditional salute to Syl- vanus Thayer, founder of the Academy, before reviewing the Corps of Cadets which we had seen grow from 400 to 4,000. On that day, the general view of West Point—carved out of the mountain lair of the Storm King—remained much the same as when we first saw it in 1908, and the cadets were still immaculate in their dress uniforms. Still, and however familiar the long, gray line and the high, gray cliffs, there was a difference, for West Point is in transition!
During our visit, each old grad received a copy of the new USMA catalog, which listed the instructors and their academic credentials, the degrees from civilian colleges which are now a prerequisite. I counted about 500 degrees, ranging from bachelors to doctors, but only 25 instructors were listed as graduates of the Armed Forces’ schools. Throughout June Week, we were told of continuing efforts to bring West Point back into the mainstream of American thought. Yet, at the same time, across the country, leaders in American thought were busily engaged in downgrading the "military mind.” Quo vadis West Point?
In a letter to Armor magazine, General Bruce C. Clarke, U.S. Army (Retired), reminds us: "The graduates of Command and General Staff School (C&GSS) and our War College all have at
least two years of formal postgraduate work in formal academic environment under high standards. Many colleges cannot approach these standards.” It would seem, then, that Congress ought to authorize degrees for the Armed Forces schools. But, whether or not this is done, U. S. Military Academy authorities should not emphasize civilian degrees while ignoring the achievements of Service schools.
Agitators are seeking to belittle the importance of West Point. They point to the ROTC as an adequate source for officers. This specious attack has chosen for its rallying cry the cynical question: "Who needs West Point?” Serious students of our defense system, whether graduates of the Military Academy or not, know who needs it. But this frivolous question does not really warrant a serious answer. For the agitators and nihilists know that, if they can succeed in their concurrent effort to "demilitarize” West Point, the question will be academic—and they will have gone far toward permanently crippling the American military profession.
The ongoing attack on West Point began with the verbal salvo by the intel-
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ligcntsia—who seem to have missed the point that West Point is a military academy, not a university—claiming that USMA education was and is inferior. In the courses provided, USMA has maintained a very high standard, but the critics’ scoffing because USMA instructors in general had so few civilian degrees led to a policy of sending officers to the four winds in a drive to acquire degrees of all sorts. Proponents of this policy argued that this vanguard of military missionaries could educate civilian faculties in the needs of the military. I distrust this theory. For every officer who can convert a civilian professor in his own bailiwick, I suspect that there are a dozen who come back with serious dilution of their military ideals.
The sociological backlash has already appeared. There was a recent, highly- publicized flurry of resignations among USMA instructors who had won degrees in academe. The actual number was small, and friends of West Point said: "Good riddance!” But I suspect that the backlash was greater than appeared on the surface. Some officers and cadets seem to be amending the West Point motto—Duty, Honor, Country—with the word "If.” "I will fight if the war is just.” "I will perform my duty with honor if my country is in the right.” Such "ifs” as these may produce an
Army, but it will be an Army of dissenters.
The intelligentsia claim that West Point is too narrow. It is true that a military academy, by and large, does not offer the scope of intellectual challenge one expects to find in a university, but, in striving for breadth, it is possible to lose depth. And, of course, there are worthy things to be found in a Service Academy that no university can or will match. All too many of our "great” universities have conspicuously failed, for example, to implant moral doctrines. Many of their faculties scoff at moral values such as patriotism and loyalty, and even deride "the value attitude!” Yet, if West Point can produce a good percentage of loyal and dedicated soldiers it will justify its existence. Conversely, if "The Point” becomes just another university, the question "Who needs West Point?” might be very difficult for even a military man to answer.
The ideological pressure on West Point seems to be part of a broader assault on the entire military profession. Perhaps never before has there been so much defamation. The vituperation has its origins in the war-weariness of a permissive society which has always disliked war and which was always inclined to attribute war to the military. Antiwar fever has been fanned by provocateurs who seek to destroy our system. Just as they instigated the outcry against "police brutality,” so have they tried to discredit the military by sensational treatment of "war crimes.”
When permissive Athens was destroyed by dictatorial Sparta, Plato designed "The Republic.” Instead of bringing the military into the mainstream of Athenian thought, he carefully insulated them. The Platonic plan was the objective of early American statesmen. There has always been a well-recognized policy to keep the military away from ideological pressures. In recent decades, however, new forms of political pressure have emerged. Perhaps the most powerful is being exerted by the educational hierarchy, which is slashing huge gaps in the insulation that once shielded our military profession. We cannot hope to survive as a nation unless we can restore military esprit.
A suggestion of restoring military esprit is likely to be set upon by the
heterogeneous forces of pacifism. The pacifist fallacy, that the military cause war, is as senseless as blaming the fire department for fires. But the pacifist >5 formidably allied with sentimentalist5 who preach in the name of religion- They can be refuted on their own er*- dence, for sacrifice is the keystone l,: religion, and no profession better exemplifies the nobility of sacrifice than does the military. Of a certain centurion, Jesus of Nazareth exclaimed: "I have not found so great a faith, no, not in Israel!” The centurion (a simple Roman company commander) had learned his faith in the soldier’s sacrament of obedience to orders. This sacrament was expressed in immortal line5 by Tennyson: "Theirs not to reason why, theirs but to do and die!”
But, cries the pacifist "Thou shalt not kill!” Moses, who revealed The Ten Commandments, was one of the greatest killers in history. He killed his eneroie5 in war. The disciples of Jesus, with H15 knowledge, habitually wore swords.
But, instead of trying to revive the military’s flagging spirits, our authorities yield to the politically expedient urge to "civilianize” our Armed Forces. One oi the casualties of such action would he the much-maligned military justice. Great jurists such as Elihu Root in the past and some in the present have pro- tested that the military court system 15 superior to civil practice. And what truly great legal mind has said that it is not? Yet, in response to pressure, we have reformed military jurisprudence. ^ have also "liberalized” military protocol, ritual, ceremony, training, and the way of life for soldiers and sailors.
In one of my university classes, a social scientist was scoffing at the mil'' tary profession. He heaped special ridicule on the ROTC students who were drilling on the campus. He said that if the Army were enlightened, they would simply assemble their soldiers daily and read to them from the Great Classics "Those soldiers” said he "would fighc like lions!” I laughed and he flushed with anger. Thus, again, did I learn that some professors who demand "academic freedom” think "constructive criticism is theirs alone to give, and, quickly, they denounce any opposition to their own dogma.
Their arguments—"Carpenters and
Comment and Discussion 83
plumbers don’t salute; why should soldiers and sailors? Why so much drill and Marching at attention? Why parades and ceremonies? Why all of the spit- and-polish?”—recall the wisdom of William Jennings Bryan who exclaimed that, if an enemy ever invaded this country, the farmers would seize their pitchforks and drive the rascals out!
War is a psychological phenomenon. Military procedures, through countless centuries of war experience, have tvolved and changed, but the principles °f military behavior are the same today as in ancient Rome. For thousands of years, soldiers have saluted, drilled, and strutted in parade. The good soldier has always been erect, meticulous, polished, and proud of it! "Bur,” says the social scientist, "why all of this silly practice which is so unlike the sensible behavior °f civilians?”
The answer is that the military man °ften must function under mental stress that is beyond the comprehension of the uninitiated. Humans are potentially cowards because of their God-given urge to protect their own skins. To counter
act this fear, "disciplinary training” evolved. It worked for the Marine raiders on Guadalcanal yesterday and it will work for the Armed Forces today. The name is misleading because "discipline” is associated with punishment. Actually, these practices are corrective therapy. When not used skillfully, however, therapy can be deadly. When we mobilized for World War I, many inexpert commanders could think of nothing better to do with their troops than to drill, drill, drill—all day long! Only later did they learn the value of short, snappy drills interspersed with weapon practice and quick-reaction games.
To sophisticated readers of today, it may seem absurd to discuss basic military training. But our country should realize the folly of encouraging slackness in their Armed Forces. Our recruiting advertisements are presenting a view of life in The New Army as being "just like home.” Teenage products of a permissive society can now enter into "military life” with no rude shocks to their tender sensibilities. This is worse than false liberalism—it is hypocrisy, which
is the worst sin of all. Military training should be rugged, to prepare soldiers for the rugged ordeal of battle.
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U. S. Sectpower in the 19th Century
What about our only real competitor in military affairs? A national journal recently published a photograph of a Russian guard-of-honor marching in a goose-step that is more extreme even than that of the Imperial German Army of 60 years ago! Soviet military schools emphasize the theories of Clausewitz who taught that "Peace Treaties” and "Arms Limitations” are merely words for use as political camouflage. They deem war to be natural and inevitable. New Soviet equipment is sophisticated; they are perfecting multiple-head missiles which could end the deterrent effect of massive nuclear action. Their up-to-date navy is designed for global war. They are making the Caribbean a Russian sea. In time of "peace” they are keeping their powder dry and building military esprit. They have studied military history. We are in danger of forgetting ours. This is not the time for the civilian leaders of America to ignore their military advisors.
The organization of the Department of Defense after World War II placed our military advisors under not one, but two, layers of control, invoking the political theory that war is too deadly to be entrusted to military minds. One might as well place medical surgery practice under the direct control of the layman. Secretary Robert McNamara reinforced civilian control with his computer corps of "whiz kids,” who are still in action. The voice of the military man has been muted.
In the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Admiral Rickover is quoted: "I have had some experience with Department of Defense analysts. I find them generally illiterate technically. . . . Meaningless studies [are] leading the U. S. into grave national danger.”
Our news media do not inform the public of grave warnings of this sort. Bruce Holloway, former commander of our Strategic Air Command, offered the three major TV networks a documentary which showed the Soviets forging far ahead of us in war preparation. The networks refused to air it.
Another pernicious example of the hoodwinking of the American people was the sensational treatment of Vietnam "war crimes.” Sherman knew what he was talking about when he said "War is Hell!” In the cauldron of war, passions are superheated. War cannot be "regulated” as a football game can. Yet, even as we watch football, we see the officials step off their penalties and we accept the fact that infractions do occur. And, rare is the football player who is chastised by his coach for being "too aggressive.” In Vietnam, luckless offenders were dragged into the public limelight by sensation-hungry journalists to become targets for the hypocritical wrath of the self-righteous.
From the beginning, Vietnam was not a "civil war,” but a ruthless invasion from the North, which was countered by a civilian-controlled, U. S. attempt to conduct a "non-war.” Our military leaders maintained a respectful and dutiful silence about the civilian bungling which encouraged the aggressors and prolonged the chaos. When the eager journalists succeeded in pinpointing a "war crime” (always on our side, never on the other), the civilian-controlled Pentagon joined in the search for scape
The 1,1 titled sei Hen.” *gree Peace
goats and used our military court system to try the offenders.
In each "war crime,” the question was raised: "Who ordered what?” War frequently borders on hurly-burly confusion. Orders endeavor ro systematize the general action, but orders cannot cover the detailed events. Under civilian direction, from the top, Vietnam was much worse than ordinary confusion.
In the frantic search for the culprits who had authorized such "war crimes,” some of the scapegoats were officers of high rank. The self-righteous critics expected them to have prevented any and all irregularity within their jurisdictions. So they, too, had to be degraded. Never mind that the entire war has been a display of uncontrolled brutality on the part of the invaders. Never mind that the Pentagon politicians should have known that nobody could have prevented unforeseeable reactions on the part of all troops committed to that disorderly melee. The scribes and Pharisees would not be content without sacrificial victims. Jane Fonda and other starry-eyed innocents journeyed to Hanoi in order to sympathize with the barbarians who had invaded their neighbor to the south. Who is there to sympathize with our own poor scapegoats?
The military profession has been hurt badly by the kind of publicity given "war crimes.” The U. S. soldier now questions his own credo, and subordinates of all grades have wondered why the high command hasn’t "backed up” the troops in certain instances. What is the Pentagon doing to restore the military’s faith in itself? A good deal, apparently! First and foremost, it has relaxed the rigors of military training. One example will suffice: it has authorized a large expenditure of funds to do away with "kitchen police (KP)” duty by men in uniform. KP, it is said, is degrading. Yet most of us do KP in our own homes without feeling degraded.
As a final measure for perfecting the "control” of civilians over the military, the past Secretary of Defense assigned to each separate military command an Inspector General who would report directly to him. It might be argued that there is a resemblance between this approach and the practice of the Communist Party in assigning Political Commissars to act as watchdogs over
the military commanders. This practi has been a serious handicap to So'' commanders in war; it could handid our own commanders in any future ^
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A suitable status for the military our country is not likely to result an all-or-nothing attitude on either sid There have been examples in wfo1 military men have tried to overt1' proper civilian authority. Perhaps 1 finest example of correct behavior that of George Washington. He ex^ ited almost superhuman patience duf|f; the tribulations of Valley Forge later, when Congress failed to pay troops. Never once did he yield to th^ who urged him to usurp the gov^ ment. Mutiny was not in his mak^f But he held the respect of his troops forthright demands for redress of M0 grievances. His troops knew that they ^ a voice in the government. Today, & voice has been muted.
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In Washington’s early campaigns. , troops were little more than a tsd Only the ineptness and lukewarm sp1 of the British commanders saved ^ Americans from total disaster. At 1 instigation of the French, Baron ^ Steuben was brought over to be tor General of Training in the Co^' nental Army. General von Steuben ** a professional soldier who had lean1*1 under Frederick the Great. At 0 Forge, he subjected the troops to ous drill and training in ritual, includ'11' the salute. He converted the mob an army. Their subsequent behavio( battle was immeasurably improved.
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Today, the Joint Chiefs are in a tagon-designed straitjacket. What wl)l1' George Washington have done un^1 such a regime? Let no one delude h'f! self that there were no "war crifl1^ during the Revolution. Would '$■'>' ington have consented to making scT goats of his subordinates? Woul<d have agreed to "civilianizing” the tinental Army which von Steuben ^ militarized? Nobody knows, but I ’l', pect that he would have made his anf felt in the halls of Congress and if 1( Pentagon. If a member of the J°\ Chiefs were to censure our polit*^ in the manner of George Washing
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ract" The French statesman Talleyrand So'* toined the slogan that "War is much ndid bo serious a thing to be left to military e«*5ien.” Most experienced military men ary1 free with the responding caveat: : fro' Peace is too precious to be entrusted r si<* civilian minds without the free and whi^ll vote of the military.” Both must eff^ *'0rk together, each in his own realm.
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'Pis is a truth that goes back as far as ^vid and Saul. If wc arc to survive as free nation, we must reestablish the "blitary profession in a status of dignity 1fld respect.
The anti-military animus in our toUntry today is being agitated by inim- ,f»l agents. We should remember the ^vice of George Washington: "To be spared for war is one of the most Actual means of preserving peace.” We ^not be prepared for war unless we 8lve full freedom and attention to the •dvice of the military profession. If the Lilian authorities fail to recognize this, 'd'at can the military do other than to i,Jnd up proudly and declare, like the jtaliators of ancient Rome as they Jded Caesar: "We who are about to salute you.”
^0mmand Attention:
^re-all or Crutch?
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Acting the command attention of the ^ commanding officer. There are c,Jrnmand memos and letters from levels Js high as the Chief of Naval Personnel, °n down to the local squadron readiness training officer. In my ship, there *fc 68 of these, now effective, which lre« continuing command attention to f^blem areas. There are Fleet, force, and squadron regulations, instructions ( ^ch 1^1 0f command and, finally, ^rational orders (OpOrds).
^hy does a senior commander direct
tenant Commander Charles C. Holcomb, ■ S. Navy—Imagine for a moment a ^ commanding officer, who has just Sieved as the commanding officer, renewing the general message files. What e will likely find is some 50 general Usages directing continuing corned attention towards one critical Jr°blem area or another. In addition, if c reads the station files for the previous ^ree months he will find many more.
ere are, of course other vehicles for
85
Comment and Discussion
command attention to a problem area? What is the likelihood that the directed command attention will happen? What is the likelihood that the desired result of the command attention will occur?
Basically, the senior commander directs command attention because of a new problem not covered by existing directives or programs, because existing directives are insufficient, or because existing directives are being neglected by his subordinates. The end result desired is almost always well understood by the commander and by all of the recipients of his message, letter, instruction, or regulation directing command attention. But, the matter of how to achieve the desired end result is not always understood by either and is often not defined by the commander directing command attention.
This leads to the second question: what is the likelihood that the directed command attention will happen? I believe that it may not happen if either the directing commander or the subordinate commander does not clearly see how the end result is to be achieved. Even if the subordinate commander does see clearly how to achieve the end result, he may lack the resources to do so. Here are some examples:
General messages directed command attention to minority affairs and retention. Originators and addressees of the messages understood the desired result clearly. But did they understand how to achieve it clearly?
An all (Fleet) message directed command attention to torpedo firing performance. All recipients understood how to achieve the desired result. But achievement depended on the resources available: trainer time, exercise torpedo availability, target services, and available underway days.
A number of messages directed command attention to drug abuse and drug awareness. The desired result was well understood. The concept of drug awareness education was well understood, but the method required resources not available: trained personnel, training films, and tapes. When these resources became available the desired command attention could happen.
In the absence of resources to execute command attention effectively or in the absence of a clear understanding of how to achieve the desired result, there will
either be wasted effort or neglect of the directed command attention.
What is the likelihood that the desired result will be achieved and that the problem will not recur? The likelihood is low if command attention is ineffectively applied because of a lack of understanding or lack of resources. The likelihood is also low if there are no organizational and administrative changes made to facilitate the continued execution of the required attention. The ship commanding officer is directed to give command attention to literally hundreds of problems and tasks. Command attention really means command organization attention: executive officer attention, department head attention, division officer attention, chief petty officer attention, and the like. It means the attention of 10%, 30%, or 100% of the command. Command attention may be executed through the line organization of the command down through the cognizant division or it may be executed through a collateral duty assignment.
With so many requirements for command attention, the commanding officer can effectively carry out the assignments only if he has an organization to do so. If he does not, he must adjust his organization in order to accommodate the new task or to ensure the execution of a task which has been neglected. At the senior commander level, this happens all the time. When a senior commander discovers a new requirement for his attention he usually creates a new billet on his staff with a staff officer, yeoman, desk, typewriter, and files to help him.
At the individual ship level, however, there is very little flexibility to add new billets, dis-establish old billets, or reorganize existing departments or divisions. When a new task is assigned, the ship commanding officer either adds it to the tasks assigned to existing departments or assigns it as a collateral duty.
If he does neither, continuing command attention is not likely to happen.
What is the likelihood that units in the Tonkin Gulf, or units preparing for major inspections, or units in workup, would or could give minority affairs or drug awareness the immediate command attention sufficient to achieve the desired results? Probably not too good if they lacked the resources and the organ-
ization to do so. Eventually, however, the resources and an organizational change would be provided in the form of trained personnel, training aids, and a new collateral or primary billet.
Sometimes the subordinate commander will be saturated with requirements for command attention. By this I mean that he and his organization are saturated with tasks and are unable to make sufficient manpower resources available to execute command attention. Then the commander must either ignore the directive to apply command attention or he must accept the likelihood of command inattention to another task.
In addition to the pressures of tempo of operations, the factor of personnel turnover often contributes to task- saturation. This is particularly true where collateral duties are layered on top of primary duties. I am sure it is a fairly common practice for each commanding officer to add collateral duties to primary ones up to the capability of the individual to carry them out. In effect, the commanding officer saturates the indi
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vidual. When the individual is transferred, his replacement must learn, in sequence, the new primary duty, then the watches he must stand, and then, finally, the collateral duty. As a result, the collateral duty gets neglected and sometimes is virtually forgotten. Collateral duties are frequently shifted from one individual to another at intervals of a year (or even less) to level the work load, to adapt to individual capabilities and to adjust for personnel turnover. In my experience, command attention applied through collateral duty assignment is inconsistent unless backed up by inspections as those in the 3-M and registered publications systems.
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If we accept the foregoing, we can next consider a potential improvement to the situation. That is, we can change the primary billet structure of the subordinate units in order to pick up several collateral duties into the line organization of each command. One opportunity would be to establish a new department, at the ship and aircraft squadron level responsible for personnel services, and manned by personnel
trained in career counselling, awareness education, legal assistant voting, taxes, and minority affairs a department could have implement ^ the action directed in some 30 messages during 1972.
I suggest that if the senior mander has a high probability of achif1 ing the desired results from direct command attention it is probably ^ cause: all levels of the command strti‘ ture understand how to effectively cat' out the command attention and achi^ the desired result; an adequate orgaf ization exists or is created at the suW dinate command to execute the cot* mand attention; and adequate resour^ exist at the subordinate command ,l support the effective execution of coif mand attention.
There is one other effective tooltl get the desired results, the inspect^11 \ For years. Vice Admiral Hyman Rid over could not get as much commit attention on nuclear propulsion ph"1 operation as was needed. He used ^ vices such as required reports, require letters, and letters to the subordin^
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'ttmatid level than any other single ^ ’■a. Inspections make command atten- - I)n happen. Inspections can also get stn,Ned resources and organizational .^nges too. The inspections focus the Motion of the senior and subordinate >r£^ nmanders on the effectiveness of their 1 'Sanizations and resources. c°n there is a pitfall. If the inspection >urc ftsuits are used only to direct more 1 :rnmand attention without any con- c0,,1 Oration of organizational changes or ,tsource changes to correct short- ,0tnings then there will almost surely * more command /^attention in an '"inspected area.
directed command attention is a ^tral fact in Navy management today, command attention is directed with- "Xt the method of achieving the desired tCsults being understood nothing can be Sieved. If the method of achieving the ^ired results is understood, but the Ordinate command organization or '"sources are inadequate, results will be '"consistent at best. If an inspection is "sed, command attention is assured and ^ired results are likely, however, com- ’"ind inattention in uninspected areas ^uld also result. Command attention s no better than a crutch when it is ■ected but not backed up by proper Jr8anization and resources. Command Mention is a cure if it is backed up by 8°°d organization and adequate recces.
Military Policy-Makers and the ^•Volunteer Force
tytam Jerome L. O'Brien, U. S. Navy— end of the war in Vietnam marks attainment of one of this country’s ^ior policy goals. Concommitantly, termination of the draft and the ^tion of the All-Volunteer Force
^AVf) affords an unusual opportunity 0r professional U. S. military personnel 1 rc-cxamine the role of the uniformed *rv'ces in the foreign policy process. If as military officers, can agree with
Comment and Discussion 87
a generally-accepted thesis that the United States has been overcommitted militarily for the majority of the period since World War II, we should recognize that military officers, too, are at least partially responsible for that overcommitment. All too often we have either proposed or tacitly accepted military solutions to political problems better solved, perhaps, by traditional diplomatic means. We, in the Armed Forces, have become integrated in the foreign policy process to the point where we have undertaken a new role as a purveyor of administration policy which competes with, and sometimes handicaps, our historically-grounded task of policy implementation. I believe we need to reverse this trend.
The nation’s almost chronic involvement in war—hot or cold, declared or undeclared—since Pearl Harbor necessarily has focused a great deal of attention on its Armed Forces. We have become a nation of veterans, with 30,000,000 Americans, over one-fifth of the country’s adult population, personally involved because of their service in the Armed Forces. Also, there is inherent interest in military affairs because of the large defense budgets. Finally, the growing interest of the citizenry in international affairs, stemming from improved education, technological change, and an increased appreciation of the demonstrated ability of the public to affect the government’s policies, has accentuated popular attention to military matters. Familiarity has bred criticism.
Anti-militarists and dissidents, in general, joined forces to oppose the country’s involvement in Vietnam, not just because they hated war itself, but also to promote domestic programs whose implementation seemed to conflict directly with prosecution of the war. The foreign policy of the 1960s, with its activism and emphasis on extensive U. S. military involvement overseas, was the basis for much of the criticism levied against the Administration and, in particular, the defense establishment. Nevertheless, politicization of the military, especially in conjunction with U. S. policy in Vietnam, was the capstone resulting, rightly or wrongly, in the uniformed services bearing the brunt of the blame, both for
the policy and for its implementation.
The advent of the All-Volunteer Force and the draft’s demise offer an opportunity for the officer corps to re-examine its chosen profession, to identify carefully its goals, and to return to the standard of excellence that has traditionally characterized the U. S. Armed Forces. If we are to optimize military effectiveness and promote credibility, we must devote our efforts to improved implementation of policy and divest ourselves of the policy-making role. The AVF could be used either as a tool to perpetuate near total emphasis on crisis diplomacy, with principal stress on military solutions, or it could be considered as an instrument, which, by its existence, permits a return to normalcy in pursuit of the President’s "generation of peace.” To me, the choice is clear; the AVF should be responsive to policy, not vice versa. Accordingly, we should accentuate the role of the force in support of peace by tailoring it for its deterrent role while de-emphasizing its interventionist capability.
Public relation aspects of the All- Volunteer Force should be devoid of sensationalism. It is imperative that efforts to gain popular support of the concept be kept low key and that its capabilities not be oversold to an increasingly sophisticated public. In this regard, we should avoid stressing the ability of the force to respond to brush- fire conflicts. The AVF must not be depicted as a panacea which simultaneously would solve the country’s security concerns, provide opportunity for the underprivileged, and end the inequities of conscription forever. Rather, it should be described realistically as a peacetime deterrent force, composed of professional military personnel with the size and composition of the force reflecting the foreign policy that it is designed to support.
All of this does not mean that we should not actively recruit the best personnel available by stressing the advantages of service in the AVF. Inasmuch as public acceptance of the force is by no means assured, it is imperative that we do all we can to make military Service attractive. In so doing, we should not perpetuate the permissiveness and materialism that pervade our society. Instead, we should stress the
satisfaction and recognition aspects of affiliation with true professionals dedicated to the preservation of our country. Those of us privileged to serve in the AVF, like Caesar’s wife, must be irreproachable. Honesty and integrity must be the watchwords if we are to bridge the credibility gap in an open society. I am suggesting that we appeal to elitism and a return to idealism. If this approach is to succeed, it will require an improved attitude on the part of the American public toward its military personnel. Attitudes are formed slowly and altered the same way; however, acceptance by the public is a sine qua non for the All-Volunteer Force. A truly professional military force, comprised of patriotic, responsible men and women, divorced from the policy-making process and performing outside of the political arena would enhance public acceptance.
"What’s In a Name?”
(See T. B. Grassey, pp. 40-47, February 1973
Proceedings)
Commander N. T. Wood, U. S. Navy, Washington Placement Officer, Bureau of Naval Personnel— Lieutenant Grassey’s very interesting article was marred by making the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BuPcrs) the "heavy.” The Bureau is many things, not all of them necessarily good, but in this case, BuPers is innocent.
On 19 July 1951, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a letter to the Chief of Naval Personnel on the subject of "Ship’s Names and Sponsor’s Unit.” The letter directed the shift of that unit, with its functions, from the Bureau of Naval Personnel to the Ship’s History Division (OP-29) in the offices of the Chief of Naval Operations. The function has remained with the Ship’s History Division through the various subsequent metamorphoses. That division has become the Naval Historical Center. The records of the Historical Center show the shift of functions from the Bureau of Naval Personnel became effective on 19 August 1951.
Then, as now, the function was administrative, with proposals being staffed for final selection and approval by the Secretary of the Navy.
The Seaborne Mobile Logistic System
Commander Tyrone G. Martin, U. S. Navy, Chief Staff Officer, Amphibious Squadron Seven—Known to some amphibians as SMELLS, and smiles to others, the Seaborne Mobile Logistic System (SMLS)* is a new concept being developed by the Navy and Marine Corps for use primarily by the smaller amphibious forces, such as a ready group and its associated Marine Amphibious Unit. Its conception is a result of our new national defense strategy—sometimes referred to as the Nixon Doctrine—which advances the idea of local or sub-theater warfare, and recognizes the need to position general purpose forces to respond quickly in crises or near-crisis situations.
A characteristic of most past amphibious operations has been the rapid build-up of supplies, spare parts and equipment, and logistic support personnel in the beachhead. For a "come to stay” invasion, this has been necessary. But in situations where the scope, duration, or political conditions accompanying an operation require a high degree of flexibility and mobility, and perhaps a "low visibility” profile, such a buildup is a potential liability. The SMLS is intended to eliminate this requirement in low or mid-intensity conflicts where no significant threat exists, in that the supply, repair, and replacement functions are retained onboard the amphibious shipping involved. In a sense, these ships are both combat loaded and "servMart loaded.” They will operate offshore at distances determined by tactical and logistic considerations, and they retain the capability of transferring ashore, piecemeal or in toto, these embarked logistic functions if the situation should indicate such a move is required.
The principal agency for operating the SMLS is the Combat Service Support F.lement of the Marine unit involved. Called a Logistic Support Group (LSG) or Logistic Support Unit (LSI'), this organization already exists in the Marine structure, but the disposition of certain sub-elements and their operating
*See L. F. Snowden and M. N. Carter, "Sea-based Landing Force Operations: An Evolutionary Development,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1972, pp. 105-108.
methods have been changed markedly $ a result of their retention onboard ship The LSG/lsu, however, retains the cap' bility to operate ashore, if necessary.
Three levels of control are established to effect coordination of activities in thf SMLS. These are the Logistic Support Center (LSC), the Ship Logistic Contra! Center (slcc), and (when, and if established) the Forward Logistic Contra! Center (FLCC).
The Logistic Support Center (LSC) i* established on board the amphibious group command ship to act as the I0, gistic agency for both the Navy and Marine commanders. Navy and Marina personnel man the LSC, which has complete coordinative control of all logistic efforts supporting the Landing Force. In fulfilling its assigned tasks, the LSC: (1) coordinates actions of all logistic agencies; (2) receives and processes logistk requests; (3) provides inventory control' and (4) informs and advises the commander on logistic matters.
A joint Ship Logistic Control Cente1 is established onboard each ship in the task group providing logistic support As a subordinate to the LSC, the SIX£ (1) receives and processes logistic requests from the LSC; (2) locates and arranges the movement of equipment and supplies; (3) maintains inventor)' control of landing force equipment and supplies; (4) arranges for loading and unloading of equipment and supplies b)' boat or aircraft; and (5) supervise maintenance performed on board ship on Landing Force equipment.
Should the tactical situation requi^ it, a Forward Logistic Control Centet can be established ashore as an extension of the LSC. Equipped with the requisifC communications and administrate support personnel, the FLCC receive* requests and coordinates requirement* of the debarked units, taking appriV priate action in accordance with polklCS established by the LSC. Being in close1 touch with the troops than the pare111 center, the FLCC can provide the *-sC with a better evaluation of priorities m the case of conflicting or competm? requests.
Three kinds of requests are hanm^ by the SMLS: supply, maintenance, Jn medical. While supply and medical a> sistancc requests are self-explanatory-3 word concerning maintenance requc>1
is in order. Actions in this category are quite comprehensive, ranging from the delivery of spares (parts or units), to the pickup, repair, and return of failed units, to the assignment of repair personnel (contact teams) to field units and their subsequent return afloat for further assignment.
When a supply or maintenance request is received by the LSC, it checks with the appropriate SLCC for item availability and with both the Helicopter Direction Center (HDC) and the Primary Control Ship (PCS) for a determination of transportation availability. With this information in hand, a supplier is designated and transportation assigned. Airlift is, of course, the preferred method, and will be employed at every opportunity.
Rather than coming from the troops or flcc to the LSC, medical assistance requests are hotlined from the Air Liaison Officer (ALO) or Forward Air Controller (FAC) to the HDC via the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC). The medical coordinator in attendance determines whether or not air evacuation is needed and is available. If affirmative on both counts, the HDC dispatches the necessary helicopters and the LSC is not involved. If one or both of the foregoing criteria are not met, the coordinator passes the requirement to the LSC, which coordinates surface transport between the PCS and shore units.
No matter how one chooses to pronounce the acronym, the Seaborne Mobile Logistic System offers the prospect °f even greater flexibility and responsiveness in the traditionally dynamic Navy-Marine Corps amphibious assault team.
Proceedings Cover—USS Quincy
(CA-39)
(if Cover and Cover Box, p. 1, February 197} Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander John //. Mee, Jr., L- S. Natal Resene (Retired)—The USS Quincy (CA-}9) steaming in convoy brought some very fond memories to me, as I served in her from July 1941 until her loss in August 1942 at Guadalcanal.
I believe that I am one of the few survivors from the bridge and had the
Comment and Discussion 89
sad duty to hold up Captain Samuel N. Moore, U. S. Navy, who died in my arms. Following this, I managed to reach the port side of the gun deck and jumped overboard. I was rescued at daylight by the USS Ellet (DD-398), along with others.
Throw a Nickel on the Grass
Lieutenant Commander Richard A1. Vance, U. S. Navy—The controversy about lightweight and multi-purpose fighters, as well as other aircraft, continues back and forth between designers, planners, and the civilian control agencies. But seldom has the fighter pilot been asked what he wants in an aircraft, or has the fighter pilot even been defined. This situation is a long-time result of mission identification, defense requirements, cost effectiveness, and non-operational experts. Does a fighter need to fight, intercept, bomb, fire missiles visually and by radar, have short and long range capabilities, fly in all types of weather and from all kinds of bases, and require all sorts of super systems? The answer for a true fighter is no.
To identify the mission of the true fighter, a rather well known German aviator in 1915 or so, mentioned something about fighters being allowed to
"roam their alloted airspace in whatever fashion suited them, spot the enemy, shoot him down, and anything else is rubbish.” Since then, this same wheel has been reinvented on at least four different major occasions. It would seem strange to some that he did not mention bombs, weather, range, or several other items. So the truth comes out once again—the mission of the fighter is to fight. The other missions are for the interceptor, attack, and/or reconnaissance aircraft. In short, we can use one aircraft for many types of missions, but we cannot use many types of aircraft for the air superiority mission. For example, no one asked the A-7 to achieve air superiority in Vietnam.
Each Service requires different types of aircraft to achieve its assigned missions. In many cases, one airframe will satisfy a particular mission requirement for all Services. In all cases, however, fighters should not be confused with interceptors. A mixed bag is required to be available in any tactical situation.
The fighter aircraft is basically a clear air mass, day weapons system capable of achieving air superiority. The history of aviation makes no reference to dogfights taking place in instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions. To achieve air superiority, a fighter must have superior performance. This has not been the case
since World War II in the U. S. inventory. Air superiority has been achieved by better tactics and training, not by better aircraft. To make the case in point, the best kill ratio in Vietnam was maintained by the F-8 Crusader, basically a single-engine, single-piloted, day, visual flight rules (VFR), close-in fighter. It is interesting to note that almost all the F-8 kills were achieved in whirling dogfights with short-range, visually-fired IR missiles and/or guns. The next best kill ratio was achieved by the Navy F-4 pilots. It was not until the advent of the Naval Fighter Weapons School, however, that the Navy F-4 kill ratio became comparable to the F-8 that excelled early in the war.
I think that the vast majority of Navy fighter pilots from both the F-4 and F-8 community will agree on the fact that both fighter and interceptor aircraft are needed. The F-14 Tomcat is unusual in that it apparently can perform both roles in an outstanding manner; the only catch being high cost and a low acceptable loss rate. It therefore becomes readily apparent that the F-i4 needs to be augmented by a lightweight fighter. The key to a real fighter aircraft is simplicity, spelled with a capital "S.”
Requirement | Figure 1 Fighter | Interceptor |
Launch weight | 25,000 lbs | 60,000 lbs |
Fuel | 10,000 lbs | 22,000 lbs |
Thrust/weight | 1:1 on t/o | 1:1.2 on t/o |
Engines | 1 | 2 |
Crew | 1 | 2 |
Radius | 500 nautical miles | 1,500 nm |
Weapons | rapid fire (1,500 rds) or Sidewinder (4) | 30-mm (400 rounds) Sidewinder (4) Sparrow (4) or Phoenix (6) |
Gunsight | real time or | hot line |
ECM | passive | passivc/active |
Radar | search—50 nm | full—300 nm |
Radios | 2 | 2 |
Support | simple | systems |
Speed | 1.8 + | 2-5 + |
NOTES: Fuel: augment with jettison tanks leaving clean aircraft.
Weapons: radar missiles on jettison pods leaving dean aircraft.
To protect our attack aircraft and the
Fleet, our carriers require a mixture of fighters and interceptors. Basic requirements are roughly outlined in Figure 1.
The use of this mixed bag of fighters and interceptors would allow the carriers to achieve air superiority in all the tactical situations that we face. Initially, the interceptor will allow reduction of numerically superior forces at long-range, while the fighters maintain air superiority over the task force. As the tactical situation allows the force to close, both types can be used to gain air superiority, ranging from the vicinity of the strike group to over hostile territory itself. As the air superiority situation moves from being "gained” to being "maintained,” the multi-purpose interceptor can assume some of the attack role and leave the fighting to the fighters. In marginal weather, the roles can be reversed and the fighters would be able to assume the flak suppression and rescap roles. Systems, however, should be incorporated that will allow both the fighter and the interceptor to return instantly to its designed role without degrading its performance by external racks, and the like.
Using both types of aircraft in their primary roles will give us control of the air in any tactical situation. Integration of the fighter and interceptor missions
with our seaborne surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems allows flexibility as the situation dictates, even to the point of permitting the entire air wing to perform strike missions. This concept will cause the pure fighter pilot to turn green around the gills—the thought of "his” fighter sitting on deck, loaded down with racks and associated ordnance is enough to make him look hard at anything else in sight but "that.” While this picture brings on many grins from the attack pilot, whose sole purpose is to hurl his body at the ground while maintaining his Joe Cool image (and do an excellent job in the process), there is a real reason for all this interplay between fighter pilots and attack beanies. For example, just let one MiG show up! The reason our attack pilots get good results in combat is because they practice continuously. But pitted against a MiG pilot, however, they ate in a lot of trouble. It is therefore reasonable to assume that if we want good results from our fighter pilots in combat, then they must spend many hours practicing in mock dogfights. If we try to teach all trades to all pilots, we produce a large group of jacks-of-all-trades, and masters of none. This was the case with the Navy F-4 pilofs. Initially taught intercept tactics, then air-to-ground procedures, they suffered from a lack of fighter training. Finally, after ten years of operational service, one pilot took the bull by the horns and created a Fighter Weapons School. No one can argue with the results—the F-4 kill ratio achieved in the last year of the war was 11-to-l. Yet, the U. S. Air Force F-4 did not do well at all. The reason for this is well known throughout the Navy, and yet there are those who want to institute the same program on our fighter pilots. This brings us to an obvious fact of lift that apparently is not obvious enough- Traditionally, Navy pilots have been saddled with multipurpose fighters that have been historically proven to h*vC many characteristics inferior to those ot the enemy. In World War II, the F-6F Hellcat was the first to surpass the Japs- nesc Zero, but by then the Tony and several others were in production. During Korea, the F-9 could hardly survive against the MiG-15. During Vietnam, the MiG series once again was superior in many ways to our fighters. So, once
Comment and Discussion 91
again, better training, better tactics, and a group of aggressive pilots overcame the odds. This was possible only because the Navy pilots were allowed to practice air combat maneuvers (ACM) before engaging in actual combat. This was not true throughout the Services, however, with the not-so-surprising results. It is imperative therefore that the Navy continue to maintain this attitude and inject it into the other Services. This is not only true for fighters but also for the attack and other light aircraft pilots who must know how to defend themselves. An excellent safety record does not necessarily produce an excellent combat record, especially since we have proved that ACM training can be done safely. Somewhere, an insignia patch exists that quotes "The more we sweat in peace, the less we bleed in war.” It is imperative that we continue to produce fighter pilots who know how to fight.
After 30 years or more, the United States has been able to produce an aircraft that is superior, or at least equal, to any other in the world. This record is surpassed only by the fact that now we cannot decide on how many are to be purchased and at what price. It is a shame that while the politicians politic, the one guy left holding the bag is the same one who was seldom consulted— the fighter pilot.
So what else is new, you say? Actually you are quite right, it was only new in 1918. Since then, it has been forgotten and re-invented every 20 years or so. Applied to the 1970s it simply amounts to the fact that we must develop aircraft for specific missions, continue to develop the correct tactics, and be allowed to practice continuously. The use of simulators can be a big help in teaching and in the development of tactics in fighter pilots; but contrary to popular belief, simulators can still only simulate, and they do not really fly like real aircraft. We must augment by actual practice and make use of the Air Combat Maneuvering Ranges. Putting it into numbers, the first cruise fighter or interceptor pilot should have a minimum of 100 actual mock combat engagements and 15 to 20 simulator engagements in type, both against similar and dissimilar aircraft before he deploys. At the moment a pilot has less than 30 such en
gagements. Then, while deployed, each pilot should be scheduled for at least two such "yo-yo” sorties per week off the ship.
We must then provide this pilot with a first-line fighter or interceptor. The fighter must be lightweight, light-cost, and have superior characteristics in the Mach 0.8 to 1.3 range, where the vast majority of dogfights take place. And dogfights will take place; it is very hard to sneak around in a ground-controlled intercept (GCl) environment, and present and future policies will dictate visual identification. This fighter must be equipped with an instant gunsight for its rapid fire cannon and a reliable visual missile system. The addition of a simple radar would give it a limited all-weather capability. Trade-offs for other missions affecting its maneuverability, high thrust-to-weight ratio, and simplicity should never be allowed.
The all-weather interceptor should have long-range, high-Mach capability, and a selection of both long-range and close-in weapons systems. It should have the same instant gunsight, but could carry a heavier cannon where a few rounds will do the same job as the rapid-fire cannon. The Israelis demonstrated this technique quite effectively with the 30-mm. cannon. The long- range, radar-controlled missile selection or selections must be carried on jetti- sonable pods that will allow the interceptor to revert to the fighter role with a clean airframe for close-in combat.
Both of these aircraft can support each other and provide air superiority whenever and wherever needed. Correct use of these aircraft will allow them to roam their alloted area, find the enemy, and shoot him down. We have the ability to produce these aircraft and we must have them—"anything else is rubbish. ”
A Blueprint to Professionalism
Lieutenant Commander James L. Waldron, U. S. Navy—The "unrestricted line” is not just a term, but exists as a program. It deals with an officer’s career pattern leading to "Command at Sea,” and addresses the development, education, and assignments of U. S. naval officers.
The blueprint of the unrestricted line
officer has been floating for over a decade. Ten years ago, a line officer was to be knowledgeable of his profession while not requiring specialization in any particular area. But, toward the end of the 1960s, training became more in line with concentrating on a specific field, i.e., operations, weapons, or engineering. And more recently, it has expanded to include subcategory and subspecialty qualifications.
The identification of the Navy’s growing requirements have been changing, especially now as the Service moves toward a smaller, more professional Navy. The Chief of Naval Operations has pointed out that the Navy needs certain highly-specialized officers in the subcategories of warfare and the supporting fields, such as ASW, AAW, EW, training, and logistics. He also has indicated that there is a need for more subspecialists. He also mentioned that most of these fields required a background combining both operational and technical or managerial experience.
In order to meet better the real requirements of the Navy, the unrestricted line now has been divided into three areas of specialization and then into subcategories of warfare. Additionally, subspecialties have been created in certain warfare areas. In giving guidance to selection boards, the Secretary of the Navy has highlighted the importance to the Navy of the subspecialist.
Realizing the personal concern of every warfare officer to have his own command, the "Blueprint to Professionalism” was conceived. It is an attempt to present the latest view, although not necessarily to scale, of an officer’s (1110) career pattern leading to "Command at Sea” and to provide him with excellent prerequisites to flag rank. Certainly the objective of the unrestricted line program is to develop a capably-led, highly-competent fighting ship of qualified officers and men. The long-range plan envisions at least one staff assignment, two Service schools, and three tours at sea before becoming a commander.
The development of unrestricted line officers is now oriented to sea and operations, while requiring other special expertise usually found in the staff corps. To ensure being developed in the "profession of going to sea,” two opera-
tional tours should be completed first, with the idea of establishing a warfare specialty at a Service school. The subspecialty would best be obtained after postgraduate education and experience in the field.
92 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1973
Boards have been made up of officers with a mix of warfare specialties and subspecialties. Their job has been to identify unrestricted line officers who have qualified in a warfare specialty (with a subcategory), earned a subspecialist status, and exibited leadership, dedication, and experience which provides the foundation on which an officer can "build and grow professionally.”
"The Last Days of Peace in Pearl Harbor”
{See L. R. Schmeider, pp. 85-88, December 1971; p. 104, July; and pp. 89-90, November 1972 Proceedings)
Commander D. P. Kirchner, U. S. Navy, Former Weapons Officer, USS Saratoga (CVA-60)—Commander McGuire’s comment in the July 1972 Proceedings, concerning the speed of the "old” Saratoga (CV-3), raised a couple of thoughts about the new Sara (CVA-60), that might be of interest to readers.
Probably it is not common knowledge that the "new” Sara wears a certain prominent and distinctive mark in homage to the "old” Sara. The "old” Sara and the "old” Lexington were essentially identical in appearance. For easy identification, the "old” Sara carried a wide, vertical black stripe up each side of her stack. The "new” Sara still carries the stripe, as a token of remembrance of her heroic predecessor.
The "new” Sara also carries a memento of an even older Sara—the stern name plate of the third Sara, the sloop of 1845. That ship had a long and active life. She served on anti-slavery patrol, and with Perry at the opening of Japan. During the Civil War, while blockading the Georgia coast, her crew carried out a series of private enterprise, one-ship invasions of the area near Savannah. (Even today, Sara sailors are adventurous and enterprising souls, and all— especially the gunner’s mates and ord- nancemen—are still enthusiastic about going ashore, even in unlikely territory). The nameplate is ornately carved and
beautifully painted, and has a special place of honor on the quarterdeck of the "new” Sara. It would be interesting to know whether this same nameplate was carried also on board the Sara No. 4, the armored cruiser of the Great White Fleet, and the Sara No. 5, the beautiful carrier.
Another special item is that the
"new” Sara is one of the ships whose mast could be pivoted horizontally so the ship would fit under the Brooklyn Bridge in passage to and from the New York Naval Shipyard. The shipyard has been gone for a half dozen years or more, and although the pivot, which is as thick as a man’s leg, remains, the mast is now fixed in place, which proba-
Comment and Discussion 93
% is just as well, considering that it is hard enough to keep all the gadgets on the mast in service even when they Jre standing straight up.
And lastly, the "new” Sara really is not so new any longer. Some still think of her as a junior member of the Fleet, and that may be, but actually she has been around for quite a while. Her keel was laid more than 20 years ago, on 16 December 1952, and she was launched in April 1955. Time passes, and the sixth Sara is no longer quite as young as she used to be. To those who know her well, however, she, like certain other charm- ers, grows more fascinating with each anniversary, and to those fortunate enough to have been to sea with her, she will always be an enchantress.
Russia’s Fictitious Naval Tradition”
{Set P. J. Rollins, pp. 65-71, January 1973
Proceedings)
Robert E. Johnson, Professor of History, The University of Alabama— In his article, Dr. Rollins states: "While refueling at sea 's best remembered in connection with U. S. naval operations in the Pacific in World War II, it was originally a Russian technique conceived in weakness and born out of desperation.”
While I cannot doubt that Vice Admiral Rozhdestvenski recognized the weakness of his position and resorted to refueling at sea out of sheer necessity, the fact is that other navies had experimented with underway refueling before the Russo-Japanese War. The experiments in the U. S. Navy date at least from 1893 when the old screw-sloop USS Rearsarge and the new cruiser USS San Hancisco steamed in tandem while one transferred coal to the other by means of a whip. Thereafter, interest seems to have lagged until the Spanish-American War revealed the difficulty of keeping Warships alongside colliers in even a slight swell. In the autumn of 1899, the collier USS Marce/lus, fitted with a "marine cableway” of which an automatic tension engine was an important part, Was taken in tow by the battleship USS Massachusetts in a moderate sea. A speed °f five to six knots was maintained and coal was received on board the battleship at a rate of some 20 tons per hour. By
comparison with the 100 tons per hour often achieved when coaling ship in port, this was not an especially impressive achievement.
The Russian underway replenishment five years later was positively primitive, however, for Rozhdestvenski’s warships received coal in their own small boats and in lighters carried by the Ham- burg-Amerika colliers. In short, they were "underway but not making way” and such a technique surely did not add anything to the development of at-sea refueling.
To continue, in the spring of 1913, the collier USS Cyclops, fitted with more sophisticated gear, towed the battleship USS South Carolina while delivering up to 83 tons of coal an hour during a four-hour trial, and little more than two years later the same collier pumped oil to the USS Wyoming in a similar process. Underway refueling on what might be considered a large scale came only in 1917, however, when the fleet oiler USS Maumee kept station south of Iceland to replenish the fuel supplies of the destroyers being sent to the war zone. She used a technique developed by her commanding officer, Lieutenant Commander Henry C. Dinger, and Lieutenant Chester W. Nimitz, who was both executive officer and engineering officer. Quite obviously, the Maumee's, highly- successful operations owed nothing to the Russian example of 1905.
I was surprised to read in the February issue[1] [2] that Captain David Porter’s Essex ", . . had been sunk by a collision with a whale 45 years before.” Of course, this is not correct—Porter surrendered his frigate Essex to the British in 1814, after which she was repaired and served in the Royal Navy until sold in 1837. The whale’s victim was, fittingly enough, a whaleship of the same name as the warship.
devised by Arthur A. Ageton. For more than three decades, at a price of 90C, this neat little black book probably represented the most for the money of any product of the Hydrographic Office. Packed into its fifty 6 X 9-inch pages was the wherewithal for the mariner and others to compute quickly and easily line of position, precise sun azimuth, great circle track, or to determine star identity. In this computerized age of instant read-out and TV dinners, perhaps it was only natural H.O. 211 give way to H.O. 249, H.O. 229, and the like. But what a pity, its complete extinction! For those volumes and volumes of predigested tabulations can never match Ageton’s compact format, remarkable versatility, and not least, the silent satisfaction of doing your own solution. Goodbye, Admiral Ageton, and good sailing; for though you may be out of print, you most certainly will not be out of use— by this old fan, and I wonder by how many others.
"Cost-Effective Reserve Forces”
(See J. G. Abert, pp. 53-61, November 1972 Proceedings)
Commander Frederick C. Dyer, U. S. Naval Reserve {Retired)—Commander Abert’s article provides cogent and interesting analyses of the "cost-effectiveness of Reserves” in peace and war and as part of the "total force” available to the United States.
Admiral Mahan also addressed this subject, cut to the basic issues, and provided the following strong endorsements of Commander Abert’s ideas: "That nation which, in the later stages of a war, be it long or short . . . can put forward the largest reserve . . . will win the struggle.” ("Character of the Naval War College,” 1892)
"It is likely enough that . . . where the danger incurred by failure exceeds the advantage to be gained by success, a 'fleet in being’ may prove a sufficient deterrent.” ("Retrospect Upon the Japa- nese-Russian War,” 1906)
Finally, and the following is not put forward as a criticism of Commander Abert’s useful analyses, but as a comment on some of the "administrative-minds” that require ever-more
detailed cost-effective studies:
"May not some facts, the exact truth about some matters, be not only beyond probable ascertainment, but not really worth the evident trouble by which alone they can be ascertained?” ("Subordination in Historical Treatment,” 1902)
"Accountability: The Crumbling Keystone”
(See B. C. Dean, pp. 40-45, January 1973 Proceedings)
Hershel E. Kaufman—My industrial background covered 36 years in steel manufacturing, and the problem outlined in Lieutenant Commander Dean’s article is not unique to the U. S. Navy—and for the same reasons.
During my career, in a variety of functions and at many work locations, I have observed the same tendency—also aided and abetted by superior levels of management.
Modestly, 1 consider myself fortunate that, during the latter 20 years of my career, at a plant management level, I achieved some degree of success in restoring accountability to the workplace level—be it key worker, foreman, or department superintendent, as the situation required.
Localizing the "power of command”—with attendant personal accountability—requires eternal vigilance and appraisal by superior managerial levels, but it is the only way to assure continuity of "order” versus "chaos.”
they are—of us older retirees, are slowly and steadily being whittled away. We are the forgotten men, the black sheep, so to speak—and this leaves me depressed.
"Flexible Family Financing”
(See R. H. Bowers, pp. 52-60, October 1972
Proceedings)
H. Hollister Cantus, Professional Staff Member, U. S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services—It is unfortunate that Mr. Bowers’ article was published within two weeks of the enactment of Public Law 92-425, the Survivor Benefit Plan. Had the author been aware of the pending passage of that bill into law, he might have been able to further clarify financial planning for future years based upon what has generally been acclaimed as one of the most significant pieces of military personnel legislation in the past two decades.
While the comparison of the Retired Serviceman’s Family Protection Plan (RSFPP) to straight life policies is accurate, the author did not, in my opinion, sufficiently stress the point that since participation in that plan does not become possible until retirement (and thus at an advanced age), it is necessary that the plan charge annual premiums of considerable size in order to remain actuarially sound—that is, in order that the amounts paid into the plan by all members be sufficient to cover all present and future benefits to survivors. It was for this reason, the high premium charges, that fewer than 15% of all eligible retired military participated.
Recognizing this problem, the House Armed Services Committee’s Special Subcommittee on Survivor Benefits, appointed in June 1970 and chaired by the Honorable Otis G. Pike (Dem., N.Y.), commenced a two-year inquiry which resulted in the drafting, passage, and enactment of the Survivor Benefit Plan. With considerable assistance from the Fleet Reserve Association and, after some reluctance, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), the Committee produced a bill which the President signed into law on 21 September 1972.
In order to update the article by Professor Bowers, the following is, as briefly as possible, a description of the principal
provisions of the new Survivor Beneft Plan:
The basic plan was intentionally designed to be as comparable as possible to the Civil Service Survivor Bencft Plan. Thus, rather than being an ac- tuarially sound plan, it is one of coparticipation by the retiree and the go'r- ernment with the creation of a" un-funded liability on the part of the government. This, however, should no! become a problem for some 20 years, since contributions into the plan art expected to exceed payment of benefit* through to the early 1990s.
Under the plan, a military retiree, present or future, may provide survivot protection for a spouse, children, ot someone who has an insurable interest in him. Present retirees have one ycaf from the date of enactment in order to elect to participate. Future retirees will be automatically included in the pr0' gram unless they opt out at retirement The retiree may designate all or a p°r' tion of his retired pay as the base upon which his premiums and his survivot* benefits may be computed. Upon hi* death, regardless of the cause of thaI death, the designated beneficiary will receive 55% of the amount upon which the benefit was based. The cost of tin* annuity will be deducted from the ft' tiree’s monthly retired or retainer pa)'- Thus, if a retiree’s monthly gross pJ) is $600 and he designates that sum 35 his base amount, the annuity would be $330 per month (55% X $600). The cost of this plan is: 2'/2% of the first $)$ of the base amount of monthly retired pay and 10% of the remainder of the desig' nated base amount. Thus, in the example the cost per month would be $37.50-' 2%% of $300 ($7.50) plus 10% of the remaining $300 ($30.00). If the membef chooses a lesser base amount of $45®- the cost of a monthly annuity of $247-50 will be $22.50.
Of import to the article is that RSFpl’ will be phased out. As of the enactm^[3][4]' of this plan, further participation ,n RSFPP by new retirees is prohibited- Present retirees who are participating RSFPP may elect to remain in RSFPP 3(1 not join the new plan; remain in RSF*’P and join in the new plan (up to a ma*1 mum benefit of 100% of retired pay), °r they may opt out of RSFPP and into d'e new Survivor Benefit Plan.
Comment and Discussion 95
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There are additional provisions of interest in this plan—such as the way the benefits are integrated into the Social Security benefits and the provisions for coverage of dependent children—all of which should be given careful consideration in the financial planning of all hands. The best, and at this time the only, publication which accurately pro- vides all the details of the new plan in layman’s language is the October 1972 Supplement to the Fleet Reserve Association’s Naval Affairs magazine. I would encourage all those who intend to analyze their family’s financial situation to obtain a copy of that publication.
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Oil Pollution—Carelessness or Crime?”
(See A. R. Butler, pp. 51-57, December 1972; and pp. 83-84, April 1973 Proceedings)
Lieutenant H. Lee Dantzler, Jr., U. S. Navy—The collisions and/or break-ups of the larger trans-oceanic tankers provide dramatic and highly-publishable examples of ocean pollution. Yet, how do these isolated instances of pollution
compare in magnitude and in environmental impact to the daily pollution in most coastal waters? The Oil Pollution Act of 1961 may stipulate a 50 to 100- mile prohibitive oil dumping zone, yet this zone is flagrantly violated on a daily basis by both commercial and naval ships. The effectiveness of a law might be gauged by the number of successful prosecutions. In this light, it would appear that the law is ineffective at best.
The results of this incessant burden on the coastal environment is seen in the decline of certain marine life and spawning areas off the Northeastern and the Gulf States. A specific example of this occurred in 1971 when a major industry in the Upper Chesapeake Bay was connected with a petroleum spill which resulted in the killing of over 100,000 fish. This industry was fined a mere pittance of less than $5,000.00. This, too, might be considered a dramatic event, but what of the permanent damage? For the United States to attempt to establish an international oil pollution control agency before it can even control its own territorial waters is simply ludicrous.
"Civilianism, Civilianization, and the Military Services”
(See J. C. Sandsberry, pp. 62-67, November 1972 Proceedings)
Bart. Steib—The Captain displays an amazing lack of appreciation for the distinction between professional military officers and civilians. He fails to see the true raison d’etre of his calling. The professional military officer is distinguished by his skill and his commitment, the management of violence as a career.
Modern warfare has caused a proliferation in the skills used to manage violence, so many professional military officers find themselves in specializations which parallel skills usually expected to be found in Civil Service. While the skills may be the same, the commitment remains different. The civil servant is not directly committed to a career dealing with the management of violence. His career is merely skill-oriented; tomorrow, he could be plying his trade in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
So, commitment is the essential facet to be seriously recognized. Now, the
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Sail
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Second Edition
by Richard Henderson with Bartlett S. Dunbar
SAIL AND POWER is the guide for sailing instruction at the U. S. Naval Academy and is the designated text for the Navy wide sailing program. Covering all elements of basic seamanship, it begins with nautical terminology, takes the learning seaman through the rudiments of handling dinghies, day-sailers, cruising yachts, and single and twin-screw power boats, and goes on to discuss racing tactics, heavy weather sailing, and other advanced aspects of seamanship.
The second edition has been thoroughly updated and broadened in scope with the coverage of many new topics including: basic hydrodynamics of sailing, recent theory on rigging and sails, recent spinnaker theory, instrumentation, boat management in heavy weather offshore, auxiliary engines, and more.
1973. 303 pages. Illustrated.
Clothbound—List price: $14.50 Member’s price: $11.60 Softbound—List price: $9.00 Member’s price: $7.20
(Please use order form in book list section)
96 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1973
career-concerned Captain had his option. At this time in his career, it may be that he realizes he went to the wrong window at the local post office. If he had gone to my window, he could have applied for a Civil Service Commission examination; taken and, hopefully, passed the test and started a career which would keep him in civilian attire seven days a week.
During the course of 30 years of satisfying service in the support of and under the management of military leaders, a metamorphosis has been observed. Early in my career, military personnel were so sure of the relevancy of their vocations that they would not stoop to match their careers with the Civil Service. Now, it seems that a growing number strive to compete for involvement in civilian-economy type Department of Defense work, using every degree of sophistry to show that a military Service career suffers in comparison. They make no attempt, however, to compare their lots with public corporation or other executive career systems. And, there is no striving to demand that the military Service be recognized for its true worth to this nation and that its career be rewarded by the U. S. citizenry intrinsically. They seem to zero in on those who try to serve them best—the Civil Service. Gentlemen, military personnel are in a league by themselves; their raison d’etre is of major proportion and their careers should be so committed. To compete with ilks of less noble stature, not only detracts from the meaningfulness of their "duty-honor- country” pursuit, but also, it could bring about a merger of least common denominator value, under which the whole nation would probably suffer. Please fix your perspective and get on with the real fight!
"I Remember Pearl Harbor”
(Sr* J. K. Taussig, Jr., pp. 18-24, December 1972; and p. 91, April 1973 Proceedings)
Commander Paul H. Backus, U. S. Navy (Retired)—My good friend and classmate, Joe Taussig, is far more generous than I am, or would be, regarding Admiral Kimmel and General Short at Pearl Harbor. As Joe knows, only five minutes of alert would have made a
tremendous difference to those of us on battleship row.
Few have been heard to criticize the two officers in question for what they did after the attack began. But what about their decisions beforehand? Why were the Army Air Force aircraft lined up like shooting gallery targets? Why were there not torpedo nets around the heavy ships? Why, when we had just returned Friday night from two weeks at sea, during which we were standing continuous condition watches (unheard of except during war games), was everything relaxed as soon as we hit port? In the USS Oklahoma (BB-37) the 5-inch, 25-caliber ready boxes were padlocked, there was no air on the rammers, and the firing locks were in the armory. As for watertight integrity, there was little or none. The ship was wide open in preparation for an inspection.
Yes, if we had been at sea we might have been sunk, as were the Repulse and the Renown, but first they would have had to find us. When and if they did, they would have had closed-up, moving, maneuvering targets, not sitting ducks.
And why was not the U. S. Asiatic Fleet similarly caught in port? The difference was the admiral in command, Admiral Thomas Hart. He and Admiral Kimmel are said to have had the same information. One used it; the other, seemingly, did not.
"The Impact of Technology
on Strategy”
(See J. T. Hayward, pp. 24-30, September 1972;
and pp. 86-87, January 1973 Proceedings)
of
gency shiphandling. His discussion
Thaddeus G. Bell, Naval Underwater Sys- terns Center, New London Laboratory— Admiral Hayward questions whether a U. S. destroyer can defend herself against a ". . . Soviet submarine, armed with missiles that can be fired from 200 miles away.” Although writers on naval affairs now commonly assume that the submarine-launched cruise missile has made the destroyer obsolete as an effective ASW platform, history tells us that some caution should be exercised in estimating the capability of a technique that has not yet been battle tested. In World War II, 36 Kamikaze aircraft had to be expended for every
surface ship sunk. In Vietnam, 85 surface-to-air missiles (SAM) were expended for every U. S. aircraft brought down The cruise missile submarine, with het limited payload, must obviously be at least an order of magnitude more effective than the Kamikaze or the SAM to be a threat of any consequence against a destroyer. Can a submarine cruise missile, fired at ranges up to 200 miles awa)'. assuredly meet this criterion in the face of the usual technical difficulties with surface-to-surface missiles?
The pat answer is that taking a pessimistic view of capabilities of the opposition is the safest way to deal with uncertainties. This is really not a safe procedure, however, because it may lead to an unwise de-emphasis on what mav be an essential capability in a real conflict—in this case surface ship ASW.
Ironically, the 1930s gave us an example of exaggerated capabilities working psychologically against the submarine. Accounts of new developments in the British underwater sound detection system, ASDIC, led to "conservative” estimates on the part of the German Navy that the submarine no*' may have become obsolete because ASDIC had stripped the submarine of hef ability to hide. Admiral Doenitz tells us that in 1935, there were real doubts as to the value of the U-boat, because of the ASDIC publicity. We may suppose that this must have had an adverse effect on giving the U-boat the emphasis in German development and construction programs that subsequent events proved to be needed. Clearly, we must be cautious that the same de-emphasis is no1 inflicted upon the destroyer because a possibly exaggerated assessment of the
capability of the submarine-launched
cruise missile.
"When Am I Committed to Collision?”
(See J. M. Myers pp. 41-50, December 1972 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Frederick K. Small' wood, U. S. Naiy, Shiphandling/Tactic Instructor, U. S. Fleet Training CetilC• Norfolk—Lieutenant Myers has provided a lucid explanation of a topic surprising^ difficult to convey to students of emer"
Comment and Discussion 97
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Lott’s Thumb Rules for Collision Prevention, for use by both privileged and burdened vessels were well stated. Nothing is more disconcerting than being required to hold course and speed, trusting another vessel to take timely action to avoid collision, and for this reason the two rules for use by privileged vessels are probably more useful. Burdened ships should need no guidance since they may take action at any distance.
Lieutenant Myers’ article assumes that most readers are aware of the methods for determining privilege and burden status, or more explicitly, not only have a knowledge of the "Steering and Sailing Rules’’ section of the Rules of the Road, but also a knowledge of the point at which these rules begin to apply. Based on a pre-test administered at the outset of the Norfolk Fleet Training Center’s (FTC) course on the "rules,” most students are able to discuss, vaguely, privilege and burden in meeting, crossing, and overtaking situations, but almost none are aware of the definition of "Risk of Collision,” the parame
ter used to determine the point where the "Steering Rules” become effective. It is all too often unnecessary for a mariner to allow himself to become required by the rules to hold course and speed, placing his vessel’s safety in the hands of another; adequate maneuvers may frequently be made prior to the development of "Risk of Collision.” The courts have stated that ". . . risk of collision begins the very moment when two moving vessels have approached so closely and upon such courses that by departure from the rules of navigation ... a collision might be brought about by such departure.” Privilege and burden are not necessarily established when vessels first sight each other, as most seem to feel, but rather at the point where "Risk of Collision” develops. Prior to the development of this "Risk,” while ships are still several miles apart for example, either may make any desired maneuver and it is doubtful that this maneuver, if well chosen, would result in collision. Indeed, any turn or speed change by either vessel would likely eliminate a constant
bearing-decreasing range situation. A cautious conning officer will be aware of his own abilities and will choose to trust himself rather than someone on another ship he would just as soon not have the pleasure of meeting.
A significant part of collision avoidance then becomes "defensive driving,” ensuring that your own safety is not unnecessarily placed in the hands of another. If it does become necessary to do this, when ships are quite close before sighting each other, or where restricted waters prevent early avoidance maneuvers, the "Steering and Sailing Rules” provide guidance on rights of way, and Lott’s Thumb Rules provide further guidance if the former are disregarded.
Correction
The Proceedings erred in captioning a photograph that appeared on page 54 of the February 1973 issue. The officer in the center is not Brigadier General Tran Van Don, but Commander James Ross, U. S. Naiy.
The attack on the Italian fleet in its strongly defended base at Taranto on 11th November 1940 was an event of far reaching consequence in World War II. It demonstrated, for the first time, that carrier-borne aircraft were not only invaluable as "the eyes” of the fleet, but that they possessed a formidable striking power capable of inflicting serious damage on a fleet lying in what, up until then, had been regarded as a well protected harbor.
In this book, the author traces briefly the development of British naval aviation from its early beginnings in 1912, through its part in World War I, the frustrations of the interwar years, to the conception and execution of the attack which added such lustre to its name. It is a dramatic story of individual achievement by a handful of officers and men whose enthusiasm, skill, and tenacity more than made up for the obsolescent aircraft which they had to fly. In a final chapter the author describes the heavy price subsequently exacted by the German Luftwaffe and the Italian Regia Aeronautica in a combined all out but unsuccessful attempt to sink the aircraft carrier, HMS Illustrious, from which the attack on Taranto had been launched two months previously.
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VceActnial
B.R Schofield
1973. 94 pages. Illustrated.
List price: $5.95 Member’s price: $4.75
A Naval Institute Press Book (Please use order form in book list section)
Goodbye, Admiral Ageton
Nelson J. Fay—Recently, the Defense Mapping Agency Hydrographic Center ceased publication of H.O. 211, Dead Reckoning Altitude and Azimuth Table,
[2] See W. Menard, "The Least of Lincoln’s Brethren,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1973, pp. 59-66.
Retirees—The Forgotten Men
Travis E. Beard— Please accept my resignation from the U. S. Naval Institute. As a retired warrant officer, I feel that it does not meet any requirement that
[4] have presently. I have also become disenchanted with the Navy, because I have the feeling that it used me for its benefit for a great many years, and now, would like to forget that I exist.
No one, at any time, ever made the slightest effort to show any appreciation for any of the sacrifices that I made, personally, to serve my country and the Navy for such a length of time.
It appears that the benefits—slim as