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Symbolic both of the long-held emotions which underlie much of the politics of the Eastern Mediterranean and of the enormous naval and military significance of the narrow waterway below, the walls of an ancient fortress stand on the heights of Europe, overlooking the Bosporus and the Anatolian hills on the far shore. Year in and year out, the greatest single strategic issue in the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea is over who shall control the Turkish Straits.
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-L he history of humanity is closely related to the seas. Of all the world’s waters, the Mediterranean Sea, especially its eastern part, has undoubtedly exerted the strongest influence on the evolution of all nations down through the centuries. It was ships and a successful naval strategy which, some 2,400 years ago, saved the Greek world from the Persian onslaught. Again, early in the 19th century, ships and a successful naval strategy led to the defeat of Napoleon. It was ships about which Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote: "Those far distant, storm-beaten ships, upon which the Grand Army never looked, stood between it and the dominion of the world.” It was ships and a successful naval strategy that contributed to the destruction of Rommel’s Afrika Korps during World War II.
Because political and social conditions and the discovery of wealth along the African coast, with the resulting nationalism and tendency of the developing countries to reject the influence of the West, are perhaps of greater importance for maritime strategy than technical developments, it is appropriate first to present a short historical review of seapower in the area, before analyzing the current political, social, economic, and military factors.
The Mediterranean is big, covering an area of three million square kilometers (i.e. > Vl2 of the North Atlantic Ocean), but it is almost totally enclosed by land: Europe, Asia, and Africa. Ships can enter this sea, which stretches for 2,100 miles from Gibraltar to Syria, only by means of narrow straits, from the Atlantic and from the Black Sea. For 98 years, 1869-1967, ships could also enter from the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, by means of the Suez Canal. But six years have gone by since the last ship passed that way. One may hope that we need not wait so long for the next ship to pass through.
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The main feature of the Mediterranean, then, is it5 distinct isolation from the open oceans and this has always been the chief reason for the limitation of the Mediterranean civilization to the peoples living on the coasts surrounding this sea.
The Mediterranean is distinctly sectioned by the deeply penetrating Italian and Greek peninsulas and it5 big islands. Connected by the narrow Sicilian Channel are two vast basins whose destinies were different fo( many centuries; Mediterranean civilization was born i*1 the Eastern basin, and it took thousands of years to extend to the Western basin. After a period of unified tion, during the Roman Era, the two sections of the Mediterranean had different fates although interpenc tration often took place.
Historical Aspects
The Eastern Mediterranean, Cradle of Civilization
The Ancient world knew of only three continents Africa, Asia, and Europe. All three meet in the Easter*1 Mediterranean where the mingling of the elements ot their respective civilizations seems only too natural Historical necessity has thus made the Eastern Meditet' ranean the cradle of Western civilization.
Africa gave the Egyptian civilization; Asia th£ Sumerian, Akkadian, and Mesopotamian; and Europ* the Aegean civilization centered in Minoan Crete an^ later Mycenae, with the Aegean islands and Cypr**5 contributing considerably. Of fundamental important is the fact that, although many continental civilization5 have developed in other parts of the world (such & in India, China, and Mexico), there has been only oflc maritime civilization, that of the Aegean, to which od Western civilization is indebted for the art and thc science of the sea.
This same area gave birth to the classical Greek cb1' lization with its main centers in the city states of tbc Greek mainland, Asia Minor, and Alexandria, tran5' formed in time into the Greco-Roman civilization a*1^ then the Byzantine. The Arab civilization was born o*1 the Eastern shores of the Mediterranean, and from d'f Eastern Mediterranean and in particular the Italia” peninsula, emanated the Renaissance.
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Two of the most widely spread religions today, te' sponsible for shaping the destiny of mankind and tl'c’ flow of history, Christianity and Islam, were born the Palestinian corner of the Eastern Mediterranean the Arabian peninsula, respectively.
These civilizations and religions were spread throu^' sea trade, the Greek colonies being the main contrib utors to the transplanting of the classical Helle*1'1 civilization to the Mediterranean and Black Sea coas*5
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The existence and penetration of different ethnic groups, religions, and civilizations in the Eastern Mediterranean area have caused more confrontations, wars, and rivalries than in any other part of the world.
The development of all these civilizations and religions, beyond the inherent confrontations and wars during their dynamic and expansionary initial stages have created in the peoples of the area a somewhat loose Mediterranean conscience, strong local traditions, and powerful nationalistic feelings which constitute an important factor influencing any attempts at penetration in the area. In our time, religion and nationalism have contributed greatly to limiting the success of the Soviet Union’s infiltration efforts in the Arab world.
Seapower in the Eastern Mediterranean
The ancient empires of North Africa and the Middle East were exclusively continental, even when they extended to the Mediterranean; for them the sea constituted the boundary; never was it a means for achieving power and domination.
The first known maritime and commercial power was an island people, the Cretans, who from the 3rd millenium B.C. extended their domination over the whole Eastern Mediterranean until 1400 B.c. when their seapower came to an end.
Next came the Phoenicians who gradually founded commercial stations along the coast to such an extent that the Mediterranean was a Phoenician sea until their downfall in the 6th century, B.c.
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Meanwhile, the Dorian invasion of the Greek Peninsula in the 12th century B.C. combined with overpopulation to force the mainland Greeks to settle in the islands and all along the Mediterranean coast. However, internal differences and conflicts kept the Greeks from ever achieving total sovereignty in the Mediterranean, despite their free use of this sea. The Greek victory over the Persians at the battle of Salamis in 480 B.c. gave Athens a supremacy in the Eastern Mediterranean which lasted less than a century. Macedonia succeeded Athens as the supreme power until the death of Alexander the Great in 323 when Ptolemy’s capital, Alexandria, became the main commercial and cultural center in the Eastern Mediterranean; Ptolemy’s navy was well organized but limited in scope.
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Concurrently with the Greek expansion, Carthage, founded by the Phoenicians on the African shore of the Sicilian Channel in 800 B.C., became the supreme seapower in the Western Mediterranean, until destroyed by the Romans in 146 B.c.
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A Strategic Analysis of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea
Carthaginian supremacy brought forward into the then known world the Western Mediterranean which, until then, had been outside the big events taking place in the Eastern Mediterranean; it also contributed to the
Northern Mediterranean peoples establishing contact with those from the South.
Following the fall of Carthage, for five centuries the Mediterranean was under the domination of one power, Rome, a feat never repeated. There have been other cases of one nation exercising control over this sea, but this control has been short-lived, continuously questioned, and never extended to the Mediterranean hinterland. The unity and prosperity enjoyed by Mediterranean countries during this period did not survive the Roman decline and therefrom ambitions, ideologies, nationalism, and racial discrimination led to our contemporary political and economic divisions of the area.
Among the barbaric groups which invaded the Roman Empire only the Vandals displayed any notable naval activity, but their power did not last long, for their state was dissolved in 455 a.d.
In the 6th century Byzantium, the Hellenized eastern part of the Roman Empire began its expansion and eventually spread over the entire Mediterranean except for a small part of Spain, the French coast, and Northern Italy. Byzantium made extensive use of seapower, and great amphibious operations on a scale since encountered only in modern times were undertaken, such as the advance towards Mesopotamia of the Emperor Heraclius who landed with his troops on the eastern Black Sea coast. Constantinople, the capital of the empire on the banks of the Bosporus, became not only the commercial but also the cultural and spiritual center of the whole Mediterranean; its successful repulse of the Arab attacks, of which the last took place in 718, saved Europe from the Arabs, who, however, with their strong fleets succeeded in a partial domination in the Mediterranean. For centuries they occupied most of the big islands therein.
The Arabs developed a splendid civilization which proved beneficial to most of the occupied nations. But maritime trade suffered greatly, and the occupied peoples’ relations with Christian Europe were severed. Trade was restored by the 11th century and supremacy at sea regained slowly by Greek, Italian, and Norman sailors. The latter appeared in the Mediterranean at the beginning of 11th century; thanks to them the Christian world remained master of the Mediterranean until the end of the Middle Ages. As a result of the Crusades which had taken place in this period Latin kingdoms were established in the Eastern Mediterranean, piracy was suppressed, and better understanding between the nations of Western Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East was achieved. However, unity in the Mediterranean was not re-established because of differences in the Christian world, foremost of which being the schism in the 11th century between the Eastern and Western churches; these differences were the main cause
of the establishment of Islam on the north coast of Africa and the weakening of the Byzantine Empire which finally fell to the Turks in 1453.
The Turkish Empire dominated the Eastern Mediterranean, the North African coast east of Morocco, and a big part of the Adriatic coast. The Turks created powerful fleets, the struggle against which was waged by the naval forces of Venice, Genoa, Spain, the Papal States, and the Knights of Malta, culminating in the brilliant Christian victory in the naval battle of Lepanto, fought on the western coast of Greece in 1571. Thereafter, Turkish naval power declined and the Turks eventually were restricted largely to the Aegean Sea. The destruction of their fleet at Navarino (also on the western coast of Greece) in 1827 by the combined British, French, and Russian squadrons marked the end of their seapower. The net result of the Turkish conquests was a severe reduction of Mediterranean trade.
Meanwhile, for years the real contest for domination of the Mediterranean had been waged by France and Great Britain. England emerged victorious in 1798 after the defeat of the French fleet at Aboukir Bay on the Egyptian coast. Its domination was not challenged until the beginning of the 20th century.
This British domination had no similarity with that of Carthage, Rome, or Byzantium; the naval strategy of these last powers had as its objectives both the safeguarding of maritime trade in the Mediterranean and dominance over the hinterland. Great Britain, on the contrary, was satisfied with the occupation of strong points such as Gibraltar, Malta, Corfu, and later on Cyprus, which served to support its powerful fleets, a strategic concept of a purely maritime nature. The fleets, in turn, existed mainly to protect the routes to India and the Far East, to support British diplomatic efforts in Europe, to interrupt hostile communications, and to harm weak points of continental enemies.
During the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th, the coastal areas of North Africa and the Middle East fell under the political and military control of European nations: Spain, France, Italy, and Great Britain, and did not become independent until after World War II. This occupation created an unfavorable psychological climate and distrust of the Arab peoples against the above European countries and against the western countries in general with sole exception of Greece. The policy of Greece, in conjunction with the friendly attitude of the Greek element living in those countries, assured Greece the confidence of the Arabs. The same cannot be said for Turkey, which the peoples of these countries, despite their common religion, still mistrust as a result of their memories of the Ottoman occupation.
The first half of the 20th century, mainly after 1920, was characterized by Italy’s effort to become the foremost seapower in the Mediterranean and to ensure Italian control of this sea. These aspirations ended with Italy’s defeat during World War II.
The second half of the 20th century is characterized first by the permanent presence in the Mediterranean and, especially in its Eastern basin, of the strong fleets of the United States and the Soviet Union, each providing itself with its own mobile support and depending only to a modest degree on bases in allied or friendly countries; and second by the limited power of the navies of the Mediterranean countries. Despite the ability of the United States and Soviet fleets to move freely throughout the Mediterranean, neither’* strength is great enough to ensure complete control of this sea. Another characteristic is the withdrawal of the British naval force, which today is represented merely by some light units using Malta or Gibraltar as their main bases.
The Black Sea and Surrounding Countries
Because it is not especially big, is in an offset position, and has but one exit, controlled by one country, the Black Sea has been dominated by relatively fe"' nations. Thus Greek influence was succeeded by Romaf to be followed by Byzantine domination. During the Middle Ages the Venetians and Genoese established trading posts in the Sea of Azov. Since 1783, with the occupation of the Crimea and successive expansion along the shore of the Black Sea, Russia has gradually become the foremost power in this area. Despite th£ presence of the German battlecruiser Goeben and the light cruiser Breslau at Constantinople, the Russia11 Black Sea Fleet dominated that sea in World War' until the Bolshevik Revolution and the German victor) i over Russia. The Russian fleet interrupted the transportation of coal from Anatolian ports and seaborne logistic support of the Turkish armies in the Caucasus The Russian amphibious force made administratis landings on Turkish territory at Trabzon and, in prep3' ration for an assault landing on the northern entrant to the Bosporus, the fleet shelled the shore defense* of that waterway.
The extension of Russian seapower to the Medit£t' ranean has been the pursuit of Russian leaders sincC Catherine the Great (1762-1776). A Russian fleet 40 ships appeared in the Aegean to help Greek guerillas in the last quarter of the 18th century and, o'c< since, Russian ships have sojourned in the Medit£t' ranean for greater or lesser periods.
During the 20th century and after World War ' in particular, Soviet naval power in the Black Sea w3* significantly increased and after World War II Sovi£t
A Strategic Analysis of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea 117
Russia gained undisputed control therein. However, Turkish control of the Bosporus, the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles restrict the U.S.S.R.’s flexibility in the use of its navy in the Mediterranean. Hence, the constant Soviet efforts to alter the status of the Straits.
The power occupying the Straits is able, through suitable fortifications, to control the Black Sea-East Mediterranean route and prevent forceful passage, as proved by both an unsuccessful British attempt in 1807, and the disastrous combined land and sea operations by the Anglo-French forces to occupy the Gallipoli Peninsula during World War I. In the latter war only a few British submarines were able to pass through the Dardanelles and operate in the Sea of Marmara.
One of Russia’s aims has long been to occupy the Straits and gain free exit to the Mediterranean; but it has always met with opposition from England who did not want to see a new rival in the Mediterranean. These opposite positions are reflected in all treaties which regulate the status of the Straits since 1803, when, despite Russian opposition, the Sultan prohibited passage of warships. In the conference which led to the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, this situation was reversed, with Russia, lacking a strong navy, desiring the closing of the Straits and England, not threatened any longer by the Russian Navy, trying to keep them open. The articles of this last treaty were revised by the Montreux Convention in 1936, which has since governed the status of the Straits. The Convention provides for their fortification by Turkey, for free passage of merchant ships, for the controlled passage of warships (with restrictions as to their number, displacement, stay in the Black Sea, and responsibility to notify Turkey), and for Turkey’s right to deny passage to warships should it consider itself to be exposed to an immediate threat of war.
However, by announcing future passages of warships and keeping such movements pending, the Soviet Union has succeeded, despite the Montreux treaty, in Maintaining the ability to reinforce quickly its Fleet in the Mediterranean. Since 1964 this fleet, usually consisting of 40 or 50 ships, has been active in that sea, mainly in the Eastern Basin.
The status of the Straits, together with the decline of the Ottoman Empire during the 19th century, was 'he central issue of backstage negotiations and rivalries among European powers for influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Known as the Eastern Question, this situation made the whole region, and the Balkans in particular, an unstable and sensitive area during the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. This rivalry resulted in the present set up of boundaries and, indeed, of whole states in the Eastern Mediterranean and constituted one of the main factors in deter
mining contemporary alignments and pacts.
Besides its goal of acquiring freedom of sea communication with the Eastern Mediterranean, the Soviet Union made vigorous efforts after World War II to outflank the Straits both by extending its influence to Greece, where it was the main instigator and supporter of the 1945-1949 Communist uprising, and by establishing bases originally along the Yugoslavian coast and later in Albania. These bases were later lost after Tito’s break with Moscow and Albania’s development of close relations with the People’s Republic of China.
Nonetheless, by exploiting the decline of British and French influence in the Mediterranean, the Russians were able to sign a military aid pact with Egypt in 1955, which is the landmark of Soviet postwar penetration in the Eastern Mediterranean. This pact was followed in 1962 by a treaty for economic and military aid with Syria, resulting in the presence of Soviet naval units in Latakia. Soviet influence in this area was further enhanced in subsequent years but has since greatly declined in Libya, Egypt, and the Sudan, particularly after the aborted Communist coup in the last-named country.
The Eastern Mediterranean as a Means of Communication Between Three Continents
Since early times shipping and navigation developed in the Aegean have bound together Greece and Asia Minor. Because of their narrowness, the Bosporus and Dardanelles have never been an obstacle to the crossing of military forces between Europe and Asia. On the other hand the passage in the Mediterranean from east to west, or from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea and vice versa, has always been difficult because of the narrowness of the various straits, which make it possible for small naval forces to oppose successfully the passage of much stronger formations. As a result, the trading nations have always tried to develop friendly relations with those countries controlling the straits. Clearly, the countries dominating the straits are exposed to various pressures, and this is more than obvious in the case of the Bosporus-Dardanelles Straits.
The limited width and elongated shape of the Mediterranean both renders north-south communications easy and facilitates the movement towards Asia where people are attracted by the raw materials of the East. In peacetime, reaching the ports of the Eastern Mediterranean is easy; therefrom the difficulties became significant, because of the mountains, the deserts, and the lack of rivers running east and west. Nonetheless, the following routes were established in ancient times:
► The Silk Route, whose main track passed south of the Taurus Mountains and the Caspian Sea, towards China.
► The Silk Sea Route which, in its initial part, coincided with the Spice Route, passing through the Suez area and reaching the Gulf of Tonkin by sea.
► The Europe-to-Central-and-East-Asia route, through the northern Black Sea and Caspian Sea area.
These routes were difficult and the voyages dangerous, but the merchants and missionaries were not stopped by any obstacle. To the difficulties of nature, other obstacles were added by the people of the Middle East and Asia, which explains many of the wars that took place in the Middle East. The Arabs, and to a greater extent the Turks, severely hindered the passage of travelers; in contrast, the Mongols generally assisted the traders.
At the western extreme of the Mediterranean, Gibraltar was no obstacle to navigation; thus the Mediterranean peoples managed to reach the shores of the Atlantic, but the fear inspired by the vastness of the ocean was the main cause for the very late establishment of communications with America.
The asymmetry between the European and African Mediterranean hinterlands, with the empty space of the Sahara Desert and the fertile plains of Europe, exerted no influence on the Mediterranean countries in their mutual infiltration and intercommunication during the first millenium of history.
Up to the appearance of the square-rigged sailing ship the connection between Europe and Asia was exclusively effected through the Mediterranean and by the overland roads in the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean areas. However, after the development of square-rigged ships and the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope, a large percentage of trade switched to the long but safer sea route around this Cape. Nevertheless, the Mediterranean never lost all its significance as a route to the East, especially for the British Empire, for which it constituted the alternate road to India. This significance was the main cause for the long military presence of the British in Egypt, which started in 1882, was reduced in 1936 only to the Canal Zone, and ended abruptly in 1935, a few years after India had become independent, when the last British troops were withdrawn.
With the appearance of oceangoing steamships, the
industrialization of Western and Northwestern Europe and, in 1869, the opening of the Suez Canal, the Mediterranean and especially the eastern part, regained its previous importance as a means of uniting the three continents and, especially, Europe and Asia. This sig nificance still survives to an extent, although severely reduced nowadays by the deviation of commerce around the Cape of Good Hope following the closing of the Canal in 1967 as a result of the Arab-IsraeH conflict.
The Strategic Geography of the Eastern Mediterranean
The Eastern Mediterranean is approximately 1,30® nautical miles long and comprises the Adriatic, th£ Aegean, and its own basin. It is connected through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles to the Sea of Maf' mara and the Black Sea. This region provides acctf* for the U.S.S.R. to the South, the Middle East, afld Africa.
The depths in the Eastern Mediterranean are gre^ averaging 1,200 fathoms, with a maximum of 2,65® fathoms southwest of Cape Tainaron (Cape Matapan) Most of the Adriatic and the Sea of Azov form i<l exception with a maximum depth of less than 100 and eight fathoms respectively. The 100-fathom curve 15 generally close to the coast except off Tunisia whtfc it lies as far as 150 nautical miles offshore, off Sy^ where it is up to 10 to 40 nautical miles distant, the European coasts of Turkey and Bulgaria, where 11 is up to 30 nautical miles offshore, off Romania a^ southwestern Russia where it is as far as 90 nautk3* miles distant, off the Crimea, where it is ten nautk* miles distant, and off the Bosporus, where it is up t0 ten nautical miles at sea.
Currents are of low intensity and without partial importance.
The effect of tides is generally small (3.5 inches)' but strong winds may produce variations to the $ level at certain regions such as near the Bosporus whef<: they can reach a height of 3 to 5 feet.
Fog is rare except along the southern and westef|1 Black Sea coast where it is often met during wint£f and fall.
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Studded with peninsulas and islands and composed of straits, channels, passages, gulfs, and minor seas, the Eastern Mediterranean is made for fierce struggle, sometimes for local cause, and other times for what lies just a step or two beyond■ the north, in the Black Sea, lies a powerful fleet, with welt equipped bases, and supported by great industrial strength. Far to the west, across the Atlantic, ties another such fleet, with similar bases and industry. It is here, in the Eastern Mediterranean, that the two fleets maneuver in peace for advantage and where, in war, they would grapple with the utmost vigor for stakes of the utmost importtf
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ranges from 37 to 39 parts per thousand parts of water, while the average temperature varies from 11° to 28° Centigrade.
Climate—Winds: The prevailing weather conditions are mild: most favorable in May and June and most unfavorable between October and March; the northern coasts of the Black Sea are hampered by ice from December to February but little or no ice is formed on the eastern coasts; the mouth of the Danube also is blocked by ice during winter. The winds are subject to local conditions; northern winds up to Force 9 (Beaufort Scale) prevail during winter while southern winds of similar intensities blow during the fall. Winds like the bora (northeasterly; intensity up to 100 knots) and the sirocco (southeasterly) in the Adriatic can be strong. Northeast winds (up to Force 7, Beaufort Scale) in the Aegean in summer and southerly winds in the southern Black Sea in winter prevail locally.
Antisubmarine Conditions: These vary according to the season and the prevailing conditions, and sonar efficiency sometimes becomes negligible during summer; sonar conditions are more unfavorable for surface ships than for submarines.
Adriatic: The Adriatic is nearly a closed sea which can be controlled by a single nation occupying both coasts. The peculiar configuration of the Dalmatian coast, with its well protected bays, channels, and islands affords numerous bases for submarines, FPBs, and light surface craft in general. The shallow northern sector of the Adriatic is suitable for mining but not for submarine operations. For the latter the deeper southern sector is more suitable. The Adriatic is suitable for FPB and FPB(G) operations particularly near the Dalmatian coast, whereas the proximity of airfields makes operations by larger surface vessels impossible without adequate air cover.
The Yugoslavian coast is mountainous and not suitable for landing operations, except for commando raids. The Albanian coastline, 250 miles long, is flat as far as 10 to 30 miles inland and there are certain landing sites midway along this area; to the east of this flat strip, mountains rise up to 3,000 meters high. Likewise, many suitable landing beaches exist along the entire length of the Adriatic coast of Italy.
Valona Bay in Albania and the port of Durazzo in the southeastern Adriatic are excellent bases for submarines and FPBs which may already be in the Mediterranean or be transported there in parts and assembled on site. In fact, Valona Bay and the island of Sasson in its entrance were fortified in the past by the U.S.S.R. as a submarine base.
In case of hostilities, Yugoslavian light naval units could seriously disrupt potential enemy transport in the Adriatic. Obviously, the safety of Greek ships in the
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An extensive maritime traffic, a multitude of focal points, and relatively deep water make the Aegean suitable for submarine operations. Depths and geography (short distances, a multitude of islands and straits) render the operations of small submarines more advantageous than those of large nuclear ones. FPBs and FPB(G)s can operate in the Aegean throughout the year by taking advantage of weather-protected bays, coves, and sea areas to the leeward of the islands, and b)r hiding in suitable indentations in the coast from which they can make surprise attacks against much motf powerful ships. The depths are not suitable for bottom- laid influence mining, except near the coasts and pot1 approaches; however, defensive mining with anchored mines is feasible in most of the straits. The disposition of the islands provides successive natural defense fineS through which must pass any force entering or exiting the Black Sea; thus the Aegean islands and straits form the natural continuation of the Turkish Straits as bf south as the passages east and west of Crete. The island* acquire additional importance since they are not eithd easily attacked or outflanked by land. Clearly, whoevd controls this sea can interrupt the Black Sca-Meditef' ranean maritime route.
Fighter and attack aircraft from the mainland cou^ help in ensuring control of the North Aegean; ho"" ever, control of the South Aegean and its approach^ requires aircraft based on the islands, especially Ct&e and Rhodes.
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The great strategic significance of the Aegean j5 obvious; today, with Greece a member of NATO, |! provides defensive depth to the Turkish Straits and possibility of setting up air and naval bases on ^ islands. If the Aegean’s northern coast were occupy and the sea itself controlled by the Soviets, not oflb would the route towards the Turkish Straits beconlf inaccessible to NATO but also the supply of the So"^1 Mediterranean Fleet would become possible regard!^ of who controlled the Bosporus-Dardanelles Straits
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is connected with the Aegean through the Turki-*1 Straits, with the Sea of Azov through the Ke^’ Yenikal Strait, and with the Caspian Sea through Don and Volga rivers. The distance from the Bospo1^ to the eastern shores of the Black Sea is just over 5'. nautical miles; the maximum width is about 350 nautl
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A Strategic Analysis of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea 121
From the Crimean Peninsula to Turkey the distance is only 135 nautical miles.
This sea provides significant foreign trade possibilities to the U.S.S.R., Bulgaria, and Romania. In fact, it constitutes Bulgaria’s and Romania’s only access to the Mediterranean. The industrial potential of the southern Ukraine and the nearby Romanian and Caucasian oilfields increase its strategic value. Traffic in this sea serves the Soviet bloc countries far more than Turkey whose needs are satisfied through Istanbul and the Turkish Mediterranean ports. Except for some northern ports, ice is not a problem.
The western coasts of the Black Sea (Turkey-Bul- garia-Romania), including the area of the Bosporus and western Anatolia, and the northern ones (U.S.S.R.) with the exception of part of the Crimea, are flat and suitable for landing operations; such operations are best carried out during summer because of weather conditions. The eastern (U.S.S.R.) and southern (U.S.S.R.- Turkey) coasts are mainly abrupt and high and do not lend themselves to landing operations.
The most important base of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet is Sevastopol on the Crimea. Many shipyards are also situated in this area, with Nikolayev the main center for the construction of warships.
Aircraft from anywhere on the coast can cover any point in the Black Sea. But because of the lack of hiding places and islands, FPBs and FPB(G)s can operate only near the coasts. Soviet naval and air superiority in the area restricts NATO’s offensive possibilities to submarine operations, minelaying, and air attacks. Soviet coastal communications are exposed to attack mainly by air, because of the shallow waters in many areas. Ports and bases in the northern and western parts of the sea could be blocked by offensive minelaying.
Eastern Mediterranean Basin: The basin of the Eastern Mediterranean, washing the shores of North Africa in the south, Turkey in the north, and Palestine in the east, is suitable for extensive air and naval operations. The whole basin is within the radius of action of fighter and attack aircraft, coming on one hand from Africa and Palestine, and on the other from the islands and European coasts; in order to obtain complete control over it both coasts and the islands therein, chiefly Cyprus and Cr^te, should be in friendly hands.
The shores of Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt are flat and mostly sandy. They are suitable for landing, although offshore navigational hazards limit the number of landing points and most of the coastal waters are suitable for minelaying. Once troops were ashore their movement inland would be difficult.
The shores of Syria and Lebanon are flat and suitable for landing, but mountain ranges having a north-south direction rise immediately behind them. Here, too.
advancing inland would be difficult for military forces.
Most of the Eastern Mediterranean’s big cities are situated near the coast; however there are very few ports along the 3,200-kilometer long shores of East Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt (Sfax, Tripoli, Bengazi, Tobruk, Alexandria, Port Said), and no islands. In contrast, on the shores of Southern Turkey and Palestine, bays and ports are numerous (Marmaris, Antalya, Mersin, Alexandretta, Latakia, Tripoli, Beirut, Haifa).
The strategic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean basin stems from the Suez Canal and the maritime route through it, from the pipeline terminal ports of Latakia, Banias, and Haifa (for Middle East oil); El-Sidr, Marsa Brega, and Tobruk (for North African oil); and from the fact that by means of her fleet the Soviet Union can use it to outflank the West. However, the use of Suez and some pipelines has been stopped because of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Port facilities possibly granted in war to the Soviet Mediterranean fleet, by Egypt (Alexandria, Port Said, Marsa-Matruh) and Syria (Latakia) and airfields also possibly made available by Egypt would enhance the Soviet Fleet’s efficiency in the Eastern Mediterranean. If provided with adequate air cover, that fleet would be capable of threatening NATO’s communication lines towards Greece and Turkey, and of preventing the Sixth Fleet from executing its strategic mission and supporting the land and air battles.
The Straits: The Sicilian Channel is the natural passage between the eastern and western basin of the Mediterranean. The narrowest section, between Sicily and Cape Bon, is 75 nautical miles wide, and the greatest part of the Channel may be mined. Malta and the Italian island of Pantelleria dominate the channel although their size makes both of them vulnerable to air and nuclear attack. An alternate passage is provided by the narrow (1.5 miles wide) Strait of Messina between Sicily and the Italian mainland.
The Strait of Otranto has a maximum width of 45 nautical miles and is the only passage to and from Adriatic ports. The depths are of the order of 400 fathoms and so it cannot be mined, but, if based on Corfu and the Italian coast, NATO light naval units and submarines could control this Strait.
At present Albanian naval forces based at Valona area cannot seriously challenge Western control of the Strait, but should Albania and Yugoslavia align themselves with the Warsaw Pact, NATO would find maintaining this control extremely difficult.
At the Dardanelles and the Bosporus, where Europe and Asia are separated only by a narrow strip of water, two main routes cross—the land route which connects Southeastern Europe with Asia Minor and the maritime route connecting the Mediterranean and Black seas.
From the naval point of view the Turkish Straits consist of the Bosporus, the small Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles. Because the width and depth of both straits is small, continental powers without significant fleets can control them from either side by means of nets, mines, and artillery. A large portion of the Sea of Marmara is less than 100 fathoms deep and can be mined. The best way to oppose amphibious operations near the entrance to the Bosporus is by using submarines, minefields, light surface ships (FPB-FPB(G)), and offensive aircraft.
The capture of the Straits might be achieved by the Soviet Union by a land advance from Bulgaria supported from the sea. A course of action even more dangerous to NATO would be for Soviet forces to occupy the northern Aegean coast or the whole of Greece. This would result in the Soviet Union outflanking the Straits, interrupting NATO communications through and across them, and acquiring bases on the European continent for its Mediterranean fleet. It would also mean the eventual fall of the Straits.
The Suez Canal is the eastern entry to the Mediterranean and part of the shortest maritime route between Europe and the Far East, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf. It is 67.5 miles long and sufficiently deep to ensure the passing through of ships drawing as much as 12 meters. Passage takes about eleven hours. Its closing in war is very easy, however, and this was done in 1956 and again in 1967. The Canal opened in 1869 and free through-passage of all merchant vessels and warships under any flag both in war and peace time was theoretically recognized by the Istanbul Convention in 1888. By the same Convention, hostilities along the Canal and up to three miles from its banks were banned. In wartime, however, conventions of this sort are very often violated.
Big Islands: Malta, situated in the Sicilian Channel, has a surface area of 95 square miles, a maximum length of 15 miles and a population of 300,000 inhabitants. The island is flat (100 meters altitude) with a rocky coast line; it has two airfields, and a large number of ships can be accommodated in its excellent ports and anchorages. Malta was used as a main base by the British Mediterranean Fleet until World War II, when the development of aviation required that fleet to use Alexandria instead.
Nowadays, Malta is suitable geographically for surveillance and control of both the Sicilian Channel and the Eastern and Western Mediterranean in general; its importance has been reduced, however, because of its small size and the possibility of its neutralization by nuclear weapons. As most of Malta’s facilities can be matched by similar ones in mainland Italy and Sicily ! the island’s main importance to NATO is negative: it must not be used by the Soviets. The use of Malt* by the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet would permit the provision of air cover to that fleet in the central Mediterranean, with the possibility of controlling the Sicilian Channel. Most likely this use and control would be of short duration, probably in the opening period of hostilities only. In view of the importance free use of the Mediterranean has to NATO, Malta’s subsequent maintenance as a Soviet base would be questionable-
Crete is the biggest and most important island of the Aegean Sea and the fifth largest of the entire Mediterranean. Situated in the middle of the Eastern Mediterranean basin, Crete is 160 miles long, 8 to 3<> miles wide, with a surface of 3,234 square miles and j a population of 485,000. Since its distance from both eastern exits of the Mediterranean is about 350 mile5 and it is only 160 miles from the North African coast, it is ideally located for the control of the maritime routes linking the Suez Canal and the Eastern Mediterranean ports with the Turkish Straits, the Black Sea. Gibraltar, and the Adriatic. The main maritime routes of the Eastern Mediterranean pass, at the most, 9® nautical miles from the island. Crete has four airfield5 and three harbors. One of the latter is at Souda Bay. a significant anchorage in the Eastern Mediterranean, with a major Greek naval base and a NATO missile- , firing range. The island’s relatively long distance from 1 possible enemy bases to the north facilitates its defen# against attack from that direction, while its size and mountainous topography facilitate its defense again# both amphibious and airborne invasions.
Together with the islands to its east and west, Crete forms a natural defensive line in the Aegean which, when properly organized, can form an effective barrier to any exit of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet into the Mediterranean, in case of the fall of the Turkish Straits- It is obviously also useful as a base for operations to meet the threats from the south. These advantages
It doesn't matter greatly who uses these waters now but, in war, the life of the Sold1 Mediterranean Fleet will depend on Soviet control of the Aegean and the Turkish Straits; the life of Greece and Turkey will depend on NATO control of those same waters. Fighters, attack planes, small submarines, missile boats, minelayers, mine countermeasures craft, and ground combat forces: in such confined waters, these will be the instruments of the struggle for that control. And the support for these combatants will lie on the decks and in the holds of the smalt merchantmen which crowd these narrow seas.
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make Crete the most important base in the Eastern Mediterranean for supporting operations for the control and surveillance of this sea and the protection of the supply routes to Greece and Turkey.
Cyprus is the third largest Mediterranean island, with an area of 3,572 square miles. It is mainly mountainous except for the coastal areas. Because it has no natural ports capable of harboring large ships, costly construction works have been undertaken at Famagusta and Limassol. The distance between the island and the entrance of the Suez Canal is 200 nautical miles, whereas only 35 nautical miles separate it from the coast of Turkey, and about 55 nautical miles separate it from Syria. Cyprus is important for the West as a maritime air base, wherefrom surveillance and other air operations can be conducted for the control of the Eastern Mediterranean. The short distances separating Cyprus from the mainland, however, diminish the island’s strategic value, exposing it to air attacks, despite its size which facilitates air defense. The island has never been an important naval base, and was used by the British mainly as a focal point of air transportation, particularly after the Suez Canal crisis.
The Land Areas of the Surrounding Eastern Mediterranean Countries: Italy, with an area of 116,286 square miles (including Sicily and Sardinia) and a population of 54 million people, deeply penetrates the Mediterranean from northwest to southeast.
The Alps, which isolate the Italian Peninsula from the rest of Europe, constitute a natural barrier both against invasion from the north and expansion towards Central Europe; communication northward must go through one of several passes, mainly the Simplon and the St. Goddard to Switzerland and the Brenner to Austria.
The Apennines, an extension of the Alps, spread southwards from the French border along the peninsula to Sicily. They divide the country into an eastern and a western section; this mountain range is 1,400 kilometers long and from 35 to 135 kilometers wide, bordered by plains of different sizes, some of which are mere narrow strips stretching along the coasts. The Po valley in the northern and northeastern part of the country is the main flat area, and constitutes a strategically weak point for possible invasion from Austria or Yugoslavia. It also lends itself to possible amphibious attacks from the Adriatic. The most important ports on the western coast are Genoa, La Spezia, Livorno, and Naples. On the Adriatic they are Trieste, Venice, Ancona, and Brindisi. The port of Trieste is of greater importance to Austria and Yugoslavia than it is to Italy because, in case of a blockade of the eastern ports, the Italian road and railway network is capable of covering the needs of eastern Italy through overland transportation [1]
from the western ports. The configuration of the country provides successive defensive lines from north to south and renders all east-west military operations difficult. The central position of the Italian Peninsula is of great importance for the control of the Mediterranean, provided Italy has suitable maritime forces available.
The Balkans are mostly a mountainous area with long ranges running from northwest to southeast and from west to east or southeast; the first run the length of the western part of the peninsula and provide depth in the defense against an attack along the north-south axis. But in the east, the flat areas immediately south of the Balkan Mountains in central Bulgaria expose both the Turkish Straits and the Aegean shores.
In the event of an offensive from south to north, after overcoming the difficulties in crossing the mountains and the rivers—the Save and the Danube—the flat Romanian and Hungarian plains would permit a rapid advance towards Central and Eastern Europe. For such an advance, the ports of the northern Adriatic and on the southwest coast of the Black Sea would have to serve as supply terminals.
Yugoslavia occupies an area of 98,766 square mile5’ mostly mountainous, and has a population 18,500,000. Suitable ports are available as well as adequate railways and roads. In contrast to the rest of the country its northeastern corner is flat and suitable for invasion from Hungary and other bordering countries- Moreover, because it constitutes a corridor for an advance against northern Italy, it affects the Western defense in Italy. But that is not all, because the main invasion axis toward Greece starts from Belgrade along the Morava and Axios rivers to the Aegean and through the Sofia plateau to Macedonia, Thrace, and
the Straits. On the other hand, the West can assuna£
• • • \ offensive action through a military operation support^0
through the Adriatic ports.
Albania, with an area of 28,750 square miles and a population of 2,200,000 is mountainous and unsuitable for large conventional military operations bn1 favorable for guerrilla warfare. Its position, being placed for the control of the entry to the Adriatic provides it with some strategic importance. Its imp°f’ tance as a Chinese bridgehead in Europe in time 0 war is doubtful, if Yugoslavia is not committed, because of its isolated position. For this very reason, even with Yugoslavia committed, enemy activity fr0fn Albania would be limited and of short duration.
Greece, inhabited by approximately 9,000,000 pe°’ pie, has a total area of 51,182 square miles of whic^ 8,500 square miles constitute its insular territory. gether with the mainland the numerous islands f°fl11 a continuous and indivisible entity. Greece has n°
A Strategic Analysis of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea 125
direct land communication with Western Europe. But its borders with the Communist countries are 1,000 miles long (260 Albania, 240 Yugoslavia, 500 Bulgaria). The depth of its northeastern area is slight, varying between 15 and 50 kilometers (10 to 35 statute miles). This borderline is very long compared with the Greek mainland, the depth of which does not exceed 700 kilometers (about 400 statute miles) from north to south.
Greece is extremely mountainous. The main ranges
islands, makes sea transport vital. Hence, sea transport is essential to Greece both for local movement and for connection with Western Europe. It is the only way for supplying and supporting any war front in Greece, as well as the civil population.
Strategically, Greece covers the Straits from the west and provides cover to Italy from the east. It contributes to the control of the Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa, ensures continuity in the NATO Southern Region, furnishes a base of operations against the
in the west have a north-to-south direction and in the northeast an east-to-west direction, providing successive defense lines <ill along the mainland. But because of the lack of depth in the northeast and the country’s extensive frontiers, defense is extremely difficult. However, the Aegean Sea and its islands can be used to provide the necessary depth, improving the situation somewhat. The roads and railways, stretching mainly from north to south, are poor and vulnerable to attack and interdiction. This, coupled with the mountainous Mature of the country, the poor road connections between the east and west coasts, and the numerous
Warsaw Pact forces attacking towards Central Europe, and provides defense against the threat from the south.
Turkey, another mountainous country, has an area of 296,185 square miles and a population of about 35 million. The peninsula of Anatolia consists of a plateau 1,000 meters high, surrounded by mountain ranges. Those ranges near the Mediterranean coast are not continuous and there are many large flat areas between them and the sea. In the northern part of the country the mountains are very close to the Black Sea coast and extend far inland. In the east, the Caucasus mountain range runs in a north-south direction with altitudes up to 5,600 meters.
The railways and roads provide fair connections between west and east, and north and south. Normally supply traffic between Mediterranean and Black Sea ports is carried by land, and sea transport is used mainly for overseas trade. The main Turkish Black Sea ports are Trabzon, Samsun, Sinop, Zonguldak, and Eregli (which is a naval base). Samsun and Zonguldak have railway communication with the south, but the easternmost port, Trabzon, must first communicate by road with the Erzerum railway junction. The remaining ports intercommunicate through a coastal road.
Turkey’s great strategic value lies in the fact that it controls the Straits and that its Asiatic section lies between the U.S.S.R. and the Middle East. In case of war, efforts by Warsaw Pact forces to occupy the Straits by an advance through Bulgaria and eastern Thrace could be supported by amphibious operations on either side of the Bosporus and in western Anatolia. Another possible Russian operation could be a two-armed effort, one against eastern Turkey directed towards Alex- andretta and the other against Iran, Turkey’s eastern neighbor. Such an operation could be helped only slightly by occupying Samsun and Trabzon, because of those ports’ limited communications with the hinterland. Indeed, because of the geographical characteristics of the area and the road limitations, this course of action appears unlikely.
Israel and the Arab Countries: Lebanon and Syria are traversed by the mountains which constitute a natural obstacle to any movement inland, and they even offer several defense lines in a north-south direction. Troop movement inland is not easy.
In the remaining countries, with the exception of Israel, the Nile Delta, and a narrow coastal strip in Libya and Tunisia, the mainland is sandy, the desert broken only by an occasional oasis. The roads are extremely poor and, serving mainly the coastal area, can very easily be interrupted. Communications off the roads are difficult because of the sand, and though there are no defense lines, soil depressions suitable for defense are often met. (In this respect it is worth noting that
the great desert battles of World War II were fought along the coastal strip of North Africa.)
In conclusion, exempting Mesopotamia and the valley of the Nile, the defense of the area is facilitated by the vast deserts which hinder the operations of large military forces and especially of mechanized units. The strategic importance of the area is great, because of its geographic position, the Suez Canal, the link it once provided—and might again provide—between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, Asia, and Africa, and most recently, because of the oil it produces.
Countries of the Soviet Bloc in the Black Sea: Bulgaria and Romania have an area of 42,796 and 91,699 square miles, and a population around 8 and 18 million, respectively, and they are industrially developed. Romania produces significant quantities of oil. B)' Balkan standards, they are flat, especially Romania. The mountain ranges have a west to east direction except for a part of the Carpathians, which run northwest to southeast. The railway and road network is well developed, and connected with that of the U.S.S.R. Most of the boundary between the two countries is formed by the Danube River.
Southern Russia is also flat (except for the Caucasian region) and has large rivers (Dnieper, Dniester, Don, and Volga) flowing in a north-south direction. There are significant oil fields in this area as well as a great deal of industry.
The terrain is mostly flat and offers few defense lines. It permits offensive operations in the Balkans southwards towards Thrace, westwards within Romania and Bulgaria, and northwards from Thrace. Because of its industrial wealth, oilfields and flat terrain, which, as we have noted, is suitable for landing operations, the southern Ukraine is the soft underbelly of the U.S.S.R It can be attacked from bases in the Balkans and the Middle East and by naval forces operating in the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea.
Economic Aspects
Because strategy is closely related to economics, the main economic characteristics influencing the strategic situation in the Eastern Mediterranean must be examined.
Resources and Raw Materials
Although, as far as climate and nature are concerned, the Mediterranean area is privileged, it lags in wealth The climate and the geographical conditions limit the area and yield of the arable lands from a maximum in Italy to the north (44% arable and 23% wooded ou1 of the total area) to a minimum in Libya and EgyPc
A Strategic Analysis of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea 127
to the south (7% arable and 3% wooded).
Though varying every year, the yield of the cultivated areas decreases in general as one moves from west and north to east and south.
In comparison to the arable areas, there is a large population, amounting for several countries, like Egypt, up to five inhabitants per hectare of arable land.
The sea resources of the Eastern Mediterranean are distinctly inferior to those of the Atlantic. Fishing, mainly coastal, yields a total product inferior in weight to that of Norway alone. Thus the needs for fish must be satisfied by imports or by ocean trawling in the Eastern Atlantic.
The subsoil is poor in coal and iron, though copper, tin, sulphur, and phosphates are there in valuable quantities. The general paucity in resources and the limited energy sources are responsible for the delay in industrialization during the 19th century. In northern Italy the use of hydroelectric power and the discovery of natural gas in many ways offset this disadvantage and contributed to the rapid industrialization of that section.
In spite of intense efforts to industrialize and to locate raw materials, especially by Greece and Turkey, the Eastern Mediterranean countries’ underdeveloped industry makes them depend on imports and causes a deficit in their balance of trade. Financial assistance from elsewhere and reliance on external loans are the main economic features of these countries and expose them to the influence of the economically powerful nations.
Recently, however, rich oil deposits have been discovered and exploited in Libya; intense drilling is being carried out with encouraging results by Turkey and Egypt. If successful, these efforts can lead those countries to financial independence. Although crude oil production in the Middle East is more economical than that in the Sahara, their difference in distance from the European consumer countries reduces the transportation cost of the African oil to one-fifth of the normal cost. Thus, North African countries will more and more be Europe’s energy suppliers, increasing considerably their strategic importance. The need for cooperation between the northern and southern areas of the Eastern Mediterranean and the whole Mediterranean, in general, is evident; however, foreign influence and the distrust of the Arab countries towards the old colonial powers of Western Europe make this cooperation difficult.
Economic Development
For several reasons economic development in the Eastern Mediterranean is not uniform. Northern Italy ts considered a developed area. Israel, thanks to the energy of its people and to significant foreign aid, mostly from private donations, has attained maximum
soil yield and an amazing industrial growth, giving the impression of a developed country. Southern Italy, Sicily, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, and Lebanon may be classed as semi-developed, while Egypt and Libya are on their way to development. A vast demographic explosion in the Arab countries will cause the doubling of their populations by the end of our century, and the enormous difference in standards of living within their societies has not yet been eliminated.
These conditions are favorable to Communist propaganda which claims the main cause for difference in the standards of living between the advanced nations and the developing ones is the economic exploitation of the latter by the former. The difference in the standards of living are particularly apparent today because of increased contact between peoples (hence, comparison of standards) through tourism, immigration, overseas education, and foreign employment of technical personnel.
The raising of the standard of living of the developing nations is vital to ensuring stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. Efforts towards this end will require time—and assistance from more advanced nations—if they are to succeed. In the long run, industrial production capacities, agriculture, and commerce must all be improved. Availability of capital, preservation of stable market conditions for raw materials and export, adoption of a customs and trade policy, and provision of machinery and technical personnel will help considerably in the achievement of these targets.
Trade
In the past the geographic distribution of a country’s trade influenced its national strategy because of the close dependence of the economy on foreign trade. Today, however, because of the increase of special revenues and the influx of capital for economic development, the role of foreign trade has diminished but has not ceased to constitute a factor to be taken into account. Thus, the economy of most of the Middle East countries depends today on funding by the industrialized Western nations; Egypt, Syria, and a few other countries depend on Soviet aid.
Recent statistics regarding foreign trade of Eastern Mediterranean countries (except Tunisia) give a picture of trade in this region as follows:
► Imports from non-Eastern Mediterranean countries, 26,186 million dollars; exports, 22,340 million dollars.
► Excluding military goods, imports by Arab nations from the Soviet bloc Black Sea countries, 542 million dollars; exports, 366 million dollars.
► Imports by Arab nations from Yugoslavia, 56 million dollars; exports, 36 million dollars.
► Imports by Arab nations from Italy, Greece, Turkey,
338/30/23 million dollars, respectively; exports, 707/38/ 27 million dollars.
► Imports by NATO countries (Italy, Greece, Turkey) from Yugoslavia, 276/36/12 million dollars, respectively; exports, 456/30/79 million dollars.
► Imports by Mediterranean NATO countries from Soviet bloc Black Sea countries, 532 million dollars; exports, 571 million dollars.
► Greece buys 227 million dollars’ worth of goods from Italy, and sells back 70 million. She buys one million from Turkey and sells back six million. Turkey buys 127 million dollars’ worth of Italian goods and sells back 79 million dollars’ worth to Italy. Notice that neither of the less-developed countries have much to sell the other. Both buy heavily from the more developed country.
► Imports by Israel from Yugoslavia, Italy, Greece, Turkey, 7/70/4/3 million dollars, respectively; exports 12/45/9/4 million dollars.
► Total commercial transactions between Arab nations are 240 million dollars.
From the above data it can be seen that the commercial transactions between Eastern Mediterranean countries amount to only 6.5% of the sum of their transactions with the countries outside the area. Of the latter, 24% concerns trade between Arab nations and the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and Romania. With the exception of Israel the trend to move manufactured goods from the northern and western regions and agricultural ones from southern and eastern regions is clearly established. To a varying degree politics influence commercial transactions between the Free World countries and those of the iron curtain. But trade barriers imposed in the past have diminished gradually and today this tendency is minimized.
No trade barriers exist between non-aligned nations and either the West or the East, since each of the world powers seeks to associate itself with the non-aligned or at least help to keep their independent attitude.
The differences among the Arab countries in their political philosophy, apart from some exceptions caused by local disputes and disturbances, does not greatly affect the rather low trade between themselves. However, the strong foreign exchange position of the oil- producing countries which are using their power to further political aims, exerts a decisive influence, bargaining foreign currency aid for economic development and armaments.
Finally, in the transactions between the countries of the Free World of the Eastern Mediterranean, politics hardly ever come into play and this only within the framework of the European Economic Community, of which Italy is a full member, Greece and Turkey are
%
members under certain restrictions, and Israel is commercially related.
Transportation
The Eastern Mediterranean countries often have poor communications between the coastal areas and the hinterland, mainly because of their geography. To balance that weakness, there are water avenues which, through the Strait of Gibraltar in the west, the Turkish Straits in the northeast and the Suez Canal in the east, connect them with the other countries of the world
Thus the general picture, almost unaltered since ancient times, is the transportation of international trade and domestic trade intended for coastal destinations almost exclusively by sea (especially in the case of maritime nations like Greece), and other domestic trade by land.
Because they have no land connection with their main supply sources, Greece, Turkey, the Arab countries, Malta, Cyprus, and Israel find sea transport vital In the case of Italy and Yugoslavia, because they have limited connection overland, it is only slightly less important. In contrast, for Russia, Bulgaria, and R0‘ mania, sea transport is of much less importance.
The land communications of the U.S.S.R. with its allies, sufficient for covering all needs in the initial stage of a war, may be considerably weakened because of the numerous vulnerable points; sea transport may therefore be needed as the war progresses, particularly towards the Bulgarian ports in order to support opera- tions in the south, and from terminal ports of oil pipelines (Constanza, Odessa, Rostov, Tuapse) an<l from military bases in the Crimea, such as Sevastopol
No country in the Eastern Mediterranean depend so much on sea transport for her internal movemen1 of people and supplies as does Greece, which us^ hundreds of small vessels in its coastal traffic. In 1970’ there were 500 diesel-driven cargo vessels and caiquC’ (small wooden vessels) of up-to-500 registered tons 8 to 12 knots speed, and 210 passenger ships and ferries. Though most of the latter are under 3,000 ton* capacity and 12 to 16 knots speed, some are larger faster.
Italy, Yugoslavia, and Turkey all have considerate coastal traffic but in the other countries most sea tr3fls' port is engaged in foreign trade. The following nui11 bers are characteristic of sea traffic (ocean and coast^- domestic and foreign) of merchandise including 0‘'' in millions of metric tons:
Greece Italy Turkey Cyprus Malta
17.5 215 10.5 2.8 1
Romania Bulgaria Syria Lebanon Egypt
7.3
13.8
33.5
41.5
15.4
Israel Yug‘>slJ,l'> 6.5 U-8
Libya
151 1>6
A Strategic Analysis of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea 129
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Most of the traffic between Mediterranean ports consists of cargo ships of a capacity of 500 to 3,000 tons and speeds of 8 to 14 knots, and of passenger and cruise ships of 2,000 to 5,000 tons and speeds of 14 to 17 knots. Known by the collective name of Mediterranean ships, these ships do not undertake longer voyages because of their limited size, low speed, and old age. They are useful in these trades because they are capable of exploiting small quantities of merchandise unprofitable for large vessels. Travelling mostly in the areas neighboring their own country, they offer direct and important national advantages.
The LASH and container type ships have only recently appeared and it is still too early to draw conclusions on how much they will influence transportation in the Eastern Mediterranean; their high building and exploitation cost, their inability to unload in more than one port per country (except Italy), and the lack of experience in cargo-handling by local stevedores render their employment in the Eastern Mediterranean difficult, though their use presents important advantages. Although these ships are continuously gaining ground, it will take a long time to replace the types of merchant ships now used in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Western | Eastern |
|
|
Countries | Countries | Uncommitted | Total |
525 | 109 | 99 | 733 |
693 | 201 | 118 | 1,012 |
A general idea of the magnitude of sea traffic can be obtained by the following figures referring to ships •n the Mediterranean in a typical day in 1967:
Ships at sea
Ships in port
The strength of the merchant marines of the East
Mediterranean countries, in mid-1971 was shown in
Table 1.
By country, these ships have the following characteristics:
Egyptian: Old ships.
Yugoslavian: New ships employed mostly on regular
lines.
Greek: Greek ownership holds the top position
in the world (37 million tons g.r.t.). Its tonnage flies the flags of Greece, Liberia, Panama, Lebanon, and Cyprus.
Eraeli: \ Forty-seven ships additional are under
foreign flags to avoid Arab boycott. Under the existing five-year-plan the Israeli fleet will reach 6 million tons dwt.
kalian: Moderate growth tendencies and con
siderable effort for renewal. There is excess capacity of passenger ships.
Most Greek and Italian shipping is used for interna
tional trade, whereas that of the other nations of the Eastern Mediterranean is used mainly to serve national needs.
The ships of the Eastern Mediterranean countries are manned mainly with crews of the same nationality. The Greek merchant marine today employs 120,000 people, a considerable number by world standards; the equivalent figure for other countries can be obtained proportionally by comparing their merchant marine strength to that of Greece.*
By its contribution to the national income, to employment, to raising the standard of living of the crews, to tax revenues, and to the balance of payments, the merchant marine is vital to the economies of Italy and Greece, important to the economies of Yugoslavia, Turkey, Cyprus, Israel, and the U.S.S.R., and unimportant to the economies of the other nations of the area. Thus, apart from the 120,000 seamen employed, the Greek merchant marine contributes 350 million dollars yearly to the Greek balance of payments.
Because of the size of their merchant marines, the strategic importance in war of both Greece and Italy are greatly enhanced.
The Suez Canal
By shortening the distance between India and Eu-
*Thc United States, with a population some 23 times that of Greece, employs about 28,000 men in its merchant marine.
| Total g.r.t. Capacity | Table 1 | Number of Ships of over 100 g.r.t. | ||
Country | Total | Tankers | Cargo | Various | |
Italy | 5,139,121 | 1,680 | 309 | 707 | 673 |
Yugoslavia | 1,542,727 | 355 | 27 | 259 | 69 |
Turkey | 713,767 | 328 | 39 | 147 | 142 |
Israel | 645,858 | 102 | 2 | 84 | 16 |
Egypt | 240,194 | 124 | 18 | 45 | 61 |
Lebanon | 127,325 | 65 | — | 61 | 4 |
Libya | 4,692 | 12 | - | 7 | 5 |
Syria | 1,020 | 4 | - | 2 | 2 |
Greece | 16,790,290 | 2,622 | 338 | 1,856 | 428, of which, 221 are passenger liners |
Cyprus | 1,498,114 | 277 | 10 | 251 | 16 |
Romania | 363,996 | 71 | 4 | 50 | 17 |
Bulgaria | 703,878 | 148 | 17 | 98 | 33 |
U.S.S.R. | 14,181,058 | 6,620 | 403 | 1,778 | 4,439, of |
which, 209 are passenger liners
rope by 6,000 miles the Suez Canal had great strategic value and added to the importance of the Eastern Mediterranean. Before the Canal closed, 20,000 ships sailed through it yearly. From I960 to 1966, there was an increase of 42.8% (104 million tons) in net capacity, and, in 1966, 13.3% of the world’s sea transport was carried through the Canal without any significant engineering having been done to widen or deepen it.
Because of changes in the world and the Middle East in particular since the closing of the Canal in 1967, its reopening should not be regarded as a simple continuation of the interrupted maritime traffic. New factors have considerably altered the importance of the Canal for the two opposing worlds. Among the factors which make the Canal important to the Soviet Union are its value as an alternative to the Trans-Siberian Railway in the event of hostilities between Russia and China, and as a far shorter route than around Africa from the Black Sea to the Middle East and Indian Ocean for both Soviet merchant ships and warships. A voyage, for example, from Odessa to Bombay via the Canal takes 16 days as opposed to 41 days around the Cape. Happily for the Soviet Union, all its ships are able to pass through the Canal.
On the other hand, the interest of the West has been mainly focused on securing its supply from the rich Middle East oil sources, for uninterrupted, fast, and secure oil transport is of considerable importance. The repeated interruptions in the use of the Suez Canal since Egypt took over control has forced the West to seek to diminish considerably its degree of dependence on the Canal for oil transport; big tankers have been built, balancing by their increased capacity the extra cost and the delay owed to Africa’s circumnavigation.
Thus, in a comparatively short time, the situation has almost completely changed and the U.S.S.R. needs the Suez Canal more than the West in order to back up economically its infiltration plans and to stabilize its presence in the Middle East and Indian Ocean.
As for the Eastern Mediterranean and Indian Ocean countries, the Suez Canal keeps its full importance as an easy, short and inexpensive route for the carriage of all kinds of merchandize. It is estimated that if this route were open about 9 billion dollars could be saved by the European countries in the next seven or eight years. In addition, the Canal reopening would mean:
► Support and development of the Eastern Mediterranean ship-repairing industry.
► Reactivation and extension of supply centers along the Mediterranean.
► An increase of the area of operation of Mediterranean cargo ships and the creation of an excess capacity for the oceangoing ships.
► Considerable strengthening of the Egyptian econofl1! by the rights from the use of the Canal. This sort o* income amounted to 250-million dollars and it is esti* mated that it could be tripled by 1980.
In conclusion, despite the redispositions which ha'£ occurred, the reopening of the Canal would again ma# the Mediterranean one of the most important comnu1' nication routes between the West and the East. I1 would lead to a significant increase of maritime auxiliary activities in the Eastern and, in general, th£ entire Mediterranean, on the one hand; and, on the other, to the creation of an undesirable excess of ocean' going ships. The appropriate exploitation of the abov£ advantages by the West in favor of the Eastern Med*' terranean and Middle East countries as well as in favo( of India could reduce both the intensity of the Arab' Israeli conflict and the Russian influence in this are3 From this point of view, the reopening of the Canal in spite of the advantages offered to the Soviet Unio11 would prove to be more profitable to the West than to the East.
Petroleum
The oilfields of the Middle East and in the Persian Gulf contain 65% of the oil deposits in the world Recently, vast quantities of oil have been discovered in the Sahara Desert. Europe’s expanding needs for oil are coming to be satisfied to an ever-increasing degree by the Saharan deposits, which are much closer £° Europe than are those of the Persian Gulf, and Saharan or Libyan, oil may become the Continent’s main source of energy.
No serious problem regarding transportation Saharan petroleum exists. On the other hand, trans- portation of the Persian Gulf’s produce is complicated as a result of the prevailing political situation in that area. Thus, of the three transportation possibilities: th£ Suez Canal route (not used since 1967), overland pipe' lines, and the round-the-Cape voyage, the two first a££ subject to fluctuations in the political situations so tha1 the third, round-the-Cape, appears to be the safest rou££ and at the same time, owing to the use of the ne*' supertankers, not uneconomical.
Taking into consideration that': (1) the petroleum output of the U.S.A., representing 34% of the world production, no longer suffices for the needs of tha1 country; (2) the oil fields of Latin America produce just 13% of the total world output; (3) of the 6^ million tons of fuel imported by Western Europe >n 1970, 529 million tons were from the Middle East and North Africa and 40 million tons from the U.S.S.R' and Romania, which is to say that 85% came from the Middle East, North Africa, and the Eastern Meditef'
A Strategic Analysis of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea 131
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The EEC and the Eastern Mediterranean The rapid development and continuing growth of the European Economic Community’s economy logically seeks an outlet for its trade and investments. For this reason, right from the beginning it turned toward the Mediterranean world, because of the latter’s closeness, its undeveloped resources, and its traditional trade dependence on the EEC countries. Thus, to date, Greece and Turkey have connections with the EEC, Israel has trade links, and negotiations for preferential agreements with Lebanon and Egypt are underway. The expansion of the EEC toward the Eastern Mediterranean despite the presently existing political obstacles, would seem to be a strong possibility for the near future. The greater capacity of the EEC, compared to that of the U.S.S.R., to absorb the industrial and agricultural production and labor potential of the Middle Eastern and North African countries is a most favorable factor. In order to achieve substantial expansion, however, the EEC will need to promote countries affiliated with it to full membership. In this context Greece is particularly well suited for such promotion because of its rapid economic growth, its huge merchant marine, and its ability to serve as the economic bridge joining the Free World and ,he Middle East. Such a link between the EEC and the Middle East, aside from increasing the former’s economic strength, offers the Western world the advantage of neutralizing Russia’s economic and political penetration in this area. Toward this end, it is necessary that the Middle Eastern countries be convinced that such an association is more beneficial to them than Soviet economic and military presence, for the latter can only lead to tension and crisis.
Soviet Economic Penetration of the Arab Nations The Arab regions were the first where Soviet efforts at economic and commercial penetration were manifested. This was greatly facilitated by the political and
economic vacuum caused by the unfortunate Suez campaign in 1956 which resulted in the withdrawal of England and France from the economic foreground of the Middle East. The U.S.S.R. rushed in to fill the gap through a massive political and economic penetration. To achieve its purpose it offered aid under favorable economic conditions and undertook significant construction (such as military bases and the Aswan Dam) without imposing immediately obvious political and military conditions; it encouraged industrial development regardless of whether the established units could survive; it supported Arab political demands before international organizations and professed to be their patron and advocate; it offered massive opportunities for technical cooperation and education by putting a large number of advisors at their disposal (15,000 to 20,000 in the case of Egypt); and it bought and continues to buy large quantities of their products in exchange for military hardware and machinery.
With the passing of time all the above have proved to be of limited value and, despite initially achieving impressive results, the U.S.S.R. has made small progress in its designs for economic and commercial partnership with the Arab world. This is clearly apparent from figures regarding foreign trade and Middle-Eastern aid during the last five years. The result of the U.S.S.R.’s penetration efforts and, also, of some new and interesting principles in Western foreign aid, has been the Arabs’ gradual shift toward renewal of cooperation with the West. Proper exploitation by the West of this trend and re-establishment of trust and cooperation with the Arabs could completely nullify Soviet economic and political influence in this area.
Political and Social Aspects
The era we live in is characterized by a tendency toward total unification of the world and a universality of its problems. The Eastern Mediterranean world is closely related to and influenced by both Eastern and Western civilizations, and, partly in consequence, for thousands of years it has lacked political, social, and cultural unity. Today there are wide political and social differences in the structure of its various states, exposed as they are to strong contemporary influences from many sources.
Thus, Greece, Italy, and Turkey, all closely related to the Western socio-economic philosophy, are members of NATO. Of the Communist nations, the U.S.S.R., Bulgaria, and Romania participate in the Warsaw Pact; Yugoslavia is part of the so-called Third World; and Albania keeps close relations with the People’s Republic of China. The Arab nations try to keep outside the
Eastern and Western coalitions. Israel, although close to the West, is not included in any political security system. Finally, Cyprus and Malta, though both members of the British Commonwealth, follow independent political courses.
The conditions prevailing in these countries are those of developing societies with strong efforts to raise the standard of living of their populations. Concurrent with efforts for industrialization and decentralization, a strong tendency towards urbanization as well is apparent. Another new and interesting condition is the immigration of workers to the more advanced western European nations. The demographic problem, which had most plagued Italy in the past, contributed to the
flow of emigrants from Greece, Turkey, and Italy- mainly toward the United States; that flow to the Western hemisphere, however, has been curbed consi^' erably today as a result of restrictions imposed by receiving nations.
Political and Social Conditions in the NATO Nations
Italy, a democracy since the last war, appears poll'1' cally sensitive, with obvious pressures from the Con1' munist and Socialist parties for a greater left-*111# orientation. Given that the Italian Communist paft! is the strongest in Europe and that its influence, 35 well as that of the Socialists, on the workers’ union5 is considerable, the agitation encouraged by them huT the stability and the economy of the nation and, if ’’ is left unchecked, it may have serious consequences- Italy, which in 1913, maintained that no country h3^ or ever would have the right to claim the Meditetf3' nean as theirs, and that this sea should remain open to free passage for all nations, ten years later deda1^ it was "Our Sea” and demanded the withdrawal of3" foreign forces which came from the north. In purs111' of this aim during the first quarter of the 20th centuT Italy established itself in Istria, Fiume, Zara, aI,a Albania on the Adriatic; in the Dodecanese in Aegean; and in Libya; and had similar designs 0,1 French-held Tunisia. With the loss of all these teffl
tories after World War II, the bid for supremacy in the Mediterranean has to a great degree faded away.
In Greece, after the establishment of a strong government as the result of the military intervention in 1967, all left-wing tendencies were checked. The resulting stability has been a major factor of Greece’s economic boom. Today, a great effort to clean up public life and to modernize institutions and procedures in order to create the necessary prerequisites for a true, healthy, and viable democracy is evident in this country. The result of such political development is that Greece is currently the most stable NATO partner in the Eastern Mediterranean, a consideration having influenced considerably the decision to homeport there ships of the U. S. Sixth Fleet.
The "New Turkey,” shaped by the perceptive Kemal Ataturk, was able to retain its neutrality during World Vr II, and constitutes a significant partner in both h'ATO and CENTO. The country’s political stability has been endangered lately. The March 1971 military inter- vcntion led the government to enforce drastic security ’•'easures in order to check anarchistic and left-wing Pudencies.
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V Soviet Union and Other Communist Countries Soviet political and ideological power in the Eastern 'Viterranean was felt originally through the commutation of the Balkan countries, and later by Soviet tietration into the Arab countries through exploita- j'°n of their rivalry with Israel, and by the Soviet lion’s efforts to detach Greece and Turkey from 'Vo. In their efforts in the Moslem world the Soviets 4te taking advantage of the Moslem republics in the Vhern region of the Soviet Union.
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A Strategic Analysis of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea 133
. Thanks to Tito, Yugoslavia has practiced a policy "dependent from Moscow. However, the future is ^certain: in September 1971, the two countries an- Vriced their desire to create a Balkan missile-free yne. Interestingly, the U.S.S.R. agreed to the right of IJgoslavia to formulate its socialism as it sees fit. for many years, Yugoslavia has made major efforts become the leading power of the group of inde- Vent nations. Within the framework of this policy * bas established friendly relations with the bordering 0ni1rnunist and non-Communist countries and, in par- Hr, Romania, with whom it seeks closer policy
coordination. The existence of a significant Albanian population in the Kosovska region and the tendency of the Republic of Skopje (the southernmost of six republics that comprise Yugoslavia) to expand toward the Aegean and Bulgaria, however, are latent causes for friction with Albania, Greece, and Bulgaria.
Bulgaria is the U.S.S.R.’s most trusted ally in the Balkans and enjoys complete stability internally and externally. Aithough it declares its desire for developing friendly ties and complete cooperation with the other Balkan countries and especially with Greece and Yugoslavia, it has always been influenced by a tendency to incorporate certain elements of the population of the Republic of Skopje, and a desire to obtain a territorial passage to the Aegean from Greece. These pursuits, though formally denied at present, may emerge again under favorable conditions and this will always influence the position of Bulgaria with respect to the two great alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
Romania, though orthodox Communist in its internal policy and a member of the Warsaw Pact, attempts to maintain an independent position toward the U.S.S.R. and the Sino-Soviet controversy. Thus, so far, she has always refused permission for Warsaw Pact forces to exercise on Romanian territory and has often aligned its position with those of Yugoslavia or China on matters of general policy of the Communist World. This tendency, together with the recollection by the Romanian people of the loss during World War II of two Romanian provinces to Russia and a third to Bulgaria, make Romania a rather unstable ally who, given the appropriate circumstances, could cause problems in the Warsaw Pact.
The fact that Romania is bordered by Russia must be taken into consideration in the relations of these two countries. Such is not the case with Albania which, since 1961, has been able to free itself completely from Soviet influence. Despite the limited resources of the country, its underdeveloped economy and its almost complete dependence on foreign aid for survival, all Soviet efforts to detach Romania from Chinese influence have failed. Thus the Warsaw Pact has lost a significant base from which it could exercise political and military control in this area. The incorporation in 1914 of northern Epirus into the then newly-established Albanian state, with special privileges for its predominantly Greek population, and the treaty in 1927 between Italy and Albania which brought the latter under Italian rule in 1939, led to tension between those two countries and Greece. During World War II, Italian forces invaded Greece from, and with the support of, Albania. All the foregoing, to which was added Albania’s alignment with the Communist bloc after World War II, resulted in the total lack of contact
between Albania and Greece from the late 1930s until the re-establishment of diplomatic relations in 1971.
Countries of the British Commonwealth
The only remaining British Commonwealth countries in the Eastern Mediterranean are Malta and Cyprus. Each of these countries follows its own policies and each is characterized by peculiar political conditions. After Malta’s independence in 1964, British military presence on the island was gradually and significantly reduced, although the strong ties with Great Britain, which had been forged during the British administration of one-and-one-half centuries, continued to exist.
The rise to power in the summer of 1971 of the labor party under Dom Mintoff and the denunciation of agreements with Britain were the beginning of a policy of neutrality. They resulted in the loss of the use of the island by the naval forces of the NATO countries. The headquarters of Naval Forces Southern Europe (NavSouth) was moved to Naples. In his plan for neutrality Mintoff had the unreserved support of the Arab countries, especially Libya, in their effort to deny the use of Malta to the benefit of Israel.
The sharp controversy between the British government and Mr. Mintoff regarding the payment to Malta for Britain’s military use of the island almost led to a British withdrawal. This was avoided only after long negotiations, when Britain agreed to pay 9.5 million pounds (as against an initial demand of 30 million pounds), when procurement of this sum from elsewhere (especially from Libya) was not forthcoming.
The limited economic possibilities of the island and the loss of economic advantages as a result of discontinuing the presence of NATO forces and staffs favors Russian infiltration. However, Premier Mintoff’s one- vote majority, combined with the Western orientation of the greatest part of the population and the island’s strong tourist connection with Great Britain, are factors which can check this infiltration and provide a possibility for Malta’s realignment with the Western world. Important economic assistance from the Soviet bloc is not a practical proposition, anyway, because the consequent strong presence of citizens from the eastern countries would not be tolerated by the island’s Catholic population.
Be that as it may, the political importance and psychological impact of the subjection of the island to Russian control would be much more significant for the West than its military importance.
Cyprus, with its very ancient Greek civilization, was for eight centuries a part of the Byzantine Empire, and was for the following seven centuries successively under the occupation by the Crusaders, Venetians, Genoese,
and Turks. In 1878, the island came under 800511 administration, became a British colony in 1925, and gained its independence in I960 after a three-year revolt by its Greek population. Four-fifths of its 600,000 population are of Greek origin desiring union with Greece; to this the Turkish element, the other fifth, is opposed. This controversy, combined with what is in many respects an impractical constitution, paralyze^ 1 the newly established state and led to armed conflirt between the two communities, despite the presence since 1964 of a United Nations Peace Force. For 3 [ period, the controversy weakened Greek-Turkish cooperation.
This unstable situation and the disillusion of the i Greek element, caused by the Cypriot people being denied the right of self-determination, make the usefulness of the value of British bases on the island questionable, contribute to the strengthening of the Communists on the island, and provide the Soviet Union with favorable conditions for developing its influence The continuation of this situation exposes the Western i World to the danger of seeing the Soviets installed on the island, an event which can be prevented by thc application of a just, satisfactory, and acceptable nf' rangement, toward which aim talks are currently taking place between the two communities.
Israel
Right from the beginning the state of Israel- founded in May 1948, became the object of Arab effort5 for its liquidation. Although Israel succeeded in ovct- coming these efforts, an atmosphere of hatred a0 revenge was formed around its frontiers and constitute5 a permanent source of conflict. This conflict is *n' tensified by the Israeli occupation of Arab territoflc’ and Israel’s refusal to comply with the decision of tk1- U.N. Security Council concerning its withdrawal thert' from.
The Israelis, mainly originating from European a0 American immigrants, have, despite their population less than three million, developed a strong econort1! and created an excellent army of 50,000 with availaO reserves of 200,000 well equipped and perfectly traine“ soldiers.
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Financially supported by the United States and rich Jews of the Western World and morally af|J materially backed by the Jewish element through01*1 the world, they succeeded in creating a politico- stable state of pro-Western orientation and met succ#5 fully the burden of a long war. Despite its recogni^1’1 of the Israeli state immediately after its foundation Russia later supported the Arabs in their claims, fO- aware of the excellent opportunity of increasing influence in the Middle East. Indeed, the foundati0'
A Strategic Analysis of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea 135
of Israel deeply influenced the Eastern Mediterranean area by prompting Arab unification, speeding up the decline of Western influence, and providing an open invitation for a Russian settling in this area.
Arab Countries
The political and social conditions of the Eastern Mediterranean Arab countries were influenced considerably by the lengthy struggle of their peoples against the Western powers in their endeavor to obtain independence after a long period under a colonial regime. In most of these countries the conditions prevailing today are the result of revolutions in which the main part was played by the armed forces. Thus, it was mainly presidential type regimes that were formed, with socialistic leanings. In general, they were anti- Communist in character, and influenced strongly by Arab nationalism, by the character of their peoples, by the acute confrontation with Israel, and in certain cases by the lack of confidence in the West. These qualities resulted in a mass nationalization of natural resources and large companies as well as the expulsion of most Europeans.
In spite of the revolutionary changes, the social differences stemming from the pre-existing feudal and bourgeois classes have not yet been erased. These differences, coupled with the underdeveloped economy and the miserable living conditions of 900,000 Palestinian refugees, not only create a social and political instability favorable to Communist penetration but also they can foment developments with unforeseen—but enormous— conseq uences.
By supporting economically, politically, and militarily the regimes of these countries the Soviet Union succeeded in replacing Western influence in the area in spite of the repeated clashes between some of the regimes and the Communist parties of their countries. Notwithstanding the Soviet penetration, there are, however, factors which properly exploited may lead to 'he neutralization of Soviet influence in favor of the Western powers; the necessary prerequisite to this end is the termination of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Characteristic of existing possibilities is the expulsion in the summer of 1972 of a large number of Russian advisors and technician from Egypt by President Sadat.
In brief, the present political and social situation in each of the Arab, countries appears as follows:
Lebanon, with a population of 2.5 million, half Christian and Moslem, was under French mandate between 1920 and 1941. It obtained its independence horn France in 1944 while World War II was still in progress. The last foreign troops left in 1946. It Maintains friendly relations with the West and at the same time solidarity with the rest of the Arab countries.
Traditionally the president is Christian and the prime minister Moslem. In the past it received economic aid from the United States and today it has both economic stability and a high standard of living, particularly in the large cities as Beirut.
Syria, with six million people, and under French mandate since 1920, also gained its independence in 1944.
Jordan, today the second Middle East Arab country with a monarchy, was created in 1921 as the Kingdom of Trans-Jordan. In 1950, after the annexation of Arabic Palestine west of the Jordan River, the country assumed its present name, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Nearly a third of its population of 2.5 million consists of refugees from Israel living under unfavorable conditions and constituting the main recruiting source for members of the extremist Palestinian organizations. The turn of these organizations against King Hussein led to a bloody clash with the Jordanian army and the restriction of refugee activities inside Jordanian territories. This clash and the hostile attitude of most of the Arab countries against Hussein in conjunction with the U. S. grant of military aid brought a clear change in the policy toward the West that had been followed by Jordan ever since 1956. The relative calm restored in the country is, however, uncertain in view of the unfavorable attitude of certain Arab countries especially Syria, Egypt, and Libya.
Egypt, with a population of 35 million, was a British protectorate until 1922 when it became independent, though Britain reserved some rights. Relations between those two countries were settled by a treaty of alliance in 1936. After unsuccessful efforts to change the treaty, Egypt denounced it in 1951. The last British troops left the Canal area in 1956.
World War II also brought to an end Italian rule over Libya which had begun in 1911. Wartime protectorates by Britain and France ended in 1951 with Libya’s independence.
In September 1971, a plan for a federal constitution, calling for close contact and cooperation between Syria, Egypt, and Libya was proclaimed; this cooperation was further promoted in July 1972 by the announced union of Libya and Egypt. The avowed aim of this Arab federation under Egyptian leadership, apart from common defense, economic, and foreign policies, is the unification of all the Arab nations and the complete coordination of action against Israel.
In spite of the common aims and pursuits, the new federation suffers from a lack of political and economic uniformity, which may prove a catalyst. Thus, Syria has the largest percentage of pro-Communist elements from any other Middle East country, and has received military aid from the Soviet Union disproportionally high
in comparison to its forces. Egypt, notwithstanding its close cooperation with the Soviet Union, has strong anti-Communist and anti-Russian feelings, which are at the base of the adverse developments in the relations between Russia and Egypt. These became publicly clear in 1972; in this policy and attitude Egypt was firmly supported by Libya, the military regime of which—in spite of its opposition to the West—is strongly anti- Communist. The discovery of oil has turned Libya, with its population of only 1.5 million, from one of the poorest countries of the world to a leading Arab power, one unfavorable to Arab monarchies and actively supporting Arab unity and the continuing struggle against Israel.
Tunisia, with a population of 5 million, was a French protectorate from 1881 until 1955. This country keeps a neutral attitude between both the anti- and pro- Western Arab countries and firmly supports the efforts for unification of the struggle against Israel. It has avoided federation with other Arab countries and pursues development of the concept of Mediterranean unity. The application of a realistic Western policy towards this country provides the opportunity to counter Russian efforts for penetration and influence and for the maintenance of its independent orientation.
Iraq (population 9 million), a British mandate from 1921 to 1932 and independent thereafter, was linked with the West until it denounced the Baghdad Pact in 1959. The latter then was renamed CENTO, with its headquarters in Ankara, Turkey. CENTO, whose members are Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Britain, and the United States, is still considered to have some political value despite the rather loose connections of its members and recent developments in Pakistan.
pears as a defender of Arab independence. In spite of
In the remaining Middle East Arab countries (except Saudi-Arabia, which has friendly connections with the United States), Western influence has been reduced in favor of the U.S.S.R., which is making strong efforts at further penetration in the area.
Geopolitical Factors in the Eastern Mediterranean Area
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The situation in the Eastern Mediterranean is characterized by the remnants of the Arab opposition to the Western powers during the first half of the 20th century, their confrontation with Israel, the Communist threat to the Arab world and Western civilization, the absence of religious fanaticism in the Western nations and its considerable moderation in the Arab world, the accentuation of Arab nationalism, and the American presence in the area.
The absence of religious fanaticism and the diminishing of nationalism in the European countries constitute two basic elements that favor peace and
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The 20th century experience demonstrates that the right of self-determination of the peoples is not always the best solution of the political and economic problems of humanity. It also demonstrates that the principle of federalism, constantly gaining ground, crates favorable conditions for countering the threat of penetration in the Eastern Mediterranean area of such super- powers as the Soviet Union.
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Pan-Arabism, which has existed from the very first days of the independence of the Arab countries, is manifested today through the will of the Arabs to oust Israel. The attachment of the grater part of the people to the ida of Pan-Arabism, together with the pull of Islamic ideas and the xenophobia of the masses, constitutes a strong factor adverse to Communist imperialism. The Moslem laders of the Arab world, aware of the decline of Islam in the Soviet Union, suspicious of the Soviet technicians they receive in their countries, and in general distrustful of the local Communist parties, are at present, more afraid of Russian and Chinese imperialism than they are of the Europan. which no longer exists in reality. Their effort to use to their benefit the antagonism between the two super powers is obvious and, although dangerous, has proved fruitful. The developments in relations between EgyP1 and the Soviet Union in recent months, providing 3 unique opportunity to the West to stop Russian pene tration in the area, confirm the strong influence of the above factors.
The idea of combining Pan-Islamism and Pan' Arabism, although appealing to some Arab leaders, >5 still at the conceptual stage, with little chance of sue cess. The Europeanization of Turkey and its partici' pation to the defense systems of the West is a confirm3' tion of this thesis.
The Soviet Union, having assured control of tb£ Moslem populations of the Soviet republics, now up
its failures in Albania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, that country- has peacefully acquired an important po’1' tion in Syria, Iraq, and Egypt. Nevertheless, at preset31 the Middle East countries lean more to neutrality that1 to Communism. But the Soviet Union demonstrate admirable patience, and its political strategy, aiming t0 put under control all the Eastern Mediterranan area- is more ambitious than that of the Tsars. The U.S.S-R
has succeeded in stabilizing its presence in this area at1' in enlarging the gap between the Arab countries anu the Western powers. This was aided by the West’ failure to exploit the strong discontent felt by the Arabs toward the U.S.S.R. after their 1967 defar-
A Strategic Analysis of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea 137
which they attributed to the limited aid they received from the Soviet Union.
The American presence in the Eastern Mediterranean is unique. As a non-Mediterranean power, the United States has no territorial claims, and is interested mainly in uniting Europe in defense against the U.S.S.R. Base requirements for American forces are met by using Allied bases in the area.
American policy in the Eastern Mediterranean aims at opposing Communist penetration and preventing the coastal countries, especially those in the Arab world from falling under Soviet domination. U. S. actions are dictated by the belief that in order to check Communist predominance in the Third World, it is necessary for countries under colonial regime to become fully independent. Within the framework of this policy, the United States tries to cooperate with every country or group of countries in the development of their economies. The United States supports their national independence, establishes military aid programs, and intends to use its own armed forces to ensure the territorial and political independence of the countries which ask for such help against aggression by any country under Communist domination. The application of this policy in the Eastern Mediterranean area is made evident by active U. S. participation in NATO, in U. S. support of CENTO, in the permanent presence of the U. S. Sixth Fleet, and in the granting of economic and military aid to the countries of the area.
The continuation of this U. S. activity is an indispensable condition for countering Soviet penetration in the area. The importance given it by the Soviets is clearly demonstrated in the text of the final communique of a conference, organized in 1968 by the U.S.S.R. and held in Rome, of the "progressive and anti-imperialistic powers” of the Mediterranean countries. Seventeen Communist parties participated, among them those of Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Syria, and Egypt. During this conference it was proclaimed that "At the present, the Mediterranean and Southeast Asia constitute the poles of American aggressive policy and its strategy of world domination. The progressive and anti-imperialistic powers believe that it is their primary duty to fight against this imperialistic presence and the associated military, political and economic threat. The conference declares that it is in favor of the abolition of the British and U. S. bases in the Mediterranean (both in the framework of NATO and the other agreements and treaties which connect the Mediterranean countries with the United States), the withdrawal of the Sixth Fleet, the non-renewal by September 1968 of the U. S.-Spanish Treaty and the dissolving of NATO, which is the main instrument of U. S. aggression in the Mediterranean.”
Military Aspects in the Frame of Naval Strategy
A Comparison between the Forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea
The military situation in the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea and its effects on the strategic aspects of this area are considered within the framework of the East-West confrontation. A brief comparison, mainly between the forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO in the area, leads to the following considerations:
Land Forces: The direct threat against the NATO countries in the southern region (Italy, Greece, and Turkey), comes from the approximately 23 Romanian and Bulgarian divisions and the 28 Soviet divisions in southern Russia. Though no Soviet forces are located permanently in Romania or Bulgaria, the considerable number of Soviet divisions in southweastern Russia is capable of being rapidly moved and deployed to the south through these countries. By means of these forces, on the ground the Warsaw Pact has a superiority over NATO of more than two to one. The comparison renders itself more unfavorable for NATO when one considers the number of tanks, guns, and other weaponry available on each side, and the geographical features and the capability of force concentration and initiative, all of which are greatly in favor of the Soviets. The land forces of Yugoslavia and Albania (a total of more than 12 divisions) should also be taken into consideration; these countries, both of which have an extended common border-line with Greece and, in the case of Yugoslavia, also with Italy, would make things worse for the Southern Region NATO countries should they decide to join forces with the Warsaw Pact.
Air Forces: The comparison in this field is also unfavorable for NATO forces. The direct air threat against the NATO Southern Region comes from the approximately 700 Romanian and Bulgarian aircraft and more than 1,800 Soviet aircraft of all types located in southwestern and southern Russia.
To these figures the Southern Region NATO countries oppose a total of about 850 aircraft of all types; thus the Soviet alliance has a superiority in the air of up to three-to-one. The situation becomes more unfavorable for NATO if we consider the early warning systems, antiaircraft missiles and guns, airfields, and other elements available to each side. The Yugoslavian air force has about 375 aircraft of all types and the joining of those aircraft with those of the Warsaw Pact would make the balance even more adverse for NATO in its southern region.
Naval Forces: The Soviet Fleet in the Black Sea constitutes an imposing force of more than 400 vessels among which are 30 submarines (five with guided
missiles), two guided-missile helicopter carriers, two guided-missile cruisers and one conventional cruiser, 15 guided-missile destroyers, 25 FPB(G)s, 60 landing craft (some of a small type) as well as coastal escort vessels, FPBs, minesweepers, and support vessels. There are also about 270 aircraft of all types, mostly operating from ashore, but some of which are borne by the helicopter carriers. The amphibious capability of this fleet in the Black Sea area amounts to the assault life of up-to-13 battalions and, by using Soviet merchant vessels usually available in the area, the administrative lift of a follow-up force of 10 divisions. The landing battalions are obtained from specially organized and trained units of naval infantry as well as some adequately trained army infantry units.
To these naval forces, those of Bulgaria and Romania should be added, comprising a total of two submarines, 16 escort and patrol vessels, 33 FPB(G)s and FPBs, and 57 minesweepers of all types.
Special reference should be made to the considerable contribution that can be offered by the ever-developing Soviet merchant, hydrographic, and fishing fleets in the fields of logistic support, collection of information, minelaying, sabotage, and so forth.
To oppose those forces, the Southern Region NATO countries and the U. S. Sixth Fleet have a total of 32 submarines, two attack aircraft carriers, six guided- missile cruisers, about 56 destroyers (several of which have guided missiles), about 40 escort vessels of all types, 41 FPB(G)s and FPBs, 96 minesweepers of all types, about 63 landing ships of all types, and a sufficient number of support and auxiliary vessels. Despite
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the fact that, at first sight, there is a rough numeric31 equality—NATO being superior as far as main units concerned—it should be taken into account that, ap3ft from many of those in the Sixth Fleet, some in Italian Navy, and a very few in the Turkish and Gre^ navies, the ships of Southern Region NATO country are old. Nevertheless, as far as deployment of for#5, bases, and air coverage are concerned, the NATO na'1-1 ^
forces are in an advantageous position. Sqj,
The greatest part of the Soviet Mediterranean Fl^1 normally is in the Eastern Mediterranean; this sj^
consists almost entirely of ships from the Black Fleet and usually includes 50 to 55 modern skip'
A Strategic Analysis of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea 139
among which 13 to 15 are combat surface vessels, 10 to 14 are submarines, and two or three are amphibious vessels, accompanied by a landing force not exceeding one battalion. The main weaknesses of the Soviet Fleet in the Mediterranean, the absence of both permanent bases and air cover, are not especially perceptible in the Eastern Mediterranean where the Soviets have secured harbor facilites in some Arab countries and can rely, as far as air cover is concerned (particularly in the Aegean Sea), on aircraft flying from land bases in the Balkans, in southwestern Russian and, perhaps, in some Middle East countries. Such coverage is already provided, on a limited scale in peacetime—particularly as regards reconnaissance—from countries of the Middle East. However, the latest developments in the relations between Russia and Egypt may adversely affect those activities. Reportedly, the problem of supplying air cover to forces at sea may be solved in the near future by means of aircraft carriers or even by VTOL
ers of all types as well as about 150 support ships of all types.
The small Yugoslavian Navy, consisting of light forces, would constitute (in case Yugoslavia joined the Warsaw Pact) a serious threat to NATO in the Adriatic, through the operation of five submarines, a destroyer, and 55 FPBs (of which 10 are guided-missile ones), and their capability to support raiding operations. Under similar circumstances, one should not overlook the threat presented by the four submarines and 42 FPBs of the Albanian Navy whose remaining light units, old and limited in number, are not considered significant.
aircraft operating from Moskva-typt helicopter-carrying
vessels.
The operation of French naval forces in the Mediterranean, ensuring NATO control in the Western and Central Mediterranean, will contribute considerably to the naval battle in the Eastern Mediterranean. That country’s navy could deploy in the Mediterranean a considerable part of its forces, which consist of two aircraft carriers, one helicopter carrier, one cruiser, 21 submarines (of which two are nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines, with three more to follow), six guided-missile destroyers, 40 conventional destroyers and frigates, 15 patrol ships, and about 100 minesweep-
The other naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean- all quite small—consist entirely of light units. Israel has two destroyers, three submarines, nine FPBs, and 12 FPB(G)s. Syria has 17 FPBs and 10 FPB(G)s. Egypt has 12 destroyers, 12 submarines, four FPBs, and 20 FPB(G)s. Libya has three FPB(G)s. In general, with the exception of the Israeli and Egyptian submarines,
140 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review 1973
these forces can operate only near their own coasts, and constitute little threat to ships any distance from those coasts.
The Soviet Naval Penetration in the Eastern Mediterranean
Soviet naval activities in the Mediterranean and elsewhere during recent years prove the continuously developing capabilities of the Soviet Navy to operate far from its bases, which is partly a result of having developed strong long-range naval aviation and effective surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles. And, as always, the Soviet Navy has considerable skill and power in mine warfare. As a result, Eastern Mediterranean NATO countries are exposed to the threat of interruption of their maritime lines of communication and commerce, on which, as we have seen, they rely for their survival. Furthermore, the Soviet naval force in the Mediterranean serves to detract the U. S. Sixth Fleet from its main task, and in general to outflank NATO’s Southern Region.
Soviet Strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea
During peacetime, the main tasks which serve Soviet objectives in this area have been undertaken by the naval force in the Eastern Mediterranean. Simultaneously, Soviet land and air forces facing south pose a constant threat to NATO’s southern flank and contribute in many ways, together with the Soviet fleet, to the success of Soviet strategic aims. Foremost of these aims are the expansion of Russian political and economic influence, and the securing of advanced military positions.
In wartime, it is estimated that the main effort of the Soviet bloc forces, would be directed at the quickest possible occupation of Thrace and the Turkish Straits so as to obtain an exit to the Aegean. Besides other military goals success here would secure the necessary naval bases and ports in the Eastern Mediterranean. This effort would be undertaken, no doubt, by land and air forces supported by the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Meanwhile, the Fleet in the Mediterranean, reinforced before hostilities began by ships from the Black Sea and possibly from the Atlantic, could act to destroy NATO naval forces in this area and to support operations ashore.
Since the survival of the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet depends on air cover and on the occupation of bases and harbors needed for the ships’ logistic support, it is almost certain that Soviet vessels in the Mediterranean would operate, at least to begin with, mainly in the Eastern Mediterranean. Here, they would enjoy better air cover than they would in the western part of the sea. The aircraft could be positioned at support
ing air bases along the North African and Middle Eastern littoral before war began and reinforced after war had begun through airfields in Bulgaria and, should Yugoslavia align itself with the Soviets, through that country, too. The ships of the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet could also aid the land and air forces in their drive to obtain supporting harbors. Thus, intense Soviet naval activity in the Aegean is to be expected. Undoubtedly, during the first phase the primary objective of the Soviet Navy will be the destruction of as many ships as possible of the U. S. Sixth Fleet. The attempt to interrupt Mediterranean communications totally will follow, once naval bases in the Aegean are secured. This does not mean that once hostilities begin the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet will not seek to destroy Allied merchant ships in the East Mediterranean, especially those moving towards Greece and Turkey. However, the conflict with the Sixth Fleet and the naval forces of the other NATO countries of this sector will take the form of an all-out struggle for survival and destruction of the enemy.
In this context a strong NATO grip on the Turkish Straits is bound to doom Russian forces in the Mediterranean because of the resulting Soviet inability to provide adequate logistic support, reinforcements, and air cover to those forces. In case the Turkish Straits are seized by Warsaw Pact forces, so long as the Greek ports in Thrace—Thessalonika, Kavalla, and Alexan- droupolis—do not fall into Soviet hands or, at the very least, as long as NATO maintains control of the Aegean, the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet is still doomed.
Should the Soviets occupy Thrace and gain control of the Aegean, they will render the Turkish Straits untenable to NATO for, in addition to the obvious possibilities of overland assault through Bulgaria and amphibious assault from the Black Sea, the defenders of the straits will be cut off in the rear from all help Thus, at one and the same time Thrace is both vital to NATO and, because of its limited depth, one of the weakest points in NATO’s defenses.
In the Black Sea, besides those necessary to assure control and to neutralize the Turkish naval forces, Soviet naval operations could include an amphibious operation on the Turkish coast, particularly on either side of the Bosporus in support of the principal land operations.
The situation in the Adriatic will depend mainly on the positions taken by Yugoslavia and Albania. Should those two countries be neutral the situation in that sea will not be difficult. But should they side with the Warsaw Pact, a significant portion of the Italian and Greek navies (the latter in order to face Albania h1 the East Ionian Sea) must be deployed to this area thus weakening their main effort elsewhere. Hostile
A Strategic Analysis of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea 141
aircraft and the significant number of FPBs and FPB(G)s available to the Yugoslavian Navy would make Allied naval action near the Dalmatian coasts very unsafe.
Soviet Fleet Objectives in the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea The composition, disposition, and size of the Soviet naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea permit one to summarize its objectives in non-war in this way:
► to maintain continuous surveillance of and a capability to eliminate those NATO naval forces, which pose a threat to Russian territory (mainly the U. S. Sixth Fleet);
► to contribute to the Soviet nuclear deterrent force;
► to exercise political pressure, enhance Soviet prestige, collect information, and train crews in the areas of possible action;
^ to support Soviet strategic, political, and economic interests through visits to the Mediterranean countries and through influencing political and other developments in the area;
^ to create diversion and doubts as to the ability of the NATO Alliance to control the vital Mediterranean area; and
► to obtain facilities in advanced Mediterranean bases and simultaneously to deprive NATO of such bases.
During war additional Soviet naval objectives would
be:
^ to protect Soviet soil from all NATO "strategic” forces in the area (especially from submarines and carrier strike
forces);
► to support land operations against the southern flank
of NATO;
► to contribute to the Soviet "strategic” nuclear offensive through the use of submarines and surface ships armed with missiles;
^ to destroy the naval forces and the merchant shipping of the countries of the southern flank of NATO; and, in general,
^ to control the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.
NATO Strategy in the Southern Region The expected Soviet efforts impose the development of strong defenses, because territorial losses will severely weaken the alliance. Hence, as elsewhere, NATO strategy in the southern sector must provide both for a flexible response and a forward defense.
In order to confront the Soviet naval expansion in the Mediterranean, NATO must develop the forces and bases indispensable for successfully meeting the new
threat from the south. To meet the long-standing threat from the north, adequate naval and naval air forces should be available to overcome the Soviet naval threat, to ensure sea transportation, and to support the land forces.
Should the eastern Adriatic coast be made available to enemy forces, the operation of NATO surface forces in the Adriatic would be most unsafe, mainly because of the anticipated intense air threat. This threat, coupled with the lack of islands along the Italian coast, the large number of enemy FPBs, and the distances involved militates against the employment of NATO FPBs in that sea. This consideration may have influenced the Italian Navy in including so few such vessels in its composition.
Despite the lack of depth in some parts, NATO’s defense can be greatly strengthened, provided naval and naval air support operations of the land battle are assumed from island bases such as those on Crete and others in the Aegean, the defensive organization of which during peace-time is indispensable. The importance of such bases, for meeting the threat from the south also cannot be overemphasized.
During peacetime and periods of tension the naval forces of NATO should display the solidarity and determination of the alliance to react to every Soviet provocation or effort to undermine the positions and interests of the West.
The Objectives of NATO Naval Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea
The peacetime objectives of NATO’s naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea, based on the previously outlined NATO strategy and the Soviet Fleet’s deployment and objectives in the same area, can be summarized as:
► to contribute to the general deterrence by developing a high degree of readiness for both conventional and nuclear war and to be ready for immediate action during a crisis;
► to display NATO solidarity and power against the Russian political and strategic expansion in this area; and
► to maintain surveillance of the Russian Mediterranean and Black Sea fleets.
In case of limited scale hostilities in the area, the objectives will be nuclear deterrence, the control of this area, the protection of shipping, and the support of NATO’s southern sector land forces. In case of a full- scale war the naval forces will have as additional objectives the participation in nuclear attacks and the neutralization of the Warsaw Pact naval forces.
State and Tasks of NATO Naval Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea
The tasks of NATO’s naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean, derived from their objectives, include the execution of naval operations of all types. The state of these forces, in general, and their ability to perform their tasks varies according to the economic situations of the countries who own them.
The need to eliminate the threat posed by Soviet submarines and surface vessels as a prerequisite to the U. S. Sixth Fleet fulfilling its primary task, participation in the land-air battle, makes the latter task difficult indeed. Considerable assistance can, however, be provided toward this end by the naval forces of NATO countries in the Southern Region.
Geography in the Eastern Mediterranean favors the
of
enemy forces and facilitating their destruction; sud operations should take place, basically, in two at#5, first in the Black Sea exits and the Aegean islands, & second in the Sicilian Channel. Given that the Si*1^
Fleet must remain free to fulfill its main mission, an1
that the Turkish Navy is burdened with Black Sea na';l1 operations and the defense of the Straits, the defa1* of the previously mentioned areas becomes the chi£ responsibility of Hellenic and Italian naval forces.
execution of operations restricting the mobility
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Probably the Italian Navy is in a better position tha" the Hellenic Navy to undertake the task since it h1' a significant number of new ships and has develop^ a satisfactory program for modernizing and improve? old ones. The Hellenic Navy is making considerate efforts toward modernization by placing emphasis 0,1
FPB(G)S and modern submarines and escorts. In order to accomplish their tasks both the Italian and Hellenic naval forces should develop the necessary capability for mining and patrolling the passages and straits through which enemy vessels have to pass. To a great extent, mining requirements can be met by appropriate merchant vessels converted to minelayers. Destroyers and escort ships have to undertake such tasks as controlling domestic maritime routes, antisubmarine patrols in restricted areas, and support of land forces.
Several Hellenic ships need replacement or modernization; however, this, together with the limited number of ships available, would make the Hellenic Navy’s war task difficult indeed.
Maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters, and naval strike air from land bases would greatly aid the operations
of the Italian and Hellenic navies; both have fixed-wing ASW aircraft and the Italians have helicopters as well, manned jointly with the air force which has the administrative command, while the navy has operational control. The effectiveness of the airplanes, however, (especially the Hellenic ones) is adversely affected by age and small numbers, and replacement by more modern types is sought.
In addition, the obligation of the Allied air forces to support the land battle, that is, to provide close support to the land forces and cover simultaneously the general requirements of air-defense limit the availability of land-based strike aircraft for attacks on naval targets. Yet, if those aircraft do not make the attacks often, they will not be made at all, for both countries lack strike aircraft in their navies.
Apart from the amphibious possibilities of the Sixth Fleet, the Hellenic Navy, in particular, disposes of a considerable number of amphibious vessels. Despite the great age of these ships they can provide logistic support to land forces, and their ability to carry out amphibious operations can be considerably exploited when combined with the modern amphibious forces of the United States and, perhaps, Great Britain.
In the Black Sea, the Turkish Navy’s primary tasks should be the control of the Straits in cooperation with land and air forces and, at the same time (relying mainly on FPBs and submarines), the surveillance and control of the Black Sea facing the northern Turkish coast, in order to be able to react against a possible Soviet amphibious attack. The survival of destroyers (especially old ones) in the Black Sea is very doubtful, given that these ships are extremely vulnerable to air attacks, which will be intense.
The small size of the Turkish Navy (the main units are 14 old destroyers, 14 old submarines, and 11 FPBs),
A Soviet Krupny-class destroyer broad on the USS Forrcstal’s port quarter during flight operations on board the American carrier in the Mediterranean. Not only do the two ships represent rival fleets, they also represent rival concepts of what constitutes the most effective form of seapower. Interestingly, a number of Krupnys have had their surface-to-surface missiles replaced by surface-to-air weapons. In their new guise they are known to NATO as the Kanin class.
when posed against its main mission in the Black Sea and its additional commitments to ensure the supply of the Turkish forces in Thrace and to provide protection to Mediterranean traffic steaming to and from the Turkish ports, render highly improbable the simultaneous covering of all these tasks. Consequently it will be forced to concentrate its efforts upon the most crucial task, the protection of the approaches to the Straits. Its tasks elsewhere should be undertaken by other Allied naval forces. The development of maritime aviation, with ASW helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft for both ASW and strike could significantly improve the operational capabilities of the Turkish Navy. Presently that navy is acquiring a small number of helicopters and fixed-wing airplanes for the antisubmarine battle.
For the countries of NATO’s Southern Region, the ability to counter the threat of Soviet offensive minelaying is also of primary importance, and considerable efforts are being made to develop their numerically inadequate mine countermeasure forces.
It should be plain, however, that the success of naval operations in the advanced areas of the Aegean and the Black Sea will depend largely upon the ability of the Hellenic and Turkish air forces, reinforced by Allied aircraft and aided, as far as the situation might permit, by aircraft of the Sixth Fleet, to ensure air superiority or at least air balance in these areas for, not only are there many Soviet bloc air bases near the Black and northern Aegean seas, but also with the exception of a few Italian ships the warships of the NATO southern region countries lack the weapons necessary to repel attacks by modern aircraft and missiles.
Peacetime: In peacetime the Southern Region allied naval forces are kept in a high degree of readiness. Through constant NATO and national exercises the training standard is improving and both the national naval presence and NATO’s seapower are felt in the area. Simultaneously intelligence gathering and the readiness for quick reaction by both national naval forces and the NATO on-call force greatly contribute to the Alliance’s ability to match the Soviet naval presence and to counter Soviet efforts at expansion of their influence in the Mediterranean area.
In periods of tension it is of vital importance that the countries of the Southern Region and the Sixth Fleet intensify their surveillance effort.
Limited and General War
NATO naval forces must be ready in case of limited- scale hostilities to assist immediately and effectively all the land forces involved as well as to carry out naval operations for the control of the sea and the protection of the islands and bases situated therein, the surveillance
X,
of the enemy forces, the protection of Allied shipping, and the harassment or destruction of the enemy’s met' chant shipping.
Provided that naval superiority against the Russian* in the area of conflict is maintained and control of vital geographical positions assured, NATO should proceed with naval operations to divert the enemy’s land activities.
Should the initial conflict lead to a full-scale wat in addition to the above tasks, NATO naval forces mus1 gain and maintain control in the entire Mediterranean area. For this reason enemy warships either have to I* destroyed or restricted to closed areas such as the Black Sea, Adriatic Sea, or Aegean Sea, wherefrom any attempt to pass through strongly controlled points woukj result in their destruction by the combined efforts & the Allied navies, the Sixth Fleet included. The control and protection of Allied shipping, mine warfare, and amphibious operations must be among the tasks ol NATO naval forces. The successful and quick executio11 of these operations will permit the U. S. Sixth Fl#1 to accomplish its main mission.
Post-Nuclear Exchange Operations
After a general nuclear exchange it is probable rha[ only the naval forces will be able to survive as effect^ organizations. Hence, their main task will be to undertake supply operations to assist the land forces and the populations of the countries of the Southern Regi°fl' and to help re-establish order ashore. It will be necessaO for the naval forces to reconstruct themselves quick'' in order to ensure the control of the sea, for that be the only practicable route for the movement supplies and reinforcements both to the mainland to the islands.
NATO Command Structure
Within NATO, Italy, Greece, and Turkey form a d|5 tinct part of the Alliance, the Southern Region, und‘’f a unified commander (always an American adrrur;1 with headquarters in Naples. To the Command^ Southern Europe, report two subordinate commandcJ for land forces (one responsible for Italy with he3 quarters in Verona, the other responsible for and Turkey with headquarters in Izmir), two subofd nate commanders for naval forces (one of whom, Co1’’ mander Naval Striking Force Southern Europe n°! mally acts in his national capacity as Commander U Sixth Fleet); and one subordinate commander for,|f forces, with headquarters in Naples.
Under the Commander Naval Forces, five naval commanders, one submarine commander and one
time patrol aircraft commander exist. The two named control NATO’s submarine and maritime p:
planes in war and in exercises. This organization ensures common planning, preparation for war, and training of the forces of the three nations. The close collaboration between the commander of land forces in Southeastern Europe and the Commander Air Forces ensures the common planning and cooperation of the Hellenic and Turkish land and air forces responsible for the defense of the sensitive contact area between the two nations in Thrace. The organization of the naval forces ensures the coordination of all activities of Allied and national forces. A great part of the Italian and Hellenic naval forces and all of the Turkish are under their national commands for meeting national operational requirements mainly in the vicinity of their own countries. Thus, normally the Italian forces operate around Italy and in the Adriatic (MedCent Area), the Greek forces in the Aegean and Eastern Ionian (MedEast), and the Turkish ones in the Black Sea, the Sea of Marmara and the Turkish territorial waters (MedNorEast). All these forces also operate in the rest of the Eastern Mediterranean, which constitutes the fourth NavSouth area—MedSouEast.
Conclusions
► The U. S. effort to check Soviet infiltration and expansion.
► The jealousy of the underdeveloped countries towards the developed Western nations.
The long historical past of the Eastern Mediterranean peoples and the civilizations and religions developed in this area have created a loose but nonetheless real Mediterranean feeling. This, together with strong local traditions and national consciousness constitutes a restraining factor in the efforts of foreign powers to penetrate the area. It favors the development of close relations between the countries on the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean which will contribute in checking foreign infiltration.
The geographical configuration of the area is such that in case of war:
► The advance of the U.S.S.R. into the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Africa is blocked by the countries on the southern flank of NATO, provided these countries maintain control of the Turkish Straits, the Aegean Sea, and the Adriatic.
► The support of the fronts and the populations of NATO’s Southern Region countries depends basically on sea transport.
► The limited depth in the sensitive area of the Greek- Turkish border can be balanced by an appropriate use of the north Aegean Sea.
► In case the Turkish Straits are occupied by the Soviets, the exit of their Black Sea Fleet into the Eastern Mediterranean can be stopped by an appropriate defense based on the Aegean island chains.
► The NATO Southern Region countries dispose of successive defense lines, which make it possible to halt an attack from the north, provided effective naval support is assured. These defense lines permit NATO’s stand on the Mediterranean peninsulas even if Central Europe is occupied.
► Control of the islands and Eastern Mediterranean straits is essential for the successful conduct of open1' tions. From this point of view, Malta must not be permitted to come under Russian control, although small size and the possibility of its substitution by other NATO territories (such as Sicily, or even Pantelleria d the necessary infrastructure were developed) reduce ltS importance and put the emphasis on the political and psychological aspects of its loss.
► Operating conditions for surface warships are unfav'
orable because of adverse sonar conditions and the possibility of the enemy air force to cover the ate3 However, deep water and favorable weather condition5 facilitate the activity of the Sixth Fleet’s aircraft carrier- and large submarines. I
► Southern Russia is exposed to an attack by na'd
A Strategic Analysis of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea 147
forces operating in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Consequently, deployment of NATO forces with a nuclear capability, such as the U. S. Sixth Fleet (including modern submarines for the Black Sea), is of vital importance for the successful repulse of a Soviet attack.
► The Eastern Mediterranean allows the supporting of large- or small-scale operations in the Middle East and ensures NATO liaison with CENTO and SEATO.
The independent attitude of Yugoslavia and Albania reduces the Soviet Union’s chances for infiltration in the area. It is important to encourage these nations in their attitude, especially through increased economic, scientific, and cultural relations with the West, in order to offset the economic and political pressures from the Warsaw Pact. Furthermore, any future tendencies within the Soviet World towards independence should be similarly treated and exploited.
The economic and strategic importance of Greek and Italian northern territories as well as the Turkish straits impose the need for maintaining the integrity of these areas and the adoption of the forward defense strategic concept. Special efforts by the West in assisting the economic development of the Eastern Mediterranean countries—especially the Arab ones—will have a beneficial effect in checking Soviet infiltration and restoring confidence in the West. Wherever and whenever possible, the West must foster stability—e.g., settlement of the Cyprus crisis, establishment of progressive social measures—throughout the region. Arab nationalism and Islamism constitute powerful forces that should be harnessed in opposition to Communist infiltration.
The continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict constitutes the factor most favorable to Soviet infiltration in the Middle East, since it restrains all economic development in the area and perpetuates the wretched conditions of the Arab refugees, who, in turn, become the center of agitation. A settlement is equally essential to the West, to Israel, and to the Arabs. The reopening of the Canal, with its consequent direct and indirect financial advantages to Egypt and the other Middle Eastern countries and their development of an interest in keeping the Canal open, would be a major step in the right direction, and to the advantage of all.
Soviet capabilities are such that, for NATO it is essential not only to organize defenses and develop national forces in peacetime, but also to ensure the timely arrival of the reinforcements and logistic support indispensable for meeting the threat to the southern flank. No defense whatsoever can be organized without ensuring sea transportation.
The withdrawal of the U. S. and Soviet fleets from the Eastern Mediterranean would be in essence a unilat
eral withdrawal of the Sixth Fleet because of the great distance of its home bases as compared to those of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. Such an American withdrawal would provide the U.S.S.R. with a distinct strategic advantage in the Eastern Mediterranean, in addition to its adverse moral impact on the peoples of the area, which should be avoided.
Because the burden of both defensive and offensive operations in the Eastern Mediterranean will be borne by the Sixth Fleet and the navies of Greece, Italy, and Turkey, they should all be reinforced by modern ships, airplanes, and equipment. This is essential both for the successful conduct of the land and air battle and for the checking of the Soviet advance southward. The catastrophic consequences for NATO of an unchecked Soviet advance are obvious: the main oil supply routes to Europe will be cut, Central Europe will be outflanked, and the Soviet Union will reach the Atlantic through the Mediterranean.
In this respect, the control of the Eastern Mediterranean for at least the opening stages of a war can be assured if beforehand its southern coasts have not fallen under Soviet control. The prevention of that disastrous eventuality is, plainly, chiefly within the province, not of the warriors, but of the makers of foreign policy.
In spite of the Soviet Union’s successes in the Mediterranean and its land and air superiority against NATO’s Southern Region countries, the U.S.S.R. still suffers some disadvantages. Proper exploitation of these disadvantages—a weaker technological and industrial base than that of the West, a less attractive technological and cultural contribution than that of the West, a lack of sufficient military bases, and the cultural and religious heritage of the peoples in this area—will allow NATO in peacetime to stop the infiltration and in wartime to rebuff penetration of the Soviets in the East Mediterranean.
* be
eCo. "rt distance* and modest-sized ports of the Eastern Mediterranean make r*8ist 'C "ecess','es °fsuc^ small ships as the cargo ship Theseus of 1,988 gross Tr, w ^ to,,s. for the same reasons, in war, such ships will become military necessities, extent, their protection will be provided by other smalt ships, such as the ^'aiy 's new 255-ton Kimothoi. With her four Exocet surface-to-surface ttojn *' *ler two 21-inch torpedo tubes, and her four 35-rnm. rapid-fire guns in two rf , "'"‘"ts, this 36-knot warship can engage with confidence enemy ships n,0sl «*y size.
Summing up this analysis, we come to the following conclusions:
The Eastern Mediterranean is an area of supreme strategic importance because it is through the Mediterranean that the communications of the surrounding countries, with their supply sources and their markets, are assured, and through it passes the shortest route to the Middle East and potentially, to the Indian Ocean. The largest oil deposits of the world are located in the lands surrounding this sea and in the adjacent Middle East; moreover, the Mediterranean opens the way for the Soviet Union to reach the oceans, and makes possible its advance towards the Middle East and Africa.
The Eastern Mediterranean today assumes special significance, for it is located in the center of great pursuits and tendencies such as:
► The still vague conception of a Euro-Africa, which would be aimed first at developing an economic entity and, perhaps later, a political one.
► The Arab ambition to develop a political organization stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic.
► The Russian effort first to render the Eastern Mediterranean countries neutral and then to make them members of the Soviet world.
► The Russian-Chinese rivalry which sometimes leads one or the other to support extremist groups, attitudes, and policies which are harmful to the peoples of the region.