Seapower and the Smaller Nations

Throughout most of the Cold War, the U. S. Navy’s contribution to NATO’s naval forces has been roughly equal to the ham’s contribution to the ham sandwich. But, in this new era, which might be called the “Hot Peace,” such disproportionate naval strength does not make either good strategic or common sense.

Neither superpower can wage general war without facing unacceptable destruction. That is how it is and that is how it will remain for the foreseeable future. The era in which we live is fundamentally different from the previous era. The United States, for example, describes this nuclear balance as “the transition from confrontation to negotiation.” This is not to suggest that either superpower has come to like the other’s means or ends. The statement is simply an acceptance of the world as it is.

The Cold War, then, has given way to what might be called a “Hot Peace” since, it would seem, it is the rules of peace which must guide us in the future.

Such ringing rhetoric as “There is no substitute for military victory” is heard less often these days. It has been made obsolete by the realization that, with or without military means, a nation must strive for political victory—and must often settle for only social or economic victory.

Where, once, a nation’s freedom of action was determined by its physical capabilities, today the United States and the Soviet Union, the world’s most powerful countries, are much restricted in their freedom of action. Neither superpower can permit itself to allow the other to use any substantial amount of pressure against it without reciprocating. When this happens, a process of more or less automatic escalation is set in motion.

One way for the superpowers to compensate for the restricted freedom in their direct relations is for them to conduct their transactions through an allied nation that is not hampered by the burden of the deterrent—which is what the Soviet Union has been doing for some time. This may be the crux of the Nixon Doctrine. It is difficult for a great power to do business this way. But the United States must accept the fact that its strong arms—which once guaranteed the freedom of the Free World—have now been tied behind its back. A once-powerful America, which for so long offered substenance [sic] and security to its friends, must now look to those friends for some of its own security.

Obviously, this fundamental fact is greatly altering relations between the United States and its allies. Not only does it require the most powerful nation in the world to play the role of beneficiary, it also requires the smaller allied nations to adjust themselves to their own increased freedom of action; to develop their own conceptions and to accept the responsibility for them.

The Hot Peace environment has other consequences. One which follows almost mathematically from the overall restricted freedom of action pattern is that action is bound to gravitate toward the area where freedom of action has always been the greatest—on the high seas.

But, increased though the freedom of action of the small powers may be, it is not total. The superpowers are extremely reluctant to let other nations drag them into confrontation situations. One coiner of words has called this phenomenon an alliance against co-nonexistence.

What has evolved, then, in a world that might be characterized as bi-multipolar is really multipolar freedom under bipolar restrictions.[*]

Under these circumstances, a strong body of international law is needed now if chaos is to be prevented. And, in view of the importance of the sea as a future area of action, a strong body of international law of the sea is particularly needed. The development of the laws of the sea should be an integral part of a maritime strategy, especially for the Western Alliance, whose nations are so vitally dependent upon the sea.

Now that the stage is set upon which seapower is to operate, let us turn our attention to seapower itself.

Seapower is and always has been an instrument of peace. Therefore, war at sea meant that seapower had failed to function to its fullest extent. Maritime strategy is basically a peacetime strategy. It may have an annex—a war plan—to tell us what to do if the strategy fails and a war at sea erupts. But all too many of our navy departments seem to be filled to overflowing with these annexes, and the maritime strategy itself is often nowhere to be found.

What is seapower? It is almost sacrilegious to talk of seapower and not cite Alfred Thayer Mahan. “Seapower,” said Mahan, “is all that makes a people great upon the sea or by the sea”—great, we may safely presume, by gaining riches and influence. Riches and influence, however, have become dirty words; today we call them economics and politics. Thus, it might be more appropriate to say that: “Seapower is all that leads to economic and political progress upon the sea or by the sea.”

Economics involves trade, fishing, and resource extraction. Politics involves the conduct of foreign policy, for which the sea is either a means of communication or a power base. Basic to seapower and all its elements is the freedom of the sea. Without freedom of the sea, seapower loses its meaning. Overseas trade would be as restrictive as overland trade. Fishing would be as controlled as hunting; resource extraction as monitored as mining on land. The conduct of foreign policy would be the same as that across land borders and, instead of a means of foreign policy, the sea would become a subject of foreign policy. As we witness the problems of land borders and the enormous efforts by politicians, economists, and sociologists to overcome the restrictions imposed by land borders, we should all the more cherish the freedom of the sea and redouble our efforts to broaden the free use of the sea, rather than to restrict it.

What, then, is the role of seapower in all this? Mahan stated: “Naval strategy differs from military strategy in that it is as necessary in peace as in war,” and: “Naval strategy has indeed for its end to found, support and increase as well in peace as in war the seapower [this is all that leads to economic and political progress upon the sea or by the sea] of a country.”

Sir Peter Gretton observes that Mahan was able to prove that the thinkers on the continent [i.e., von Clausewitz, Jomini, etc.] had stopped short of the ultimate truths, because of their lack of appreciation of maritime matters.

Yet, we in the Western Alliance have failed to realize that naval strategy should be part of a maritime strategy and not of a military strategy.

Why? As mentioned earlier, one of the elements of seapower is the use of the sea as a power base; we have concentrated on this aspect. We have used our naval power as floating military land power, directed towards the Eurasian land mass. We could do so, because seapower had been a Western monopoly for centuries and, consequently, we could and did take the freedom of the sea for granted. It was only natural then, that we used this freedom to support our continental strategy.

But things have changed. Of all areas, the Eurasian land mass promises the least freedom of action.

Action will tend to shift to the high seas, but in this bi-multipolar world, with its dramatically changed freedom of action pattern, freedom of the sea is no longer a monopoly, nor can it be taken for granted. Thus, it is time for the Western Alliance to create a maritime strategy and a subsequent naval strategy, not as a preparation for war, but as a power for peace—a Hot Peace. Our maritime strategy should support seapower; our naval strategy ought to support the freedom of the sea.

The question of naval power should be how to ensure the freedom of the sea, preferably without the use of force. Only after this is decided should we consider the sea as a power base to peacefully project our power inland.

Freedom of the sea is based on two factors, law and power. These two are inseparable and in delicate balance. If the balance is disturbed, power turns into force; law disappears and force is all that is left. Law establishes the freedom of the sea, and power enables the freedom to be maintained despite many sovereign states considering themselves not as means to a common end. but as ends in themselves.

The paradox of seapower is that the balance is created for the freedom, and freedom causes an imbalance. Therefore, in the Hot Peace environment, the sea is the most attractive area of action for those who consider it their right to ignore law in the attainment of their objectives, exercising sovereign rights as an end in itself.

And, because this is so, naval power is a vital weapon in our total arsenal of seapower. It can be used, if necessary, to project our power across oceans and onto continents. But, of even more importance, it must support freedom of the seas—concentrating not so much on punishing the lawless as on preventing lawlessness.

In this sense, power is wielded by people who seek to influence other people—decision makers—to play the game by the rules. Whether the influence is a carrot or a stick does not alter the principle. This human relationship distinguishes power from force since the objective of force is to obtain goals without the decision of others.

In International Conflict for Beginners, Professor R. Fisher has stated: “Our job is to alter their perception of their choice, that they will decide in the way we prefer.” This is true. It is their perception of their choice we are after. We are not trying to provide them with our set of choices. With regard to force, Fisher states: “Inflicting pain upon an adversary government is likely to be a poor way of getting them to change their mind.” Power, however, is different in one important way from other means of influence in that, because it is capable of generating force, it is always easily identified with a threat of force.

It should be, however, the aspect or character of our power, as a potential source of force, rather than the implicit or explicit threat of force against the undesired decision, which brings about the required influence.

In International Politics, K. J. Holsti used the following example to illustrate power as a threat:

“Suppose an unarmed man walks into a bank and asks the clerk to give him all her money. The clerk observes clearly that the man has no weapons and refuses to comply with his order. The next time he walks in armed with a pistol and threatens to shoot if the clerk does not give him the money. This time the clerk complies.”

In this example, there is clearly the stated intention to inflict harm. Chances are, however, that if the man had not stated his intention to shoot, he would have obtained the money anyway because of the influence of the gun. Owing to the lack of freedom of action in the “bank environment” the difference between the intention of the man and the influence of the gun would be a technicality.

The freedom of action in the maritime environment, however, makes naval power particularly well suited as a means of influence without the implicit or explicit statement of the intention to inflict harm. This is what gives the expression, “naval presence” its specific meaning. It enables us to remain in complete control of the transformation of power into force. But it requires the careful planning of power. Too much power is just as bad, if not worse, than too little. Timing and positioning should be considered as well as the quality of power in terms of the influence desired.

Having discussed some principles regarding the future environment, seapower, and naval power, how does all this apply to the Western Alliance and what, in particular, will be the role for the smaller nation?

The present strategy of NATO is flexible response. This is basically a continental defensive strategy designed to ensure the territorial integrity of the member countries. The role of NATO’s seapower therein is to ensure the continued logistic support of the European continent.

In the Hot Peace environment, however, the chances for an extended European land war have become remote. Moreover, since it is hardly likely that the Soviets could force Europe to convert to Communism by cutting off its supplies rather than by physically occupying the continent, the serious disruption of the overseas supply of Europe also has become a remote possibility. Consequently, the logistic support role of NATO’s seapower in the style of World War II has greatly diminished.

The emergence of Soviet seapower in a multipurpose role—in an environment of Hot Peace with a changed freedom of action pattern—has given the Soviets new leverage for attaining limited political objectives by actions at sea. In the first place, there is the possible harassment of the West’s free use of the sea, to be carried out as a lever for political objectives. In the second place, the sea is an area par excellence for hurting one particular nation in the Alliance in such a way that other nations in the Alliance may not look upon it as aggression. Such action could drive a wedge between members of the Alliance.

All this could be achieved by Russian power even without the use of force, unless the Western Alliance is ready and willing to employ power to influence Russian decision-makers not to pursue such a line of action. This means the employment of power before the fact, not after. It means flexible initiative instead of flexible response. It requires, in the words of Andre Beaufre, a “strategy of action” in a deterrent role, whereas the continental strategy is more a pure deterrence strategy. Since the present strategy of flexible response is a deterrence strategy without further qualification, it seems to provide a roof for both strategies mentioned above, which is rather confusing.

If maritime strategy is to be more than mere support for the continental strategy, it is clear that it should be more than flexible response in the strict deterrent sense of its continental counterpart. The term “flexible initiative,” of which flexible response is a part, seems to be a more appropriate term. It should be understood, however, that in this context flexible initiative is a power strategy, while flexible response as a part of it is a force strategy, to be used if power fails. Furthermore, flexible initiative is a peace strategy, while flexible response is a (limited) war strategy.

On a limited and incidental scale, this maritime strategy is already underway, as demonstrated by the Standing Naval Force Atlantic and multinational surveillance operations. There does not seem to be, however, any implementation on an overall plan. The “wait for the blow and support Europe” strategy, based on total enemy capabilities rather than on enemy possibilities, still seems to be predominant.

The overall implementation of the strategy will not be easily achieved. The main problem will be the fact that the strategy cannot be kept within geographic borders, but is necessarily oriented towards the maintenance of the freedom of the sea wherever this is required. Notwithstanding the fact that this freedom is beneficial to virtually all members of the Alliance, it seems that public understanding of the principles involved is not such that political support for deployment of Allied naval forces beyond the NATO area will be easily achieved. For that matter, the NATO defense system is still too much oriented towards the direct defense of the territory of the homeland. It seems, however, that the fact that the area off Greenland is just as much—or just as little—connected to the homeland defense as the area off the Cape of Good Hope, can hardly have slipped the minds of politicians. But the problem lies much deeper.

The problem is that Europe is simply not willing to regain global responsibilities and even less willing to share global responsibilities with the United States. This is global responsibility in a continental style, whereby seapower is of the floating land power variety. And it seems to be difficult to divorce U. S. obligations outside the NATO area from an Allied global maritime strategy involving the participation of U. S. naval forces, just as it seems difficult to view naval power to be of any other kind than floating land power.

What seems to be most needed is the deployment of multinational naval power, not necessarily including U. S. units and not necessarily based on U. S. initiative. In The Troubled Partnership, Dr. Henry Kissinger wrote: “Throughout much of the postwar period the policy of our European allies has consisted essentially in influencing American decisions, rather than developing conceptions of their own.”

This is no longer true or, at least, it should no longer be true. Maintaining the mission along principles outlined earlier, there is no reason not to orient the participation along requirements of regional deployment. The question should not only be who is willing to serve, but also who can best serve for the particular contingency in terms of mission objectives and requirements of Allied execution. Along these lines it seems feasible to organize—within the overall mission—multinational squadrons for deployment outside the NATO area, covered by multinational agreement. Multinational agreements within the Alliance are not a new phenomena [sic]. They have operated within the overall strategy of the Alliance and have not complemented the concept of Allied solidarity.

Another problem is that of the action by the adversary upon which Allied concerted counteraction can and will take place. It would be unrealistic to assume that flexible response could be applied by the Alliance to any action of the adversary. The strategy is set in motion only if the adversary’s action is of such a nature that it warrants a concerted riposte as viewed by all the members of the Alliance. The level of adversary action to which the strategy of flexible response actually responds cannot be too low, or it would have a war-provoking rather than a war-preventing effect. In this, the concerted counteraction as such is an act of escalation.

On the continent, the territorial integrity of any of the member nations is easily ascertained and the picture is always in focus. Regarding the nation’s maritime interests, however, the picture is considerably more confused. The Alliance may be willing to go to war if but one square mile of West German territory is overrun by the Soviets. But is it prepared to fight if ten West German merchant ships are sunk? 0r twenty? Perhaps war will not result unless one hundred of them are sunk.

All this means that, below the level upon which the Alliance is willing or able to react in concert, nations must be capable of deploying power on a national basis. In the Hot Peace maritime environment this level can be very high indeed for a particular nation. This means, in effect, that national naval forces should be of a harmonious composition so as to be able to meet all contingencies which require handling on a national level. Specialization within the Alliance may be suitable for pure deterrent military forces, and it may be less expensive. Concerning the naval forces, however, it is not in the interest of the nations concerned. Moreover, such specialization would provide the Soviets with freedom of action in this area of national reaction and it may subsequently force the Alliance into early concerted reaction. Consequently, specialization is not in the interest of the Alliance, either.

This necessity for national maritime capability within the overall Allied strategy, however, intensifies dangers for the Alliance. Its members may get involved, involuntarily, in the affairs of overreacting nations. In the past, this was prevented by the dominant role of the United States in the Alliance and the reaction of the other members thereto.

Today, however, owing to their greater freedom of action, smaller nations within the Alliance may very well develop conceptions on their own. In fact, they should do so in the maritime field in order to meet contingencies below the concerted flexible response level, and to play their part in the overall strategy. What is needed, then, is a strengthening of what von Riekhoff calls “NATO’s internal stabilization mechanism.” Von Riekhoff relates this to general political and military matters, which are not our present concern. It seems, however, that creating such mechanisms in the maritime field will be of particular importance.

Within the present organizational frame this can be done by creating a Maritime Committee, if necessary, containing several subcommittees, incorporating advisory, planning, and consultative functions. Such a committee could devise the overall strategic framework wherein multinational or national groups are to operate, whereupon the consultative function provides a feedback for the internal stabilization. On a basis of combined planning and consultation, then, the maritime strategy can provide common goals, to be pursued nationally, multinationally, or by the Alliance as a whole. Close liaison can be maintained between the maritime strategy and the continental military strategy but, basically, the two strategies are not the same. At the same time, the maritime committee could act as a sounding board to obtain concensus [sic] on the consolidation of the laws of the sea and pursue its promotion, which is an integral part of the maritime strategy.

Finally, the question of hardware remains to be answered. Already the considered concept of power points in the direction of versatile multipurpose units, providing a wide range of force characteristics, rather than large striking power within each unit. The requirement to keep the quantity of force down calls for high quality personnel and equipment. The number of required units are to be determined by the required dispersion of power rather than by considerations of total Soviet capabilities. For each contingency, the particular force structure is to be governed by explosion-level considerations and the required field of influence. In this pattern, the small nations can and should provide the range of required quality, especially in those cases where the United States is contaminated by the burden of its nuclear deterrent and its continental involvement. Furthermore, small nations should play their part on a national level below the operating sphere of concerted Allied response.

Translation of the above principles into ships, aircraft, and personnel requires a more elaborate study than is possible within the scope of this paper. It is clear, however, that the requirements are beyond the means of smaller countries on an individual basis. It is even questionable if large nations could support the burden. It seems, however, that much can be done by pooling resources within the Alliance. Cooperation on training, research and development, industrial planning, production and evaluation has taken place in the past. However, this cooperation has been on incidental projects on a rather small scale and seems to have been guided by political-economic national interests rather than by operational necessities, which by nature yield a less tangible gain in terms of national interest. Walter Schutze’s study, “European Defence Cooperation and NATO,” is revealing in this respect and shows a number of ways to correct a deficient situation. Schutze suggests that, in this field, there is much room for a concerted effort by the Alliance. It could very well be that such a concerted approach could assist in redefining the Alliance’s efforts in a positive way.

But, one danger will probably remain. Raymond Aron defined it:

“The danger is that all Allies, repeating the same rationale—I am doing little disservice to the common interest but I am doing great service to my own—might end by the enemy’s victory.”

Let history not say that the Western Alliance was incapable of recognizing and averting this danger.

__________

Commander Binnendijk graduated from the Royal Netherlands Naval Academy in 1950. After a short term in submarines, he underwent flight training in Pensacola, Florida, and Kingsville, Texas, and qualified as a naval aviator in November 1952. He served in numerous billets in naval aviation, both ashore and embarked, alternated by tours of sea duty as ASW officer and XO in destroyers. A graduate of the Netherlands Naval Staff College, the National Security Management Course at the U. S. Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the Naval Command College at the U. S. Naval War College, he is at present commanding officer of HNMS Zeeland (D-809).