The Combat Stevedores
By Commander Frank S. Virden, Supply Corps, U. S. Navy, Former Commanding Officer, U. S. Navy Cargo Handling and Port Group
Another crisis begins in the Middle East, and the U. S. Sixth Fleet shifts to the eastern part of the Mediterranean. A third aircraft carrier hurriedly joins this force. Behind the scene of this urgent activity, logistics planners begin the involved task of re-routing and expanding the vital pipeline of supply.
At Souda Bay, on the island of Crete, a small detachment of sailors manning a tiny airstrip suddenly finds itself running a major terminal. One after another, Air Force cargo jets touch down to disgorge tons of freight essential to the operation and defense of the great Fleet steaming nearby. Without help for this detachment, the cargo-handling load will soon become too great, and high priority goods will be delayed, or perhaps mis-routed and lost in the confusion.
In Norfolk, the Commander, Service Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, is informed of the situation, and a member of his staff quickly places a phone call to Williamsburg, 40 miles away. “How soon can you be ready?” he asks. “We are ready,” is the reply.
A few hours later, at the Norfolk Naval Air Station, 22 men, clad in utility greens decorated at the neck with bright orange dickies, file into a C-141, which they have just helped to load. The next day will find them hard at work on Crete. In the following three weeks, they will handle almost 2.5 million pounds of sea and airborne cargo, sort and stage it, and load it in carrier onboard delivery (COD), aircraft bound for the Fleet.
And the men who accomplish this task? They are Combat Stevedores, a group that is relatively little-known even to the Navymen who become urgently dependent upon their services during periods of crisis and emergency operations.
As the occasion warrants, a detachment can be found in Naples, at Guantanamo Bay, in the Antarctic, and at Diego Garcia. At their Williamsburg headquarters, two more detachments train and prepare for further operations with the Fleet. No two of their assignments are quite the same, but the consistent effectiveness of their effort warrant a closer look at their operations.
What is a stevedore? Narrowly defined, he is a person employed in the loading or unloading of ships, or a longshoreman. But in recent years, the term has come to refer to the man who organizes and carries out the many functions necessary to move freight safely and effectively through land, sea, and air cargo terminals. Add to this the ability to deploy, anywhere, on call, to perform, with austere facilities, under the most rigorous conditions, and you have the Navy Combat Stevedore.
The parent command is the U. S Navy Cargo Handling and Port Group (NavCHAPGru), formed on 1 December 1970 as a mobile logistic support unit of the Service Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet. The NavCHAPGru is the Navy’s only active mobile stevedoring command, and is assigned a worldwide mission to provide supervisory cargo handling, terminal operations, and port control services in support of Navy and Marine Corps expeditionary movements. The unit is self-sustaining and can deploy in force; but peacetime missions are normally carried out by detachments of ten to 50 men.
The basic purpose of the NavCHAPGru is to support amphibious assault, and its usefulness lies in the need to use merchant shipping for such operations. The Navy’s commissioned force of amphibious ships is not, by itself, sufficient to place ashore all of the massive amounts of material required to sustain a major invasion. The Military Sealift Command (MSC) has to make up the difference with whatever ships it can get.
In terms of military utility, there is one important difference between amphibious force vessels and commercial-type ships. Amphibious ships are especially configured, loaded, and manned to discharge their cargo without outside assistance. Merchant ships are not. They can employ crew members to man their rigging for brief cargo operations in emergencies; but this procedure would be slow and inefficient as a routine. Consequently, merchant ships require stevedores at each port to handle loading and discharge.
One of the many seemingly-obvious lessons learned during World War II, particularly in the Pacific island-hopping campaign, was that considerable proficiency, organization, and teamwork are required for effective loading and discharge of marine cargo. It has been said that everyone is a cargo handler, but not everyone is a skilled cargo handler. Loading out a general cargo ship just is not the same as packing the family station wagon; and mishandling of the job can result in extremely expensive confusion and loss. Effective cargo handling means, of course, that minimal damage and loss of cargo is experienced, and that fast turnaround of cargo vessels is permitted.
In combat zones, such effectiveness is critical, particularly because of the multiplier effect attending poor performance. When cargo is unnecessarily lost or rendered useless by inept stevedoring, it must be replaced by additional shipments. When cargo operations move too slowly, ships must spend excessive time in hazardous forward areas, thereby making fewer round trips. Both factors increase the load on already overburdened shipping capacity, decreasing pipeline effectiveness and perhaps critically affecting results in battle.
As one might assume, reliable stevedore service from indigenous sources is seldom available during amphibious assault. Someone else has to move our cargo ashore. This role was performed during World War II by several kinds of units under command of both Supply Corps and Civil Engineer Corps officers. These units were later demobilized. With the need still apparent, however, in 1949 the Chief of Naval Operations established the Naval Cargo Handling Battalions, of which from one to five were kept active for the next 21 years. These were supplemented by four contingency nucleus port crews, manned on an additional duty basis by designated continental United States (ConUS) shore duty personnel. Two cargo-handling battalions and one nucleus port crew were temporarily joined together in 1965 to establish the marine terminal at DaNang. The success of that effort eventually led to a reorganization, wherein their manning and functions were all combined to create the NavCHAPGru.
In peacetime, the NavCHAPGru is a cadre organization, manned on an austere basis, as shown in Figure 1. Full capability to provide stevedoring support would demand a large pool of unskilled personnel to perform “strongback” labor. Since this manpower requirement exists only during actual cargo operations, and varies from one kind of cargo to another, the NavCHAPGru has been limited to maintaining technical and supervisory skills. Strongback labor is drawn ad hoc from supported units, and is returned thereto after the job is done.
Figure 1
NavCHAPGru Incremental Manning
| Peacetime | First | Eastern | Western | Full |
Officers | 9 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 20 |
Enlisted | 275 | 189 | 308 | 308 | 1,080 |
Permanent Total | 284 | 198 | 309 | 309 | 1,100 |
Maximum strongbacks | 148* | 116 | 116 | 116 | 348 |
Temporary Total | 432 | 314 | 425 | 425 | 1,448 |
Maximum capability | Cargo terminal for | Add | Add | Cargo terminal | |
* In lieu of first increment only.
As a further concession to economy, active manning is kept at the bare strength necessary to keep the organization capable of required peacetime missions and minimum quick reaction to war emergency. This is possible because the unit can be quickly expanded to full strength through a three-increment augmentation force, consisting of active duty personnel serving elsewhere in the United States on routine shore assignments. Men of this force are designated and trained in advance, and are therefore able to report immediately when directed by the CNO.
Fully-manned and deployed, the NavCHAPGru constitutes an extensive combat cargo terminal. It is first of all capable of exercising maritime port control, including coordination of pilotage, tug, and lighterage services, ship berthing, and harbor area tactical communications. Secondly, it provides around-the-clock stevedore servicing of up to three general cargo ships at a time, and provides any nearby and related terminal services required for moving cargo by land or air.
When employed directly over the beach, the NavCHAPGru initially is used to off-load merchant shipping into lighterage in the objective area, while shoreside materials handling is managed by the Navy’ beach group commander and the Marine shore party battalion. Then, once the shore party battalion leaves the beachhead, the NavCHAPGru moves ashore to establish a temporary cargo terminal.
The NavCHAPGru is primarily designed, however, to move cargo through established port facilities, whatever their state of repair. When such facilities are not available, operations can be conducted at unimproved sites, improvising with organic equipment and whatever other resources can be obtained locally either from other military units or by contract. The U. S. Navy Cargo Handling and Port Group has a significant minor construction capability for erecting its own tent city and establishing outdoor cargo staging areas, and is further equipped with light infantry weapons for limited self-defense.
As in any military command, training is vital to readiness. Few men, rated or not, report to the NavCHAPGru fully-prepared to deploy. Even senior boatswain’s mates normally require some instruction in rigging and cargo-handling techniques. Furthermore, the steady turnover of personnel generates continuing attention to proficiency of the augmentation force, whose members receive one month’s indoctrination prior to reporting to their regular shore duty. For these reasons, the NavCHAPGru conducts a regular schedule of organic training courses lasting from two to six weeks. These cover marlinspike seamanship, principles of cargo handling, terminal operations procedures, cargo documentation, air cargo handling, marksmanship and defensive field tactics, and operation of cargo rigs and materials handling equipment on board a full-size school ship, the ex-MS Cape Fairweather.
Ordinarily, each class has room for additional trainees. Such spaces are made available to personnel of other Fleet units and occasional shore activities. Recently, the newly-activated Naval Reserve Cargo Handling Battalions Program also began to take advantage of this special opportunity for the special training of all of its personnel.
Once a new member of the NavCHAPGru has received his basic instruction, he is assigned to a hatch team. There, he puts his lessons to work, demonstrating familiarity with nomenclature, safety procedures, and basic cargo handling routines. When considered qualified to assist in supervision over unskilled laborers, he is designated a stevedore. Through successive training and experience, he can qualify as forklift operator, signalman, winchman, hold boss, hatch captain, and finally, a ship supervisor. Each of these achievements is noted in his service record, to assure recognition of his skills at future duty stations.
The NavCHAPGru’s professional capabilities, experience with formal training programs, and administrative organization make the Group unusually well-suited to assist in a current program to increase Atlantic Elect usage of the standard tensioned replenishment alongside method (STREAM) of transferring cargo while underway. STREAM is vastly safer and faster than the conventional Burton or housefall methods of connected replenishment. But difficulties in training personnel in operation and preventive maintenance of equipment have greatly inhibited its use.
To solve the problem, a mobile training team was formed to go on board both delivery and customer ships to instruct in use of the STREAM system. Composed of senior boatswain’s mates, machinist’s mates, and electrician’s mates, the Navy Cargo Handling and Port Detachment Bravo (NavCHAPDet Bravo), now regularly rides the Fleet, and also conducts week-long courses each month at both Norfolk and Davisville, Rhode Island. Its success at improving Atlantic Fleet STREAM professionalism has been impressive.
Full unit deployments are rare, since, short of war, there is seldom need for the NavCHAPGru’s full capabilities in a single location. Highest in priority is maintenance of emergency reaction detachments, capable of deployment to trouble spots within a few hours of alert. The NavCHAPDet Charlie is available as a cadre which can be flown in to provide managerial, clerical, and technical skills to develop and operate a temporary air or surface cargo terminal.
An additional ready detachment consists of two supervisory cargo-handling hatch teams. The two ready detachments can be immediately deployed separately or as a combined unit, depending on the circumstances. After two or three months in stand-by, ready detachments normally deploy for scheduled missions, while new detachments assume alert status.
Most sought after is an assignment to NavCHAPDet Echo, which, yearly, visits “The Ice” to participate in Operation Deep Freeze, the great scientific exploration of Antarctica. General cargo resupply for this effort is delivered late in the austral summer by two Military Sealift Command ships. Their visits to Palmer and McMurdo Stations, just a few hundred miles from the South Pole, present a difficult and hazardous stevedoring challenge of primitive facilities, bitter subzero weather, and the annual race against the sunset of the long Antarctic night.
A recent mission that illustrates the NavCHAPGru versatility was support of Project Reindeer Station, the construction of a naval communication facility on the island of Diego Garcia, lying almost dead center in the Indian Ocean. Here, in early 1971, the NavCHAPDet Golf, consisting of 43 men, discharged the first four merchant ships delivering heavy equipment, vehicles, supplies, and construction materials required for Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB) 40 to begin work. Upon completion of this, they were relieved by the NavCHAPDet Zulu, a 16-man cadre of supervisory and technical specialists, augmented by island personnel as needed.
Until April of this year, when relieved by permanent station personnel trained at NavCHAPGru headquarters, Det Zulu was responsible for loading and discharge of ships, movement of material over the beach, loading and discharge of air cargo, and with operation and maintenance of lighterage, as well as all other port control functions.
The mobile logistic support role of the NavCHAPGru has carried its combat stevedores worldwide, where they have won consistent recognition for their willing spirit and expert professionalism. But what of their usefulness tomorrow, with the growth of automation in transportation of goods?
There is no question that rapid development of bigger boxes for commercial cargo, whether represented by container or barge carrying ships, is shouldering out the once ubiquitous yard-and-stay/jumbo-rigged, break-bulk general cargo carrier. From the standpoint of support to amphibious assault, this is unfortunate. Non-selfsustaining ships and 20-foot containers present enormous difficulties in over-the-beach cargo movement, especially when heavy lift capabilities must be ferried in by invasion forces. Nevertheless, we have to learn to cope with it. The likelihood is remote that sufficient numbers of the more useful break-bulk ships will be in service a few years from now.
In 1970, the Army conducted a major exercise in over-the-shore discharge of containerships (OSDOC) to test the feasibility of different techniques in moving containers from ship-to-shore, and over the sand. They found it is not easy, but it can be done.
Late this year, OSDOC II will be conducted as a joint Army-Navy project to evaluate further container handling problems. This time, both underway replenishment and amphibious landing procedures will be tried. Along with Beach Group Two and several other units, the NavCHAPGru will play a significant role in these events, from which the Army hopes to write the textbook for future logistics over the shore. No doubt the lessons learned will have considerable effect on Navy planning as well.
Yet, some things are already clear. Commercial ships, however equipped, will continue to sail with minimum steaming crews, and will continue to need stevedores in port. Cargo in containers or barges will still have to be unloaded, sorted, staged, and accurately distributed. Retrograde cargo will still pile up, and require shipping to the rear. New technology may certainly change the structure and skills of the NavCHAPGru. As long as we count on our merchant fleet as potential for support of military operations, however, the Combat Stevedores will form an important element of our Navy’s unusual capacity to project seapower in defense of American interests, anytime, anywhere such seapower may be needed, around the world.
NROTC—A Quality Education?
By Commander N. T. Hansen, U. S. Navy, Executive Officer, and Associate Professor of Naval Science, NROTC Unit, University of Nebraska
While in recent years, the Reserve Officer Training Corps presence on campus has been a matter of great general interest and, in many cases, dispute, little attention has been given to the opinions and attitudes of those students who have sought to obtain an ROTC education. The dissident voice arises from the ranks of the non-ROTC affiliated students with some minor support from the ultra-liberal faculty. This same dissident opinion favors freedom of academic choice, while denying that same freedom of choice to the student who wants to pursue a military education at a civilian institution.
The dissident argument further decries that the ROTC provides instruction not education, that verbatim recall of subject matter in “how-to-do-it” subjects is required of the ROTC student, and further, that the level of teaching is somehow substandard, because the ROTC faculty members do not, in general, possess a sufficiency of Ph.D.s or even master’s degrees.
At the University of Nebraska, the Department of Naval Science conducted a broad survey of all students enrolled in the Navy, Army, and Air Force ROTC units at that University. The format of the survey coincided with a survey conducted among 4,000 civilian junior college students by the American College Testing Program of Iowa City, Iowa, in 1967, as described in their Research Report Number 28.
In broad terms, this survey was conducted to find answers to the following questions:
(1) Are the experience and professional abilities of military teachers assigned to ROTC departments comparable with teachers in the two-year college?
(2) Are existing ROTC teaching methods in consonance with established civilian methods and objectives?
After soliciting replies from 458 students, the findings of the survey were broadly categorized as “Teaching Practices” and “Student Evaluation of ROTC Faculty.”
The ROTC student opinions concerning the teaching practices employed by the ROTC units are shown in Table 1.
Table 1
Percentage of students indicating each Teaching Practice
is characteristic of their instructors
Question | Navy | Air | Army | ACT | ROTC |
1. Examinations emphasize recall of | 96.0 | 83.8 | 86.5 | 94.8 | 90.4 |
2. Instructors are most concerned with conveying specific information about their subject matter. | 82.0 | 71.4 | 81.0 | 84.6 | 78.6 |
3. Assignments are designed to give students a thorough knowledge of the facts about the subject. | 70.6 | 85.2 | 92.2 | 87.1 | 82.0 |
4. Lectures place a great deal of emphasis on specific details. | 490 | 36.5 | 55.0 | 72.1 | 47.5 |
5. In many cases it is hard for a student to know how well he is | 35.7 | 38.0 | 24.8 | 23.3 | 32.3 |
6. There is some time given to student discussion in almost every class period. | 64.2 | 67.0 | 66.4 | 75.2 | 65.4 |
7. Instructors do not encourage questions from the class. | 10.1 | 7.5 | 15.5 | 10.4 | 11.0 |
8. The instructors seem to be concerned with keeping up with the latest developments in their own field. | 61.5 | 73.0 | 84.2 | 92.2 | 72.4 |
9. Assignments are designed to give the students an understanding of the current state of the field. | 73.5 | 89.5 | 84.3 | 83.1 | 81.8 |
10. Instructors really seem to like their students. | 80.0 | 88.0 | 82.0 | 90.6 | 82.5 |
11. Instructors want each student to consider his own set of values and outlook. | 54.0 | 78.8 | 70.1 | 79.7 | 66.3 |
12. Questions on exams often ask students to contrast two or more views of given topics. | 20.4 | 36.4 | 28.2 | 49.6 | 27.0 |
13. The instructors try to teach students methods of gathering and evaluating information in their field. | 56.2 | 67.0 | 74.2 | 71.9 | 65.0 |
14. Instructors try to tell each student clearly how well he is doing, and how well he has met their expectations. | 49.1 | 44.0 | 70.0 | 32.5 | 54.8 |
15. Student participation is an important part of most class work. | 62.8 | 74.3 | 74.0 | 62.6 | 65.7 |
(Average percentage of students replying affirmatively to the statement). Recall of specific facts is emphasized in the ROTC, but to a lesser degree than reported for civilian undergraduates. Instructors are shown to be concerned with keeping up with the latest developments in their field, more so in the Army ROTC than in the Navy ROTC. This is probably due to the fact that Army officers tend to specialize, whereas the Navy officer is more prone to general service line duties. It can be clearly seen that ROTC instructors may be classed as friendly to their students but not on a social level, that both instructor and student dearly understand what is expected in the course, and finally, that the teaching standards are at least as high as that practiced by civilian faculty, and in some areas higher.
The ROTC students evaluated the ROTC faculties as shown in Table 2. Ratings range from “extremely inadequate” through “extremely capable.” Replies indicate percentages of students choosing each rating factor. Students rated 97.6% of ROTC instructors capable or higher in the area of knowledge of subject matter. As counselors, the ROTC instructor fared significantly better than his civilian counterpart—93.3% of the ROTC instructors were rated capable or higher as counselors, whereas in the junior college, this rating was only indicated as 81.6% of the time.
Table 2
Student Evaluation of ROTC Faculty
| Extremely | Fairly | Capable | Very | Extremely |
1. Knowledge of their |
|
|
|
|
|
Navy ROTC | 1.2 | 4.1 | 28.6 | 36.7 | 29.4 |
Air Force ROTC | -0- | -0- | 9.1 | 21.3 | 69.6 |
Army ROTC | 1.0 | 1.0 | 3.0 | 25.0 | 70.0 |
ACT | 0.6 | 11.2 | 60.2 | 25.0 | |
2. Overall ability |
|
|
|
|
|
Navy ROTC | 1.2 | 12.0 | 35.8 | 39.7 | 11.3 |
Air Force ROTC | -0- | 7.6 | 10.6 | 50.0 | 31.8 |
Army ROTC | 4.0 | 7.0 | 19.0 | 47.0 | 22.0 |
ACT | 1.8 | 24.2 | 60.5 | 10.5 | |
3. Ability as counselors |
|
|
|
|
|
Navy ROTC | 2.4 | 11.2 | 33.7 | 30.7 | 22.0 |
Air Force ROTC | -0- | 4.5 | 12.1 | 51.8 | 31.6 |
Army ROTC | 3.0 | 9.0 | 23.0 | 43.0 | 22.0 |
ACT | 14.8 | 37.9 | 33.7 | 10.0 | |
4. Ability to stimulate |
|
|
|
|
|
Navy ROTC | 3.1 | 12.0 | 44.0 | 30.7 | 10.2 |
Air Force ROTC | -0- | 6.0 | 25.8 | 44.0 | 24.2 |
Army ROTC | 3.0 | 12.0 | 32.0 | 39.0 | 14.0 |
ACT | 6.7 | 38.0 | 41.5 | 9.8 | |
5. Ability to make subjects |
|
|
|
|
|
Navy ROTC | 2.5 | 5.0 | 39.0 | 33.7 | 19.8 |
Air Force ROTC | 1.5 | 6.0 | 25.8 | 24.3 | 42.4 |
Army ROTC | 6.0 | 8.0 | 25.0 | 33.0 | 28.0 |
ACT | 5.2 | 36.6 | 44.3 | 10.6 | |
A comparison of the civilian ACT data and the ROTC averages provided in Table 2 show a strong agreement, particularly when ratings of capable and higher are grouped for comparison. Students in the ROTC at this University do feel they are receiving professional instruction and equate this instruction favorably with that received from their civilian instructors. With minor exception, the ROTC data can be closely compared to the ACT data. The ROTC teaching methods are in consonance with civilian teaching methods and, to a small degree, are less restrictive. The ROTC instruction is more personal and less formalized than would be expected by laymen. This is probably due to the renovations and pressures placed upon the various ROTC units over the past two years.
In general, it is concluded that the quality of the ROTC instruction and instructional staff, at the University of Nebraska, at least, is equal to that existing among their civilian counterparts. From this, it can be clearly inferred that there is no educational basis for criticism of the Reserve Officer Training Corps across the board.
The Changing Role of the Officer of the Deck
By Commander Nicholas Brown, U. S. Navy, Former Executive officer, USS Jouett (DLG-29)
“The Officer of the Deck is the officer on watch in charge of the ship.”
By this bold statement, Navy Regulations gives legal formulation to one of the oldest and most time-tested traditions of the sea. Qualification as officer of the deck is a milestone of the greatest importance in a young line officer’s career. Fitness reports remark on it; certain school programs require it. Yet, in a growing number of our combatant ships operating in a hostile environment, the officer of the deck is no longer in complete charge of the ship. Indeed, he may find the ship involved in a remote tactical engagement which leaves him in control of neither the engagement nor the ship’s response to it. Accordingly, a portion of both his responsibility and authority has been transferred away from him, to be assumed, usually, by the watch officer in the combat information center (CIC).
Why has this happened? Is this change legal? What is coming next? It is the burden of this Professional Note to offer answers to these questions.
Since World War II, the air and subsurface threats to a naval force have changed significantly. Today, a missile launched well beyond the horizon is upon a ship with virtually no advanced warning. To survive, the ship must take the decision to operate her electronic countermeasures and launch her own defensive weapons in a matter of seconds. The smallest delay may prove fatal. As defense in depth is the basis of the task formations currently employed, complex voice radio networks have been supplemented by computerized tactical data systems and automated target displays. For the modern escort on picket duty, the bridge is no longer adequately equipped or staffed to serve as the command center. Too much data must be kept current, too many voice circuits must be guarded by too many people for this to be accomplished within the confines of the bridges now constructed, or even projected.
This fact has been recognized in our newer ships, and the modular CIC has been constructed to allow for a “display and decision” module. The total contact picture is centralized here, as well as virtually all of the voice radio circuits, whether or not the ship is equipped with the naval tactical data system (NTDS). For the DLG assigned to the positive identification radar advisory zone (PIRAZ) station in the Tonkin Gulf, for example, an average of anywhere from ten to 100 air contacts are monitored constantly, air controllers work around the clock, over a dozen radio circuits are guarded, and direct liaison with the weapons watch officer is maintained. For the FRAM 1 destroyer, cruising alongside the DLG as “shotgun,” the situation differs in detail only. Contacts are plotted manually from data received over Link 14 teletype, and air controllers are not normally employed; but in the complex tactical picture of the Tonkin Gulf, the evaluation of—and response to—each new threat as it arises must be made as quickly and surely as on the larger DLG. Can the OOD do this? No, not if he is to maintain his watch station on the bridge.
Navy Regulations state “. . . the station of an officer in charge of a watch shall be where he can best perform the duties assigned to him and can effectively supervise and control the performance of duties assigned to those on watch under him.” Basis is thereby given commanding officers to post their officers of the deck in CIC. To do so, however, would run counter to the hallowed tradition that the officer of the deck controls the actual movements of the ship by holding the conn. Further, there are numerous duties assigned the officer of the deck which he can best perform from the bridge. Visual navigation, supervising ship’s routine, maintaining security, and, especially, avoiding collision—these are all inherently bridge functions.
What is required, therefore, is two watch officers, each of exceptional maturity and experience, each with differing responsibilities, that nevertheless require the closest coordination. The power of decision no longer rests uniquely with the officer of the deck, as it has done for so many years in so many navies. It must now be divided, at least in certain types of ships on certain missions.
Virtually every DLG, and an increasing number of other escort types, when operating in an environment such as Yankee Station, post the most experienced watch officer in CIC calling him variously the “evaluator” or the “command duty officer.” The next most experienced officer stands his watch on the bridge as officer of the deck. Other officers may also be posted as junior officer of the deck, surface watch officer, ship weapons coordinator (or air watch officer), and so forth.
In this arrangement, the division of responsibility between the officer of the deck and the evaluator can be classified in over-simplified terms as “local” versus “remote.” The officer of the deck retains complete responsibility directly to the commanding officer for orders to the helm, control of the engineering plant, ship’s routine, visual communications, navigation, writing the deck log, and as the safety observer in a multi-ship ASW action.
The evaluator is primarily concerned with the way the ship relates to the remote or tactical situation. He monitors the threat picture—air, surface, and subsurface; designates targets and controls the weapons battery within the limits prescribed by the commanding officer; prescribes the employment of aircraft assigned to the ship for control; issues the orders for electronic countermeasure activity. He controls all tactical voice radio circuits, including the secure voice circuits (which are seeing ever-increasing use in a communications security-conscious Navy). When CIC has control in ASW, he directs the action.
In short, he is, under the commanding officer, charged with the tactical employment of the ship.
As a practical matter, coordination between the evaluator and the officer of the deck poses no problems. There is usually a difference in rank. Evaluators are almost always qualified as officer of the deck for formation steaming (OODF) themselves, and the officers of the deck have often grown up in the system, wherein they expect to receive direction from the evaluator as well as from the commanding officer.
It is not inconceivable, however, that a problem could arise where the officer of the deck had a genuine disagreement with the evaluator over the employment of the ship. This might be over the best way to open the closest point of approach (CPA) on a surface contact, or concerning the correct moment to change course while patrolling station, and so forth. In such a case, which consideration is paramount? Whose word is final? Both the evaluator and the OOD have direct access to the commanding officer, and both coordinate with each other. But such a duality of responsibility cannot exist at sea without some final resolution.
Provision for the resolution exists in Article 1009 of Navy Regulations. This article permits the executive officer, as well as other officers delegated for a specific watch, to “. . . direct the officer of the deck how to proceed in time of danger or during an emergency, or . . . assume charge of the deck himself . . . .” Implementation of this article is, of course, up to commanding officers. As a minimum, they should make the status of the evaluator clear in their bridge and CIC standing orders. The paragraphs concerning the officer under way watch organization, normally found in the second chapter of the Ship’s Organization and Regulations Manual, should also be revised to define the evaluator’s authority and responsibility. It is, of course, imperative that the written shipboard directives be in accord with current onboard practice, so that no misunderstanding might arise.
Just as the debate of a few years ago concerning the commanding officer’s proper battle station was resolved in favor of CIC (at least in AAW ships), so this present trend toward the establishment of an evaluator watch will certainly continue. There are, however, obstacles to be overcome. In some ships whose employment would justify such action, there might be insufficient officers of the appropriate level of experience and maturity to afford two per watch section. There will be those who consider any infringement upon the traditional authority of the officer of the deck as unacceptable. Only in newly-constructed or modified CICs are the physical appointments such as to permit an evaluator to discharge adequately his responsibilities. Still, within the ships of the Cruiser-Destroyer Force and perhaps in other combatants as well, the trend is clear. Facts require it to be so.
The OOD’s seaman’s eye and his surface search radar give him the same control of the local picture that he has always had. He remains the master out to the visible horizon. But advances in naval warfare—new air search radar, long-range weapons systems, and, in particular, NTDS—have extended the modern combatant’s area of tactical concern outward hundreds of miles. Once beyond the visible horizon, the tactical picture, and with it the authority of command, inexorably shift aft toward CIC.
It remains necessary only to accord the evaluator the prestige he merits. Qualification in this watch station equals or surpasses in significance that of OODF, and must be so recognized by detailers and selection boards. Just as is already being done in regulations at the shipboard level, so the appropriate section of Navy Regulations should be modified so as to treat more fully the duties and also the authority of the evaluator in CIC.
Without doubt, this is the most challenging watch that an officer can stand at sea. Equally without a doubt, the evaluator is able to contribute to the combat effectiveness of the command in a manner reserved heretofore to the commanding officer himself.