Codeword: “Direktor”
Heinz Höhne, New York: McCann Coward, & Geoghegan, 1971. 310 pp. Illus. $10.00.
The Game of the Foxes
Ladislas Farago. New York: David McKay, 1971. 696 pp. $11.95.
The Double-Cross System
J. C. Masterman. New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1972. 203 pp. $6.95.
Reviewed by Commander Robert E. Bublitz, U. S. Navy (Retired)
(Commander Bublitz, served on board various ships and at shore stations in both the United States and overseas. As a naval aviator, he served three years with Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron 1. He also served with the Office of Naval Intelligence.)
Spies, intelligence, and espionage are three words that fascinate most people, but are perhaps not really understood. Three books: Codeword: “Direktor,” The Game of the Foxes, and The Double-Cross System, discuss, in detail, the “undercover” operations of the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and the Soviet Union during World War II.
The least interesting of these three books is Codeword, a major effort to do the definitive work on the Rote Kapelle (Red Orchestra). Rote Kapelle is the code name assigned by the World War II German authorities to a group of Soviet spies that operated in Berlin and a number of other cities in occupied France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The network was broken up when most of its members were arrested in 1942.
Possibly more legend surrounds Rote Kapelle than any other intelligence operation of World War II, and for good reason. Rote Kapelle had much of the stuff of which myths are manufactured—it had agents in high places, provided substantial amounts of intelligence, numbered quite a few women among its members as well as some real swingers, and received supply and personnel support through Red Army parachute operations. Some of Rote Kapelle’s key members survived the round-up and have never been accounted for since, and it is a known fact that the Soviets received high-grade espionage reports from within the German Armed Forces headquarters throughout the war—long after Rote Kapelle was broken and many of its members executed. Then, too, the time was right, after the end of World War II, for the growth of mythological monsters—boogermen [sic] as well as heroes. The Germans needed to feel that somebody had been working against Hitler, the Communists needed some folk heroes and, as the Cold War settled in, the Western Allies were finding enough evidence of Communist espionage operations in Europe to make even the official intelligence services receptive to a “Rote Kapelle Lives” theory.
How well—or how poorly—Rote Kapelle actually did has been layered over by masses of misinformation published in German, French, English, Russian, and probably other languages as well. Höhne has done a useful service in debunking some of the wilder tales and bringing the main characters in the ring down to man-size. In point of fact, the most amazing thing about Rote Kapelle is not its accomplishments in gathering intelligence, but rather that it survived as long as it did in enemy territory in wartime, especially since it was hastily thrown together, badly administered, ill-disciplined, and violated most, if not all, of the basic espionage survival rules. True, a few of its members survived the roundup of 1942, but there is no real evidence that for the remainder of the war they did anything but concentrate on keeping alive.
What did Rote Kapelle do? It provided a steady flow of order-of-battle information on the German Armed Forces, unit movements, and from time to time, some information of strategic significance. It did not (as has often been alleged) provide the key information which led to the encirclement of General Paulus’ Sixth Army at Stalingrad. Credit for that fiasco belongs solely to Hitler. It provided industrial and scientific information, some logistic information, and data on the quality of Wehrmacht troop formations. It also managed to provide advance information on 12 of the Abwehr’s special sabotage operations in Russia, ten of the sabotage teams consequently being destroyed in Soviet ambushes. It provided considerable information on German intentions, but much of this information appears to have been the sort of thing which the Soviets could and should have figured out anyway if they just sat down and thought about the problem. The GRU (Red Army Intelligence), however, thought highly of the information they were receiving from Rote Kapelle, and the net provided the Soviets a useful insight into developments in the enemy’s Armed Forces.
Who were the members of Rote Kapelle? The leader of the net was an old hand at the spook business. He was a Communist, a Pole, a Jew, and an obvious candidate for trouble in Hitler’s Europe. However, he was an expert at disguise—he actually was sent away from the net’s Belgian headquarters by a member of the German arresting squad, when he knocked at the door disguised as a peddler. He survived the roundup, the war, and the peace; he now lives in Poland, and recently, has been trying to obtain permission to immigrate to Israel.
The glamorous part of the net, and the most important in terms of the intelligence produced, centered around an erratic young revolutionary, Harro Schulze-Boysen, a lieutenant on the Luftwaffe intelligence staff. Schulze-Boysen recruited a group of sub-agents and unwitting sources, including two Luftwaffe colonels and other military personnel, civil servants, and his own wife. Many, if not most of his subagents were known leftists, living on borrowed time in Nazi Germany. The Schulze-Boysen group gave Rote Kapelle its well-deserved image as a swinging organization. On the Berlin leftist intellectual scene, “proletarian” morality was early preached and enthusiastically practiced. Indeed, the female members of Schulze-Boysen’s sub-agent group seem all to have been his mistresses at one time or another.
Several Red Army officers served as net controllers on radio operators for the Belgian, French, and Dutch groups of the network, and when Schulze-Boysen’s group lost radio contact, the Red Army parachuted in agents with equipment and communications skills. This latter group arrived at an unfortunate time, just as the Abwehr and Gestapo were closing in on Schulze-Boysen’s operation. All were captured and executed.
Why did Rote Kapelle fall to the German counter-espionage efforts? A list of the security precautions violated by the GRU and its agents reads like a primer of what a spy should not do and be, as well as what a controller should not do, either. Rote Kapelle was destroyed primarily because the Germans broke their codes. The net would have survived much longer, had it not been for the GRU’s helpfulness in including the street addresses and apartment numbers of three key members of the Berlin group in the radio traffic, and of using the Russian transliteration (Charro) of Schulze-Boysen’s first name (Harro) as his code name. These two bloopers must rank among the great bobbles of all time. In addition, the net included many known leftists, the Schulze-Boysens, and quite a few other members of the ring were flamboyant and unstable (flamboyance in a spy is excusable, at times even desirable, but instability is a no-no) and had a tendency to mix anti-Nazi political and propaganda actions (writing for underground newspapers and burning a Nazi propaganda exhibit) with their spying, a most lamentable practice from the security point of view. In fact, Schulze-Boysen was so open and outspoken in his opposition to the regime, that some of his leftist friends began to suspect that he was a Gestapo provocateur. The GRU, always alert for an opportunity to help out the opposition, repeatedly broke down the compartmentalization of the network by placing the various groups in contact with each other—usually to remedy some logistic deficiency (radios were in short supply and chronically breaking down). With all that going against them, one wonders why it took the security organs as long as it did to catch them. In addition for the record it should be noted that nearly all the agents, once captured responded freely to interrogation and gave away others still at large. Some collaborated with what can only be described an enthusiasm. As becomes apparent in the other two books, however, it is indeed an exceptional agent who does not cave in after capture if adeptly handled.
There are some distracting things about the Höhne book. The translation is rough in spots, the punctuation is often erratic, and the proofreading careless. The inventive use of idiom occasionally impedes communication. Höhne footnotes as though there were no tomorrow, hitting a high of 447 in one chapter. The bibliography is good. On the balance, the book deserves a passing grade, but its usefulness is marred by its defects.
The Game of the Foxes, sub-titled “The Untold Story of German Espionage in the United States and Great Britain During World War II,” is another flawed book. Farago put together a great deal of information, well documented, which is new and fascinating. He discovered in the National Archives the microfilmed records of the Abwehr reports in World War II, and apparently acquired—where or how he does not say—the microfilmed records of the Abwehr’s stations in Hamburg and Bremen. Since those two stations were responsible for most of the German espionage directed against the United States and the United Kingdom, materials taken from the records are the heart of the book. Farago, an enthusiastic researcher, spent several years locating and interviewing many former Abwehr officers and agents, and has fleshed out considerably the records of the cases, discovering a number of fascinating new facts.
One of the most interesting is Farago’s account of a German spy who operated in the United States and under FBI control throughout most of World War II. The FBI role in this case was later published in a book by J. Edgar Hoover. As Farago examined the records of the Abwehr station which dispatched this particular agent, he was intrigued by the fact that the Abwehr records showed the agent had submitted about twice as many reports as Hoover said were sent, while the agent was under FBI control. Farago’s research makes the story clear. The agent was dispatched to the United States with instructions to turn himself in and permit himself to be run as a double agent, which he did. As the FBI gained confidence in him and allowed him some freedom of movement, he was to commence sending genuine, uncontrolled intelligence reports without the FBI’s knowledge, which he also did.
The main problem with Farago’s book is not really the author’s fault. The book would have been outstanding had it been published a year or two earlier, and indeed, it is not a bad book today, readable although a bit long. Farago’s extensive research of the German records of their intelligence operations against the United States and United Kingdom naturally imparts a certain bias to the book, reflecting German judgment of the successes of their agents in the field. The Germans, however, totally misjudged their success in Great Britain, for they were the victims of the most successful double-agent operation in history. As Sir John Masterman puts it in his book, The Double-Cross System, “. . . by means of the double agent system, we actively ran and controlled the German espionage system in this country.”
Farago obviously became aware of the Masterman book before publication of either book, for Game of the Foxes shows signs of a hasty and not entirely complete revision, in order to reflect the fact that the British ran the entire German espionage system in the United Kingdom during World War II. One can sympathize with Farago over the timing of the Masterman disclosures, since they would have upstaged his book rather badly, had he not injected a minimal acknowledgment of the British accomplishment. Farago’s inclination toward the use of spectacular adjectives and super superlatives in describing operations which tickle his professional fancy, result in his expressing some conflicting opinions. Thus, while acknowledging that the Germans were deceived and misled by the British all through the war, he persists in recounting their “stunning” successes in England. A pity, for Farago is a good storyteller and his book, although somewhat uneven in quality, deserves the place it has earned on the best-seller lists.
Sir John Masterman’s The Double-Cross System is an indispensable book for the professional intelligence officer, the sub-specialist, and those who get their thrills vicariously by reading about the game. Masterman tells of British double-agent operations in World War II and the part they played in deceiving the German High Command in Operation Overlord, the invasion of Normandy. The book, finally cleared for publication by Her Majesty’s government in November 1971, was originally written as a classified review of the Double-Cross System just before the author was demobilized after the war.
Briefly, the story is this. After the British were driven from the continent at Dunkirk, they detected a number of German agents attempting to enter Great Britain. As these agents were detected, the British attempted to bring them under control so that they could be “doubled” back against their German employers. They were successful for the most part, although a few agents were recalcitrant. These short-sighted, (although admittedly dedicated) types were tried briefly and executed promptly. Those who chose the less courageous but more rewarding course of collaboration, were kept alive and most were freed after the war. In the course of doubling these early, poorly prepared agents, the British began to suspect how lucky they were when they found that the emergency “contacts” given these agents were agents already under control. For some time, they hardly dared believe the extent of their success, but it became crystal clear that there were no agents operating for the Germans in Great Britain who were not under Double-Cross control. Observers in some of the neutral embassies, yes (and Farago makes too much of these), but they were of only limited value to the Germans and their access to information and carefully controlled by their British hosts.
The British system was sophisticated, functioned at the highest strategic levels, and probably was the most successful in the history of espionage. Indeed, in the latter stages of the war, the British encountered unusual problems with the system, caused by the very remarkable success they achieved. One problem arose when an intelligence fabricator sold his services to the Germans, who began to believe him. Unknowingly, the fabricator, who had sold the Germans the idea that he had an extensive net—wholly imaginary—of agents reporting to him from the United Kingdom, was making some accurate guesses. Since the British were deceiving the Germans on the points in question, the provision of this spurious but accidentally authentic information, presented a very real threat to the deception operation. The British response was typical—they recruited the fabricator, had him enlarge his notional network, and ran him as part of the Double-Cross System. At the end of this operation, some 14 totally imaginary sub-agents were functioning for the former fabricator, who was now supplied with British-originated, genuine and deceptive information. Another problem was caused by the success of the Allied armies in battle. German intelligence personnel were among the first to learn that the war was going badly, and in the latter stages of the war, they began to “make their arrangements for the future.” The British thus found themselves in the peculiar position of hoping that German intelligence personnel with access to valuable information about intelligence operations in Great Britain would not defect, for the Germans would eventually learn of the defection and assume that all information to which the defector had access was compromised. Then the British would be faced with a dilemma: If they closed down the operations (which they controlled) they would lose a valuable channel for passing deceptive information; if they did not close down the operation, they would have to assume that the Germans would assume that the operation was controlled and could conceivably come to the conclusion that all of their British operations were controlled. A classic dilemma of counterespionage, but one seldom encountered on a scale as broad as that the British faced.
The Masterman book sets forth the British objectives in operating the Double-Cross System: to control the German espionage agents in the United Kingdom, through them to contact and apprehend new agents, to learn all they could about the German espionage service, to obtain information about the German codes and cyphers, to ascertain strategic intentions of the Germans, to influence and perhaps change those intentions, and finally, to deceive the Germans as to British and Allied strategic intentions. Although only partly due to the efforts of Double-Cross, the deception preceding the invasion of Europe was a complete success. Double-Cross carried out its part so well that the Germans accepted the deceptive information provided by the Double-Cross agents as genuine, and even after it became apparent that the agents’ reports were erroneous, they preferred to believe that the agents had reported accurately, but that the intentions of the Allies had changed meanwhile. That, this reviewer submits, is deception of the first order.
Sir John also extracts the most important lessons to be learned from the British experience: no traffic to be sent to the enemy without written approval of some competent authority; double the enemy’s agents, but do not try to bait the enemy into recruiting one of yours; the doubled agent must actually live the life and go through all the motions of the genuine agent; assign a case-officer to each case to live with it in detail; do a careful psychological study of each agent; pay the agent well under a fixed financial agreement; take rapid and decisive action at the start of a case; keep excruciatingly detailed records; compartment your agents; evaluate the risks carefully and realistically; and finally, while real double-agents are preferable for most work, for deception the notional (imaginary) agent is best. The list of principles is as succinct a summary as is available anywhere and certainly has lost none of its validity today. The success of the British in applying these principles in other areas is clear, e.g., Kenya, where the British authorities “turned” Mau-Mau terrorists around in 36 hours and set them to hunting their former comrades, eventually creating a situation where there were more controlled Mau-Mau hunting real Mau-Mau than there were real Mau-Mau.
The success of Double-Cross, however, was not wholly due to British adeptness and perceptiveness, nor was it entirely due to the high caliber of their personnel, one of whom, Kim Philby, was himself a double agent of some fame. A portion of the credit must be given to that master of strategic blunder, Adolf Hitler, who created the conditions essential to British success. During the years preceeding [sic] the war, the Abwehr was forbidden by Hitler to conduct operations in Great Britain, apparently because of Hitler’s belief that the British most probably would not fight Germany and, if they did, they could be persuaded to accept an early peace. As a result, the Abwehr conducted only a few operations into the United Kingdom during peacetime (and those without Hitler’s knowledge) failing to gain the experience in England that they needed, and failing also to establish agents there during peacetime, when it would have been much easier. More unfortunately, one of the few agents they had in the United Kingdom before the war, reported himself to the British authorities as a German spy and become the first Double-Cross agent, code-named “Tate.” Then, when the British retreated from Dunkirk, Hitler decided to invade England. To support the invasion the Abwehr deployed several groups of hastily-trained and poorly-equipped agents into England, by parachute, by submarine, and through neutral countries, as Farago recounts in detail. They were all detected and several of them doubled. Their emergency contact was “Tate,” and from there on out, it was all downhill for the British, and disaster for the Abwehr.
The Masterman book, is concise history of a double-agent operation, and is a valuable addition to the responsible literature of intelligence.
Professional Reading
Compiled by Robert A. Lambert, Associate Editor
Aircraft Annual 1972
J. W. R. Taylor (ed.). New York: Arco, 1972. 96 pp. Illus. $3.95.
An illustrated collection of articles covers aspects of aviation’s past and future; the Rolls-Royce engine company’s demise is reported, the news of the year is summed up and other articles discuss airport design, moon-vehicle design, what it was like to be a test pilot in 1911, and the London-to-Sydney Air Race. The Collector’s Corner section provides photographs of rare historic and experimental aircraft.
America and Russia in a Changing World
W. Averell Harriman. New York: Doubleday, 1971. 218 pp. $5.95.
Based on three lectures delivered at Lehigh University, the subject was divided into past, present, and future. Of the three, the past is the most coherent and interesting, especially when recalling conversations with Stalin and Churchill; the present and future chapters too often wander erratically and present a most indistinct view.
The American Nightmare
Sidney J. Slomich. New York: Macmillan, 1971. 285 pp. $6.95.
Words snap, flash, sizzle, and crack with the intensity of bursting sky-rockets, only to dull the reader’s interest as repetition mauls the brain. In his effort to alert the public to the failure of modern technology and politics to deliver anything but horror, called the “good life,” the author has overdone it.
American Policy Toward Communist China 1949-1969
Foster Rhea Dulles. New York: Crowell, 1972. 273 pp. Illus. $7.95.
This historical record is not a deep probing effort, but a survey which provides an introduction to the directions of American policy and the personalities who shaped it. The late author, who died nearly two years ago, contends U. S. policy gave too little weight to the national, as opposed to the communist, aspirations of the Communists, and that President Nixon had begun to approach the China problem far more realistically than any president since the Korean War.
America's Lighthouses
Francis Ross Holland, Jr. Brattleboro, Vt.: The Stephen Greene Press, 1972. 226 pp. Illus. $15.00.
An interesting, illustrated history that locates and mentions each of these navigational aids; discusses the designs, lenses, and fuels used and describes the duties of lighthouse keepers, but is marred by an irritatingly poor layout of text and pictures.
The Battle for Moscow
Albert Seaton. New York: Stein and Day, 1971. 320 pp. Illus. $8.95.
A thoroughly researched account of a major turning point in World War II; unusually fine analytical comparisons of the military thinking of the two opposing dictators.
The Battle Stalin Lost
Vladimir Dedijer. New York: Viking, 1971. 341 pp. $8.50.
In 1948, when Tito broke with Stalin, the writer was Yugoslavia's Director of Information. From that especially privileged vantage point, the author studies the course of the economic, diplomatic and propaganda conflict as it developed until the Russian dictator’s death in 1953.
British Battles and Medals
L. L. Gordon. London: Spink, 1971. 440 pp. Illus. £10.00.
After a lapse of some ten years since the third edition of this standard reference, this fourth revised edition describes every campaign medal awarded since the Armada. An appendix lists all army regiments with a brief historical statement, complete to 1970, which covers most of the recent unit mergers.
The Crabtree Collection of Miniature Ships
August F. Crabtree. Hampton, Va.: August F. Crabtree, 1969. 40 pp. Illus. $3.14 (paper). Rt. 1, Box 458, Hampton, Va. 23366.
Sixteen models—built in the 20th century but displaying 18th century craftsmanship—depict the history of water transport from a man on a log raft to the first Cunard liner of 1840. The vessels, which are a permanent display in the Mariners Museum, Newport News, are shown in separate black and white photographs, accompanied by a short narrative description.
The Double-Cross System
J. C. Masterman. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972. 203 pp. $6.95.
The highly intricate care and feeding of Britain's counterespionage system during World War II is the subject of this report. By means of double agents, occasionally triple agents and fictitious agents, the Twenty Committee (XX) withheld good information, supplied false intelligence, and made the German Abwehr pay in pounds sterling for the privilege.
The Flying Navy
Richard E. Gardner. London: Almark, 1971. 80 pp. Illus. £1.25 (paper).
An illustrated record of the ships, aircraft, and equipment of Britain’s Fleet Air Arm in the years 1965 to 1970 which saw the transition from attack carriers with fixed-wing aircraft to the commando carrier with V/STOL aircraft and helicopters. There is a short discussion on the merits of the change and the concept of the through-deck cruiser.
The Fourth Dimension of Warfare
Michael Elliott-Bateman (ed.). New York: Praeger, 1970. 181 pp. 16.50.
The systematic supply, training, and deployment of irregular forces for the disruption of enemy forces, morale and communications by means of subversion, intelligence, and resistance is the concern of the nine papers covering the long history of non-regimented warfare.
French Warships of World War II
Jean Labayle Couhat. London: Ian Allen, 1971. 176 pp. Illus. £2.25.
While the main purpose of this compendium is to describe the ships of the French Navy, it also attempts to explain the crosscurrents set up within the service resulting from the fall of France. Unfortunately, the book is not too successful at achieving its purposes and suffers from an awkward translation as well.
Gehlen: Spy of the Century
E. H. Cookridge. New York: Random, 1971. 402 pp. Illus. $10.00.
A thoroughly engrossing, critical biography of one of Hitler’s chief espionage agents who, at the war’s end, switched sides to work with the newly formed CIA and, until his recent retirement, headed the West German Secret Service.
German Navy Warships 1939-1945
W. D. G. Blundell. London: Almark, 1972. 88 pp. Illus. £1.25 (paper).
A comprehensive coverage in photographs and 1:1200 scale drawings is provided with each ship or class, including captured units, described in concise detail; major ships are shown in several views.
The Germans
Adolph Schalk. Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice-Hall, 1971. 52 pp. $10.00.
Every facet of German life, character, customs, and politics since 1945 is explored in this anecdotal, fact-filled survey of the country both East and West. Not scholarly, usually as humorous as it is opinionated, and often debatable, but never dull.
Great Court-Martial Cases
Joseph Di Mona. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1972. 291 pp. $6.95.
A fast-paced, journalistic-style review of a dozen trials, from the Revolution to Vietnam, of famous and unknown personalities who have been part of the American military establishment. While all the cases cited are interesting, few are great, even in historical interest or perspective.
Hawker Hurricane MK.I/IV in Royal Air Force and Foreign Service
Richard Ward and Christopher F. Shores. New York: Arco, 1971. 46 pp. Illus. $3.95 (paper).
The history of the first eight-gun fighter, the mainstay during the Battle of Britain is chronicled; eight pages of color plates show the plane wearing various markings and insignias.
Junkers
P. St. John Turner and Heinz J. Nowarra. New York: Arco, 1971. 128 pp. Illus. $3.95 (paper).
An account of the development, features, and career of each of the Junkers aircraft types constructed, with specifications for each, forms the main body of this book which tells of the German company that built the first all-metal aircraft and was for a time the largest aviation enterprise in the world.
Katyn
Louis Fitz Gibbon. New York: Scribner’s, 1971. 285 pp. Illus. $10.00.
In early 1940, nearly 15,000 Polish officers, taken prisoner by the Russians when they divided Poland with Germany, disappeared. Two years later, the Germans found 5,000 bodies buried in Katyn forest. This account provides the forensic evidence on who was murdered, how, and when, and makes a reasonable assumption as to who was responsible.
The Lost Crusade
Chester L. Cooper. New York: Dodd, Mead, 559 pp. $12.00.
The American intervention in Vietnam is subjected to a critical review by a diplomat with nearly 30 years experience in Asia, in general, and with almost 20 of those years involved with Vietnam.
Martial Justice
Richard Whittingham. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1971. 281 pp. Illus. $6.95.
In August 1945, three months after the war with Germany had ended, seven German POWs went to the gallows at Fort Leavenworth where they were hanged in what was not only the last mass execution in the United States but also the largest single execution in this country in this century. They had participated in the murder of a fellow prisoner whom they were convinced had been a traitor to Germany. This is the story of a controversial and startling case, probing the events which led up to the murder, its preparation, the months of interrogation, the court martial, and the execution itself.
Messerschmitt
J. Richard Smith. New York: Arco, 1971. 144 pp. Illus. $3.95 (paper).
Over 150 photographs aid the text in telling the story of aircraft produced by the Messerschmitt Company, from the Pilotus glider of 1921 to the jets of today; understandable emphasis is on the famous planes of World War II.
North Vietnam’s Strategy for Survival
Jon M. Van Dyke. Palo Alto, Calif.: Pacific Books, 1972. 336 pp. $10.95.
The effects on daily life, governmental control, and the national economy of a country under constant aerial bombardment for 3½ years are fully described, with the failure of the American bombing strategy explained in terms of failing to understand the North Vietnamese system of political and social values.
The Russian Secret Police
Ronald Hingley. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972. 313 pp. $7.50.
The control of political dissent by secret police has had a long brutal history—the times change, the name changes, but the aim of today’s KGB is no different than that of the Oprichnina of Ivan the Terrible, as is shown in this survey.
Russian Tanks 1900-1970
John Milsom. Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1971. 192 pp. Illus. $11.95.
Nearly 400 illustrations in this large-format volume back the narrative which describes the design, development, and technical characteristics of these vehicles, and tells of the evolution of Soviet armored forces. A worthy companion to German Tanks of World War II.
Sailors, Scientists and Rockets. Volume 1
Albert B. Christman. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Priming Office, 1971. 303 pp. Illus. $4.75.
This history of the Naval Weapons Center. China Lake, California, covers the origins of the Navy’s rocket research as an outcome of dimly-seen needs following World War I and the establishment of the then named Naval Ordnance Test Station in 1943.
Salerno: Foothold in Europe
David Mason. New York: Ballantine, 1972. 160 pp. Illus. $1.00 (paper).
This sometimes confusing World War II beachhead battle, which the Germans very nearly won, is the subject of this often repetitious account.
Sea Fever
Emery N. Cleaves. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972. 283 pp. $6.95.
A personal remembrance of a short-lived career at sea on a coal-burning tramp steamer, by a New Englander when both he and the century were in their early twenties.
The Sepoy and the Cossack
Pierce G. Fredericks. New York: World, 1971. 274 pp. Illus. $7.50.
For those who like history well-salted with humor, this saga of a war that never happened—an Anglo-Russian struggle for India—is just the ticket.
Shipwrecks of the Western Hemisphere: 1492-1825
Robert F. Marx. New York: World, 1972. 482 pp. Illus. $15.00.
Based on documentary research and diving experience, this is a guide and catalog to underwater wrecks; also included is archeological and salvage information useful to the above-average amateur treasure hunter.
Siege and Survival
Elena Skrjabina. Carbondale, III.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971. 174 pp. Illus. $4.95.
The diary of a Leningrader, who survived the siege, and who was evacuated across Lake Ladoga only to be captured and sent to a labor camp in Germany, forms the basis for this remarkable record of the vagaries of human nature under inhuman conditions.
Since Stalin
Brian Crozier. New York: Coward-McCann, 247 pp. $6.95.
This scholarly treatment evaluates what has happened to Communism since 1956 and assesses what effects these developments, especially rifts within the Soviet bloc, may have on it as a world force in the near and distant future. The author feels the Sino-Soviet alliance can be re-established after the death of Mao.
Stalin, Hitler, and Europe 1939-1941
James E. McSherry. New York: World, 1970. 357 pp. Illus. $12.50.
Beginning with the second Nazi-Soviet agreement of 28 September 1939, the book explains why Stalin based his policies on what he thought Hitler would do rather than what Hitler could do, and on events leading to Hitler’s decision to invade Russia; and the diplomacy surrounding the Russian take-over of the Baltic states and the Russo-Finnish War of 1940.
Submarining: Three Thousand books and Articles
T. O. Paine. Santa Barbara, Calif: General Electric-TEMPO, Center for Advanced Studies, 414 pp. (paper).
This bibliography is a comprehensive listing of material on submarines and submarine warfare, a compilation which goes beyond the standard technological fare to include fiction as well. Only a few entries are annotated and most references are in the English language, however, a wide variety of other languages is represented, including Hebrew and Yiddish.
Swords and Plowshares
Maxwell D. Taylor. New York: Norton, 1972. 434 pp. Illus. $10.00.
The justly-renowned general’s memoirs range from his cadet days at West Point through his distinguished military career into the period when he was ambassador to South Vietnam and advisor to two presidents. His last chapter attempts to present a guide for future national policy. A literate book, quite useful for understanding American history since the Korean War.
Tablice Kii: Direktno Odredivanje Fi I Lambda Pomoću Dvije Zvijezda
S. Kotlarić. Split: Hidrografski Institut Jugoslavensk c Ratne Mornarice, 1971. 367 pp.
Volume V N (40°-49° 30’ N), with explanation in English, provides a two-star fix without use of altitude difference method.
Tank Warfare
Kenneth Macksey. New York: Stein and Day, 1972. 284 pp. Illus. $7.95.
The evolution of tank warfare from World War I to the present and beyond, into future battlefield situations is the subject of this readable and most interesting history.
Tito
Phyllis Auty. New York: Ballantine, 1972. 160 pp. Illus. $1.00 (paper).
Not so much a biography of the Yugoslav leader as it is a history of World War II in the Balkans; provides only slight insight to his character and motivation.
To the Sandwich Islands on H.M.S. Blonde
Robert Dampier. Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1971. 131 pp. Illus. $10.00.
In 1824, the author was given a position on this British warship as artist and draftsman and was allowed considerable leeway in selecting his subjects. While en route to Hawaii, to return the body of King Kamehameha II, who had died in England, the ship touched at many South American ports and seldom visited islands in the Pacific. In addition to his drawings, the young Englishman kept a journal of his experiences and observations. This book is not a facsimile of his diary but an intelligently edited version with some 30 reproductions of his sketches. While the price is high, the quality of the book is more than equal to it.
The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934
Hans Schmidt. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1971. 303 pp. Illus. $10.00.
Drawing upon archival and manuscript materials, previously unavailable, the many complicated elements of the military occupation and wholesale civil intervention in the economic and diplomatic affairs of the Republic are examined.
Why Don’t We Learn from History?
B. H. Liddell Hart. New York: Hawthorne, 95 pp. $3.95.
To learn from history, one needs to know the facts, but it is not easy to separate fact from fiction found in official records, government documents, personal reports, and “eye witness” accounts. Lucid, incisive, provocative, there is hardly an aspect of human nature, government and social order that is not commented upon. Revised shortly before his death, this is an expansion of the author’s philosophy of history originally published in 1944.
RE-ISSUES
The German Navy in World War II
Edward P. Von Der Porten. New York: Crowell [1969], 1972. 274 pp. Illus. $2.95 (paper).
Navies of the Second World War: Japanese Aircraft Carriers and Destroyers
New Rochelle, N.Y.: Sport Shelf [1963] 1971, 152 pp. Illus. $6.25.
Navies of the Second World War: Japanese Battleships and Cruisers
New Rochelle, N.Y.: Sport Shelf [1963] 1971. 152 pp. Illus. $6.25