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Hollis M. Dole, Assistant Secretary, Mineral Resources, U. S. Department of the Interior—The proceedings of the recent Stockholm conference on ecology faithfully affirmed the summary statement of environmental attitudes contained in the first paragraph of Colonel Leider’s fine article. There is indeed, it appears, almost a linear relationship between expressed environmental concern and per capita income among the nations of the world. Some of the spokesmen for the poor nations were more discreet than others, but even among these who were willing to give lip service to the environmental ethic, the implication was very clear that people living at subsistence levels have more urgent things to worry about than the niceties of the natural world around them.
And so do we, as Colonel Lcider so persuasively points out. I submit that our pathological uptightness about environmental matters proceeds out of two utterly footless assumptions which arc eminently compatible with each other, but with no aspect of reality that I am able to observe. The first of these is that the world in general, and America in particular, is headed for hell in a handbasket unless the most Draconian measures for environmental protection and restoration are instituted without delay. Second is the dreamy notion that America "has it made,” economically and technologically, and that from this comfortable position of security and affluence we can afford any and all remedial actions that may be represented on whatever premises as being necessary or
desirable, no matter how costly they may be.
On both counts the American people have been sold a bill of goods. We are not about to reduce the planet to a wasteland. The largest polluter of both air and water is not man, but nature herself. Three volcanic eruptions within the past century have ejected more particulate matter and more combined gases into the atmosphere than all mankind’s activities since the discovery of fire—without any notable effect upon the earth’s habitability. Enormous quantities of natural contaminants are deposited in our streams ever)’ year by springs and rainfall—chlorides, sulfates, carbonates—not to mention such nutrients as phosphates and fixed nitrogen which have caused us so much concern about our fertilizers and detergents. Earthquakes, floods, storms, and forest fires work immense havoc upon the earth, as they have done for millions of years before man ever evolved. What we have succeeded in doing is to make life thoroughly unpleasant for people who inhabit certain densely populated localities by dumping high concentrations of waste into the air or watersheds that serve them, or onto the land in their immediate vicinity. Man’s impact is still local, but because he is both numerous and ubiquitous, the problems he has created for himself are quite large. But they arc not cosmic, and they have no property of urgency that requires us to subordinate all other considerations to their solution.
Almost as many canards have been uttered about our so-called "affluent society” as have been mouthed about the putative state of our environmental decay.
We can and we shall pay for all the needed measures for environmental protection and restoration. We shall never have the resources to pay for the last 2% of purity, nor should we be required to do so. From the immaculate insularity of their campuses and clubs, owlish, radical-chic intellectuals pontificate with lunacy on such liaisons as the abolition of strip mining; the exclusion of offshore drilling; of "zero” effluent discharge to streamflows; and the suspension of nuclear powerplant construction, as if these things bore no relationship to the nation’s capacity to provide for its people and to survive in a world that is always competitive and frequently hostile. It is no accident that this pressure for purity comes from the representatives of the suburban "leisure class” who feel directly none of the problems connected with the production of the goods and services they enjoy, and who blandly assume that there will somehow always be gasoline at the pump and electricity at the switch—for them. Poor people, and poor nations, arc under no such illusions. They understand perfectly well the connection between their own survival and that of the hard and grubby
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members arc invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication in these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged. The U. S. Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion published in the Proceedings.
86 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1972
processes upon which it is based.
What our modern apostles of the New Indolence fail to grasp is that the fierce and implacable imperatives of selection, of competition, and survival that grip the poorer nations so tightly will in time operate just as surely upon the fortunes of even the most prosperous. One can draw no comfort from the erosion of our technological lead over competitor nations; in the widening gap in our balance of payments; in our rapidly increasing dependence upon uncertain sources of energy abroad; and in the recurrent and deepening crises of confidence in the dollar. These are realities that no amount of glib double-talk about "zero-growth,” the "post-industrial society,” or "re-ordering national priorities” can conjure away.
The truth is that we cannot give up building power plants or refineries, or drilling oil wells or mining coal, or using pesticides and fertilizers simply because in the past they have contributed to air and water pollution. We cannot go back to the peaceful, bucolic Currier & Ives regimen of the last century, and when the hardships of that period arc given their proper weight, few would want to. There are now 209 million of us, and even at the lowest birth rate in our history, there will be 265 million Americans to be fed, clothed, housed, and otherwise cared for by the turn of the century, and it cannot be done with cottage industries and organic gardens. This means that continued access to natural resources must be provided for; that the facilities to transform the raw resources into usable products must continue to be built and operated; that people will have to put up with some noise, some inconvenience, some affront to their sense of beauty and tranquility, as the price of survival in a crowded world.
There is no enduring contradiction between the production of goods and services and the legitimate requirements for minimizing damage to the environment. These can be reconciled. The real conflict—the only conflict—is between the material needs of the nation and the obstructive actions of environmental extremists, which threaten not only the viability of our productive processes, but ironically, our capability to solve our environmental problems as well.
Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles, U. S. Naty (Retired)—The article gives the impression, both in its title and in much of its content that the "ecologists” arc concerned primarily with the aesthetic quality of life. In fact, when we realize that a civilization is an inseparable combination of physical environment and human behavior, it becomes clear that the "ecologist” is concerned with the survival of the civilized way of life to whose defense the military system itself is dedicated.
While the recent Stockholm Conference confirmed Colonel Leider’s fears about the reluctance of undeveloped nations to accept measures of pollution control, it is obvious that the nations with major military potential are now well aware of the consequences of uncontrolled growth.
When Colonel Lcidcr states, ". . . we now command enough observation of the movement, though it is but four years old, to group its effects under three postulates . . .’’he fails to recognize the continuity of thought and action which preceded the rapid expansion of environmental concern which did indeed occur four or five years ago.
The Modern Environment Movement is the natural consequence of the conservation concerns which grew up in the mid-19th century and continued to expand until the 1960s, when the need for control of nuclear and atomic weapons testing brought major issues before the whole literate world.
A few highlights of a very practical nature are worth mentioning: The ancient practice of crop rotation, the German concepts of forest management; the alliance between Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot which curbed the wasteful practices of American lumbermen, the growth of contour plowing and soil banks to check devastating soil erosion which contributed to the disastrous dust storms of the 1930s; the efforts to control the flooding of the Tennessee, Ohio, and Connecticut rivers; the beginning of the efforts to restore Narragansctt Hay and other estuaries to revive the shellfish industry.
In all of this movement, while aesthetic considerations were important to some, the major driving force was the recognition that unrestrained short- range commercial exploitation of always
limited natural resources and produced unacceptable long-range, physical, economic, and social damage.
It seems ironical that the Navy's major professional journal should publish an article with enormous implications, as to the oceans and other waters of the world, of such a nature as to imply contempt for the opinions of the scientists and engineers most experienced in working in, under, and around our oceans. This is especially true when we realize how much there remains to be learned about the relationship between our major food chains, the microorganisms of the sea, and the coastal wetlands and the possibility of irreversible damage occurring before conclusive evidence appears.
Admittedly, many immature environmentalists have proposed silly or utopian measures of control, furthermore, many political extremists have used environment problems as vehicles for personal or ideological exploitation.
But the ensuing resentment and sometimes organized opposition should not obscure the major issues involved. There are very real long-range problems which must not be placed in direct opposition to our legitimate defense requirements.
In considering the economic aspects of the whole problem, we should also bear in mind that pollution control stimulates technological and economic activity with new industries growing up and new useful by-products of the recycling processes becoming available.
It is not easy to assess the overall effects on our economy. The costs are divided among the federal government, the state and municipal governments, and private industry.
One aspect of the "quality of life” is that individuals may gain a better understanding of their own personal responsibility, which extends not only t° reducing pollution, but also to a greater participation in the process of self- government.
In summary, the most serious defect in the paper is its total avoidance of the crucial issue: What arc the long-range economic, social, and political consequences of continued exponential growth in our consumption of the natural resources of the planet earth? This transcends any conflict between acs-
thctics and nationalism which Colonel Leider poses by his concluding sentence: "The physical surroundings may be important, but what about America?”
Paul F. Mitchell— While it is certainly valid to include political and social considerations when evaluating proposals for environmental protection, Colonel Lcider’s article in making this point suffers from considerable overkill and makes his view suspect by its wholesale condemnation of the ecology movement.
7973 Naval Institute
A Century of the United States Navy
Hopefully, it is not a choice between national greatness and a viable environment as Colonel Leider insinuates, for we Americans arc a better people than he gives us credit for. We are starting to face up to problems of a deteriorating environment and as a people are willing to make the sacrifices required to solve them. If others with greater problems do not face up to them either because of shortsightedness or greed, we pity them; but we will not be frightened into emulating them by such articles as the Colonel’s, and ultimately the United States will be stronger for having acted in time.
The 1973 United States Naval Institute Desk Calendar and engagement book covers one hundred years of the Navy and commemorates the United States Naval Institute centennial with a tapestry of photographs, many never before published, selected from both official and private archives. An outstanding gift, this collection of photographs will be retained in libraries and treasured long after the calendar year.
This convenient and functional weekly calendar includes holiday dates, Julian dates and a section for monthly planning.
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Finally, anyone who can talk about this country "coddling” its environment as Colonel Leider has in his article, has got to be suspected of losing touch with reality.
Margaret L. Steere, Staff Geologist, Oregon Department of Geology anil Mineral Indus- tries—We would like to have your permission to reprint all or part of this article in an issue of our monthly publication, The Ore Bin.
Major H. J. Sage, U. S. Marine Corps— The ecology movement finds itself at its peak. The most recent, and widely- heralded book on the subject, Only One Earth, by Barbara Ward and Rene Dubos, predicates its argument on the condition that the current trend towards ecological disaster will continue unless we change our present life styles. But the authors point to significant progress
in making such change. And, as Lieutenant Colonel Leider points out, the cure being applied appears to be a massive dose.
Colonel Leider does not prove his charge by pointing out that other patients are sicker. Mourners arc consoled little by knowing that others are also dying. People on the shores of Lake Erie could care less about a sea in Siberia; their patient is in the throes of death. People who used to swim in the Hudson are not comforted by knowing the Rhine is a cesspool.
Comment and Discussion
Just as in medicine, massive cures arc being applied to arrest the initial fever. But once ecology is under control, maintenance costs will become relatively smaller. Technology will absorb the costs as a matter of routine. Preventive measures will not only be cheaper, but also the beneficial side effects will recoup much of the cost. The employment of manpower and other resources in the environmental field will aid unemployment and stimulate discovery. Techno
logical devices and expertise to control pollution can be exported as well as other products. If the United States bears the cost of creating pollution-free automobiles, will not the higher price be offset by the greater attractiveness of the product? The United States can afford to make the sacrifices to stem the tide of pollution. The rewards will come in time.
Colonel Leider’s thesis is clear, and demands a hearing. It provides a balance to the all-too-extreme views of the most avid environmentalists. But his arguments are not unchallengeable, and it seems that he is too concerned with the momentary high pitch of the battle. If the trend continues, his arguments will increase in validity. But there is evidence that the effects of massive anti-pollution efforts will take hold shortly, and as they do, the rhetoric will become more tempered, and balance will be restored. The most powerful economy in the world can absorb the temporary shock, and perhaps reap some im-
portant side benefits in the process.
Finally, the contrast between Colonel Leider’s article and Commander Bckke- dahl’s "Pollution: Wc Do Our Part,” in the December 1969 Proceedings, is striking. If the military conquers its pollution problems on its own initiative, many of our problems of recruiting, image, and the like, can only be improved, as a result.
Lieutenant (j.g.) Steven L. Oreck, U.S. Naval Reserve— Europeans, Russians, Japanese, and other industrial peoples are no more capable of drinking foul water or breathing carbon monoxide and sulfur dioxides than are Americans. Japan, a country that has little arable- land and lives off the sea, cannot afford the kind of pollution that killed and crippled the fishermen of Minncmata Bay. The Rhine may be no worse (or better) than Lake Erie, but it is more vital to Europe than Lake Erie is to the United States. Like it or not, all industrial nations must deal with reality, and the reality is that major rivers arc open sewers unfit for human or animal use, and the air in many metropolitan areas is so bad that traffic police need oxygen to prevent monoxide poisoning. Ignoring "ecology” and wishing pollution away is as unrealistic as attempting to circumvent the law of gravity by flapping one’s arms.
If wc accept Lieutenant Colonel Lcidcr’s argument, wc can guess at the nature of our "strategic” victory. It will be a Pyrrhic victory, with workers rushing to put in overtime at bustling factories, while wearing gas masks to stave off silicosis and emphysema.
Daryl P. Damning, Department of Paleontology, University of California—Mm has been fouling his nest since the dawn of civilization, if not longer, and seems pretty accustomed to living in his own filth; why, then, the sudden fuss about housebreaking him, and why from a nation that is not as polluted as some others? The answer to the first question should be obvious enough: pollution has increased exponentially with population and consumption, and the global
damage it causes grows clearer every day. To the second, Colonel Leidcr gives three answers: a fastidious middle class, a sophisticated scientific community, and an influential press. These are necessary factors, but there is a more fundamental reason for "America’s advanced state of environmental hypochondria.” The United States is the most technologically advanced nation and has the most experience with the effects of technology, on both the physical environment and the intangibles expressed by the phrase "quality of life.” What nation is in a better position to see whatever dangers may lie hidden along the present course of human development, and sound the warning to others with neither the leisure nor the vantage-point to look beyond immediate needs?
Suppose wc do foresee dangers arising from technology. Surely it is unreasonable to force poorer nations to bring their anti-pollution standards up to ours, at their expense, on the grounds that their environment is ours, too. On the same grounds, rather, wc should subsidize their cleanup and make funding for population and pollution control part of any aid package to underdeveloped countries. And assuredly, we should not become party to any project as simplistic and shortsighted as the Aswan Dam; though the Soviets have "reaped nothing but strategic pluses” from that little caper, Egypt has reaped economic and ecological havoc. Is that the kind of self-interested "foreign aid” Colonel Leider advocates? His plea for "a nation’s own desires for what it needs” rings hollow in the context of "the strategic and political aims of foreign aid programs;” between his lines I can read only the total moral bankruptcy of our nation.
But whoever chooses to pay the ecology bill does buy a handicap relative to those who do not. Should we then ignore the foreseen dangers and continue to compete, with pesticides and SST; in a game wc know in the long run no one can win, just so we will not be the first to drop out? Our scientists tell us we have dreadfully little time; how long should we keep on playing technological chicken?
Certainly there is "... a new belief which appears to enshrine the sanctity of the environment in a higher place
than the concept of a nation.” It is based on the realization that the survival of all nations is totally conditional upon the survival of the biosphere. We are going to look pretty silly someday fighting for possession of a sinking ship, especially since it—this planet—is the only ship we have.
There is indeed a value shift underway, but it is not that ", . . physical concerns expand at the expense of intangibles.” Americans have always valued intangibles above all; they are simply re-evaluating which ones they want to honor in the future. Maybe they do not want the hollow "liberty” of living in their own waste and pursuing happiness in a land of smog and con- I Crete. There comes a point in national defense when the commitment attains all the characteristics of a critical mass: it becomes self-sustaining without anything being added. A nation in this predicament must stand helplessly by, while its institutions, beliefs, values, and even way of life are transformed. How much of the merchandise advertised as "defense” can we afford to buy before this is no longer the same country wc started out to defend?
"The 1100: He Flies Not;
Neither Does He Sink”
(See A. G. Nelson, pp. 44-48, March 1972
Lieutenant John L. Byron, U. S. Navy— Captain Nelson’s article dealing with the plight of the 1100 surface line officer contains a paragraph near its conclusion in which the author contrasts the surface Navy with conditions in the submarine force. He notes that the quality and quantity of men in the submarine service arc better than the surface Navy, that ”. . . submarines get more than their share of funds, equipment, and priorities.” He suggests that submariners have little conception of motivational leadership and that they get the job done as a result of the sailors being ". . . threatened with being surfaced and losing sub pay.” He thinks submariners have little in common with their surface counterparts, small empathy ", . . with the surface lieutenant jaygee who must create in his newest fireman a pride in standing the smartest
Comment and Discussion 89
security watch in the entire amphibious squadron on a quiet Sunday evening in port,” as Captain Nelson puts it.
Because such notions enjoy wide circulation and credibility throughout the Navy, I feel obliged to offer a more correct view. Having served in both surface craft and submarines, I hope the following opinions, though not in agreement with Captain Nelson, will do justice to both groups. It is difficult to say which group is more ignorant of the other—the Captain Nelsons, who in fact know nothing of the conditions of the modern submarine force, or the smug submariners who quietly agree with the author’s premise that submarine people are intrinsically superior. I say both groups are wrong and offer the following thoughts for both to consider.
The quality and quantity of submariners—The similarities in the enlisted manning of surface craft and submarines arc much greater than most partisans suspect. In the advanced ratings, the entrance requirements for submarine- peculiar specialties, such as navigation electronics technician and the Polaris/ Poseidon weapons technicians are no higher than for similar top-caliber surface ratings, such as data systems technician and fire control technician (missiles). By-and-large, parity exists down the line. Sonar technicians, cooks, quartermasters, torpedoman’s mates are the same sort of sailor on submarine and "tin can” alike. They meet the same standards, take the same advancement exams, and generally share the same sea/shore rotation and pro-pay. Only in the undesignated seaman/fireman area does a discernable contrast exist. In a surface craft, this group commonly comprises 20% of the crew, whereas in a nuclear submarine, only 10% are non- designated, non-rateds. In both cases, the good lads find a rating and strike; the rest serve their time and leave.
The best general statement of the situation is that submarine and surface craft sailors come from the same sources, and are of identical quality when they report on board. If differences do show up, these result from conditions in the ships and not from a disparate allocation of talent. If submariners seem to be of better quality, it results from better leadership and motivation on board submarines; such fact would seem to
indict critics from the surface Navy.
The conditions faced by submariners arc not especially conducive to high morale and better performance. For one thing, submariners must work harder than their surface counterparts.
What sets the basic limit on the size of a submarine’s crew is the number of bunks that can be crammed inside the submarine hull. The Spartan quarters of an SSBN berth 140 men; a DLG of similar tonnage sleeps 400 in relative opulence. Granting that every effort has been made to design submarines of low maintenance materials, the submariner still shares more work than his surface neighbor. Because of the lower ratio of non-rateds, the menial work gets passed farther up the line. There is an old saw, not entirely untrue, that, during field day in a submarine, it is easy to spot the chiefs; they are the ones who scrub only as high as they can reach.
Submariners would dearly love to motivate and retain their people with the travel and liberty all surface sailors see. In two years of typical duty in a surface ship, I enjoyed liberty in California, Canada, Puget Sound, Hawaii, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Samoa, and the Kingdom of Tonga. In contrast, in three typical years on board an SSBN we berthed only in Rota, Spain, and Holy Loch, Scotland; little time was available to enjoy these garden spots because of the pressures of SSBN refits. The crew was always in port-and-starboard, though several work groups could not meet this goal and stood something less than that. Diesel and SSN crews have slightly better port calls, but they likewise have heavy workloads and extensive watchstanding requirements. The only advantage enjoyed by SSBNs is in having two crews; the stringent training in off-crew and the tyranny of the patrol cycle diminish this advantage. There is nothing in a modern submarine’s schedule, workload, or itinerary that would induce envy in a surface sailor.
Perhaps Captain Nelson’s premise that submariners are superior refers to the officer cadre. I privately think that submarine officers are the best in the business, but I also think this is a direct result of the high standards existing in submarine wardrooms. Such high standards arc available to anyone willing to
study submarine force practices. The British nuclear submarine people hand out a small poster showing as background a submarine’s profile and superimposed the legend, "Sub Men Are Super.” I will not argue that statement on its merits, but I do suggest that if senior officers of the surface Navy believe it, as Captain Nelson would seem to, they should investigate and adopt the management and leadership practices of the submarine service, rather than credit such successes to unfair competition.
The submarine force’s share of funds, equipment, and priorities—The nuclear submarine force is fully funded and supported, and indeed holds highest- priority status; in these facts, the author and I see things alike. But is this emphasis wrong? Captain Nelson’s opinion that submarines get more than their share has not been agreed with by those past administrations, which created the modern submarine fleet and it most certainly contrasts with present policy. The SALT Agreement emphasizes this fact. Had Captain Nelson said that submariners have had "more than their share” of successful equipment, that they have better applied existing funding, I would concur. The submarine force never had DASH. No DBS of the 1040/1052 type—the illustrious "Edsel Class.” No double-ended DLGs, with their shotgun escort DD trailing because the frigates have no cannon. Submarine nuclear power plants operate properly (in common with the four surface nuclear ships); compare this with the sad condition of the typical surface steam plant (I am aware of the excellent and long-overdue improvements occurring in this field). In sonar, the AN/BQS-6 and AN/BQS-13 were developed with no more emphasis than the AN/SQS-26. If the submarine sonars find more submarines, the cause is not funding or priorities (the submarine sonars do find more submarines). I really think there is only one area in which submarines receive extraordinary funding and support in comparison to surface craft—periscopes.
Leadership; disqualification from submarines— Any officer or petty officer worthy of his dolphins is offended by Captain Nelson’s suggestion that submariners get work done by threatening disqualification and loss of sub pay. It
is a cheap shot. One would hope that nowhere in the Navy does negative leadership of this sort succeed.
It is a singularly large decision, disqualification. The closest surface Navy corollary is removing an officer’s officer of the deck for formation steaming (OODF) designation. In submarines, disqualification is used only to deal with an individual who simply cannot cope with the demands and rigors of submarine life. It is a serious matter and does not happen without full cause. On the practical side, those seniors who review a recommendation for disqualification arc the same gents who will have to produce the relief for the man disqualified. If Captain Nelson will accept that submariners do not have a bottomless pool of talent to draw from, then he will have to suppose that frivolous disqualifications are forcefully rejected. Frivolous disqualification does not occur; those who wear dolphins respect them.
If a man is finally surfaced, where
does he go? Generally to one of two places, either to a submarine support activity (AS, ASR, and the like) or out of the Navy for good. If a lad ends up in the surface Navy, it is almost always a case of sending elsewhere an otherwise fine sailor who could not environmentally adapt to submarines.
If I have managed to lay aside that the threat of disqualification is the touchstone of submarine leadership, then what is? Do submariners bribe their people? Flog them? Or perhaps is it that the thing which Captain Nelson indicates submariners have little conception of, motivational leadership, permeates the submarine chain of command? Whatever operates (I say it is leadership), the author would do well to refrain from knocking it. It is a rare quirk of the mind that would criticize an organization for its successes.
The point of this essay is becoming clear. Differences do exist between submarines and surface craft, but these result from submarine-unique practices
and attitudes which the surface force would do well to consider. The plight of Captain Nelson’s jaygee is illustrative. In a submarine, it would be not the jaygee but the commanding officer responsible for the security watch’s performance. The jaygee would have no doubts as to the fireman’s competence, because of the rigorous qualification program the fireman had completed. Nor would the commanding officer be unduly concerned with the fireman’s abilities, because he would know him by name and furthermore, would have interviewed him personally prior to designating him qualified for the watch. There would be no competition with the other ships in port, an objective standard being the issue. Smartness would not rule, but competence.
The surface Navy could profitably consider the following list of "better ideas” that I found operative upon joining the submarine force. None are enormously expensive, though they would require a bit of staffing to implement.
The U. S. Navy’s Transatlantic Flight of 1919 By Richard K. Smith
The first flight across the Atlantic is described in detail: the men and their' aircraft, the primitive radio communications, and the methods of air navigation. Photographs, cartoons, and even advertisements of the era support the author’s exciting account and help to evoke the spring of 1919, an important moment in aviation and world history.
Richard K. Smith demonstrates that the success of the NC flights was not owed to derring-do, but to the same thing that pul Americans on the moon fifty years later—good planning, good organization, and good logistics.
Comment and Discussion 91
Their summation is a major factor in the ability of submarines to conquer their difficult world. It is not my intention to decipher the list; the ideas and materials are available: objective, rigorous watch qualification; objective requirements for broad knowledge of the total ship (i.e., submarine qualification); Interior Communication Manual; Operational Reactor Safeguards Exam (ORSE); Demonstration and Shakedown Operations (DASO); Tagout Bill; Standard Submarine Organization and Regulation Manual (SSORM); Preventative Maintenance Management Plan (PMMP); Conventional Weapons Manual; Polaris/ Poseidon Standard Operating Procedures and Casualty Procedures; Poseidon Weapons Officer’s Guide; Reactor Plant Manual; Submarine Nuclear Weapons Manual; Quarterly Information Bulletin (QIB); Trouble Failure Report (TFR).
The final comment is that submarines and surface craft are mostly alike. Certain real differences exist in funding, because submarines have such an important role (quietly, as appropriate to the Silent Service, the 1,000th Polaris/ Poseidon deterrent patrol was completed in May). Whatever other divergences show up result because the submarine force, I suggest, has found a better way to do things. Given basically the same resources and tools as the surface Navy, submariners have managed to make more and better use of them. Communication and exchange of ideas seem imperative here. The best last thought is one associated with Admiral Zumwalt: "It’s gotta be one Navy.”
William F. Speers—Captain Nelson’s closing statement exactly captures the goal: ", . . let us place first and foremost the readiness, training, and morale of the 1100 lieutenant jaygee.” The problem is, it does not work that way.
As Captain Nelson perceives, the line officer—the backbone of the Navy— must be a generalist. The author might have added that the average junior line officer is a generalist by experience and education even before he comes to the Navy. He does not have the specialized formal education that sends his contemporaries into the medical, supply, civil
engineer, and judge advocate general corps.
But precisely because of his lack of specialized training, the 1100 gets the hardest work, the most responsibility, the lowest rank for time in service, the lowest total pay, and the least status. While the first lieutenant of a DD is standing a hairy bridge watch during night screening operations, his supply corps counterpart is watching the wardroom movie, or snoring in his bunk. While the chief engineer of the same DD is crawling through a steam drum inspecting boiler tubes, his medical corps counterpart is consulting with pretty nurses at the base hospital. While the gun boss is sweating out a competitive shoot during refresher training, the chaplain is observing the activities like a spectator. And the staffies enjoy the additional advantage of experts in arcane subjects. The captain understands the work of the line departments. He can, should, and does monitor—sometimes abrasively—the work of his 1100 officers. But lie does not understand medicine, law, religion, and the like, so, for better or worse, he tends to leave the staffies to their own devices.
So, all during his first tour, the 1100 compares his long hours, hard work, relatively low pay, and low status with the work, pay, and status of the staff corps types. And at the end of his tour, the 1100 perceives, whether rightly or wrongly, that the Navy is more interested in keeping the staffies than in keeping him. So if he can get a good civilian job, he gets out. If not, if his general experience and training did not fit him for an acceptable civilian job, he stays; the Navy keeps him by default. And retention by default docs not seem to be the best way to build a highly- motivated, well-trained corps of general line officers.
What can be done about it? Well, nothing can or should change the work, the responsibility, or the authority of the line officer; those are the very factors that will make him into the generalist leader of Captain Nelson’s essay. But it looks as though the Navy could take- positive note of the 1100’s importance, could afford him the opportunity to formally study his own specialty- professional seamanship—could grant him status commensurate with his im
portance, could, in short, make sure that the star on the 1100’s sleeve means something special. And the Navy could also take effective action to retain the 1100 at the end of his first tour. Such changes in current practice would not cost much, and they might help to provide the Navy—and the nation — with a line officer pool from which to develop ", . . the naval leaders of tomorrow.”
Commander J. C. Totten, Civil Engineer Corps, U. S. Navy—As a member of the staff corps community, 1 must reluctantly agree, from an all too familiar association, that we are overly concerned with our own world. Although overall policy and public information may proclaim service to the Fleet, when one looks at the day-to-day operation, the tasks that succeed and appear to carry the most reward to the individual arc those concerned with perpetuating the Corps for its own sake.
Having once been a line officer, I feel 1 can relate to Captain Nelson’s premise that the generalist line officer with command at sea, proven under combat, must form the base for tomorrow’s leaders. In stating this premise, however, he has refused to recognize that technology and society, in general, arc changing at an ever increasing pace. 1 am afraid he has come face-to-face with what Alvin Toffler calls "future shock.” The answer, like it or not, cannot lie with the generalist, since it is not humanly possible, during a normal career time frame, for this individual to receive, let alone understand, the information required to make the tradeoff decisions.
Choosing tomorrow’s leaders only from the generalist line community is as wrong as choosing these leaders only from the specialist community. Some combination of generalists and specialists are required if our Navy is to cope with the future shocks of life. It may be better to concentrate on developing decision-makers and not worry about the generalist/specialist syndrome.
Captain Nelson’s comments expressing his obvious distaste for "staffies,” staff corps, and restricted line types detract from an otherwise fine article. One such comment is his slighting of Seabces
92 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1872
and the hobby shop routine, A Seabcc command in combat, operating within small arms range, is to a Civil Engineer Corps officer, what command at sea is to the line officer. If the future leaders of the Civil Engineer Corps are carefully picked from among those with Seabec experience, the Navy will have staff corps personnel comparable with the line types longed for in the article.
Lieutenant Commander RichardJ. Schlaff, U.S. Naty—l certainly agree that "... a hard corps of surface line officers will and must continue to exist.” Their special skills are, and will continue to be, as essential as those of other specialists. But technical skills alone do not uniquely qualify anyone for "high command.” As sociologist Morris Janowitz notes, "The military is no different from other institutions in that the higher the position, the less important specific technical skills are, and the more impor
tant are general interpersonal skills.” Henry A. Kissinger has also discussed this phenomenon. In The Reporter (March 1959), he wrote: "One of the paradoxes of an increasingly specialized bureaucratized society is that the qualities rewarded in the rise to eminence are less and less the qualities required once eminence is reached.”
The trend toward specialization does pose a threat to traditional military organization, but I believe it will result in a better Navy since, as Janowitz also notes, "Those best qualified to make sensitive judgments, and appraisals of complex situations, arc frequently those most attracted to specialized graduate- school. ”
I think the moral for the future is to be found in the writings of Dr. Harold Leavitt, professor of industrial administration and psychology, who says: "For the first time in our history, obsolescence seems to be an imminent problem for management because for the first time, the relative advantage of
experience over knowledge seems to be rapidly decreasing.”
My point is that the Navy is a team of specialists—including general line officers—performing a very sophisticated kind of operation and that for "high command,” the real requisites remain, managerial skill and leadership ability- anyone’s.
Lieutenant Commander Steve F. Rime. U. S. Navy—Though I obviously disagree with the view Captain Nelson puts forward, 1 believe that the publication of such controversial and provocative articles is in the best interest of both the Proceedings and the Navy.
The article boils down to the old assertion, familiar to naval officers, that those who know a little about several things, arc more fit to lead than those who have learned a great deal about some one thing—and often know a little about several other things as well. We
from a small naval observatory
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Comment and Disousslon 93
have verbalized this absurdity for so long, that it is, of course, no surprise that senior naval officers still believe it. This particular article again refuses to recognize that effective and capable leaders can and must emerge from the widest possible range of career patterns that the Navy can offer.
According to Captain Nelson, the "caliber of the man” is not as important as his career "experience,” which is the real determinant of his capability for future leadership. Only the "right” experiences can produce a future admiral. Such a narrow image of proper career management for future leaders might be likened to a three-ring circus. Stars arc made in the center ring. The other rings are necessary and must be tolerated but, being peripheral, they are not the place to steal the show. No center ring performer should ever do an act in the relative darkness of the supporting ring and he must never, never, permit the notion that the lesser luminaries there might have what it takes to run the show. The surface line officer, the "generalist” dwells in the center ring and, like a pre-selected God, absorbs the fruits of the labors of the "rascal” specialist, who timidly remains locked in "his place” in an outer ring, The generalist remains the only one in this circus-Navy, presumably because he has never wasted the time or energy required to become deeply knowledgeable about some one thing, ". . . who can put technical details into political perspective.” Incredible! Fortunately, recent flag selections reflect a wider (though still too narrow) appreciation in the Navy for expertise than is reflected in the article.
The mythology surrounding the concept of the generalist is a product of the past, when the line officer who had done little but ride ships was sufficiently qualified to "coordinate the experts.” His mettle proven at sea and in combat, he imposed his strong will and common sense. He was a good synthesizer. Things arc a little different today. The best men might not want to ride any kind of ship, surface ship or otherwise, for the vast part of their careers. Truly outstanding officers might not have to thwart their desires to fully develop some specific skill in order to master the broad, traditional facilities still needed
for a good naval leader. Today, when it is possible for an officer to be a Jack-of- all-trades and the master of one, at least, it is no longer in the Navy’s interest to propound the mythology of the generalist.
If there is a problem of rationalizing the increasing numbers of technicians and specialists with the institutional need of producing tomorrow’s naval leaders, it is a matter of properly assimilating the highly qualified naval officer rather than of forcing him aside into a dead-ended career pattern or of "leading” him. If our most talented naval officers are permitted the opportunity to become thoroughly qualified in some specific facet of the Navy’s effort, without jeopardizing their ability to stay in the mainstream of career development that will eventually qualify them for flag rank, we will produce fine modern naval leaders. It is precisely the narrow view of the "specialist” as one necessarily out of this mainstream that threatens our ability to produce a qualified naval leadership for the future.
Commander Norman T. Hanson, U. S. Navy— F.ducators recognize that the decade of the 1960s exhibited a frenzied concern for the development of scientific and technological specialists. The mere fact that a Russian Sputnik preceded American efforts in space led to damnation of the American educational system by some of our Navy’s super specialists. Nationwide pressure shoved every young blooded American toward the graduate degree. For instance, if a master’s in electrical engineering was good, a doctorate was better. In the last few years, however, some serious second thoughts have arisen. Many technical fields have found that we have created a pool of specialists so narrowly confined, that they are quite unable to function outside their specialty, and, in many cases they are unable to support the administration under which they were originally employed. Witness the degree of unemployment among the Boeing engineers in Seattle. Business and industry no longer seem to be hypnotized by the graduate degree. Apparently the prestigious graduate with newly-conferred sheepskin in hand, is
also questioning the market value of his degree.
For the first time universities are seriously considering offering doctoral options in general areas of preparation. Granted, advanced education, or more aptly put, continuing education, is desirable and in the military, necessary, should we not seriously reflect on the current trends espoused by our educators?
In the Navy we have seen the development of many exotic weapons systems, and for the use of these tools we must truly thank the specialist officer. But we must not wait for newer and greater secret weapons to win our wars, as did Hitler. Perhaps we are already over-committed in this regard. In our frenzy for bigger and better gadgets, have the specialists yet been able to provide an operational surface-to-surface missile of the caliber of the Styx, Gabriel, or Exocct? Or docs the tail tell the dog, that these little goodies offer no tactical threat?
Historically, the school of hard knocks has trained officers with a wealth of sea time and combat experience, in a blend which developed a skill in tactics and an appreciation for strategy. Surely, the spirit of Mahan is not dead, but how is the young officer of today’s Navy to be trained to become the strategist of tomorrow? There certainly is no school available for the junior officer, and it is rather naive to assume that the qualification "strategist cum laude” is bestowed from Olympus upon attainment of the rank of commander, or even captain. Reliance on a required professional reading list will not suffice, neither will a limited course at a War College, once commander is reached. The specialist is so completely involved in his technical field that he has little time and perhaps even less inclination to do study outside his field. He is simply too limited to become our future hope. What is needed then, in our shrinking Navy, is a concerted effort to challenge the junior line officer with a deep and continuing education, not only in the school of the sea, but also in tactics and strategy’, so that they may be better prepared to use the tools of the strategist in future wars. It would therefore seem prudent in the long run to provide that the training of the surface warfare specialist be given
94 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1972
the same priority and financial support that goes into our Nuke of aviation programs.
All too often we hear the statement "anyone can be a ship driver!” It is always voiced by a specialist or a civilian, never by a deep water sailor, and never in the time of war.
"Damage Control: Before,
(See C. F. Fischer, II, pp. 44-48, April 1972
explain Daniel S. Appleton, U. S. Navy (Retired)—To the author’s list of inadequacies, I would like to add the following:
With regard to human safety and effectiveness— Members of repair teams, as well as most of a typical ship’s company, still lack personal uniforms suitable for coping with violence. Their heavy steel helmets are designed for stopping bullets, not for protection against being smashed bodily into protruding steel edges and corners, nor for working overhead, nor for attachment of handsfree lights, nor for use with telephones (except with absurd modification), nor for wear with special clothing. The image of a "fighting man” in black dress shoes, "protected” by having his pants stuffed in his socks and cellulose tape around his too-small shirt collar, is nothing short of ludicrous. But the resulting hazard to his safety is undoubtedly far less serious than the impact on his sense of purpose and importance.
And it still seems essentially impossible to break down enough psychological barriers so that damage control and medical personnel will try hard to work in close harmony. Shipboard doctors seem rarely inclined to think and plan in terms of dealing with violence—to assume responsibility for minimizing the physiological effects of chemical, biological, or radiological weapons, or for the just-mentioned topic of human protection against violent shock. This means that such matters must be dealt with by people probably far less qualified, and eventually that other people will be unnecessarily hurt or killed.
When a ship’s wardroom is contemplated for use as a battle dressing sta
tion, there never seems to be provision for laying out medical implements and materials to be, at the same time, ready for use and protected from falling and scattering with even moderate motion of the ship. Such matters seem never to be addressed by medical inspections.
The Navy does not have many people left who have actually fought and lived through the all-out efforts of an enemy bent on destroying them and their ships. We try to learn what we can by such devices as battle problems. But how familiar is the scene where the investigating team enters the ruptured, smoke-filled, partially-flooded compartment and instantly reports, "Two men found dead,” without even a pretense of examination by anyone remotely qualified to pronounce death? If it happens in simulation, it will happen in real life.
With regard to the ability of ships to withstand violent physical shock—Some of our newest and best ships would be seriously and unnecessarily endangered by relatively moderate shock, such as caused by near-miss bombs or hits by small weapons. I have seen new ships undergoing explosive shock tests literally plastered, internally, with masking tape. Heavy equipment, safes, tools and tool chests, furniture, and test equipment arc too often left free in vital spaces to wreak potential havoc should the ship be picked up and shaken like a toy. Machinery space deck plates and gratings can play the roles of giant scythes. And all that is needed to prevent or greatly reduce the prospect of such chaos is forethought and some reasonably simple securing devices— simple but generally still beyond the do-it-yourself capacity of a ship like a destroyer.
Most Navy tenders and repair ships, although intended to be able to function in forward areas, have come to regard it as utterly impractical to maintain any semblance of security of their equipment and material against unexpected violent shock. Such ships may as well be merchantmen.
With regard to ability to cope with a general emergency in port—At 0200, with the liberty sections ashore, all the officer of the deck may initially hear about his newest spine-chilling problem could be, "Sir, I think I heard an explosion
down forward somewhere.” Since this is a warship, the OOD must assume the possibility of sabotage, and his actions must recognize the prospect of further violence not limited to his own ship. Somehow, he must make enormously efficient use of the very few personnel he is likely to have on board, to generate information about the scene of violence, deal with it, generate the ship’s own power, search and protect all of the ship’s interior, guard her perimeter, establish exterior communications, and generally transform his dark, quiet, empty, power-down ship into a taut and vibrant information system in a very few minutes. Impossible? Perhaps very nearly, but not necessarily if good procedures have been thoroughly worked out, if every available man has an individual assignment and knows it cold, and if thought has been given to special equipment requirements. "General quarters in port,” with a partial crew on board, is wholly distinct and highly demanding condition of readiness. And yet, the crews, equipment, and procedures for even our newest ships are still being designed around the supposition that in such situations, the personnel on board will be dispersed to their regular battle stations, or, except for a "Duty DC Team,” assembled on deck on call.
With respect to deciding how damage is to be controlled— The task of developing the "optimum” size and composition of the crews of new ships is running headlong into the basic problem of deciding what a repair party or damage control team is intended to be able to do. (Every man on board will cost the nation a quarter of a million dollars.)
Is a repair party really expected to erect shoring or repair machinery or ordnance, or mainly to localize damage and generate information? Should it be diverted to carrying battle messing rations, passing lines, or handling freight and ammunition? In an amphibious assault, should it be held on station during ship to shore operations when the ship is most vulnerable and in greatest danger? During Condition III, "at sea in wartime,” does it make sense to man weapons and not man at least an investigating team? All of these, and other questions like them, are being argued vigorously pro and con by people of extensive experience, and they still
lack any dear policy decisions.
These examples, like those, I am sure, cited by Lieutenant Commander Fischer, have been picked from a barrelful of similar or more serious damage control problems. I do not believe there is as simple an overall answer as giving the shipboard damage control officer the status of a department head. The underlying problems are deeper, and they extend into the guts of the matter of how the Navy intends its ships to be managed. Men will not be adequately protected against the violence of combat as long as the combat environment remains outside the purview of the Naval Uniform Board, nor until ship designers recognize that availability of special uniforms requires availability of a place to keep them (not under the deckplates in after steering). Ships will not become tough enough to withstand violence until the matter is regarded as of importance equal, for example, to that of habitability.
Damage control capabilities in port
and at sea will not substantially improve until decisions have been made about what a ship is intended to be able to do in these respects—and there is no central office or agency responsible for working out such decisions. And all of these matters of how intended capabilities, organizational assignments, procedures, equipment, and ship design should fit together are not likely to be efficiently resolved until some office or agency is made responsible for development and test of shipboard management as a whole. The material sophistication of our ships is simply outstripping our ability to manage them.
And Damage Control
Curtis C. Cordell— The most recent major shipboard disasters, which have rendered Fleet units non-opcrational and received the most publicity, were fires. This is but one aspect of the overall problem facing the damage control assistant.
In searching for the real problem, which is the point of departure for any change, it is necessary to analyze the functional design of a modern ship, be it a fighting or a support unit. No longer is there a "gang” in the sense of a "black gang.”* Ship design has evolved so that departments are now a group of related subsystems integrated into a major system. The composite of the major systems (engineering, ordnance, and the like) is the ship. This systems approach to ship design has led to some major efficiencies, but not all problems have yet been solved. Damage control is but one of these problems.
In order to function efficiently, the various systems must be controlled and maintained by personnel who understand the total department concept and the dependent relationships of one system to another. To demonstrate this
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Comment and Discussion 95
* See P. D. Rogers, '"Beefing up' the Black Gang." U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1972, pp. 93-95.
facet of a systems approach, let us examine the engineering system.
Recent ship design is based on the premise that efficiency must be increased, even though forces are reduced, so that the Navy can maintain an effective operational force. Manpower reductions are the area wherein the greatest savings can be made, and these reductions arc possible only when human functions become mechanized. Automation is the Navy’s method of cutting that particular Gordian knot. Within the engineering department this means a central control point, continuous system and equipment monitoring, computer control of recurring functions, and an automatic logging capability. Although this concept is relatively new to the Navy, it is nothing more than normal evolution. New design, for example, the Spruance-class (DD-963), incorporates these features and will produce a significant reduction in manning. The systems approach and automation are expected to continue in the design of all
future ship classes of the Navy.
The engineering system is divided into two primary operational subsystems—propulsion and auxiliaries, and damage control. Ship construction incorporates the control and monitoring functions of both subsystems in one compartment, although each system is independent of the other. Despite the distinction of system functions, the interrelationship between systems and mutual cross-effect of system on system necessitates a single point of control at department level. The Spruance fuel oil fill and transfer system is controlled at the damage control central position of the central control station, yet the major impact of the system lies in the propulsion and auxiliary machinery area. Equally, routine start and stop of the fire and bilge pumps, and the output indications from these pumps are on the propulsion and auxiliary control console. Yet their impact, from an importance standpoint, lies primarily in damage control.
The problem, therefore, resolves itself into determining the most effective level in the chain of command wherein functions may be efficiently separated. Although the actions at the scene in certain damage situations, fire being the best example, may be considered in isolation from all departments, nevertheless, the system operation of the total damage control team cannot be so isolated. To consider any of the examples so frequently used to illustrate the need for divorcing the damage control assistant from the engineering department is to ignore the concept of a system approach.
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96 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1972
Recent conferences and supportive studies indicate the basic problem lies not in the organization, but in the implementation of that organization. All too few naval personnel realize that a multi-million dollar weapons system, the ship in this instance, has no value unless she can be brought to bear in a timely manner. The cost of training the operators and maintenance personnel of
that weapons system is a complete waste unless the ship can remain operational. Herein is the key to damage control— keep the ship operational. Herein also is the key to the problem—place appropriate emphasis on damage control training. Rather than reorganize as a cure-all, it would be much more effective to perform a detailed analysis of the training problem and perform appropriate surgery in that area.
It is not the intent of this letter to discuss the how of damage control training, or attempt to analyze the problem in depth. Simply stated, there arc other, and perhaps better, methods of solving the Fleet’s problem with damage control than reorganizing. Let us, then, take the effective corrective measures now rather than postpone the inevitable by procrastination.
The Attack Helicopter
Lieutenant John C. Cook, Jr., U. S. Navy— Helicopter Attack (Light) Squadron Three (HA(L)-3), has been the Navy’s first and only experience with attack helicopter aviation, and during that time (the first HC-i detachments from early 1966, then HA(L)-3 since April 1967), the armed helicopter has repeatedly demonstrated its versatility and effectiveness. As of 1 January 1972 HA(L)-3 had chalked up the following accomplishments:
(Probable) 4,695 (Destroyed) 6,418 (Damaged) 2,319 (Destroyed) 4,010 (Damaged) 5,479 1,530
Enemy killed by air (Confirmed) 4,001
Enemy sampans Enemy structures Medical evacuations
The attack helicopter, as employed by HA(L)-3, is armed with 14 2.75-inch rockets, with a variety of optional warheads available for specific purposes, a copilot-controlled flex 7.62-mm. minigun, a door-mounted 50-calibcr machine gun (usually in lead aircraft), a door- mounted 7.62 mm. w-60 machine gun. In place of each rocket pod, a fuel air explosive (FAE) bomb may be carried, a seldom-used feature in Vietnam. In addition to these offensive weapons, several types of night illumination flares may be carried for night missions, marker flares, and smoke markers for target identification, CS (teargas) either
M-79-propelled or hand-dropped, and a starlight scope or night observation device with accompanying Xenon light can be rigged for night reconnaissance/ interdiction missions. The result is an extremely heavily-loaded helicopter, but even so, when the situation warranted, they have been successfully used for some emergency medical evacuations (Medlivacs).
There arc many things that the attack helo is not, however. It is not a replace
ment for fixed-wing attack aircraft, nor is cither fixed-wing or helicopter attack aircraft a replacement for artillery or ship’s guns. Yet, as a quick reaction, anti-personnel weapon, as employed by HA(L)-3, the attack helo has no equal. Its mobility, versatility, and intense firepower have made the attack helo extremely popular with allied riverine forces in Vietnam. The armed helo does not compete with fixed wing attack aircraft, since they operate in different
98 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1972
flight regimes. Helo attacks are generally commenced at about 1,200 feet above ground level (AGL) and broken off at or above 500 feet AGL. Normal patrols are flown at an altitude of 1,000 to 1,500 feet which, at 70 knots, yields a good examination of the territory under observation. When an area warrants very close scrutiny a low-level reconnaissance is conducted at 100 feet AGL or lower. Throughout all of these maneuvers, two extra sets of eyes, peering out from behind their machine guns, arc at work in the aft cabin area. This helo fire team can be deployed from small helo platforms on board barges or ships as well as from small bases ashore. This versatility and ability to deploy with almost any small size naval unit is not a capability that we should lightly cast aside. Yet, it appears that the Navy has not accepted the tenets of attack helicopter aviation. All Seawolf (HA(L)-3) gunships arc U. S. Army property and the Army provides the intermediate and depot level maintenance for these helicopters. Apparently, when HA(L)-3 departs Vietnam, the Navy has no future plans for helicopter gunships.
The Army’s commitment to attack helicopter aviation has already taken a quantum jump in sophistication and a different direction, but their reasons for these moves are based on a situation different from those that exist in the Navy. The Navy has its own organic fixed-wing attack air power, so the Huey Cobra (AH-i) and follow on gunships would not necessarily provide the same advantages for the Navy that they will for the Army. A more versatile helicopter than the specialized Cobra is needed for the Navy to justify their existence when not involved in a brownwater operation such as we have in the Mekong Delta. A basic airframe suggested by this writer would be the UH- 1N, a twin-engine version of the Huey. This type aircraft is recommended for several reasons, but primarily because there exists all of the hardware to incorporate the rocket system, minigun system, and bomb racks. This helo could be deployed on board destroyer type ships and be used for a plethora of tasks other than just attack. This helo requires low-maintenance man-hours per flight hour, is relatively unsophisticated, and simple to maintain, and with minor
modifications it would be ideally suited for a small detachment situation.
The DASH helo seems to have met with a rather infamous end, although it left a legacy of dash decks on board our destroyers. The LAMPS program witli manned helicopters appears to answer the unreliability problem of the dash drones, while further enhancing the capabilities of the ship/helo system by increasing the range of the shipboard antisubmarine sensors. A manned, unsophisticated helicopter without sensors deployed on board ship would not replace the LAMPS helo, but would be able to deliver an offensive antisubmarine weapon at the ship’s direction, would be able to provide gunspotting duties for the ship’s guns, would be able to conduct search and rescue operations, as well as the more mundane, but no less useful, utility duties involving person- nel/mail transfers and vertical replenishments. This helo would be extremely useful, much less expensive than the LAMPS helo, and could be easily converted to its attack role and transferred to another ship, ashore, or upriver when and where needed. This metamorphosis to an attack helo would not need to take more than mere minutes to accomplish.
At the present time, there are approximately 400 pilots in the Navy with attack helo experience, so this program need not suffer for lack of trained and experienced personnel. Since the Huey is employed by Helicopter Training Squadron 8 (HT-8) at the Naval Air Station, Ellyson Field, an attack helo flight training syllabus could be incorporated into helo flight training at Pensacola without much difficulty. There are officers there now eager to do just that. Fort Rucker, Alabama, the Army’s attack helo training center, is not far from Pensacola, so arrangements should be possible to borrow their expertise or gunnery ranges if their assistance is required. This attack training would further increase the attractiveness of helo aviation to flight students and would give a boost to the morale of helo pilots in general. The marriage between the nonaviation ship and the helicopter has been a most propitious one in the past and this program would further increase their usefulness to each other, while giving a new dimension to the Navy’s limited warfare capability.
India Plans a Naval Expansion
Ravi Rikhye— More by circumstance than by design, the Indian Navy is applying to its expansion program two of the new maxims of sea war: one, the sub- marine/antisubmarine battle has become the most important operation in sea war; and two, for reasons of economy and increasing vulnerability to submarine, air, and surface-to-surface missile attack, large warships will steadily be replaced by smaller units.
The Indian Army and Air Force rank fourth and sixth in the world, yet the Indian Navy is only 14th. India’s attention has traditionally been focused on its land frontiers, and so it was only two years ago that a long-range naval expansion plan was even drawn up.
The 1971 war dramatically focused attention on the need for a strong Indian Navy. The Navy’s performance during that war would have led to complacency instead of highlighting the need for a stronger Navy, however, had it not been for the USS Enterprise (CVAN- 65). Despite its small size (29 major warships), the Indian Navy blockaded East and West Pakistan, attacked the Pakistani main base at Karachi, countered enemy submarines, provided gunfire and air support to the Army, and conducted amphibious and riverine operations in the East. The Indian Navy so outclassed the smaller (12 major warships) Pakistan Navy, that making a case for a larger Navy in the face of limited budgetary resources would have been an exercise in futility.
Luckily, the Enterprise saved the Indian Navy from total obscurity. Until the 1971 war, the United States was regarded by the great majority of Indians as India’s firmest friend and mentor, li is unclear what the Enterprise was up to, but the trauma she engendered was second in scale only to the shock of the 1962 Chinese attack. Indians suddenly realized for all their strength on land and in the air, they were helpless in the face of great-power pressure from sea.
A ten-year buildup program, costing $1.2 billion had been drawn up prior to the war. Changes may now be expected in this program. While the exact sums of money to be spent on naval expansion arc still under debate, the Navy is formulating plans that call for the greatest return for the smallest investment.
The four primary requirements arc seen as: (1) the defense of the Indian sea frontier, including offshore islands; (2) control of the sub-surface in the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal; (3) control of the sea surface; and (4) a deterrent against big-power pressure.
The defense of the Indian sea frontier will be conducted by missile boats and ASW helicopters. The Indian Navy has 12 missile boats and two squadrons of ASW helicopters (one Sea King and one Alouettc). This force will be at least doubled.
The 25 submarines are seen as adequate to maintain sub-surface control; three squadrons of Tu-22 Blinder supersonic bombers are seen sufficient for surface control. Three Krivak-type Soviet DLGs with long-range surface-to- surface were originally favored for a deterrent force; but with the advent of the considerably smaller and cheaper, but equally potent Nanuchukas, the Navy’s attention is being directed towards this type. Though the SS-N-9
carried by the Nanuchukas has less range than the Shaddock, for India’s purposes nine Nanuchukas arc more of a deterrent than three Krivaks.
Self-sufficiency is the keynote. The missile boats will be Indian-designed (perhaps with the help of a European designer) and produced; four more submarines will be procured from the Soviet Union to supplement the four already in commission, but plans are being drawn up for manufacture in India. The British Oberon-class submarine is favored, but cost considerations may, however, swing the choice to a Soviet type. The jet bombers and missile ships will be purchased abroad, with the Soviets the only logical source.
Frigates, which will remain as allpurpose ships, are already under production in India. The first of six Leander- class ships was recently commissioned. The others will follow at yearly intervals from 1974. Four additional ships will probably be added, though the weapons fit may be changed soon. These ships
will supplement the eight newer frigates, but since the Navy is pleased with the five Petyas, it is possible more will be acquired to accelerate replacement of the eight old destroyers and frigates in the fleet.
The Navy is watching Pakistani efforts to install surface-to-surface missiles on frigate/destroyer types. It is believed the Pakistanis have encountered severe problems, perhaps with the integration of the missile system’s electronics. If feasible, at reasonable cost, India will fit a missile like the Exocet on its frigates.
Two squadrons of maritime reconnaissance aircraft, increases in amphibious capability, perhaps to brigade lift size, and a Marine Corps, are all in prospect. The choice of aircraft seems to be between the Nimrod and the Atlantic; amphibious ships will almost certainly be Soviet types.
The Riddle of the Sands
by Erskine Childers LIMITED EDI TIO N
If you know The Riddle of the Sands you will welcome the appearance of this exquisitely produced new illustrated edition.
If this is your introduction to what has become one of the great classics in nautical literature, a rare reading experience is in store for you.
The Riddle qf the Sands is the story of two British yachtsmen whose small boat explorations of the treacherous and mysterious Frisian Islands of Germany in the early 1900s led them into danger and intrigue and gradually unfolded a momentous discovery. Although a work of fiction, the plot of this convincing narrative had a very real effect on British naval plans.
To those who love a good sea story The Riddle of the Sands is a wonderfully written talc of adventure. To anyone who has ever cruised in sailing yachts it is a story of an unusual aspect of small boat seamanship that will be read again and again.
This edition, published by the Imprint Society in a limited, numbered edition of 1950 copies, is handsomely illustrated with black-and-white and color wood block prints, is bound in quarter leather, and is presented in a decorative slip-case.
Publisher’s List Price: $35.00. Member’s Price: $28.00.
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Comment and Discussion 99
Two basic problems remain. One, though the Navy accepts the fact that for financial reasons there will be no
more aircraft carriers, it has yet to decide what to do with its single CVL, and has yet to examine seriously the DH (sea control ship or mini-carrier) proposal. The Navy is very keen on the Harrier, but really has no place to put it: 20 aircraft for a single CVL hardly constitutes a viable program. If the Tu-22 squadrons were replaced by DHs, India would have, together with the amphibious ships, a small projection force capability that would greatly boost its influence in the Indian Ocean.
India’s defense planners show no indication of appreciating the ambitions in the Indian Ocean call for a Navy far larger than the force currently envisaged. Despite the Enterprise, there is still lack of widespread awareness about the need for a strong Navy. The Soviets have learned that real influence lies with possessing a significant navy. India still has to understand this, and continues to focus the greater part of its attention on the more immediate problems of its north and west land frontiers.
"The Naval Officer’s Career—
'Exigencies of the Service’”
(See R. H. Smith, pp. 18-26, October 1971;
and pp. 94-95, April 1972 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander C. William Stamm, U. S. Natal Reserte-R— Attractiveness in a military career depends on far more than increased pay. I have spent the last several years as personnel officer for a museum where the salary scales are far below the rates paid for comparable jobs in the geographic area, and yet we have no problem recruiting and retaining qualified people. The appeal is not monetary, just as the problems of a naval career will not be solved with money alone.
My experience over a period of 17 years in the Reserves has been that the Navy insists that it come first in the officer’s affections, with family and non-Navy relations, poor seconds. One comes to work on Saturday to do paperwork—not because it needs to be done on Saturday, but because the command
ing officer is on board. As a bachelor, I had no place else to go and did not mind being on board seven days a week. As a married man with a family, however, I feel a greater obligation to my family than I do to my job.
Captain Smith places much emphasis on the mobility of the naval career and the excitement of not knowing where one will be a few years hence. Is he unaware of the mobility of the younger civilian population, both within a given company and by means of changing employers? I am with my third employer and third geographic move since leaving the Service nine years ago. No one, military or civilian, can say with confidence "what milestones, what jobs, what desk, and what home may be theirs through the full course of their lives.”
This facsimile edition of a work first published over one hundred years ago, is a contemporary account of the laying of the Atlantic cable.
The initial planning and earliest attempts are described in detail, and throughout the narrative appear glimpses of many historical figures including Samuel F. B. Morse, Colonel Samuel Colt, Cyrus Field, William Henry Seward, the Earl of Carlisle, President James Buchanan, and Queen Victoria.
Among the expectations of that day was the hope that the cable would be a conservator of peace: “What justification could there be for war, when the disarming message, when the full explanation, when the genial and healing counsel may be wafted even across the mighty Atlantic, quicker than the sunbeam’s path and the lightning’s flash?”
There are 26 detailed and delightfully rendered illustrations including H.M.S. Agamemnon laying the cable: A whale crosses the line and The Great Eastern at Sheerness: Visit of H.R.H. The Prince of Wales.
117 pages. List price: $12.50 Member’s price: $10.00
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A career naval officer tends to become predominantly preoccupied with his job and his career—and is at a loss to understand why the rest of the world does not view him or his Navy in the same light as he does.