The first gray fingers of the false dawn reveal the choppy waters of the Baltic Sea. On board the darkened landing craft of the multinational task force, gongs suddenly beat out General Quarters, galvanizing into action the Soviet, Polish, and East German ships’ crews and Marines. The task force has been discovered as it neared the “enemy” shore. The shore defense system is now on the alert.
Ashore, fire controlmen of coastal missile and gun batteries turn on their radars and search their scopes for the telltale blips of the task force ships. In the offshore area, “enemy” fast patrol boats appear suddenly and converge on the landing ships in simulated torpedo attacks. A “fire” breaks out in the tank hold of a ship and damage control parties race to control it.
Farther ashore, tense air controllers are scrambling fighters.
Having lost the element of surprise, the task force commander throws his Sunday punch at the shore. Miniature mushroom clouds rise over the main strong-points of the beach defense as the task force’s tactical nuclear-tipped missiles explode. A flight of “friendly” Polish tactical fighters swoop down to engage the shore defense fighters before they can gain altitude. Ships’ guns wake up and begin eliminating the remaining shore targets.
The amphibious task force has stopped. The doors of the landing ships come open, and amphibious tanks and armored personnel carriers head for shore. Above them Polish helicopters appear and outpace the seaborne armor. The choppers swing in over the beaches, machine guns spitting, and bounce down on the sand. Polish underwater demolition teams and combat engineers race from the helicopters. The frogmen plunge into the water and begin searching for underwater obstacles. On the beach, combat engineers, using detonating cord, blast paths through the defensive wire.
Deep inland, Czechoslovakian paratroopers airlifted by Soviet transport aircraft are dropping in a landing that has been coordinated with the sea assault. They attack and seize crucial road junctions, beach exits, railroad bridges, and potential strongpoints.
By now, the amphibious tanks and APCs have reached the beaches. The tanks lurch on toward the main line of beach defenses, but the APCs halt and disgorge their complements of Soviet, Polish, and East German Marines. Three battalions of Marines have landed on a regimental front. A fourth battalion of Soviet Army troops remains on board the landing ships as a floating reserve. The steel-helmeted Marines of three nations charge across the sand toward their objectives. From the Soviet sector, floating across the water comes the echoes of the deep-throated Russian “Ur-a! . . . Ur-a! . . .”
In his command post on board the amphibious assault command ship, the Russian task force commander listens to the terse reports coming into his radio receivers in a babble of Russian, some of it Polish and German accented. He smiles broadly at his surrounding staff. The initial phase of the landing operation of the 1969 Warsaw Pact exercise “Oder-Neisse” has been carried out successfully. The Marines are ashore and have gained their objectives.
This simulated combat landing, carried out by the joint forces of the U.S.S.R. and its Northern Tier allies of the Warsaw Pact, highlights the rebirth of the Soviet Marine Corps or “Naval Infantry.”[1] It also reveals the remarkable growth in scope and sophistication of the Warsaw Pact’s amphibious capability.
For reasons never stated officially by the Soviets, their Marine Corps, which had been created as a branch of the Soviet Navy during World War II, did not long survive that conflict. The Corps was abolished—possibly in the early 1950s. With equal mystery, the Marines were reactivated in the early 1960s just before the fall of Khrushchev.
The clues for the deactivation and reactivation of the Marines are meager. A Soviet naval manual, dated 1947, reveals that the Marines as a branch were then subordinate to the Naval Coastal Defense Service. A semiofficial Soviet naval dictionary published in 1959 defines the Marines as follows: “Morskaia pekhota: A special branch of troops in foreign armed forces. In our armed forces, the morskaia pekhota is a special branch of the Navy intended for use in naval amphibious landings. At present, this branch of the armed forces is abolished.”
Thus, the Marines were deactivated no earlier than 1947 and no later than 1959. In this regard, it is worth noting that a survey of the Soviet military press from the mid-1950s to 1963 shows that all references to Marines during this time were either historical accounts or descriptions of foreign Marine Corps. Beginning in 1963, however, articles and photographs in this same press related to contemporary Marines.
The Marines’ hiatus is alluded to in an article written in 1965 by a professional Soviet Marine officer, Guards Lieutenant Colonel Laletin, who noted—“Soviet Marines, who constantly improve, have not yet become what they were 20 years ago.” Laletin went on to describe how Marine veterans of World War II are often invited to visit contemporary Marine units and to relate their war stories and experiences.
Laletin’s article was one of a series that covered the activities of past and present Marines. Since their reactivation, the Soviet Marines have been the recipients of an unusually intense publicity campaign clearly planned to create a high esprit de corps.
What are they like—today’s Soviet “Soldiers of the Sea?”
Photographs in the current Soviet military press show the Marines to be husky, tough-looking, eager young men commanded by relatively youthful officers. Their distinctive uniform stands out in sharp contrast to the drab utilitarian uniform of the Soviet Army soldier.
The Soviet Marine wears a blue-black uniform consisting of a beret, jacket, and breeches tucked into shiny black boots. His open-at-the-throat jacket reveals the traditional blue and white striped undershirt of the Russian seaman, and his beret is worn rakishly on one side. Officers’ rank insignia is worn on shoulder boards, noncommissioned officers and enlisted men wear theirs on their sleeves. In the field, a steel helmet replaces the beret.
Marine officers and noncommissioned officers have Army-type ranks—e.g., captain, major, senior sergeant, while non-rated men are called “seaman.” These ranks suggest a fixed table of organization structure, unlike that of World War II, when Marine units were often raised as ad hoc units, and their officers and men retained their naval ranks and titles until late in the war.
The Soviet Marines are armed with standard infantry weapons, including machine guns, mortars, and the highly efficient AK-47 rifle. They have been observed manning multi-tubed rocket-launchers, amphibious tanks, and APCs. However, little is yet known of Soviet Marine artillery, beachmaster personnel, air and naval bombardment liaison, or helicopter units.
The Soviet Marine Corps today numbers about 15,000. This seems quite small until one recalls that the 17,000-man U. S. Marine Corps of 1937—smaller at the time than the New York City police department—expanded over the next seven years to a wartime strength of more than 500,000. Soviet Marines are divided among the four major Soviet fleets, with each fleet having available within its area of operation the approximate equivalent of a U. S. Marine Corps Regimental Landing Team or a British Royal Marine Commando brigade. There is no known Marine formation higher than brigade, although a division could be formed if need be by combining the individual fleet Marine forces and perhaps by adding the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact amphibious forces, i.e., the East Germans and Poles.
Marine training, as might be expected of an elite corps, is hard and demanding, and resembles U. S. Marine “boot” training.
A Soviet Marine colonel, has described the training of junior Marine officers in a way that suggests they are recruited from other services or branches of the Navy. He noted that the candidates from general troop schools “do not have the special knowledge and traits needed by a member of the Marine Corps.” These candidates, once selected, are given special Marine training with an emphasis on map-reading, reconnaissance, boat-handling, ship familiarization, and weapons training, using all organic weapons. The candidates are required to be trained in unarmed combat and parachute jumping.
The reactivation of the Marines has resulted in a spurt of development in the design and production of modern landing ships, the lack of which was a serious limiting factor in Soviet amphibious operations during World War II. Currently, the Soviet Navy is deploying the new 4,000-ton, Alligator-class landing ship, which has accommodations for an entire Marine battalion below flecks and space for from 20 to 25 tanks, APCs or vehicles on deck. The fleet also has the older and smaller Polnocni-class landing ships with a capacity for a Marine company and from eight to ten vehicles. Soviet landing ships are manned by naval personnel, not Marines, although the latter have auxiliary duties, such as damage control, while on passage.
The nerve center of the Soviet amphibious task force is the assault command ship, which is equipped with the latest communications gear and manned by mixed complements of naval personnel and Marines. Embarked on the ship are staff specialists in embarkation-debarkation, air and naval gun support liaison teams, communications and intelligence officers, and staff radiological specialists. These latter officers work out nuclear detonation and fall-out parameters that might affect the conduct and outcome of the planned landings.
In addition to tactical nuclear weapons, current Soviet amphibious doctrine lays great stress upon naval shore bombardment and tactical air support. The Soviets clearly recognize the dangers of a conventional “gun gap.” They realize that nuclear weapons may leave untouched many small defense nodes that must be knocked out by conventional artillery and air strikes. The task force, therefore, has a naval bombardment support element as part of its composition.
Despite the deployment of the ASW helicopter carriers, Moskva and Leningrad, the Soviet Navy currently does not have strike aircraft carriers in its inventory. For this reason, it depends upon land-based aircraft for air support. This dependence for air support upon land-based aircraft presents no problem in the contiguous seas such as the Baltic, Black, and Arctic Seas, and the Pacific Ocean. It does, however, represent a serious limitation for overseas operations. Despite the lack of strike carriers, contemporary Soviet naval writers are keenly aware of the importance of air support in amphibious warfare. Earlier Soviet naval specialists tended to disparage the role of strike carriers and close tactical air support. This scornful attitude has disappeared.
Current Soviet combined operations capabilities appear to be limited to tactical landings. These landings are mounted to seize local objectives or to provide support of Army elements operating in coastal theaters of war. By joining forces with their Warsaw Pact allies, the Soviets have been able to carry out regimental landings in the Baltic. Less is known of their capabilities in the Black Sea where the estrangement of the Romanians in recent times has vitiated Warsaw Pact cooperation in the Southern Tier. The Soviets have also conducted tactical landing exercises in areas outside of the Warsaw Pact perimeter, namely, by the Northern and Pacific fleets.
Marines are not a new phenomenon in Russian naval history. Marines have existed as a separate corps since 1705 when Peter the Great created them simply by transferring two regiments of foot soldiers from the Army to the newly created Baltic Fleet. Marines were employed by the Russians throughout the 18th and early 19th centuries. They participated in the capture of the Prussian naval fortress of Kolberg during the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) and in the overseas Mediterranean campaigns of Spiridiov, Ushakov, and Seniavin. At Sevastopol during the Crimean War, (1853-1856), and again at Port Arthur during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), the immobilization and destruction of Russian ships resulted in the raising of ad hoc Marine units formed from supernumerary ships’ crews who fought ashore as infantry and artillerymen.
In World War I, a Baltic Fleet Marine regiment was formed, elements of it fighting in the only significant Russian landing in the Baltic during the war—the tactical landing at Roen-Domesnes in October 1916. The landing had as its purpose the support of the Russian Sixth Army, which was deployed on the southern littoral of the Baltic. Marines of the Baltic Fleet also fought a rear guard action on Oesel Island during Operation Albion, the highly successful German strategic landing on the Moon Island archipelago in October 1917 on the eve of the Bolshevist takeover.
In the Black Sea, the Russians carried out a successful tactical landing in the Atina-Meprava area of the Turkish Anatolian shore in 1916. The landing aided Russian Army forces driving on Trebizond. It was followed by an even more ambitious undertaking—the sea-lift of an entire Russian Army corps from southern Russia to Anatolia in the same year. This operation ensured the capture of Trebizond. Russian Marines also fought Bulgarians in the Danube Delta.
Toward the end of World War I, the Russian Imperial General Headquarters (Stavka) planned first to create an entire Marine division and then a Marine Corps for possible operations against the Turkish Straits or Anatolia. These plans were frustrated by the lack of trained Marine cadres and the outbreak of the Revolution.
During the Civil War, the Red forces fighting on the Southern Front created a Marine division in order to defeat General Peter Wrangel’s White Army by carrying out a series of amphibious landings. However, the Whites, in general, were more successful in mounting amphibious operations including the final seaborne withdrawal from the Crimea, which ended the Civil War.
Marines were not a part of the nascent Red Fleet during the 1920s and early 1930s. They reappeared, however, during the Russo-Finnish War of 1939-1940 when an Independent Special Rifle Brigade was activated in the Baltic Fleet and deployed against the Finns.
At the outset of World War II, the Marines were rapidly expanded for the same reasons they had appeared in the Crimean War and at Port Arthur. The rapid German and Axis offensives against the Baltic and Black Sea littorals and against Murmansk bottled up many Soviet ships in besieged naval bases. Their officers and crews went ashore to form ad hoc Marine units.
Admiral Nikolai I. Krylov, a participant in the siege of Odessa, described the process of Marine activation as follows:
“Our military terminology of the time did not include the concept of ‘Marines.’ The Odessa Naval Base designated its Red Fleet regiments simply as the First and Second Naval Regiments. But these units were, in fact, Marines, probably some of the very first of the war.”
The nature of Marine operations during the war reflected the fortunes of Russian arms generally. Prior to 1944, they were engaged primarily in the defense of naval bases and in spoiling attacks to relieve the pressure of Axis offensives. Examples of these operations include the defense of the Odessa and then Sevastopol naval bases and the naval landing carried out at Grigovievka in September 1941, the latter operation featuring the use of naval paratroops in a coordinated sea and air landing. When the pendulum began to swing against the Axis in 1944, Marines were used in offensive landings in support of the Red Army. By the eve of the German surrender in Europe, the Soviets were able to mount the Frisch-Herrung landing in East Prussia. Spearheaded by Marines, this operation approached the magnitude of the strategic landings carried out by the Western allies.
In the Soviet Union’s brief but profitable summer war with Japan in 1945, Marine units of the Pacific Ocean Fleet were instrumental in the capture of Japanese-held ports in North Korea, thereby laying the foundation for the political partition of Korea. They also participated in the occupation of southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, which were ceded to the Soviet Union in the postwar peace settlements.
By the end of World War II, the Soviet Union had large Marine contingents as an organic part of its armed forces—125,000 in the Baltic, 60,000 in the Black Sea, 40,000 in the Northern Fleet, and 143,000 in the Pacific. The ad hoc Seamen’s Detachments of the early days had given way to formal tables of organizations which included “Marine Brigades,” “Naval Rifle Brigades,” “Independent Marine Regiments,” and “Independent Marine Battalions.” A Marine brigade consisted of from four to six rifle battalions and from one to two artillery battalions, with attached mortar, service, and administrative units. Naval rifle brigades were made up of three rifle battalions, two artillery battalions, a mortar battalion, and attached units. Later in the war, both types of brigades received organic tank companies.
The Soviets admit that Marine performance in the early phases of World War II left much to be desired. Marine units were hastily raised, often without preliminary training and were inadequately armed. Cooperation between the Marines and their supporting naval and air units was spotty. The most serious shortcoming was the persistent lack of specialized landing craft and ships. These gaps in equipment, training, and know-how led to such early disasters as the ill-fated Novyi Peterhof Landing in October 1941, near Leningrad, in which almost the entire assaulting unit was wiped out.
During the second half of the war, Soviet amphibious operations improved noticeably. Marine commanders began to carry out careful preliminary reconnaissance, including hydrographic surveys. Communications, liaison, and air and naval gun support improved. The Marines received tanks. Operations were carefully planned and preceded by briefings and dress rehearsals. At the war’s end, the Marines had become an effective, highly motivated, and specialized branch. They had acquired a rich store of experience.
Yet, by the mid-1950s, the Marines had disappeared. Why?
One must recall that in the postwar period, Stalin, the unquestioned dictator and the arbiter of all policy, was already being stalked by paranoia. He developed and expounded ideological theories in matters of linguistics and economics. He also articulated a theory of five basic factors in achieving victory in war—any war—out of his World War II experiences. Stalin was primarily a traditionalist, who favored large conventional forces and who tended to scorn the revolutionary armaments that had had their genesis during the war. Thus, he denigrated the atomic bomb although Soviet scientists were working feverishly to end the West’s nuclear monopoly.
Inevitably, a reaction against Stalin’s static theories developed with a clique of military officers. This clique based its strategic conceptions upon the military revolution that came out of and followed World War II. It stressed nuclear armaments and missiles. Theoretically, these weapons could provide for Soviet security, make possible a “forward” foreign policy and permit considerable reductions in the costs of military hardware and manpower. Following the death of Stalin, Khrushchev, his successor, embraced the new strategy enthusiastically. The nuclear-missile forces of the Soviet Union were given first priority in the formulation of strategy, and the conventional forces, including the Navy, were cut back. The effect upon amphibious warfare capabilities was devastating. Fleet Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, writing in 1967, described the results of the Soviet “New Look” on combined operations.
“In opposition to the views accepted in the early postwar years defining joint operations with ground troops as one of the Navy’s primary missions, views were advanced that completely denied the need for the Navy to cooperate with ground troops in the conduct of combat operations. According to these views, it was considered that ground troops having nuclear weapons would not need support from the sea, since they could overcome any water obstacles in the way of their own forces or even attack an enemy fleet that attempted to strike blows at them from the sea.
“It was even considered that amphibious landings had completely lost their importance and that the tasks that they had carried out formerly would be accomplished by airborne assaults or by the armored amphibious personnel carriers of ground troops.”
The new school of strategy held that amphibious operations of the scale conducted during World War II were an impossibility in the nuclear age. Seaborne landings would be vulnerable at every stage: embarkation, passage, debarkation and follow-up. Only the missile-equipped vessels (especially submarines) and missile-carrying naval bombers were deemed worthy of continued development. Given this climate of thought, which had Khrushchev’s backing, it was not surprising that the Soviet Marine Corps was neglected and presumably deactivated in the 1950s.
Possibly the nadir of Soviet strategic thought concerning combined operations was reached with the publication, in 1962, of a definitive work on Soviet strategy—Voennaia Strategiia (Military Strategy)—produced under the editorship of Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky. The collective authors of the work did not number a single naval officer among the individuals cited and the subject of amphibious warfare was not even mentioned. For this oversight, shortly after its publication, the work was taken to task by an articulate Soviet Navy spokesman, Admiral V. A. Alafuzov, who pointed out that the work ignored a basic Soviet strategic principle, i.e., that occupation of the enemy’s homeland was a prerequisite to victory.
By 1962, the poverty of the nuclear-missile strategy had been amply demonstrated by the Cuban Missile Crisis, the showdown over Berlin, and the Taiwan Straits Crisis. Nuclear parity had not achieved Soviet foreign policy aims. The Soviet High Command, headed by Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, was apparently restive over the downgrading of the traditional forces. Alafuzov’s objections did not fall on deaf ears. In the 1963 edition of Sokolovsky’s book, the collective authors provided a hasty apologetic revision. They wrote:
“In developing the Navy, one must take into account the mission of combined operations with the ground forces and above all make provision for amphibious operations.”
By this time, other spokesmen had taken up cudgels defense of the Navy. Even Admiral Gorshkov spoke out. Thus, it does not appear to be a coincidence that the Soviet Marines were reactivated shortly after Alafuzov’s protest. Fed up with Nikita Khrushchev’s uninspired tinkering with strategy, the naval hierarchy apparently laid down the law to Marshal Malinovsky and to Soviet premier Khrushchev himself.
Although the Soviet Navy spokesmen never mentioned it, they must have been influenced by the flexibility and effectiveness of the U. S. Marine Corps and the Royal Marines in crisis-control situations such as Suez, Lebanon, Aden, and during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
The downfall of Khrushchev did not signal a complete rejection of the nuclear missile strategy. The predominance of missiles as the big stick in Soviet military policy remained. But from 1963 forward, Soviet amphibious experts were given a voice in the Soviet military press to expound their theories and proposals. Because of the Soviet ideological rejection of “limited war” on the grounds of its being escalatory and tainted with imperialism, Soviet military and naval writers have not seized on limited or local war as a justification for their renewed interest in combined operations. Rather, they have stressed the role of Marines in modern nuclear warfare, avoiding, however, extreme statements.
In 1963, the year of the Marine reactivation, Captain First Rank N. R V’iunenko produced a long article entitled “Modern Amphibious Landings” in the Soviet naval journal Morskoi Sbornik. In it, he pointed out that nuclear weapons may have had radical effects on all forms of combat but have not ruled out amphibious landings. Such landings, as maintained, are essential in the nuclear era for seizing critical maritime objectives such as islands, naval bases and ports. Landing forces are also useful in penetrating the loose defenses that characterize nuclear war. By maintaining high rates of advance and by closing rapidly with the enemy, mobile Marine units can avoid devastating nuclear retaliatory strikes. Thus, along with mechanized Army and airborne units, they have a definite nuclear war role.
V’iunenko admitted the difficulties that potential nuclear strikes imposed on combined operations at all phases, but offered a number of countermeasures. During the vulnerable embarkation stage, he suggested extensive use of camouflage, dispersed anchorages, and tight security. Passage at sea could be safeguarded by using high-speed transports and landing ships and by employing open maneuvering formations. Speed was also an essential element in debarkation; hence, he favored the use of helicopters, which permit rapid transit of troops from ship to shore. He recommended combat-loading of ships to avoid mix-ups in debarkation.
The Soviet captain called for simultaneously executed airborne landings in conjunction with the main sea landing in order to confuse the enemy and to seize vital objectives. Another tactic proposed by him was the landing of troops on a broad front and in great depth, although in this regard, he admitted that too great a dispersion could turn out to be self-defeating.
Generally, V’iunenko favored small tactical landings over larger ones, basing his preference on the vulnerability of large landings to nuclear strikes and on the greater logistical demands implicit in them. However, he left the door open to consideration of large strategic landings in subsequent phases of a nuclear war. He wrote: “Later, when the nuclear capability of the warring sides is reduced and the armed conflict slows down, one can expect the debarkation of major landing forces to decide operational missions.”
In this last statement, V’iunenko appeared to be echoing Admiral Alafuzov.
In 1966, another Soviet amphibious specialist, Admiral Iu. A. Pantaleev discussed combined operations, under nuclear conditions, in Morskoi Sbornik. He pointed out that there were a number of schools of thought on the subject. One school felt that nuclear-missile weapons had ruled out amphibious landings. A second school believed that they would be replaced by airborne landings. A third school favored the old-fashioned strategic landing. As an adherent of a fourth school, Pantaleev took up a position similar to that of V’iunenko. He called for tactical landings carried out by highly mobile forces using hydrofoil and air-cushion craft as well as high-speed landing ships. He favored helicopters as well. He felt that tactical nuclear weapons could substitute for heavy conventional artillery and air bombardment in the reduction of well-established shore defense systems, but admitted that foreign navies were continuing to stress conventional gun support of landings.
Pantaleev approved of combined sea and airborne landings, but warned that an early link-up between the two forces was essential since the airborne forces were inherently weaker. He did not take a stand on the question of night-versus-day operations, but indicated that the specific situation should dictate the time of the landing.
Pantaleev had decided views on command and control functions in an amphibious operation. He insisted on a clearly defined chain of command. He also made the wise suggestion of calling for amphibious assault command ships to be camouflaged as ordinary auxiliary ships in order to prevent them from being singled out for enemy strikes.
Many of V’iunenko’s and Pantaleev’s suggestions and comments have been embodied in recent combined operations exercises carried out by the Soviet Fleet and Warsaw Pact Navies.
Since the reactivation of the Marines, Western military and naval analysts have speculated concerning the significance for the reappearance of the blue-bereted naval troops. Here, again, there are two definite schools of thought—and a cautious group of analysts who prefer to wait and see what the Soviets are up to.
One school holds that the Soviet Marines are presently organized and constituted as special purpose troops intended for limited missions in a given Soviet maritime theater, i.e., in the contiguous seas. This school believes that the lack of strike aircraft carriers, the small size of the Soviet Marine Corps, and budgetary limitations rules out the use of the Marines in an overseas crisis role such as those assigned to the U. S. Marine Corps or Britain’s Royal Marine Commandos.
A diametrically opposed school sees just such a future threat to be posed by Soviet Marines in a political and military crisis situation such as Cuba, Lebanon, Suez, and the Dominican Republic. These analysts point to the potential growth of the blue berets. They do not consider the lack of strike aircraft carriers an impediment, since the Soviets could at any time begin construction of such carriers. Moreover, the Soviet Navy could also convert its helicopter ASW carriers—the Moskva and the Leningrad—to “pocket carriers” by putting V/STOL aircraft aboard them. Failing these alternatives, the Soviet Fleet could depend upon shore-based aircraft operating from friendly countries. This school of analysts is apprehensive about the possible employment of Soviet Marines in the Third World.
The fence-sitters are reluctant to commit themselves to a Cassandra attitude toward the Marines. They point out, however, that the overall Soviet strategy is increasingly oriented toward the sea and mobility, in contrast to the age-old Russian dependence upon land power.
The Soviets themselves are enigmatic (possibly deliberately so) on the present and future missions of the blue berets. Guards Lieutenant Colonel Laletin has contrasted their role with that of the U. S. Marines, whom he castigates as “blind agents of the imperialists, . . . a weapon of aggression and colonial encroachment . . . a gendarme and police force.” He added sanctimoniously, “The Soviet Marines are assigned the performance of completely different missions.”
This bald statement would appear to rule out the use of the Marines as an overseas crisis-control force. However, Laletin went on to qualify his statements cryptically. He wrote:
“At present, the importance of landing forces in the defense of the socialist motherland and brotherly countries from aggression has grown significantly for the defense of state interests of the U.S.S.R. in naval theaters. Our fleet in the struggle with aggressors must be active and ready to conduct all types of offensive operations including those of landing forces.”
Here, the key phrases are “brotherly countries” and “for defense of state interests.” The first phrase could be understood as a reference to the Warsaw Pact, on the one hand, or the Soviet Union’s overseas allies such as Castro or the Arab nations, on the other. The phrase “for defense of state interests” has been pointed out by a contributor to the Proceedings as a cliché that hints at an expanded naval strategy.[2] Thus, Laletin may have left the door open for a future and more ambitious Marine role.
The growing importance and scale of combined operations in the Soviet Navy have been amply demonstrated by recent naval exercises. For example, Exercise “Sever,” carried out in 1968, consisted of widely separate operations conducted in the Baltic, Arctic, Barents, and North seas and in the North Atlantic.[3] It included two amphibious landings—one a Warsaw Pact exercise mounted presumably in Poland and the second—an all-Soviet landing on the Rybachii Peninsula near Murmansk.
“Sever” followed hard on the heels of a NATO exercise—“Polar Express”—conducted in Norway by combined air, ground and naval units.[4] The anti-NATO orientation of “Sever” was indicated by a Soviet naval observer, Vice Admiral N. I. Smirnov, who wrote:
“The countries making up NATO have carried out during the first half of this year more exercises and maneuvers than occurred during the course of an entire year formerly. The exercise ‘Polar Express,’ which took place in northern Norway, was of a particularly provocative nature. No one has any doubt that it was directed against the socialist countries.”
The Baltic landing of “Sever” resembled that of “Oder-Neisse” described at the beginning of this article. It was carried out by a “Western” task force that obviously represented a NATO amphibious thrust against the Northern Tier of the Warsaw Pact. While on passage, the Western force was detected and attacked by Eastern submarines, aircraft, fast patrol boats, and shore missile batteries. Despite severe losses in the scenario action, the Westerners succeeded in seizing a beachhead.
The Westerners received high marks from Smirnov, who wrote, “There was a rapid operation by the Marines, who carried out a landing on the ‘Easterners’ shore. Aircraft and surface ships supporting the debarkation performed their mission in a highly qualitative manner.”
Fleet Admiral Gorshkov, the commander-in-chief of the Soviet Fleet, and nominal controller of the exercise, was reported to have been highly pleased by the Baltic landing. Captain First Rank M. Novikov, a naval correspondent, noted:
“He [Gorshkov] observed in particular the coordination of the three allied fleets in the exercise, the speed of their offensive and the growing skill of the landing ship commanders. The exercise controller thanked the Polish aviators, who had demonstrated during their combat operations excellent flying skill and a fine knowledge of aviation and tactical ability.”
A third Soviet naval observer commented:
“High naval training was demonstrated by the crews of the landing ships and by the Marines. They completed an extended voyage under storm conditions, beat off an ‘enemy’ sea attack and overcame the powerful system of his anti-landing defenses. Along with their Polish and German comrades, they audaciously assaulted the shore.”
Despite this excellent performance, the Westerners, once ashore, were not favored in the exercise scenario. Weakened by the Easterners’ continuing air attacks they were unable to hold their beachhead. Presumably ideological factors played a part here, since the Easterners were clearly the good guys while the Western Marines were figuratively the guys in the black hats.
Less was reported in the Soviet press on the Arctic Sea landing which appeared to simulate a NATO attack on the Rybachii Peninsula, presumably with the purpose of knocking out the main naval base of the Red Banner Northern Fleet near Murmansk.
The “Sever” and “Oder-Neisse” exercises, along with previous earlier amphibious maneuvers conducted in Bulgaria by Southern Tier Warsaw Pact forces, clearly indicate the growing capabilities of the Soviet Fleet and its East European allies to mount combined operations in the contiguous seas. The potential objectives of such operations have been described before but can be recapitulated here.
In northern Europe, the obvious targets are Scandinavia and the Danish Straits. The long coastline of Scandinavia invites amphibious assaults, and the powerful Soviet Northern and Baltic fleets are within easy reach of both Norway and Sweden. Despite her adherence to NATO, Norway has been under unremitting diplomatic and military pressure to quit the alliance. The defense of Scandinavia is further vitiated by the traditional neutrality of Sweden and the increase of anti-American sentiments in that country. The Royal Norwegian and Swedish fleets are small and designed specifically for coastal warfare but are no match for the mighty Soviet fleets poised north and south of Scandinavia.
The Danish Straits are a prime target for Soviet and Warsaw Pact amphibious operations. Extensive Soviet naval forces are concentrated within the Baltic. To avoid being bottled up in the Baltic as it was during two World Wars, the Soviet Fleet could be expected to strike at the Straits. It is also significant that the Soviets face relatively weak NATO forces in the Straits area, the combined Danish, Norwegian, and West German navies offering little threat to a determined assault.
In southern Europe, the traditional goal of Soviet strategists has been the seizure of the Turkish Straits. Here, the Soviets face approximately the same problem of geography that they do in the Baltic—confinement in a closed sea, the exit and entrance of which are controlled by a power whose interests have often been inimical to Russia. In recent years, Russo-Turkish relations have seen a change for the better, but the reaction of the Turks to a Soviet demand for free access through the Straits in time of war would be unpredictable. Therefore, if only on a contingency basis, one of the planning missions of the Black Sea Marines must certainly be that of serving as a spearhead for an expedition to seize the Straits. In this regard, there is also the problem of Turkey’s membership in NATO.
Potential operations against Turkey would currently be complicated by the attitude of Romania. One of the most recalcitrant of the U.S.S.R.’s East European satellites, Romania has flirted with West Germany, Israel, and China in the face of Soviet objections and strives to maintain an independent foreign policy. Relations between Romania and the U.S.S.R. reached such a low point during the Czechoslovakian aftermath that the foreign offices of the West were nearly convinced that the Soviets intended to invade Romania in a similar punitive expedition. In any move against the Turkish Straits, the Black Sea Fleet would require the use of Romanian ports as staging areas. Unwillingness on the part of Romania to provide such staging areas might make her the victim of a preliminary campaign. In this event, the assistance of neighboring Bulgaria, which has territorial claims against Romania, might prove beneficial to the Soviets.
The Mediterranean provides the Navy with a potential theater of employment for Marines. Landing craft have already been reported in the Mediterranean Squadron of the Soviet Navy; hence, the presence of Marines here may be presumed. Marines could be used in a crisis situation provoked by an Arab-Israeli outbreak of hostilities or another flare-up between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. The effectiveness of amphibious raids across the Suez Canal has been vividly demonstrated by the Israelis. Soviet Marines could be (and possibly are) employed as instructors for Egyptian amphibious forces, or, in an extreme emergency could join the Egyptians in an attack on Israel by seaborne landings.
As the Soviets continue to build up their naval presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, one might expect ultimately to see Soviet Marines and landing craft here. It should be pointed out that the potential military defences of the Trucial States, Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia are extremely weak. The British, who are now withdrawing from east of Suez were able to keep the peace in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf for a generation using slender amphibious forces made up of Royal Marine Commandos and light carriers. The U.S.S.R. is making a concerted effort to move into the Western vacuum. The establishment of Soviet naval bases in the Indian Ocean would certainly be accompanied by the deployment of Marines as police and crisis control forces.
In the Far East, the U.S.S.R. has been committed militarily and politically to support its North Vietnamese and North Korean allies. To date, the Soviet Union has limited its support to provision of military materiel and advisors. However, the Soviets are also currently engaged in attempting to draw a cordon sanitaire around Red China. The build-up of Soviet military forces in Central Asia and in the Far East underlines the worsening relations between the two Communist giants. In a future Sino-Soviet war, Russian Marines of the Pacific Fleet might be used in a number of missions against the Red Chinese. These missions could include the defense of the Vladivostok Naval Base against Chinese forces massing in Manchuria just west of the vulnerable Primorskii Krai, operations along the Amur River, or hit-and-run raids against Chinese seaports. The U.S.S.R. could also elect to seize and hold these seaports and force China to terms by cutting off the latter’s foreign trade outlets.
The visits of Soviet naval ships to Cuba on “show the flag” cruises and reports in 1970 of construction of a Soviet naval base in that country have raised in the minds of some Western journalists the possibility of Soviet Marine deployments in the Western Hemisphere. These observers point to the embarrassment and frustration of the U.S.S.R. during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when, having no conventional rapid response forces to deploy to Cuba during the crisis, the Soviets were forced to watch passively while the United States rapidly prepared amphibious forces for a Cuban invasion. Had even a token force of Soviet Marines been available in Cuba during the crisis, these commentators suggest, the outcome might have been much different.
What emerges from the sources available to the Western naval analyst studying the Soviet Marines is a picture of a small, well-equipped, and highly mobile force with a carefully nurtured esprit de corps. Since its re-establishment, the Soviet Marine Corps has shown remarkable progress in relearning the lessons of the past and in acquiring skills pertinent to the modern concepts of amphibious warfare. Because of its small size and dispersion among the several Soviet fleets, the Corps cannot be considered to be a force on a par with the U. S. Marine Corps. Moreover, except for the reported landing craft in the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron, there is no current evidence of Marine deployment outside of the contiguous seas of the U.S.S.R. and its allies.
Based upon this evidence, one might be tempted to downgrade the blue berets as some analysts have done. However, the most significant thing about them at present is their very appearance as an active peacetime force. In the past, the Marines have been primarily a wartime phenomenon in Russia. Now, for the first time, the Soviets have elected to activate their Marines in time of peace. The Marines are a professional, permanent force, and their expertise and capabilities are constantly growing.
In this regard, one should recall that the foundations of American transoceanic strategy, i.e., the ability to project military power overseas and inland from the sea, grew out of small-scale experimentation in the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps in the 1920s and 1930s. Within a generation, this overseas capability of the United States became a reality. Thus, the renascent Soviet Marine Corps may have within it the seeds of a larger Soviet naval strategy.
The Soviet Navy is well on its way toward becoming the world’s most powerful fleet. It has burst the bonds of geography and is moving out on the high seas as Peter the Great intended it should. Peter created the original Marine Corps in Russia because he realized that his infant Navy would have need of it. The modern Soviet Marine Corps is precisely the same sign of growth and necessity.
A sobering thought to consider is that, at a period in history when the U.S.S.R. has embarked on a vast naval and maritime program of development, the United States is moving to curtail and limit its own amphibious forces. History is unsparing in its treatment of the unprepared.
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During World War II, Mr. Pritchard enlisted in the U. S. Army and served in Europe as a bomb disposal squad-leader. From 1950 to 1951, was on active reserve duty in Korea, first as a IXth Corps combat correspondent and later as an 8th Army explosive ordnance disposal specialist. He received the Bronze Star Medal in 1951. He was educated at the University of California, Berkeley, where he received an A.B. in Slavic Language (highest honors) and at Georgetown University where he wrote his M.A. thesis in Russian Studies on the subject of the Soviet Marines. Since 1952, he has been a U. S. government research analyst in Washington, D.C.
[1] The term morskaia pekhota is often translated by Western analysts literally as “Naval Infantry.” The Soviets themselves, however, translate the term in their English language publications as “Marines.” Moreover, the article on Morskaia Pekhota in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia indicates clearly that the term is a generic one, referring to the Royal Marines of Great Britain and to the U. S. Marine Corps as well as to the Soviet Marines.
[2] See David R. Cox, “Seapower and Soviet Foreign Policy,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August, 1969, pp. 25-40.
[3] See C. L. Parnell, “Sever and the Baltic Bottleneck,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1969, pp. 26-36.
[4] See D. Wettern, “NATO’s Northern Flank,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1969, pp. 52-59.